INTRODUCTION
As discussed in brief in Chapter 1 and 2, British attitude towards the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union can be characterized as favourable as compared to other policy-sectors of the EU. However, it is to be noted that British response to the EU’s CFSP has been asymmetrical and incremental in nature. To understand Britain relations with the EU especially in the area of Common and Foreign Policy, it is important to understand first the background towards the EU’s EPC/CFSP evolution and second, Britain’s association with this institution. Both can be analysed in the context of domestic and international events that preceded the Maastricht Treaty and after. Therefore this chapter is divided into two sections. The first will be the evolution from the EPC to the CFSP; the second part will be on the Britain’s response to such change and most importantly the new CFSP for which Kosovo crisis will be tested as a case study. The aim of this study is not to dwell on the case but to analyse the importance of the case in changing British perception towards EU and Europe in general and the CFSP in particular.

FROM EPC TO CFSP
Foreign and security policy as it is today was never an original idea of the Schuman plan. The first decades of the Community’s common market witnessed the growth in a multitude of commercial and co-operation agreements concluded between the Community and the non-EC states on the one hand, and a bilateral agreement between the EC Member States with a third country on the other. However, with the expansion of the common market from an internal market into international trading bloc, the demand for a common political platform was felt where the EC could be represented as an important bloc with one voice on the required issue. It is therefore in these linkages between trade and politics and the expectation that the EC would play a leading role in
international economic and political arena that foreign and security policy was integrated, though informally, into the functioning of the common market. As Andreas Kitnis argues:

One factor therefore for the introduction of some kind of cooperation in the field of foreign policy was the need for the Community to rectify its image in the outside world as a unified force and to respond to third parties' needs for a 'political' European Community (Kintis 1995).

Moreover, factors that shaped EC foreign policy objectives was mostly in its external relationships with the United States, the Soviet Union, East Germany and Eastern Europe and constant involvement in the peace initiative in the Middle East crisis prompted the EC to frame a common foreign policy to 'sustain and promote European interests in the world' (Kintis 1995).

Before the advent of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union foreign policy was operated under European Political Cooperation (EPC). The evolution of the EPC dated back to the Hague Conference of the Head of States of the Member States of the European Community on 2 December 1969 where they declared:

Entry upon the final stages of the Common Market not only means confirming the irreversible nature of the work accomplished by the Communities, but also means paving the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditional and its missions (Government of Federal Republic of Germany 1988: 22).

It was also agreed that the Foreign Ministers of the Six Member States, under the chairmanship of Walter Scheel to "study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification..." (Government of Federal Republic of Germany 1988: 22). Thus on 30 October 1970, the Foreign Ministers of the Six met in Luxembourg and expressed their determination to "pave the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its missions" (Government of Federal Republic of Germany 1988: 22). Moreover, it was felt that in order to "meet the ultimate goal of political union in Europe" the proposal has to proceed from three considerations. These are:

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I) Shape ought to be given ...to the will for political union...to further the progress of the European Communities.

II) Implementations of common policies require corresponding developments in the political sphere so that Europe will be able to speak with one voice.

III) Europe must prepare to assume its responsibilities in world politics which are both its duty and necessity on account of its greater cohesion and increasingly important role (Government of Federal Republic of Germany 1988: 25-26).

More importantly, the Luxembourg Report of 1970 was aimed at advancing the Community for a deeper economic integration and also enabled the Community to speak in a single voice in the international economic and political platform. It is in these aims and objectives for a new political cooperation that Member States—by then known as the European Councils—after submitting three reports which finally ended in the Luxembourg Report established an institutional mechanism to smoothen the functioning of the EPC. These are:

1 System of regular meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs where they are to meet at least every six months;

2 a Committee of the Directors of Political affairs was required to meet at least four times a year to prepare for the upcoming ministerial meetings and other tasks as required by the Ministers;

3 the Group of European Correspondents whose task was to prepare the Political Committee meetings and supervise realisation of the political co-operation;

4 working Parties for individual questions consisting of senior officials
from foreign ministries of the member-states;

5 the Presidency which was to take control of implementation of decisions made at the Ministerial meetings, to propose consultation at the appropriate level concerning a certain subject, to relate to Ambassadors of member-states between Political Committee meetings as well as to conduct press briefings;

6 special staff for the Presidency from the preceding and succeeding presidencies in order to facilitate business and ensure continuity;

7 the COREU network (*Correspondance Européenne*, a special telex communication network between the embassies of member-states; and

8 close and regular contacts and collaboration between the embassies of the member-states in third countries (Government of Federal Republic of Germany 1988: 27; Also see, Rupp 1999).

Despite these mechanisms, lack of political will, incoherence between Member States’ interests along with the undefined policy processes within the EPC and lack of legal instruments to implement or bind decision making within the EPC render political cooperation in international developments insufficient. What the EPC could effectively act was in the form of common declarations, common views and joint actions which on many occasions were only recommendatory in nature. Nevertheless, the EPC was in itself an important initiative. According to Michael E. Smith, despite the failure and deviation from the original plan of establishing a “European Identity”, by 1970s the EPC did make progress in specific areas. Furthermore, such progresses should be seen in the context that the EPC was established first and foremost as a “defensive measure to protect the EC” and thus “shield the still-evolving Community from potentially disruptive unilateral foreign policy actions by its own members” (Smith 2000). Thus, “through EPC the Member States of the EC resolved never to allow their foreign policies to become so
independent and selfish that they threatened to disrupt their hard-won efforts regarding economic integration” (Government of Federal Republic of Germany 1988: 27; Also see, Rupp 1999).

These legal and technical handicaps were overcome only in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 when the EPC was given a legal status by incorporating it in Title I (Article 1 to 3-Common Provisions); Title III (Article 30(1-12) - Provisions on European Co-operation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy) and Title IV (General and Final Provisions) of the treaty framework that the EPC and its institutions were given a legal status.

