Chapter - 2

China–Pakistan Strategic Relations: Opportunities and Challenges
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"One careless move loses the whole game" refers to a move affecting the situation and not to a move of a partial nature, a move which is not decisive for the whole situation, as in chess, so in war.¹

Strategic Relations: An Overview

The end of the Cold War led to a new beginning for China and Pakistan. A key factor that emerges is a well-governed security sector comprising the civil, political and security institutions responsible for protecting the state and the communities within it.² This is because security challenges faced by most countries of the world were similar, but only their approach differs.³ In addition to this, most intra-state conflicts lead to interstate conflicts commonly called “spillover.”⁴ Therefore, the concept of security captures the full range of external imperatives that impinges upon state’s decision making process.⁵ For China, since the formation of the Chinese communist armed forces in 1927, the basic military dilemma facing them has been that of developing strategies for defeating adversaries that have superior weapons and equipment.⁶

This was the case similar with Pakistan. Constant courtship with other countries to acquire weapons and to build up its defense posture started since its inception as an independent state and continued even today. China’s foreign policy strategy basically seeks to escape full absorption into the American dominated world.⁷ In order to achieve

¹ Mao Tse-tung “Freedom after Death, the course of Sino-Soviet Difference” (East Asia Research & Coordination Division Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India) GMG/IND-S/102 EA-LSII-5-11-63.
⁴ Ibid.
this during the Cold War period China eventually gave priority to the non-aligned countries by neither considering its policy towards the Soviet Union nor the United States.\(^8\) This was followed by more centralised modern foreign policies with efforts to enforce the strategic triangle between China, India and Russia after the collapse of former USSR.\(^9\) This initiative was mooted out to check the advancing U.S. global military strategy.\(^10\)

China with an annual GDP growth rate of sustain 7-8 per cent with inflation rate scaling down to almost nil in the last few years shows its dynamic economic growth.\(^11\) Thus, unlike its counterpart Pakistan, China sends a strong message in the twenty-first century. “The U.S cannot take China for granted; China wishes to pursue a policy of peace and security with its neighbours and not hegemony and conflict and it desires to modernise rapidly by attracting foreign investment.”\(^12\) On one hand China maintains enduring relations with Pakistan, while on the other hand it seeks to play vital role in the region. In the words of John W. Garver, “China’s overriding strategic interest in South Asia is to maintain a balance of power favourable to itself.”\(^13\) The China-Pakistan strategic relations is a long standing friendship that has been, as the Chinese and Pakistanis like to say “tested by adversity.”\(^14\)

**China’s Strategy and Doctrine**

Chinese strategies and doctrines can be traced back to the time of Mao Zedong’s popular theory the “people’s war” in which he coordinated the three organisations; the main forces, regional forces, and militia against an enemy.\(^15\) This protracted war concept of Maoist military doctrine aimed at the gradual attrition or slow destruction of a stronger

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\(^14\) Ibid, p. 323.

\(^15\) June Teufel Dreyer, “The Chinese People’s Militia: Transformation and Strategic Role”, n.6, p.156.
and more powerful enemy.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, Mao’s concept of “New Strategy” also consists of taking tactically offensive action within a basically defensive strategy known as “active defence” (\textit{ji ji fangyu}) and the opposite “passive defence” (\textit{xiao ji fangyu}) where in the defending forces simply resist without attempting to weaken the adversary.\textsuperscript{17}

This was followed by Deng Xiaoping and the political and economic pragmatists in China.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, China’s first Five Year Plan (1953-1957) and the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) also emphasised modernisation of national defence.\textsuperscript{19} Faced with the dilemma of developing strategies for defeating adversaries with superior weapons, the Chinese leaders concluded in the late 1970s that “the defense of cities had to become an important aspect of China’s defence strategy.”\textsuperscript{20} It is here that the Chinese constantly reiterate “no-first-use” and pledged that “Beijing’s missile forces are designed only to break the superpower monopoly.”\textsuperscript{21} The Chinese also conceptualise two approaches to attain military professionalism. \textit{First} the “Maoist” approach (this approach was characterised by stressing the importance of men over machines and the suppression of uniqueness among the armed forces as an institution), \textit{Second}, the “Pengist” or “Dengist” approach (this approach stresses the uniqueness of the armed forces, their specialisation, and their diverseness from society and also stresses the importance of modernising equipment).\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{China’s Security Calculus}

Since the earliest time China’s leadership were concerns about the vulnerability to external pressure. Thus, the military modernisation that China pursues also relates to how China defines its relationship with the West.\textsuperscript{23} China also gives priority to the five key questions related to the acquisition and use of modern arms; “What to acquire, how much, how quickly, by what means, and for what purposes-have recurrently been the source of disputes among political and military leaders.”\textsuperscript{24} In tune with this, People’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Paul H.B. Godwin, “Mao Zedong Revised: Deterrence and defense in the 1980s”, n.6, p.28.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{19} David L. Shambaugh, “China’s Defense Industries: Indigenous and Foreign Procurement”, n.6, p.45.
\item \textsuperscript{20}Paul H.B. Godwin, “Mao Zedong Revised: Deterrence and defense in the 1980s”, n.6, p. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 36.
\item \textsuperscript{22} William R. Heaton, “Professional Military Education in the People’s Republic of China”, n.6, p.124.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Jonathan D. Pollack, “Rebuilding China’s Great Wall: Chinese Security in the 1980s,” n.6, p. 3.
\end{itemize}
Republic of China also gives emphasis in promoting peaceful environment for Chinese economic development. This was because China’s independent foreign policy marked a long-term shift from a confrontational to a conciliatory approach based on the declining influence of Maoist ideology and the increasing importance being given to economic development.

China’s foreign policy is largely consistent with Neo-Realist Theory. And with one-party political system it becomes a powerful agenda implementer. Thus, China’s foreign policy seeks to improve China’s international status, promote socialist revolution and desire for regional hegemony. Regarding China’s foreign policy, writes Kim, “No single concept, method, or perspective is adequate to describe and explain it.” For Thomas W. Robinson, “No integrated ‘model’ of Chinese foreign policy yet exists to meets the essentials tests of any theory.”

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, Deng Xiaoping’s embarked a new reform in the field of economic liberalisation and modernisation, this Reform of 1978 provided the border regions with a legitimate excuse to reopen their borders for trade with neighbouring countries. The PRC employed the strategy of extensive development, also called capital accumulations. The 1978 Reform marked the second phase (the first phase being 1949-1978) and gained momentum during the 1980s with the expansion of

33 John W., Garver, n.26, pp. 195-7.
“Border Trade Policy”, which was followed by Xiaoping’s third phase in 1989.® Deng Xiaoping spread the word that “to get rich is glorious.”

PRC’s primary objective is to seek balance of power in managing potential conflict with other strong states or coalitions.® For instance in 1984, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited the United States, where the U.S. President Ronald Reagan reciprocated the gesture and visited China.™ Similarly, China’s relations with USSR improved. Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech of July 1986 eased the tension between the two; this was followed by Gorbachev-Deng Summit in May 1989.® However, the major constraint is China’s defence modernisation efforts are not transparent.® Although right from the beginning PRC captures the full range of external imperatives, now seek to close the gap between political, economic and military capabilities separating it from the other great powers and to take what it sees as its rightful place as the preeminent state in Asia.®

**China’s Defence Policy Implementation and Guidelines**

Post-Cold War set in motion a profound rethinking of the notion of security in the international domain. The militarised notions of security that emerged during the Cold War gave rise to a narrow stress on territorial integrity and security through armaments that has been difficult to change.® Thus, for military preparedness, China’s strategic planner divides its missile command into two – Internal units and Missile Control Center.® In addition to it, China’s foreign policy maintains three primary and enduring goals – power (capacity to influence the policies of other governments and international system), wealth (promoting Chinese economic development) and status (increasing

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34 Kuah Khun Eng, n.32, pp. 73-75.
37 Denny Roy, n.28, p. 34.
38 ibid.
However, as China engaged in world affairs a range of factors like policies and actors were taken into account.

Pakistan’s Strategy

For Pakistan, owing to the historical, ideological and domestic reasons its strategy mainly focuses towards India. Historically and ideologically Pakistan failed to reconcile the partition and looks at India with suspicion. In order to balance this, Pakistan followed parallel strategic policies i.e. entangling alliances with various outside powers (Britain, France, United States and China). With an amalgamation of various linguistic and ethnic identities (Punjabis in Punjab, Sindhis in Sindh, and Baluchis in Baluchistan and the Pathans in North West Frontier Province) Pakistan finds it difficult to carry out the domestic politics vis-à-vis the conglomerate nature. This makes Pakistan distinct from other states of developing countries facing ethnic conflicts. In Pakistan it is the resonance within major ethnic communities with the provinces named after the ethnic communities living in them. Thus, Pakistan with coherent identities and strong religious zeal makes it more unstable.

For instance, General Zia ul-Haq’s policy to promote extremist Sunni Islam by imposing “Sunni code of Islam” on all Islamic sects including Shia resulted in widespread Shia’s resistance. This “Islam” policy of Zia resulted to militarisation of Islam. It also helped to bring different provinces under one umbrella to counter dissent in minority provinces. Significantly, this military reliance on Islamic extremists helped

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43 Denny Roy, n.28, p. 215.
Pakistan’s strategy to conduct proxy war with India. President Zia also opposed any cuts in defence budget. According to Zia:

“How can you fight a nuclear submarine or an aircraft carrier with a bamboo stick? We have to match sword with sword, tank with tank, and destroyer with destroyer. The situation demands that national defense be bolstered and Pakistan cannot afford any cut or freeze in defense expenditure, since you cannot freeze the threat to Pakistan’s security.”

Pakistan also used irregular forces as part and parcel of its strategy. In the 1965 “Operation Gibraltar,” 5,000 troops were first used to infiltrate the valley which would then be followed by Pakistani Army. This operation involved dropping troops behind “enemy lines” in the Indian occupied Kashmir with the objective of helping a civil war type situation. However, Pakistan’s strategic planner failed due to lack of proper coordination between the three wings of Armed forces. It is stated that the Pakistani Navy came to know the war through an Indian radio broadcast.

But when Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto succeeded Zia-ul-Haq, he tried to remove the discrepancies of the old system as it serve the interests of a single service i.e. the Army. Conversely, Bhutto was removed from the post of Prime Minister on July 5, 1977. The simple reason, even his sympathizers and admirers conceded a “strong” government. And by 1990 onwards, an extensive review of strategy was being carried out by the Pakistani Army General Aslam Beg. Since then the military-led government

54 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Tara Kartha, n.53, p. 204.
exercise centralised control over the economy, utilising a disproportionate share of revenues generated by the provinces as well as externally derived resources. The military also continued to play a dominant role. "Using external threat to justify an ever-increasing defence burden, the military has neglected human development in the state" stated Hasan Askari Rizvi.

