CHAPTER 4

LIBERAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE NPT
INTRODUCTION

This study aims to analyze, explain and understand the complexity and depth of the NPT in world politics. This research seeks to answer the central questions on the NPT: Why did the NPT evolve into a global security regime? How did the NPT work? What is the limit and possibility of the NPT in world politics? To answer the questions, this thesis uses a pluralistic comparative theoretical approach. This chapter analyze the liberal perspectives on the NPT. First, the dynamics and evolution of the NPT is explained and examined through the lenses of three liberal theories: Institutional Liberalism, Republican Liberalism, and Cosmopolitan Liberalism. This chapter also examines the liberal promise and arguments on the roles and meanings of the NPT, focusing on its liberal progressive agendas such as the NPT's three pillars and grand bargains, NWFZ, security assurances to the NNWS, contribution to international peace and security as a whole.

THE DYNAMICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NPT

Examining the Liberal explanations

How and why was the NPT formed and developed? Why does the NPT evolve into the global security regime? How are the prospects for the NPT and international nuclear order in the 21st century? Here, we examine three major liberal approaches to the NPT: Institutional Liberalism; Republican Liberalism; and Cosmopolitan Liberalism.

Institutional liberals argue that international regimes and institutions enhance
co-operation, common interests and security, and mutual understanding among states by increasing transparency, accountability, trust and mutual understanding (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003). Furthermore, collective security ameliorate security competition and dilemma under anarchy by establishing the formal and effective international organisation and law to provide security and peace for all (Baylis, 2008).

Republican liberals contend that republican constitutionalism, a federation of free states, and cosmopolitan human rights are the basis of perpetual peace. Commercial liberals claim that individual liberty, liberal economy and interdependence enhance peaceful international relations. Contemporary liberals contend democratic peace theory: a core region of mature democracies with advanced economy is "a liberal pacific union", "a zone of peace" or "a pluralistic security community" where states are unlikely to resort to military measures and war to solve conflicts among them. Francis Fukuyama is famous for his thesis of "the end of history", arguing that after the final victory of liberal ideologies, the spread of liberal democracies and economy strengthen republican peace and international co-operation (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992).

Cosmopolitan liberalism (soft-revolutionism) emphasise oneness of humanity as a whole, universal human rights, individual liberty, freedom, and equality. For cosmopolitans, the existing sovereign-state system is not a solution but a problem which needs "structural and revolutionary change" to achieve a just, equal, and stable global order. Globalization pose challenges to broaden and strengthen our cosmopolitan identity and consciousness to transcend the increasingly problematic nation-state system to a better global cosmopolitan community (Falk, 1977, 1977, 1995; Linklater, 1999).
Most importantly, all strands of liberalism share core beliefs, values, and assumptions such as liberty, freedom, prosperity, universal human rights, change and progress in world politics toward co-operation and peace. All liberals are sceptical of realist theory. To liberals, anarchy is what states and non-states actors can change through liberal internationalism (Hoffmann, 1998; Dunne 2001; Jackson and Sorensen 2003; Doyle 1997).

**Liberal approaches to the dynamics and evolution of the NPT in world politics**

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THE INSTITUTIONAL LIBERAL EXPLANATION OF THE NPT

Nuclear proliferation threatens national, regional and international security. Civil nuclear energy is desirable for economic development.

States demand for nuclear non-proliferation to enhance security co-operation and to avoid dangerous nuclear arms race and security dilemma.
States demand for international civil nuclear co-operation. ("the shadow of the future")

The NPT regime strengthens nuclear non-proliferation through mutual understanding, confidence-building, and security co-operation. It also provides a framework for nuclear arms control and disarmament, while enhancing civil nuclear co-operation. (public goods and reciprocity)

Institutional liberalism

Liberalism has a long tradition of thinking that international peace can be achieved by legitimate and effective organizations: from a world government to the League of Nations, the United Nations, functionalism, international organization, law, and regime. Contemporary neo-liberals assume that issue-based inter-national institutions and regimes enhance common interests, mutual understanding, and co-operation among states even under anarchical international politics. Common problems demand for public goods and collective actions: from international security and stability to economy, trade, finance, transportation, resource, environment, and so on. International institutions alleviate problems concerning lack of trust between states, reduce states' fear of each other, and promote international "co-operation under anarchy" (Krasner 1983, 1989; Stein 1983, 1990; Jervis 1983; Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 160
In 1986; Ruggie 1992; Powell 1994; Martin 1999).

Keohane point out roles of international institutions below:

- Institutions provide a flow of information and opportunities to negotiate, leading to ameliorate uncertainty;
- Institutions enhance the ability of governments to monitor others’ compliance and to implement their own commitments, by increasing transparency, – hence their ability to make credible commitments in the first place; and
- Institutions strengthen prevailing expectations and stability about the solidity of international agreements. (Keohane, 1989)

The dynamics and evolution of regimes are debated. Institutional liberals have two answers to regime formation. First, “a dominant or hegemonic actor” prepares to sustain the cost of producing “a public goods”. Second, facing “the shadow of the future” over players, the principle of “reciprocity” facilitate states’ cooperation, understanding, increasing “information rich” (Little, 2008). Liberals are rather optimistic the function and maintenance of regimes even after the decline of hegemony.

**Institutional liberalism and the NPT regime**

Assuming that institutions and regimes facilitate international collaboration, institutional liberals argue that the NPT regime can alleviate mutual distrust and fears through enhancing confidence-building, mutual understanding, common interests, and trust among member-states. As the NPT regime with the IAEA safeguard gain nearly universal memberships, it becomes the cornerstone of international laws, norms and rules on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, and the peaceful uses

Why did the NPT evolve into “the most successful global security regime”? According to Muller, non-nuclear-weapon states join and support the NPT for two reasons. First, nuclear non-proliferation is collective goods in international peace and security. Second, the NPT promises equality on the foundation of the “grand bargain” (Muller 2005).

Using a term of economics and neo-liberal theory, UN Undersecretary General Dhanapala claims that the goals of global nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and international peace as a whole are “collective public goods” for all countries’ shared interests: “Global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are collective public goods. People in all countries will share the benefits of achieving these goals. ... A broadened alliance of shared interests and ideals would help substantially in advancing the full gamut of international efforts, well beyond nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament” (Dhanapala, 2001:99-106).

For institutional liberals, the NPT regime enhances co-operation and understanding among states: “The NPT should ... be seen chiefly as a confidence-building measure and IAEA safeguards as a means of fortifying that confidence.”(Fischer 1992:7). “I believe it is especially important to view the NPT as a treaty regime, one that shares many qualities with other regimes. The deeper we understand these qualities – in particular the factors that influence the behaviour of its states parties – the stronger will be our foundation for improving the overall health of
this regime” (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005:101-103).

The NPT regime strengthens international cooperation as seen nuclear coordination between the US and the USSR during the Cold War years, Nye Jr. claims: “[W]hen the sea of hostility rose again, it did not submerge this island of cooperation. In part this was because hostility did not rise to its previous Cold War levels (despite rhetorical excesses), and in part because superstructure of regimes constructed in the 1970s raised the level of cooperation and made it less submersible by a rising tide of hostility.” (Nye, 1988). The NPT regime changes international relations in more cooperative and peaceful ways.

**The NPT and its nuclear non-proliferation regime**

During the decades the NPT has become the cornerstone of the global WMD non-proliferation regime. The intrinsic worth of the NPT is enhanced even further by additional efforts that have been undertaken to thwart the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These agreements – whether in the form of treaties or resolutions, or concluded unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally – together form what is known as the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The system incorporates measures intended to make the acquisition of nuclear weapons less attractive and more difficult. (Nye 1988; Tate 1990; Fisher, 2002; Cirincione 2000; Jones and McDonough 1998; Goldblat 2002; MOFA, Japan, 2004; Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005).

The NPT regime has evolved into global, comprehensive, and complex issue-linkaged “multi-multilateral” institutions (Fukuyama). Components of the nuclear non-proliferation measures sustaining the NPT regime include various measures: (1)
Safeguards; (2) Export controls; (3) Security assurances; (4) Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs); and (5) Nuclear-test-ban and arms control treaties.

Because the NPT guarantees non-nuclear-weapon States access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the regime includes several mechanisms to ensure that this provision does not help create additional nuclear-weapon States. Towards this end, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have undertaken to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction or control. Not all countermeasures result from an agreement voluntarily reached between a supplier and a recipient, however. Export controls on equipment deemed to be sensitive and potentially destabilizing to the maintenance of international peace and security have also been established. These actions, which address concerns over the supply of material and technology used to make nuclear weapons, comprise important parts of the regime.

Just as important are measures that confront the potential demand for material and technology to make nuclear weapons. Providing for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States so that they do not feel compelled to attempt to procure nuclear weapons for their defence represents another aspect of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Both the security assurances issued by the nuclear-weapon States and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones address this question of demand. They have the potential to provide significant disincentives to procuring nuclear weapons, and thus serve to buttress efforts to curtail horizontal proliferation (Ghali, 1995: 13). Thus, it is important to recognize that the international community should deal with not only the supply side but also the demand side of nuclear proliferation.
Examining the NPT regime

Krasner defines international regimes as:

"...sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice..." (Krasner, 1983:2).

Following this definition, the NPT can be seen as a international regime of nuclear non-proliferation, which has sets of "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures".

Principles

First, principles are represented by coherent bodies of theoretical statements about how the world works. The nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty rests on following basic principles (underlying assumptions):

1. a principle which links the proliferation of nuclear weapons to a higher likelihood of nuclear war
2. a principle that acknowledges the compatibility of a multilateral nuclear non-proliferation policy with the continuation and even the spread of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
(3) a principle stating a connection between horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation [i.e. the notion that in the long run the proliferation of nuclear weapons can only be halted if the nuclear powers are ready to reduce their nuclear arsenals]

(Hansenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997; UMEMOTO, 1996, 2000).