Article 30 of the SEA stated “to direct political co-operation towards the goal of achieving a European foreign policy, to strengthen its basic elements and to improve its functioning” (Government of Federal Republic of Germany 1988: 355). The treaty also reaffirmed the Community’s desire to play an active role in international politics by stating that closer cooperation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of European identity in external policy matters (Single European Act 1987: Article 30 (6) a). Important in the functioning of the EPC in the newly established SEA is the clear definition of the functioning of the EPC’s decision mechanism and subsequently its relationship with the various institutions. Before the SEA, the evolution of the EPC between 1969 and 1987 took place outside the legal framework of the European Communities. Its legal foundation involved declarations by member-states’ governments at the summits - later called European Councils which was generally a system of closed door meetings of the head or foreign ministers of the Member States only. With the SEA, a system of six month rotating presidency known as troika, a more formal, bureaucratized EC decision making mechanisms quietly developed. At the same time competencies of the various organs of the Community like the European commission and the ECJ were delineated (Smith 2000). But most importantly the SEA implicitly created an international obligation not only for Member States but also for the applicant members in the form of acquis politique. The case with Greece’s application was an example where documents on EPC procedure and the
‘European identity’ were given and asked to take part in EPC with all its associated rights and obligations (Smith 2001: 95). Likewise, the 1986 Single European Act finally included a reference to cooperation on the “political and economic aspects of security” within the framework of EPC, a major advancement of the formal agenda for political cooperation against the backdrop of cold war and European security (Smith 2000).

MAASTRICHT AND AMSTERDAM TREATIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CFSP

i) Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP:
The Maastricht Treaty represents an important point in the evolution of the CFSP. The foundation to the CFSP of the Union runs side by side with that of the economic and monetary union since the formation of the EEC and subsequently culminated in the 1990s. In the earlier years emphasis on economic was greater and any political cooperation that was taken revolves with the aim of fostering economic growth within the Community. However by the beginning of the 1990s a breakthrough was achieved as Francois Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl both agreed in first week of January 1990 that ‘the central axis of policy is the development and strengthening of the Community and the structures, so that it really moves towards a common political will’ (Manners 2000: 191). To this effect the subsequent series in the effort towards a political union followed suit when in March 1990 both the German foreign Minister, Hans Dietricht Gensher and his counterpart the Italian foreign minister, Gianni de Michelis issued a joint declaration ‘calling for a second intergovernmental conference to deal with political union’ (Manners 2000: 191). Notwithstanding these declarations the path to achieve an effective European Political Union was hampered by discordant policy among Member States toward a common and foreign policy within the EU.

Nevertheless, after twenty years of informal foreign policy cooperation under the EPC system, in 1991 the Treaty on European Union (TEU) finally and explicitly linked this unusual arrangement to the existing EC treaties by establishing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP was given a formal treaty
basis and placed under Title IV and article J (1-11) of the treaty. The CFSP was established as a separate pillar (second pillar) within the TEU and made a distinction between the supranational and intergovernmental activities of the new Union. Foreign, security and defence are explicitly included in the CFSP and was established with the aim of developing a policy that covered “all areas of foreign and security policy” and to assert its identity on the international scene. Thus, the Maastricht Treaty affirmed that “the common foreign and security policy [would] include all questions related to the security of the European Union including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense” (Maastricht Treaty: Article D, para. 1). However, during the negotiation for the Maastricht Treaty there were differences between parties on the exact role of the future of EU’s security and defence organisation with Britain opposing any diminished role of NATO and the Atlantic relationship. It was at last decided that the Western European Union (WEU), working closely with NATO, would function as the "defense component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance" (Assembly of WEU 1991: para. 2). Nevertheless, the main broad objectives of the CFSP as laid down in Article J.1.2 are:

1. to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;

2. to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;

3. to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;

4. to promote international cooperation;

5. to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (ibid).
Notwithstanding the development from the EPC to the CFSP, the Maastricht Treaty attracted a lot of debates and opinion among Member States during its IGC on future status of the EU as a political union. The issues that vexed the IGC were regarding the functioning of the CFSP and the integration of Member States foreign policy with that of the Maastricht Treaty. The result of the IGC was that the CFSP would be based on an intergovernmental cooperation under a new heading within the new treaty. However, despite such changes, the Maastricht treaty failed to live up to its expectation in the field of foreign policy. As Michael Alexander Rupp (1999) argued:

...despite its impressive name, the TEU did not incorporate all policy-sectors within the Union’s competencies into one unified political structure. Instead, it introduced two separate legal constructions, the CFSP and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which are not communitarian (Rupp 1999).

ii) The Amsterdam Treaty: Revision of the Maastricht and the CFSP
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty unexpectedly faced its first test during the Yugoslav Crisis of 1991. The crisis exposed the conspicuous imbalance in the Maastricht Treaty’s capability-expectation gap with respect to the new CFSP. Lack of institutional coordination between Member States was mainly due to institutional guidance from a definite source or head, and this to a great extent weakens the institutional capability of the CFSP institution. For example, as discussed in details in the next section, the ‘Joint action’ principles which expect Member States to coordinate accordingly in response to any crisis was exposed when Member States reacted differently to the crisis and remain uncoordinated for most of the time.

It is in these shortcomings of the Maastricht Treaty vis a vis the CFSP that the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1996 sought to revise the institutional incapability of the Maastricht Treaty to deal with the future crisis. To this many of the problems identified were to some extent rectified to improve the CFSP’s performance and to bridge the EU’s capability-expectations gap in this area. The main improvements in the Treaty of Amsterdam were mainly in the area of institutional functioning of the CFSP. These include (Europa: 2005):
1 A system of qualified majority vote, with the dual safeguards of "constructive abstention" and the possibility of referring a decision to the European Council if a Member State resorts to a veto.

2 A new foreign policy instrument to the existing ones (joint action and common position) namely, common strategies was added. The European Council has the right to define by consensus, common strategies in areas where the Member States have important common interests. The Council is responsible for implementing common strategies through joint actions and common positions adopted by a qualified majority vote. It also recommends common strategies to the European Council.

3 In the area of decision making-The general rule remains that CFSP decisions always require a unanimous vote in their favour. However, Member States can exercise "constructive abstention", i.e. an abstention which does not block the adoption of the decision. If they qualify their abstention by a formal declaration, they are not obliged to apply the decision but they must accept, in a spirit of solidarity, that the decision commits the Union as a whole and must agree to abstain from any action that might conflict with the Union's action under that decision. However, this mechanism does not apply if the Member States abstaining in this way account for more than one third of Council votes weighted in accordance with the Treaty.