**Pakistan’s Strategy and Doctrine**

The principle objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy wrote Ayub Khan, "Are security and development." For security, Pakistan equates power with military power, military power with arms acquisitions and arms acquisitions with external political support. The adoption of a militaristic approach to security by Pakistan was due to the emergence of "military factor" in the domestic politics and its strong input in the formulation of foreign policy decisions. Yet, any analysis of threats to Pakistan’s security must emphasise between internal and external problems. To meet these problems, priority is attached to territorial security and cushioned defense spending from all other needs. Even the growth of Pakistan’s GDP was linked with the increase in investment in services such as defense and public administration. Although, in early 1980s, Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo demanded to freeze military related spending. It hardly had any impact in its defence spending, Pakistan’s national budget continued to concentrate on debt servicing and defense.

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69 Mushahid Hussain, n.52, p. 70.
Thus, Pakistan's strategic policy towards China emerged out of a particular set of circumstances and was determined by a variety of considerations. The Afghan problems on its western borders supported by the Soviet Union posed danger to the troubled areas of Pakhtoonistan and Baluchistan. And the geostrategic imbalances cause by "India factor." Apart from China, Pakistan overtures with the U.S. can be traced back to 1950s. "The relationship started way back in 1959 when an agreement was signed between the two countries, making Pakistan the only country in South Asia which is closely allied militarily to the United States," according to Kalim Bahadur. It got impetus in the early eighties as a result of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Stephen P. Cohen stated three components of Pakistan's strategic doctrine: first, It closely resembles an attempt to hit multiple moving targets from a moving vehicle (Pakistan defines the nuclear threat in this way); second, regard war as an opportunity to bring outstanding conflicts to the attention of the international community and to mobilise its friends among the Islamic world and fellow alliance members (and more recently, the PRC), and third, component includes Pakistani strategic doctrine has been to use military force to deter an Indian attack.

Nuclear Strategy of Pakistan

Pakistan's nuclear strategy can be viewed under three categories: "Technical strategy; Political strategy and Diplomatic strategy." Strategically, the nuclear weapon reinforced by its rapidly growing conventional might puts it into an advantageous position. The political strategy is even much numerous. Pakistan believes in the doctrine of "offensive-defence." General Aslam Beg formally announced during his tenure as the Army Chief that the main objective of this doctrine is to meet the nuclear

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72 Surendra Chopra, n.65, p. 279.
74 Ibid.
option and at the same time used as a deterrent to the enemy.\textsuperscript{79} Pakistan’s nuclear-diplomatic strategy generally involved the role played by different factors: The Islamic factor; the United States; China; and India.\textsuperscript{80} In a message on the “Defense of Pakistan Day” on September 6, 1985, President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq said, “Our resolve to defend our homeland at any price does not, in any way, conflict with our peaceful intentions.”\textsuperscript{81} Pakistan seeks to balance its conventional disadvantage by acquiring nuclear weapon, as it perceives India’s possession of nuclear weapons as a threat.\textsuperscript{82}

**China’s Neighbourhood Policy: South Asia**

China’s link with the South Asian countries can be trace back to 1950s. The famous “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (\textit{Wu-hsiang yuan-tse}) commonly known as “Panchsheel” was used by China to cement treatise with its neighbours.\textsuperscript{83} The principles first mooted out by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on June 28, 1954, were later reaffirmed by Chou En-lai in a joint communiqué issued with Prime Minister U Nu of Burma (Myanmar).\textsuperscript{84} This principle became a cornerstone between China and India when an agreement was reached on trade and intercourse between India and Tibet on April 29, 1954.\textsuperscript{85} And in 1960s, Chou En-lai’s famous “Ping-pong diplomacy” to secure position in the Third World particularly in Asia began to determine its role according to the strategic requirements.\textsuperscript{86}

However, China’s belligerence role in South Asia can be seen vis-à-vis Pakistan. Its support to Pakistan by transferring arms and sensitive technology provided adequate ground for other South Asian countries to be concern of China about its policies.\textsuperscript{87} Garver pointed out that in order to maintain balance of power in the region, China


\textsuperscript{80} Savita Pande, n.76, p. 337.

\textsuperscript{81} “Pakistan President on Meeting Territorial Threats”, \textit{China Report, P.S.M.A. JPRS-CPS-85-102}, October 2, 1985, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{82} Kalim Bahadur, n.73, p. 58.


\textsuperscript{84} Ibid

\textsuperscript{85} Gary L. Scott, n.83, p. 54.


significantly followed a well formulated policy towards its neighbourhood popularly known as “Good neighbourhood policy” (mulin zhengce in Chinese). 88

China also occupies a growing sphere of influence in Asian economic and international dominance. Thus, China’s policy in South Asia is deeply rooted in long-term global ambition. In the words of John W. Garver, “A top ranking Chinese objective is to prevent the emergence in Asia of barriers to the gradual, long-term growth of China’s presence and role- that is, spread of Chinese influence.” 90 Besides this, he says that “China’s overriding strategic interest in South Asia is to maintain a balance of power favourable to itself.” 91 It is due to this objective Beijing persuaded all of India’s immediate neighbours, and between 1960 and 1963 it concluded important border settlements or friendship agreements not only with Pakistan but also with Nepal, Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Afghanistan. 92

Not only this, in November 2005, China neatly entered into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit, it is here China enlisted help from Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan to force India to accept China as an observer and dialogue partner in the regional body. 93 As a result, China’s South Asia policy serves two key objectives: first, it dissuade India from cooperating with countries hostile to China like the former Soviet Union and the United States; second, it induce India not to object to China’s military security ties with other South Asian countries. 94 In the words of Michel D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, “China follows a calculative security strategy of

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91 Ibid, p.323.
94 John W. Garver, n.88, p. 131.
encirclement of India through military and economic cooperation with Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Maldives."  

**China’s Concern about India in the Region**

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the fear of Soviet encirclement of northern border in China's strategic thinking was reduced. Since then, "Beijing sought to renew its lapsed membership in the Third World, beginning with China's large southern neighbour, India", stated John W. Garver. Two satisfactory explanations about the phenomena of asymmetrical Chinese and Indian perceptions of threat from one another can be looked upon. The first is the probable existence of a calculated but highly classified Chinese foreign policy towards India, and the second level is in terms of the outcome of decade's long application of Indian and Chinese national power to shape the correlations of forces in Sino-Indian relationship. One Chinese strategist has been quoted as saying that, "We still regard India as a threat because they still occupy Chinese territory, though not as ominously as a few years ago." 

Fundamentally, China seeks to prevent India from dominating South Asia, which could otherwise limit China's potential leadership role in Asia. Beijing also asserts that India's attitude in the region is hegemonistic. In addition, Liu Yang and Guo Feng stated that "the military strategic targets of India are to seek hegemony in South Asia." In 1993, General Zhao Nanqi, director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences has been quoted saying "The Chinese would step in to prevent what they saw as an attempt by India to "dominate" the Indian Ocean. We are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India's Ocean." This makes it clear that China's Indian Ocean policy has been

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97 John W. Garver, n.88, p. 131.  
101 John W. Garver, n.96, pp. 344-5.  
primarily conditioned by its imperatives to contain India in the South Asia – IOR (Indian Ocean Rim). This is because the region also serves as the main trading route for India. It is estimated that nearly 89% of India’s oil imports arrives by sea route.

To begin with, Chinese strategic thinking about the Indian Ocean figured out since time immemorial. It is stated that the ancient mariners of China sailed in this water first for trade and then suzerainty. However, in due course of time, China’s interest in the region started basically to safeguard its energy sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf and the markets of the region. Besides this, economically, “the two economies are largely competitive rather than complementary” opined John W. Garver. In the 1990s, India’s economic intercourse with China amounted to a modest $1.2 billion only. But in 2003, India’s bilateral trade with China amounted to $5 billion, almost more than four times that of Pakistan’s $1.8 billion. In addition to it, it has been expected that in 2008, it is likely to hit the $20bn mark, much ahead of its trusted ally Pakistan which is limited to an abysmally low $4.5bn.

Thus, China shows its unwillingness to concede “strategic space” to India as a regional power. Beijing also knows that a secure and stable Pakistan at peace with India will make New Delhi focus on China. As an old Chinese saying goes “one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers”, Beijing, aware of India’s size, might, numbers and, above all, the intention to match China, began to pursue a policy of containment and

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109 John W. Garver, n.96, p. 326.


encirclement by proxy toward India. It is estimated that 90% of China’s arms sales goes to countries bordering India.

**Pakistan**

China’s strategic alliance with Pakistan is something which impinges all other neighbours in the region. “China’s relations with Pakistan can be viewed within the context of South Asia’s relevance to China’s counter encirclement strategy” writes Samina Yasmeen. The strategy serves dual purposes – first to resist the erstwhile Soviet Union during the Cold War days and also to counter Indian pressure. Interestingly, in the post-Cold War era, China–Pakistan relation focuses primarily on restricting increasing Indian influence in South Asia. “The keystone of China’s new South Asia policy was Pakistan” writes A. Doak Barnett. Conversely, John W. Garver also maintains that “China’s perspective of constraining India includes fostering a strong, self-confident Pakistan on India’s Western flank.”

The prime motivating factor behind this politically and ideologically strange friendship is because of “Sino-Indian and Pakistani-Indian animosities,” stated Gary L. Scott. Therefore, China’s diplomacy aims at inducing settlements in South Asia acceptable to Pakistan. This is because “Pakistan is the only country that can stand up to Indian hegemony in the region” stated Mohan Malik. In addition to it, John W. Garver also opined that “in fact it was Pakistan only that could constrain and balance India in any serious way.”

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114 Mohan Malik, n.113, p. 32.
115 ibid.
120 John W. Garver, n.90, p. 380.
121 Gary L. Scott, n.83, p. 222.
123 Mohan Malik, n.113, p. 32.
124 John W. Garver, n.90, p. 217.
Considering the significance of Pakistan in its strategic thinking, China carried out numerous strategic ventures with Pakistan. China is aware that Pakistan provides land corridor to the Indian Ocean and a link to the Gulf and West Asia for emerging market for Chinese military exports.\textsuperscript{125} Thus, China, co-opted to build the Gwadar port as it also will let China’s strategic intrusion on the Makran coast.\textsuperscript{126} The Gwadar project designed by Chinese engineers was laid on March 23, 2002.\textsuperscript{127} China is said to have financed $198 million of the estimated $248 million project.\textsuperscript{128} The port strategically located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf serves as a naval base for Chinese submarines.\textsuperscript{129} This in turn would enable China to control the Indian Navy in the region.\textsuperscript{130} Economically, the port provides an outlet to exports coming by road from Central Asian Republics and China.\textsuperscript{131} In addition to it, the Gwadar port also provide as the shortest route access to warm waters via the Karakoram highway for China’s industries located in Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{132} Beside Gwadar, Pakistan also mooted out to develop a second naval base at Ormara in the Baluchistan province known as the Jinnah Naval Base.\textsuperscript{133}

**Others**

In Southeast Asia, China has taken advantage of Myanmar’s isolation since 1990 to satisfy its own great power ambitions, especially its desire to counter India in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{134} Since then, China has provided US$2 billion in military aid to Myanmar and established electronic listening posts on Myanmar’s Coco Islands, opposite India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands to monitor Indian naval activity and missile testing.\textsuperscript{135}


\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{131} Ahmad Faruqui, n.129.


