INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades there has been an increasing level of impact of EU integration on Member States domestic politics and policy-making. This impact of European integration upon Member States' domestic institutions and government is known as Europeanisation. This process of Europeanisation "affects the political systems of all Member States: their politics, policies and polities, including the workings of the institutions of government" (Bulmer and Burch 2000: 2-3). Europeanisation is also explained as a "shorthand term for a complex process whereby national and sub-national institutions, political actors, and citizens and adapt to, and seek to shape, the trajectory of European integration in general, and EU policies in particular. The result is usually some convergence in policy outcomes, but of a kind that is neither widespread nor uniform" (Bomberg and Peterson: 2000).

Thus the above definition of Europeanisation is mostly concerned with the impact of European integration on domestic policy and how institutions within the domestic policy adapt to these changes. To others like Ladrech (1994; 2001), Europeanisation is a "response by actors-institutional and otherwise-to the effects of European integration...it is also an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making" (Ladrech 2001: 1-3). Similar to this definition is Radaelli (2000) explanation of Europeanisation as "Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the

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6 organisational logic' Ladrech meant the 'adaptive processes of organisations to a changed or changing environment'. He wanted to emphasise the role of organisational adaptation, learning and policy change.
logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2000: 3). Thus central to Ladrech/Radaelli definition of Europeanisation is their “focus on the adaptive response by actors to a changed or changing environment, in particular, the primary environment or arena which has most direct impact on resources, system or organisation maintenance,” (Ladrech 2001:3; See also Radaelli 2000: 5)

It is this organisational logic and institutional adaptation that whether there is a pressure from the EU on British domestic politics and institutions is examined here. In examining this process of Europeanisation, this chapter follows Radaelli’s (2000) questions of ‘what is Europeanized?’ (that is, the domains where the effects of Europeanisation are supposed to materialize in the domain of domestic structures, cognitive structures, or public policy) and ‘to what extent?’ (that is, extension and direction of Europeanisation, in other words, how much change has been brought about by Europeanisation)” (Radaelli 2000:6).

Europeanisation of Member States domestic policy has been rapid in the last few decades. Areas like trade, businesses and environment has seen the most impact of flow of European governance in these sectors. It is also in this that is a general fear that over the time this impact of Europeanisation will spill-over to other core sector like the two intergovernmental pillars of CFSP and JHA.

Taking the general framework of Europeanisation as discussed above, this chapter will take into account the history of British relationship with the EC/EU and examine the questions of Europeanisation of British i) domestic policy and ii) supposed spill-over on CFSP. If this is true, then what level of Europeanisation has Britain experienced? Or is Europeanisation been restricted to a few areas of British politics. In tracing this process of Europeanisation of British foreign policy this chapter will re-examine the history of British reluctance to ‘deepening’ of European integration in general and the EPC/CFSP in particular.
THE BEGINNING
As discussed in earlier chapters in any discussion on British-EU relations there has been a
general conclusion of Britain as an ‘awkward’ partner in European integration and that
the role of domestic and international politics as channels that influences British policy
towards the EU is important in analysing this awkwardness. Central to the domestic-
international constraint in British foreign policy can be seen from its history as an island
nation; an imperial power; sovereignty of the parliament; an unwritten constitution and;
the comprehensiveness of British laws and legislations, all these attributes are in contrast
to the idea of European integration and thereby a friction in the relationship (Chapter 2,
4). Nevertheless, despite this awkwardness, Britain’s engagement with the EC/EU since
1973 has structurally influenced British politics and changed British governance. In other
words, Britain, like other Member States, is also affected—even if it is minimal—by the
process of Europeanisation.

Europeanisation of Member States domestic politics which begins with the process of
economic integration now stretches to sectors like business, environment, emigration and
social policy of Member States’ jurisdiction. The area being an exception or least affected
by this process is the domain of ‘foreign policy’ where decision is taken at an
intergovernmental level of the European Council or foreign ministers. Nevertheless, it
can be argued that the process of European integration is so deeply enmeshed in Member
States domestic policies that it is difficult to distinguish between national boundaries
from that of the EU. It is here that there is a general fear among some Member States of
the spill-over of this process of Europeanisation to the core area of national foreign policy
making over a period of time, this despite the institutions of CFSP being least the least
developed and compared to the other institutions within the EU.

PAST EXPERIENCE
Post-War period when other West European countries were heading towards post-modern
institutional arrangements in the form of ECSC and later the EEC, for a long time Britain
choose to stay away from this process. Its attempt to negotiate with the original Six
members for an intergovernmental organisation rather than a federal one was resented by
the Six members and instead decided to leave Britain from the process and go ahead with the idea of ECSC. An exclusion from the process of European integration did not make an immediate economic or political impact on British foreign policy towards Europe for the Atlantic and the Commonwealth alliance as part of the ‘three circles’ of foreign policy objectives is always seen as a fallback option.