Norms

Second, norms specify general standards of behaviour, and identify the rights and obligations of states. The norms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (treaty) regime are defined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty itself and other various agreements and initiatives. A variety of norms "serve to guide the behavior of regime members in such a way as to produce collective outcomes which are in harmony with the goals and shared convictions that are specified in the regime principles. The NPT identified main norms as below:

(1) The obligations of non-nuclear weapon states to refrain from producing or acquiring nuclear weapons.
(2) The obligations of all members not to assist non-nuclear weapon states in the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons, and
(3) The obligation of nuclear weapon states to enter into serious negotiations with the purpose of concluding nuclear disarmament treaties. (Hansenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997:9).

Rules

Third, rules operate at a lower level of generality to principles and norms, and
they are often designed to reconcile conflicts which may exist between the principles and norms. The rules of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Treaty) regime are defined in the NPT and various other agreements and documents. The NPT include Articles on the procedures for the collective review and revision of provisions of the Treaty. Other formal and informal documents, which support the NPT, include the London Suppliers’ Guidelines, the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the safeguard rules in INFCIRC/66 and /153, and the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties.(Hansenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997; Wheeler and Davis, 1996:159)

The basic provisions of the NPT define rules on nuclear non-proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and arms control and disarmament as below:

(1) Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons: Article I prohibits the transfer of weapons, directly or indirectly, from states in possession of nuclear weapons. Article II disallows receipt or manufacture of weapons by non-nuclear-weapons states.

(2) Safeguard nuclear materials and facilities: Article III seeks to assure that materials and facilities in non-nuclear-weapons states are used for peaceful purposes only via application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency. All parties agree not to transfer nuclear materials and technology to these nations without arranging safeguards. (Note: Subsequently, nuclear weapons states agreed to apply safeguards to their own non-weapons-related facilities and materials.

(3) Make benefits of peaceful nuclear energy available: Article IV assures the right of all nations to access benefits of nuclear energy. Article V specifically cites the rights of all to use peaceful nuclear explosions, under appropriate observation and
(4) *Promote disarmament:* Article VI commits all parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on measures to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve disarmament. (Bailey, 1993:5).

**Decision-Making Procedures**

Fourth, decision-making procedures identify specific prescriptions for behaviour, the system of voting, for example, which will regularly change as a regime is consolidated and extended. The decision-making procedures are defined in the NPT article and other supporting documents and agreements. The draft of the NPT was negotiated on the basis of the US and the USSR draft and finally adopted at the UN General Assembly. The NPT Review Conference is held every five years, which is defined in the article of the NPT. In 1995 NPT REC, Decision of Extension of the NPT as well as Decision of Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty were adopted in order to revitalize the function of the NPT. (Rauf, 2000, 2001; Dhanapala, 2000).

**Multilateralism and the NPT regime**

Realists underestimate the NPT and its regime assuming that it is merely the manifest of the hegemonic power(s) and their interests, thus not workable for the international community as a whole. On the contrary, institutional liberals reply that the NPT regime is "a true international effort" including both large and small states. Cirincione claims, "The regime is a true international effort. Large states and small have all played crucial roles" (Cirincione 2000). According to Dhanapala, the Treaty represent "universal membership", "global norms", "collective efforts" in "the world community".
"...I believe the regime is continuing to demonstrate its vitality in the world community today. ... The treaty is about as close to full universal membership as is possible: Its norms represent global norms. ... If positive change does not occur from the top-down – as it may yet – [from statesmen of nuclear states] then it must come from elsewhere. On the international level, a middle-out approach involving collaborative efforts among key states in diverse regions would also serve nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals... "(Dhanapala, 2000).

Multilateral efforts can be seen in a “new agenda” in nuclear arms control and disarmament. “The New Agenda Coalition” indicates the importance of a joint initiative of middle powers, Ungerer claims.

“...With the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, ... a number of NNWSs have been pushing for a ‘new agenda’ in nuclear arms control negotiations. In direct contrast to the ‘old agenda’, the ‘new agenda’ is more multilateral in focus, inclusive of non-state actors and driven not by the strategic interests of the major powers but by the more cosmopolitan interests and expectations of the leading middle powers. At its core, the advocates for a ‘new agenda’ are seeking fundamental reform in the processes and timing of nuclear disarmament. The most prominent and successful expression of the push for a ‘new agenda’ has been the New Agenda Coalition, a joint initiative of leading middle powers which first emerged in June 1998. ... As a result the NAC have now positioned themselves at the centre of contemporary arms control negotiations.
Indeed, following the successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the NAC has shown itself to be a major political player in the nuclear arms control debate...” (Ungerer 2001; 196-200).

In other words, states capable of making nuclear weapons but who have eschewed their development, such as Sweden, South Africa, and Brazil, are critical to efforts to forge a new agenda for the regime. The ‘New Agenda’ grouping has already demonstrated what can be done to produce concrete progress, as was amply illustrated in the negotiations that led to the ‘thirteen steps’ for global nuclear disarmament agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. More evidence of middle power initiatives in the NPT and international non-proliferation efforts include:

- Ireland introduced the United Nations resolution in 1961 that began the negotiations for an international treaty for nuclear non-proliferation.
- The NAM states like India, Egypt, Mexico, Indonesia, .... played a significant role to draft the five principles in making an international non-proliferation treaty in 1965.
- The Netherlands’ role in the early 1990’s revival of the NSG,
- South Africa and Canada played a key role in the 1995 NPT REC.
- Australia was instrumental in securing the successful negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
- Australia’s role in the creation of the Australiasian Group,

(Dunn, 1998; Cirincione, 2000; Dhanapala, 2001:99-106)
Institutional liberalism and the prospects for the NPT

Although institutional liberal assume the importance of a hegemon to create a regime, the existence of a hegemony is not necessary to develop or maintain regimes. Little claim that, "[f]or liberal institutionalists, power may be used by hegemon to pressure other states to collaborate and conform to a regime. But it is also acknowledged that states can establish and maintain regimes in the absence of hegemonic power. Collaborative strategies are pursued and maintained because of the 'shadow of the future' -- a mutual recognition that if any state defects from a regime, it will result in mass defection on 'tit for tat' basis and states moving from an optimum to a suboptimum outcome. ... the major mechanism for establishing and maintaining a regime is not the existence of a hegemon, but the principle of reciprocity " (Little,2001: 310-313). Inspection, surveillance, and compliance, and scientific knowledge become important to ensure trust among states within the regime. In case of nuclear weapons, states demand for nuclear non-proliferation because further nuclear proliferation will seriously harm international, regional, and national security. As long as a majority of states prefer non-proliferation to further proliferation, the demand for nuclear non-proliferation keep the NPT maintained and developed (Umemoto, 2000).

Critical assessments

Whereas institutional liberals correctly point out the positive role of international institutions in contemporary world politics, critics counter-argue that liberals overestimate the significance of the NPT regime. First, international security regimes are likely to fail to overcome the problem of conflicting national and security interests which lead to mistrust, cheating, and security dilemma in international security...
under anarchy. (Jervis, 1983, 1999; Mearsheimer, 1994-95) The NPT regime can neither stop nor reverse the hardest cases of nuclear proliferation. See the case of Israel, Iraq and possibly Iran in the Middle East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, North Korea in East Asia and South Africa in the 1980s. Second, at best, international institutions or regimes serve the specific interests of the hegemonic/great power(s), not the common interests in the international society as a whole (Carr, 1939; Strange 1983). The NPT is a tool of satisfied great powers. It is not public goods of international community, but private goods of hegemonic/great power(s). The NPT regime can work, at best, only for nuclear non-proliferation, which serves the national interests of the hegemonic power(s) (Rajagopalan, 1999, 2005). Third, international institutions are likely to demise together with the decline of hegemony (Gilpin, 1981). For neo-realists, the biggest weak point of the NPT is its lack of flexibility to deal with the change and shift of power balance and structure in international politics (Paul, 1998).

THE REPUBLICAN LIBERAL EXPLANATION OF THE NPT

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<th>Liberal democracies, non-proliferation, and the NPT</th>
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<td>Liberal democracies share common values, norms and institutions such as human rights, individual liberty and freedom, and economic interdependence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal democracies within pluralistic security communities prefer to solve international disputes peacefully and not to resort to war and military measures against each other.</td>
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<td>Liberal democracies within “a zone of peace” are likely to support and observe</td>
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the norms and rules of nuclear non-proliferation and the NPT.

**Non-democratic authoritarian regimes, proliferation, and the NPT**

Non-democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian regime leaders do not share liberal values, norms, institutions and human rights.

→

Non-democratic regimes on the periphery are more likely to resort to military measures and war.

→

Non-democratic regime leaders on the periphery of "a zone of peace" are more likely to break the norms and rules of nuclear non-proliferation and the NPT.

**Republican democratic peace, and security community**

Democratic peace thesis is originated from Immanuel Kant’s liberal thesis of "republican peace" (Gallie, 1978). Contemporary liberal internationalists develop the thesis of liberal democratic peace. Liberal democracies do not go to war against each other due to their common moral values and economic interdependence (Fukuyama 1989; Russet 1989; 1993; 1995). Democratic peace thesis is based on three conditions:

- Democratic norms of peaceful resolution of conflict;
- Peaceful relations among democratic states, based on a common moral foundation like liberty and human rights (what Kant called a "pacific union");
- Economic cooperation among democracies and interdependence. (What Kant called "the spirit of commerce".

(Doyle 1982; 1995, 1999.)
According to Ikenberry, "[d]emocracies re better to create binding institutions and establish credible restraints and commitments than nondemocracies". Several characteristics of democracies allow to "more readily make [institutional] arrangements that reduce risks of domination and abandonment" (2001:75-76).

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<th>Characteristic</th>
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<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Reduce surprises</td>
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<td>Generate higher confidence information</td>
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<td>Decentralized policy process</td>
<td>Policy viscosity</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Open and decentralized system</td>
<td>Access and voice opportunities</td>
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<td>Transnational and transgovernmental connecting points</td>
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(Source: Ikenberry, 2001: 76)

Another source of democratic peace is commercial liberalism originated from Cobden, Smith, and Schumpeter. Economic interdependence and globalization make international relations more peaceful. Trade and commerce enhance regional integration, economic interdependence and globalization. States seek mutual gains and economic welfare rather than relative gains, military power and security, thus international relations become more cooperative, stable and peaceful through commerce, trade and economic interdependence (Mitrany, 1966; Haas 1958, 1976; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Doyle, 1997). States within a core region consist of “pluralistic security communities” or “a liberal zone of peace.” Advanced liberal economies are unlikely to fight against each other (Deutsch, 1957; Mueller, 1990).
Republican liberalism and the NPT

Why did the NPT evolve into a global security regime? Firstly, liberal democracies support the NPT and pose little risks of strategic weapons proliferation. Straus points out the Western leadership in non-proliferation and global security:

"...General acceptance of Western global leadership is a condition for the success of non-proliferation. ... Fortunately, the leadership role of the NATO/OECD/G-7 countries is more widely accepted than it may seem at first sight. They have long been the leaders in global modernization and in providing the public goods of global security..." (Straus, 2004).

