CHAPTER-III

An exposition concerning doctrine of Spirit (Geist) in Hegel

I, in this chapter, shall discuss critically the doctrine of Spirit in the German idealism of G.W.F. Hegel. The doctrine of Spirit (consciousness) is discussed here in its interrelated aspects namely, metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, psychology, and ethics. The analysis will proceed by the elucidation of reality in terms of Idea (the categories and notion which are also known as truth in the most absolute and objective form) and Nature (the sphere of external existence), which finally engulf in the absolute Spirit. The basis of analysis is the three basic works of Hegel. These works are: Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes), Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik), and Philosophy of Right (Gundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts).

The Phenomenology of Spirit was published in 1807, but title of the book went through some changes; its original title was the Science of the Experience of Consciousness¹. The use of term ‘Phenomenology’ goes back to Johann Heinrich Lambert’s (German scientist, mathematician, and Kant’s correspondent) “Neues Organon” of 1764 in which ‘Phenomenology’ is said to be the doctrine of appearance (Schein), its goal being to avoid the seeming

¹ www.philosophypages.com/ph/hegel.htm, Britannica Internet Guide Selection, retrieved on 15 March, 07
and to reach the truth. In this book, "Hegel criticized the traditional epistemological distinction of objective from subjective and offered his own dialectical account of the development of consciousness from individual sensation through social concern with ethics and politics to the pure consciousness of the world-Spirit in art, religion, and philosophy. The result is a comprehensive world-view that encompasses the historical development of civilization in all of its form." It means Hegel tries to encompass the Spirit in form of human development with relation to consciousness.

Hegel’s Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik) is a fore piece published during 1812-1816. This work unfolds the concepts of reality in terms of dialectical reasoning in form of thesis-antithesis-sublation, which in his view only method of progress in human thought. He also tries to explain the scientific position of the mind through the stages of consciousness from intellectual to spiritual endeavor. Hegel also published Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Die Encylopadie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse) in 1817. In this work, he describes the application of dialectical reasoning in all the sphere of human knowledge.

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3 www.philosophypages.com/ph/hegel.htm, Britannica Internet Guide Selection, retrieved on 15 March, 07
Later, he published in 1820, his work Philosophy of Right (*Gedanken der Philosophie des Rechts*) whose object is to philosophize the idea of ‘right’ i.e. the conception of right and the realization of the concept. It means to provide the rational outlook to the concept of right.

Basically in the beginning Hegel wrote, ‘*Phenomenology of Spirit*’, but latter he realizes to categorize the ideas enumerated in this book. The categorization of these ideas into logic, science, and ethics leads to the publication of his further works viz. *Philosophy of Logic*, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, and *Philosophy of Right*.

The available English translations and commentaries on these above mentioned basic works of Hegel helps in elucidating the doctrine of Spirit in concern with viz. Consciousness, and Spirit or Mind (different stages in thought). These notions are discussed here in its interrelated aspects as discussed below-

3.1 **METAPHYSICAL ASPECT**

Hegel’s metaphysical approach to the problem of reality is based on the shortcoming of Kant’s unknown and unknowability of thing-in-itself. It is refuted by formulating the view that reality is accessible in principle and potentiality to consciousness. In Hegel’s view no part of it is unknowable in principle or walled off from consciousness like, Kant’s ‘veil of
appearances'. Thus, in accordance of it Hegel assumes that all being is realized by 'reason' and all becoming is a development of 'reason', and if all that is real, because it is either a manifestation of 'reason' or a stage or modification of 'reason' then it means reason and real are identical. Hence, it seems that there is an 'identity' between being and thought. But this identity is not immediate; it means instead of 'identity' there is 'unity' between laws of thought and laws of reality. In Hegel's *Science of logic*, 'reason' passes through the main triad, viz., Being, Essence, and Notion. The Being and Essence together constitute the two mutually interrelated aspects of what Hegel calls objective logic. The logic of Notion represents the subjective logic in which the former two aspects are assimilated. These three parts constitute a triad. According to Hegel reality can be defined in its most immediate and abstract stage as Being. Being constitutes the idea as understood by common sense and "posit itself in the following determinations:

- As Determinateness, as such: Quality;
- As Determinateness transcended: Magnitude, Quantity;
- As Quantity qualitatively determined: Measure."

The first category of Being is characterized by immediacy. Hegel says, "Being, pure Being – without any further determination. In its indeterminateness immediacy it is similar to itself alone." The definition of Being represents the possible abstraction of any kind from all determinations is seems to be completely empty and can, therefore, be defined in terms of Nothing. According to Hegel Nothing is same as pure Being. Thus, Nothing and pure Being are identical, but they are not known immediately. They are identical that is evident only when Being has passed over Nothing, and Nothing into Being. It shows that there is constant movement in between Being and Nothing through which one dissolves in other. This kind of movement Hegel termed as Becoming. About Becoming Hegel says, "Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing, but as the unity of being and nothing it is this indeterminate unity in which there is both being and nothing. But in so far as being and nothing, each unseparated from its other, is each is not. They are therefore in this unity but only as vanishing, sublated moments." In this way, Becoming is used in two senses. In the one sense, in Becoming, Nothing is immediate, that is, the determination starts from Nothing which

5 Ibid. p.94
relates itself to Being. In the other sense, in Becoming, Being is immediate, that is, the determination starts from Being which changes into Nothing: the former is coming-to-be and the latter is ceasing-to-be.

Here Being, Nothing, and Becoming are not only simply the concepts of thinking but also a matter of study of things, of the objects of thought, which is actual. It is both thought and reality.

As Being involves Nothing, in the same way, quality, quantity, and measure involve one another. Its significance and meaning consists in the deduction of categories from one another. Hence, Being is the first category and presents the sphere of immediacy or thesis.

It is stated earlier, Being, Essence, and Notion constitute a triad in Hegel's logic. Essence is the sphere of mediation, which is implicit in Being. Essence is the second category to the whole process through which being undergoes. Therefore, it presents the truth of Being. In *Science of logic* about Essence Hegel writes, "The truth of Being is Essence. Being is that which is immediate. Knowledge seeks to understand that truth which Being is, in and for itself, and therefore, pressing beyond the immediate and its determinations, penetrates further, assuming that behind this Being there is something other than Being itself, and that this background constitutes the truth of Being. This cognition is mediated knowledge, for it is not lodged
immediately with and in Essence, but begins at an Other, Being, and has to make a preliminary passage, the passage of transition beyond Being, or rather of entrance into it. Only when knowledge coming out from the sphere of immediate Being internalizes itself, does it through this mediation discover Essence.  

It reveals that Essence is that in which Being has its infinite movement, but it is not something external to Being. The categories of Essence always occur in pairs such as cause and effect, action and reaction, substance and accident, identity and diversity, positive and negative. Each mediates other. But the categories of Essence differentiates with the categories of Being, as we have seen earlier that the categories of Being like quality, quantity, and measure appears to be self-governed due to which it seems to be unconnected and connection with others is implicit rather than explicit, on the contrary, the categories of Essence resembles themselves as linked together and one is conceived as the essence or ground of other in form of essential inner reality of which the other is the outer appearances. The connection between them is open and explicit. By the categories of essence Hegel overcomes the gulf between phenomena and thing-in-itself created by Kant.

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Finally, as the Being is the immediacy, and Essence is the mediation so, the third element of triad is Notion. It is the sphere of merging mediation or the synthesis. With reference to the Notion Hegel says, “The Notion must be looked upon as the third term (where Being and Essence are the other two). In this regard, Being and Essence are the moments of its becoming; but the Notion is their foundation and truth, as that identity in which they have been submerged and are contained. They are contained in it because it is their result.”\(^8\) It reflects that the Notion is that in which Being and Essence are merged into a unity. This is a unity that vanishes again soon before it unites. It is a unity in which Being and Essence disappears for that reason a new immediacy occurs that results from the absorption of all mediation, that is the highest form of immediacy.

It is a point from where the Objective logic turns into the subjective logic or in other words, subjectivity is in true form of objectivity. Hegel analyse this situation in following manner:

“The true form of reality requires freedom. Freedom requires self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth.

Self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth are the essential of the subject.

\(^8\) Ibid. p.211
The true form of reality must be conceived as subject.\textsuperscript{9}

Here, Hegel demonstrates that the subject is notion. Its freedom consists in self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth. The form in which truth is held is the Notion. Thus, freedom is an attribute of the Notion and the true form of reality in which the essence of Being is realized as the Notion.

The notion represents the totality in which all particular moments are appears to be self-differentiating in the universal that governs the totality. It means every particular moment contains, as it’s very content, the whole, and must be interpreted as the whole.

Successively, the notion designates the general form of being in which being realizes its essence through the development of being. So, notion expresses the free-subject adequately as true being. This free-subject presents in movement from lower to higher modes of self-realization. Hegel calls the highest form of this self-realization- the 'Absolute Idea'.

3.2 ONTOLOGICAL ASPECT

The subjective and objective spirits are the two independent extremes, which are opposite and limiting each other. The absolute Spirit is a concrete reality, which transcends the division between them. It is an actual consciousness of both individual and object. The entire physical and non-

physical world is nothing but itself. According to Hegel, the knowledge of absolute by human is the absolute Spirit, as Spirit exists only in human consciousness. For Hegel the self-knowing absolute Spirit is equated with the necessary content of human mind, which is freedom. Absolute Spirit is freedom, which is infinite and self-determined. Hegel also equates the absolute Spirit with god, as it endows all those attributes that god is endow with. The absolute Spirit expresses itself in three forms viz. art, religion, and philosophy.

(1) Art- it is known already that idea manifests, initially in its immediacy. In the realm of art the form and beauty are the immediate modes of the absolute. The form is the external sense-objects through which the absolute manifests, while beauty is the shining of absolute through the veils of the worlds sense-objects. According to Hegel, the absolute idea becomes the beautiful, only when it is perceived through the sensuous world.\textsuperscript{10} It refers that the only mental image of a sensuous object in its abstraction is not beautiful; it becomes beautiful only when mind perceives the absolute through it. With this, in Hegel's view beauty and truth are identical because they together constitute the idea of absolute. But they are distinct also, as the beauty is apprehended by the sense objects, and truth is by pure thought.