In the scheme of ‘three circle’ of foreign policy, Europe’s space in Britain foreign policy lexicon is contextualised in what Larsen (1997) called ‘detached term’ and thus placed next to the Transatlantic and Commonwealth. The hurdle in British relations with the ECSC and the European Defence Community (EDC) is that when these relations are compared to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance and Commonwealth countries, the ECSC and EDC are federal in nature and bore the hallmark of an intrusion of British sovereignty by a supranational authority. With the emergence of the US as a superpower along with its economic recovery and security plan for Europe in the form of Marshall Plan and NATO an alternative to the ESCS and EDC emerged and there started the beginning of a historical Britain-US transatlantic alliance. This relationship have lasted throughout the later half of the 20th century and given the nature of recent events in international politics and new threats that confront nation states’ national security in the form of terrorism, ethnic conflict and peacekeeping this alliance will without doubt continue to run deeper in this 21st century.

Juxtaposing this Transatlantic alliance is the Commonwealth relation. This relationship is dominated mostly by the remnant of an imperial hangover and its romanticism. The fear of damaging the Commonwealth relationship has always been an issue of concern whenever debate of Britain joining the EEC was discussed. Thus even when Britain decided to apply for membership to the EEC there was a deep anxiety not only from the Commonwealth nations but also from the British media and general public who viewed such application as an end to British-Commonwealth affinity.

However, analysed from a realist view the importance of the Commonwealth countries to British politics emanates from political and economic necessity of the Post-War period.
The economy shattered by the World Wars and by the loss of overseas colonies, Britain was at the worst phase of the 20th century. The need to maintain its trade with its former colonies was therefore important not only to cushion its economy but also to serve its political interest in the newly established United Nations. And any sudden withdrawal from its colonies would signify British insensitiveness to its former colonies and this in turn would be detrimental not only to its fragile economy but also to its diplomacy at the international level.

Thus the early attempt at Europeanising British politics through the process of European integration failed due to its over-emphasis on the ‘three circle’ of foreign policy and sovereignty of the British isle. However, this started to change by the early 60s when Britain’s relations with its former colonies began to deteriorate due to i) decreasing volume of trade ii) process of de-colonisation and iii) its negative foreign policy outlook towards the Commonwealth countries in Africa. This damaging relation between Britain and many of the Commonwealth countries left her with a chance to focus its foreign policy to the other entities of the three circles, that is, the Transatlantic and Europe/EEC. While the transatlantic relationship in NATO continue to strengthen as the result of the Cold-War, its bilateral relationship with the US however suffered relatively due to the American pre-occupation in the Vietnam War, Cuban and Latin American crisis.

It is in these realities, as noted in Chapter 2, that the subsequent application for membership in 1961, 1967 and 1971 was prompted more by the ‘pragmatic self-interest’ of British domestic and foreign policy. It is also during this period that a general opinion within a section of British political elite argued that despite being outside the Community, Britain is still affected by developments and choices taken by the other six in Brussels, and by staying away from Europe, Britain commercial and political interest in Europe is at stake (Hollowell 2003: 96). Thus the cost-benefit of the estimated volume of trade within the EEC and future British-EEC pushes the debate on sovereignty to the backdrop. So much so is the importance of being inside the Community, that most of the political party leadership except for a few (like Edward Heath, and Roy Jenkins) did not
envisage that the EC/EU would develop in such a manner as to challenge Britain’s sovereignty or identity in a crucial way (Larsen 2004: 54; Also see Sharp 1987).

In Britain powers to make and amend law resides with the British Parliament and never in history of Britain has it occurred that its sovereignty over this matter been transferred to an outside authority away from the House of Commons and House of Lords. Engrained deep within British policy thinking is the notion of importance of sovereignty and identity to British politics. However, once inside the Community, Britain realised that its bargaining power are lesser than its expectation, and most of the Community’s rules, regulations and legislations which were framed prior to its entry to a great extent override its national law. This sudden loss of sovereignty in framing legislation in some areas, over the time, led to British confrontational attitude towards the EEC and a strained relationship with other major Member States like France and Germany.

BRITAIN AND EURPEANISATION OF MEMBER STATES DOMESTIC FOREIGN POLICY: THE EARLY ATTEMPT

Thus the initial years of British association with the EC has been more of a necessity to British self-interest rather than building bridges for European integration. Taking the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a study, we have seen how a late entry to the EEC substantially deprived Britain to take part in the process of discussion and negotiation of the EPC in the 1970s, a political framework for foreign and security policy which would later become a benchmark for the CFSP. Besides staying away from the EPC in 1970, Britain was also exempted from Fouchet Plan of 1961-62 and the Davignon Report of 1970 which are the two attempts at institutionalising the EPC. While the Fouchet plan envisaged a political union with the aim to “to reconcile, co-ordinate and unify the policy of Member States in spheres of common interest: foreign policy, economics, cultural affairs and defence” (Article 2 of the Draft Treaty-Fouchet Plan II)( of 18 January 1962), the Davignon Report confirmed the necessity of a common foreign policy under the framework of a proposed EPC.
Thus By the time Britain entered the EEC in 1973, the idea and process of a political union despite being in a rudimentary stage was well conceived. This development while leaving Britain stranded also exposed her to de Gaulle’s political acumen who make sure that the process of ‘deepening’ the Community through the proposed political union is without any hindrance from intergovernmentalist states like Britain. Moreover, by engaging itself mostly on issues like trade, subsidies and access to and for Commonwealth market, Britain failed to recognise the future implication of the development on the political union. Thus, by 1981 when the London Report on European political cooperation was published (13 October 1981), Britain’s support to this Report was a mere formal acquiesce to that earlier foundations laid by the Six Member States. In other words, this acquiesce was a binding commitment for Britain to support the EPC in the forthcoming negotiation of the Single European Act.