On the one hand, advanced liberal democracies like the US and its Western allies within "a liberal pacific union" support the NPT-based non-proliferation efforts. On the other hand, nuclear proliferation challenges come from non-democratic developing countries such as North Korea, Pakistan, Libya, Iran, and Iraq within "zones of conflict or turmoil". "Proliferation is unlikely within this [pluralistic security] community because the component states by definition do not regard each other's military threats. The absence of threat derives from shared democratic values and a history of institutionalized cooperation." (Chafetz, 1993) For republican liberals, non-democratic regime leaders do not always observe the norms and rules of non-proliferation and the NPT and illiberal regimes pose higher risks of nuclear proliferation. Challenges to a liberal pacific union lies on the periphery: zones of conflict and turmoil. (Singer and Wildavsky 1993; Holsti, 1999; Mandelbaum, 2002). Proliferation is unlikely within the "core" area of liberal security community, but highly likely on the "periphery". On the one hand, liberal democracies with advanced
economies are peace-loving. These liberal democracies and economies support non-proliferation. On the other hand, anti-democratic regimes with undeveloped economies are not always peace-loving. These authoritarian regimes with poor economies can harm and violate non-proliferation efforts. According to Glenn Chafetz,

"...proliferation is unlikely within this (pluralistic security) community because the component states by definition do not regard each other as military threats. The absence of threat derives from shared democratic values and a history of institutionalized cooperation. ... Because of the common values and shared identification within the entire core (of a pluralistic security community), the nonnuclear-weapons states which belong to that community do not perceive from other members threats strong enough to induce them to acquire nuclear weapons. Shared democratic values and the experience of the cold war forged a pattern of cooperation within the core that is stronger and more durable than a temporary alliance in response to a common threat, in short, a pluralistic security community. ... Within the core, further proliferation will occur only if democracy in one or more of the core countries succumbs to an internal challenge. This is very unlikely..."

"...The states on the periphery have either little or no experience with liberal democracy and thus have not yet established among themselves the norms of peaceful cooperation which govern relations among the states of the core. In this subsystem, the states possess sufficient amounts of fear and ambition – the root causes of any arms program – to make further nuclear proliferation likely. ... The threat of proliferation remains high, however, in an arc running from North Korea through the Middle East. In these areas, ideological, historical, and nationalist incentives for conflict abound..."(Chafetz:127-158).
The cases of liberal democracy and advanced economies

• The US republican initiatives

Republican Presidents, from Eisenhower to Kennedy to Regan, played the important role in creating and nurturing the non-proliferation regime, Cirincione argues:

"...Under Eisenhower initiative of “Atoms for Peace” programme, the IAEA (international Atomic Energy Agency) was created in 1957, and it aimed to implement a system of audits and on-site inspections, collectively known as “safeguards,” to verify that nuclear facilities and materials are not being diverted for nuclear explosive purposes. President Kennedy proposed a “Program for General and Complete Disarmament” to the UN on September 25, 1961. Kennedy’s ambitious proposal included all the elements that negotiators still pursue today: a comprehensive nuclear test ban; a ban on the production of fissile materials for use in weapons (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); the placement of all weapons materials under international safeguards; a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons, their materials, or their technology; and deep reductions in existing nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, with the goal of eventually eliminating them. Kennedy was able only to complete the Limited Test Ban Treaty in his short tenure. President Lyndon Johnson successfully finished negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. President Nixon signed the treaty to bring it into force in 1970. President Nixon successfully established in the early 1970s the Non-Proliferation Treaty Exporters Committee (known as the Zangger Committee, so named after its Swiss chairman) to control the export of nuclear weapons-related materials and equipment. The Zangger Committee adopted a set of guidelines including the “trigger list”, and which was
updated in subsequent years. President Ronald Regan began the first effort to control the spread of ballistic missile technology – the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) – in 1987…” (Cirincione, 2000).

- Liberal democracies of the US allies

Some western liberal democracies, such as France, Italy, Spain and Germany, did not support the nonproliferation regime when it was first proposed in the 1950-60s. However, they are now among its most fervent supporters. As these liberal democracies in Western Europe began to identify their collective security, their attitudes and interests in non-proliferation have changed. In spite of their abilities to go nuclear, Japan and Germany have positively denied any plan to acquire nuclear weapons. The Japanese also turned their reluctant attitude toward non-proliferation regime to ardent promoter of non-proliferation and disarmament as the US-Japan security treaty developed their sense of liberal security community. Japan maintain their status as a non-nuclear-weapon state and continue their progressive agenda for nuclear arms control and disarmament in spite of emerging threats from North Korea and China. (The Tokyo Forum, 1999). Germany also explicitly affirms their non-nuclear-weapon status. (Chafetz 1993:138).

All of European advanced nations came to have more deep commitment to the NPT by the beginning of 1990s according to Fischer: “Since 1987 all of Europe has committed itself more deeply to the Treaty. There is little need to underline the importance of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime to the industrialized democracies of Western Europe or to Canada and Australia. All are now staunch supporters of both the Treaty and the regime. Japan is playing a more active role in
promoting non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament to support the NPT regime.” (Fischer, 1993: 43-47). By the beginning of 1990s, “almost all the industrialized non-nuclear-weapon states ... saw it as a powerful force, directly serving their security interests. ... The role of this group of [industrialized] nations has become especially important in view of the decline in the power of Washington and Moscow to influence the civilian nuclear policies of nations.” (Fischer 1993: 232). Strong supporters of the NPT and nonproliferation among industrialized countries include:

- Western and Northern Europe: Britain, France, Germany (Big-3), Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Sweden
- East Asia and Pacific: Japan, Canada, and Australia

**The cases of non-democratic states**

- Iraq before the 1991 Gulf War

  The case of Iraq before the Gulf War in 1991 supports a liberal democratic thesis. Iraq’s Saddam Hussein regime had long pursued WMD as a means of achieving Iraqi political and military preeminence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The regime used chemical weapons not only against Iran but against its own people. Hussein regime used ballistic missile for tactical, strategic, and psychological purposes. After the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the IAEA inspectors discovered that Iraq had developed undeclared nuclear weapon programme. Iraq was a member of the NPT then, but Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime violated its NPT obligations and developed secret nuclear weapons programme nearly to the level to manufacture its first atomic weapons. (Jones and McDonough 1998) The Bush administration embarked on the highly controversial 2003 War against Iraq, claiming Husseins’ opaque nuclear-weapon
programme, although no evidence has been found before or after the Iraq war in 2003.

• Iranian nuclear issues

The case of Iran also supports liberal internationalists’ theses. Though Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1970, it is believed to have pursued a secret nuclear weapons program since the mid-1980s. Iran has been the revolutionary Islamic regime under Ayatollah Khomeini that came to power in 1979. Iran’s efforts to get nuclear weapons go hand in hand with Iran’s promotion of Islamic fundamentalism through violence and subversion. The Clinton Administration has branded Iran a “backlash state” because of its sponsorship of terrorism and assassination, subversion of the Middle East peace process, campaign to intimidate smaller countries in the Gulf region, and its human rights abuses. (Jones and McDonough 1998: 169-186). The agenda of Iranian nuclear programme has become one of the difficult international issues during the Bush administration involving the US, the EU big-three (Britain, France, Germany), the UNSC, the UN, and the IAEA.

• The North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation

Though North Korea had been a party to the NPT since 1985, it is believed that this totalitarian regime pursued an active nuclear weapons program in violation of the Treaty. North Korea remains one of the few communist regimes after the Cold War in spite of serious economic crises. Pyongyang blocked International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and threatened to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, forcing an unprecedented regime crisis. North Korea posed serious threats in East Asian security especially to Japan by their missile tests which flew over Japan. Though the nuclear crisis in 1993 was once solved by the 1993 Agreement Framework between the

- The US approach versus the USSR approach

The US non-proliferation policy is based on liberalism assuming a positive sum game in general and absolute gains, whereas the USSR policy is based on “mercantile” approach assuming a zero sum game, the balance of power, and relative gains, Mandelbaum argues.

“...The Soviet Union seems to have taken a more “mercantile” view of international politics in general and nuclear issues in particular. One nation’s gain, the Soviets appear to have believed, is necessarily another’s loss. This view is summed up by a phrase that Lenin considered the key to understanding all politics, “kto kovo” – “Who is going to do what to whom?” – which denotes the assumption that in any political transaction one party is the perpetrator and the other party is the victim.

So although the United States and the Soviet Union committed themselves to the same things in the accords that were signed between 1963 and 1976, they may well have had different motives for agreement. The Nonproliferation Treaty, for example, was attractive to the United States because the spread of nuclear weapons
anywhere, under any circumstances, seemed undesirable. Nonproliferation was for Americans a kind of international public good. The Soviets, by contrast, may have been moved not by a commitment to the general principle of nonproliferation but by a commitment to the general principle of nonproliferation by the fear that the states likeliest to acquire nuclear weapons would promptly train them on the Soviet Union.”(Mandelbaum 1979: 191-223).