4 A safeguard clause enabling Member States to block majority voting for important reasons of national policy.

5 An introduction of the position of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and specified the means at the Union's disposal (Europa: 2005).
Thus, the Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force on 1 May 1999 to a large extent is an improvement from the Maastricht Treaty. The Irish Presidency which took over from the Italian in July 1996 cleared the confusion over the use of joint actions and common positions by proposing to amend Article J.1(3) of the TEU. Finally, the Amsterdam Treaty took up the suggestion of the Irish proposal so that the redrafted Article J.2 (Article 12 of the new Treaty of Amsterdam) would empower the Union to pursue its objectives by:

- defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy;
- deciding on common strategies;
- adopting joint actions;
- adopting common positions; and
- strengthening systematic co-operation between Member States in the conduct of policy (Rupp 1999).

With the CFSP’s failure during the Bosnian crisis, the Amsterdam Treaty therefore, enhanced the provisions of Common Foreign and Security Policy under Title V of the Treaty on European Union to contribute towards the progressive formation of a common Defence policy; this was more particularly concerned with Article 17 which summed up:

1 The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common Defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common Defence, should the European Council so decide. The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing it with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of integrating the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so
decide.

2 Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking as envisioned in the “Petersberg tasks” of the June 1992 WEU Ministerial meeting in Petersberg, Germany.

3 The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and Actions of the Union which have defence implications (European Commission (2005)

BRITAIN AND THE CFSP: A CASE STUDY OF YUGOSLAVIA/KOSOVO CRISIS

The events leading towards the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty was a period of great upheaval both at the international and the domestic level as far as Britain was concerned. The end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, the Yugoslavia crisis, the Gulf war were some of the most important issues that confronted British foreign policy decision-making at that time. However, taken singularly, ‘Europe’, as William Wallace has pointed out, was “the defining issue for British foreign policy” (Young 2000: 152). When John Major took over the reign from Thatcher, his main agenda to Britain’s foreign policy was to take back Britain to the centre of Europe. He was convinced that Britain’s future lay with continental Europe and in his speech in Bonn on March 1991 he declared ‘I want us to be where we belong at the very heart of Europe’ (Young 2000: 154). However, such vision was hampered by the internal division within the Conservative Party over the issue of integration and the ever decline of the Sterling pound. For instance, the then Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker had in the past favoured EC membership but was never in favour of the diminishing of Britain’s national sovereignty in a community where an absorption into a super state was what the EC institutions in Brussels seem increasingly determined to move to (Young 2000: 152).
Therefore the general position of Britain on the CFSP was evident from the strategy it adopted prior to the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty. The absence of any official White Paper prior to the IGCs indicated that Britain on its part was not ready for such negotiations ahead of a general election (Young 2000: 155). Its attitude towards institutional reforms was downright negative, the strategy was to keep central institutions as weak as possible, to support inter-governmental co-operation rather than supranationalism where new areas of activity (such as the CFSP) were concerned; to avoid a 'two-tier' Europe the issue of deeper integration, and to secure in principle of 'subsidiarity (Young 2000). The general disposition towards the EC/EU foreign policy can be attributed to the constraint John Major faced within his Conservative government during the negotiation to the Maastricht Treaty. The bill on the ratification of the treaty was earlier opposed by 40 Conservative MPs on 20 May on the question of 'Social Chapter'. When the bill was placed in front of the House on 22 July it was opposed by the Conservatives MPs who had consistently opposed the government's bill during the long protracted committee stage (Boucek 2003). The main opposition to the bill came from the ‘Fresh Starters’-MPs who had signed an ‘early day motion’ (EDM) a year earlier demanding a ‘Fresh Start’ on European negotiations and a postponement of the treaty (Boucek 2003). Moreover, this rebel faction had the support of many prominent past and present cabinet members and some influential party officials (Boucek 2003). Interestingly, members of this faction were composed of MPs from various affiliation backgrounds, some of them were those who opposed the Common Market while others were ‘free-marketeers’ but opposed fixed exchange rates and a single currency; while some members feared the legal repercussions of the treaty on Britain’s institutions, laws, and identity others strongly felt about defending British sovereignty (Boucek 2003).

i) The Yugoslav Crisis:
The Yugoslav crisis that erupted in the first half of 1991 was the first real test for both EU and British foreign policy making. The crisis which was boiling since the death of Tito soon erupted after the end of the Cold War with Milosevic in power. With the death of Tito, Yugoslavia lacked visionary leaders like him to keep the county intact and there created a power vacuum which was filled by Milosevic after a brief power struggle. By
the late 80s when communism started to collapse, Milosevic began to increase his grip on power through centralisation of power and abrogation of autonomy of various provinces. The result of all these was the beginning of demands for self-assertion by different ethnic groups and sub-nationalities who felt economically and politically deprived by the Serbian controlled government.

By the beginning of 1991 problems between the Croats, Bosnians and the Serbs began to worsen and the EC began to realise that the situation was getting out of its hand. The immediate response to the crisis was economic and financial instruments which attempted to, a) a need to preserve a united Yugoslavia, b) a political dialogue between all parties to implement needed democratic reforms and, c) a ban on the use of force (Wood 1993: 233). Working along this line, in May 1991, the EC threatened to suspend the second financial protocol with Yugoslavia and negotiation over an association agreement with Yugoslavia unless the fighting ceases and independence movements in Croatia and Slovenia were halted (Wood 1993: 233). Following the examples of the EC’s posture, Britain announced that its first priority is to keep the federation together (See Wood 1993) and such view were supported by the French and the Italian. Though the official EC position on the crisis was clear, fissure began to appear within Britain, France and Spain against any disintegration of Yugoslavia while Germany was seemingly on the opposite side of the fence. Meanwhile, any attempt from the international community to pressure both Croatia and Slovenia to desist from declaring their independence went futile and both countries went ahead and declared their independence. Responding to this the EC met at Luxembourg on 23 June and agreed not to recognise Slovenia or Croatia if they unilaterally seceded from Yugoslavia.