Nonetheless, British participation in the EPC of the 1980s went on smoothly and was without any hurdle or protest. Such bonhomie was mostly dictated by Britain’s search for a role in an international arena. With the United Nations failing due to the standoff between the two super powers, the EPC provided Britain a much needed role and voice in international fora. Moreover, this international role suited Britain because such roles are based on coordination between foreign ministers of Member States which at the same time informal and flexible (Chapter 2).

Thus despite attempts at resisting the process of European integration in the early years, British resistance began to fall under the weight of its own necessity. The stagnant economy of the 1960s, the collapse of the ‘three circle’ and a search for an international role is what forced Britain to look towards Europe for salvation rather than cultural or geographical affinity.

PRESENT CHALLENGES
The Domestic Factors/politics
Moving to the 1990s, Britain’s policy towards the CFSP post Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty witnessed a high degree of cooperation during the first phase (1992-2000) and
grows cold by the second phase (2000-till date). This section is divided into two sections; the first section deals with the first phase and is related to the period between 1993-2000, this period was marked by an improvement in both areas of common foreign policy as well as common security and defence policy. The second section examine the period of 2001-2006 as a second phase where British attitude towards the CFSP, especially in the area of common foreign policy, was on a back foot.

The first phase of this relationship coincides with series of internal changes within British politics. First in these changes is within the Conservative party. Margaret Thatcher’s Euroscepticism was replaced by John Major who took a conciliatory approach towards the EC. However, despite his positive view of the EC and his relative success during the Maastricht Treaty negotiation, the ERM crisis which is close to his heart is also responsible for the defeat of the Conservative party in 1995. With change of government to Labour party under Tony Blair leadership there was a push for another change in British domestic and foreign policy.

Importance in Labour government’s EU policy is Blair’s leadership is personal leadership within the Labour party and his commitment to lead Britain closer towards the European Continent. Foremost in Blair’s European vision is his call for a complete transformation of British domestic politics which he argued had to start from within the Labour party’s constitution itself. Thus in his speech to the Labour Party Conference, Blair made clear his intentions to replace Clause IV7 of the party constitution with a new statements of aims and values which is based on ‘democratic socialism’. With a change in its constitution, the ‘New Labour’ as Blair would describe is more adapted to the surrounding of changes in economy, market and politics that occurred at home and elsewhere in Europe.

The domestic setting

7 Clause IV of the Labour Party Constitution is based on the ideas of ‘common ownership of the means of production and exchange’. In other words it is a veil for ‘Nationalisation’.
It is important to note that when Blair took over office on 2 May 1997 there were two important domestic factors that favoured his European policy. First is the scale of victory by the Labour party during the general election. The party commanded an absolute majority of 179 in the House of Commons and gave Blair ample room to manoeuvre his domestic and foreign policy. Second, the stability in British monetary and exchange rate policy which to a great extent led to the improvement of the economy in general. When compared to the Conservative era where the Chancellor fixes the interest rates, Britain’s monetary policy began to improve due to Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown’s initiative in empowering the Bank of England to set the interest rates. This effectively empowered the Bank to fix the interest rates and exchange according to behaviour and trends of national and international trade, in this new policy the scope of political interference in setting interest rates for political mileage was thus avoided.

Boosted by the majority in the House and the improved economy, Blair foreign policy grew in confidence. His charismatic leadership and desire to take Britain to the heart of Europe led to a new beginning in British-EC/EU relationship which could be termed as the most successful relationship. To emphasise this point, the first in the series of his pro-EU policy was demonstrated by his approval of The Amsterdam Treaty during the European Council of 16-17 June 1997. This Treaty which amended the Treaty of European Union made a marked improvement in the area of foreign and security policy of the Union (see Chapter 3).

The first challenge to Blair’s foreign policy commitment towards Europe is his response to the second crisis in the Balkan Peninsula. This crisis provided Britain an opportunity to play a leading role. In this task Blair choose to engage Britain with its European partner, with France being an important one, in solving the crisis. The result of such engagement is the St Malo’s Declaration where both Britain and France took a common position in developing a coherent EU defence capability. This convergence of British and French foreign policy (though temporarily) is dictated mostly by the two factors i) willingness of Britain to speed up the process of European integration by ‘widening’ the EU through eastern enlargement. ii) The other factor for this convergence is the urgency of the
situation in Kosovo which seems to disrupt if not damaged the process of enlargement altogether. Thus, it is in this convergence of interests that development of the CFSP to a new security and defence framework in the form of ESDI and ESDP was speeded up. However, despite the early convergence of foreign policy, this Anglo-French relationship was short-lived, and by the beginning of the second phase of post-Maastricht (2001-2006) it began to sour because of differences between their foreign policy over the Iraq crisis.

Moving towards the second phase of post Maastricht is the damaging relationship between Britain and the EU. Unlike the first phase, this phase marked a restriction to Blair’s manoeuvrability in domestic and foreign policy making. More precisely, the final years of this second phase, that is post 2005 general election left Blair with limited choice to express his foreign policy independently because of the constraint within which his domestic constituencies operate. Compared to the 1997 general election where his party secured a majority of 179 in the House of Commons, the 2001 and 2005 general election witnessed the Labour’s party majority declined to 167 and 66 respectively. Thus in contrast to his first and to a certain extent second term, Blair’s third term lacked the confidence of both the electorate and his own party members. This term was weighted down by the increasing oppositions and open rebellion from within his party against his foreign policy against Iraq and his subsequent domestic anti-terrorism policy.