Hegel also considered that the work of art or the beautiful object is essentially an organism.\textsuperscript{11} It means distinct parts of an art have no meaning, because the idea of beauty consists in the unity of parts. So it must be like an organism, which has no significance in parts rather then as a whole. Beauty has two important forms, viz. nature, and art. Nature is an idea that lies in its otherness. The implicit idea in the nature makes it beautiful. Its beauty varies depending upon the degree of the manifestation of the idea. On the contrary, Hegel is of view that the beauty of nature is not perfect, since it is lacking in infinitude and freedom. So the beauty of nature is essentially defective and imperfect. This lacking leads to the level of the idea of beauty in art. The beauty of Spirit is the creation of art. Aesthetic is the subject that deals with the beauty of art. According to Hegel, art has two distinct sides viz., subjectivity or unity, objectivity or plurality. Subjectivity denotes the content and objectivity denotes the form. The former contains the spiritual significance and inner meaning and latter represents the sensuous or the material form through which subject reveals itself\textsuperscript{12}. The idea of art is that in which the content and form are in perfect unity. Hegel divides art in three fundamental types based on the distinct relations between content and form: (1) the art where form predominates over content. (2) The art where form

\textsuperscript{12} Hegel. \textit{Aesthetics-Lectures on Fine Art}, etc., p.153
and content are in perfect balance. (3) The art where content predominates over the form. To these three distinct relations Hegel gave three corresponding types of art: symbolic (earliest), the classical (medieval), and the romantic (modern) arts respectively. In symbolic art, the meaning is suggested through the medium of symbol without expression. In it the symbol is its material form and the signify symbol is the content. In Hegel’s opinion the symbolic art is confusing and problematic, since it did not signify the entire expression for the purpose it is made of; the symbol may be taken differently by different persons. It is the problem realized in the Hinduism, because the separation of both the content and form is vague as all creatures are worshipped in form of god. On contrary to this, Hegel exhibits Egyptian art at the higher level of symbolism; it is more genuine example of symbolism, since it is more clearly separates between divine and sensuous element of an art like the phoenix, the pyramids and the temples. With this, the symbolic art has certain drawbacks; it is abstract in the sense that its aspect are not reveal either in particularity or individuality, and the content is not concrete universal. Thus, the symbolic art passes to the classical art, in which the absolute reveals in the concrete not as abstraction. The best example of classical art is the Greek art wherein the Greek people considered their god as anthropomorphic; their god is not an empty universal
but a spiritual individuality. So in Greek art content and form is one. Here man sees absolute in himself. Hegel treats the Greek sculpture as par excellence the classical art. Further he discovers that classical art is finite and unfree because it is expressed only in particularity which is also sensual. Hence, Spirit does not remain at the classical level and passes to romantic type of art. In this type of art the Spirit sheds its material veils and reveals within its own subjectivity. In this way, romantic art is an inward life of Spirit.\textsuperscript{13} In it the Spirit dominates over the form and grasps its own nature truly. So, in Hegel's opinion, the romantic art of medieval period reveals the Spirit only in the form of conflict. But Spirit to its nature becomes truly Spirit when it has the tendency to get spilt in two parts and again becomes one. The unity of Spirit after splitting itself into two as spiritual and other is concrete. In Hegel's view Christian art depicts the conflict and unity in Spirit clearly. In it the division and reconciliation of Spirit can be realized in the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. Thus the story of Christ represents the absolute as concrete Spirit. Hegel was successful in maintaining the supremacy of Christendom, as he belongs to it. The romantic art then proceed to the particular art, which is of three types viz., (1) the symbolic art

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid. p.519
of architecture (2) The classical art of sculpture (3) The romantic art of painting, music and poetry.

The symbolic art of architecture reveals an abstract idea that is depicted from the symbolic building. Hegel takes the example of Babel tower, which only symbolizes the idea of unity among the people who built it. So, the tower is entirely an independent work of an art. Here the symbolic architecture passes to classical architecture. The classical architecture has purpose rather then depicting an abstract idea through an art. The temples of Greek gods are an example to serve the purpose of providing an abode for the idol of god and used as the place of worship. Hence, the classical architecture passes to romantic architecture. As it is known, the essence of romantic architecture is predominates the content over form as spirituality. The perfect example in view of Hegel is the Gothic churches of modern Europe. The subjectivity is totally get averted from the world. The churches were constructed in such a way, so that it may get cut off from the outside world and in seclusion forming an abode of the soul. The sun can only enter through the stained glass window. From here the romantic art passes to the concept of sculpture.

In sculpture organic matter is being used as medium, not a crass matter as used in architecture. Sculpture uses the spirituality or subjectivity as a
medium of creation especially in form of human shape. The human shape was being used because human body was considered to be an appropriate presentment to show the unity of content and form in the undisturbed universality of Spirit. They depict the moral praise like justice, love, fortune and delineate the permanent human character like goodness, honesty, courage, intelligence. The human emotions like anger, surprise were not considered suitable for the subject-matter of sculpture. So, the classical art of sculpture passes to the romantic art. The romantic art is consisted of painting, music, and poetry.

The principle of romantic art, as we know, is the withdrawal of the sensuous world from the Spirit or subjectivity. This is shown in painting wherein it does not require the crass matter; instead, it takes the appearance of solid matter as the basis of it. Hegel says, the illusion is created by a painting is not due to the defect but it is due to the differentiation of light and color that makes a painting superior to sculpture. Painting not only depicts the subjectivity or Spirit but it sometimes depicts the individual peculiarities like caprice, idiosyncrasies, etc. However, painting is limited, as it depicts the single moment of time. So painting proceeds to music.

As painting a romantic art appeals to the sight, so music appeals to the sense of hearing. Music totally negates the space so it exists absolutely in time.
Thus, it is purely subjective.\textsuperscript{14} In it there is no separation of subject and object, so it is emotional because it touches the soul. Music is not a matter of sounds; it becomes an art when the soul distinguishes the ordered relation, among the various nodes and sounds. According to Hegel, time-beat in music has philosophical basis, since the soul finds in music the absolute counterpart of itself; it sunders the unity and again returning into unity and identity with itself. Thus music proceeds to poetry.

In Poetry, the words are medium of an idea. It possesses both content and form, as it contains subjectivity and also individuality. It is not confined to particular phase of Spirit because through language it can express anything of human mind. So there is unity and the identity of the universal and particular. Poetry is divided into three main divisions: epic, lyric, and dramatic. Epic poems are objective, since they describe only the particular event of a particular person and poet is only the narrator of the events. Example: Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. On contrary to epic poetry, the principle of lyrical poetry is subjectivity.\textsuperscript{15} In it the poet concentrates on its own soul life but it appeals to the human heart in general. It passes to the dramatic poetry which combines the principles of subjectivity and objectivity of the work of art. It is subjective in the sense that it develops

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. p.888
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p.1113
outward action through the inward soul-life; it is objective in the sense that it put forward before us the series of events in outward world. So, it is also the unity of epic and lyrical poetry. It is the universal art of Spirit which is free in itself and not dependent on anything extraneously for realization. Thus, the development of art reaches to its peak in dramatic poetry, which marks the transition to a higher phase i.e. religion.

(2) Religion- the religion is an intermediate position between art and philosophy. In this realm the absolute is not purely rational and purely sensuous, but experienced in its partial nature. So apart from subjectivity and objectivity of religion; it passes through three stages: (a) natural religion (b) spiritual religion (b) absolute religion.

According to Hegel natural religion is that in which Spirit did not realize the power over nature. In this man yet not distinguish himself other then nature, since he recognizes everything as particular rather then universal. In natural religion though the human spirit is under the power of nature, but it can at the any moment through the particular ego appear as being superior to nature. So, Spirit has identity and power to command the nature, as man feels one with the nature. In it god as a substance is universal and abstract without any particular content. At this stage, since man and world are the particularities so everything is comes out of it and get disappear in the
substance. These transitory modifications founds in the Chinese religion, Hinduism, and Buddhism. In the Chinese religion, god is empty, undifferentiated being, and empirical consciousness. In it god is realized as both universal and particular Spirit; it realized universally in the elements of nature and particularly as the individuals, but also as the Spirit of dead. In Hinduism, Hegel’s view on account of god is only advaitic. Accordingly, god is an undetermined and wholly abstract substance. It is independent and without form, and nature. It is Brahman. Only Brahman is real, everything else other then Brahman is either unreal or accidental. Further in Hegel’s view at certain times Brahman is having personality, and then also it is a substance not a Spirit. So, it is not concrete but abstract and an empty notion. According to Hegel, absolute in Hinduism is only present’s chaotic world-view of unrelated forms. It is not based on reason. Hegel also poses that the salvation cannot be achieves through abstract and content less worship, but in true religion which conceives god as Spirit, it is attained through the concrete work of “striving after universal ends, in morality, in the state, and in religion.”16 In Hegel’s point of view Buddhism is also inadequate like Hinduism, since god is the substance which is pure non-being. In it,

16 Stace, W. T. The philosophy of Hegel, 1955, etc., p.497
salvation is aimed at the attainment of nothingness by the suppression of all desires.

The Zoroastrianism, Syrian, and Egyptian religion are the transitional religions. According to Hegel, in the transitional religions Spirit appears to be sensuous and fragmented. Here the god is an abstract reality rather than concrete reality. So, it passes to the religions of spiritual individuality.

In spiritual religions the god is a substance of definite and concrete reality. Its idea of personal god extends to take part in the certainties of external world, like politics, economy, agriculture, and morality. In it god finds in absolute wisdom with freedom and independence. The life is not the withdrawal from the world but an active life of morality in the state. Hegel consider the Jewish, the Greek, and roman religions of spiritual individuality. In Jewish religion there is only one god, i.e. Jehovah. Here the attitude of man toward the god is one of fear. Due to this man is not free before god. In it god exists as Spirit and is conceivable only through thought and not represented in statues and images. So, Hegel proceeds from Jewish to Greek religion. It is a religion of humanness. Humanness in the sense god (Zeus, Apollo, and Poseidon) represents the genuine character. In Hegel’s view, “each is a living individuality with a wealth of character, a

\[17\] Ibid. p.506
multiplicity of traits, not personifications of a single attribute." So, the Greek gods are friendly, human, and gracious gods. The man and god are of equal spirits and worship of god manifest in festivals, processions, songs, plays, games and work of art, but at the same time Hegel contends that there is an element of irrationality, since they accept fate as the element that even rules over the god. Hence, Hegel moves towards the roman religion. In roman religion god is at the both universal and particular ends which belongs to the world. Here state is the universal and brings all particular under its power. Further in search of absolute religion Hegel reaches to the Christianity. According to Hegel, the content of Christianity is same as the content of Hegelianism, they just differ in form. He thought it is an absolute religion as truth lies in the inner thought of it. Hegel elucidates the three spheres of Christianity viz. the god, the world, and the church under the heads of the kingdom of the father, the son, and the Spirit. This appears in Christianity as the doctrine of the trinity. According to it, god is an idea or notion which is three-fold viz. universal, particular, and individual. As the universal, god is the father deals with nature prior to the creation of world. The universal produces the particular out of itself, so also god as universal

18 Ibid. p.507
begets the son. And as the particular returns into the universal and becomes
the individual, so also, the son returns to god and becomes the Holy Spirit.
The triad of Hegel’s dialectic is Idea-Nature-Spirit. Just as the idea passes
into nature, so god creates the world. World is the otherness of god, just as
the nature is otherness of idea, the alienation of between idea and nature
leads to the estrangement between god. In Christianity, the reconciliation or
the unity between man and god can be seen according to Hegel in the
doctrines of incarnation, the death of Christ, and his resurrection. The
reconciliation between the universal and the particular is complete. Thus, the
kingdom of the father is the logical idea and the kingdom of the son is the
idea of nature and the unity of the two is the kingdom of the Spirit. Finally,
he arrives at Christianity and realized the notion of religion.