When heavy fighting broke out by the end of June and beginning of July, arms embargoes on Yugoslavia and the suspension of the second and third financial protocols with Yugoslavia were signed by all Yugoslav participants on 7 July 1991 in the form of Brioni Declaration (Wood 1993: 234). However despite such effort, the EC failed to find a durable solution to the crisis and cracks began to appear within the EC over the timing of the proposed upcoming conference to the crisis. Italy, France and Germany wanted to
convene the conference at the earliest while Britain and Netherlands wanted it to delay until ceasefire had been fully implemented (Wood 1993: 234). Nevertheless, the conference was held on 7 September at The Hague under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. At the conference, debate over military intervention in Yugoslavia was proposed under the umbrella of the WEU. This was supported by France Italy and Germany, but Britain, Spain and Greece again opposed such attempts. The conference ended with a mere casual agreement to “continue its reflection”. So much time had been wasted on deliberations and conferences without any results and this greatly hampered any attempt to resolve the crisis by then. By the time the EC members met again at Hague on 19 September greater split was apparent than before. While the Dutch was of the opinion to send a peacekeeping force under the WEU, the French and the German supported a UN Security Council mandate to send in a European force. Britain on the other hand was totally opposed to such ideas and Prime Minister Major clearly stated that he will not commit any contribution to the proposed peacekeeping force, for such force would be deemed irresponsible and risky to be involved in a guerrilla war without a widely accepted ceasefire (Wood 1993: 235).

The failure of the Member States to find an effective solution to the Yugoslav crisis was mainly due to the bargaining process that underwent prior to the Maastricht Treaty. Germany, because of historical and cultural links, privately wanted to go ahead and recognise both the breakaway Republic, however the forthcoming Maastricht negotiation prevented it from doing so and hence agreed to fall along the line of the other EC Member States. The British government on the other hand was occupied with two issues i) the negotiation to the Maastricht treaty where issues like ERM and social policy were of main concern and ii) Domestic pressure on issues of economy and Maastricht negotiation on the sideline of the 1992 general election greatly restricted the government’s role in the crisis in Yugoslavia. The constraints faced by Britain during the crisis were quickly capitalized by the Germans who announced immediately after the Maastricht summit that Slovenia and Croatia would be supported with or without the EC mandate. This was particularly true when mounting pressure from the public and lobbying groups within Germany left Kohl with no other choice but to recognise the two
breakaway republics. The clout of German economy and influence prevailed over the others despite initial opposition from Member States like France and Britain. Meanwhile, by the end of September it was clear that the EC on its own could not find a solution, hence acting upon the request of Britain, France and Belgium the UN on 25 September 1991 passed Resolution 713 on arms embargoes to Yugoslavia and called upon the government of Yugoslavia to open up a negotiation (UNSC:1991). Following the Franco-British and Belgian initiative, the twelve EC members realised that European peacekeeping forces could not be agreed by all and hence called upon the UN Security Council to intervene and send an UN force instead.

Though the UN agreed upon this, the absence of ceasefire in the region prevented it from sending a peacekeeping force. It was however not until January 1992 that the UN was able to send fifty military liaison officers to promote ceasefire under the UN Special Envoy, Cyrus Vance that a ceasefire was agreed upon. Thus on 21 February, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 743 which endorsed the deployment of 10,000 UN Protection Force to Croatia (Wood 1993: 237). With the crisis of Croatia yet to be settled down, fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina started to take its ugly turn in the same time. On both the crises the EC’s EPC was marked by lack of policy coordination among Member States where problems of recognition of the breakaway republic, issues of military intervention and increasing humanitarian right violation completely divided the EC members. For instance while France supporting military intervention, Britain fiercely opposed such an idea. Furthermore, a strain in relation between Britain and France was again witnessed when on 28 June President Mitterrand flew to Sarajevo in an attempt to break a diplomatic stalemate to the crisis. The British were upset upon the timing of the visit because it felt that Britain which was supposed to take over the Council’s Presidency on 1 July was not consulted. Though Mitterrand’s effort paid off immediately with the Serbs agreeing to open the airport to UN forces, Britain considered such action by the French President as a lack of support for European solidarity (Wood 1993: 237). However, despite such differences, on 15 January 1992 Britain recognised Slovenia and Croatia, and on 7 April 1992 recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina.
British attitude could be attributed to the timing and circumstances of the crisis which was restricted by factors that are generally domestic in nature. During the crisis, British's Bosnian policy lacked leadership quality of John Major, moreover division within the Conservative, negotiation to the Maastricht treaty, the coming 1992 general elections, state of the British economy and most importantly the 'no' result by Denmark on the Maastricht Treaty on 2 June 1992 greatly restricted his ability to maneuver any room to play an influential role during that time. Such constraints greatly affected British's search for a role to play as an international actor on an international stage.

Moreover, the differences between France and Britain over the nature of military operation and command inevitably led to the debate over whether a UN peacekeeping force, WEU peacekeeping forces or NATO forces should be involved. The lack of coordination between Member States, especially Britain and France (Germany was completely engaged in the restructuring of the former East Germany) led to a complete failure of EC/EU common foreign policy framework during the Yugoslav crisis. The lack of action was hampered by loss of time when more than a year and a half was wasted because of differences of opinion among Member States resulted in crisis spilling towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania. It was not until the Americans intervened in the crisis that the Dayton Accord on the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed on 30 November 1995 thus ending the Bosnian crisis.

**ii) The Kosovo Crisis**

Within the context of the Yugoslav crisis, the Kosovo crisis presented a prism of British foreign policy as a) an EC/EU member that takes collective action based on the provision of the EPC and b) subservient to the Atlantic alliance. When the crisis erupted in Yugoslavia in May 1991, Britain, while offering its "good offices" to resolve the crisis from the very outset made its intentions clear by reiterating that the final responsibility for establishing peace and resolving the conflict rested with the nations living within the Yugoslav boundaries (Markovic 1992: 2; Foreign and Commonwealth Office's press release 8 May 1991).
However, five years after the Bosnian-Croatian crisis, a second crisis began again in Yugoslavia when tension between the Serbian government and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) erupted in Kosovo. What followed during this crisis was ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights by both the parties. By 1998 it was clear that the situation was getting worse, Britain and its six “Contact Group” that was responsible for the Dayton Accord, that is, France, Germany, Italy and US met on 9 March 1998 in London to resolve the crisis and issued a statement threatening Serbian authorities of new sanctions if they did not withdraw their special forces from Kosovo by 19 March and asked the Serbian leader, Milosevic to begin an unconditional dialogue with the Albanian leadership. However, the threat seems to have little impact on Milosevic who by then was resolving to crush down the Kosovar aspirations. It was around the same time that the UN Security Council met and passed a number of resolutions on the Kosovo crisis and intimidated to the Serbian authority that a possible NATO air strike was imminent if they failed to comply by the UN resolution (Resolution 1160(1998) 31 March 1998; Resolution 1199 (1998), 23 September 1998).