\textsuperscript{133} “Pakistan’s Ormara Naval Base”, *Strategic Affairs*, http://www.stratmag.com/issue/july15.2000.htm

\textsuperscript{134} J. Mohan Malik, “Myanmar Slides under China’s Shadow”, *Jane’s Intelligence Review* 9, 6:320-5, as cited in Mohan Malik, n.113, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{135} Mohan Malik, n.113, p. 32.
Myanmar also expanded its naval facilities on Great Coco Island with the help of China. Interestingly, “Chinese arms transfer and economic ties with Myanmar have turned the non-aligned state of Burma into China’s client state” stated J. Mohan Malik.

Conversely, China’s close ally Pakistan also provided small conventional weapons training to Myanmar’s armed forces, and joined with China in concluding an intelligence sharing agreement with Myanmar regarding India’s force deployment in north-east India and the Bay of Bengal. China is also actively engaged in building military infrastructure in Myanmar, the military inventory assisted by China include: Chinese origin fighter aircraft, radar and radio equipments, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, rocket launchers and naval ships. Myanmar also acquired ten Hainan Class patrol boats from China in 1995. Besides this, Chinese made tanks and some K8 trainer aircraft, co-produced by China and Pakistan are already available in Myanmar’s military inventory. This makes it clear that Pakistan and Myanmar have been the most significant beneficiaries in receiving Chinese weaponry.

In addition to it, China also facilitated “Corridor Project” a transportation network from Yunnan’s principal city Kunming to the Myanmarese port of Bhamo and from there down the Irrawaddy River to Yangon. The significance of this “Corridor Project” for China is that the near-western access is provided through Myanmar and the Kumming-Yunan “Irrawady Corridor”. Beside this, China has also been engaged in building a major naval base at Hangyi Island near the Irrawaddy river delta. China also views the Andaman Sea of Myanmar’s coast as an important source of oil to fuel its economic

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139 Ibid, pp. 216-17.
140 Vijay Sakhuja, n.139, p. 217.
expansion. Thus, China's ties with Myanmar posed serious strategic security concern in the region especially for India. Under such scenario, for India, having stronger relations with its neighbour is essential for its security and strategic interest in the region.

China's security relationship with Bangladesh is another important move of China's South Asia policy. In fact, China was the first country to have broad based defence cooperation with Bangladesh. In fact, China's strategic maneuvering with Bangladesh is based on long-term maritime considerations. China has emerged as a major supplier of arms to the Bangladesh armed forces, particularly the Navy and Air Force. It has been reported that Admiral Zhang Lian Zhong, the erstwhile Commander of the PLA Navy, had assured his Bangladesh counterpart of cooperation in the sophisticated management of the Navy.

John W. Garver stated that China is engaged in a "creeping encirclement of India." To these Indian analysts are convinced that Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran forming the right or western pincer of this move, Bangladesh and Myanmar making up the left or eastern pincer with Sri Lanka acting as the southern anchor and completing the encirclement. China's encirclement policy also includes Maldives. It is stated that China negotiated with the Maldivian government to construct a submarine base at Marao.

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147 Denny Roy, n.28, p.171.
149 John W. Garver, n.88, p.132.
150 The Indian Express, November 26, 2002.
Island, a coral reef. Besides this, China has also deployed a variety of nuclear weapons including tactical nuclear weapons in Tibet. According to Raja Menon, China has already fielded an Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) system using the Russian S-300 ABM in Tibet.

Apart from all these, China also shows willingness to work for peace in the region. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in a discussion with the Prime Minister of UK Tony Blair, during his visit to China on July 21, 2003 said “China is willing to work with the international community and make its own efforts to maintain peace and stability in South Asia.” Similarly, in the key-note address at the opening ceremony of the fourth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) in Islamabad, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, on April 2, 2005, said “His country would never pose a threat to any other country nor would it seek to dominate Asia.” Conversely, on April 5, 2005, Pakistan and China signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations. Likewise, on April 11, 2005, India started a “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” with China. Thus, during Chinese President Hu Jintao visit to India in November 2006, both side put forward a “Ten-pronged Strategy” – to further enrich and reinforce the strategic and cooperative partnership between the two countries and also to expand cooperation in economic, energy, cultural defense and other fields, and to cooperate on regional and international stage.

One important aspect in South Asia is that armed conflict is basically internal, characterised by Asymmetrical power. Under such situation the strategy for peace and

\[155\] A.B. Mahapatra, “China Acquires a Base in Maldives Against India with Some Help from India”, at the website of New Insight.Net, http://indiareacts.com
\[157\] Ibid
stability establish around unambiguous threats it poses.\textsuperscript{164} For instance, China's sheer size and growing power had already altered the contours of Asian security posing substantial challenges and balance of power in the region.\textsuperscript{165} In addition, China pursues this strategic move by maintaining a favourable balance in terms of regional influence and security of its Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs).\textsuperscript{166} In order to achieve this, China has also consolidated the Southern Asian and South-East Asia and encircled the Malacca Strait and is said to have established a strategic listening post to control the Western approaches of the Malacca Strait.\textsuperscript{167}

In order to neutralise the balance of power in the region China developed diplomatic relationship with non-Communist government in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{168} Thus, under such situation, "A contest between China and India over control of South, Southeast and Central Asia, and the Northern Indian Ocean (Malacca Straits) as a dominant feature of Asian geopolitics in the twenty-first century increases", writes Mohan Malik.\textsuperscript{169} Therefore, apart from China, India's relations with its neighbours constitute an important factor affecting peace and stability in the region.\textsuperscript{170}

**Opportunities/Convergence in China – Pakistan Strategic Relationship**

The diplomatic relationship between China and Pakistan that got nurtured way back in 1950s continued to flourish. The reason is obvious, Anne Gilks and Gerald Segel pointed out three reasons: firstly, China was the only country that continued to provide uninterrupted military supplies to Pakistan; secondly, China never found shy in sharing its technologies with Pakistan; and thirdly, Pakistan has been China's most preferred


\textsuperscript{165} David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s Responses", in Michael E. Brown, n.44, p. 207.


\textsuperscript{167} Vijay Sakhuja, n.139, p. 219.


\textsuperscript{169} Mohan Malik, n.113, p. 40.

client.\textsuperscript{171} Similarly, in the words of Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, "China concluded defence cooperation agreement; supplies were subject to almost no limitations, and Beijing does not look for commercial but for strategic gains from this partnership."\textsuperscript{172} "The partnership not only benefited Pakistan military but also China's continued cooperation has greatly contributed towards enhancing the morale of Pakistan's military establishment as also expanding military's influence and role in Pakistan's polity", opined Shen Chun-Chuan.\textsuperscript{173}

Thus, Chinese strategy in the region can be explained in terms of the relationship it shares with Pakistan. One thing is clear that Beijing extent its support to Pakistan to resist Indian pressure.\textsuperscript{174} "Pakistan is China's exceptionally friendly neighbour. If there is a war and Pakistan suffers foreign armed attack, the Chinese government and people will, of course, stand on the side of Pakistan," the then Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian has been quoted as saying way back in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{175} In his first well-known public proclamation, General Ayub Khan said: "If India grows menacingly strong, Pakistan might feel compelled to enter into a military pact with China."\textsuperscript{176} However, during this period, their interest also converges as Pakistan in return provided access to the know-how of western technologies to China.\textsuperscript{177}

Similarly, in the contemporary times, General Musharraf in a speech to China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), said, "The partnership between the two countries is as deeper than the oceans, higher than the mountains," Musharraf further stated that "the past belongs to Europe, the present belongs to the United States and the future belongs to Asia."\textsuperscript{178} Thus, keeping in mind the intricacies underlying in the region, "China is not prepared to sacrifice its entente with Pakistan on

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\textsuperscript{174} Stephen Philip Cohen, n.66, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{177} Paul H.B. Godwin (ed.,), n.20, pp. 15-18.
\textsuperscript{178} Detailed explanation is given in http://www.rense.com/general44/asapec.htm.
\end{flushleft}
the altar of Indian-Chinese friendship.” In similar line, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a speech to the Pakistan Senate on December 2, 1996, said:

Our two peoples have regarded each other as friends in need and brothers bound by common fate, always sympathizing with and supporting each other. The Chinese Government and people cherish profoundly the traditional friendship between the two countries and stand ready to join the Pakistani side in further solidifying this friendly and cooperative relationship.

According to sources China and Pakistan being traditional partners, also began to strengthened consultation mechanism for promoting cooperation in the non-traditional security fields and working together for peace and development at all levels. “As a torn in the flesh of the U.S., a road to the Middle East and a trusted ally, Pakistan is almost indispensable for China”, stated Chan Akya. Interestingly, China-Pakistan strategic relationship is known by different names, some of the few well quoted definitions include: “All-weather friendship”, “Time tested friendship”, “Enduring, multidimensional and comprehensive relationship” and “Friendship is higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, and sweeter than honey.” Some of the important factors responsible for their convergence of interest include:

**India Factor**

Since independence, Islamabad has been formulating its foreign and security policies to protect itself against a perceived threat from India. On the contrary the

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179 John W. Garver, n.96, p. 347.
185 “Pakistan’s Relations with China”, [http://www.forisb.org/pak-majorpowers.html](http://www.forisb.org/pak-majorpowers.html)
Chinese tend not to perceive a serious threat from India. However, the asymmetry prevailing in its strategic move, the “India factor” serves as the foremost converging factor in China-Pakistan relationship. It is under this condition that Sino-Pakistan entente may be measured as an impact of Sino-Indian rapprochement. Therefore, “India factor” was responsible for the two countries to come together for a strategic alliance.

Right from the emergence of Pakistan as a separate nation, Pakistan showed deep security vis-à-vis India. On September 12, 1947, the then Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan himself became involved in drawing up plans to help the rebels to fight for Kashmir by proxy. The dominant urges for Pakistan wrote Zulfikar Ali Bhutto “Is to dispel the notion of seniority or superiority of Hindu India over Muslim India by creating a Muslim State equal and sovereign to the other State.” Thus, Pakistan formulated her defence and security requirements vis-à-vis India. “Our first concern was the defence of Pakistan against any possible aggression from India” wrote the first Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Mr. Ayub Khan.