“The differences between the American and Soviet political systems have not ... been entirely irrelevant to their approaches to nuclear weapons. In the American approach there have been traces of an attitude, basic to neoclassical economic thought, that international arrangements that advance the interests of all states are possible. This attitude is rooted in the liberal conviction that a natural harmony of interests among nations exists, a conviction that remained influential even after the abandonment of the liberal approach to nuclear diplomacy.”(Mandelbaum, 1979: 210)

- Chinese nuclear assistance to proliferation

China’s nuclear and arms trade practice did not conform to international non-proliferation regime standards, and major efforts were required to persuade China to bring its nuclear trade practices into closer alignment with the policies. China has posed formidable challenges to the international non-proliferation regime. China disregarded international norms during the 1980s by selling nuclear materials to countries such as South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Argentina, without requiring that the items be placed under IAEA safeguards. China’s nuclear and missile exports to two particular countries, Pakistan and Iran, have been the leading causes of concern. China
has posed a further challenge through the lack of transparency in its domestic nuclear safeguards and security measures; presumably these exist in some form to protect its nuclear arsenal and stockpile of fissile material from unauthorized use or theft. The political instability and social upheaval of a major crisis, like the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown on the student-led democracy movement, has been a major concern that the political struggle could give rise to internal political disorder or even to state disintegration leading to collapse of these internal measures for non-proliferation. (Jones and McDonough 1998:49-67).

• Pakistani nuclear proliferation

The case of Pakistan support the thesis that authoritarian regime do not obey the international norms of non-proliferation. Pakistan has a long history of making a nuclear bomb. Pakitani leaders in history have been determined to hold nuclear options to match with her bigger and stronger neighbour of India. Western observers are worried about Pakistani nuclear weapons because their nuclear weapons are regarded as “Islamic bombs.” The news of a Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’ international nuclear black market gave impressions to the world that Pakistan was a irresponsible prolifelaters or a nuclear rogue state.

• South African nuclear weapons

South Africa has a history of making nuclear bombs for security when her infamous “apartheid” regime was surrounded by their hostile neighbours of “black” countries. South Africa did not accept the NPT during the time it was ruled under an authoritarian regime to maintain her discriminative apartheid. South African apartheid regime is supposed to have had as much as 8 nuclear bombs in the 1980s.
The cases of regime change and democratization

• The case of Argentina after democratization

Argentina has "remarkable non-proliferation progress" since 1983, when she ended the development of its military-nuclear program. Argentina's nuclear program started by 1953, and after a military junta claimed power in a 1976 coup, efforts were increased to achieve greater nuclear self-sufficiency and progress toward nuclear arms. However, "a major shift" occurred in Argentine nuclear policy following the defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas war with the United Kingdom and the inauguration of President Raul Alfonsin in December 1983. The country's nuclear program, which had been directed by the Navy, was placed under civilian control, and the new government introduced legislation to legally prohibit development of nuclear weapons. Nuclear confidence-building measures with Brazil were agreed to in November 1985. The most important landmarks of Argentine "great strides toward becoming a cooperative member of the non-proliferation regime" occurred in early 1994, when Argentina joined both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and on February 10, 1995, when it became a party to the NPT. (Jones and McDonough 1998:223-230).

• The case of Brazil after liberalization

Brazil has made "great strides toward becoming a responsible member of the non-proliferation regime" since renouncing its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 1990. In the 1990s, Brazil has also transformed itself from a cash-strapped nation ruled by an authoritarian regime to a country with a strong market economy, democratically elected leadership, and good long term prospects for further development. "A significant milestone" on this non-proliferation path came on May 30, 1994, when
Brazil brought into force the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), therefore assuming non-proliferation obligations while accepting IAEA inspection of all its nuclear activities. (Jones and McDonough 1998:231-239).

- The case of South Africa after democratic revolution

The case of South Africa supports this thesis of liberal internationalism. South Africa is the first nation to have developed and possessed nuclear weapons and then renounced them. South Africa is believed to have started nuclear efforts in the late 1960s, and in 1974 the government secretly decided to develop nuclear weapons. The election of F.W. de Klerk as South Africa's president in September 1989 marked the end of the nuclear weapons program. In 1993, President F. W. de Klerk declared that she had produced six nuclear devices up until 1989 and then dismantled them prior to signing the NPT. In a historic reform of South Africa's politics, de Klerk ended the country's decades-long policy of racial separation (apartheid) and brought an end to white minority rule. South Africa's accession to the NPT and its constructive participation in the 1995 NPT Extension Conference show it to be "a champion" or "a leader among the non-nuclear-weapon states". During the May 1995 NPT Extension Conference, South Africa strongly supported indefinite extension among the members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and also favored a strengthened review process and a statement of principles to accompany an indefinite extension. Both proposals were unanimously accepted by the conference. The change of political system from authoritarian regime to democratic regime was an important why South Africa went nuclear and then renounced it to support the NPT regime. (Jones and McDonough 1998:243-250; Albright 1998:80-87). South Africa has been actively committed to
nuclear disarmament movement including the New Agenda Coalition (NAC).

- The case of Russia after communism

  Democratized Russia after the collapse of communism regime emerged as an ardent supporter of the NPT regime. Arguably, “no country’s full participation in the global non-proliferation regime is more important than Russia”. Russia has been an effective partner in the peaceful de-nuclearization of the other Soviet-successor states and has continued to play a leadership role in developing the nuclear non-proliferation regime – as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as a key supporter of the permanent extension of the NPT in 1995, and in voluntary cessation of nuclear weapons testing and strong support for the CTBT. Russia after the breakup of the former Soviet Union, enabled the implementation of Start I, signed and ratified Start II. Russia has worked closely with U.S. counterparts in developing post-Soviet controls over nuclear facilities, materials and the nuclear weapons infrastructure. Russia has joined the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement and ratified the CWC. (Jones and McDonough 1998:25-48).

- The case of Kazakhstan after communism

  Kazakhstan was one of four Soviet-successor states with both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons deployed on their territories at independence when the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991. “...Kazakhstan has since been a model state both for cooperating in the removal of nuclear arms from its territory and for fully embracing international nuclear non-proliferation norms...” (Jones and McDonough 1998:71-100).
These evidences suggest that regime change or democratisation from authoritarian regime to liberal democracies is likely to reverse nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear non-proliferation.

*Republican liberalism and the prospects for the NPT*

Republican liberals claim the case for expanding liberal democracies and economies as a basis of international peace and prosperity (Fukuyama 1989, 1992; Michael Doyle, 1999; Michael Mandelbaum, 2002). For republican liberals, more liberal democracies, more peace and stability. Sokoski claim the case for republican peace as the best strategy for non-proliferation and peace: “…The expansion of these ‘zones of peace’ over those of ‘turmoil,’ then, is a trend that could obviate current concerns about strategic weapons proliferation. A world of Canadas is a world not at war. … the progressive trend towards global democratization is a powerful engine for peace and suggests a new order of battle for nonproliferation. The challenge facing nonproliferation policy makers today, is, at a minimum, to contain the proliferation threats in the zones of turmoil. Indeed, focusing on this nonproliferation objective may be the surest way to get existing weapons states to reduce or eliminate their strategic weapons arsenals…” (Sokolski 2001: 110-111).

*Critical assessments: The problem of the republican liberal approach to the NPT*

Although republican liberals correctly point out the peaceful relationship among advanced industrialised democracies (security communities), critics are sceptical of liberal democratic peace theory. For a realist like Mearsheimer, “Lamentably, it is not possible for even liberal democracies to transcend anarchy” (Mearsheimer, :123) According to Jackson and Sorensen, neo-realist counter-argue that: (1) The states,
especially great powers, act on the basis of their own decision and self-interests even cooperation through institutions; (2) there is the possibility that a liberal democracies will revert to authoritarian or non-democratic regime; (3) today’s friend might turn out to be tomorrow’s enemy, even among democracies (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003:126-127. For critiques, see Layne, 2000).

Regarding the democratic peace approach to the NPT, we can point out several flaws and problems. First, democracies, or states in general, are not consistent in non-proliferation policy. For example, the United States non-proliferation policy has never been fair as the case of Israeli nuclear weapons, the Pakistani nuclear programme during the Cold War, and the US-India nuclear deal.

Second, all of advanced industrialised democracies (G-7) enjoy nuclear deterrence. Most of advanced economic states of G-7(8) are either nuclear-weapon states or the US allies such as NATO or the US-Japan Security Treaty. The US, Britain, and France are the official NWS. Many of the US allies signed the NPT as they can rely on the US extended nuclear deterrence. Besides, Japan is believed to re-think nuclear options seriously if it face serious nuclear threats from North Korea or China without the reliable assurance of the Japan-US security treaty. Taiwan, though fully democratic today, is believed to re-think their nuclear weapons options if it faces Chinese threats without the credible US commitment. Strong disarmament advocates like Sweden, Ireland or Canada of middle/small powers enjoy their calm and peaceful security environment without any serious security threats.

Third, many of the NPT member states are not democratic, but even
non-democratic authoritarian regimes still observe the norm of the NPT. Leading NAM countries such as Mexico and Egypt play active roles at the NPT Review Conference, and these NAM states observe the major articles of the NPT till today. In the realist’ eyes, liberal republican theories miss the salience of national security perspectives to explain the evolution of the NPT and non-proliferation issues. For critics, the liberal argument of “peace-loving democracies are the strong supporter of the NPT” are superficial at best, seriously hypocritical and flawed at worst.

THE COSMOPOLITAN LIBERAL CRITIQUE OF THE NPT

Cosmopolitan liberalism

Cosmopolitanism shares core values and assumption that universal human rights and oneness of common humanity and that emerging cosmopolitan identity and awareness make our common planet safer and better for individual and humanity. Herbermas maintains, “Even if we still have a long way to go before fully achieving it, the cosmopolitan condition is no longer merely a mirage. State citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum whose contours, at least, are already becoming visible”.(quoted in Linklater 2001:628) According to Beitz, cosmopolitans regard international politics not just as a society of states, but as a society of individuals, the interdependence of the global society in terms of distributive justice. National boundaries and inter-state system have “no moral standing” as “they simply defend an inequality that should be abolished if we think in terms of global justice” (Beitz 1979, Nye 2007: 27). Falk critiques the existing state-system, “Separate state sovereignties are not oriented toward the protection of long-run human or overall planetary interests”
(Falk 1977: 92). Furthermore, cosmopolitanism is strengthened by globalization, Linklater argues. "Globalization may seem to create new opportunities for promoting the cosmopolitan idea that all human beings are equal. The greater interconnectedness of human beings has increase popular awareness of common threats ... which affect all human beings. How political community and individuals should respond to the problems of global interconnectedness is one of the great moral challenges of the age." (Linklater, 2008:555) Actually, Singer claim, "now, we are beginning to live in a global community. ... we should be developing the ethical foundations of the coming era of a single world community. ... The twentieth century's conquest of space made it possible for a human being to look at our planet from a point not on it, and so to see it, literally, as one world. Now the twenty-first century faces the task of developing a suitable form of government for that single world." (Singer, 2004).