Likewise, the EU on its part declared a series of economic and political restrictions which was adopted through a ‘Common Position’ and ‘Regulations’. From 1998 up to 1999 Common Positions and Regulations was adopted on arms embargo; freezing of financial support; ban on flights between the EU and the Yugoslavia and; sales and supply of petroleum and petroleum products. For a brief period between the months of October-December 1998 it looked like peace process was going headway when a ceasefire was agreed between the Yugoslav government and NATO and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in October of 1999.

Despite such attempt, peace between the conflicting parties remains elusive. The situation became more precarious with the murder of 45 ethnic Albanian in the village of Recak, 18 miles south west of Pristina on 15 January 1999. The repercussion of this incident seemed to threaten whatever limited progress that was made so far. In response to this threat, a conference was held in the French town of Rambouillet from 7-23 February 1999. During the first round of talks, the Conference failed to make any progress for
there was a lack of consensus on the issues of autonomy, peacekeeping and the final status of Kosovo. However, on the final day of the conference, Yugoslavia agreed to discuss the scope and character of international presence, in other words, the presence of international peacekeeper; local autonomy for Kosovo that will not lead to independence and the inclusion of Russia in peacekeeping. This proposal was rejected by the Kosovar Albanians who wanted nothing short of independence.

As the two parties failed to reach an agreement, the negotiation was postponed till 15 March but by 13 March fighting broke out again and when the call for signing of the text of 23 February was opened on 18 March no parties seemed willing to sign. Nevertheless, the Albanians signed the text which was witnessed by only two of the three negotiators (Weller 1999: 235). The Serbs refused to sign and instead on 22 March launched an attack on Kosovo and on 24 March NATO started to intervene militarily and ended eleven weeks after.

**BRITAIN, CFSP AND THE KOSOVO CRISIS: FROM ST MALO TO NICE**

The Kosovo crisis which was a spillover of the Bosnian crisis was all along looming since 1992 but the immediate crisis in Bosnia pushed the Kosovo crisis to the backdrop and therefore the question of Kosovo was never spelled out properly in the Dayton Accord of 1995. This negligence eventually led to the Kosovar Albanian to adopt tactics of the Bosnians by taking up arms struggle against the Serbian government to achieve their objectives and at the same time attract international attention to their plight. Though peaceful movement for independence was going on as earlier as 1992, it was not until 1998 that serious fighting between the Kosovar Albanian and the Serbian government broke out. Thus, when the crisis broke out, an opportunity for the EU to learn from the earlier mistakes of the Bosnian crisis was imminent. Though the EU was lacking in terms of military infrastructure and capabilities to deal with the crisis, yet it was clear that politically it was ready to speak with one voice.

It was therefore clear that Kosovo would be a test to the EU’s CFSP. A positive outcome would mean that the EU has matured in term of foreign and security policy and therefore
less dependent on NATO. While toeing along the EU’s policy on the crisis, Britain, with the earlier EC’s failure in Bosnia fresh in mind was certain that American intervention through NATO was indispensable. Britain, following in the line of EU approved a series of Common Positions and Declarations taken by the Council. The first in the series was the Common Position of 19 May 1998 (No.240) on arms embargo to the region which was also taken earlier in Common Position 96/184/CFSP in 1996; it also reaffirmed the earlier Common Position taken in 1996 which restricted the sales of arms to Yugoslavia. Britain as the leading stakeholder in resolving the Yugoslav crisis fully acknowledged the need for an international intervention in Kosovo. This implies its changing perception to the crisis which was different from that of the Bosnian crisis by willingly aligning British foreign policy with that of EU’s foreign policy. Contrary to the Bosnian crisis, the Kosovo crisis witnessed Britain taking a deep interest in resolving the crisis. Working in tandem with the EU’s NATO members and the US, Britain from the outset of the crisis declared that it was willing to participate in any peacekeeping operation in the region. This was a shift from the earlier policy during the Bosnian crisis where it refused to commit its troops for any peacekeeping efforts under the EU security arrangement.

In the case of Kosovo, the main shift in British foreign policy was mainly due to the change of leadership at Whitehall. The new Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair right from the beginning of his election campaign days was clear with his foreign policy issues. British policy to Europe, he declared, that he was ready to take Britain back to the “heart of Europe”. This shift in foreign policy directions was possible by the fact that a Blair leadership quality within the party was unquestionable, and this enabled him to chart out his EU policy without much distraction from within the party. In his European scheme of things, Blair’s first foreign policy objective is to engage France as its guiding partner in the new Europe.

The importance of France to British foreign policy objectives was evident from the lesson of the earlier crisis where clashes between the French and British interests crippled the EU foreign and security mechanism. For any EU military force to succeed, will to a great extent “depend on tight Franco-British cooperation” (Howorth 2003-04: 174). It is only
through such an alliance that the EU foreign and security policy will benefit both in term of material and strategic value especially when Britain arms and defence establishment could be complimented by the French strategy. In other words, the British pragmatism and the French strategy is what the CFSP needed to tackle not only the Balkan crisis but also any future crises (Howorth 2003-04: 174).

According to Ian Manners (2000), despite the appearance at national level that the UK and France were in complete disagreement, the Anglo-French Phase quietly took place throughout 1990 and 1991 at an operational level within their defence (Manners 2000: 193). This he pointed out to the fact that as early as 1990 “there was some agreement amongst the French and British services that if the WEU was to be used as the EC defence component then it should remain a purely intergovernmental structure” (Manners 2000: 193). With the coming together two of Europe’s major military state a political compromise was a little easier to attain in during the Maastricht Treaty Negotiation in December 1991(Manners 2000: 193).

Following in this direction, a major development in Britain’s U-turn on the EU’s CFSP occurred at Blair’s press conference at the informal European Summit at Pörtschach on 24-25 October 1998 when he remarked:

On the CFSP:

A common and foreign security policy for the European Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed and it is high time we got on with trying to engage with formulating it and I think that people were pleased that Britain came to this with an open mind and was willing to participate in the debate and I think it is important that we do that (Rutten 2001).