Since then, Pakistan followed a strategy of “balancing through containment” to achieve parity with India. Therefore, in order to neutralise India, Pakistan cultivated friendship with China. The friendship nurtured way back in 1955 Bandung Conference continued to friendly “Sino-Pakistan entente cordiale.” The emergence of Sino-Pakistan entente was due to the deteriorating Sino-Indian relationship.

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188 John W. Garver, n.88, p.109.
189 John W. Garver, n.96, p. 333.
198 John W. Garver, n.96, p. 324.
For China, the situation was not much different. China continued to follow containment policy towards India through Pakistan. During the Cold War, the Chinese followed this strategy to isolate India diplomatically and weaken its influence in the region and also to exert pressure to a compromise settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute.\textsuperscript{199} This was followed by China pacifying Pakistan in the 1970s, especially after the 1974 India's peaceful nuclear explosion.\textsuperscript{200} China also has aspirations to be an Asian and ultimately a global power.\textsuperscript{201} Therefore, it would be futile to isolate Pakistan or to sacrifice Pakistan and concede South Asia as India's sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{202}

The stage was set by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visit to China on December 1988, as it opens scope for improvement in Indian-Chinese relations.\textsuperscript{203} China's merging point with India in the post-Cold War era covers a wide range of international issues – New Economic Order, disarmament and pollution.\textsuperscript{204} Besides this, the Chinese and Indian leaders are extremely sensitive to the alignment of the other vis-à-vis the U.S.\textsuperscript{205}

For India, “the Sino-Pakistan military relationship confronts India with a two-front threat” and also “blames the Sino-Pakistan military link for drawing extra regional powers in South Asia”, said Garver.\textsuperscript{206} And in order to maintain a balance under such situation, India stepped up its “Look East” policy and also pressures Beijing to disengage from missile and nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{207} The reason is simple. India fears that “China's expanding links with other South Asian countries will consummate “encirclement” against her, and on the contrary, China worries that India's dominating behaviour towards smaller southern Asian states may foreshadow efforts to impose regional hegemony.”\textsuperscript{208}

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\textsuperscript{201} John W. Garver, n. 96, p. 347.
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{203} John W. Garver, n.96, p. 323.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid, p.325.
\textsuperscript{206} John W. Garver, n.96, p. 333.
\textsuperscript{207} John W. Garver, n.88, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{208} John W. Garver, n.90, p. 16.
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Gwadar Port

The Gwadar port symbolises a major milestone in China-Pakistan relations. The port constructed in Balochistan’s vast coastline Pasni, lies at the mouth of the Gulf of Oman provides as an alternative to the Iranian port of Chahbahar.\textsuperscript{209} The objective of this port is to provide entry for goods for the Central Asian States and an exit point from Turkmenistan passing through Afghanistan, along with this a naval base for China.\textsuperscript{210} The Gwadar port is 290 miles west of Karachi and 160 miles southwest of Turbat, the capital of Makran.\textsuperscript{211} The port is build with help of Chinese engineers and financial assistance amounting to initial loan of $200 million.\textsuperscript{212} The Gwadar port also reduces the distance, it halves the distance between Xinjiang, the westernmost province of China, and it’s nearest accessible port some 2,000 miles.\textsuperscript{213} During the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Rongji visit to Pakistan on January 1, 2002, he termed “the Gwadar deep seaport project as a symbol of Pakistan-China friendship.”\textsuperscript{214}

Economically, the port also provides tremendous scope. From the point of view of Balochistan poorest province, the port with estimated arrear of 6 billion rupees ($100m) it open up new vistas for the inhabitants in terms of revenues and jobs.\textsuperscript{215} The Gwadar port link between Pakistan and the rich Central Asian Republic is destine to be a regions energy hub, as it further links with landlocked countries such as - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan; Gwadar will be traders paradise, Gwadar is investors heaven.\textsuperscript{216} However, Pakistan’s Finance Minister, Shaukat Aziz has been quoted as “We have covered every facet of relations, including political, cultural, defence, but on economic side a lot needs to be done” stated Shaukat.\textsuperscript{217} Interestingly, the economic significant of the Gwadar port became operational when the first cargo ship

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{209} Vikram Sood, “Lost Identity,” \textit{Hindustan Times}, New Delhi, April 18, 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{210} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{212} Dera Bugti, “The Tribes Arise”, \textit{The Economist}, Vol. 375, No. 8425, May 7-13, 2005, p. 25.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{214} “Pakistan China to Solidify Economic Ties: Shaukat”, \textit{POT}, Pakistan Series, Vol. XXX, No. 1, January 1, 2002, p. 17
\item \textsuperscript{215} Dera Bugti, “The Tribes Arise”, \textit{The Economist}, Vol. 375, No. 8425, May 7-13, 2005, p. 25.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Ibid, n. 211.
\end{itemize}
carrying 73,000 tons of wheat from Canada arrived at the Gwadar port on March 14, 2008.\textsuperscript{218}

**Divergence/Challenges in China-Pakistan Strategic Relationship**

As mentioned above Pakistan’s major concern of security is to maintain status quo vis-à-vis India. This forced Pakistan to lean towards Beijing, where the latter did not hesitate to accept such request as China too shares contentious issues with India. However, in the post-Cold War era many developments in the region changed the strategic alliances that China shared with Pakistan. So, the major focus here would be to look into the divergence in China-Pakistan strategic partnership. The divergence can be seen in the following cases:

**Kashmir Issue**

The Kashmir issue as a bond of contention between India and Pakistan existed since 1947.\textsuperscript{219} Since then, efforts to broker a solution were undertaken in different form and condition. For instance, the then Prime Minister of India is said to have written to the then Prime Minister of Pakistan in October 1947, saying “Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision regarding the future of this state to the people of the state is not merely a pledge to your government but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world.”\textsuperscript{220} However, Nehru’s urge did not materialise. A brief Indo-Pak conflict broke out in 1948, and ostensibly the issue got internationalised, as India is said to have opted for a peaceful resolution by taking it to the United Nations Security Council on January 1, 1948.\textsuperscript{221}

Regarding the significance of Kashmir issue for Pakistan, Salman Khurshid, wrote “the liberation of Kashmir is a sacred mission and at the same time equally

\textsuperscript{218} Saleem Shahid, “First Cargo Ship anchors off Gwadar”, http://www.dawn.com/2008/03/15/top6.htm
\textsuperscript{219} When Britain’s last viceroy of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, organised the partition of India he approved the incorporation of the state of Kashmir into India. Pakistan’s insistence that it should have been given control of the Muslim-majority state has given rise to a bloody and debilitating dispute that remains unresolved even half a century later. The fight for Kashmir, which began within months of Independence, resulted significant loss of life in both side. The dispute encouraged the growth of Islamic militancy, and caused lots of insecurity to India.
\textsuperscript{220} Mohammad Ayub Khan, n.194, p. 242.
important for Pakistan domestic policy." 222 And in order to accentuate this, Pakistan followed a "low intensity conflict". 223 This was again followed by 1965 Indo-Pak war. The war was started by Field Marshal Ayub Khan to resolve the Kashmir question. 224 During this time, Ayub Khan visited China in March 1965, where the Chinese is said to have extended its firm support for a plebiscite in Kashmir. 225 On the other hand, India remains willing to discuss the Kashmir issue in the context of "Simla Agreement." 226

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon explained the helplessness felt by Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir, they stated that, "The army kept the Kashmiri pot boiling by supporting an indigenous insurgency." 227 Like, when a riot broke out in Kashmir as a result of the disappearance of the hair of prophet's bear, the then foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, during Ayub Khan's tenure, taking the situation as an advantage encouraged the people of Kashmir to fight, Bhutto even said "The People of Kashmir were in revolt." 228 And in 1970s, Pakistan's President Yahya Khan visited China and got renewed Chinese assurance for Pakistan's cause in Kashmir. 229 Since then, Pakistan's preoccupation about Kashmir can be felt in all international forums, as Pakistan always tabled the issues. 230 "India had occupied Kashmir but she failed to capture the hearts of the hapless people living in the area and Kashmir Muslims are and will always be against the Indian hegemony", wrote Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. 231 The situation worsened once the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistani military intelligence along with affiliated Al-Qaeda slipped and began to launch their attacks. 232

For India, Kashmir is not merely an issue of preserving the integrity of India, but it's a matter of maintaining solidarity from the evil designs not only from Pakistan, but

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222 Ibid, p. 66.
225 Owen Bennett Jones, n.223, p. 74.
226 Salman Khurshid, n.221, p. 29.
also from the U.S. and China.\textsuperscript{233} Pakistan pursuing proxy war through terrorism and threat of conventional war at the backdrop of nuclear umbrella is two important concerns for India.\textsuperscript{234} Like, the 1998 nuclear tests by both countries plummeted to 1999 Kargil conflict, followed by India’s “Operation Parakram” (ten-month border mobilisation) in 2002.\textsuperscript{235} In spite of all these, Kashmir remains to be the main issue between India and Pakistan endangering peace in South Asia.\textsuperscript{236} Persistent infiltration in Kashmir cause concerns for India to firmly deal with Pakistan hostile attitude.\textsuperscript{237} The stand also becomes clear when on March 16, 2008, India’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Navtej Sarna, rejected the observations by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Dakar that Kashmir issue should be resolved according to UN resolutions. “The grouping had no locus standi to comment on Delhi’s internal affairs”, the spokesman has been quoted as saying.\textsuperscript{238}

Pakistan although being contiguous with Afghanistan, Iran, Russia and China, “nothing imposed a heavy moral and strategic burden like Kashmir.”\textsuperscript{239} Pointing the fingers to each others is common phenomenon between India and Pakistan. For instance at a press conference, Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riaz Khokar, “denied any cross-border infiltration from Pakistan and asks New Delhi to cease atrocities against civilians in Kashmir and return to the negotiating table for composite dialogue.”\textsuperscript{240} Mr. Khokar also stated that “Kashmir is the main source of tension between the two countries.”\textsuperscript{241} It is also commonly referred to as the “potential flashpoint.”\textsuperscript{242}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item\textsuperscript{233} Owen Bennett Jones, n.223, p. 74.
\item\textsuperscript{235} E. Sridharan, “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations: International relations theory, nuclear deterrence and possibilities for economic cooperation”, \textit{Contemporary South Asia}, Vol. 14, No. 3, September 2005, p. 322.
\item\textsuperscript{238} Jawed Naqvi, “Kashmir part of India, OIC told”, http://www.dawn.com/2008/03/17/top10.htm
\item\textsuperscript{239} “Comments: Making a Ram-Rahim Hospital at Ayodhya”, VI, \textit{POT}, Pakistan Series, Vol. XXXI, No. 262, Nov. 5, 2003, p. 4840.
\end{thebibliography}
Similarly, while addressing a Press Conference on July 4, 2003, President Musharraf said, “I personally feel that the best way of solving the dispute, ideally, is on a bilateral basis” he further said “the peace process should not be allowed to derail by incidents in Kashmir.” Contradicting Musharraf’s statement, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Rashid Ahmad, while addressing the Kashmir conference organised by the Anjuman Tubba Islam at Murree on July 13, 2003, has been quoted as saying that “Pakistan would not compromise on its integrity, freedom of Kashmir and the nuclear programme.” Pakistan’s President Musharraf also stated that “there will be no re-partition of ‘Line of Control’, and India will not yield an inch of Indian Kashmir.