(3) Philosophy- According to Hegel, philosophy is the history of
philosophical thought. The historical sequence of philosophical systems is
an essential development of the self-knowing Spirit. He holds that anything
a world Spirit experience in the objective essence is in the realm of
philosophy. For Hegel’s philosophy it is maintained that just as the absolute
spirit is the totality of all its moments. So, also Hegel’s philosophy is an
epitome of the truth of all previous philosophies. It sums up all previous
stages of philosophy. In Hegel’s philosophy the mind is both subjective and an objective in form of knower and known as an idea in itself. The rift between these two aspects of mind has been reconciled in the knowledge of an absolute. Philosophy is the sphere, wherein all contingency get ends and mark the beginning of necessity. It is a sphere in which everything comprehended in its certainty, and as a necessary manifestation of the spirit itself. It is the self-knowledge of the Spirit as absolute. He holds that, philosophy deals only with real, essential, what is life within itself and what is existence in its very notion. So, it is a concrete reality in its content.

3.3 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT

The approach to the problem of doctrine of Spirit is psychological in nature. On the basis of the level of consciousness manifests in Spirit; the subjective Spirit can be divided in anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. At the level of anthropology the Spirit is in the state of sleep or in semi-conscious state. At the level of phenomenology it is conscious and at the level of psychology it is self-consciousness.

Anthropology is a study of idea which emerges out of nature as soul (In orthodox schools of Indian philosophy ‘soul’ stands for the principle of

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consciousness or the seat of consciousness as opposed to body (matter). ‘Soul’, for Hegel, stands for the lowest conceivable phase of the Spirit in the course of its evolution. It is the lower phase of consciousnesses that finds the Spirit in sleep as the semi-conscious and realizes nothing. It is still in relation to nature but not above the level of animality. In the relevance to soul Hegel says, “Soul is the ‘substance’ of Spirit, the basis of all further particularization of Spirit as consciousness and rational intelligence. In soul, Spirit has all the material (Stoff) of its determinations. In its first moment as “natural soul”, however, soul is but the “sleep” of Spirit. It is not a tabula rasa, but like the passive Nous of Aristotle, it is “potentially all things.”

So, for the Spirit, soul is a kind of determinations in which all forms of particularization involve in its rationality and consciousness. At this point of emergence the soul is not able to differentiate its determinations as spiritual determinations on the level of spirituality. In this sense it is still ‘abstract.’ In Hegel’s view on anthropology, the soul’s development through these determinations constitute of three basic syllogisms (Schluss) of the anthropology viz., natural soul (naturliche Seele), feeling soul (fühlende Seele), and an actual soul (wirkliche Seele). It is to be seen how this movement or development takes place as moments of the “natural soul”, the

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“feeling soul,” and the “actual soul,” each of these moments themselves comprising syllogisms.

Natural Soul

The natural soul is the first syllogism of the anthropology in its development. The Schluss or speculative syllogism, according to Hegel, is not merely a subjective form of inference, any more than the Notion is a merely subjective form of thought. The syllogism is “the completely posited Notion; it is therefore the rational.”

Accordingly, Hegel means to say that the syllogisms are subjective form of thought and for the development it depends upon the posited notion and notions makes it rational. As natural soul is the first syllogism in the development of moment leads to the explanation that, “Natural soul is soul “in itself” in its immediate unity with nature, soul in its implicitness and its unconsciousness (Bewusstlosigkeit). Its own determinations, of which it is itself unaware, belong to it in the manner of properties: the purely natural “qualities,” “alterations,” and “states,” such as racial traits, phases of the individual’s maturation, and the alternating rhythms of sleep and waking.” So the natural soul is comprises of determinations implicit in the immediate unity with nature in itself. It

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22 Greene, Murray. Hegel on the Soul, Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1972, p.61
means the properties of these determinations are determined by the natural soul.

The physical **qualities** of the natural soul are determined by the environment out of which it emerges. The natural soul is what the environment makes it to be and even these qualities are affected by the planetary system also. As natural soul, Spirit lives in a kind of primitive attunement (*Mitleben*) with the universal planetary life.\(^2^3\) Here he means to say that man is living a primitive life in which the differences of climate, seasons, and times of day are showing the elemental affinity of soul and nature that comes to soul in the ways of primitive peoples as dim moods. Further the "immediate" universal substance, soul is termed by Hegel "world soul" (*weltseele*).\(^2^4\) World soul, Hegel explains is not to be taken as also "subject," i.e. as having existence apart from and independent of individual souls. In the logical idea of life, the "creative universal soul" is to be viewed as "the side of the universality of the Notion, consequently as an abstract universality, essentially only inhering in the subject and in the form of immediate Being which posited on its own account, is indifferent to the


\(^{24}\) Hegel. *Philosophy of Mind*, etc., p.35
subject."\textsuperscript{25} It suggests that these determinations are in the form of objects of nature for the rational consciousness because the soul does not relate itself for itself to them as externalities. Therefore, the soul has the determinations only in itself as belonging to it in the form of "natural qualities." Qualities, in the logic, are one of the "earliest" determinations of Being, hence one of the most abstract and least rich of the categories.\textsuperscript{26} According to Hegel, quality has a subordinate place in Spirit and belongs more properly to the realm of nature. In this way, the soul’s first determinations are "qualities" because they "belong to the mere Being" of Spirit.

In the first appearance of natural individuality, the abstract universal soul returns to its natural qualities into itself from the manifold of group spirits in which it seems to be lost itself, and now it becomes concrete as individual soul of man. Hegel broadly divides the individual qualities into those of talent, temperament, and character.

According to Hegel, talent is a natural endowment, which is lasting throughout life but at the same time it is an immediate development to something outside themselves.

\textsuperscript{25} Hegel. \textit{Science of logic}, etc., pp.764-765
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid. p.111
Temperament for Hegel in general sense comprises of the ways in which the individual tends to relate himself to the activity of an outer world either "outwardly" or "inwardly" toward himself in his singularity.

In character, the talent and temperament lost their immediacy as a mere determinate quality, but temperament becoming something more than disposition and character endures as developed by will. Due to this, Hegel remarks that a man's character is essentially his own creation rather than inheritance. Hence the soul's individuation in character concludes the first moment of the anthropology.

The second moment of anthropology is 'natural alterations' (natürliche Veränderungen). In an individual soul the distinctions in the first instance take the form of 'alterations' (Veränderungen). It means alterations are in an individual, which abides as permanent subject in these moments of its development according to the universal life of the species. The alteration are in the first instance the growth and maturation stages of an individual constituting the course of the life ages, sex relationship, sleep and waking is an odd kind of sequence but it claims to have connection. In the life ages, we saw the soul as simple subject persisting through its distinction as passing alterations (filessende Veränderungen) brought about in it by the universal as

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27 Hegel. Philosophy of Mind, 1971, etc., p.55
genus life; in the end the individual succumbs to the universal in death. In the sex relation, on the other hand the genus or universal acts in an individual through a real opposition within himself. Sleep, according to Hegel is the state of the soul’s sunkenness in its undifferentiated substantial unity or universality. Waking is the state of the soul in that it entered in the opposition with universal ‘Being’. Sleeping and waking, however, are not only the mere alterations but the alternating states of one going on other. Hence, says Hegel, sleep is not merely rest as cessation of an activity. It is the soul’s return within itself in its simple universality, the restoration of its wholeness from its dispersion in the particulars of waking life. In sleep those organs and functions that are outwardly attuned, such as the senses, become inactive or subdued, while those concerned with the soul’s concentration ‘within self’ proceed with their work. Finally Hegel defines ‘alteration’ logically as, “In so far as something alters, the alteration falls within its constitution; it is that in the something which becomes another. The something itself preserves itself in the alteration, which affects only this unstable surface of its otherness not its determinations.” It reflects that alteration is a process in which something alters to other, but it preserves something in itself that does not affect the others. In this way there are two

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28 Greene, Murray. Hegel on the Soul, etc., p.78
29 Hegel. Science of Logic, 1969, etc., p.124
types of alterations viz., essential and accidental. The essential alterations are the changes in childhood, youth, manhood, and old age. The accidental alterations are the changes in sexual relations and those we experience in sleeping and waking states. Hence, the second moment of soul’s individuation in anthropology meets to its end.

The **sentient soul** is the concluding moment of the natural soul constitute as the syllogism of anthropology. Sentiency refers to the sensation of physical qualities by the soul. The soul possesses them as something different from itself. But the distinction between them is an internal. The sensations are not an objective, but purely subjective like hunger, pain, fatigue, courage, and anger.

**Feeling Soul**

"It is the soul which feels and the soul so viewed is the feeling soul."