And on the Kosovo crisis:

Kosovo has brought home to us, it is right that Britain and other European countries, as part of Europe, play a key and leading role and that we enhance our capability to make a difference in those situations (Rutten 2001).
With these events as background a ‘sea change’ attitude in Britain’s policy towards the CFSP finally came at the British-French summit at St Malo on 3-4 December 1998. The declaration of the summit was the cornerstone for Britain’s decision to plunge more deeply in the European affairs especially in the area of security and defence. Basic to the text declaration was the call for the EU to define and express its defence capabilities while at the same time committing its obligation to NATO as well. In abstract, the text to the declaration emphasised that:

1 there is a need for a continuous support and implementation of the CFSP’s provision as agreed upon in Amsterdam Treaty. Moreover, the Union should be in a position to play a full role at the international stage;
2 the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises;
3 the collective defence commitments to which Member States subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained;
4 …the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning without unnecessary duplication taking into account the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU;
5 Europe needs to strengthen the armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology (Rutten 2001).

The St Malo’s Declaration once again reaffirmed Britain’s pragmatism and calculative approach in dealing with the EU in general and the CFSP in particular. The Government’s Strategic Defence Review of July 1998 was partly responsible for the Blair’s decision to endorse the St Malo. The Strategic Defence Review of July 1998 clearly pointed out that if imbalance in the level of European participation-as it happened during the Bosnian crisis- continues British-Atlantic relationship could be a detrimental,
and that the only way to save the Alliance was via Europe (Ministry of Defence, HM Government 1998).

On the other side of the coin, the St Malo’s Declaration illustrates a merger of British and French foreign policy interests. According to Jean-Yves Haine (2004), the compromise between the French and British, as experienced during the mid 1990 gained more confidence during a close cooperation on the ground in Bosnia between British and French troops which to a large extent culminated in a de facto solidarity between the military personnel and hierarchies (Haine 2004). This merger of interests stemmed from the short-term British’s objectives on the one side and the French’s long-term objectives on the other. And this was reflected in London’s approach to Europe as much as a French concession to Atlantic legitimacy and its desire for a powerful integrated Europe in a long-term (Haine 2004). Taking the past experience of Bosnia Crisis and the looming Kosovo crisis into account, the joint declaration identified EU’s defence capability i.e. the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) as the key element that will bring Britain and France closer together in leveraging the EU as international actor who could swiftly response to crisis and events within and outside Europe in a systematic and organised manner. In other words, the EU as an international actor will enhance its new foreign and security identity without upsetting the Trans-Atlantic alliance. To this the declaration states:

...In strengthening the solidarity between the Member States of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1998).

Furthermore,

In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable

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military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework) (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1998)

The success of St Malo Summit paved the way for a cohesive EU’s security and defense policy which was effectively manifested during the run up to the Kosovo crisis. It is through St Malo that for the first time a foundation for a new defence identity for the EU in the form of ESDP was put in place. With this there followed the other initiative like the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) was followed soon after.

Overall, the process of European integration was boosted by the St Malo’s Declaration where the two big players in the EU- with different approach to European integration in the past-come together. If the European Coal and Steel Community is the driven force behind European economic integration, then the St Malo declaration brings together Europe’s two biggest defence establishment, thus pooling together the much needed defence infrastructure for the ESDP while at the same time complimenting to that complimenting to the role NATO. In this new set up, while Britain play a role that bridge the gap between Europe and the US, France act as a channel through which Britain can exert its influence within EU.

With relations between France and Britain reaching to a new level, there was a general upbeat within the EU on the future of the CFSP. However, as expected, the first test to the St Malo’s Declaration was the development in Kosovo. With London at the heart of the defence and security policy, the EU in its European Council at Cologne of 3-4 June 1999 placed the “Petersberg task” at the core of the European Common Security and Defence policy which will have “the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks”(European Commission 2003a) To achieve this the Council maintained that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1998)” With this the EU’s CFSP was greatly
strengthened to tackle issues which are not only of traditional security issues but also to commit itself in the area of humanitarian intervention as it was in the case of Kosovo.

To reaffirm his European policy, Blair at the Royal United Services Institute remarked:

We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our backyard. The EU should be able to take on some security tasks on our own and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own. To strengthen NATO and to make European defense a reality, we Europeans need to restructure our defense capabilities so that we can project force, can deploy our troops, ships, and planes beyond their home bases and sustain them there, equipped to deal with whatever level of conflict they may face (Tony Blair’s Speech at The Royal United Services Institute, 8 March 1999).

This comment from Blair was enough to testify his pro-European policy without diminishing the role of NATO, thereby making the Atlantic Alliance stronger without annoying his European partners.

A year after St Malo, Britain and France met again in London on 25 November 1999 and proposed to the impending European Council in Helsinki to take “a decisive step forward for the development of those military capabilities and for the setting up of the political and military instruments necessary to use them” and also urged Member States to commit themselves to:

1 the issues of deployment of combat forces of 50,000-60,000 men ‘which are militarily self-sufficient...with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, combat support and other combat service support (up to 50,000-60,000 men) and appropriate naval and air combat elements;

2 the capabilities to deploy in full at this level within 60 days and within this to provide some smaller rapid response elements at very high readiness;
3 develop rapid capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic lift (Rutten 2001).

The initiative by both parties was to add new elements to the EU’s capabilities by offering their readiness to house the Permanent Joint Headquarters and Centre Operational Interarmees in Britain and France respectively for the purpose of EU-led command. Besides, the summit while welcoming the transformation of the EUROPCORPS to Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), it however, proposed that logistical infrastructure be pooled from among Member States for effective operation. In this direction, the proposal spelled out the readiness of the British to provide its forces to the EUROPCORPS HQ for specific operations as the EUROPCORPS nations have already done in the case of the British-led ACE (Allied Command Europe) Rapid Reaction Corps.

Similar to the St Malo’s declaration, the British-Italian Summit was held in London from 19-20 July 1999. The summit in preparation to the next WEU Ministerial meeting and the Helsinki European Council declared the launching of the European Defence Capabilities Initiative (ESDI). The ESDI to be developed with other Member States aims at:

1 enhancing the military capabilities of the CFSP to undertake crisis management, including peacemaking;
2 to prepare the road map for more effective European defence procurement which will include harmonisation of military requirements and collaborative arms procurement and;
3 promoting restructuring of defence industry (Rutten 2001).