Blair’s attempt to redefine British sovereignty in foreign policy in Iraq away from the EU utterly failed in his second term in office. His Iraq policy was questioned by the Foreign Affairs Committee (HC 813- I, II 2003) for lack of evidence and most seriously for plagiarism of research work and presenting it as an intelligence document for the case against Iraq. The government was criticised by the opposition party, the media and the civil society and questioned Blair and his decision to align with the US for the war. The intense debate on the government’s participation in the Iraq war to a large extent influenced the British electorate in the general election of 2005 with Blair retaining his power but with the lowest majority since 1997. With the Iraq crisis in hand, Blair’s attempt to reassert his leadership within the party by trying to influence his MP’s to
support his proposed anti-terrorism legislations in 2005-2006 backfired. This despite his plead for a tougher anti-terrorism legislation in the wake of terrorist attacks on 9 September 2001 in New York, 11 March 2004 in Madrid and 7 July 2005 in London Blair’s proposal was not only criticised and rebelled by his own MPs during the voting of the bills but were also rejected by the House of Lords for violation of the basic human rights (see Chapter 4).

The International setting

If the events in Europe like the Yugoslav and Kosovo crisis drew Britain closer to Europe, the international events like the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the Iraq crisis equally withdrew Britain from Europe and drew it closer towards the Transatlantic. By aligning closely with the US foreign policy, Blair put himself at distance from his European counterpart and created a friction in British-EU relationship. His frequent trips to European capital and meeting with his European counterpart to discuss issues of foreign policy matters was prominent in Blair’s first term was soon replaced by his frequent meeting with his American counterpart. Thus the early phase of cordial relationship between Britain and the EU began to grow cold with the subsequent events that unfolded abroad and at home. This division between Britain and the other Member States on the Iraq position translated into two directions. The first being the spill-over of the crisis during the EU convention on the Future of Europe and the subsequent reassertion of British sovereignty in the area of foreign policy making. The second is the deadlock in the CFSP institutional arrangement and development of its security and defence mechanism in the form of ESDP. In both cases the impact on British’s attitude towards the EU was at its lowest and with the event of 7 July 2005 a transformation of Blair’s foreign policy from a European centric to an inward looking foreign policy where national borders, national interest and security comes first was thus completed (see Chapter 4).

Thus given the nature of parallel transformation between British politics and evolution of the EU from the ECSC up to the EU Constitutional debate a general question arises: will Britain assist or resist from the process of European intégration? Such a question is more
pertinent when linking two factors that are interconnected to each other i) the oscillation of British attitude from reluctant to conciliatory and from cooperative to uncertainty and ii) despite such frequent change in British attitude towards the EU, it is acknowledged that Britain cannot turn back or withdraw itself completely from the EU. Such withdrawal is not possible for the fact that not only the British economy is deeply rooted to the EU but even British politics is entrenched to EU governance.

The next section will therefore answer whether the penetration of the EU governance (Europeanisation as it is commonly known) in few areas of British domestic politics ‘have’ or ‘will’ spill-over to other area of governance or not. In other words, has there been or will there be any spill-over of this process of Europeanisation to the second pillars institutions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and what are the effects of such Europeanisation to British foreign policy decision making?

EUROPEANISATION OF BRITISH POLITICS

Europeanisation of British politics is a multi-level process where both internal and external factors operate under certain circumstance of time and space. According to Anthony Forster and Alasdair Blair (2002) the Europeanisation of British politics is determined both by external and internal changes. To them, it is in these changes that cause British politics to adapt (formally and informally) to the process of Europeanisation. Such adaptation they argued is facilitated by:

i) The widespread administrative changes across Whitehall for the last two decades have clearly had an effect on British European policy. Such administrative changes were first introduced during the Conservative government for less expensive, more efficient and more effective bureaucracy was most widespread during the Thatcher tenure. Her distrust of the civil services advices led to the rise of external policy adviser. According to Forster and Blair, for the last decade this trend is getting more specialised under the Labour government through the involvement of think
tank institutes like the European Policy Centre and Centre for European Reform at the expense of senior civil servants (Forster and Blair 2002: 168).

ii) The increasing overload of work on the minister due to the interdependence of ministries, the spill-over of EU governance on domestic policy and the increasing media pressure have all led to ministers having less and less time to devote themselves to understand individual policy. The effect of this is, minister’s increasing dependence on officials, and thereby increases the status and role of key government officials while limiting the options for ministerial decision (Forster and Blair 2002 168).

iii) The response to an increasing flow of EU governance over those policies which are previously of national concern. The result of this is the complexity of dealing with issues. The task of dealing with those issues that are cross-sectoral and multi-governace has required multiple departmental co-operations. This multiplicity of policy making which engages Member States, the Commission and the European parliament is typically long and therefore requires a continuous approach to co-ordination before, during and after decisions are made. The end result of this is a change in British governance (Forster and Blair 2002 168).