Cosmopolitan liberals are critical of the existing states system:

1. That the states system can no longer provide, if it ever did provide, peace and security – or, more generally, minimum world order. This is the classic argument against 'the international anarchy' now reinforced by the special dangers of nuclear war.

2. That the states system, even though it might prove compatible with the continuation of minimum of peace and security, cannot provide for the more ambitious goal of economic and social justice, among the nations of the world and within them, for which a politically awakened world is now in search.

3. That the states system is an obstacle to the attainment of man's ecological objective of living in harmony with his environment: that the connected issues of population control, food production and distribution, resource management and
conservation can be effectively advanced only through global approach and a sense of human solidarity that are vitiated by the division of mankind into states (Bull, 1977:283).

*Cosmopolitan liberalism and the NPT*

Cosmopolitans are strong disarmament advocates and critical of the discriminative NPT based on the existing states system. According to Falk, there are two reasons why “the viability of an inherently discriminatory global structure is questionable.” Firstly, discrimination can not be justified. “On pragmatic grounds, it is unlikely to work. ... Second, governmental leaders seek narrow state interests and security. ... On principles ground, the morality of the state system is built around the primacy of state interests as conceived by governmental leaders.” Thus, Falk critiques, “in fact, ... the nuclear powers seemed to take even these modest steps to diminish the *discriminatory* character of the NPT system. At most, in other words, mainstream policy analysis discusses moderating discrimination against nonnuclear weapons states. It rarely acknowledges the dubious validity of a world order system based on the inherent discrimination that flows from the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear states...”

Furthermore civil society and peoples’ movement can enhance not only non-proliferation but also disarmament. “The bottom-up approach stresses the important role of civil society in providing both the inspiration and the political support for national leadership to achieve responsible disarmament policies. A greater role is required from civil society, because the people themselves are the ultimate beneficiaries of nonproliferation and disarmament policies.” (Dhanapala, 2001:99-106).
Cosmopolitan liberalism and the prospects for the NPT

Based on these critical analyses, Falk suggests "...the necessity of structural change" to connect non-proliferation, de-nuclearization, and "nuclear policy with the wider search for stability and equity in the world". Thus, "a major conclusion of a world order analysis is that the goal of non-proliferation should be integrated into a credible program of overall de-nuclearization. ... [And,] de-nuclearization is the only way to overcome the inherent discrimination of the present world system ... beneficial both if understood as reform for the state system or as transformation. ... Given successful de-nuclearization, the perception and reality of inherent discrimination would rapidly disappear, along with the incentives and legitimacy now associated with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. ... the process of getting the nuclear genie back in the bottle must be associated with and sustained by a social movement organized around the interrelated pursuit of peace, economic well-being, social and political justice, and ecological balance held together by an emergent sense of human community and planetary identity..." (Falk, 1977: 84-89).

Critical assessments: The problem of the cosmopolitan approach to the NPT

Cosmopolitans' analysis and advice seem to be "utopians" as Carr famously noted. Falk's visionary project claims the desirability of overall structural changes, but lack of concrete steps and measures to overcome the present problems to reach his future utopia of peaceful, disarmed, wealthy, and equal world order. "The advocate of a scheme for an international police or for 'collective security', or of some other project for an international order, generally replied to the critic not by an argument designed to shew how and why he thought his plan will work, but either by a statement that it must
be made to work because the consequence of its failure to work would be so disastrous, or by a demand for some alternative nostrum” (Carr, 1939). Suppose, Falk recommend the desirable policies such as a CTBT, a comprehensive no-first-use pledge, “to bolster a global sense of mutual security during the period when international security itself is being detached from the war system” toward disarmament. But it is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Second, cosmopolitans tend to downplay “the inherent dilemma” and “the trade-offs between order and justice” (Bull, 1959, 1961, 1966, 1976, 1977; Nye, 2007: 27-28; Walker, 2004, 2007a). Radical overall changes in international system, like disarmament, would be most likely to run the unpredictable risks of enormous disorder to the world no less than the French Revolution in the late 18th century to Europe. Falk point out the desirability of “drastic global reform” without considering the possibilities of risks and chaos. “It is difficult to depict the precise character of the shift, but it would almost certainly have to involve societal commitment to the pursuit of drastic global reform … In fact my world order preferences are based on the possibilities of political and economic decentralization and functional centralization” (Falk, 1977: 88). Thus, for critics, cosmopolitanism is too utopian, even dangerous and irresponsible to the complex difficulties in world politics where states play major roles both positively and negatively.

THE ROLES AND MEANINGS OF THE NPT:

Examining the Liberal arguments

The liberal promise of the NPT roles and meanings

- “The NPT is a grand enlightenment prospect”
- “The NPT contribute to international peace and security as a whole” (Preamble)
The liberal promise of the NPT in history: "a grand enlightenment prospect"

Liberalism is a prevailing modern ideology, believing universal human rights, liberty, liberal democracy and economy, and progress in history (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992; Mandelbaum, 2002). Assuming this liberal world-view, Walkers argues that the NPT can be seen as hallmarks of "a grand enlightenment prospect". In essence, the NPT aims to create an international nuclear order assuming rationality, reason, justice, international law and organizations, and progress in control of nuclear energy and technology, Walker contend. "Nuclear weapons were an unintended consequence of the scientific enlightenment. As if in recompense, ... the attempt in the second half of the twentieth century to create an international order which would limit their dangers, while exploiting in controlled ways their capabilities to discourage war, itself came to possess hallmarks of a grand enlightenment prospect. It was permeated by assumptions of – and expressions of faith in – a ubiquitous rationality and commitment to reason; the attainability of justice in the face of obvious inequalities of power and opportunity; the possibility of achieving trust among states on the basis of international law; the ability of organizations to exercise control over complex technological activities; and the feasibility of progress in escaping a nuclear-armed chaos and realizing nuclear energy's economic potential" (Walker 2007a: 431-453). Reflecting success of the NPT, Keeny
called the NPT history as “a global success story”. He argued, “the most important and inclusive arms control treaty ever undertaken ... that has proved far more successful than even its most optimistic architects dared hope” (Keeny, Jr., 1995. See also Dhanapala, 1995, 2001, 2005). For liberals, the NPT is supposed to contribute to the liberal agendas like universal human rights, international peace and security, and general and complete disarmament, which are promised in the UN Charter.

The liberal promise that “the NPT contributes to international peace and security as a whole” (Preamble)

For liberals, the NPT contributes to international peace and security as a whole as Preamble of the NPT reaffirms the spirit of the UN Charter. Today the NPT is more than three decades old and the most adhered treaty of nearly all membership of the United Nations. The Treaty provides the basis of international and regional security, arms control and disarmament negotiations, above all international peace and stability as a whole. UN Undersecretary General Dhanapala argues that international peace and security depend on “the future of the NPT”:

“...By any measure, the NPT has contributed much to international peace and security. ... At stake here is not just the future of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and its fundamental norm of global nuclear disarmament, but potentially the future of international peace and security, and with it, the future of the world itself. ... The more one considers the potential gains from meeting this challenge [to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime], and the tragic consequences of failing to meet it, the more apparent it becomes how much international peace and security depends upon the future

UN Secretary-General Annan claims the indispensability of the NPT to safeguarding international peace and security:

“...The existence of multilateral instruments to promote disarmament and prevent proliferation among States has been central to the maintenance of international peace and security ever since those instruments were agreed. But they are now in danger of erosion. They must be revitalized to ensure continued progress on disarmament and to address the growing risk of a cascade of proliferation, especially in the nuclear field. ... The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 35 year old this month, has proved indispensable: it has not only diminished nuclear peril but has also demonstrated the value of multilateral agreements in safeguarding international peace and security’…” (Annan, 2005: 33-37).

**The liberal promise of the NPT’ three pillars: (1) nuclear non-proliferation, (2) nuclear arms control and disarmament, and (3) the peaceful uses of nuclear energy**

Liberals emphasise the NPT’ “three pillars”. According a UN view,

“...The Treaty’s architecture was constructed on the three pillars of [1] nuclear non-proliferation [Article I,II,III], [2] nuclear arms control and disarmament [Article VI, Preamble] and [3] the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy [Article IV, Preamble]. During its negotiations, as well as over the years since then, there has been much discussion among the States party to the
Treaty of the relative importance of each these pillars, but especially of the balance between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations...” (UN, 2005).

First, the Treaty set the obligation of nuclear non-proliferation. The NPT prohibits nuclear weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons (Article I), and prohibits non-nuclear weapon states from receiving and manufacturing nuclear weapons (Article II). The treaty obliges non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards (Article III).

Second, the Treaty assures the rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The NPT aims to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from diverting nuclear materials and equipment to military purposes by obliging those states to accept the IAEA safeguards. On the other hand, the treaty stipulates the “inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty” to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Article IV-1). It acknowledges that all the Parties to the treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article VI-2).

Third, the Treaty assigns the obligation of negotiations on nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states. The NPT obligates the state parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament (Article VI), while preventing non-nuclear weapon states from diverting nuclear energy for military ends (MOFA, Japan, 2004:78-80).
Furthermore, liberals claim that the legitimacy and efficacy of the NPT depends on the balanced pursuit of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Preez claims that the implementation as a whole is crucial for vitality and effectiveness: “The NPT’s continued vitality and effectiveness as an instrument to achieve the international community’s common goals and as a building block for maintaining international peace and security is dependent on the implementation of the treaty as a whole” (Preez, 2005). Voices to demand for the five NWS’ disarmament progress gain wider support and strength especially after the Cold War. Dhanapala insists the importance of the 1995 Principles and Objectives to the NPT regime: “I therefore believe Thomas Graham got it exactly right when he wrote after this event [of the 1995 NPT REC], ‘it is important to understand that a failure to meet the obligations of the Statement of Principles and Objectives – especially reductions in nuclear weapons – will endanger the permanent status of the NPT or even the NPT regime itself’” (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005: 58). UN Secretary-General Annan emphasises that “Progress in both disarmament and non-proliferation is essential and neither should be held hostage to the other” (Annan, 2005: 37). These debates on the NPT’s three pillars have been always contested, but the intensity has been increasingly contested and problematic today. We shall examine each pillar and promise as follow.

