PREFACE

Foreign and security policy cooperation is an ambitious goal of the European Union (EU) since the early 1950s, and despite failures of past attempts, the EU has persistently try to establish itself as an influential actor in international system. However within the EU there exist multiple layers of foreign policy making where the process itself does not begin or end with the 'second pillar' of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but also extends up to the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council Presidency. This complexity within the system with which foreign and security policy operates is further challenged by the intricacies of foreign policy processes at the national level of 27 EU Member States. Overall, foreign policy making in the EU is a complex, intertwined and a cumbersome affair which involves a high degree of interplay between three entities, i.e. the European politics, the national politics and the third actor at the international level.

The interplay between these three entities has led the CFSP to a great deal of "push and pull" both from within and outside the EU and also from within the institution of CFSP itself. It is therefore in this 'push and pull' that paradoxes in defining the CFSP exist. The CFSP that is to be achieved and coordinated at Intergovernmental level is complicated by the ambiguity of definition of the term 'common foreign policy' and 'common security policy'. Thus this uncertainty in the concept is the major reason of reluctance for Member States to wholly subscribe to EU foreign policy objectives. Moreover, the emphasis on the phrase important and stated reasons of national policy within the CFSP provision indicates that 'common foreign and security policy' as an important identity of the EU is still fragile and Member States still values their sovereignty in foreign policy making.

Foreign policy making in the EU has been described as a synthesis approach of integration which is arrived through an intergovernmental cooperation where there is a 'synthesis of theory and evidence' (Manners 2000). Taking the EU Common Foreign and
Security Policy as a case study, the study tests the hypotheses that the interplay of domestic and international politics along with preferences and bargaining at the EU level determines British attitudes and policy towards the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. It is in the pursuance of an understanding of the EU foreign policy vis-à-vis its Member States that this study uses to test Robert Putnam's "Two-level games" (1988) and Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmental (1989, 1991, 1993) approach to explain this interplay of domestic and international politics in British policy toward the EU and other Member States.

When dealing with Member States' relations with the EU, problems of defining foreign policy arises from both quarters of Member State as well as within the EU. This is more evident given that the delineation of authority, power, and processes within the EU institutions is complex and overlapping with the authority of national agencies like the parliament, bureaucracy, oppositions and interest groups (Chapter 1). No theory is able to capture the complexity of foreign policy making at the national and EU level. Even in the functioning of EU institutions on a day to day basis where decision is hampered by lack of agreement, delay in taking action, or if at all any decision is taken, it is the lowest common denominator.

Despite these complexities and paradoxes various models and approaches of foreign policy analysis have attempted to explain states' behavior to foreign policy making in the EU. Various schools of thought like the realist, neo-liberals, decision-making and other modern schools of thought have over the years sought to find a viable approach towards EU foreign policy analysis. Though few of these partially succeeded in explaining the processes yet no individual theory on its own could authoritatively explain states' behaviour and foreign policy making in the EU. In explaining EU foreign policy analysis, the present study while maintaining the importance of Putnam-Moravacsik thesis at the same time tries to explore the viability of a synthesis approach towards a better understanding for EU-Member States foreign policy analysis.
The importance of exploring different theories and approaches is taken to explore the impact of organisational and institutional behaviour on EU-Member States foreign policy making. Independent variables within domestic constituents (leadership, party system, bureaucracy), are equally important in explaining Member States preference towards EU's foreign policy. This is particularly important because when it comes to implementing EU policies, Member States are influenced not only by international obligations (that is, UN obligation), regional (EU), National (State) but also by domestic constraints. To put it simply, while some of its decision making comes directly from Brussels, that is the European Commission, the Council and Parliament others are still dependent on national government to decide and negotiate at intergovernmental conferences. It is therefore acknowledged that in the area of the CFSP, difficulties of implementation are real for Member States. It is more difficult when concepts of sovereignty and national interest are foremost in constructing a debate on CFSP. To Member States like Britain who favour an intergovernmental framework of European integration, sovereignty in foreign policy making is an integral part of a nation state. Therefore intergovernmental co-operation is seen as a viable option to retain its sovereignty in vital areas of national interest.

Given the complexities of the CFSP as an institution, this thesis examines British attitude towards the CFSP from two directions. The first is a comparative historical analysis of British policy towards the European Political Cooperation (EPC) vis-à-vis its Trans-Atlantic and Commonwealth relations during the Post-War period. The second is Britain’s Post-Maastricht attitude towards the CFSP is analyzed in the context of case studies of the Yugoslav-Kosovo crisis, 9 September 2001 and Iraq crisis of 2003, Convention for the Future of Europe and 7 July 2005 London terror attack.

In analysing British foreign policy making it is now a common parlance within academic studies to suggest that Britain has become so deeply enmeshed within the European structure of governance that detecting where national policy stops and ‘European’ policy starts is almost impossible (White 2001). It is thus argued that Europeanisation of British
foreign policy is inevitable and this is attributed to the high volume of policies and directions flowing between Brussels and London. However, despite such 'high degree' of ideological convergence between British foreign policy making with those of the EU, at the policy level of 'high politics', British interest is being significantly divergent from that of the EU and other Member States. Its opposition to the deployment of the EU/WEU forces in Albania in 1997 and the present engagement in the war in Iraq are two examples where convergence between British and EU’s foreign policy is difficult to arrive at. In understanding Britain in EU, this study takes “domestic” and “international” politics as the two variables that will explain British policy towards the EU, in particular the EPC/CFSP. To this the framework of preferences and bargaining that prevails in the domestic and international environment other independent variables like the party system, leadership, Economic condition, events of 9/11 and 7 July 2005 terror attack in London, IGCs, and Convention on the Future of Europe are also taken as indicators for the study.

