CHAPTER-1
INTRODUCTION

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY: SITUATING STATES' BEHAVIOUR

Introduction
Foreign policy formulation is one of the main attributes of modern nation’s state existence. The capability to negotiate and influence at the bilateral, multilateral and international arena, whether political or economic outcomes is the hallmark of a nation states foreign policy practices. In other words, foreign policy is “the action and purposes of the state in the world beyond its own territorial boundaries” (Jones 1974: 1). Foreign policy formulation is, therefore, a priority of every state to define, influence and assert its existence in international politics. It is only when the state as an actor is adept to maximise its bargain at a minimum risk to its national interest that its foreign policy practice is deemed successful. It is in the pursuance of such national interest that states’ behaviour in matters of foreign policy is determined by both domestic and international constraints and compulsions.

The doctrine of foreign policy “emphasizes three forms of reality: the structural dominance of the state, the distinction between the domestic and the international aspects of politics, and the priority of the national interest” (Jones 1974: 1). To achieve its objectives, the state as an actor is influenced by its action, reactions, and interactions with other similar political entities called national states (Snyder; et al 1969:199). Such actions are the result of “processes analysis” that occurs due to continuous change and consequences (Snyder; et al 1969). Hence in the final analysis, “the purpose of state action, the form it takes, the processes which it initiates, or the societal sources from which it derives” are “determined partly by the goals towards which it is directed, partly
by the resources available to sustain it, and partly by the organisational and intellectual processes through which it was selected” (Rosenau 1969: 167).

While there have been various models and approaches of explanation towards states’ behaviour to foreign policy making, yet no definitive model or approach has been able to find a definitive answer on the issue of states’ behaviour and foreign policy making. The complexity and vastness of foreign policy as a subject as to what James N. Rosenau observed 40 years ago still holds true today. According to him, “taken together or singly, these areas present a number of substantive and methodological problems” (Rosenau 1969: 167). The reasons for this he opined is because

The interrelationship of the various aspects of foreign policy is so intricate that the societal factors which underlie state action are affected, through feedback, by the action itself, and thus operate differently as sources of future action. In short, like all behaviour, foreign policy action is sequential. It does not have a beginning, an existence, and an end. Rather, it is constantly unfolding, and at any given moment is partly a function of what it was previously and what it may become in the future (Rosenau 1969: 167).

And that,

...even if a workable model of foreign policy goals could be developed, there would still remain the difficult problem of distinguishing between ends and means. For every goal can also be viewed as a means to some other goal. Short-range objectives are instruments to the realisation of long-range objectives; specific ends are designed to serve more general ends; divergent goals are considered necessary to the achievements of unified goals; and so on. In other words, the same phenomena can be classified as both ends and means; and, of course, the way they are classified will significantly affect the interpretation of them. It makes a difference, for example whether one posits power as the goal of a society’s foreign policy, or whether it is regarded as instrumental to the achievement of other ends (Rosenau 1969:168).
It is in the ‘ends and means’ that the issue of foreign policy making has been a subject of intense discussion. Foreign policy making has been debated from two quarters. The first is the approach that was dominant in the 1970s, known as the Decision Making Approaches. Central to the Decision-Making approach is the explanation of foreign policy making through three models: (I) The Bureaucratic Model, (Allison 1971; Halperin 1974) (II) the Organisational Model (Janis 1972) and (III) the Cognitive Model (Holsti 1976; Jervis 1976). The second approach that dominated the 1980s are the two schools of systematic approach, the first is the Neo-Realist school of structural Realism (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981) and the other is the Neo-Liberal school of Institutionalism (Keohane 1984).

**APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY MAKING**

Within the European Union (EU), approaches to foreign policy making of the EU and its Member States has been a subject of constant debate since the advent of the European Community as an organisation in 1957 in the form of the European Economic Community (EEC). It is in the complexity of the EU as an entity that various schools of thought like the realist, neo-liberals, decision-making and other modern schools of thought have challenged each other’s theories.

When dealing with Member States relations with the EU, problems of defining foreign policy arises from both quarters of the Member State as well as within the EU. This often complicates not only in the explanation of theories but even in the practicality of functioning of the EU institutions on a day to day basis. This is more evident given that the delineation of authority, power, and processes within the EU institutions is complex and also overlapping with that of the national authority and lacks clear definition that often leads to confusion in defining the term ‘foreign policy’.

While the purpose of the EEC on its conception was to foster economic cooperation and growth in Western Europe, over time, political cooperation was incorporated within the Economic Community’s functioning for enhancing economic growth and removing disparities in the functioning of the internal market. Along with political cooperation, the
need to further enlarge the Community was felt necessary not only to expand the Western Economic zone but also to serve as a reminder to the then Communist bloc of the manifold benefits of the democratic and liberal markets of Western Europe.

With the end of the Cold War, there occurred two major changes within the European Community. The first is the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union in 1992 and the second is the enlargement of the Union in 1995. With the Treaty of European Union, the functioning of the European Community and the Single European Act (SEA) was completely overhauled by the institution of a new legal framework in the form of Three Pillars within the new European Union (The European Community, The Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs). The enlargement in 1995 is important for it happened soon after the end of the Cold War, thus increasing EU membership from twelve to fifteen. It was in these new developments that the Member States' relations with the Union were tested by the various challenges of democratic deficit, institutional reform, budgetary allocation, and most importantly the issues of deepening (more integration and institutional building) and widening (increasing membership) the EU.

While such challenges are perennial within the EU, outside-at the international level- the EU has been constantly trying to portray itself as a viable international actor. It is in search of such a role that on many occasions its role clashes and entangles with that of the Member States especially in the domain of the ‘second pillar'-that is, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP which was to be achieved and coordinated through an Intergovernmental level was however complicated by the complexity of definition of the term ‘foreign policy’ and ‘security policy’. An ambiguity arises in the functioning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union when the concept itself is a matter of reluctance for Member States to wholly subscribe to the EU foreign policy and the simple fact that it was instituted at an intergovernmental level indicates that ‘common foreign policy’ as an important identity of the EU is still fragile in the international arena.
When it comes to foreign policy, concepts of sovereignty and national interest come foremost into constructing a debate. Likewise, within the EU, Common Foreign Policy when translated into action means that Member States will have to forgo a part of their sovereignty and national interests to Brussels. It is in these circumstances that foreign policy decision within the EU has either been hampered by lack of agreement, delay in taking action, or lowest common denominator if at all any decision is taken comes into effect. Although foreign policy is done at an intergovernmental level, various institutions like the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Presidency among other in a limited way shape foreign policy making decision within the Union.

Outside the EU institutions, Member States shape EU foreign policy through their respective national agencies like the parliament, bureaucracy, oppositions and interest groups. Thus, overall foreign policy making in the EU taken as a whole is complex, intertwined and therefore difficult to identify with any particular theory of foreign policy analysis.

It is in the pursuance of such an understanding of the EU foreign policy vis-à-vis its Member States that this chapter will try to understand the various theories of foreign policy within the realm of international relations in general and Britain-EU relations in particular.

A. The Realist/Neo Realist and Neo-Liberal Approach
The Realist/Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberal approach as theories of foreign policy making in international relations does not explain much in detail about the internal dynamics of foreign policy Decision-Making. However, the main issues of these two theories are their identical sets of argument towards the state. Drawing from their general argument as given below, we can proceed towards a greater understanding on their view on foreign policy making. According to these two schools:

- The State is the primary actor in an anarchic international system,
- The States are constrained by international environment,
Foreign policy is determined by interest of the dominant societal actors, and

The State will trade part of its authority in order to exert influence.

Thus as White (2001) argued that:

...By the 1990, it must be said the difference between realist and institutionalist (Neo Liberals) had been blurred. New versions of both theories brought them closer together. In particular, both now accept the anarchic nature of the international system and both states rather than the actor (highlighted in earlier institutionalist account) as the key actors within the system. While these theories remain divided by their concern to explain two very different international outcomes—conflict and cooperation—they are united by a common structuralist approach to explaining actor behaviour (White 2001: 30).

It is in this analysis that both Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberal “opt for a systemic approach to theory, which focuses on the external structural conditions under which governments make foreign policy decisions, consciously neglecting the impact that the internal (domestic) attributes of the units may have on the choices of actors” (Hasenclever; et al 1997: 28). This is particularly true when taking into account the emphasis on the internal attributes of the units by the other approaches as discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

i) The Realist/Neo-Realist Approach:

Realism as first developed by E.H Carr and Hans Morganthau gained prominence with the Neo-Realist school of Kenneth Waltz, Robert Jervis, John Mearsheimer and Robert Gilpin among others. Both Realist and Neo-Realist argues that “the international system is the structure that determines the behaviour of state within it” (White 2001: 30). The State as a main actor in the international system, its basic function is to protect its sovereignty and national interest and “power” is the main criteria of comparison in its relation with other states.
Therefore, as a ‘state-centric’ approach, ‘power’ is an important criterion in this definition of the international system. The state is thus taken as “a single, coherent actor pursuing clear national interest in a rational manner, with varying degrees of success according to the talents of particular leaders and the constraints and circumstances” (Hill 2003: 6).

Such views by the realist school were contested and criticised by the growing trend of systematic and detailed study of foreign policy, also known as Foreign Policy Analysis, which agrees that though the state will remain as an important actor in the international system other agencies like the bureaucracy, pressure group, specialised organisation among others also influence foreign policy making. It is however in the failure of Realism to explain the sources of ‘power’, “the idea of rationality, coherence, international interest and external orientation” (Hill 2003: 6) that led to the reorientation of realism in the form of Neo-Realism which is attributed to Kenneth Waltz as the main architect.