iii) The precedence of European law over national laws “had an impact on the way in which Parliament has traditionally sought to control British government”. This has not only lead to difficulty in transposing EU-level law into national law but is also responsible to a clash in legislative culture; a clash between British ‘perspective’ and ‘regulatory’ approach and EU’s ‘enabling’ and ‘purposive approach’; between British preference of standard ‘legislation’ and EU’s ‘flexible’ legislation (Forster and Blair 2002 169).
iv) The effect on the machinery of the government due to the constitutional bargaining between Member States' governments in the EU in the form of IGC. This kind of interaction between governments forces the domestic policy of co-ordination to adapt because of the "intensity of bargaining, interdepartmental co-ordination to be designed around achieving shared goals and, public expectation of treaty revision put the ministers concerned, the foreign offices and the prime Minister on constant engagement with one another" (Forster and Blair 2002: 170).

v) The effect of EU-level policy making on the behaviour of private and non-governmental actors, which in turn have an impact on British policy making. Such impact by private and non-governmental actors on British politics is due to the scale of operation by these entities which being trans-European also extend their operations and lobbies to national government, European Commission, European Parliament directly (Forster and Blair 2002: 170).

Thus taking Forster and Blair argument, it can be argued that the dynamics of Europeanisation of British politics is not a one way process where everything flows formally from Brussels or EU’s institutions, it is, but also because of informal changes within the domestic administration and departments that tries to adapt to the constant flow of information and policies direction from the EU. The constant flow and scale of information that flows daily between Brussels, Whitehall and 10 Downing Streets makes such adaptation inevitable.

EUROPEANISATION OF MEMBER STATES FOREIGN POLICY: IS BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY EUROPEANISED?

The Common and Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union is perhaps the most ambitious project of the EU that has been going on for the last five decades and continues to evolved till date. This is because the Common Foreign and Security Policy does not operates or end within the jurisdiction of the second pillar but also reaches to
other sectors of decision making like trade and commerce, environment, crime and terrorism. Therefore, it is important to examine whether this lateral influence of EU policy on domestic governance will act as a formal or informal spill over in British foreign policy making.

Europeanisation of Member States foreign policy as Michael W Smith (1996) pointed out began with the process of EPC itself. Over the years the EPC "has become more institutionalised, binding, and sensitive to the EC - more "Europeanized"-than most observers appreciate...(and this) has been accomplished through the quiet development of an innovative transgovernmental policy network, and the codification of informal norms as rules and laws" (Smith 1996).

The evolution of the EPC was not facilitated by the EEC search for an international role in areas of 'high politics' but rather motivated by the necessity of harmonisation of intra and extra EEC trade. The process of surrendering their foreign economic policy is thus an important step of Europeanisation of Member States foreign policy. However, this does not mean that Member States were ready to part away their 'authority' of foreign policy making to Brussels. The development of the EPC during this time was also a temporary adjustment in response to the subsequent crisis in international politics during the late 60s and 70s (like the Arab-Israeli conflict) where protecting the EEC from the possible oil shock was a major concern. It is for this purpose along with the sensitivity of foreign policy as a subject that the EPC was instituted as an informal institution where Member States' foreign ministers meet informally and discuss issues of common interest (Chapter 3).

The relative success of the EPC during its early years prompted the Six Member States to take the EPC to another level where institutional arrangement began to take form. A system of regular meetings; committee of Directors of Political affairs was formed; involvement of senior officials from foreign ministries of Member States; establishment of COREAU and, close and regular contact between embassies of Member States in the third countries were developed during this time. However, despite this system, the EPC
lacked legal and technical capabilities and it was only in the SEA that the EPC was given a legal status.

By delegating the EPC to a legal status, the EC took another step of formalising it in the Maastricht Treaty and later refined in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Maastricht Treaty established a formal treaty basic for the EPC in the new Common and Foreign and Security Policy. The new CFSP took a radical step in establishing the EU as an international actor representing a single voice for the 15 Member States (now 27 members). Important in the new CFSP is the institutionalisation of foreign and security policy of the EU. Despite being an intergovernmental institution, the CFSP influence on Member States’ foreign policy decision-making is channelled through the various processes like common strategies, consensus, common position, joint actions, qualified majority voting and the establishment of office of High Representative.

More recently the development with the CFSP is within the proposed draft constitution of the EU. The final report of the Working Group on External Action recommended a far reaching institutional changes where the current roles of the High Representatives for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations be merged into an office of “European External Representative” otherwise known as “European Foreign Minister”; the new HR will be preferably someone from the Commission; will have the direct mandates from the Council; would have a formal (but not exclusive) right of initiative; and this HR will replace the current system of Troika. However such development was paused with the French and the Dutch veto of the Draft treaty of the Constitution.

**IS BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY EUROPEANISED?**

Europeanisation of Member States foreign policy falls into two categories. The first category is concerned with the federalist Member States who view the process of Europeanisation as a necessary step for deepening the process of European integration. On the other side is the intergovernmentalist camp, with Britain as the main leader, who sees this process of Europeanisation in foreign policy as suspicious. Nevertheless since
joining the EEC there has also been a constant adaptation in some areas of British foreign policy to those changes that flows from the EU.