The traditional NPT approach is expressed in UN Secretary General Annan’s statement and The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC)

“...When multilateral forums falter, leaders must lead. ... To revitalize the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, action will be required on many fronts.” (1)
to strengthen verification and increase confidence in the regime (2) to reconcile the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the imperative of nonproliferation (3) to move beyond rhetoric in addressing the question of disarmament...Prompt negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty for all countries is indispensable. All-countries also should affirm their commitment to a moratorium on testing, and to early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. And I hope leaders will think seriously about what more can be done to reduce – irreversibly – the number and role of nuclear weapons in the world.” (Annan).

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) recommendations

- All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty need to revert to the fundamental and balanced non-proliferation and disarmament commitments that were made under the treaty and confirmed in 1995 when the treaty was extended indefinitely.
- All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should implement the decision on principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process, and the resolution on the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, all adopted in 1995. They should also promote the implementation of the ‘thirteen practical steps’ for nuclear disarmament that were adopted in 2000.
- To enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, all Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon states parties should accept comprehensive safeguards as strengthened by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Additional Protocol. (Independent Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction chaired by Hans Blix, 2006)
(1) The liberal promise of nuclear non-proliferation (Article I,II,III, Preamble)

The first central objective of the NPT is nuclear non-proliferation. This non-proliferation objective is well expressed in Irish Resolutions to urge for concluding an international agreement on the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation as a step toward future disarmament (UNGA Resolution 1380 (XIV)). Since the conclusion of the Treaty in 1968, it has played a salient positive role to support international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. First, the Treaty successfully created an international standard against the spread of nuclear weapons. Second, the NPT established the international inspection regime that helps prevent the diversion of nuclear reactor fuel to bombs. Third, the NPT has set an international norm and rules, which has been changing the acquisition of such weapons from a source of national pride to an object of official denial (Cirincione 1995: 201-206).

Empirical evidence largely confirms the NPT’s positive contribution to non-proliferation. Reflecting the NPT’ history before the historic 1995 NPT REC, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali praised for the NPT’ success:

“...The NPT, together with other measures that comprise the nuclear non-proliferation regime, has succeeded in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in reducing the existing nuclear arsenals. While the NPT was being negotiated there was much concern that failure to create a treaty would result in significant nuclear proliferation. Even after the NPT entered into force, sceptics warned that there could be 20 to 30 nuclear-weapon States by the 1980s. That this has not occurred is not simply good luck. A
cause-and-effect relationship is discernible...” (Boutros-Ghali 1995).

Cirincione emphasizes the successful cases of non-proliferation efforts:

“...Historically the non-proliferation regime has one great factor in its favor: It works. ... Overall, however, the [NPT] treaty regime has done a remarkable job of checking the unrestricted global proliferation Kennedy feared. ... Fifteen years ago, experts analyzed the nuclear proliferation risks posed by the top ten states of concern: India, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Libya, South Korea, and Taiwan. Today, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Iraq and Libya have abandoned their nuclear weapon programmes, South Korea and Taiwan would be a risk only if their regional security situation sharply deteriorates. Only India, Pakistan, and Israel now have nuclear weapons. Over past fifteen years, only two other nations of high concern must be added to the list of high concern: North Korea and Iran ...” (Cirincione 2000).

It is true that there are many factors why states actually get nuclear weapons or refrain from them such as security, norms, domestic politics, organizations, technical, financial, and individual factors, and so on. Of course, it is not easy to assert decisively which perspective and factor are correct and the most important regarding nuclear non-proliferation. But, Diehl and Jones argue, it is fair to say that the NPT regime have been helpful in raising the costs of proliferation, delaying access to technology, and thereby making it less likely for proliferation to occur (Diehl and Jones 2002:42-51).
(2) The liberal promise of nuclear arms control and disarmament (Article VI, Preamble)

The NPT enhances not only nuclear nonproliferation, but also nuclear arms control and disarmament, liberals claim. Some UN official paper explains the Treaty as a "multilateral disarmament agreement": "Since its entry into force, the NPT has been the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Adherence to the Treaty by nearly 190 States, including the five recognized nuclear-weapon States (NWS), renders the Treaty the most widely adhered to multilateral disarmament agreement" (UN, 2005). Also UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali emphasises the pre-eminent significance of the NPT for arms control, arguing that:

"...The fact that more countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement attests to the Treaty's pre-eminent significance. ... The NPT, together with the other measures that comprise the nuclear non-proliferation regime, has succeeded in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in reducing the existing nuclear arsenals. Today, more than ever before, the NPT remains the vital instrument it has always been..." (Boutros-Ghali, 1995).

Many arms control advocates argue that the NPT should work as a step toward arms control and disarmament, not as a goal for preserving nuclear cult. Fischer asserts that "It should be stressed that the NPT was seen not only as a means of preserving the nuclear status quo, but also as a step towards ending and reversing the nuclear arms race and towards general disarmament" (Fischer 1993:18). According to Dhanapala, "It [the NPT] is of course much more than just a 'non-proliferation' treaty. It also obligates all
its parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, a duty unanimously reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in its historic advisory opinion of 1996" (Dhanapala, 2000). "We do need to know, with absolute certainty, that we are progressing towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the fulfillment of all the undertakings of the NPT so that we may have a safer world and a better world” (Dhanapala 1995: 1-13).

UNGA repeatedly urges for nuclear disarmament. The 2003 UNGA resolution on “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” maintains that “Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and as an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament”.

Empirical evidence supports this liberal case for arms control, at least, to some extent. During the later half of the Cold War, the NPT became the basis of superpowers’ arms control talks. According to Fischer,

“...Since 1957 (and especially since the early 1960s) non-proliferation has provided a mechanism for USA-Soviet cooperation in arms control that has survived all the jolts in their relationship and it has helped to nurture the more far-reaching cooperation between them in arms control and disarmament that began in the mid 1980s...” (Fischer 1992:28).

The numerous efforts undertaken by the US and the USSR began to reach fruition in the late 1980s to 90s. The progress of these arms control efforts includes;
• 1984-86: The Stockholm Conference agreed on far-reaching measures to promote mutual confidence. NATO and the Warsaw Pact would henceforth provide each other with precise calendars of major military manoeuvres and would enable the other side to observe them.

• 1987: To ensure that nuclear war is not unleashed by accident or misjudgement the US-USSR agreed to establish nuclear crisis control centres in each others’ capitals to provide quick and unrestricted communications in emergencies.

• 1988: The US-USSR agreed to give each other details of planned ballistic missile tests and to defuse any incident caused by troops crossing the other sides border by mistake or without authorization.

• 1989: The US-USSR agreed to exchange information on bomber alerts.

• The US-USSR held regular consultations on regional conflicts and have helped to end the South African and Cuban involvement in Angola, the Iran-Iraq war and the conflict in Indo-China. The most remarkable development was the cooperation between the US and the USSR in confronting Iraq.

• As a result of the work carried out by US and Soviet scientists at each others’ test sites, there was significant progress in the effective technical verification of a CTBT.

• The INF (Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles) Treaty, Signed in 1987 and entered into force in 1988. More than 2500 missiles with nuclear warheads together with their launching systems were destroyed.

• The START I Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), Signed in July 1991.

• The START II Treaty (Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), Concluded in 1993. Each of the parties to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 3000 and 3500 by the year 2003. (Fischer 1992: 204)
After the cold war, much more debates have been going on the Article VI of the NPT regarding arms control and disarmament. How much the NPT five NWS fulfil their obligations of nuclear arms control and disarmament? Running up to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the US and Russia emphasised their arms control records since the late 1970s. (Mendelsohn and Lockwood, 1995:11-21; Graham Jr. 1995). Actually, the NPT Review Conference in 1995 and 2000 were remarkable. The five NWS reaffirmed their commitments for nuclear arms control and disarmament. In response to increasing tone of voices from the NNWS such as the traditional NAM and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), the NPT RC in 1995 and 2000 adopted clear objectives and concrete steps of arms control and disarmament progress as follow.

Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference)

The nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:

A) CTBT: The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996.

B) Fissile materials treaty: The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

C) Nuclear arms control and disarmament: The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament (The 2000 NPT RC)

1. CTBT.
2. Nuclear test moratorium.
3. CD: negotiations on fissile materials treaty.
4. CD: establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament.
5. The principle of irreversibility.
6. Unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals leading to disarmament.
7. The early entry into force of START II; the conclusion of Start III; preserving the ABM treaty.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative.
9. Steps by all the NWS leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all: (Unilateral reductions; Increased transparency; The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; De-alerting; A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies; The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the NWS.)
10. Arrangements by the NWS to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the NPT’s strengthened review process.

13. The further development of verification capabilities.


In the face of diplomatic impasse, Preez suggests “a compromise approach” to reach “agreements on the nuclear disarmament obligations, commitments, and undertakings that could be implemented in the foreseeable future ... without negating those that were agreed on in 1995 and 2000”. He lists up “the more specific measures could include agreements on:”

- The necessity to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT while maintaining existing moratoria on nuclear testing;
- The need for nuclear-weapon states to take further steps to reduce their nonstrategic nuclear arsenals and not to develop new types of nuclear weapons in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies;
- The need of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) urgently to resume negotiations on an internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation
objectives;

- The completion and implementation of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification;

- The establishment of an appropriate CD subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament;

- The imperative of the principles of irreversibility and transparency for all nuclear disarmament measures and the need further to develop adequate and efficient verification capabilities;

- A reaffirmation by the states-parties to restart negotiations urgently on an internationally verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) and an agreement to adopt comprehensive safeguards agreements plus the Model Additional Protocol as the standard for safeguards inspection of the non-nuclear-weapon states (Preez, 2005:6-12).

For liberals, decisive change and progress happened in world politics after the Cold War. Liberals claim that the 1995 and 2000 NPT RC brought significant changes in the context of the NPT debates. Simpson claims that a progress in disarmament becomes more important for nuclear non-proliferation.