The basis of Waltz neo-realism was a better explanation of the different structures from which power originated. To him, the state remains the sole actor in the international system; the system is still anarchic and that ‘balance of power’ and ‘self help’ operate at the international system. Though both Realist and Neo-realist explained the nature of the state in the international relations, yet, they lacked explanation towards the importance or functions of the state’s internal dynamic (the bureaucracy, leadership, organisation) in understanding foreign policy formulation. According to the Realist and Neo-Realist school of thought the State as an institution exists in two environments i) the Internal Environment and ii) the External Environment. However, it is argued that there is a difference in their function for Realism and more profoundly in Neo-Realism where the external environment of the State is given priority over the internal environment. Such overlooking of the internal environment by the Realist/Neo-Realist can be explained by the fact that their treatment of ‘foreign policy’ as a subject in international relations is more concerned with the domain of domestic environment rather than its external
domain. Thus, in other words, autonomy of the state to frame and influence its national interest in the form of foreign policy goals is an immediate concern for the neo-realism.

It is true that foreign policy decision-making is solely within the realm of the internal dynamics of the State like bureaucracy, leadership and organisation. To the Neo-Realist theorists, internal dynamics are typical 'black box' for which they are not concerned. To them, the International System is taken as a whole and States act as units or actors of this System. It is the International System as a whole that shapes and influences the Units on how they should behave and influence each other as this will ensure each States own survival. Therefore, if any interaction between Units exists, such interaction is channelled and influenced through the process known as foreign policy.

Figure 1 illustrates that national interest is the main concern of realist theory. National interest can be defined specifically in the form of national security which derives its input from the two quarters of military interests and strategic interests. In this scheme of things, a gamut of military, economic and other domestic interests and preferences which are important to national security are finally filtered towards the Decision Making Unit which deliberate to produce a Policy Output in the form of Foreign and Domestic Policies that are in consonance with the country’s national interest. It is therefore assumed that the actor’s preference has always been guided by its national interest and this assumption holds true throughout the history of relations between states.

Basic to the understanding of Realist and Neo-Realist interpretation of the foreign policy is their assumption of the state in international relations as given below.

- The State is a central unit in international relations and is legally sovereign in the sense that it does not recognize a superior body in the international system.
- The State exists in the world composed of other, similarly characterised, territorial, sovereign political units which are characterised by central decision-making and enforcement machinery.
• In this system other bodies such as Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Trans-National Corporations (TNCs), Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) etc are secondary to the State as are the countless activities which take place within the State such as economic, social and cultural transactions.

• The anarchic nature of the International System has meant that emphasis has been placed on diplomacy, military power and strategy (traditional tools of the state) when conducting relations with other States.

• This has meant that States have been obliged to look after their own interests and pursue them employing their own resources, that is, ‘Self Help.

Figure 1: Foreign Policy Making: The Realist Model

Waltz’s Neo-Realism has been especially criticised that it failed to recognise the importance of the sub-systemic in the international system in shaping the actor’s preference. In other words, Waltz’s shortcoming is his dismissal of the significance of the
decision-making influences and other state-level phenomenon in policy making (Hagan 2001: 5).

Moreover, by explaining the state level through reductionism and by emphasising on the anarchic nature of the international system and the importance of systemic structure in explaining the actors’ preference, Waltz ignored the role of the domestic constraint and leadership response of an individual in decision making, thus assuming foreign policy analysis as “divorced from the context of international politics” (Hagan 2001: 5) and “that all leaders would readily understand them and respond according to their state’s position in the system” (Hagan 200: 5).

ii) Neo-Liberal Institutionalist Approach/Functional Theory of Regimes

The dominance of the Realist theory in the 70’s was challenged by the Liberal Institutional approach as developed by Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Oran Young, Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala. According to Brian White, Liberal Institutional approach “rather than focusing on actor-generated behaviour, provides an explanation of actor behaviour as a function of the international institutions or other structures within which actors are located”. Like the Neo-Realist, basic to the understanding of the Neo-Liberal institutional approach is their explanation of the international system in terms of regimes and institutions. Like the realist theories, the Neo-Liberal Institutionalist also argues that:

- The international system is in a perpetual state of anarchy and conflict.

- But unlike the realist approach where the state is self interested and seek to maximise its power and operates under the self-help system, the Neo-Liberal Institutionalist believes that states are as Hobbseian in nature as portrayed by the realist school, however, the states try to help each other in a situation of anarchy and disorder and therefore try to develop regimes and institutions which are agreed upon by every member. Thus, such
regimes are defined by principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.

- Foreign policies as well as international institutions are to be reconstructed as outcomes of calculations of advantage made by states. These calculations, in turn, are informed, though not exclusively determined, by preferences (utility functions) of actors (Hasenclever; et al. 1997: 23).

According to the Neo-Liberalist, apart from the role of “power”, they also emphasise the role of international regimes in helping states to realise common interests. By such account, the neo-liberals “portray states as rational egoists that care only for their own (absolute) gains” (Hasenclever; et al. 1997: 23). Accordingly,

They portray regimes as both effective and resilient. Regimes help (self interested) states to coordinate their behaviour such that they may avoid collectively sub optimal outcomes, and states can be shown to have interest in maintaining existing regimes even when the factors that brought them into being are no longer operative (Hasenclever; et al. 1997: 23).

Based on such an assumption, it is argued by the neo-liberals that despite the unstable and anarchic nature of the international system, “cooperation” is possible. Robert Keohane, who is the major pioneer of regime theories, in his *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* agrees with the realist assumption that states are important actors in world politics, and that they are rational, egoist and self-interested and whose goal is to maximise its own interest. Thus like Waltz, Keohane opts for a “systematic approach to theory, which focuses on the external structural conditions under which governments make foreign policy decisions, consciously neglecting the impact that the internal domestic attributes of the units may have on the choices of actors” (Hasenclever; et al. 1997: 28-29). He also agrees that States’ behaviour is also influenced by the degree of power and distribution of wealth. In other words, the international political economy and its microeconomic theory is important to the systematic approach
of theory generation. He, however, observes that despite the traits of egoism in the actors' behaviour there exists rationality in state's behaviour.

...rationality means that (actors) have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximise their utility functions in view of those preferences. Egoism means that their utility functions are independent of one another: they do not gain or lose utility simply because of the gains or losses of others (Keohane 1984: 27).

In other word "egoism" is an agent for interdependence between states. It is the concept of self-interest that "allows the well-being of others to enter positively into actors' utility functions" (Hasenclever; et al 1997: 30).

The result of such utility functions is the "contractualist theory of regime which operates under a specific situational precondition (that is) the states that are active in the issue-area concerned must share common interests which they can realize only through cooperation" (Hasenclever; et al 1997: 30). To him, "cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests. In such situations, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of the other" (Axelrod and Keohane 1986: 226). Such cooperation exists under mutual adjustment which is the result of "a process of policy coordination" (Hasenclever; et al 1997: 32).

It is thus assumed that "common help" rather than "self-help" promotes the actors' interests. It is however to be noted that "common interests" of two actors as such are not identical rather it is the "presence of a mixed-motive situation" and "that it is not interests (preferences over outcomes) that are adjusted when states cooperate, but policies (preferences over actions)" (Hasenclever; et al 1997: 32). Thus, the Neo-Liberal institutionalist focuses on the international regimes that help states create an institution to promote common interests while maintaining that such common interest does not affect its own interests.
To further illustrate Keohane’s thesis, cooperation under the anarchic system is possible and when states opt for “common help”, they rather restrict themselves to a “self help” system. It is through this “common help” that actors’ preferences are generated over time when they realize that as a group it is easier to achieve their own individual “national interest” rather than isolate themselves in pure power play and “self help’ system. To explicate this point, the idea of game theory is most apt as explained in Kenneth A. Oye’s *Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies* that dwells on the possibilities and limitations of cooperation under the anarchic system (Oye 1985). Basic to his explanation is the structure of “Payoff” which is at times of “Mutual” and “Conflicting Preferences”. Here the games of “Stag Hunt”, “Chicken” and “Prisoner’s Dilemma” are played for each player understood that “cooperation is necessary to the realisation of mutual benefits” (Oye 1985:7).

However, such payoff differs according to certain conditions, such as cooperation, mutual benefits and defection (Oye 1985). In every situation, the actor’s preferences are judged by their estimation of the other player’s preferences and assumed choices. This can be more exemplified by taking the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma into consideration as shown in Fig 2 above. For a “mutual benefit to exist, actors must prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD). For coordination to be necessary to the realisation of the mutual benefit, actors must prefer unilateral defection (DC) to unrequited cooperation (CD)” (Oye 1985:6). However, such games differ in their payoff and at times result to “no incentive” due to cheating or preference of CD to DC.

1*Stag hunt* is a game which describes a situation in which two individuals go out on a hunt. Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag.

*Chicken*- The game of Chicken models two drivers both headed for a single lane bridge from opposite directions. The first to swerve away yields the bridge to the other. If neither player swerves, the result is a costly deadlock in the middle of the bridge, or a potentially fatal head-on collision. It is presumed that the best thing for each driver is to stay straight while the other swerves (since the other is the "chicken" while a crash is avoided). Additionally, a crash is presumed to be the worst outcome for both players. This yields a situation where each player, in attempting to secure his best outcome, risks the worse.