The feeling soul is the second main syllogism of anthropology in the development of soul. It is the phase in which soul proceed from its abstract unity to the universal natural being in self-sunderance and an opposition. At the same time, it is a stage of particularization and negation or negativity that is essential for liberation from its naturalness. The inner world of feeling-subjectivity knows in an immediate manner of dream and

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31 Ibid., p.334
presentiment, not only comprises of natural soul but also have deep-rooted ties with the conscious life and his own inner substance. The feeling-subjectivity or man’s feeling world is a manifold against the simple unity of soul. But it is neither apart from soul nor is soul apart from it. It is a substantial being of concrete life and substance. Its manifold passes in the form of dream world. Dream world is a manifold of natural soul where its content entirely may be or may not be contingent. So, Hegel says that often soul in dreams attains to a “deep and powerful feeling of its entire individual nature,” of the whole compass of its past, present, and future.\(^{32}\) Hegel also considers that the subjectivity in dream is sublated in higher subjectivity of ego, which is in the sense two subjectivities in one. It means two subjectivities existing in the same selfhood in form of natural basis as living in one another and as waking consciousness that is one controlling power over the other. Its immediate example is the relation of foetus and mother. In the foetus-mother relationship according to Hegel, the being-for-self of the individual soul (the foetus) and its being-in-self are divided between two individuals in a “psychical unity” \(^{33}\) He depicts this unity in terms of “unity of the distinguished”, because this kind of unity is “distinct” and incomprehensible in its spatial and material sense, so it constitutes the

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\(^{32}\) Greene, Murray. *Hegel on the Soul*, etc., p.107

\(^{33}\) Hegel. *Philosophy of Mind*, 1971, etc., p.94
essence of Spirit. It develops into feeling subjectivity when the inner feeling get individualized as his own particular, to which Hegel termed as “genius.” It is something according to Hegel that marks us as distinguished from others. In light of this view he also says, “I am within myself a “twofold being” (ein Zweifaches).” Here he intends to say that he is an individual known to him in everyday world and known to his fellows but there is also an inner being with particular genius nature, which is responsible for all the activities and having last say in the decisions that provides to reason. So this kind of healthy development of an individual’s inner-feeling subjectivity as a rational selfhood is proves to be a controlling genius over the feeling-life. But in certain abnormal states or sickness the rational selfhood is not able to maintain their sovereignty and can relapses to the level of feeling subjectivity. Such a condition is termed by Hegel the “unhealthy magical relation,” which is an unexplored aspect of subjective Spirit.

As it can be followed that in case of ‘healthy magical relation’ of waking consciousness the feeling-subjectivity itself is not resort to rational consciousness, so as in dream subjectivity the representations did not intrude to waking consciousness, even ego does not come in between an another subjectivity. But in healthy sleep there is dispersion of an outer world to the

34 Greene, Murray. Hegel on the Soul, etc., p.109
inner-feeling life of the monadic selfhood. In contrast to this state according to Hegel, the monadic selfhood emerges as "real subjectivity".35 At this point, he wants to describe that the self has no longer open-eyed contact with the external world rather it becomes an inwardly turned consciousness as clairvoyant (hellsehende) subjectivity.

Thus, the feeling-subjectivity is the unity of being-for-self and being-in-self in concern with subjectivity, substantiality, individuality, and universality in the form of "immediacy". It can be summarizes in three kinds of immediacy, in the first place according to Hegel, there is an immediate knowing of outer objects without any mediation of an external sense organs. To such cases he called as diviners or the persons who experiences outer objects by virtue of some sensitivity. The second kind of immediate knowing is manifested in sleepwalking and catalepsy. In these kinds of state according to Hegel the sensual objects are at a distance from us in the normal relation of consciousness, in this condition of non-separation of subjective and objective ceases to be active. The third kind of immediate knowing is "clairvoyance," whereby, "an undefined feeling gives rise to intimation or a vision of something not sensibly present but distant in space

35 Hegel. Philosophy of Mind, 1971, etc., p.105
or time, either future or past.\textsuperscript{36} So, here he intended to reflect that these empirical evidence shows that the soul is not confined to the limitations of space and time. Therefore, according to Hegel, the feeling soul's immediate being as a substantial being at the monadic level prior to consciousness is a foreshadowing of that unity of Spirit with itself to which it will return as reason. Hence Hegel' whole conception of the soul's development to consciousness is a liberation struggle.

The second moment of feeling soul involves the monadic subjectivity which recognizes itself in a particular manner and confirms itself as a being-for-self in a determinate content. Hegel termed this moment as \textit{"self-feeling"} (selbstgefühl). In this way, self-feeling is a moment of particularization in which negativity appears in a strongest and acute form that encounters in the development of soul. The negativity or negation can be taken as a selfhood in the schism or insanity. It infers that the insanity is viewed in the context of liberation struggle, so as the soul tries to attain self-possession of the rational consciousness.

The feeling soul envelopes the individuality, it is a process in which to differentiate itself from within itself by awaken the particular feelings as a subject and its determinations. The subject possesses the determinations in

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. p.109
itself as the feelings. The feelings then immersed in the particularity of feelings and come closes together with itself as subjective through the ideality of the particular. Hence, Hegel says, it is a self-feeling and at the same time is so only in the particular feelings.\textsuperscript{37}

The notion of self-feeling as the soul’s necessary particularization is the first negation, which forms the basis for the characterization of insanity as the mind in terms of Hegel as, “Being-with-self in the negative of itself.”\textsuperscript{38} Here Hegel proposes the notion of self-feeling as the moment in the soul’s development toward the objective consciousness. But there is difficulty to view the insanity as the movement toward consciousness and as a regression from it. So for that Hegel specifically compares the role of insanity in the doctrine of subjective Spirit with that of crime in the doctrine of objective Spirit. As crime and insanity are extremes which do not always exist in an every individual as extremes but may take the form of eccentricity, momentary loss of self-possession, non-criminal guilt. This shows that at the emergence of objective consciousness the self overcoming of subjective consciousness as feelings and let it go to its monadic content to achieve higher form of subjectivity.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. p.122
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. p.126
The self-feeling is a moment absorbed in particularity in form of feelings. It is a second moment of feeling soul in particularization of the self in relation to itself as a feeling life.

In the third moment of feeling soul, the psychical subjectivity comes back to itself in its wholeness through its particular in habit (Gewohnheit). Hegel considered that it will reveal the movement of soul to ego. According to Hegel, “the main point about habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from the feelings, even in being affected by them.” Here he mean to say that in habit, the soul get united with corporeal world, but in such a way, so that it remain freed from immersing in the particular. The particular being of the soul is the moment of corporeality in which soul distinguished itself from it as its “simple being” and ideal subjective substantiality of this corporeality. When soul is coming out of particularity then it can move easily in this corporeal world as its own familiar element in contrast to dream subjectivity.

Hegel termed habit as a second nature. Whatever we do; we do either habitually or in a sense naturally, but whatever we do, it is not an immediately natural rather it is a result of soul’s own work upon itself. So habit is the soul’s self formation of its feeling determinations in their

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39 Ibid. p.141
corporeality and particularity into the being of the soul. The naturalness of habit is an immediacy posited by soul. Therefore, Hegel says, it is the nature of man to make himself a second nature—Spirit. As the soul maintains the particular corporeal determinations into the universal being is the liberation from particular to the formation of all higher freedom.

Hegel termed the habit in three moments of the notion: a) when an individual develops an inurement toward sensations of cold, heat, weariness, or even the blows of fortune. Habituation is the process in which the soul preserves particular affection itself abstractly for itself; b) habit is a higher form of “indifference to satisfaction.” It means the inner desires get blunted through their regular fulfillment. According to Hegel, this is the rational liberation from these desires rather then the monkish asceticism in which “the enemy creates itself in its very defeat.” 40 c) In skill or “aptitude” habit attains its highest form. In expounding these three moments of habit in its notion, Hegel maintains that in these moments the soul is able to gain freedom from the particular corporeal determination precisely in achieving a higher unity with the corporeal as such. Habit is seen by Hegel as the basis of consciousness, when it attains the “ideal subjective substantiality” of the corporeality. The corporeality is determined as “immediate external being

and limit” against the inner determination of the soul in its subjective purpose. The soul-body relation is no longer that of the individual’s monadic feeling subjectivity as inner genius of the feeling-life. As habit is the soul’s own “break” as “simple being-for-self within itself against its naturalness.” Hegel also says, man is still in the mode of natural existence, and therefore unfree. Hence habit is after all a kind of mechanism, and reduction of life to habit is death. The universal of habit is far from the concrete universal of the notion as it affects the soul through mechanical repetition.

Thus, the concluding moment of the feeling soul is not yet the being-for-self of ego in its content as an independent outer world; rather the abstract being-for-self of the psychical subjectivity is still a being-for-self of individuality in its corporeality. So the corporeality in habit is reduced to ideality.

**Actual Soul**

In habit, Hegel holds that the feeling soul is at the verge of consciousness. But in this section, Hegel will try to show that the psychical subjectivity “actualizes” itself as an ego of consciousness. With this it is a third and concluding stage of the syllogistic movement of the soul in which it unites the other two stages: the natural soul and feeling soul. So far in all other

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41 Hegel. *Philosophy of Mind*, 1971, etc., p.142
stages we were dealing with the self-relation in relation of the soul as subject to itself as substance or predicate; and substance at the level of natural subjectivity is a soul's own physical being in terms of corporeal determinations. The stage of an actual soul is emerges as a new and higher unity of subjectivity and substance by virtue of the body that is the soul’s own outer “sign” (Zeichen). The “sign” is not only the identity of inner and outer form, but also stands for the very “sign” of externality in inner form; the “free form” in which the soul “feels itself and makes itself felt.”

It infers that the “sign” or externality is a state of an identity in which the soul expresses itself in habit and realizes itself as consciousness. Hegel also expresses that, it is an inner Spirit that distinguishes man from animals not merely anatomically because the body of man is not very different from higher apes.

The soul-body relation also plays role in Hegel’s notion of right. Hegel says, as sign in its corporeality is the soul’s being-for-self universality; the body is “externality” as being of the soul in its universality. It refers that the externality as sign is a universal and the soul as an inner Spirit that is for itself in its body is a kind of individuality in corporeality. This, according to Hegel constitutes the actualization of soul in its notion. In its actualization of

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42 Ibid. p.147
soul, Hegel claims to show, the subjectivity has “awakened” to the ego of consciousness. It means the former natural and an immediate identity of subjectivity and substance, there has emerged the reflected identity of consciousness in the subject-object relation. In terms of materiality, Hegel points out that the body can never be an adequate expression of the inner Spirit.\textsuperscript{43} It refers that the gestures can be at its best but are limited, and the words, speech, moral deeds, and actions are genuine expressions of an individual rather than the body, which remains as the being of inner selfhood.

Successively, Hegel presented the soul’s development in Anthropology as a struggle toward freedom, where the psychical subjectivity strives to actualize its selfhood in the Spirit without immersing in its feeling-life. With this the struggle requires a sunderance of the self from its natural being. In relation to objectivity, the subjectivity holds it as if; in the particular it remains as the universal even for itself. Thus Hegel sees an objective consciousness as a freedom that the human Spirit must try to attain for itself.

The other aspects of the anthropology viz., Phenomenology, and Psychology will be discussed in relation to epistemology. Successively, it can be

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. pp.151-152
deduced that the subjective Spirit requires an objective Spirit for realizing consciousness in relation to the external world.