The situation somewhat improved following Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting at the sidelines of the Islamabad summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in January 2004. Besides this, “Pakistan always stood for peace and harmony in the region and had always urged solution of all issues by peaceful means”, stated General Musharraf. Musharraf also stated that “There is no room for compromise on such issues and no leader has a right to make any deal on them.

China’s interest revived in 1950s when it saw the benefit of constructing an all weather road across Aksai Chin linking Xinjiang with Tibet. Ostensibly, a Chinese magazine is also said to have published a map showing the location of a road in Aksai Chin in eastern Kashmir. Pakistan’s venture towards China’s interest was expected, as Pakistan considered China as a strategic ally to achieve its aim of annexing Kashmir and

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244 “No Compromise on Kashmir, N-Programme: Rashid” VII, POT, Pakistan Series, Vol. XXXI, No. 175, July 24, 2003, p. 3415.
246 E. Sridharan, n.235, p. 322.
250 Owen Bennett Jones, n.223, p. 72.
balkanise India. Since then, Chinese provision of nuclear materials and missiles to Pakistan during the late 1980s and 90s encouraged Islamabad to wage a proxy war in Kashmir. And it is no secret that Pakistan’s ISI continues to support Kashmiri.

However, in early 1990s China tried to improve ties with New Delhi. The foremost reason is the fear of the spill-over of the combined Taliban and Al Qaeda activities in its own province of Xinjiang. Al Qaeda is also said to have been providing shelter and military-cum-religious training to the Uighur demanding autonomy in Xinjiang. Since then, of late, China has taken a neutral stand on Kashmir. The reason for China’s neutral stand on Kashmir is China’s fear of spillover of insurgency in Kashmir into its own Muslim dominated province of Xinjiang. Since Kashmir involves ideological, identity and territorial competition for both India and Pakistan. “China also began to categorically support the “Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination”. Since then, China no longer blindly support Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir. China also wishes that India and Pakistan settle their disputes through peaceful consultations and negotiations.

The Kargil crisis of 1999 exposed China’s changed attitude towards India and Pakistan. Unlike the earlier Indo-Pak conflict in which China vehemently supported Pakistan, however, during the Kargil conflict, China surprisingly showed a neutral stand. Not only this, China further stated that the Kashmir problem is the bilateral issue between

254 Mohan Malik, n.252, p. 20.
256 Ibid.
257 Dr. Rakesh Datta, n.251, p. 237.
262 Ma Jiali, “India’s China Policy after the Cold War” in Shen Qurong and Bhabani Sengupta, (eds.), China Looks at the World, (Delhi: Konark, 1999), p. 263.
India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{263} Kargil misadventure has been aptly termed as “Musharraf’s war” for it was General Musharraf who played a leading role in starting this war.\textsuperscript{264} It is stated that Pakistan carried out the Kargil to interdict the vital Srinagar-Kargil-Leh road.\textsuperscript{265} Ostensibly, General Musharraf is said to have embarked the war without Sharif’s consent or knowledge.\textsuperscript{266} The May 1999 war was said to be a limited one due to India’s restraint of not crossing the Line of Control.\textsuperscript{267} The war proved to be utter mistake from the part of military leadership Musharraf in miscalculating nuclear deterrence.\textsuperscript{268} The war was confined in Kargil sector only, as Pakistan is also not readily prepared for a full-fledged war.\textsuperscript{269}

Thereafter, Beijing modified its pro-Pakistan position on the sensitive Kashmir question, and the Sino-Pakistan \textit{entente cordiale} remains unchanged.\textsuperscript{270} During Kargil conflict, China’s Premier Zhu Rongji describes Kashmir as an “historical issue involving territorial, ethnic and religious elements” which, he said, need to “be solved only through peaceful means.”\textsuperscript{271} Similarly, China’s Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan meeting with Pakistani counterpart Sartaj Aziz, visit to Beijing on June 11, 1999, had said “The Kashmir issue is a complicated affair with a long history and should be, and could only be, solved through peaceful means.”\textsuperscript{272} In addition to it, during talks between Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Liu Jian and Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf in 2003, Jian said “We will continue to encourage and push both India and Pakistan to resolve this problem through dialogue and other peaceful means.”\textsuperscript{273}

\textsuperscript{263} “No Compromise on Kashmir, N-Programme: Rashid” \textit{VII, POT}, Pakistan Series, Vol. XXXI, No. 175, July 24, 2003, p. 3415.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid, pp. 83-84.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{270} John W. Garver, n.96, p. 325.
\textsuperscript{273} “Musharraf’s visit to boost ties says China”, \textit{VIII, POT}, Pakistan Series, Vol. XXXI, No. 262, Nov. 5, 2003, p. 4844.
About Kashmir issues, coercive force or military means alone cannot resolve the problem.\textsuperscript{274} Both leaders of India and Pakistan committed to break the deadlock on Kashmir and resolve the dispute under “Lahore Declaration.”\textsuperscript{275} Speaking to Kashmir leaders, including the President and P.M. of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in Rawalpindi, on December 22, 2003, President Musharraf “reaffirmed the primacy and the centrality of the Kashmir dispute for a durable peace in South Asia.”\textsuperscript{276} Besides this, at a joint press conference between President Musharraf and German Chancellor Schroeder, on June 30, 2003, the two leaders expressed complete understanding of all major international issues and called for “concerted efforts to ensure peaceful solution of all outstanding issues including Kashmir disputes.”\textsuperscript{277}

\textbf{Terrorism}

Terrorism and Pakistan’s role in this chain of network is of great concern for China. The reason is apparent – China’s fear about the growing Islamic fundamentalism in its own Xinjiang province. This is because the nature of the growing Muslim population is no longer insignificant as it began to take centre stage.\textsuperscript{278} In 1999, Pakistan was suspended from the Commonwealth due to its failure to check the menace of terrorism.\textsuperscript{279} But, after four years it was again re-admitted in 2004.\textsuperscript{280} Besides this, post-9/11 depicts a different scenario for China. Pakistan becoming a frontline state for the U.S. in the fight against terrorism made the situation even worst. Beijing believes that “Russia, India and Japan have all been big winners post-September 11 leaving China out

\textsuperscript{274} J.N. Dixit, \textit{Across Borders, Fifty Years of India’s Foreign Policy}, (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), p. 257.
\textsuperscript{275} “Pakistan, India were close to Kashmir Solution: Naik”, VIII, \textit{POT}, Pakistan Series, Vol. XXXI, No. 187, August 7, 2003, p. 3587.
\textsuperscript{279} Manavvar Alam, “Pakistan’s re-admission marks a new beginning”, \textit{Diplomatist}, Vol. 8, no.2, Second Quarter 2004.
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid.
in the cold.\(^{281}\) China is also discomfort with the ever expanding U.S. military power and presence in Southern Asia.\(^{282}\)

In order to check the menace of terrorism and its insecurity in its own province, China joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai.\(^{283}\) (See appendix – 2 for detail SCO Summit). The SCO guideline is based upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.\(^{284}\) Since then, the SCO made a remarkable achievement in confidence-building measures amongst the member states; formed a close coalition in fighting the destructive cross-border forces; and regional cooperation was promoted.\(^{285}\) The SCO also buttress the needs for effective regional stability and development in Central Asia.\(^{286}\) And the successful joint military exercise staged by China and Russia in 2005 within the framework of the SCO shows the commitment.\(^{287}\)

Interestingly, during July 5-6, 2005, SCO Summit in Astana focusing on security, energy and terrorism, India made a maiden participation, and similarly, Kazakhstan participated as an observant, this impinged Pakistan.\(^{288}\) Conversely, India vehemently opposed Pakistan’s presence in the organisation, as Pakistan and Iran too showed interest to join.\(^{289}\) However, as a matter of interest, China would not entertain India without letting in Pakistan, its ally.\(^{290}\) Prior to this, in order to secure access to Central Asian oil. In 1997, Beijing invested in Kazakhstan major petroleum company and plan to build a pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang to develop secure energy resources by a natural gas

\(^{281}\) Mohan Malik, n.252, p. 22.
\(^{282}\) Ibid
\(^{287}\) Ibid, p.53.
\(^{288}\) Indrani Bagchi, “India to take part in SCO summit,” The Times of India, June 23, 2005.
\(^{289}\) Ibid
pipeline connecting Siberia to China's northeast provinces. With this strategy in mind, China can not forsake Pakistan.

**Nuclear Issue**

China-Pakistan strategic relationship vis-à-vis nuclear issue have been a major concern not only for the neighbouring countries in South Asia, but also attracted much attention from the non-proliferation regime. This is because China's hand in assisting Pakistan is clearly visible. Evidence shows that a shipment of ring magnets for the use in the centrifuges in Kahuta was assisted by China. Besides this, China exported high-powered weapons and technology to Pakistan. The reason is obvious, "China sees a weak Pakistan as destabilising for the region", said Han Hua, a proliferation specialist at Beijing University. However, the M-11 missile transferred to Pakistan by China in 1990s raised much concern about China's role in the global problem of proliferation.

On August 25, 2002, China issued a revised set of regulations on the "export control of missiles and missiles related items and technologies." The regulation set forth measures for the export control of sensitive missile-related items and technologies and China's role as an active part in the international cooperation in non-proliferation. China also announced that its nuclear cooperation with other countries is limited and...
peaceful. However, in contrast, “China’s nuclear power industry played the leading role in assimilation of international nuclear non-proliferation norms”, writes W.X. Hu.

China’s nuclear assistance to Pakistan also become difficult to control, as the know-how acquired at one facility could be easily used at the other. Besides this, keeping such transactions under surveillance is not easy. According to James Woolsey, Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Beijing has consistently regarded a nuclear armed Pakistan as crucial regional ally and as a vital counterweight to India’s growing military capabilities.” This is because China’s nuclear proliferation to less stable states violates the norms and is undesirable.