*Prisoner’s dilemma* is a type of non-zero-sum game in which two players can "cooperate" with or "defect" (i.e. betray) the other player. In this game, two prisoners are kept separately for interrogation. The only concern of each individual prisoner is maximizing his/her own payoff, without any concern for the other player's payoff.
Likewise, no mutual benefit can be realised in a situation of “Deadlock” when the actor prefers nominal DD to nominal CC. Moreover, different game brings about a different level of payoff in a certain situation. For example, “cooperation will be likely in Prisoners’ Dilemma than in Stag Hunt or Chicken” (Oye 1985: 6).

**Figure 2: Prisoner’s Dilemma**

![Prisoner's Dilemma Diagram](image)

**Note:**
Number left (right) of comma refers to A’s (B’s) preference ordering (1=worst outcome; 4=best outcome)

**Source:** As reproduced from Andreas Hasenclever et al (1997), *Theories of International Regime*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 31

Apart from the ‘Payoff Structure and Cooperation’, Oye discusses “how the prospect of continuing interaction affects the likelihood of cooperation... how strategies of reciprocity can provide direct paths to cooperative outcomes under iterated conditions; and suggests strategies to lengthen the shadow of the future” (Oye 1985: 3). This he termed as ‘Shadow of the Future: Single Play and Iterated Games,’ where “recognition and control capabilities-the ability to distinguish between cooperation and defection by others and to respond in kind-can affect the power of reciprocity and suggests strategies
to improve recognition capabilities" (Oye 1985: 4-5). In the last section of the article, ‘Number of Players: Two-Person and N-Person Games,’ he explains why “cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of actors increases; the present strategies for promoting cooperation in N actors situations; and offers strategies for promoting cooperation by reducing the number of actors necessary to the realisation of common interests” (Oye 1985: 4).

Therefore, cooperation is the main theme for the Neo liberals and emphasise on the “inertia and the inability of states to respond to international changes in the most efficient way” (Gustavsson 1999: 78) and thus argue that states form an institution to mitigate conflict and help to facilitate international cooperation and order.

It is to be noted that in term of foreign policy analysis, both the neo-realist and neo-liberal approach are limited in their explanation of the policy-making processes. Criticism of the Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberal School has been on account of their failure to accept the basic functions of the sub system (i.e. the political system) and their overlooking of the domestic politics as an agent of foreign policy making.

Though different in their outlook towards the nature of actors’ preference towards payoff, in the area of foreign policy, yet both agree that the source of foreign policy making is exogenous in nature. They believe that the state as a unitary actor is responsible in its actions and in dealing with another actor, and all its foreign policymaking is influenced by the external happening outside its domestic politics. In other words, the social conditioning in the international system influences policymaking. Thus, the most important similarity is their “shared commitment to rationalism, a meta-theoretical tenet which portrays states as self interested, goal-seeking actors whose behaviour can be accounted for in terms of the maximization of individual utility” (White: 30). Both agree that foreign policy is the outcome of calculations made by actors according to the perceived preference and advantages (White: 30).
B. The Decision Making Approach

Decision-making approach in the study of international politics was first articulated by Richard Snyder and his colleague in 1954. However, with the emergence of the Neo-realist and Neo-Liberal School in the 70's and 80's, Decision making approach was almost pushed out of the realm of theories in the study of foreign policy making. With the shortcomings of the Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberal along with the change in international politics in the early 90's, decision-making approaches or Foreign Policy Analysis as it is known began to gain ground again.

Foremost in the decision-making approach is the importance given to the sub system or units and their capabilities in influencing the decision making in the area of foreign policy making. In the Decision making approach, though the role of domestic and international factors in influencing foreign policy behaviour are taken into consideration, it is however argued that these influences are “necessarily channelled through the political apparatus of a government that identifies, decides, and implements foreign policy which is configured in various ways depending on the nature of the problem and the structure of the government” (Hermann 2001: 47). Therefore it is concluded that foreign policy is a response not only

...to perceived aspects of the international environment, but is also very much a result of the prevailing state executive-legislative relations. In other words, foreign policy action is a product of decisions, and the way decisions are made may substantially affect their contents (Rosenau 1969: 169).

Basic to these arguments within the decision making approach is their focus on the analysis of sub system as a variable of decision-making. Within this system of analysis there are factors that affect action of the state which include both external and internal settings (Snyder; et al 1969: 203). External setting is usually referred to factors and conditions that are beyond the territorial boundaries of the state and societies (Snyder; et al 1969: 203). The internal settings are the factors and conditions that are usually referred to as “domestic politics”, “public opinion” or geographical positions” (Snyder; et al 1969: 203). In this approach both the external factors as well as the domestic politics along with the ‘non-governmental’ factors such as ‘cross-cultural’ and ‘social...
relationship' are given due importance in the analysis of the system. It is based on such factors that decision makers “act upon and respond to conditions and factors which exist outside themselves and governmental organisation of which they are a part” (Snyder; *et al* 1969: 203).

The factors that influenced foreign policy making according to the decision making processes no doubt involves a high degree of external conditioning as argued by the neo-realist and the neo-liberals. However, it is not only external conditions that influences foreign policy making, it is the internal or domestic politics that also influences decision making in the matter of foreign policy.

The internal conditioning involves a high degree of interaction between units within the system. Within the units, the role of individuals and the role of an organisation cannot be ignored. In brief, the role of leadership, bureaucracy and organisation within the system to a great extent influences foreign policy making. This is because in any democratic form of governance, decision is never authoritarian. Though individual leadership and charisma might, to a large extent, influence a majority of the decision-making, but overall, it is the interaction of the inputs and the outputs that flows out of “social behaviour through which values are authoritatively allocated within a society” (Easton 1965:57) that decision-making is performed.

Therefore, in any political system, decision-making is the result of conditioning both by the internal and external environment. It is based on such conditioning that ‘demands’ and ‘support’ which form an ‘input’ for the political system and provide the political system with the choices and alternatives to take ‘decisions’ and ‘actions’ accordingly (Easton 1965:57). To facilitate such decision making within the political system is the role of the facilitator in the form of bureaucracy and the intellectual expression and lately the role of the pluralist organisation or Non–Governmental organisation, as it is known, is also taken as a yard stick in measuring the factors that influence foreign policy making. Such roles by these organisations are more evident in the areas of environment, anti-nuclear and anti-war. To this the role of the green movement in Germany is a notable
example. The Green party which emerged from the student protest movement of the 1960s, the environmentalist movement of the 1970s, and the peace movement of the early 1980s was able to win its first representation to the Bundestag in 1983, and from 1998 to 2005 it formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (Encyclopedia Brittanica 2007). The rise of the Green Party was mainly attributed to the combination of concerns for both international and local environmental issues where public attitudes toward environmental protection changed dramatically in the early 1980s, when it became known that many German forests were being destroyed by acid rain (Encyclopedia Brittanica 2007). By the mid 1990s when issues like climate change was started to be taken seriously, Germany with its strong environmental based NGO in the form of Greenpeace, Friend of Earth became the forefront nation where environmental issues were aligned to foreign policy making at the EU level.

Basic to the understanding of the decision making approach is the application of the various models by which decision making is thought to have be influenced. The use of the Rational Actor Model (leadership is important (Holsti 1976; Jervis 1976), Organisational Process Model-specialized people/groupthink (Janis 1972), Bureaucratic Politics Model (Allison 1971; Halperin 1974), and Pluralistic Bargaining Model is important in the understanding of the Decision making approach.

Based on these models, decision-making approach is dissected to lead us to recent development of research in the units of the systems. The main focus is on the role of bureaucracy, leadership, organisation, group dynamics, coalition and pressure groups in influencing foreign policy making. This branch of study is identified as a Decision Unit Approach.

Margaret G. Hermann (2001: 58) has identified few of the important scholars dealing with this approach. They are ‘T Hart (1990); Maoz (1990); Vertzberger (1990); Bende and Hammond (1992); Khong (1992); Welch (1992); Caldwell and Mc Keown (1993); Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam (1993); Hagan (1994); Kupchan (1994); Hermann and Kegley (1995), Hudson (1995); T’ Hart, Stern, and Sundelius (1997); George and George
According to Hermann (2001), though most of this literature does explain how foreign policy is made, yet most of them do not facilitate our understanding of foreign policymaking by treating them as separate, complementary framework for explaining the essence of decision and much of the decision-making literature, as well as international relations, has focused on the constraints that limit what decision unit can do, failing to take into account the variety of ways in which those involved in policymaking can shape what happen. Decision units are often active participants in the making of foreign policy (Hermann 2001: 48-49).

Therefore, the main framework of the decision units approach is to:

1. view decision making as responding to foreign policy problems for decisions;

2. focus on three types of authoritative decision units (Leader, Single Group and Coalition);

3. define the key factors that set into motion alternative decision-making process. When alternative decision processes is linked to particular outcomes, an approach to the study of foreign policy decision-making is possible (Hermann 2001: 52).

In Figure 3 below Margaret Hermann demonstrated how the inputs to the framework "represent the stimuli from the international and domestic environments to which the authoritative decision unit is responding" (Hermann 2001: 52). The figure shows how through decision units approach government make foreign policy and how agencies like predominant leaders, single groups, and coalitions are involved in the process. In a scenario crisis in foreign policy, the governments often organise their foreign policy
bureaucracies to allow policymakers to monitor certain areas for problems (Hermann 2001: 53). As and when the problem is recognised, decision units like the foreign policy bureaucracies are generally convened by the government to deal with the problem (Hermann 2001: 53).