3.4 EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECT

Hegel’s approach to the problem of the doctrine of Spirit (Self-consciousness) passes through three stages of consciousness viz. Sense-certainty or sensuous-consciousness, Perception (Wahrnehmung) or sense perception and Understanding (Verstand) or intellect.

Sense-certainty and Perception

It begins with the external knowledge of the world to the internal knowledge. The knowledge begins with the knowledge of an object, which is an immediate knowledge of itself or what simply is the knowledge of ‘is’. It means sense-experience is the initial knowledge. The immediate knowledge is needed to apprehend as it is receptive to us rather than comprehension. Hegel here tries to point out that, “sense-certainty appears to be truest knowledge; for it has not as yet omitted anything from the object but has the object before in its perfect entirety. But, in the event, this very certainty proves itself to be the most abstract and poorest truth. All that it says about what it knows is just that it is; and its truth contains nothing but the sheer being of the thing (Sache).”

Therefore, sense-certainty is

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44 Hegel, G. W. F, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, etc., p.58
considered to be the knowledge of space and time. But, on the other hand, it is considered as an abstract and poor kind of knowledge, because it proves only what it 'is' and contains only being of the thing (Sache). In the form of Being, here consciousness in its certainty is only a pure 'I' or 'I' in this is pure 'this' and the object is similarly only as a pure 'this'. It is not the case here that 'I' or 'this' is arise due to particular 'I' or thing in particular but arise due to consciousness. This consciousness has developed either myself or in various other ways as by virtue of distinct qualities shared with other things. The truth of sense knowledge of pure being is simply constituted in immediacy. Finally, certainty is an immediate final connection: consciousness is 'I' or a pure 'this' in singular terms. It is in the relation of subject and object. An actual sense-certainty is an instance of immediate knowledge. In this sense-certainty the pure being splits into two 'this', one is in form of 'I' and other in form of other object. But when we reflect on the basis of difference it presented to us we find neither 'I' nor 'object' is immediate to us but through something else i.e. 'I'. It means sense-certainty is not present in itself but through the mediation of 'I', which knows the object because the object is immediate to 'I'. It is not necessary or essential to know the object when it 'is'. So, it is true or it is the essence regardless the situation whether it is known or not, then also it may present there.
Conceivably, the essence of the object is a kind of an object in itself or it is the notion of 'this' present in sense-certainty. In spite of clarification, the doubt arises here whether it is 'I' or something other than 'I' or 'this'. So obviously question arises, what is 'this'? 'This' here refers to a singular term, which denotes an object immediate to our senses or 'is'. This 'this' could also refer with certain demonstratives such as, 'now' and 'here'. These demonstratives 'now' and 'here' are the instances, which posses by the nature to preserve truth. When these instances get change or negated then due to self-preserving character of 'Now' and 'Here' remain preserve as truth because they are least contradicting the other being's sense-certainty. It follows that; universality is the true content of sense-certainty. Therefore, it is determined as mediate as well as permanent. It is considered that the object of sense-certainty is a kind of awareness of a particular mental object with specific sensual qualities. In general, sense-certainty is an immediate knowledge of 'is' or an awareness of mental object that seems to be non-inferential and complete. It means consciousness or awareness has the direct acquaintance with an object and nothing else. So, there is no difference in the consciousness and the object to which we are conscious. At the same time, Hegel points out that how this gap between consciousness and object to which we are conscious will be filled. Thus, he thought that it could only
be describable as existent individual of object sense-certainty. We could not express it even, as we are not certain about it and it also violate the condition of immediacy. Therefore, sense-certainty of an object is indescribable. Consciousness has taken sense-certainty as the awareness only of the being of things and nothing beyond it. If it is so then in describing the general form of existing individuals (assuming) as non-inferential awareness should consist of two things: the individual perceiver and the individual object perceived. This denotes the “I” and the individual object are in an equally pure singularities. Here we need not to presume anything about, “what this “I” is, or what is this object”. It means no need to refer that the “I” is a mental substance, a subject of experience or living organism neither that the object is sense-datum nor an object is an entity of space and time. Hegel termed this knowledge situation as “essence”. Essence is the knowledge of pure individual object in itself. At this stage, we can posit that the whole of sense-certainty itself as its essence. The essence of one moment happened in two ways first as the object confronting “I” and other “I” supposed to be its reality. Thus, it is the sense-certainty which stands firm with the immediacy itself without having or excluding all oppositions. But in sense-certainty objects are attended directly or without articulation. So, as a matter of existence the external objects defined as actual, absolutely singular, wholly
personal, and individual with certainty and truth. In terms of essence there are certain words which are not in the reach of language, belongs to consciousness that is, which are inherently universal, like the word ‘this’. Consequently, the words which are ineffable are untrue and irrational, because what is meant is not actually expressed. Therefore, what is the truth of sense-certainty if I point out any thing as ‘Here’, whether it is a ‘Here’ of other ‘Heres’ or it is in its own self a simple togetherness of many ‘Heres’. The ‘Here’ denotes to be as universal. So in order to know something immediate, it is to take the truth of it or perceive it.

In Hegel’s view, “Sense-certainty approached the object from the standpoint of the objects sensuous particularity but failed because it lacked concepts, “Perception” would tackle the problem by approaching the object from the standpoint of its properties (“Sensuous-Universal”)”. So, Hegel follows that there is no direct acquaintance with objects, because for purpose of knowledge it requires the mediation of concepts. As without concepts there will be no knowledge situation, and in lacking of concepts even consciousness is not able to purport, what it knows. Therefore, a different view of knowledge is required to overcome the lacking of concepts in knowledge. This could be done by assuming another form of consciousness.

45 Sherman, David and Rauch, Leo. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Self-consciousness, New York, State University of New York Press, 1999, p.4
i.e. “Perception”\textsuperscript{46}. In general terms, perception is a mediated awareness of individual objects having universal properties. If universality is the principle of perception then moments distinguished as that which perceives and which is perceived becomes unessential, but in fact both are universal and the essence in themselves, so both are essential. Since both are related as opposites so only one can be an essential moment, but the distinction of essential and unessential should be shared by them accordingly. As one moment can be the essence regardless whether an object or simple entity perceived or not, but the act of perceiving as a movement is unessential because it is unstable and changing. This is further discussed by Hegel as “since the principle of the object, the universal, is in its simplicity a mediated universal, the object must express its nature in its own self…; for only perception contains negation, that is, difference or manifoldness, within its own essence”\textsuperscript{47}. Here he holds that, as universal is the principle of an object in form of mediated universal, so an object should reflect this nature in its own self by showing it as the thing with many properties. This kind of self-knowledge is peculiar to perception rather then sense-certainty and it is only the source of instances due to which only it contains negation in form.

\textsuperscript{46} The German for “Perception” is \textit{Wahrnehmen} which means literally, ‘to take truly’. (PS, 66)

\textsuperscript{47} Hegel. \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, etc., p.67
of differences in its own essence. Therefore, in negation ‘This’ is established as not-This but also as determinate Nothing. Consequently, the objects of perception would not be the pure singularities as in sense-certainty but would be the things with many properties and as a universal too. This kind of super session or supersedure indicates twofold negatives at once- negating and preserving together. Like ‘Nothing’, as the nothing of ‘This’ at once preserves its immediacy and sensuality itself; but it is a universal immediacy. In terms of Being, the immediacy and negatives are present within it, when expresses it is a differentiated and determinate property. Consequently, many such properties are arranged simultaneously in form of one being the negative of another. As determinacies related to themselves only, they are indifferent to one another and each is on its own and free from others. But the self-identical universality is distinct and free from other determinate properties. It is a process of relating self to self in the medium of determinacies, where they interpenetrate with simple unity but without coming into contact with one another. In fact in universality they exist indifferently on their own account.

Inevitably, the abstract universal medium can be called as ‘thing hood’ or ‘pure essence’ though it is nothing else than what Here and Now are proves to be as simple universals in themselves in form of their determinateness and
simple togetherness of a plurality. As in case of single simple ‘Here’ a thing shares many properties at a time in form of shape, colour, taste and gravity yet during interpenetration none has a different ‘Here’ from the others, but each is everywhere in the same ‘Here’ in which the others are. With this at the same time without being separated by different ‘Heres’, they do not affect each other in this interpenetration. Thus the abstract medium or ‘thinghood’ holds pure universal itself together in this way. In fact this is a positive universality. On the contrary, it should also bring into the consideration that if many determinate properties are indifferent to one another and entirely are self-related, then they won’t be determinate. They can only be determinate so far as they differentiate themselves from another, and relate themselves to other as to their opposites. This differentiation of the properties so far as not an indifferent differentiation, but an exclusive, where each property negating other property and fall outside the simple medium, the simple medium therefore an indifferent unity, but a one unity which excludes an other. Moreover, the One is the moment of negation; it is an inherent property as a determinateness which is immediate one with immediacy of being and excludes the other from this unity of opposites to exist in for itself as a thing.
As a result, the thing as a truth of perception is completed when these moments are taken together. It develops through (a) an indifferent, passive universality, the *Also* of the many properties or rather ‘matters’; (b) negation, equally simply; or the *One*, which excludes opposite properties; and (c) the many properties themselves, the relation of the first two moments, or negation as it relates to the indifferent element, and therein expands into a host of differences; the point of singular individuality in the medium of subsistence radiating forth into plurality\(^48\).