Such adaptation to British foreign policy as discussed earlier are channelled both through the formal and informal apparatus of administrative functioning. The informal as discussed in Forster and Anthony (2002) are already discussed above. The formal apparatus that facilitates this adaptation are the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Treasury Office. Since joining the EEC in 1973, the role of FCO in dealing with the CFSP has been dominant and assertive with a little involvement from other Whitehall departments (Forster and Blair 2002: 174). In recent times the role of the FCO has especially increased due to the demand for special inputs during the Intergovernmental Conferences negotiation. Thus by providing expertise and officials who can understand issues and links between institutional procedures and substantive reforms that are important in bargaining process have increase the importance of the FCO (Forster and Blair 2002: 174). Again another office which is increasingly playing an important role is the office of UK Permanent Representation in Brussels. The UK Permanent Representative supplemented the role of the FCO by acting as a bridge between the government and the Commission.

It can therefore be argued that though over the years there has been an increasing adaptation by British government to European governance, but this cannot be exaggerated for according to the House of Commons Library less than 10 percent of UK laws originate in Europe. Whatever process of Europeanisation in British politics is happening or has happened is mostly in the Europeanisation of British style of governance, that is, the administration. This change in administrative style of functioning is necessary because of high volume of information and policy direction that flows from the EU. Therefore, these administrative changes that occurred when Britain joined the EEC are changes to enable individual department to adapt and equip themselves with enough resources and capabilities to deal with the new institutional procedures that emanates from the EEC. Thus, this administrative change within British governance cannot be mistaken for increasing loss of national authority on foreign policy area but
rather a necessary administrative transformation to deal with the ever increasing flow of information and briefing between London and Brussels on the one side and London and other Member States on the other. (For explanation of Europeanisation of national governance see Bulmer and Burch 2000).

Though it cannot be denied that in the process of this administrative adaptation there also occurred a process of Europeanisation of British politics especially in the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and, Department for Environment where legislation in these two departments are increasingly linked directly to those from Brussels. Again the Europeanisation of some of these sectoral areas should not be taken as a conclusive prediction that is to be applicable to other areas as well for there are some areas of governance that will be least affected by this process because of the “opt-out” clause and the intergovernmental structure of the two pillars-CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The “opt-out” clause and the two pillars restrict any process of Europeanisation at the national boundaries and passes through a rigorous filtered system of The European Scrutiny Committee, The Foreign Affairs Committee and Parliamentary Standing Committee amongst others before any decision are taken to the effect.

Michael W Smith (1996) has argued that in the EU not only development of transgovernmental policy network or codification of informal norms are responsible for Europeanisation of the Member States foreign, even weak institutions can influence the preference and interests of Member States. In this he concluded that:

…sovereignty over foreign policy need not be directly confronted (as it has been in other EC policy areas) with majority voting, regulations, directives, ECJ rulings, or in the glare of public IGC bargains. It can be subverted in some cases, through back channels and at lower levels of administration, so that states find themselves producing common positions and conducting joint operations even while they loudly proclaim their sovereign rights to refrain from doing so. (Smith 1996: http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/smm01/)

To him the process of Europeanisation of Member States foreign policy in the present CFSP is more difficult to arrive at than during the EPC because in the new CFSP the formalisation of the institution has restricted the informality and flexibility of the earlier
EPC (Smith 1996). Nevertheless, he argues that the Commission through its “back door” policy in areas of commercial interest might just influence the CFSP. To this he adds that.

The Commission has, however, turned its attention to defense equipment cooperation, where it may be able to influence support for a European-wide security and defense policy through the “backdoors” of industrial policy and the single market. This development, and the Commission’s role vis-à-vis the East in development and enlargement policy, might enhance its influence—though indirectly and in the long-over the CFSP...(Smith 1996)

Given the above conclusion by Smith, it can be argued that such postulation though true to a certain degree of linkages between the pillars in influencing foreign policy making in the EU and its effect on Member States, it is however, to be noted that even Smith himself conceded that the process of Europeanisation has become difficult as compared to the EPC. The increasing focus on intergovernmental negotiation and legality of the CFSP has led Member States to be more vigilant when dealing with foreign policy negotiation in the EU. Even the “back doors” policies of the Commission to push this process through the EMU and JHA are difficult to arrive at for “few Member States are still on the defensive...” (Smith 1996) he concluded.

By testing the process of change in administrative governance over the last few decades or by collaborating empirical evidences of few sectors it is impossible to validate that there has been rampant Europeanisation of British politics. Even if this process has been successful in some area, how do we explain the resistance to this process of Europeanisation in the area of CFSP, specifically in foreign policy? This is because there are two elements of British attitude towards the CFSP. These are the distinction between area of ‘foreign policy’ from that of ‘defence and security policy’. Foreign policy consists of those areas that involve issues of ‘high politics’. In the areas of ‘high politics’ Member States exercised their foreign policy on the basis of nation self-interest rather than following an EU collective interest. Bilateral relationships with a third country in the areas of economic foreign policies are few of the areas that Member States will not be willing to share with Brussels, the European Commission or the European Council. To Britain, though the EU is an important framework for national foreign policy but at the
same time it is not the only one, the US, the UN and bilateral relations as indicated above are also important to British foreign policy objectives. (Interview with FCO officials and Dr Karen Smith, LSE).