Figure 3: Decision Units Framework

According to Margaret G. Hermann, in exploring how policy decisions are made, it is therefore important to first start with a problem that needs addressing. In this respect, the decision units framework is the reason for looking into these problems (Hermann 2001: 53). Moreover, Hermann argues that in addressing the decision unit framework “…Not only is the foreign policy problem the initial stimulus or input into the framework, attributes of problems provide us with helpful information in identifying the authoritative decision unit and some ideas about the options under review” (Hermann 2001: 53-54).
C. Alternative Approaches

In the explanation of the International Relations theory and the CFSP, Adam Bronstone agrees with Michael Smith that there is no single theory that can monopolise an understanding or explanation of the EU’s CFSP. The reason he opines is that when it comes to the EU, even the “realist” approach adopted by Werner Feld (1981), Caroline Webb (1983) or Christopher Hill (1983) and the “classicists” approach of Roy Ginsberg (1989) and others displayed their weaknesses “not only in the specifics of their explanation of the creation and evolution of EPC, but in the general theoretical tradition from which these understanding derive” (Bronstone 2000: 165). This is more evident when the “quasi-intergovernmental nature of the Political Cooperation, coupled with the ever increasing communitarianism of this same approach is such that difficulties occur when approaching this issue from the ‘realist’ or ‘neo realist’ perspective” (Bronstone 2000: 165). Moreover such complicity in explanation of the CFSP from the above two approaches is because of their persistence in the primacy of the state as international actor while on the other hand the role of non-state actors such as international institutions is gaining prominence (Bronstone 2000: 165). In the EU, Bronstone agrees with the ‘realist’ and ‘neo realist’ view that Member States play an important role in the function of the CFSP, but at the same time it is also to be noticed that the role of other institutions in the European Community which are “driven by the internal demands of the completion of the single market and the creation of the monetary and political union” (Bronstone 2000: 165) particularly the European Commission and the European Parliament cannot be easily ignored or downplayed for these are institutions that facilitate European integration (Bronstone 2000: 165).

In discussing foreign policy analysis within the European Union, various models and approaches have been developed in the recent times to analyse the EU foreign policy. Such approaches are generally employed as alternative explanations towards foreign policy making within the EU. This is because of the inability of a single approach, model or theory in explaining the dynamics of the EU’s foreign policy.
It is in this debate that foreign policy making in the EU has been described as a synthesis approach to integration by Ian Manners (Manners 2000). According to him, in European integration a synthesis approach is arrived through an intergovernmental cooperation where there is a ‘synthesis of theory and evidence’. Manners points to the trend within the European and American academic circle with regards to the study of European integration and the use of synthesis approach to its study where the synthesis of American rationalism and European knowledge and at the same time a synthesis of competing explanations for international cooperation is adopted (Manners 2003:3). According to him, within the European circle descriptive studies of European cooperation has been historically accepted without question except that empirical evidence to the study is corroborated. Contrary to this, within the American study circle a rational theoretical analysis towards understanding European integration is generally favoured (Manners 2003: 3). In this regard he points out that the most notable proponent of synthesis approach is Helen Wallace whose work is based on an understanding of the behavioral patterns of Member States and “how bargains are struck in EC decision-making” together in an “empirical assessment of accumulated patterns of behaviour of the main protagonist in the process” (Manners 2003: 4). And it is in the value of using such theoretical approaches to the study of European cooperation that both Emil Kichner and Joseph Grieco employed in their study of European integration which stresses not only on the theoretical analysis of negotiation process but also stresses on the importance of an empirical tests and evidences in such an endeavour (Manners 2003:3). Thus synthesis theorists like Robert Keohane, Stanley Hoffman, Joseph Grieco and Dorette Lorbey all suggested a “combination of factors that will lead to a better understanding of negotiation process amongst EC Memnber States” (Manners 2003: 3).

Based on this arguments, between 1991 and 1993, Keohane and Hoffman suggested that “a new interpretation of joint European decision making should be invented” using “institutionally detailed rational-choice models, exploring the impact of agenda control, veto power, and decision making sequence”, and that “analyst who are willing to synthesise elements of realism, liberalism, and arguments about domestic politics will be
better able to explain variations in the content and strength of international regimes” (Manners: 5; Keohane and Hoffman 1991: 9).

With every subsequent development in the European integration there evolved theories of explanation which sought to explain the nature of European integration. This further elucidates that theories of European integration are difficult to arrive at singularly. Development of integration theories about the EU which started from Functional theory of integration to Intergovernmental approaches of integration has along the way incorporated the process of amalgamation, adjustment and synthesis of various theories in each stages of European integration starting from the 50’s up to the present day.

While economic integration to a large extent can be explained using model and theories of economic interdependence, bargaining and game theories, foreign and security policy remained elusive in this regard. The Common Foreign and Security Policy within the EU though evolved over time since the 50’s to supplement the economic agenda of the EU yet its realisation has not been fully achieved. The complexity of the functioning of the Union, the increase in membership from 6 to 27 has been phenomenal which will further challenge theoretical explanation of European integration. These developments within the Union will therefore render any singular theory redundant in its attempt to explain the phenomenon of European integration. Even if any particular theory succeeds in explaining EU integration, this will be limited to a particular sector or institutions. This is because the European Union institutions are divided into three separate pillars with each operating separately while coordinating with each other. Therefore any theory that includes all institutions (that is, all the three pillars) as explanation of a theory will be not only ineffective but also difficult to arrive at. Intergovernmental institutions like the CFSP demands attention of a general theory of explanation that is multi stage process, each stage which may be explained by a separate theory (Moravcsik 1989: 174).

The complexity of the EU system within which foreign and security policy operates along with the duplicity of foreign policy making at the national level of Member States makes foreign policy making in the EU a cumbersome and complex affair. The making
of foreign policy does not begin and stop within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy but also extends up to the European Commission, European Parliament and The Council Presidency. Most importantly, it also involves a high degree of involvement within the Member States’ foreign policy jurisdiction.

It is in the above-mentioned theories and approaches that this study will examine the relevance of such framework in the study of foreign policy making in Britain with special focus on its attitude towards the European Union. Taking the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy as a case study, this thesis will study the interplay of domestic and international constrains in British foreign policy in aligning with that of the Union’s vision of a common foreign policy. The importance of the various alternative approaches discussed below will be effectively employed in the course of this thesis.

i) Robert D. Putnam’s Two-level Game:
Analyses towards EU foreign policy making can be explained by Robert D. Putnam’s analysis of the interplay between domestic and international politics in decision-making. The article on Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, (Putnam 1988) Putnam analyses how negotiations at the international level are not only determined by domestic or international conditions alone. According to him, no particular condition whether ‘domestic’ or ‘international’ singularly determines decision-making. Taking the Bonn Summit of 1978, 2 he demonstrates how the interplay between domestic and international factors to a large extent determines the actor’s preferences in decision-making. Thus, according to him, in matter of foreign policy, actors play a ‘two-level’ game, one at the domestic level and the other at the international level in order to maximise their gain from any type of negotiation (Putnam 1988).

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2 The Bonn Summit Conference of 1978 refers to the fourth economic summit of the OECD. The summit was held in the backdrop of disequilibrium in international balance of payments-large deficit suffered by the United States and its appetite for energy consumption, Japan’s big surplus and Germany’s trade surplus-and high rate of unemployment. After an intense negotiation that also involve a high degree of bargaining between the United States, Germany and Japan, the Summit agreed to boost economic growth where the United States agreed to reform its energy policy, while Japan and Germany improve their economic growth and contain unemployment.
Whether domestic politics determines international relation or international relations determine domestic politics, the debate of foreign policy making is not concerned with (Putnam 1988). This is because in foreign policy making, ‘both’ domestic and international politics ‘sometimes’ influence each other. Therefore, there exist no such questions as whether they influence each other or not, but what is important is ‘when’ and ‘how’ (Putnam 1988). To Putnam, any theory of foreign policy making would be rendered useless if it attempts to concentrate at the state-centric level as realists and neo-realists do. He asserts that “the state-centric literature is an uncertain foundation for theorizing about how domestic and international politics interact” (Putnam 1988: 433). Basic to this argument is his close observation of the Bonn Summit Conference of 1978 where he analyses that the agreement reached at the end of the summit was “a balanced agreement of unparalleled breadth and specificity…. (were) virtually all parts of the packages were actually implemented” (Putnam 1988: 428). The logic for such an agreement, he argues, is that “key governments at Bonn adopted policies different from those that they would have pursued in the absence of international negotiations…agreement was possible only because powerful minority with each government actually favoured on domestic grounds, the policy being demanded internationally” (Putnam 1988: 428). Thus in aiming for a conceptual framework of “general equilibrium” theories, he conceded that there were factors in domestic and international politics interacting simultaneously, a framework for understanding how an interaction between diplomacy and domestic politics can be arrived at (Putnam 1988: 430). Therefore his conclusion is:

At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments (Putnam 1988: 434).