So, in this way the Thing of perception is constituted as the object of perception and consciousness remains percipient as the thing of the object. Consciousness here confines itself in pure apprehension of an object in form of truth. The truth can be altered, if consciousness itself would add or subtract. It means consciousness is alterable and unessential. It may happen that consciousness itself apprehend the object incorrectly and deceives itself though it is argued by Hegel that the object is true, universal and self-identical. He posits self-identity as the criterion of truth to apprehend the object as self-identical. At the same time diverse moments are explicit to it, and the connection of diverse moments apprehends one another. During this apprehension if dissimilarity itself occurs then it is not an untruth of an

\(^{48}\) Ibid. p.69
object but an untruth in perceiving it. Hegel postulates it as self-identical. This he indicated as “Consciousness thus finds through this comparison that not only its truthful perceiving (Nehmen des Wahren) contains the distinct moments of apprehension and withdrawal into itself, but rather that the truth itself, the Thing, reveals itself in this twofold way”.49

However, consciousness is the one which takes the ‘Thing’ as truly self-identical, not self-identical, and returns back to identity. This reflected in Hegel’s view as, “The ‘Thing’ is a one, reflected into itself; it is for itself, but it is also for another; and, moreover, it is an other on its own account, just because it is for an other”50. Hence, a thing is one for itself and for other also. This oneness contradicts with diversity of moments. So, here consciousness restricts it to one and keeping away from the ‘Thing’. So far as, the ‘Thing’ is not for another but as oneness belongs to the ‘Thing’ in itself. Consciously, it should reflect into itself. Furthermore, the indifferent differences and oneness of the ‘Thing’ falls within the ‘Thing’ as both are different, so they do not fall in same thing but in different things. The thing in and for itself is self-identical but contradiction arise in it when this unity is get disturbed by other things. Moreover, contradiction is present in objective essence of the two objects. But this unity of the ‘Thing’ is

49 Ibid. p.74
50 Ibid. p
preserved as inside and outside of the ‘Thing’ as well as consciousness. The difference in the ‘Thing’ is not from itself but from the other and each is the different ‘Thing’ in itself essentially in its ownself. These differences are not in form of opposition in the ‘Thing’ in itself, but as a simple determinateness which constitutes the Thing’s essential character, and differentiate from others. Therefore, the thing due to absolute differences comes in the state of opposition to other ‘Thing’ outside of it. As its manifoldness presents in the ‘Thing’, so it is an unessential aspect of the ‘Thing’. Consequently, the absolute character of ‘Thing’ and its opposition relates itself to other and this relation is the negation of its self-subsistence, which is really a property of ‘Thing’. So, Hegel emerged with the definition of an object as, “The object is defined as having within it an essential property which constitutes its simple being-for-self; but along with this simple nature the object is also to contain diversity, which though necessary, is not to constitute its essential determinateness.”

By analyzing this, it could be said that the unessential property of an object cancels itself out; to be called as negation of itself and in this way the being-for-self is separated from being-for-another. In contrast to this Hegel claims, “the object is in one and the same respect the opposite of itself: it is for

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51 Ibid. p.76
itself, so far as it is for another, and it is for another, so far as it is for itself.\textsuperscript{52} Hegel with all the consequent difficulties finally analyzed object as, “thus the object in its pure determinatenesses, or in the determinatenesses which were supposed to constitute its essential being, is overcome just as surely as it was in its sensuous being. From a sensuous being it turned into a universal; but this universal, since it originates in the sensuous, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is not truly a self-identical universality at all, but one afflicted with an opposition; for this reason the universality splits into the extremes of singular individuality and universality, into the One of the properties, and also of the ‘free matters’. These pure determinatenesses seem to express the essential nature itself, but they are only a ‘being-for-self’ that is burdened with a ‘being-for-another’. Since, however, both are essentially in a single unity, what we now have is unconditioned absolute universality, and consciousness here for the first time truly enters the realm of the Understanding.\textsuperscript{53}

Thus, overall it appears to be the case that the knowledge situation gets upgraded from sense-certainty in form of instances and property as universals recognized by perception. But perception does not able to hold

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid. p
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. p
the knowledge theory far enough because it does not able to uphold the concept of property as universals in an individual and in relation with external thing or object. In addition to this it did not able to resolve the conception of ‘the Thing’ as ‘One’ and as ‘Also’ resulted from the conception of universal. Consequently, consciousness abandons this kind of ontology and Hegel moves further from perception to understanding.

**Understanding**

Perceptual experience was not able to hold the knowledge of sensible objects in terms of the particular representation and universal representation on account of perception. So, such an account requires something other than perceptual experience in itself, to reflect on things i.e. ‘Understanding’. In general, it is a mental capacity for separating and differentiating the qualities. It is a faculty works by the principle of identity.

The ‘Understanding’ was traced in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as a faculty distinct from reason. There Kant defines “the Understanding as a capacity for rules and categories in so far as these are applied to an object of an experience; Reason on the other hand aims at an “unconditioned synthesis” in which categories are applied to what cannot, by its very nature,
become an object of an experience." So, it means understanding and reason are two distinct categories applied to an object of experience. The aim of both is different, former applies conditionally, and latter applies naturally. Accordingly, Hegel insists that “Understanding is a moment of reason rather than a separate faculty or mode of cognition.”

The Understanding is not an immediate apprehension, but in order to explain the unity of representations (universal and particular) it requires the underlying supersensible metaphysical essence. The metaphysical essence is the seat of “powers” or “forces” whose main function is to explain the unity of representations in terms of being and properties. This infers here that the knowledge of things needs not to depend upon any other thing apart from our acquaintance with the representations themselves and our own power of reasoning. As we know, knowledge of things is not immediate but mediate knowledge of our own capacities, which reflect in the knowledge of things themselves. The term which deals with the representation of the things in form of reflective judgement is termed by Hegel as “Understanding”. Hegel argues that, “the capacity to separate the concrete into abstract determinate

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54 Hinchman, P.Lewis. *Hegel’s Critique of the Enlightenment*, University Press of Florida, 1984, p.73
qualities must be esteemed as the infinite power of the understanding."\(^{56}\) Or again, "the activities of separating are the power and labour of the understanding, the most marvelous and greatest, indeed the absolute power."\(^{57}\) Hegel emphasizes that if the things are just particular and featureless "one" then they must have some determinateness in its own that is different from sensuous properties that it has in appearance. Therefore, the thing itself has some determinateness, which is not a matter of sensuous properties due to which the thing itself did not appear to us as it is. There are appearances, which are themselves sensuous must have something supersensible. So if two things- thing in itself and appearances are related in non-causal manner, and the appearances are to be the appearances of thing in itself then Understanding has to give judgement about how appearances linked to supersensible essence of appearance. In Understanding, if we claims that the essence could be known without direct acquaintance with it then it must linked in such a way, so that supersensible essence would be knowable in the appearance themselves. Consequently, the appearance must be the expression (\textit{Ausserung}) of the underlying essence. The essence is not the thing that could causally link to another thing but it is the thing which appears in the thing in itself as appearance. "The thing in itself is the

\(^{56}\) Ibid. p.245

\(^{57}\) Hinchman, P. Lewis. \textit{Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment}, etc., p.74
‘unconditioned universal’ and is the seat of certain powers or forces (*kraft*) that manifests themselves to us in appearance”

Further, Hegel tries to determine that what is the relation of the forces were to their appearances in the world while discussing the nature of force in two different concerns in the argument of *Phenomenology*. Firstly, it was discussed in concern with science or philosophy of science. In relation to it Hegel argues for a non-substantial theory of force, where he considers that the force is not a kind of entity that stands in some relation to the entities of appearance. For this he denoted an example of the magnetic force and the iron from his *Encyclopedia*, here he tries to depict that the force and expression are not the two entities (when the movement of iron piece is in the direction of magnetic force), but it is indeed the whole that is force itself. It means the appearance (movement of iron) is an expression of an underlying force. With this the force which does not express itself is considered as unknowable thing in itself. In reference to it Hegel debates on other forces in relation to centrifugal and centripetal forces in planetary motion or the relation between inertial and accelerative forces. These forces exist only if the other does. At this position Hegel got confused in the sense,

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whether these forces are two independent entities or is only manifestations of one force.

At this stage, for Hegel the other main concern is the metaphysical idea of force, in order to give an account of perceptual knowledge in context of metaphysical problems in the argument of Phenomenology. The underlying metaphysical force is ‘one’ and supersensible so it accounts for multiplicity of appearances, but due to metaphysical and supersensible characteristic nothing can cause the force to express itself because there is something internal to the make up of force. It means force expresses itself. Here question arises that, is there one metaphysical force or multiple metaphysical forces which solicit one another? If there is necessity of being more then one force like, in every case there is always two forces-one solicited and one being solicited. This conception may be arises out of conceptual consideration rather then observation of forces manifesting themselves.

Hegel argues that there are two metaphysical forces involve in the concept of solicitation; one is passive and other is an active. “If a force is solicited, it must be passive, whereas a soliciting force must be active”.59 Therefore, until a force cannot be both passive and active, it cannot solicit. So, there must be two independent forces. Each is independent in its relation to other

59 Ibid.p.37
independent force. Thus, “a force is the kind of thing that manifests itself in its appearances”.\textsuperscript{60} Hegel totally rejects this argument because this argument seems to be a logical, conceptual claim, and something that “Understanding” can determine without having empirical enquiry.

Resultantly, Hegel argues “since force and its expression are through and through dialectical, the soliciting being also the solicited and the medium of properties also the latent force, the Understanding is driven beyond the play of forces to the principle present in them all. This is no other than the law which governs all the manifestations of one force”.\textsuperscript{61} It posits that the Understanding is an intellectual key which works beyond the phenomena of forces through the manifested laws in it.

Hegel calls the unity of the world as it appears and the way it really is “in itself” the “law of force”. For Understanding this is the true “unconditioned universality” that explains the world of appearance and left nothing to explain the way it really appears in itself. This makes difficult to specify any kind of content to such laws. On the other side, regular experiences or observations (sugar dissolves in water, stone fall to earth when dropped and so on) makes laws of appearance full of content. But the problem is with the content of the general ‘laws of force’ that gives us the knowledge of things

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Hegel, \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, etc., p.515

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in themselves through the appearances, then content may determinable only by “Understanding” itself rather than empirical observations.

Moreover, the ‘principle of Understanding’ cannot be satisfied with the plurality of laws, for it demands a unitary ground for the multiplicity of appearance. It means Understanding has to seek one metaphysical law by which all other general or physical laws somehow can be derived. To this Hegel shows the reduction of many phenomenal laws to one general law by giving the example of the Newtonian unification law of terrestrial motion with the celestial motion, even with ordinary things—the same law applies to the motion of ball and motion of planets. Hegel points out that the more general the laws are the more will have no content i.e. it becomes empty. But if it is particular enough then it would be not enough to become ‘law of force’ and will remain only phenomenally manifested force among many. Hence the metaphysical conception of force must exhibit the conceptual necessity, so that more particular laws can deduce necessary consequence out of more general laws rather than the progressive abstraction of particular laws. To the general laws it is the effect which divides the general metaphysical law itself in positive and negative sides, but as stated it is too general and indifferent to any particular law to have any real cognitive content. Hegel’s views of motion itself in its natural dealings as a single item
of motion can be derived logically in its constituent element (space, time
distance, velocity). These constituent moments develops out of motion itself
by the analysis of the concept of motion involved in scientific theory rather
than dividing in positive and negative sides. Thus the Understanding could
not able to make that the positive and negative elements or force can be
deduce out of more general law but it is considered that the Understanding
know the things in themselves by some kind of priori reflection. In contrast
to this, it seems that the Understanding imposes on nature to formulate a
theory in a way as it wants the nature to be in itself.

So far, an account of Understanding gives the knowledge of only necessities
in the way it works rather than giving us knowledge of the inner
metaphysical necessities of things in themselves. The failure in establishing
the fact that there is one metaphysical force, which shows that the
Understanding itself fails in providing the knowledge of things in
themselves. Consequently, an opposite result can be derived that there is
basically duality of forces rather than one force.