“...Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation activities are starting to converge as the possibilities of creating a universal and dynamic non-proliferation regime and a continuing process of nuclear disarmament appear to be increasing, even if these activities remain highly problematic. Without the guarantees provided by the non-proliferation regime nuclear
weapon states are unlikely to give up their nuclear weapons. Without a process of nuclear disarmament, particularly one involving China, it is unlikely that India will contemplate acceding to the NPT, and thus Pakistan also. In addition, it now seems prudent to evaluate new disarmament and non-proliferation arrangements in the light of a potential ‘nuclear-disarmed’ world. Also, several of the industrialized allies of the USA and the former USSR, which until 1991 actively supported non-proliferation but not nuclear disarmament, now regard nuclear disarmament as an equally important policy objective to nuclear non-proliferation and are taking initiatives to pursue it. The creation of the Canberra Commission by the Australian Government is a case in point…” (Simpson 1996: 561-589. See also Goldblat 2002).

Therefore, for liberals, bottling the genie thus rolling back proliferation to disarmament is now possible and desirable today as the Cold War ended. The key is renewing the bargains between the NWSs and the NNWSs (Graham Jr. 2005; Manning and Davis, 1998; Preez, 2005).

The liberal promise of the NPT’ central bargains (reciprocity)

The NPT as an international treaty is based on certain normative and legal premises. In general, international law is based on reciprocity among member states. As the NPT is essentially discriminative in nature, the Treaty is assumed on the grand bargains (central bargains) between NWS and NNWS. For liberals, the balanced obligations and responsibilities between NWS and NNWS are crucial for legitimacy, maintenance, and efficacy of the Treaty.
Historically, the arguments of "the balance of obligations and responsibilities" and "grand bargains" emerged during the making of the Treaty in the mid-1960s. Five main principles of the treaty were proposed in the UNGA Resolution 2028 supported by the efforts of NAM states (1965), contending that "The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers; The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament" (UNGA Resolution 2028, A/RES/2028(XX), 19 November, 1965).

Based on the balanced obligation, the NPT assumes the central bargains. The NNWS give up their rights of nuclear weapons in exchange of the NWS' cooperation of peaceful nuclear use and nuclear arms control and disarmament, a. a UN document claim: "There was a bargain between the NWS and the NNWS. Under article VI, NWS parties agree 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.' The preamble also states NWS parties' obligation to disarm, stating that referring that parties to the Treaty "[declare] their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament" (UN, 1995: 69-63).

Progress in disarmament is inextricably tied to non-proliferation efforts, Japanese disarmament diplomacy claims:

"...The NPT ... rests on a core partnership between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states and their solemn pact to eschew and eliminate
nuclear weapons. ... Progress towards nuclear disarmament is inextricably tied to success in non-proliferation efforts. Without movement towards nuclear disarmament, the norm of non-proliferation is weakened. Without success in non-proliferation, the goal of zero nuclear weapons is unlikely to be achieved…” (The Tokyo Forum, 1999).

The salience of the balance obligations to the NPT is clear in the five main principles of 1965 and the Principles and Objectives of 1995.

“...A key to success [for the NPT in future] will be to live up to the expectations of those who drafted and supported the five main principles in 1965, on the basis of which the NPT was to be negotiated. If we do not live up to these principles, we shall soon forget about the objectives and principles we have just agreed upon at the 1995 Conference ...”(Shaker 1995: 15-29).

“...Since the nuclear-weapon states’ pledge to seek a verifiable FMCT and the entry into force of the CTBT was integral to the treaty’s indefinite extension [of 1995], the further pursuit of these objectives, in part or in whole is needed to ensure progress at the conference. ... The NPT’s continued vitality and effective as a building block for maintaining international peace and security is dependent on the implementation of the treaty as a whole ...”(Preez, 2005).

Dhanapala also claims that the “permanence of the Treaty does not represent a permanence of unbalanced obligations ... non-proliferation and disarmament can be pursued only jointly, not at each other’s expense”(quoted in Cirincione, 2000:134).
The liberal promise of security assurances and collective security” (The UN Charter)

For liberals, security assurances and collective security of the UN Charter are important for the security of the NPT Non-Nuclear-Weapon States as stated in Preamble of the Treaty and discussed at every NPT Review Conference. Collective security can create a more effective system of “regulated institutionalized balancing” rather than relaying on the unregulated balancing under anarchy. It will contribute to the creation of a more benign and peaceful international system. The classical BOP presupposes states shift their temporary alliances assuming that their eternal ally is only “national interests”. However, new collective security system presume “a permanent potential alliance against the unknown enemy on behalf of the unknown victim” (Ruggie, 1998). Basically, collective security system is based on three conditions and principles:

(1) **From military conflict to peaceful settlement:** States must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo and agree instead to settle all of their disputes peacefully;

(2) **From national security to international security and collective response:** States must broaden their conception of national interest to take in the interests of the international community as a whole, thus the security of one is the security of all. When a troublemaker appears in the system, all of the responsible states automatically and collectively confront the aggressor with overwhelming military power;

(3) **From fear to trust:** States must overcome the fear which dominates world politics and learn to trust each other, thus states entrust their destinies to collective security.(Kupchan, 1995, quoted in Baylis, 2008)
Chapter VII of the UN Charter deals with “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. Article 42 states that the Security Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. The Security Council can authorize member states to use “all necessary means”, and this has been accepted as a legitimate application of Chapter VII powers. Article 99 authorizes the Secretary-General to “bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” (Taylor and Curtis 2005).

Despite past failures of the League of Nations to stop WWI and the UN to stop the Cold War, the success of the Gulf War in 1991 revived the UN collective security after the Cold War. President Bush claimed a “big idea: a new world order” meaning “‘peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all people” (Dunne, 2001: 170; Schroeder, 1995). UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali proposed ambitious An Agenda for Peace to broaden the UN role to peace-keeping, making, and building activities (Taylor and Curtis 2005).

UN Secretary-General Annan embraces a re-newed concept of collective security:

...Unless we can agree on shared assessment of these threats and a common understanding of our obligations in addressing them, the United Nations will lag in providing security to all of its Members and all the world’s people. ... I
fully embrace ... its case for a more comprehensive concept of collective security: one that tackles new threats and old and that addresses the security concerns of all States. ... Collective security today depends on accepting that the threats which each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all. ... On this interconnectedness of threats we must found a new security consensus, the first article of which must be that all are entitled to freedom from fear, and that what ever threatens one threatens all. ... We need to ensure that States abide by the security treaties they have signed so that all can continue to reap the benefit. More consistent monitoring, more effective implementation and, where necessary, firmer enforcement are essential if States are to have confidence in multilateral mechanisms and use them to avoid conflict...” (Annan, 2005: 33-34).

It is noteworthy that the NPT is closely linked to the UN Security Council. In this context, liberals claim the importance of the UN collective security and security assurances to the NNWS members of the NPT. First, further nuclear proliferation is regarded as threats against the current international peace, security and stability. Second, nuclear threats or attacks against any non-nuclear-weapon states are regarded as one against the international community. The Security Council P-5 (Nuclear-Weapon States) is expected to provide security assurances to the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States of the NPT. Third, the NPT is based on mutual trust, confidence, and the balance of obligations among all member-states. The NPT's mechanism on non-proliferation, safeguard, arms control and disarmament, universality, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and security assurances are believed to contribute to trust and confidence-building among member-states of the NPT in the spirit of the UN collective security.
UNGA repeatedly pay attentions to the problems of nuclear proliferation in international peace since the early 1960s. UNGA resolution 2028 of 1965 notes,

"...the General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace ... Recognizing the urgency and great importance of the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons ... Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all State ..." (A/RES/2028(XX)).

UNGA resolution 2373 on the NPT of 1968 contend,

"...The General Assembly, ... Affirming that in the interest of international peace and security both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States carry the responsibility of acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations that the sovereign equality of all States shall be respected, that the threat or use of force in international relations shall be refrained from and that international disputes shall be settled down by peaceful means..." (A/RES/2373(XXII)).

Security assurances to the NNWS are important in this context. Based on the principle of the balanced obligations, for the security of the nuclear-non-weapon states, the five Nuclear-Weapon States (UNSC P-5) are expected to provide security assurances to the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in exchange of their commitments of renounce of nuclear weapons under the NPT. Final declaration of the 1975 NPT RC
urged for strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states in the spirit of the UN Charter, stating that:

“...Recognizing that all States have need to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference emphasizes the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. ... 

At the [1975] Conference it was urged by a considerable number of delegations that nuclear-weapon States should provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those States which become fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements.

At the Conference it was also urged that determined efforts must be made especially by the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, to ensure the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. To this end the Conference urges all States, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, to refrain in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons. Additionally, it stresses the responsibility of all Parties to the Treaty and especially the nuclear-weapon States, to take effective steps to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and to promote in all appropriate for a the consideration of all practical means to this end [including military and defence assistance]...”(UN Press Release SG/SM/2181).

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali emphasized the importance of the five NWS’ security assurances given to the NNWS:
“...Providing for the security non-nuclear-weapon States so that they do not feel compelled to attempt to procure nuclear weapons for their defence represents another aspect of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Both the security assurances issued by the nuclear-weapon States and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones address this question of demand. They have the potential to provide significant disincentives to procuring nuclear weapons, and thus serve to buttress efforts to curtail horizontal proliferation...” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 13).

Although the five NWS are reluctant to accept legally-binding security assurances, the five NWS announce both positive and negative security assurances to those who are the nuclear-non-weapon states of the NPT. Positive security” assurances are undertakings by the nuclear-weapon states to come to the aid of any non-nuclear-weapon state threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. “Negative security assurances” are guarantees by the nuclear-weapon states to refrain from threatening or using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon states.(UN, 1995: 18-20; Fischer, 22-23) The UN Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968 declare the three depositary states - the US, the USSR, and Britain – to provide positive security assurances. In 1994, the three depositary governments of the NPT together with France did provide an updated set of security assurances, both positive and negative, to Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Since 1964, when it conducted its first nuclear tests, China has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The 1995 Security Council Resolution 984 acknowledged the pledges by the “nuclear five,” marking the first real, politically binding negative security assurances. (Mendelsohn and
However, the NWS do not commit to "legally binding" security assurances to the NNWS of the NPT. Such commitments by the five NWS to give "legally binding" security assurances to the NPT NNWS would be "an enormous step for the treaty, for the security interests of its NNWS", and "for international peace and security", Dhanapala argues.