According to Putnam, in any negotiation the process takes form into two stages. At the first stage is Level I where “bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement” (Putnam 1988: 436) and at the second stage is Level II where “separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement”
(Putnam 1988). In other words, at Level I, negotiation is operated at the level of head of states, foreign minister or secretary, and at Level II the interaction is between the negotiators and the domestic grouping. Level II usually operates at the level of parliament, ministries, bureaucracy and pressure groups. According to him at any stage of the two Levels there will be certain “exceptional effects” from party of negotiators by which bargaining is likely to affect both Level I and II simultaneously or respectively. In such circumstances “there are likely to be prior consultations and bargaining at Level II to hammer out an initial position for the Level I negotiations. Conversely, the need for Level II ratification is certain to affect the Level I bargaining” (Putnam 1988: 436). Even though negotiation might fail at Level II and this might affect negotiation at Level I, but on most occasions it is likely that negotiators try to repeat the two-level process of bargaining at both Level II and Level I and thus try out possible agreements by probing their constituents’ view. Such process is called an iterated game (Putnam 1988).

For the success of any negotiation, Putnam has identified “win-set” 3 as a determinant factor. First ‘win-sets’ are important because the “larger win-sets make Level I agreement more likely” (Putnam 1988: 437). And it is only when such ‘win-sets’ overlap, that is, when both sides of the negotiation camp have similar objectives for certain issues, that agreement is likely to happen (Putnam 1988: 437). Thus, the overlapping of such ‘win-sets’ indicates that both sides are likely to agree on many if not all issues. But on the contrary, if there are only few ‘win sets’ there is more likely that these ‘win-sets’ do not match with the other side’s (i.e. negotiators) expectations. Thus in such a scenario when ‘win sets’ are too small to manoeuvre for both sides, negotiation might fail altogether. According to Putnam, for any agreement to be successful it is important that ‘win-sets’ “must fall within the Level II win-sets of each of the parties to the accord” (Putnam 1988: 437). This is true in the case if both sides of the negotiation camp, when negotiating on any issues the first and foremost dominating variable for the negotiator is directed towards the domestic constituents. Therefore for any agreement to be successful at Level I there should be sufficient agreement at Level II among the respective parties. It is here

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3 “Win-set” is referred to tacit agreements between actors operating at the Level I, in other words, the possible available options of an agreement.
that Putnam’s emphasis that overlapping of ‘win-sets’ at ‘Level II’ will eventually lead to a far more flexible negotiation at Level I. In his analysis he described:

Given this set of arrangements, we may define the “win-set” for given Level II constituency as the set of all possible Level I agreements that would “win”- that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents-when simply voted up or down. For two quite different reasons, the contours of the Level II win-sets are very important for understanding Level I agreements (Putnam 1988: 437).

Secondly, though it is true that a large ‘win sets’ at Level II will lead to flexible a negotiation at Level I, it is however perceived that “the relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargaining”. This is true when the “larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be “pushed around” by the other Level I negotiators” (Putnam 1988: 440). Thus at times, such large “win-sets” at level II can prove to be an impediment at Level I negotiation. Therefore, sometimes a “small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage” (Putnam 1988: 440).

It is based on such analysis that Putnam deems ‘win-sets’ and their size as an important factor in any negotiation. The interplay of these ‘win-sets’ both at Level I and II makes it more important for the study of foreign policy. He however specified certain determinants of the win sets. These are:

i. The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents.

ii. The size of the win-set depends on the Level II political institutions

iii. The size of the win set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators (Putnam 1988: 442-50).

Though Putnam’s works are largely criticised that they are based on the line of the neo liberal’s international political economy analysis of the microeconomic theory. It is
however to be merited that his work is more relevant in the current context of European integration where there is a great deal of debate in the delineation of the starting point and ending point between the domestic and international politics.

The past decades since the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties there have seen a lot of changes within the European Union. Such changes are both internal and external. Internally, the enlargement of the EU represents one of the challenges to European integration which is greatly affected by the need for an institutional reform within the Union. It is for this reason an attempt to adopt the EU Constitution gained more prominence till mid 2006. On the other hand, external challenges mostly represent an increasing challenge in the area of defence and security which impacts not only the EU as a whole but also Member States in terms of harmonising their respective national security. The end of the Cold War presents Europe with new challenges to its security which, generally speaking, are non-traditional in nature. The future threats that emanate from ethnic clashes, terrorism and drug and human trafficking, money laundering and environmental disasters are the main concerns among Member States and non-Member States alike. Such concerns were particularly more alarming with the events that broke out soon after the end of Cold War. The ethnic clashes in the former Yugoslavia and subsequently the Bosnian war and the Kosovo crisis left the EU stranded without any clear-cut policy, infrastructure or plans to tackle the crisis at the EU level. Moreover, differences between Member States further aggravated the situation and only with the American intervention that the crisis was brought down under control. Other threats to European security were more evident with 9 September 2001 terrorist attack on the US which dispelled the myth of the US as protector for European security. It also became evident that though terrorists are mostly ethnically non-European but their activities prior to the attack indicate that they have been using Europe as a base for such operations. This became evident with the bombing of the rail station in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and the latest on 7 July 2005.

It is in this context that we are faced with the question: how far will Member States support the strengthening of the CFSP institution on one hand and protect their national
border and their security on the other. It is evident from past failures that Member States while supporting the idea of the CFSP are at the same time reluctant to delegate all powers of national interest to Brussels especially in matters of foreign and security policy. For Example, on matters of common European immigration law and Britain it will be more difficult for Britain to adopt it because Britain with its diverse multicultural society will always prefer to monitor its own immigration policy for this will enable it to tackle any threat to internal security more effectively. The second issue of contention involves the common European defence policy. In the area of defence, more development was foreseen when the Western Europe Union (WEU) along the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was conceptualised to give teeth to the concept of European defence and security. However, any diminishing role of the NATO through such new concepts was severely opposed by Britain for the fear of damaging the transatlantic alliance.

When it comes to areas of common defence policy and common foreign policy respectively, there are two striking differences adopted by the Member States to these issues. Firstly, while it is agreed that a common European defence policy will enable Europe to reduce its dependency on the Americans and respond to the crisis more effectively and on time, it is however to be seen that behind this move to develop its own defence component is also to further provide European arm industries a much needed investment and as a viable challenge to the American arms industries. Secondly, in areas of 'high politics' there are issues of diverse differences within Member States in the EU. It is agreed that there has been an increase in Europeanisation of national foreign policy, yet when it comes to issues of 'high politics' states are still reluctant to delegate to Brussels part of their national sovereignty in areas of foreign policy making. The Iraq crisis of 2003 is one such example when Britain, Spain and Italy supported the American intervention but France and Germany opposed such a move. Likewise, when the EU was in favour of lifting of arms embargo to China, member states were initially unclear over such a decision. From the EU point of view, explanation to this was the increasing dominance of China in international politics and trade that EU cannot ignore, but for Member States like Germany and Italy there are hidden politics
behind such decision. While Germany would favour the lifting of embargo, Italy would most likely oppose such a move. The answer to this difference in approach lies in the fact that Germany needs Chinese market for German arms industries and most importantly it is assumed that by championing China's case it will earn the support of China as a permanent member of the UN's Security Council (UNSC). Any such move by Germany will be thwarted by Italy who remains opposed to any such claim by Germany for permanent seat in the UNSC.

Therefore, it is acknowledged that in the area of the CFSP, difficulties of implementation are real for Member States. On the one hand, the need for an intergovernmental cooperation is seen as a viable option for Member States to hold back their national interest and sovereignty, while on the other hand, the need for European integration is seen as necessary for Europe to not only tackle issues of security collectively but also to speak as one voice in the international arena.

The interplay between three entities, i.e., the European politics, the national politics and the third actor at the international level has led the CFSP to a great deal of "push and pull" both from within and outside the EU and also from within the institution of CFSP. It is in this politics of push and pull that paradoxes exist in the CFSP. While the EU aim for a deeper integration, the arrangement for an intergovernmental cooperation and introduction of the phrase important and stated reasons of national policy in the CFSP provision has led to the interplay of both domestic politics and international politics within and outside the Union.

ii) Modern approaches (Consociationalism and Intra-Organisational Bargaining)
The complexities of functions within the European Union's institution have led to emergence of various alternative approaches in explaining European integration from different perspectives. These new approaches while to some extent are borrowed from the neo-realist and neo-liberal theories of European Foreign policy analysis but at the same time incorporate other frameworks like the importance of non-state actors and international institutions in explaining European foreign policy analysis. Though they
agreed on the importance of the Member States and their role in shaping of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, they however point out that the role of the of the EC Commission, The European Parliament and other agencies within the EU cannot be ignored.

These new approaches are described by Adam Bronstone as “Modern approaches”. They are the result of weaknesses of realist approach in explaining not only on the creation and evolution of the European Political cooperation (EPC), but in the general theoretical tradition from which these understanding derive (Bronstone 2000: 165). According to him,

…the quasi-intergovernmental nature of Political Cooperation, coupled with ever the increasing communitarianism of this same process is such that difficulties occur when approaching this issue from a ‘realist’ or ‘neorealist’ perspective” (Bronstone 2000:165).