Moreover, Hegel’s contemporary like Schelling holds that in the
metaphysical sense world requires even the negative forces. To this Hegel
argues, “that the supersensible world would therefore, have to be the
opposite of the world of appearance in order for its forces to elicit the
structure of experience as we experience it.”62 It means there should be a supersensible world that functions like a negative pole to the positive pole of appearance.

To this kind of opposition Hegel constructed a world of opposites, which he called as “inverted world”. The term “inverted world” applied by Hegel in the sense, “according, then, to the law of this inverted world, what is like in the first world is unlike to itself, and what is unlike in the first world is equally unlike to itself, or it becomes like itself. Expressed in determinate moments, this means that what in the law of the first world is sweet, in this inverted in-itself is sour, what in the former is black, is in the other, white. What in the law of the first is in the North Pole of the magnet is, in its other, supersensible in-itself (viz. in the earth), the South Pole; but what is there South Pole is here North Pole.”63 Hegel describes the inverse world as the world of opposites because in the inverse world the thing which is sweet is sour; the thing which is black is white and so on. Hegel propose the term “inverse world” due to the fact that he tries to remove the absurdity involves in the idea by directing those who think more about the particular opposition arise in it rather than about the conceptualizing activity of nature. Hegel tries to resolve this kind of opposition by one component of law of infinity

62 Pinkard, Terry, Hegel's Phenomenology, etc., p.42
63 Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, etc., p.97
i.e. the notion of indifference. According to the notion of indifference, “the unlike and indifferent moment like space, time etc. is difference which is no difference or only a difference of what is self-same and its essence is unity.”64 It means let negative and positive are two oppositions, which are unlike and indifferent, but stimulate each other into activity. In fact each is opposite in itself but each has its ‘other’ within it and suspends themselves to one unity.

However, the “Understanding” claims that it knows the internal essence of the world by reflecting on the representation of the world which infer that what is behind the “curtain”65 of appearance rather then what the world is in itself. With this, Understanding claims that there is only one unitary force rather then forces behind the appearance as “unconditioned universal” and asserting that it knows the things in themselves, each is not only a valid assertion but also leads to various kind of dilemmas and contradictions. Finally, it can be derived that “Understanding” in the inner world of appearance comes to know in truth nothingelse than appearance, but not in form of forces rather in form of absolutely universal moments and in their movement. In fact, the Understanding experiences only itself.

64 Ibid. p.99
65 The “curtain” metaphor, presumably, refers to the “veil of Maya” of the oriental mystics.
Reason

Hegel representing the relationship of ‘sense-certainty’ and ‘understanding’ as the complex and fixed between finite and its negatives, however, it is not the final state of affairs. But the things do not remain in their finite state of existence. There lies a unity between finite and its negativity; to restore its unity ‘reason’ works as an object. The sense-certainty and understanding present isolated entities opposed to one another, whereas, reason apprehends ‘the unity of the opposites.’ Reason is not a process of producing unity between them by mere combining and connecting the opposites, but it transforms them in such a way so that they cease to exist as opposites and their content remain preserved in a more ‘real’ form of being. It can be quoted as, “the process of unifying opposites touches every part of reality and comes to an end only when reason has organized the whole so that every part exists only in relation to the whole and every individual entity has meaning and significance only in its relation to the totality.”  

In the process of unification of the opposites reason negates the finite and its negation in such a manner so that it binds them together in mutual dependence so that they are revealed as moments of more inclusive whole. Hegel terms ‘wholeness’ as ‘the Absolute’ and ‘the Truth’. The whole which is derived is

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rational because it is systematically ordered. By the process of systematizing the whole Hegel try to overcome the gulf between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ which lies at the roots of Kantian philosophy. This rationally systematized ‘whole’ is what Hegel calls ‘reality’. Hegel also discusses the relationship between reality and appearance in his Science Of Logic under the headings of ‘Essence’ and ‘Appearance’.

Self-Consciousness

In the mode of certainty (a form of consciousness), what is true for consciousness is something, which is true to other in itself. But this notion of truth vanishes in the experience of it. It is an object in itself as a mere being in sense-certainty, the concrete thing in perception, and in Understanding-a force is proves to be a kind of truth in which the object in itself turns out to be only for other. When Understanding fails to analyze the duality between subject and object in terms of “I” and “this”; it leads to give set of contradictory antinomial consequences. Therefore, it means ‘consciousness’, which comprises of simple awareness of things becomes more complex or involve much more then it. The only way out of these antinomial results of the norms is to understand the ‘consciousness’ of world in terms of ‘self-consciousness’. The transition from the dialectic of an object to the dialectic of subject can be represented as “the transition from consciousness to self-
consciousness is not a shift from realism to idealism, but from theory to practice, where in theorizing we have a ‘detached’ view of the world, and so abstract from our position as subjects in the world, whereas in practical activity we act on the world and so put ourselves as subjects at the centre of things”.

So, Hegel tries to make clear that the shift from the world of object to the world of subject would able to conceive a process in which consciousness moves into its actual form i.e. ‘self-consciousness.’ From here it focuses on the object as the subordinate of subject or in other words it starts putting reflection on the concepts in such a manner so it counts as knowledge; to which Hegel in general sense called as “self-consciousness”.

But what is meant by ‘self-consciousness? In phenomenological terms, it is something internal to consciousness or it is a problematic aspect of experience that would lead us to put reflection on our thinking, it means to be conscious of our consciousness itself. According to Hegel, what makes us to think about ourselves that is the immediate experiences, which get puzzled by using the index-words like ‘this’, ‘here’ and ‘now’. These index-words are reflexive in nature as it points to the single or particular moment of function. In this ‘I’ plays a crucial role in pointing the object and it itself acts as an index-word. So in general the self-reflecting function of ‘I’ is

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itself a problem for self-consciousness but here ‘I’ is the knower, whom I am
the known. But when we turn inward to question ourselves then it is
problematic that thinking subject is also the object of our thinking and it is
not able to define neither as the freedom of subject nor able to impose upon
the object that is itself, in trying to know itself. Then also “I” is neither
subject nor object but remain oscillates between the poles. That’s why Hegel
phrases the consciousness as “the absolute dialectical unrest”. It means we
could not able to define this idea to bring at rest because it is considered that
it is difficult to define the dialectical aspect of it.

According to Hegel, Self-consciousness consists of two moments- firstly; it
is in the form of consciousness as an immediate object in form of sense-
certainty and perception, this is called by Hegel as “negative”; the second is
‘itself’ which is the true essence present in the first instance as the
opposition of an object. The unity of both the moment is essential to realize
self-consciousness. Hence the sensuous world exists only in appearance or
as a difference, which in itself is no difference. This kind of antithesis is
only a truth in its essence i.e. the unity of self-consciousness with itself. The
movement of self-consciousness in relation to other self-consciousness is
represented as an action of single self-consciousness. But this single action
has double significance for both its own action and the action of the other as
well. The first does not have the object, but exists for desire as if it has its own independence which it does not utilize for its own purpose while at the other end the other is equally independent, self-contained, and origin in itself. Thus, the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. In this way each self-consciousness sees other, does the same as it demands by other, and does the same thing, so far as other does the same. Action would be useless if it is done by one side because whatever is happening can only be brought about by both. Therefore, he concludes that “the action has double significance not only because it is directed against itself as well as against the other, but also because it is indivisibly the action of one as well as of the other.”

Hegel summarizes the notion of self-consciousness in these three moments: (a) the pure undifferentiated ‘I’ is its first immediate object. (b) But this immediacy is itself an absolute mediation, it is only as a supersession of the independent object, in other words, it is desire. The satisfaction of desire is, it is true, and the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth. (c) But the truth of this certainty is really a double reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness. Thus, the object of self-consciousness is independent on an account of negativity of itself and it is

68 Ibid. p.112
69 Ibid. p
for itself a separate universal fluid element or genus in the peculiarity of being. So it is a living self-consciousness.

Thus, in general self-consciousness is ‘desire’. When self-consciousness returned to itself and put reflection into itself the object has become life. The reflection into itself distinguishes itself as a being then the object of immediate desire is a living thing. So Hegel suddenly replaces the abstract “object” with a living object that is another conscious subject (in the form self-conscious also). As stated by Hegel that “self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.” It means when self-consciousness begins to realize selfhood as the centre of life, and its experiences are fluid but tries to see itself as the stable center of life; finds difficulty in the security of itself. Its self-questioning is quiet disturbing; therefore, for rescue and aid it turns to another individual so that the ‘other’ (as the ordinary object of the knowing subject) becomes the ‘other’ (as a rival consciousness, another self having its own sense of being the centre of its experience). Hegel also considers that “self-consciousness exists for self-consciousness.” Here he refers that self-consciousness represents its unity of itself in other, and it exists in fact in another for being acknowledged. So, the goal of consciousness has become recognition rather then the imposition

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70 Hegel. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, etc., p.110
71 Ibid.
of will through desire. While doing so ‘I’ is become the object of ‘desire’ but in fact not the object. However, ‘I’ is a universal indestructible substance and the fluid self-identical essence. So self-consciousness is ‘I’ being an object, it is like ‘I’ as ‘object’. In this manner self-consciousness starts interacting with the world through ‘desire’. Desire has a practical attitude. It means ‘desire’ takes the form of practical relation in such a way, so that the subject maintains itself as a pure will where by the sense of negating the world can lead to negate the object. So it is a negation of otherness in a way. By ‘desire’ and negating the world around it, the subject can retain its individuality but altogether it destroys the object. The destruction of object makes difficulty for the subject to demonstrate individuality and that makes the subject to find itself another object to destroy. In this way, the process goes on. At this point, Hegel resolve the ultimate difficulty faced by desire in his thought as, “when the single self-consciousness sees the world containing other self-consciousnesses, for in seeing that other selves are like it and thereby recognizing itself in them, the subject no longer it faced by sheer otherness, where only by negating the world can the subject find itself in it.”

72 Stern, Robert. Hegel and Phenomenology of Spirit, etc., pp.73-74
But for consciousness the notion of Spirit is ahead to experience. In this sense Hegel characterize the notion of Spirit as "an absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousness which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'we' and 'we' that is 'I'."\textsuperscript{73} It depicts that when self-consciousness steps into the notion of Spirit leaves behind the supersensible world and moves into the spiritual light of present. There 'I' can be the self-consciousness of self-consciousnesses.