Similarly, in order to tighten control over the nuclear technology Pakistan amended a law in March 1999, according to this revised law, “any export of nuclear, substances, radioactive materials...Equipment used for the production, use or application of nuclear energy including the generation of electricity”, needs to get an approval from Pakistan Atomic Energy Cooperation (PAEC). However, it is stated that the law could not conceal the fact about Pakistan’s involvement with China over nuclear secrets. This is because apart from China, Pakistan, for its nuclear arsenal and parts needs to buy in clandestine market.

Proliferation Issues

China became officially a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1992. The NPT system with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the

300 W.X. Hu, n.294.
304 Associate Press, 14 March 1999, as given in Owen Bennett Jones, n. 6, p. 217.
305 Owen Bennett Jones, n.223, p. 217.
most fully developed and effective non-proliferation device.\textsuperscript{308} China is also said to have signed the NPT because of the international community pressure.\textsuperscript{309} David Shambaugh stated, "Arms control reflects a realistic approach to international relations, not an idealistic or a structural one's."\textsuperscript{310} As China has grown economically more powerful in recent years nationalism has increased exponentially and is likely to result in increased defensiveness and assertiveness.\textsuperscript{311} Much before these, China has signed three regional nuclear-free zone treaties: Tlateloco (covering Latin America, signed in 1972); Rarotongo (covering the South Pacific, signed in 1987); and Pelindaba (covering Africa, signed in 1996).\textsuperscript{312}

Unlike China, Pakistan has signed the Convention in April 29, 1970, but has so far taken no decision on ratification.\textsuperscript{313} That is to say that Pakistan did not enter and remain outside the NPT regime.\textsuperscript{314} Besides this, Pakistan also agreed not to open its nuclear facilities for the IAEA inspection.\textsuperscript{315} Reason, Pakistan links its decision of not signing to New Delhi not signing.\textsuperscript{316} India refused to sign the NPT treaty by arguing that it is discriminatory between the haves and have-nots.\textsuperscript{317} India's stand became even
clearer as in a speech dated January 1997, in Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD) India’s Ambassador Arundhati Ghose said, “A test ban would make sense only if part of a specific time-bound procedure for carrying out disarmament.”

Interestingly, “Pakistan holds compliance with international treaties as being conditional on what India does” writes Aaron Karp. Besides this, the issue between India and Pakistan has been controversial and entrenched.

The main reason for the failure to contain nuclear spiral in South Asia can also be attributed to the irrelevance of the U.S. action on the question of CTBT. The CTBT was opened for signature in September 1996. However, the major constraint about the CTBT is the right of the declared nuclear-weapon states to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions (PNES). To this, China objected by stating that it would not sign unless there were provisions for review of a ban on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. China also demanded for a “no-first use” agreement as a precondition for signing the CTBT. However, on September 24, 1996, China signed the CTBT. The CTBT was designed to cover all types of underground, above surface and under water nuclear tests. China’s rejection about the CTBT is with regard to verification of a global test ban based on an international monitoring system.

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324 Bruce D. Larkin, “China and the Test Ban”, see http://www.learnworld.com/ZNW/LWRe.CTB.96.06.21.htm14/12/00.
However, the difficulties in curbing nuclear arsenals of Pakistan can also be attributed to the NPT being compliance in principles.\textsuperscript{329} This is because complication also arises due to the efforts now shifting to delivery systems rather than the nuclear and chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{330} Pakistan's foreign office spokesman Naeem Khan has been quoted as saying in Islamabad that "having its own strategic relations with the U.S., Pakistan would like to extend this cooperation in multiple fields as well, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy and space technology."\textsuperscript{331} China's missile technology transfers to Pakistan highlights the problems of regional security.\textsuperscript{332} The problem was added due to the dual-use of the missile technology and the difficulties for the member countries to withhold.\textsuperscript{333}

Therefore, the approach towards regional arms control should be base on security considerations.\textsuperscript{334} Although the concept of non-proliferation as defined by the policy of major powers discourages and prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{335} The failure to restrain India and Pakistan from going nuclear, projects the irony of such agreement.\textsuperscript{336} Pakistan's strategy writes Tarik Jan that it should acquire nuclear-power status to Pakistan; delay signing the CTBT until Pakistan has ample quantity of fissile material; continue nuclear tests until Pakistan have enough data to build upon research; do not stop civil application of nuclear explosions; and, go for thermonuclear explosions so that Pakistan can develop miniaturized nuclear warhead.\textsuperscript{337}

\textsuperscript{330} Ian Smart, "Untangling the Priorities: Weapons, Vehicles, and the Objectives of Arms Control", in Shelley A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp (eds.), \textit{Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia} (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 156.
\textsuperscript{332} Yuri Pinchukov, "Arms Trade and the Proliferation of New Military Technologies", in Shelley A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp (eds.), \textit{Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia} (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 21.
\textsuperscript{333} Christophe Carle, n.308, p. 49.
**Indo-Pak Nuclear Explosion: China’s Remark**

On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests. To this, Pakistan reciprocated by conducting 6 nuclear tests on May 28 and 30, 1998. Pakistan’s test highlighted China as the main contributor of Pakistan’s nuclear technology. In other words, China’s role in selling nuclear technology to “outlaw nations” — Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa, and Iran, became open. Besides this, the euphoric notions of Pakistan’s assertion “bomb in the basement” or the “Islamic bomb” became open as a result of the test.

For China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) analysts silent about Indian “regional hegemony” was alarmed by India’s May 1998 nuclear tests. The reaction was quick for China, it condemned India’s test. In addition to it, the situation between China and India also worsened due to the comment made by India’s Defence Minister George Fernandes, that “It was because of the threat emanating from China, India conducted the nuclear test.” The Chinese reacted with “strong words and anger.” The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman even termed the comment as “ridiculous and...

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343 P.R. Kumaraswamy, n.334, p. 129.
346 W.X. Hu, n.294.
347 Ibid
not worth refuting." The Chinese also termed the allegation as groundless fabrication without any substantive fact in it.

However, on the other hand, the Chinese approach towards Pakistan was totally different. It is stated that Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad immediately visited Beijing, soon after the Indian tests to get support from its traditional ally. Ostensibly, the Chinese government is said to have informed Shamshad Ahmad that China would not be in favour of Pakistan testing a device of its own. Besides this, Beijing also avoided siding with Islamabad publicly. And in addition to it, China expressed its “serious concern” about the test vis-à-vis peace and stability in the South Asian region. However, in spite of all these, China opted for a cautious response in dealing with Pakistan.

The response from the U.S. was also nothing less. On May 12, 1998, President Clinton condemned the Indian tests by stating that “the tests not only threaten the stability of the region, but also directly challenge the firm international consensus to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Interestingly, just after India’s tests, the U.S. sent a delegation to Islamabad headed by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, and the Commander-in-Chief of Central Command, Anthony Zinni in May 1998, Strobe Talbot is said to “offered a $5 billion package in economic and military aid to Sharif in return of showing restraint.” The test indicates the failure of the U.S. in restraining India and Pakistan in limiting nuclear and missile programme.

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349 Indian Nuclear Doctrine, para 4.3, http://www.meadev.nic.in/govt/indnuclid.htm#pr
351 Ibid
353 Ibid
356 Samina Yasmeen, n.352, p. 53.
In general, the test was viewed by Beijing as an attempt to subdue its all-weather friend Pakistan and a tool for nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat in South Asia. Similarly, the international response was equally objectionable. This is because the depth of conflicts between India and Pakistan, the leaders and defence planners cannot rule out another war. If by any means such conflicts occurred then, “the role of China would be a major concern for India.” Since then, the nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan have been subjected to a great deal of public attention. Thus, under such situation, China’s policy towards India and Pakistan vis-à-vis nuclear tests is guided by the sole consideration to prevent “South Asia from any possibility of conflict escalation.”

**Nuclearisation of South Asia**

China-Pakistan nuclear nexus has two elements: *First*, China’s approach towards India’s nuclear activities, and *second*, China’s covert nuclear assistance to Pakistan’ nuclear programme. Pertaining to nuclearisation in South Asia, Aaron Karp writes:

> China remains the most elusive element in regional disarmament hope. The short-run arms control agenda is dominated by bilateral issues between India and Pakistan. And for nuclear disarmament in South Asia ultimately will have to be pursued through a regional formula that includes China.

The annual report of India’s Ministry of Defence (1997-98) published after the nuclear tests noted that:

> China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and the sale of missiles and missile technology to Pakistan directly affect India’s security...There are credible and...

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360 W.X. Hu, n.294.
361 Ibid
w ell documented reports of outside assistance to Pakistan in these fields despite the existence of multilateral export control regimes, unilateral declarations of restraint and supply restrictions in producer countries.366

Thus, the primary feature of South Asian nuclear deterrence is ambiguous. A party involved in a conflict when unsure of its adversary’s capabilities, and considering its own capabilities, might decide to launch a first strike. In such a situation “first strike” could result from “nervousness” rather than “calculation”, writes Thomas C. Schelling.367 This could be more threatening for strategic standpoint. A country encountering a first strike would be left with no warning time prior to an attack.368 Although, the India factor in China-Pakistan helped in diverting international pressure from Islamabad to New Delhi.369 The risk of nuclear weapons for India gets locked in a nuclear rivalry with Pakistan.370 In the words of Ishtiaq Ahmad, “India’s tests and declaration of its status as a nuclear-weapons state altered the nuclear balance.”371

India and Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons increase tension in the region.372 Ramana and Mian calculated that: “The missile flight time of 10 minutes or less between India and Pakistan and with no reliable early warning of launch. The danger of use of nuclear weapons through accident or miscalculation in a crisis is high.”373 Besides this, from the regional security point of view, India provides an effective counterweight to China’s growing economic and military might in Asia, and should a new Cold War break

out between China and the U.S., India remains a figure of interest. That is India can not be ignored.\textsuperscript{375}

Table – 1 Pathways and Prescription for Avoiding Nuclear War in South Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paths to nuclear war</th>
<th>Factors affecting the likelihood of the pathway to nuclear war</th>
<th>Actions to reduce the likelihood of the pathway to nuclear war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Escalation of conventional war</td>
<td>India-Pakistan conventional war Balance of Conventional forces Vulnerability of nascent nuclear force</td>
<td>Crisis prevention and management Maintain balance of general purpose forces Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces improve command/control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pre-emption in crisis</td>
<td>Misperception/miscalculation War appears imminent and unavoidable Balance of nuclear force Misperception/miscalculation</td>
<td>Openness, transparency, predictability Crisis prevention and management Maintain vulnerability of nuclear forces Maintain ability to launch vulnerable forces on warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Accidental or unauthorized use</td>
<td>Procedures and devices designed to prevent accidents and unauthorized use Permissive Action Links Communication systems</td>
<td>Improve procedures and devices Improve communication systems Crisis prevention and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Initiation by a terrorist group</td>
<td>Terrorist groups access to nuclear weapons and delivery systems</td>
<td>Limit access to nuclear weapons and delivery systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Surprise attack</td>
<td>Extreme India-Pakistan hostility Balance of nuclear forces Vulnerability of nuclear forces Misperception/miscalculation</td>
<td>Strengthen incentives for peace Maintain balance of nuclear forces Reduce vulnerability of nuclear forces Achieve arms control/limit first strike Counterforce capabilities Ensure survivability of command and control system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table – 1 above elucidates Syed Rifaat Hussain’s five probable different causal paths that can generate condition leading to deterrence failure between India and Pakistan: Escalation of conventional war; Pre-emption in crisis; Accidental or unauthorized use; Initiation by a terrorist group, and Surprise attack. Analysts also argue that the prospects for strategic stability between India and Pakistan are decidedly bleak.\textsuperscript{376}


Regional Power Balance: China, Pakistan and India

India perceives China to be as much a part of the military calculus as its more proximate adversary, Pakistan. Although, China rebuke India for describing China as a threat in the region; Most maintain that India’s nuclear weaponisation represents a “direct threat” to China’s national security. However, the fact is that China assisting Pakistan has always been a concern for regional power balance. In terms of regional power balance, there exist “greater asymmetry” between India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan also see their conventional arms capabilities were deficient.