However, with regard to the other area of defence and security policy, cooperation in this sector has been more forthcoming. The development of the ESDI and ESDP is because these are element of ‘complimentary agreements’ rather than ‘high politics’ of foreign policy. They are complimentary because the ESDI and ESDP are more concerned with pooling of military resources and infrastructures between Member States to secure the EU, stabilise its near neighbourhood and also contribute to international peacekeeping and out-of-area operation. Moreover it is complimentary because of the shared roles between the EU-WEU-NATO thus eliminating the chance of a supranational body (as in the earlier EDC proposal) taking over the role of a military commander. It is in these objectives that the ESDP was successful in its European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovinia (EUPM) from 2003-2005; Operation Concordia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in 2003; Operation Artemis (Democratic Republic of Congo) in 2003; Operation Proxima (FYROM) in 2004 and; the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM, 2005). Even here the success of these missions and operations is because, except the case of Yugoslav which came closer in term of effect upon individual Member States like Germany, in each of these cases, Member States are individually least affected. Moreover the success of these operations was mostly in post-conflict rather than preventive action. In these post conflict action the roles are no more than policing, administration and rebuilding.

**What happen to the Anglo-French axis and the CFSP?**

Looking back to the Anglo-French St Malo declaration of 1998, it is true that this Anglo-French convergence is what lifted the CFSP to a new institutional level and thus provided the EU with the much needed international role. At the policy level, no doubt the post St Malo declaration led to a series of developments in the area of militarily and defence capabilities of the EU, however, this success was short-lived because of the differences between Britain and France on the Iraq crisis. It is worth mentioning that the 1998
declaration was prompted more by the Blair’s willingness to engage Britain in the “heart of Europe” for Europe is where British foreign policy has to start if it is to be recognised once again as an important player at the international level. His policy of engaging France is a way of restricting the Franco-German axis that would have obstructed British search for international role. Likewise, according to Blair, the strength of both France and British military infrastructure are necessary for the EU military capabilities in dealing with stabilising the recurrent conflict in the Balkan Peninsula.

Thus to accept any suggestion that Europeanisation of British foreign policy through institutional engagement or bargaining with other Member States (as in the case of Post-St Malo Declaration) is too much of a simplistic argument. As we have seen how by the beginning of the 2002 when British foreign policy interested shifted to the transatlantic alliance after the events of 9/11, the CFSP was left stranded and even attempts to push it forward in the Convention of Europe was heavily resisted by Britain (Chapter 4). The St Malo declaration was thus a one time agreement where both French and British interests converged, otherwise such foreign policy convergence between these two important players in the EU is difficult to arrive at. This is because neither France nor Britain shares similar cultural ethos: difference in language, culture and history is what divided these two countries for centuries and the only common things they share is the geographical proximity of the English Channel and the Euro rail that connect the two countries.

With events closer home like the terrorist bombing of London on 7 July 2006 and most recently in Glasgow (July 2007) Britain’s foreign policy approach as discussed earlier in this chapter has been ‘inward-looking’ where emphasis on national security has led foreign policy to be dominated by the domestic events. This inward-looking has led to the reorientation of foreign policy objective in the form of alignment between the Home Office and FCO. Though strictly speaking they are not one of the same, but the increase overlapping of the domestic and international agenda requires the two departments to work together (FCO 2006: CM 6762). One area where overlapping between the domestic and foreign policy occurred is in the area of global terrorism. The issue of dealing with issues of arresting of non-British citizen and freezing of visa, deportation of foreign
terrorist or pursue of terrorist abroad requires that a necessary domestic laws to be in place in order to enforce such action. Thus the Terrorism Act 2006 in a way is a response to the FCO’s White Paper on “Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK international Priorities”. The White Paper laid down the government’s counter-terrorism strategy (COUNTER) which seeks to minimise the threat and vulnerability by “prevent”, “pursue”, “protect” and “prepare” (FCO 2006: CM 6762). In achieving these four objectives the government acknowledges the need for out of area operation, government to government intelligence sharing and other related joint anti-terrorism cooperation at a bilateral level apart from that of the already existed EU anti-terrorism initiatives Thus the legislation of Terrorism Act 2006 though initiated by the Home Office has all the elements of foreign policy objectives (see Chapter 4 for various Terrorism Acts).

**BRITISH EU POLICY: BLAIR, BROWN AND BEYOND**

The recent developments within the Labour party with the succession of Gordon Brown as the new Prime Minister and the coming general election in 2008 have generated a lot of attention as to which course will Britain foreign policy follow. However, for Brown who is a known Eurosceptic, France again seems to be a favoured destination for him to repair the damaged British-EU relations of his predecessor. As soon as his takeover as Prime Minister, Prime Minister Brown, his foreign minister, defense minister, political director and two chief political advisers all visited their French counterparts to discuss the future of European security in particular and the EU in general (*International Herald Tribune* 20 July 2007). Brown whose Eurosceptic is a cause of concern for France and Germany thus dispelled such fear by signalling his willingness to work closely with his European counterparts by travelling to Berlin and Paris before scheduling a trip to Washington. (*International Herald Tribune* 20 July 2007). In his join statement with Nicholas Sarkozy, the new French president, Brown emphasised the need for both France and Britain to work together against the menace of global terrorism, but most importantly is his emphasis for both countries to meet and discuss regularly, in particular before big European meetings, to try to harmonise their positions on European issues as well as on international ones (EUObserver, 20 July 2007).
It is to be noted that at the time of conclusion of this thesis it is too early to judge Brown’s foreign policy; however it is clear that there is an increasing emphasis on the role of interplay of domestic and international factors in British foreign policy. Similarly the new foreign secretary, David Milband, in his first speech on “New Diplomacy: Challenges for Foreign Policy” emphasised the direct linkages between domestic and foreign policy when he said:

Britain should respond to the real insecurities and opportunities that exist in the world not by retreating from international engagement, but by using our strengths so that we are a force for good for Britain by being a force for good in the world. The old distinction, between foreign policy that affected foreigners and domestic policy that affected our citizens, has collapsed. So foreign policy is about values and interests together (Rt Hon David Miliband MP, 2007).