Within this Modern Approach, Bronstone identifies two approaches which promise an alternative explanation to European Foreign Policy analysis. The first is the “Consociationalism approach” which was developed by W. Wessels (1991) and A. Pijpers (1991). According to this approach, “Consociationalism occurs when cleavages force the breakdown of stable government, and actors substitute normal procedures for new and alternative method of governance, such as the promotion of co-operative ventures that are inclusive of perceived relevant groups” (Bronstone: 168). Therefore, within the EU the CFSP will function because of the fear of potentially destabilising external events which will also enable states to cooperate than defect (Bronstone: 168). However, according to this approach, there lies a paradox where despite institutionalisation of the CFSP, Member States still repose their loyalty towards the concept of nation state and whatever is transferred to the EU is still limited in nature (Bronstone: 168). This is so because in Consociationalism approach, there is an emphasis on the existence of external threat; relative balance of power and; a low ‘total load’ on the apparatus in order to maintain stability; and cohesion (Bronstone: 168).

The other “Modern approach” that Bronstone discusses about is Simon Bulmer’s Intra-Organisational Bargaining approach. Simon Bulmer first applied relative gains in the
form of distributive bargain to the European Community in the study of European Council’s first decade in 1985 (see Bulmer 1985). According to this approach the domestic politics within the EU’s CFSP is examined in the context of a “two-tiered” model. The first tier is at the European Council and the second is at the domestic level. Basic to this model is the behaviour of Member States that can be explained in two ways:

i. The objective of the main negotiator (the Head of the Government) of any Member State is to use the European Council to increase their domestic maneuverability. This is the higher or first tier game.

ii. Member States in the European Council behave according to ‘pull and pressure’ from domestic constituencies. Such pressures are from the political parties, parliamentary bodies and various types of interest groups. In this intra-organisational bargaining, lobbies are also prevailed within the European Union in the form of lobby to the European Commission from various interests group at the European Level. All these groups are players in the lower tier (or domestic-level) game of the European Council (O’Neill 1996: 265).

Andrew Moravcik: Intergovernmental Institutionalism /Liberal Intergovernmentalism

The other alternative approach toward the study of European foreign policy is Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism. This approach is based on the relative power of Member States and the convergence of their national policy preferences offers a satisfactory account of the SEA negotiations. This approach is built on the earlier approach, ‘intergovernmental institutionalism’, which “stresses the central importance of power and interests, with the latter not simply dictated by position in the international system” (Moravcsik 1991: 25).
According to Moravcsik, “Intergovernmental institutionalism affirms the realist foundations of what Keohane calls the “modified structural realist” explanation of regime formation and maintenance” (Moravcsik 1991: 27). He admitted that states are the principal actors in the international system and that interstate bargains reflect national interests and relative power (Moravcsik 1991: 27). He also agrees that international regimes “shape interstate politics by providing a common framework that reduces the uncertainty and transaction costs of interstate interactions” (Moravcsik 1991:27). However unlike Keohane’s argument that a hegemon propels the regime formation, Moravcsik argued that in the context of European regime formation there is no clear hegemon but interstate bargains does take place. The key question put up against functional theory by Moravscik is “not whether institutions are useful (or even essential) for cooperation, as assuredly they are. Instead, the key question is whether the existence of institutions or the need to create them alters bargaining outcomes” (Moravcsik 1989: 198). He further argued that “if institutions can be cheaply built or altered, then nations will create them ad hoc as they are necessary to facilitate cooperation, and they will have no independent effect on patterns of cooperation” (Moravcsik 1989: 198). Therefore, functional theories “must demonstrate that the cost of building or reforming regimes is high enough so that once established, they shape the short–term cost–benefit calculations of states” (Moravcsik 1989: 198).

To him Intergovernmental institutionalism “differs decisively from that of modified structural realism because “it locates the sources of regimes reform not only in the changing power distribution but also in the changing interest of states” (Moravcsik 1991: 27). Explaining states’ preferences he stated that “States are not “black boxes”: they are entities entrusted to government, which themselves are responsible to domestic constituencies. State interests change over time, often in ways which are decisive for the integration process but which cannot be traced to shifts in relative power of the state” (Moravcsik 1991: 27). Here preferences is explained not in term of neo-functional argument that variables like European institutional momentum, transnational business interest group activity, and international political leadership dictates states bargaining
preferences but rather it is the outcome of a lowest common denominator, backed by the threat of exclusion (Moravcsik 1991: 47).

Morascvik’s approach intend to attempt at “refining the theory of interstate bargaining and institutional compliance, and also by adding an explicit theory of national preference formation grounded in liberal theories of international interdependence” (Morascvik 1993: 480). In an attempt to explain theories of European integration through liberal intergovernmental approach, an analysis of the two events of European integration, the Single European Act (SEA) and the 1991 intergovernmental conference on the Treaty of European Union is taken as an empirical tool which identifies negotiation and its outcome as the result of convergence of power, preferences and bargaining on lowest common denominator.

The assumption that “state behaviour reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment” (Morascvik 1993: 480) again resonates Putnam’s ‘two-level game’. Moravcsik theory is a further improvement to Putnam’s ‘two level game’ where liberal intergovernmentalism theory is developed with an aim to “integrate within a single framework two types of general international relations theory often seen as contradictory: a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining and institutional creation…” (Morascvik 1993: 482). To him, theories of foreign economic policy, intergovernmental negotiation, and international regimes have to be redefined in order to “provide a plausible and generalisable explanation” of the evolution of the EU (Morascvik 1993: 474).
According to him

...the EC can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination. Refinements and extensions of existing theories of foreign economic policy, intergovernmental negotiation, and international regimes provide a plausible and generalisable explanation of its evolution (Morascvik 1993: 474).

As indicated earlier, fundamental to this framework is that the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the states themselves (Foster 1998: 349). Central to liberal intergovernmental is Morascvik analysis of the SEA. He argues that the negotiation to the treaty could be well understood through the explanation of the convergence of policy preferences among leading Member States (Foster 1998: 349). According to Moravcsik (1991), European integration is the result of the “convergence of national interests, the pro-European idealism of heads of government, and the decisive role of the large Member States” (Moravcsik 1991: 48). In this case, three elements of intergovernmental institutions confirm the importance of intergovernmentalism in the EU (Moravcsik 1991: 48-49).

i. Intergovernmentalism: Similar to Putnam’s two-level argument, he argues, “Heads of government and their direct representatives carry out the negotiations. The result represents the convergence of domestic policy preference” (Moravcsik 1991: 48-49).

ii. Lowest-common denominator bargaining: Beyond its national interests, Member States are not interested in conceding any flexibility during the negotiation. The outcome of the negotiation in such case is the lowest common denominator.

iii. Protection of Sovereignty: The narrow institutional reform; the limitation of ‘majority voting’ only in the area of internal market; the limited role of the parliament and finally the fear of such ‘spill over’ to other areas like the monetary policy, confirms that “maintaining sovereignty and control
over future changes in the scope of the EC activities” (Moravcsik 1991: 48-49) is Member States preoccupation.

Figure 4: The Liberal Intergovernmental Framework of Analysis

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<tr>
<th>Liberal theories</th>
<th>Intergovernmental theories</th>
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<tr>
<td>(International demand for outcome)</td>
<td>(International supply of outcomes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underlying Societal factors: Pressure from domestic societal actors as represented in political institutions</td>
<td>Underlying Political factors: Intensity of national preferences; alternative coalitions; available issues linkages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL PREFERENCE FORMATION</td>
<td>INTERSTATE NEGOTIATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Configuration of states preference</td>
<td>OUTCOMES</td>
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To Moravcsik (1993), it is through the process of intergovernmental negotiation where bargaining and preferences—which are the results of domestic and international forces—sets the agenda for its development. Though he agrees that supranational institutions do play an important role in European integration, but in the end the primary source of integration “lays in the interests of the state themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels” (Moravcsik 1991: 56). Based on this, his core assumptions are:

i. States are rational actor. Its preference is generally based in maximizing its national interest. Such preferences are calculated in terms a) benefits from such negotiation, b) cost and benefits and c) relative influence. It is
based on these three analyses that actors determine the range of policy preference as well as how flexible can be in the negotiations (Foster 1998: 350).

ii. Such preferences evolved from within the domestic politics which are outputs of various domestic agencies- the parliament, the opposition, the ministries, the pressure and interests groups.

iii. The outcome of the negotiation is the result of concession extended by the actors. However, such concession reflects the ‘interest’, but not preference, of the Member States as in the case of ‘lowest common denominator’. Moreover, such discretion to make concession ‘does not come from the actions of supranational leaders, but from the extent to which governments have autonomy from domestic interests groups’ (Foster 1998: 350).

SITUATING STATES’ BEHAVIOUR IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

In analysing all the three alternatives or ‘modern approaches’ it is evident that all these approaches drew heavily from the work of Putnam’s two level game. The emphasis on both the domestic and international politics as sources of foreign policy analysis is Putnam’s hallmark. However, taken singly, these approaches seem unreliable in their application towards development of a theory of European foreign policy. It is argued that while the Consociationalism approach does seem to fit into the framework of EU’s CFSP, yet its emphasis on the existence of external threat, relative balance of power, and a low ‘total load’ remains far fetched. For instance, Member States, through an intergovernmental structure, might be able to seek an alternative foreign policy making institution rather than leave it to institutions like the European Commission or Parliament. However, the fact remains that with the expansion of CFSP and its activities and scope of issue-areas, the load of the mechanism within the CFSP institution could lead to further increase in institutionalization and formality. Such institutionalization will
require some type of association for which the functions of the CFSP will be at the institutional level rather than intergovernmental (Bronstone 2000: 169).