Consequently when the Helsinki Summit of the European Council was convened on 10-11 December 1999 it was clear that in the context of the CFSP, the process of Europeanisation of British foreign policy could not be overlooked. Apart from Blair’s pro-European stance and personal leadership, it was the Anglo-French axis that was responsible for the transformation of the EU’s CFSP/ESDP from a fractured institution to
a close knitted group. At the Helsinki Summit, Member States agreed their “determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises” without the creation of a European army (Rutten 2001). Member States also agreed to the Anglo-French London’s proposal of creating a military force of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range by 2003 (Rutten 2001). Besides, the military capabilities, the Helsinki Summit declared the willingness of the Member States to strengthen and delineate the role of the Council in dealing with these new developments within the CFSP through the creation of a “new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework” (Rutten 2001).

The success of the EU’s CFSP that was started with the Anglo-French summit in St Malo was completed at the Nice European Council Summit held from 7-9 December 2000. Like the earlier European Council Summits, the aim of the Nice Summit was to give the European Union “the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field” (Rutten 2001). In response to any crises, “the Union’s particular characteristic is its capacity to mobilise a vast range of both civilian and military means and instruments, thus giving it an overall crisis-management and conflict-prevention capability in support of the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy” (Rutten 2001). It is in these objectives that the Summit elaborates the future of the CFSP/ESDP by identifying the areas where the EU needed to work on. These are:
1) The development of military capabilities and the strengthening of civil crisis management capabilities. In this category Member States envisaged their determination to make the necessary efforts to improve their operational capabilities in order to carry out in full the demands for availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of the new ESDP. To this, Member States agreed to pursue their efforts in the area of command and control, intelligence and strategic air and naval transport capabilities. With regard to the definition and implementation of EU capabilities in the civilian aspects of crisis management, the need for a quick and effective response to the crisis was linked to the need of developing civilian capabilities in four priority areas as mentioned in the Feira European Council. These are: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection.

2) Establishment of permanent political and military structures as to enable the EU to have at its disposal the whole range of instruments required for a global approach to crisis management, and in particular:
I) develop a coherent European approach to crisis management and conflict prevention;
II) ensure synergy between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management;
III) cover the full range of Petersberg tasks.

To achieve these objectives, the European Council decided to establish the following permanent political and military bodies:

i) the Political and Security Committee;
ii) the Military Committee of the European Union;
iii) the Military Staff of the European Union.

3) Arrangements which will permit in the EU’s military crisis management the consultation and participation of non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU

4) Permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation

5) Inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU

6) Arrangements for the consultation and participation of other potential partners like Russia, Ukraine and other east European states with which the Union maintains political dialogue and other interested States such as Canada could be invited to participate in EU-led operations.

7) Conflict prevention by inviting the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission to submit to the Nice European Council concrete recommendations for improving the cohesion and effectiveness of action by the European Union in the field of conflict prevention (Rutten 2001).
Besides this the Nice Summit included annexes on military capabilities which outline a whole range of declaration, commitment, reviews, principle, evolution and the CFSP's relation with NATO as well as with other third countries. At the end of the Summit, the Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts were adopted. Changes were adopted in Article 17 and 25 respectively. Article 17 was strengthened by cooperation between CFSP and NATO. The new defined role of the CFSP was humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Article 25 was replaced by the establishment of the Political and Security Committee which shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy. Article 27 was further enhanced by the addition of Article 27a -27e which deals with principles, power of the European Community; role of the EU institutions and the reaffirming of the QMV in taking the above decisions (Rutten 2001).

The progress of the EU foreign and security policy has come a long way from the EPC to the CFSP/ESDP to ESDI. This was possible because of various developments in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty of the European Union came at the juncture of great international events. The end of the Cold-War, the reunification of Germany and the disintegration of Yugoslavia presented the Union with both opportunities and challenges. While the end of the Cold-War and reunification of Germany dispel the fear of the Cold-War, the end of the Cold War also presented EU with new problems within its own backyard in the form of ethnic violence, nationalism and peacekeeping. It is in these shortcomings to tackle problems that as an economic giant, the EU, lacked a political will to develop a sustainable foreign and security policy.

However, such shortcomings were also the result of constraints within Member States' domestic and international policies that eventually translated into a lack of political will to lead the CFSP in the right directions. The success of the CFSP though depended on the collective policies and commitment of the fifteen Member States, yet it is also true that the main players in the CFSP were Britain and France followed by Germany and Italy.
This hierarchical order in terms of power was mainly due to the sheer size of logistic, technology and manpower of the British and the French defence establishments. Also as permanent members of the UN Security Council, Britain and French influences in the international stage is crucial to the EU’s international leadership role. Therefore, the initial years of the CFSP was hampered because of the differences between the French and the British on issues ranging from Bosnia to Iraq whereby such difference was played not only within the EU but even in the UN Security Council. Explanation to this can be understood from the British point of domestic and international constraint. The immediate Post Cold-War years presented the Conservative government in Britain with a hard choice of charting its foreign policy between Europe and Atlantic relationship. While return to Europe was inevitable, a continuance of Atlantic relationship was necessary for the end of Cold War seem to threaten the Atlantic relationship especially when NATO’s traditional role began to diminish.

Developments within and outside Britain to a great extent influenced not only EU’s CFSP transformation from a moribund intergovernmental pillar but also realised the actorness in EU international responsibility. First, the Bosnian and Kosovo crisis was an eye opener not only to the EU but to Britain on their failure to act without the American intervention. It was then realized that the EU alone through its WEU cannot operate without the support of NATO or that NATO’s Post Cold-War operation without the WEU and US support would render illegitimate to other non-NATO EU members. Second, when Britain’s Euroscepticism in joining the Euro was viewed with suspicion, it was necessary for it to balance its foreign policy between Europe and Atlantic relationship during the Bosnian/Kosovo crisis so as to augment its international profile as an actor in an international stage. Third, the change of power in Britain in 1997 brought about a sea change in its foreign policy framework. The pro-European Prime Minister, Tony Blair, acknowledged the immediate urgency of the CFSP especially in the context of the Kosovo crisis. Basic to Blair pro-European policy was his bilateral engagement with EU Member States outside the parameter of the European Union. Such bilateral engagement was able to influence the Anglo-French relationship on the CFSP were both
countries shared a similar outlook towards EU security despite their differences on other issues of European integration.

The Anglo-French axis was successful not only because of the extent of influence that both have with other Member States within the EU, but because of various other factors. Important among these were the high quality and extensiveness of both French and British military industrial establishment; their responsibility as member of the EU, NATO and OSCE and; most importantly as permanent members of the UN Security Council. For example the importance of the Anglo-French axis for EU’s foreign policy was displayed during the UN Security Council’s debate on the Kosovo crisis. Despite the refusal of Russia and China to authorise the use of force by NATO, Britain and France together represented a single voice in the Security Council, thus implying the importance of a common EU voice on international issues at the international stage.