Again on foreign policy adaptation, he remarked:

...Foreign policy goals and methods must adapt to a series of shifts in the distribution of power: a world where the security threat is not just from excessive state power, but increasingly from terrorism and conflict within failed states…(Rt Hon David Miliband MP, 2007)

These early indications of Gordon Brown’s closeness to Europe has left a speculation in the media and among foreign policy analysts that there are indications of changing British foreign policy; a foreign policy that is more European centric and a shift from the Atlantic relations. The comment by Douglas Alexander, the International Development Secretary, on military power and tackling the threat of terror by saying “In the 20th Century a country’s might was too often measured in what they could destroy. In the 21st Century strength should be measured by what we can build together” (itv.com 2007) ruffles many feathers within circles of foreign policy analyst and took it as a shift in British foreign policy from Iraq. However, the prime minister indicated that there is no such change in British foreign policy direction and that “Our relationship with America is strong, will become stronger in the years to come and the reason it will become stronger and the reason why a British Prime Minister will always have a strong relationship with the American president is that we share the same values” (itv.com 2007).
Such contradicting statements are bound to create anxiety with regard to British foreign policy towards the EU and the US respectively. It is however clear that international and European security that is being threatened by the increasing menace of global terrorism is the main focus of Brown’s foreign policy agenda. Early indication to this can be found in Robin Shepherd, a foreign policy analyst, comments that “The government has a very clear strategy at the moment of distancing itself who from Tony Blair and I think it's very clear they want to woo back those voters that left the Labour Party at the last election over Iraq” (itv.com 2007).

CHALLENGES TO BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EU

In summing up one can conclude that there are few challenges that Britain will face in its future relationship with the EU, in particular with CFSP. These challenges are both internal and external; short term and long term challenges. The recent change in leadership and the next general election present an immediate challenge to this. Whatever foreign policy direction that is going to be decided will be solely taken at appeasing the domestic constituencies. Peculiar to this challenge will be the re-orientation of foreign policy if there is a change of government from the Labour party to the Conservative. Though no such drastic or radical change in foreign policy is expected but the change in the approach of administrative functioning will affect foreign policy direction in a short term.

Another domestic issue that for a long time will continue to challenge British foreign policy with the EU will be in the area of terrorism threat. The need to harmonise functioning and policy guidance between the FCO and Home Office vis a vis the CFSP and JHA will prevent the overlapping of jurisdiction, confusion and delay in implementing policies.

At the international level (that is the EU); challenges to Britain will be the emergence of new power structure in the EU with the increase of new membership. The CFSP being too recent is further challenged by the constant evolution of the EU as an institution for which we cannot predict even though it is evident that there is no looking back at
withdrawing or disbanding the process altogether. It is in this context that decision making in the CFSP will be more complicated, while decision was easy during the EPC of 6 members or for that matter 12 members, it became uncomfortable at 15, difficult at 24 and maybe confusion at 27.

This confusion will be further complicated if the Constitutional treaty is abandoned altogether. However if at all this draft treaty is again resurrected in any form there will be lots of push and pull from Member States as question of sovereignty and national identity will come to forefront again.

RESEARCH FINDING

In the course of this research few specific conclusion can be drawn from this:

- British attitude towards the CFSP is determined by both domestic and international factors. On the domestic level its policies are shaped by the dynamics of international political events and developments as well as by the preferences, power and negotiation strategies of other governments. Here the case of Convention of Europe and the Iraq Crisis are typical of this.

- That Putnam's 'win-set' approach to a large extent can be explained in the interplay of domestic and international factors in British negotiation during the Maastricht Treaty where at Level II (domestic constituent) Prime Minister John Major was heavily constrained by the domestic pressure. It is such constraint that he was able to gain a larger 'win-set' at Level I (international negotiation at the EU level) and thus successful in his 'opt-out' and subsidiary bargaining.

- That national interest is foremost in any institutional bargaining between Britain and the EU.
• While the importance of the EU in British's diplomacy cannot be ignored, the transatlantic relationship will continue to dominate British foreign policy in the near future.

• While this thesis employed a more general analysis of Putnam's two-level fame and to certain extent Moravcsik's Liberal intergovernmentalism to explain Britain's attitude towards the EU, there is however the need for re-orientation of approaches to the study of Member States and EU. A water tight compartment of analysis from one theory or approaches cannot and will not be able to explain the dynamics of European Union foreign policy analysis. The constant evolution of the European Union with the ever increasing demands from Member States to maximise their bargain from the EU has made a single approach redundant.