"...While they [the NWS] have provided such assurances in legally-binding form to members of nuclear-weapon-free zones – pursuant to the Protocols to the treaties creating such zones – some nuclear-weapon-states continue to reserve an option of using such weapons against NNWS. The 1995 Principles and Objectives danced around this issue – while "noting" Security Council resolution 984 of 1995 and various non-binding declarations of the NWS on this issue, the 1995 Conference agreed that "further steps should be considered" and that these steps "could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument." The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference used similar language, though it also contains a statement that the "Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances ... strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. ... I believe that such assurances [provided by the five NPT nuclear-weapon-States] would represent an enormous step for the treaty, for the security interests of its NNWS, and as a result, for international peace and security..." (Dhanapala, 2005: 123-124).
The promise of "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs)" (Article VII)

For liberals, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) contribute to regional stability and to non-proliferation and international peace as stated in Article VII. A nuclear-weapon-free zone can be defined as "a zone free from nuclear weapons created by an international agreement which (1) prohibits regional states from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, deploying or controlling any nuclear weapons in the region, and by a protocol under which (2) all nuclear weapon states (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China) shall undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the states in the zone (negative security assurances)" (MOFA, Japan, 2004). The NWFZs are regarded as another "means of addressing non-nuclear-weapon States' security concerns and thus strengthening their decision to refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons. NWFZs function as important confidence- and security-building measures" (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 21-24). Today, Nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties have been formulated in Latin America, South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa.

**Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ)**

- The Treaty of Tlatelolco (the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean; adopted in 1967 and entered into force in 1968)
- The Treaty of Rarotonga (the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; adopted in 1985 and entered into force in 1986)
Other Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones are planned and proposed at the UN GA:

- The Central Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
- A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East/ A Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status (declared in 1992 and the UNGA Resolution was adopted in 1998)

The deployment of nuclear weapons and other WMD has been banned in specific places by the following treaties:

- The Antarctic Treaty (Adopted in 1959, entered into force in 1961)
- The Outer Space Treaty (Adopted in 1967, entered into force in 1967)
- The Moon Agreement (Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Adopted in 1979, entered into force in 1984)

(MOFA, Japan, 2004:126-134).

Today, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones cover considerable parts of the southern hemisphere, including South America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), South Pacific (the Treaty of Rarotonga), and Southeast Asia (The Bangkok Treaty). Other proposals are on the table (Jones and McDonough, 1998).
According to Dhanapala, the expansion of NWFZ from southern hemisphere to northern hemisphere such as Asian regions are important to international security and universal membership:

"...While nuclear-weapon-free zones now cover virtually the entire southern hemisphere, they could contribute much more to international peace and security in the years ahead. ... Nuclear-weapon-free zones also deserve to be on the table as possible solutions to the NPT's challenge of achieving universal membership, given the enormous potential value of establishing such zones in the Middle East, South Asia and in East Asia... in Central Europe. Recalling that the common agreed goal is global nuclear disarmament, I hope that European leaders will some day come to recognize that their individual and collective security interests would be best served by establishing such a zone across the entire continent..." (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005: 122-123; See also Fischer, 1993).

For example, critics argue South Asian nuclear proliferation shows the negative and deteriorating effects of nuclear deterrence while demanding the case for regional and global disarmament (Ramana and Reddy ed. 2003; Bidwai and Vanaik 2001). For liberals, the expanding NWFZs including Western Asia, South Asia, and East Asia, greatly contribute to regional and international stability and universal membership of the NPT, which would bring regional and international stability and peace.
The promise of universal membership, compliance, verification, and enforcement

As a number of the NPT come close to 190 covering most of the UN members by the late 1990s, universal membership is "a vitally important goal", liberals claim. "Though the most fundamental disarmament and non-proliferation goals of the NPT are obviously universal in scope, its membership is not, as Israel, India, Pakistan and (in the eyes of many) the DPRK remain outside the treaty. Universality of membership thus remains a vitally important goal of the NPT" (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005).

Even if admitting difficulties, "it will take some time to achieve this goal" of full universal membership, Dhanapala argues. "The NPT states parties should not, however, be too impatient in achieving the goal of full universal membership – it will take some time to achieve this goal, and the longer the security and economic benefits of treaty membership are excluded from non-parties, the greater will be the incentive to join. Decision 2 of the NPTREC called upon "all States parties" to make "every effort" to achieve the goal of universal membership. The "strengthened review process" would be the logical place to document such efforts" (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005: 117-118).

In cases of Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, Dhanapala urges for "constructive steps" and "substantial progress" in improving political condition: "Solving the NPT's universality problem will require some significant work outside the framework of the treaty itself. With respect to Israel, it will require substantial progress in the Middle East peace process, constructive steps toward establishing a zone free of WMD in the region, a substantial reduction in conventional forces by all states in this zone, and strengthened security assurances for all NPT parties, not just those in the Middle East. With respect to India and Pakistan, the world community should try to
build upon the slender foundation offered by both countries: namely, their respective
declaratory policies that they support the goal of global nuclear disarmament. To the
extent that a ‘Fissile material’ treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are
stepping stones to that goal, the world should encourage both countries to bring such
-treaties into force. The DPRK will, I believe, one day return to the NPT, probably in the
context of a broader settlement of political and security issues on the Korean
peninsula…” (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005: 117-118).

The positive roles and meaning of the NPT: Liberal optimism reconsidered

Whereas realists correctly point out the weakness, flaws, and problems of the
NPT, liberals response that realists downplay the positive role of the NPT in world
politics. First, liberals point out that realist perspectives underestimate the importance
of the NPT to international peace, security and stability as a whole. The world without
the NPT would be a more proliferated risky world as President Kennedy worried in the

Second, liberals argue that realists overlook the salient contribution of the NPT
to nuclear non-proliferation. Many analysts agree that the NPT has provided strong
normative, political and legal standard and constraint of nuclear proliferation year by
year (Pilat, 1990; Bailey, 1993; Cirincione, 2000).

Third, there are increasing strong demands for progress in arms control and
dismament notably claimed by the NAM and the NAC (New Agenda Coalition).
These Non-Nuclear-Weapons States criticise that the five NWS are not sincere to their
commitment of the balance of obligations and three pillars. For a majority of the NPT in
the international community, the NPT is not only for non-proliferation, but also nuclear arms control, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. UN officials claim that the NPT is also a multilateral "nuclear arms control and disarmament" treaty. Importantly, even classical realists admit that the trust, legitimacy, efficacy of the NPT would be either lost or considerably reduced if the five NWS does not take the importance of the NPT's three pillars and grand bargains seriously. These problems of the five NWS' arms control and disarmament commitment have been highlighted after the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conference.

The importance of the liberal promise was most evident in the debates toward the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: What if the NPT could not be extended? What if the NPT would demise or unravel? Many analysts and policy-makers did actually worry the possibilities and consequences of the NPT demise. A world without the NPT would be most likely unstable, insecure, and dangerous with further nuclear proliferation risks. Complex security dynamics would become deteriorating. Beyond the five NWS, further nuclear proliferation, arms race, or even nuclear use and threats would be escalated among great, middle, small states in regional and global security. If the NPT could not be extended, international regimes and treaties of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament would lose its basis, states would be free from legal and normative restrictions of nuclear weapons, further nuclear proliferation would be encouraged, and regional and global security would be getting worse (Pilat, 1987; Pilat and Pendley, 1990 Fischer, 1993). Dunn observed, "From a broad, global perspective, therefore, there are good reasons to be concerned that a failure to extend the NPT in 1995 would make more probable the further spread of nuclear weapons, thereby heightening global instability and regional insecurity" (Dunn,
1990. See also Keeny, 1995; Bunn and Rhinelander, 1995). As a historical fact, at the 1995 NPT REC, indefinite extension was supported by a majority of member-states without voting. The fact was evident in anyone’s eyes that the demise of the NPT was not a desirable course for the majority of member-states, even if not for all states. However, the failure of the 2005 NPT REC should be grave concerns of further weakening of the NPT in this context (Dhanapala with Rydell, 2005; Graham Jr., 2005; Walker 2007a).

Thus, critics response that realists miss the importance of the NPT in world politics. For liberals, the NPT’ progressive pillars of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, and international peace and security are not a utopian dream but a feasible and desirable goal to direct our policy course in world politics.

CONCLUSION

This chapter analyzed the liberal perspectives on the NPT focusing on its dynamics, evolution, roles and meanings. Liberal theory assumes core liberal values and assumptions: individual liberty, freedom, universal human rights, and belief in change and progress in international co-operation, peace. The dynamics and evolution of the NPT was analyzed through the lenses of three liberal theories: Institutional Liberalism, Republican Liberalism, and Cosmopolitan Liberalism. Institutional liberals (regime theorists) explain that the dynamics of the NPT regime is based on reciprocity among member-states, embodied as the NPT’s three pillars and grand bargain. Republican liberals (democratic peace) explain that advanced liberal democracies (a
liberal pacific union) sustain the NPT-based non-proliferation regime whereas non-democratic regimes are prone to violate norms and rules of the NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Cosmopolitan liberals criticize that the NPT regime is the outcome of the inter-state politics, which works for a status-quo nuclear order for satisfied powers at the cost of justice and equality. The regime needs to be radically rebuilt toward disarmament and world peace for humanity on the basis of cosmopolitanism as a humanity as a whole. This chapter also examined the liberal arguments on the roles and meanings of the NPT. Liberals point out the salience of the NPT’s liberal progressive objectives: the NPT’s three pillars of nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; the NPT’s grand bargains between the NWS and the NNWS; NWFZs; the NWS’ security assurances to the NNWS and the UN collective security; the NPT’s contribution to international peace and security as a whole. Liberals expect that the NPT regime should (and can) function to enhance mutual understanding, common interests, and security co-operation among member-states in the area of nuclear issues in international security and peace.