Britain though never opposed the idea of European cooperation, was however skeptical of the success of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Its attitude towards the CFSP institution remains to some extent “reluctant” and a “one step backward”. Such attitude stems from the fact that by completely integrating into the CFSP, it would indicate British acknowledgement for a more distinct federal EU and at the same time implying a loss of freedom in vital areas of state activity. Such issues have always been Britain’s greatest fear especially when 1) foreign policy as a nation’s prerogative should be discussed always at the intergovernmental level. 2) If common foreign policy were to be operated from the EU level, it would complicate Britain’s relations with its traditional allies like the United States and the Commonwealth countries and, 3) equally conscious of its role as a permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations.

Besides, the uncertainty of the exact role that the new Common Foreign Security Policy should be playing is another factor that contributes to British skepticism of the CFSP. The failure of the Member States to commit and respond to the Balkan crisis was regarded as a weakness of the CFSP as an institution and thereby created a sense of
uncertainty in the future of European security arrangements. Such failure prompted British foreign policy to rethink its framework for European security during the negotiation to the Maastricht Treaty and instead reaffirm its faith in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) based security arrangement. It is on Britain’s insistence that there could be no diminished role for NATO in the new EU security arrangement that the role of the Western European Union (WEU) as an independent security framework for the EU was merged together with NATO.

However, British position to the European security arrangement has been more accommodative if not at all integrated in recent years. Such a position was possible because of certain domestic and international events that unfolded during this period. The first is the change of government with the Labour Party replacing the Conservative in power; second, the Kosovo crisis and subsequently the St. Malo Declaration are two events that shaped British commitment to the future of European security arrangement; third, the personal leadership of Tony Blair and his personal interest in European affairs. Blair’s unlike Thatcher who choose to ignore her European partner or Major whose only confidant was Chancellor Kohl, his style of functioning was constant bilateral engagement with other European capitals through regular bilateral meetings, summits and briefings and finally, following from Blair’s leadership is the peaceful domestic environment and pro-people policy of the Labour Government which to a great extent indirectly assisted the government’s CFSP policy. Despite the early years of forward-looking EU policy of the first term in office, Blair’s EU policy began to lose steam by the end of his second term in office. His foreign policy on Iraq set Britain on a collision course with his EU partner and this resulted in the standoff between his government and other Member States during the Convention of Europe. To supplement this international constraint, the Labour party’s marginal victory in the 2005 general election and the subsequent terrorist attack on London on 7 July 2005 greatly weakened Blair’s leadership at home. Thus this thesis explores these international and domestic factors as a cause for delaying the development of the CFSP/ESDI. Basic to this argument is the tendency of a nation state to reassert its sovereignty in foreign and domestic policy when there is any threat to its national security.
The thesis delineates the above mentioned issues in five chapters. The first chapter deals with theoretical approaches of foreign policy making in international relations in general and the EU in particular. This chapter explores the complexity of European foreign policy making and explains the failure of a single theory or approach to explain European foreign policy analysis. This chapter propose the employment of a synthesis of theories in explaining EU foreign policy as a way of understanding Britain and other Member States’ foreign policy of the EU.

The second chapter “Britain and European Unity: From Rome to Maastricht” traces back Britain’s relation with the EC/EU from Post-War period up to 1992. This chapter examines the historical analysis of Britain’s relations with the EC in the context of its domestic and international constraints during the initial years of attempting to construct European unity. Its commitment to the “three circle” concept of foreign policy and the impact on its application for EC membership is another highlight of this chapter. Finally, economic condition, party politics and leadership (during the Thatcher era) are also the main themes of this chapter.

In Chapter three “Britain and the Common Foreign and Security Policy” British attitude toward the CFSP is analyzed in depth. Starting form Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty up to the Nice Treaty, this chapter examines Britain’s attitude towards the CFSP by analyzing the major events that shaped British foreign policy. Important events like the Yugoslav and Kosovo crises are taken as case studies to explain how these events along with a favorable domestic environment constructively shaped British foreign policy towards EU.

Chapter four “Sovereignty and CFSP in Post 9/11: British Attitude and Response” explores the impact of 9/11 in EU’s CFSP strategic thinking. While Europe was incrementally moving towards a new post-modern collective identity and articulating a CFSP, 9/11 was too soon and transformed world politics and the ability of the EU to
respond to new security threat. While the EU was in a disarray, the United States in the post 9/11 period launched an all-out war against terror by asserting its sovereignty and national interest and the right to pursue its enemies in any part of the world in order to secure its security. In its objectives the US was later joined by Britain and few other EU Member States in this war against terror. Based on this analysis, this chapter therefore enquires whether Member States will step back from the process of strengthening the CFSP and its institutions by holding back their authority in foreign policy decision-making. Taking 9/11 as a framework, this chapter takes the Iraq crisis of 2003, the Convention on the Future of Europe, and 7 July 2005 London terrorist attack as case studies to explain how these events brought about a sudden change in British domestic and foreign policy thinking.

Chapter five concludes with an overview of the entire thesis and enquires about British-EU relationship in the context of Europeanisation. Taking note of the increasing level of EU integration over the few last few decades and its impact on Member States domestic policy, this chapter examines whether Europeanisation of British domestic politics, if any, has spill-over effects on the areas of foreign policy. In conclusion, this chapter also discusses British attitude towards the CFSP by looking at the recent events in British politics, like the change in leadership and the coming general election as variables for future British-EU relationship and finally the thesis the problem and prospect of the future Britain-EU relations also attempt at suggesting few viable options which could explain Member States’ relations with the EU.