South Asia is being considered as the only place on earth where war between the two nuclear-armed states is a real possibility. China-Pakistan at one side and India on the other occupies the theater of power balance. However, the importance lies on how Pakistan uses China to confront India becomes a question of concern. This is because China enabling Pakistan to acquire nuclear technology altered the strategic affairs of South Asia. In addition to it, the leaders in Pakistan also maintain that Islamabad links its nuclear programme with India. And also showed concerns about India’s “Look East Policy.”

Therefore, how China, Pakistan and India play their role in the region obviously dictate the security environment in the region. The possession of nuclear weapons added

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380 John W. Garver, n.96, p. 327.
the feeling of insecurity in the region.\textsuperscript{387} Thus, it is necessary that India and Pakistan need to redefine their own security requirements, so that the need for nuclear capability decreases.\textsuperscript{388} But, apart from China, Pakistan’s strategic position for the U.S. represents a more equitable power of balance in the region.\textsuperscript{389} According to Brahma Chellaney, “only a strong India can be at peace with itself and its neighbours.”\textsuperscript{390} Besides this, the key challenge for India lies in how to adequately deter two nuclear adversaries China and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{391}

**Military Posture: China, Pakistan and India**

In order to understand the defence posture of China, Pakistan and India, a perusal at their military posture clearly distinguishes their strategic capability and strength.

### Table 2: Military Posture of China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Naval Forces</th>
<th>Air Forces</th>
<th>Strategic Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Major Equipment</td>
<td>Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6-12 Xia class, Julang-1 (capable to carry warhead)</td>
<td>Xia class, CSS-N-3 (Julang-1, Force 09)</td>
<td>China has a bomber force with 120 to 140 aircraft of two different models capable of carrying 120 to 130 nuclear bombs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{391} Ibid
Table – 2 above shows that China’s strategic forces include: four different land-based ballistic missiles, known as DF-2, DF-3, DF-4, and DF-5 (DF stands for “Dong Feng” [East Wind]). These missiles in the West is known as CSS-1, CSS-2, CSS-3, and CSS-4 (CSS stands for China, surface-to-surface) missile. The DF-1 was an early short-range ballistic missile which is now not of service. Similarly, the table also shows the Naval and Air Force of China. The major equipments of Naval include the Xia class, CSS-N-3 (Julang-1). Similarly, the Air Force equipments include H-6, Q-5, H-7, Xian H-6.

**Table – 3 Chinese Military Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total troops</td>
<td>3,030,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division: 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks: 9,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured vehicles: 2,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines: 97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers or Frigates: 56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other surface ships: 1,744</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Aircraft: 730</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers: 970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters: 4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other airplanes: 1,290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBMs: 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBMs: 90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table – 3 above shows the classification and the quantity of China’s total troops, ground forces, naval forces, air forces and nuclear forces as of 1993-94.

**Table – 4 The Military Posture of Pakistan and India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total no of Forces</th>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>Naval Forces</th>
<th>Air Forces</th>
<th>Strategic Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>550 MBT's</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>160+ various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Frigates, 10 Submarines</td>
<td>374 fighters</td>
<td>types of surface to surface missiles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table - 4 above shows the military posture of Pakistan and India. The table shows that Pakistan’s total number of forces consists of 620, with strength of 550 and 2,368 major equipment of MBTs. Pakistan’s Navy consists of 8 Frigates, and 10 Submarines. The Air Forces strength consists of 45,000 with 374 aircraft of different types. The strategic forces strength was attached with the ground forces. The major equipment consists of 160 (+) various types of surface to surface missiles.

Similarly, the military posture of India’s armed forces totaled 1.325 million, including an Army of 1.1 million, equipped with 3,988 tanks and some 2,050 Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs). The Navy comprises of 55,000 sailors with 1 aircraft carrier, 16 submarines, 8 missile destroyers, 11 frigates, 7 destroyer escorts, and 39 coastal patrol escorts. Likewise, the Air Force comprises of 170,000 airmen with 665 fighters, and 326 transport aircraft. The strategic forces of India consist of two strategic missile regiments with 75 Prithvi, and 20 Agni I and II missiles. Interestingly, India being nearly eight times bigger than Pakistan, has the world’s fourth largest army, fifth largest Navy and Sixth largest Air force. Thus, “the quantitative military balance with China and Pakistan is such that serious asymmetries could be created with the introduction to the region of high-technology weapons” stated Jasjit Singh.

The Changing Geo-Political Environment

China-Pakistan strategic relationship vis-à-vis India has been influence by numerous factors in the post–Cold War era. In terms of strategy, “China is convinced that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Forces</th>
<th>MBTs</th>
<th>SAMs</th>
<th>Main Equipment</th>
<th>Strategic Missiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.325</td>
<td>3,988</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>1CV,16 submerses, 8DDGs, 11 Frigates, 7FPGs, 39 PCE/PCs</td>
<td>75 Prithvi, 20 Agni I, II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>2,368</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>160 (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


India regards China as its major rival,” stated Ma Jiali, an expert on South Asia at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. This in turn led to a sort of disagreement and contention between India and China. Besides this, “[T]he crisis was caused by India’s ambition to become a world power” said Sun Shihai. Another factor is the U.S. recognition of India as a de facto regional dominance, which were not acceptable to Pakistan. However, the U.S. did not completely subtracted Pakistan from its security equation. In the 1990s Pakistan – U.S. cooperated during the Gulf crisis.

Another development is China’s relation with Russia. “Russia and China launched their first-ever joined war games in a show of military might.” The exercise will be carried out in the framework to fight against international terrorism and extremism to respond to new threats and challenges” the Chief-of-Staff of China’s armed forces Liang Guanglie has been quoted as saying.

China -Pakistan Strategic Involvement

During Pakistan’s President Musharraf’s visit to Beijing in October 2003, China and Pakistan signed 10 accords, including a preferential trade agreement. Prior to this, while talking to Balochistan Chief Minister Mohammad Yousaf in Quetta, the President of Chinese Meteorological Construction Company (MCC) Mr. Zuojin Hui declared that “MCC will invest $ 73 million in the Dohdar area of Lasbela district, some 625 km from the provincial capital.” Besides this, in order to meet the challenges in the field of economic and political aspects in the 21st century, China and Pakistan in a formal talk between Chinese President Hu Jintao and Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf

400 “US worried as Russia, China play war games,” The Times of India, August 19, 2005.
401 Ibid.
signed eight agreements on November 2003, including the first ever joint declaration for the future cooperation. 404

In addition to it, on March 11, 2004, Pakistan and China signed a historic agreement to expand air services between the two countries. 405 The agreement signed by Vice Minister China Civil Aviation Yang Guoqing and additional secretary Ministry of Defence in Pakistan Major-General Mohammad Ashraf Chaudhry enable the Civil Aviation of China (CAAC) and the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) to increase their operation on Karachi-Islamabad, Beijing, Urumqi and Shanghai routes. 406 Similarly, Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, while inaugurating a two-day international conference on “China and Emerging Asian Century” at Islamabad’s Institute of Strategic Studies on September 27, 2005, said:

Pakistan and China enjoy all weather friendship based on complete trust and confidence. Our friendship is rooted in the psyche and ethos of our people. From Khunjrab to Gwadar, the symbols of Pakistan-China friendship dot the landscape. The mega projects that we have undertaken with China’s help are like anchors that hold two countries together in trusted friendship. 407

Interestingly, leaders of both Pakistan and China have gradually begun to accept the reality of emerging India and shows sign of improving its engagement with India. 408

In addition to it, to secure the region, it is also the responsible of Beijing, Islamabad and India to work towards establishing strategic restraints. 409 Although, China’s seek to balance the entente cordiale with Pakistan against its new rapprochement with India have

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made the Sino-Pakistan relations more complex.\textsuperscript{410} But at the same time it is also clear that Sino-Indian thaw is not at the cost of Sino-Pakistan relations.\textsuperscript{411}

**Turning Point in their Bilateral Move: India-Pakistan**

Besides containing other major policy objectives related to nuclearisation and missile development in the region, the “Lahore Declaration” called for strengthening the mutual security and minimises uncertainty.\textsuperscript{412} However, barely a few weeks after the Lahore Summit, General Pervez Musharraf, while addressing the English Speaking Union in Karachi on April 12, 1999, rubbed the results of the summit of being nothing but “hot air” he even stated that “India is a hegemonic power and that low intensity conflict with India will continue even if the Kashmir issue is resolved.”\textsuperscript{413} This dictates that the basic adversarial orientation of the Pakistani establishment against India has not changed.\textsuperscript{414}

Further, India and Pakistan resumed peace process in February 2004, and after four months in June 2004, both sides had agreed to take a number of positive steps, including the setting up of a dedicated “hotline” between their respective foreign ministries.\textsuperscript{415} And after 60 years of animosity, the historical bus journey from Muzaffarabad to Srinagar on April 7, 2005, opened new Confidence-Building-Measures (CBMs) between Pakistan and India.\textsuperscript{416} The significance of the bus accord is that it facilitates traffic across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir and also enables people-to-people contact among the Kashmiris.\textsuperscript{417} Similarly, on July 25, 2005, trade between India and Pakistan open up, where the Indian trucks carrying fruits, vegetables and meat rolled