CONCLUSION

British policy towards the CFSP post-Maastricht was first marked with its reluctant approach towards the issue. Though compared to the CAP and social policy, even during the Thatcher government the CFSP was more accommodative in the British scheme of things. However, on the road to the Maastricht Treaty, an attempt for an institutional reform was greatly opposed by Britain for it was perceived these reforms would eventually lead the Community to a federal Union. Such fear was evident from the fact that the Franco-German axis looked like it would hijack the Maastricht negotiation and leads the EU towards a ‘supranational’ direction. For Britain, any supranational element within the future Union will eventually erode British leadership role on the one hand and crippled the Atlantic alliance on the other.

To avoid this, Britain undertook a series of action both within and outside the arena of the Maastricht negotiation to oppose any attempt to lead the Community towards a federal union. Within the treaty negotiation together with Italy, Britain in October 1991 produced a joint plan for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Plan envisaged the
future of EU defence policy where NATO primacy in the future of EU security arrangement was proposed. Such plan was greatly opposed by the Franco-German axis who wanted a more federal Union by proposing a speedy development in the area of defence policy and separate security arrangement for the EU away from the NATO sphere of influence. However even this failed to be adopted and with the tacit support of the United States the Anglo-Italian scheme was passed through (Young 2000: 155). This was not the only instance that Britain sought to make space for the Trans-Atlantic relationship within the EU’s functioning. Similar attempts were adopted by Britain as early as on May 1991 when it successfully negotiated the creation of a new Alliance Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) under permanent British Commands, thus preventing the French from using the political union to seize European defence away from NATO. Again on British pressure at the NATO Rome Summit in November 1991, reforms were agreed to both revitalise NATO’s strategies role and force structure and also marked a renewal in American commitment to west European defence (Foster 1998: 354; Evans 1991; Fitchett 1991).

The dominance of the Atlantic relationship during the Maastricht treaty negotiation was the main strategy of British foreign policy towards the CFSP. The strategy was to strengthen its Atlantic alliance especially when American presence in the European security umbrella was fading as a result of the end of the Cold-War. Besides, for Britain, it is evident that the development of the future EU-British relationship very much depended over the US influences over the EC Member States. Thus when the Iraqi crisis broke out in 1991, John Major on his visit to Washington officially offered President Bush on 21 December his full support for the use of force against Saddam Hussein if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. When the war broke out, Britain not only had the second largest force in the Gulf region and continued to support the US position in the United Nations but consistently opposed French initiatives within the EPC that might introduce the concept of “linkage” or interfere with U.S plans (Wood 1993: 232). These events were later instrumental in shaping British attitude towards the EU common foreign and Security policy among other policies during the Maastricht treaty negotiation.
Though never opposed to the idea of European cooperation, Britain continues however to have apprehension about cooperation in areas that are traditionally of national interest. Thus any restructuring to the institutions within the European Community was viewed with suspicion. It is this Euroscepticism that the Common Foreign and Security policy was put under an intergovernmental pillar of the new treaty despite other Member States committing to ‘widening and deepening’ of the EU.

The bargaining of ‘opt-out’ from the “Social Chapter” and ‘Euro’ was mainly the outcome of a public and political outcry over British national identity but at the same time its involvement in other sectors, especially economic integration is a suggestion of Britain bargaining for more economic integration rather than political or social. Thus despite his intention to be in the centre of Europe, the then Prime Minister, John Major’s policy to Europe was no less difference from that of Margaret Thatcher. However such attitude changed with the coming of the Labour Party into power in 1997. Blair’s objective was to regain Britain’s place in international stage, along with his personal ambition to play a primary role in international politics leading him to rethink British foreign policy. For this he keeps Europe at the centre of his foreign policy without disturbing the Atlantic Alliance.

When Blair took over, Europe was at a crossroad over the crisis in the Balkans. Though he indicated that Britain was ready to follow the EU foreign policy objectives to tackle the crisis, yet he was sure that Europe on its own would not be able to succeed without the Atlantic Alliance. Like the Franco-German axis that propelled the European Economic Community in the early years, Blair was convinced that for the CFSP to be successful in the Kosovo crisis, the Anglo-Franco axis is important to both the EU and the Atlantic relationship. Therefore, unlike his predecessor Blair was successful in his agendas mainly because of support from all quarters within his party. His leadership quality was the most important factor that changed Britain’s attitude towards the EU. Unlike Thatcher who choose to ignore her European partner or Major whose only confidant was Chancellor Kohl, Blair’s style of functioning was constant bilateral engagement with other European capitals through regular bilateral meetings, summits and
briefings. This kind of functioning allowed Britain to “gain strategic advantage in policy negotiation” and was ‘successful in creating good working relationships across the EU” (Smith 2005: 709). In the final analysis, British attitude towards the EU’s CFSP underwent a ‘sea change’ during the first term of his office. Success to this was mainly because of the peaceful domestic environment and pro-people policy of the Labour government. It is in this kind of environment that Britain’s CFSP policy took a great leap. The strategy to such policy was done at the expense of the Euro negotiation. By pushing Britain in front of the CFSP, Blair managed to keep the key question of Euro in the shadow. By this strategy, Blair managed to insulate himself from both the domestic audience and EU on the one hand and improved Britain’s international credibility in the area of defence and security on the other. This kind of bargaining worked well during the first term of his premiership but began to lose steam by the end of his second term because of the domestic pressure and criticism from EU Member States over his decision to support the US in the war against Iraq in 2003.

Events such as break up of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Kosovo could not prepare Europe for what lay ahead. While Europe was incrementally moving towards a new post-modern collective identity and articulating a CFSP, 9/11 was too soon and transformed world politics and the ability of to respond to new security threat. While the EU was in disarray, the United States in the post 9/11 period launched an all-out war against terror by asserting its sovereignty and national interest and the right to pursue its enemies in any part of the world in order to secure its boundary. These events transformed not only US domestic policy (such as the launching of ‘Homeland Act’) but also transformed American foreign policy. The world’s new challenge was to response to a new faceless threat that did not recognize state’s border and was willing to engage state anywhere. The aftermath of 9/11 brought about to the forefront issue of states’ sovereignty and the right of states to response to the new security threat.