When it comes to Bulmer's two-tiered model, the problem lies in its overemphasis on domestic politics. To this, Bronstone has rightly summed up when he noted that "it is not possible to take every national government's position on every item on the agenda of EPC to domestic politics" (Bronstone 2000: 169). In the end, he concludes:

...The more crucial issue with respect to these 'modern' theories is that there is very little to go on with respect to their relationship with international relations as a study, and specifically the European Community as an international actor. Utilized mainly for the explanation of domestic political actions, these models are, as yet, not even within the margin of theoretical arguments and debates in international relations. Consequently, they may be useful with respect to the study of EPC, but much more research and scholarship needs to be accomplished before a valid assessment of these models can be made (Bronstone 2000: 169).

Likewise, Moravcsik's argument that there cannot be a single theory to explain the phenomenon of European integration theory, holds a certain degree of truth. To him, international cooperation is a "multi-stage process, each stage of which may be explained by a separate theory. Although employing more than one theory involves a loss of parsimony, there are compelling reasons-empirical, logical, and methodological for conceding this disadvantages in order to avoid monocausal explanation" (Moravscik 1989: 174). Moreover, he argue that

International cooperation is not a discrete dependent variable; it is a bundle of interrelated dependent variables. The broadest level of generalisation, theories of international cooperation can be divided into three categories I) theories that explain state preferences for cooperation, II) theories that explain the outcomes of interstate bargaining, and III) theories that explain compliance with institutional norms. These three dependent variables-preferences, bargaining outcomes, and compliance-can usefully be viewed as stages in a logical, and often temporal, process. In a given round of a negotiation, states first define their interests, then bargain to an
agreement, and finally decide whether to comply with a different theory may be used to explain the observed outcomes at each stage (Moravcsik 1989: 175).

Moreover, like Putnam, he emphasized that domestic politics is rooted in the process of European integration and is important in analysing theories of European integration. To this he stated “domestic analysis is a precondition for systematic analysis, not a supplement to it. The existence of significant cross-national variance in state policy preferences and diplomatic strategies invites further research into the domestic roots of European integration.” (Moravcsik 1991: 55).

Though theoretically close to Putnam’s two level game, Moravcik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism have been criticised on the ground that the approaches “still clung to the Neo realist concepts, asserting that governments first calculate their interests and then present a unified front in intergovernmental negotiations at the European table” (Foster 1998: 349). By focusing that the preference of government is usually of economic interests, Liberal Intergovernmentalism assumed politics as a rational process which is not always the case, ideology, belief and symbolism are also preferences that influences and play an important role in policy making (Foster 1998:364).

Taking Britain and the CFSP as a case study, Anthony Forster (1998) agrees with Moravcsik that domestic influence on the British government from other quarters of civil societies and pressure groups was limited during the Intergovernmental Conference in 1991. Therefore, when it comes to the CFSP, there was a limited constraint on the state action and it thus enabled Britain to compromise on issues like majority voting. Moravcsik is also criticised on the grounds that first, his approach like Putnam’s lacks explanation on non-economic issues of institution and political cooperation; and second, it failed ‘to open up the ‘black box of the state’ convincingly’ (Foster 1998: 364).

With respect to the IGC, it is however to be noted that preferences were “intimately linked to the course of the IGC negotiations...policy positions were subject to constant definition and redefinition, reflecting a mix of constraints: international pressures,
departmental and organisational interests, powerful political rivalries and the need to maintain domestic support" (Foster 1998: 358).

The alternative approaches that have been identified above clearly show that none of them are satisfactory enough to explain foreign policy analysis of the European Union. All of them are however clear that they are employing not only the decision making approaches as explained above, but a great deal of development within these approaches are basic to Putnam's two-level game. Though it is acknowledged that Putnam’s two-level game will alone not be sufficient in explaining foreign policy making in the EU and its Member States, but a synthesis of the above alternative approaches especially that of Moravcsik with that of Putnam's is most likely to produce a viable theory in explaining foreign policy making in the EU.

It is therefore the aim of this thesis to use Putnam’s two-level game along with that of Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism in the explanation of the British attitude towards the EU’s CFSP. The reason for taking Putnam’s work as a yardstick for analysis in this study is not altogether to support his theory ‘in toto’ but rather to help us in understanding the interplay between the domestic and international politics in foreign policy making. Though his theory has been largely criticised on the ground that is mostly deals with the political economy rather than an analysis of international relations, it is however to be noted that within the EU, the concept of a political union arises out of the need to simplify and harmonize the functioning of the internal market. Moreover, the role of the European business forum in facilitating trade and a need for political leadership are such instances.

In the case of Britain and the European Union, Putnam’s model would be used by certain adjustment to his theory. This is more evident when a study of the CFSP is undertaken. The intergovernmentalism of the CFSP, the role of the European Commission, European Parliament, the rotating Presidency of the EU institutions all require a certain modification to Putnam’s analysis (Bronstone 2000: 178). According to Bronstone (2000),
Given the heavily iterated relationship between EU Member States, the intensity of the linkage between issues and issue-areas within the context of the European Union politics also needs to be taken into account. Modifications are therefore required if Putnam is to be applied to an in depth case study-based examination of European foreign policy (Bronstone 2000: 178).

Again taking Bronstone’s argument,

Whether or not Level I actors can ‘deliver’ a certain ‘win set’, foreign policy process in Europe is evidence of the utility of a two-level approach. For example, the bureaucrats in the British and German defence ministries may be opposed to a certain agreement concerning the role of the WEU in Yugoslavia. These actors may coalesce to lobby their respective representative ministers and associated parliamentarians to defeat such plan. It would be important for these bureaucrats to locate other like-minded bureaucrats in other leading WEU/EU Member States for their opposition to be successful. Nonetheless, world events may force Level I actors to agree even in the face of Level II opposition, illustrating the complexity of foreign policy and the need for approaches such as Putnam’s two-level paradigm that acknowledges and seeks to analyze the interplay between domestic, bureaucratic and international politics (Bronstone 2000: 178).

Likewise, Putnam’s win-set determinants are to a large extent true when it comes to the EU and the Member States. His emphasis on the theory of domestic politics and its power and preferences of the major actors at Level II is true when taking an example of British making an exit from the ERM or its reluctance to join the Euro and Social policy. These are indications that most of these decisions when taken altogether are generally based on the feedback from the domestic politics. The weakening of the Pound within the ERM, the fear of losing of the Pound symbol and its over valued rate and finally the aim of making Britain a pool of cheap labour by opting out from the social policy are indications that domestic politics whether influenced by ideology, belief or symbolism is influential in decision making.

At the international level, the role of the negotiator is important to Putnam’s analysis. During the IGC to the Maastricht Treaty, British negotiator succeeded to influence the negotiation by inserting an “opt out” clause within the treaty. Thus it enabled it to opt out of the social policy, the euro and the Schengen Treaty. In the area of CFSP, Britain conceded to other Member States by allowing the decision within the CFSP would be through majority voting. However, it succeeded in putting the CFSP at the
intergovernmental level (pillar two) of the treaty and also thwarted the French attempt to sideline NATO by reviving the WEU.

Interpretation of theories and approaches towards the subject requires an understanding of the geography and history of any state in a given situation. In the case of Britain, it is common knowledge that Britain is an island that once seems impenetrable to outside threats; that despite this aloofness it was able to transform itself from a mere insular nation to being an imperial power. However, with the spread of industrial revolution and technology towards other nation states especially during the beginning of the 20th century directly challenged the British Empire. Other European states that benefited from this wave of industrial revolution began to look for a similar territorial expansion which resulted in a rivalry for modernisation of their respective industries and defence forces. The advancement of science and technology during this period shattered the myth of British insularity and thereby exposed the vulnerability of the island as witnessed with the introduction of Fighter planes during the Second World War. This was more evident with Germany’s use of air force during the initial stages of the Second World War when Britain was bombarded for months. By the end of war though Britain with the help of its Allies emerged victorious, yet the onset of the Cold War and the division of the world in two blocs put Britain and its West European partners in direct confrontation with the erstwhile Soviet Union. The threat of a nuclear war during this period left not only Britain but other West European countries to seek an equal nuclear protection from the American led military alliance in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

In the post Second World War period Britain had to confront other issues in the international arena. The re-orientation in its foreign policy was the direct fallout from the shrinking of its empire and the resurgence of anti-colonialism and national movements across Asia and Africa. This re-orientation was particularly necessary when from the 60’s onwards trade with its former colonies, now known as the Commonwealth countries, declined drastically as compared with intra European trade within the EC or for that matter trade with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members.
Despite these realities, for almost two decades after the Second World War Britain’s attempt at re-orientating its foreign policy still lacked direction. Despite its being a permanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council, NATO, Commonwealth and other international organisations and institutions, yet none of these can make up to its former Imperial glory. Until the mid 1960s this imperialistic hangover continues to dictate British foreign policy-making which at the same time impinges on its relation with the rest of Europe.

Though by the mid 60s it was evident that the European Economic Community (EEC) was very successful and realised that if it is to play a leading role in international politics it has to look closer home towards European continent. It was also the necessity to re-orient its foreign policy both in terms of trade and political relations with the main continent that British foreign policy towards Europe began to undergo a change with its application to become a member of the European Community in 1969.

By the beginning of the 1990s the nature of international politics was completely changed with the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and subsequently the demise of the Soviet Union. As a consequence of these events, the nature of security changed overnight; traditional concept of security like nuclear war was replaced with non-traditional security problems like ethnic conflict, terrorism, money laundering, drugs and illegal immigration. Within the European Community, changes took place in the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on thereby paving the way for the European Union (EU). The Treaty for the first time in the history of the European community visualises the future of the Union by streamlining the functioning of the Union through the “Three Pillars”- The European Community, The Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs respectively.

The emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the European Union was due to the remnant of the former “European Political Cooperation” (EPC) that was established in 1970. The EPC was then established to become “a cohesive force in international relations”, and to encourage “political union”, but most importantly, EC
Member States gradually developed EPC to preserve European economic integration. Under the EPC, the Luxembourg Report in 1970 established the system of regular meetings at a variety of levels between officials and ministers from national foreign offices. Still, all these developments took place outside the treaties. It was only with the Single European Act (SEA) that EPC was formally incorporated in Title III of the treaty framework. The SEA envisaged that the commitment of the Member States to consult and cooperate in foreign policy becomes a legal obligation.

After twenty years of informal foreign policy cooperation under the EPC system, in 1991 the Treaty on European Union (TEU) finally and explicitly linked this unusual arrangement to the existing EC treaties by establishing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP was established as a separate pillar (second pillar) within the TEU and was given a formal treaty basis and placed under Title IV and article J (1-11) of the treaty. As in the earlier EPC, the CFSP was developed on an intergovernmental basis and a distinction between the supranational and intergovernmental activities of the new Union was made. Thus security and defence are explicitly included in the new CFSP with the aim of developing a policy that covered "all areas of foreign and security policy".

Britain, as a member of the European Community, though never opposed the idea of European cooperation, was sceptical about the success of the newly formed European Community (EC) and viewed it as an attempt to create a European Federation. Though ready to associate with the EC, it was at the same time reluctant to join as a member of the community. This is because its interest remains mostly in fostering the idea of free trade in Europe. However, with the success of the EC, Britain's policy towards Europe started to change and it finally applied for membership to the EC. However, such application was rejected twice because of the French veto. It was only on the third attempt in 1973 that Britain finally became the member of the EC.

Britain's association with the EC has been under a lot of study because of its reluctance to participate freely with the functioning of the EC. The Margaret Thatcher's government was one such period where British relationship with the EC was at its lowest because of
its “No” to European integration, for instance be its demands for reimbursement of British tax payer contribution to the Community or joining the single currency. Such attitude by Britain is often seen as “reluctance” or an “awkward” partner within the EC. Moving towards post Maastricht, Britain has been more accommodative but its insularity towards EU institutions and policy remains to some extent “reluctant”. Through the “Opt Out” clause provided in the Maastricht, it was able to stay out of the Euro and the common European immigration policy respectively. Thus when it comes to the CFSP, its attitude has been a step backward. By completely integrating into the CFSP, it would indicate an acknowledgement for a more distinct federal EU and at the same time implying a loss of freedom in vital areas of state activity. Such issues has always been Britain’s greatest fear especially when it has always maintained that 1) foreign policy as a nation’s prerogative should be discussed always at the intergovernmental level. 2) If common foreign policy were to be operated from the EU level, it would complicate Britain’s relations with its traditional allies like the United States and the Commonwealth countries.

Given that special relationship with the United States has been a cardinal element of British foreign policy, this special relationship was more evident when Britain participated in US’ operation or intervention in Iraq without the approval of the EU. The other important factor in the British foreign policy making is its close relationship with its former colonies which constitute today’s Commonwealth of Nations. The importance of the Commonwealth was evident in the 1961-62 EEC entry negotiations when Britain in its negotiation to join the EEC was eager to safeguard the preferential trading agreements enjoyed by the Commonwealth states. However, Britain’s entry into the EC has severely affected its relations with the Commonwealth as the Commonwealth’s role in British politics has continued to decline.

Finally, conscious of its role as a permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations, Britain perceived that such common foreign policy within the EU will also have an overall implication on its future role in international politics. Hence, while acknowledging that Britain could regain its world status by integrating itself in the EU,
however its veto power and position in the UN Security Council is equally important for it to pursue an independent foreign policy in vital areas of national interest.

In the area of common security policy Britain's position is changing. Reasons are partly historical and partly pragmatic. Britain's close association with NATO during the cold war has led Britain to conclude that the future of European security lies with NATO. So much so, that her dependence on the American shields of defence led to a complete sidelining of the European defence initiative in the form of Western European Union (WEU) and rejection of French's proposal for a European Defence Community in the 1950s.

As soon as the cold war ended, the general feeling within European circles was that Europe no longer faced any security threat. It is felt that there should be a limited role for NATO while at the same time the Community should look forward to arrange for its own security arrangement. Hence, the Western European Union (WEU) was brought back into the scene and referred as “defence component of the EU” and “as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance”. However, during the negotiation for the Maastricht Treaty there were differences between parties on the exact role of the WEU, with Britain opposing any diminishing role of NATO it was at last decided that the WEU is to work closely together with the NATO.

Britain's position arose mainly from the uncertainties of the exact role of the new Common and Security Policy which was equally complicated by the crisis in the Balkan Peninsula. The failure of the Member States to commit themselves in this area was regarded as the weakness and therefore created a sense of uncertainty in the future of European security arrangements. Such failure makes British foreign policy makers to rethink the framework for European security in the negotiation to the Maastricht Treaty and thereby reaffirm its faith in the security arrangement as provided in NATO. In other words, this has deprived any absolute role for the future WEU.
However, in recent times British position in the functioning of the EU common security policy has been more accommodative due to the unfolding events in Europe-like the war in Yugoslavia—and this was first noticed in the John Major government willingness to support an independent European security under WEU though with a limited role. An important turning point came in the autumn of 1998 in St Malo when Britain under the leadership of Tony Blair declared its support for an independent EU’s security and defence capacity which will be independent and at the same time strengthen the already existing defence and security arrangement.

Changes in Britain’s position were partly a result of Blair’s desire to lead an active European policy and the realisation that foreign and security policy is certainly one of the areas where Britain can easily promote in order to strengthen its own influence inside the EU (Sjursen 1999). This is also true when taken into account that the Franco-German axis is weaker in the area of foreign and security policy and in many ways the French policies have more in common with Britain than with Germany in term of foreign and security objectives (Sjursen 1999). Moreover, it is argued that in the area security and of foreign policy the term ‘cooperation’ is more acceptable and less sensitive domestically in Britain than the term ‘integration’ as in the case of economic or monetary union. Therefore for Britain this kind of arrangement is seen as a possible formula and explanation that the sanctity of its sovereignty under no circumstances will be threatened (Sjursen 1999).

Thus, British policy towards the EU’s CFSP has been cautious. Though in the recent years it has been continuously engaged in the process of EPC and CFSP, however it is particularly sceptical of the development of an independent security and defence role for the EU. Again this scepticism must be seen from the prism of close ties to the United States and partly its reservations of developing a kind of European organisation with a strong political dimension, thus it supports the development of foreign and security policy in the EU only on the condition that such policy will not be derived and formulated either from the European Commission or the European Parliament.
Based on the above evidences it is important to understand how the study fits into the framework of foreign policy analysis. Looking from both the Neo-realist and Neo-Liberal point of view, it is true that Britain as a sovereign state its primary concern is directed more towards its national interest. Its decision to stay out of the common immigration policy, the Euro, and reluctance to erode the role of NATO is a classic example of Hobbsean and Waltzian analysis of the state. However, its decision to engage itself in the multilateral organisations, institutions and regimes like the UN, EU, WTO, IMF and others indicates its willingness to join other actors in providing a stable international system and at the same time maximising its national interests through such association.

On the other hand, taking Decision Making approach argument, foreign policymaking in Britain cannot be possible without the involvement of the various units of the government. As it is true in the case of any democratic country, bureaucracy is one of most penetrating agent in Britain's foreign policy making. Likewise the organisational deliberation within the Prime Minister Office and his cabinet along with his personal leadership forms the backbone of foreign policy making. Such policymaking is the result of the inputs received by the government from various agencies like departments within the government or civil society like pressure groups, media and intelligentsia.

Taking both Neo-Realist/ Neo-Liberal and Decision Making approach in analysing British attitude towards the EU’s CFSP, it is important to note that within the Maastricht Treaty the EU though had signalled its intent develop a defence and security dimension to the Union’s international identity, yet the amended Amsterdam Treaty as earlier indicated provides a room for Member States to manoeuvre their own national interest. The availability of such loopholes undoubtedly enables them to pursue their own national interest rather than of the European Union.

An acknowledgement that national interest is a matter of prior importance to any state is a clear indication that the state is and will remain an important actor whether in an in organisation like the EU or in any other international organisations. When it comes to
policy formulation and decision-making in the area of foreign policy, states take their own decision based on its analysis of the situation and conveniences. This is because foreign policy making is identified with state’s independence and sovereignty and thus providing the state with its own identity which is different from the other. The sensitivity of the term ‘foreign policy’ is such that in the Maastricht Treaty the CFSP as a ‘second pillar’ of the Union is kept under the “Intergovernmental” framework of decision-making where Member States decide how foreign and security policy within the Union should be.

Moreover, though majority voting has allowed the flexibility of decision making within the institution, however the final decision lies with the Member States to evaluate whether such development is in conflict with national interests. If it seems so, Member States have the right to hold back their cooperation on certain issues.

Based on such arrangements, Member States usually tread on a very cautious line when it comes to deciding issues of foreign policy within the EU and this is because Member States are aware of the fact that any decision taken or authority delegated to the Union would be final. The end result of such cautiousness is that Member States play their European interests vis-à-vis national interests.