\textsuperscript{410} John W. Garver, n.90, p. 240.
\textsuperscript{415} Following the two-day talks at the Additional Secretary level that were held in New Delhi on 19-20 June 2004, a draft agreement handed over by India requiring both countries to work towards together, and to continue bilateral discussions and hold further meetings towards implementation of the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding of 1999. See www.Indianembassy.org/SouthAsia/Pakistan/MOU(Lahore0/21/1999).html
\textsuperscript{416} “Pervez: No one-sided concession on Kashmir,” Hindustan Times, April 13, 2005.
into Pakistan through the Wagah border.\textsuperscript{418} Pakistan's President General Musharraf stated that "the two countries should not give much important to the border issue."\textsuperscript{419} According to Pakistani scholar Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan began to show a reverse situation.\textsuperscript{420} Similarly, President General Pervez Musharraf, at the Asian African summit 2005, said: "Today Pakistan and India can be justly proud of showing sincerity, flexibility and courage that could lead to bilateral achievement of peace and harmony."\textsuperscript{421}

However, Pakistan portraying itself as the only country in the region to stand up to India's bullying needs to wear out.\textsuperscript{422} This is because the nuclear agenda and its predecessor to exercise the nuclear option increased the complexity.\textsuperscript{423} Any peace process between the two countries over Kashmir issue could also not proceed due to diplomatic predicament. Although, China began to show neutrality, according to Pakistan's Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, "Pakistan believed that the peace process with India was irreversible."\textsuperscript{424} Shaukat Aziz also stated that "Pakistan cannot wish away the Kashmir problem."\textsuperscript{425} In addition to it, India-Pakistan modernisations on the nuclear front undermine the peace process.\textsuperscript{426}

\textit{Confidence-Building and Threat Reduction Measures between India and Pakistan}

Confidence-building and Threat Reduction Measures (CBMs/TRMs) have a considerable track record between India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{427} It is stated that "Nuclear CBMs/TRMs" were included in the Memorandum of Understanding that accompanied the Lahore Declaration issued in February 1999.\textsuperscript{428} This is because it is difficult for India

\textsuperscript{418} "India-Pakistan Relations-Confidence Building Measures", \textit{Foreign Affairs Report}, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, vol.4, Nos, 7-9, July-Sept, 2005, pp. 18-19.
\textsuperscript{419} "India and Pakistan: Point of no return?" \textit{The Economist}, Vol. 375, No. 8423, April 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2005, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{421} Afzaal Mahmood, "Peace: Action, not words", http://www.dawn.com/2005/04/30/op.htm
\textsuperscript{423} Brigadier A.R. Siddiqui, "'India-Pakistan ties: A post-election scenario', \textit{Nation}, 18 March 1998; In similar line Lodhi stated Pakistan's notion about the BJP government, see, for example, Maleeha Lodhi, "Foreign Policy without Direction", \textit{The News} (Islamabad), 20 January 1998.
\textsuperscript{424} Khalleq Kiani, "Pak 'against' nuke proliferation," \textit{The Times of India}, August 10, 2005, p.30.
\textsuperscript{425} Ibid
\textsuperscript{426} Moeed Yusuf, "India's Triad: A Foregone Development", http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=2008/03/06/story_6-3-2008-pg3_2
\textsuperscript{427} P.R. Chari, "Strategic stability in South Asia: The role of Confidence-building and threat reduction measures", \textit{Contemporary South Asia}, Vol. 14, No.2, June 2005, p. 211.
\textsuperscript{428} The full text of the \textit{Memorandum of Understanding} may be seen in \textit{The Hindu}, March 22, 1999.
and Pakistan to eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery without proper control and guidance. 429 Besides this, although India pursues “no-first-use policy” with strict control over nuclear and missile related issues, Pakistan with “first-use policy” makes the situation worse. 430

Similarly, Track-II diplomacy between India and Pakistan plays an important role to deter war. 431 In addition to it, military CBMs basically “hotlines” between designated official would avoid the intricacies prevailing in nuclear installation and troop’s movement etc. 432 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commentators also expressed fear of an accidental nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. 433 In terms of bilateral dialogue India and Pakistan occupy a “zero-sum” game. 434 The growing fear also emanates from nuclear command falling into the hands of terrorist. 435 This is because as long as groups like: Harakat-ul-Ansar, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, etc. exists, it remains difficult for peace to cherish. 436 Besides this, South Asian countries were motivated for acquisition of weapons and expedite regional arms races. 437 Unlike Pakistan, for India, the threat also emanates from China. 438 It has been reported that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) vitriol deployment opposite India increased since 1990. 439

435 Mohan Malik, n.252, p. 21.
438 Brahma Chellaney, n.390, p. 67.
India-China: New Avenues in their Relationship

China and India in the post-Cold War era followed accommodative approach to normalise their relationship. The foremost include the task of finalising an appropriate framework for a final package settlement covering all sectors of the China-India boundary. In a speech by Chairman Li Peng on January 13, 2001, the Chairman explained about the fostering of cordial relationship between India and China. The Chairman has been quoted as saying that “in the 20th century mankind experienced two World Wars...History moved forward, India and China won national independence and liberation was two epic achievements of the century...And now, we are ushering in a better and more prosperous era.”

The precedence for Joint Working Group (JWG) was set forward by the then India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visit to Beijing in December 1984. This was followed by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visit in June 2003. The JWG signed between Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Wen Jiabao strengthened diplomatic success between the two countries. The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told the members of the media that “We [China] attach great important role of India in international affairs, and fully understand and support the Indian aspirations to play an even bigger role in international affairs including in the UN.” Besides this, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao describe his meeting with India’s P.M. Vajpayee at 2003 Asean Summit as significant and important. Apparently, latter in a Chinese official website, the Indian state (Sikkim) no longer figures out as Chinese territories. Both governments also agreed upon to speed

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Ibid
up the process of Line of Actual Control (LAC) demarcation involving 1, 25,000 square kilometers.\textsuperscript{448}

Again during the 2004 Laos Summit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and China’s Premier Wen Jiabao emphasis on growing friendly ties between the two neighbours.\textsuperscript{449} It is stated that Sino-Indian trade touched the ten billion mark in 2004.\textsuperscript{450} Similarly, in January 2005, India’s Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran received Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei at Hyderabad House, where the two discussed crucial regional and global issues.\textsuperscript{451} This was followed by Premier Wen Jiabao visit to India in April 2005.\textsuperscript{452} The visit was significant because it was during this visit the two sides emphasise for the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA).\textsuperscript{453} Besides FTA, a framework for a settlement of the issue on the basis of the “political parameters and guiding principles” on their long – standing border dispute was finalised.\textsuperscript{454} Again in 2006, China and India agreed to open up new Consulate General in Guangzhou and Kolkata respectively.\textsuperscript{455}

In addition to it, China agreed to look at sharing the intelligence with India in Kashmir and as well as the insurgency in the northeast.\textsuperscript{456} This is because China facing threat in its Muslim-dominated province of Xinjiang were not happy with the Al-Qaida networks involvement in recruiting Uighurs from Xinjiang for training camps and terrorist activities carried out in the province.\textsuperscript{457} Besides this, China began to follow neutral policy over Kashmir; the Kargil conflict is the best example.\textsuperscript{458}

\textsuperscript{448} Priya Ranjan Dash, n.446.
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid
\textsuperscript{452} Vishal Thapar, “Pranab sounds China caution,” \textit{Hindustan Times}, April 5, 2005.
\textsuperscript{453} “Free Trade is inevitable,” \textit{Hindustan Times}, April 5, 2005.
\textsuperscript{454} Pallavi Aiyar, “China, India: No ground given in border talks”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html
\textsuperscript{455} Cheng Ruisheng, n.440, pp. 86-87.
\textsuperscript{458} The Kargil war, which took place between India and Pakistan in 1999, was the first large-scale military engagement between any two nuclear weapon states. For the first time since 1971, India was compelled to use air force to launch attack against the infiltrators.
Thus, in the post-Cold War era, China and India enhance major thrust in economic, social and cultural relations. And also China’s recent attitude is that, “the India factor, which had played an important role in the improvement of relations between China and Pakistan, has been removed and readjustments have been made”, stated Ruishing. Gary L. Scott remarked that “international agreement acts an important indicator of a states action on the international scene.” All this aspects of the development between China and India signify that an important phase have reached for consensus in normalising their relationship.

Conclusion

China-Pakistan strategic relations stood against all odds and developed into a mature and enduring relationship. Their special relationship started with China playing the old political game of using Pakistan as an ally to deter India by transferring arms to Pakistan. However, in the post-Cold War era, Beijing’s peaceful rise is dependent on successfully accommodating other countries as well. Therefore, in order to accommodate this, “China needs to focus beyond its trusted ally Pakistan” writes Mohan Malik. Besides this, China-Pakistan relationship also witnesses various divergences in their relationship.

China faced with a threat of Uighur separatist in Xinjiang province began to be cautious about the growing Islamic fundamentalism and began to follow neutral policy on Kashmir issue. As a linkages can be trace out between the Uighur separatist and the Islamic fundamentalism active in Kashmir. Another point is that, China follow “good neighbourhood policy (mulin zhengce) in dealing with its neighbours.” The reason is obvious, China’s diplomacy in the post-Cold War cleverly blend political and strategic

China follows this policy of engagement basically to stabilise the Asian security.

China’s growing energy shortfall draws its attention towards the energy rich Middle East countries. Thus, it is under these circumstances that China abandoning Pakistan completely does not arise in its strategy. The Gwadar Port is one such notable example of China’s strategic move in this direction. To meet the challenges China also looks at the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang Province and the South China Sea. Therefore, “China’s primary foreign policy goal today is to weaken American influence relatively and absolutely, while steadfastly protecting its own corner” writes David Shambaugh.

In addition to it, although, China readily agreed to abide the various norms and regulation of disarmament, it’s nexus with Pakistan in missile and nuclear related issues still persist. This in turn makes the Indian counterpart to take more punitive measures while dealing with Pakistan and China. Interestingly, unlike Pakistan, its relationship with China has taken a new height in the post-Cold War era. In the words of Saeed Naqvi, “India wants to be the architect of the Asian security structure, and is unwilling to be treated as a piece of furniture in the building designed by the Chinese and American in Asia.”

Besides this, China with a GDP growth rate of 9.9% (totaling RMB 18232.1 billion, equal to U.S. $2225.7 billion) and per capita GDP (equal to U.S. $1700) in 2005, definitely have a major role to play in the region. Therefore, it is clear that China’s connection with Pakistan in the coming days is not going to be weaken. According to John W. Garver, “A prudent Chinese policy would sustain Pakistan against India.... To

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sacrifice Pakistan would be tantamount to conceding South Asia as India’s sphere of influence. 472 Thus, under such situation India without being able to stand up to China, will find it difficult to persuade Beijing to halt its containment of India or its clandestine nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan. 473

472 John W. Garver, n.90, p. 241.
473 Brahma Chellaney, n.390, p. 57.