In other words, it could be interpreted by Hegel in the sense of life-death struggle. In this sense when he try to impose his will on other, so other will try to impose his will on him, this will end up in conflict; this can only be resolved when one get defeated and surrender his will to him. Hence the defeated one will become the slave and the victor will become the master. The significance of this struggle is to secure recognition by other subject rather then desire. Thus, the recognition replaces the desire due to the fact that it has been realized that desire is more self-contradictory while the form of recognition is more realizable for practical well-being. With this, Hegel is identified with the three different accounts of the transition from 'desire' to the 'life and death struggle' is shown below in schematic form:

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
A: desire → impose will on objects → impose will on subjects → each tries to impose will on the other → life and death struggle between subjects.

B: desire → impose will on objects → move from desire to one sided recognition → life and death struggle, as one subject seeks to get recognition from other without giving anything in return.

C: desire → impose will on objects → move from desire to recognition → recognition by other requires staking life, and recognition of other requires testing other for willingness to stake life → life and death struggle.\(^{74}\)

These three forms of life and death struggle have different implication and interpretation to denote the limitations of self-consciousness as proposed by Hegel. The interpretation of A implies that the self-consciousness is limited because it treats subjects as it treated objects, and so tries to ‘negate’ them. The interpretation of B implies that the self-consciousness is limited by the fact that it is unable to grant recognition to other subjects without feeling that its own autonomy is undermined. And in the interpretation of C implies that the self-consciousness is limited because it finds it can only show itself to be a self by risking its life, because at this stage in the emergence of the self it lacks any other resources for doing so.

\(^{74}\) Ibid. p.80
Thus, life and death struggle is for recognition of being a subject. The conflict between two agents which consider himself as being-for-self can be resolved only when one opt for life over recognition and accept others opinion of truth. So one who opts for life over recognition becomes slave and other becomes the master. The master has its own projects and point of view in its subjectivity, which is accepted by the slave as truth. Therefore, slave becomes a being-for-another. His subjectivity accounts with all his beliefs or reason in how he contributes to satisfy the master’s desire and projects. In turn master receives the recognition from the slave. Resultantly affirms the self-working of master. This makes master to enjoy the things of desire. At the other end, satisfaction of slave is to the extent that all good reason or desires get integrated in such a way so that it fits to the desire or projects of master. Here he begins to understand his own subjective life in terms of master’s life. Thus, he affirms his master’s viewpoint on the world is true and his self-conception as an independent agent is valid. But the master’s point of view is considerably based on authoritative reason in accordance to his desires and projects. This could create conflict between two agents, which is needed to adjudicate. However, slave is also an independent self-conscious agent and has come to accept the authoritative point of view of his master. Therefore, the dominant point of view of master
is dependent on the acceptance of slave. So dominance of the master is dependent on the slave’s contingent acceptance or continuing to accept it. It means master’s dominance lies in the acceptance of slave. Resultantly, slave contingently able to establish the natural world of his acceptance or will. Hence it proves that the master-slave parable has no metaphysical or epistemological account rather it has turn out to be as a social fact in the sense that this relationship is constituted for social recognition. Consequently, master fails on his own terms because he is not able to hold his subjective point of view, instead of this all the time he tries to manage authoritative reason in such a manner, so that slave would accept it as truth contingently; out of fear for his life slave submit to his master. This suggests that the struggle of life and death resolved in favour of life because slave opt for living instead of dieing that may be due to fear of death. The two had struggled over the recognition which is nothing more then an ego. It is an ego, because it is also a sort of growth in self-awareness in which one’s sees of oneself as free subject, while one sees the other as unfree object. This does not happens due to psychological reasons but due to phenomenological reason in the form of one ‘is’. This realization of ‘is’ connects the one to the world as an independent of everything even the life that’s why he is ready to put his life at risk. In the struggle one wins and other loses but could not be
killed, otherwise winner will not able to maintain the recognition he wanted. Therefore, winner or master allows the loser or slave to live, but enslaves him. Although slave has to tell himself that despite of everything he is a free soul in his heart and mind. As he would not able to find ego-support in outer world so he must seek that support within, because his earlier attempt to find self-consciousness or selfhood get thwarted so he driven himself inward to find selfhood there. This is also not due to psychological reason but due to phenomenological reasons. Dialectically, the internalization of selfhood is the consequence of ego struggle itself. The dialectical outcome of master and slave parable leads to establish only an objective (ego, personhood, recognition) point of view that the master’s point of view can no longer be the dominant point of view to which the slave immediately adapts his own point of view. So, there is a chance of emerging more new point of views to which Hegel claims to argue further as stoicism, skepticism, and “unhappy consciousness”.

The transition of views from master-slave relation to stoicism in accordance to Hegel takes place in order to seek escape from an unsatisfactoriness of their socio-political world. Here it seems in accordance to Hegel that, as a thinking being we arrive at a consciousness, which sees its essence as infinitude and thinks itself as a free self-consciousness. It is necessary to
remember in determining this form of self-consciousness is that, it is a thinking consciousness and its object is in an immediate unity of being-in-itself (Anischsein) and being-for-itself (Fürsichsein). “This freedom of self-consciousness is called Stoicism. The principle of stoicism is that consciousness is a thinking entity, and that something has reality for consciousness (or is true for it or good for it) only insofar as consciousness relates itself to it in thinking.”75 Hegel argued that with the stoicism the consciousness moves to the rationalism and develops a new attitude to the world. This new attitude of stoics saw the reality permeated by reason. Thinking in this way gives access to see the things in its rational structure rather than as ‘other’ by the subject. So consciousness contrast the thought with the experience of world while self-consciousness seen the world as an ‘other’ to be negated. These kind of thought leads to think that ‘I am free’ because there is no ‘other’, however, Hegel himself wants this kind of results so that the subject could find rational satisfaction in the world and thought could be treated as the means of the subject. Thus, the significance of the thought may be understood by an ancient saying, “nous governs the world” or by the phrase “Reasons is in the world”; which means that reason is the soul of the world it inhabits, its immanent principle, it’s most proper

75 Sherman and Rauch. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Self-consciousness, etc., p. 30
and inward nature, its universal. Hegel later on considers the view point of stoics in form of rationalism is an abstract and formulaic that makes its recognition of the universal inadequate. Hegel makes criticism himself by claiming that stoics made abstract thinking by adopting the rationalism, which culminate in the individuality altogether and cut off from the concrete world. This kind of thinking consciousness is an incomplete negation of otherness. So, stoics failed to relate the concept of reason to particular individual and not able to advice any concrete thing as well as knowledge situation. Therefore, stoic’s concept of rationalism is quiet an abstract and formal in nature. Due to this they easily become the victim of ant-rationalistic critics and dogmatically give rise to a form of more critical skepticism.

As stoics believes that every kind of thinking is subjective, fixed and true while to this skeptics argues that everything is relative to a particular subjective point of view, it even includes point of view’s view itself. By this kind of impersonal point of view it could be assumed that every point of view is the individual’s point of view so it can be subject to all kind of relative doubts. Thus, it suggests that there is no impersonal point of view. It leads to the view that there is only subjective and relative point of view.

Hegel characterizes it as the “negative,” because it is a subjective point of view of itself and itself alone. It even uses to set the standards for knowledge, which suggests that all putative universal point of view are subjective point of view and argue that point of view cannot succeed on their own terms.

Stoics, however, assume the universal point of view through the standpoint of “rational thought” at one end, but skepticism claims that there is no universal point of view to itself. In view to this all claims of knowledge seems to be subjective and relative. Thus skeptic achieved the position of rational independence to which stoics aimed at.

As it is discussed that skepticism believes in relative and subjective point of view in itself, it leads them into a self-contradictory or self-defeating situation in such a manner so that point of views of one contingent individual get self-contradicted with one another and give rise to a conflicting consciousness within itself from which he cannot able to extricate himself. On the other hand, when he sees that everything is contingent than he distances himself and assumes as the detached impersonal point of view implicitly though he seeing the relativity in beliefs. Thus, skeptic caught in two divided form of consciousness: the contingent, purely personal point of view and the detached, impersonal point of view.
But then also skeptics uphold their beliefs regarding themselves and the world strongly. It is known to them that their beliefs are developed out of contingent point of view so they are not objectively true and has no validity outside the community of skeptics. Still they have independent beliefs which cannot be validate on their own terms.

When skeptics arrived at the division of the form of consciousness and own these divisions within itself than it gives the idea that there are certain things, beliefs, values and point of views, which they accept and not willing to change within their own framework. Even these beliefs, values and point of view have no justification outside their own framework. Hegel called this form of consciousness as “Unhappy consciousness”.

The **Unhappy Consciousness** is dualistic in nature. It is depicted by Hegel as, “In stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself. In skepticism, this freedom becomes a reality, negates the other side of determinate existence, but really duplicates itself, and now knows itself to be a duality. Consequently, the duplication which formerly was divided between two individuals, the master (lord) and the slave (bondsman) is now lodged in one. The duplication of self-consciousness within itself, which is essential in the Notion of Spirit, is thus here before us, but not yet in its unity: the Unhappy Consciousness is the consciousness of self as a dual-
nared, merely contradictory being. It infers that the division of the form of consciousness either in form of master and slave or in form of personal or impersonal point of view all leads to duality of self-consciousness in itself but not in its unity. Therefore, Unhappy Consciousness is a dualistic consciousness in itself in form of contradictory being. The dualism of Unhappy Consciousness not only regards the two forms of consciousness in an immediate unity but also as an opposite. In this one of them is simple and changeless consciousness as the essence; while it sees the other as of the many-sided and changeable consciousness as the unessential. By this fact both are alien to one another but are the forms of Unhappy Consciousness in itself, in form of contradiction. When it sees itself on the side of the changeable consciousness then it becomes unessential while when it sees itself on the side of the changeless then it becomes aware of as its own essence and aim to free itself of the unessential that is to free itself from itself. For Unhappy Consciousness it is a relation of an essential to an unessential, which is mutually contradictory. As consciousness is the mutually contradictory movement in which opposite generate a new opposite and process goes on. It means it does not come to rest in its opposites. During this process of struggle, however, the consciousness experiences the

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Hegel. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, etc., p.126
element of individuality in the changeless essence and at the same time it sees its own individuality in it. The unity of dual consciousness lies in the truth of this process. Therefore, still in the unity of dual consciousness both the features (individuality and changeless) represent itself in its dominance. Hegel presents three different ways in which individuality linked with unchangeableness or changeless, "firstly, it again appears to itself as opposed to the unchangeable, and is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle, which is throughout the element in which the whole relationship subsists. Secondly, consciousness learns that individuality belongs to the unchangeable itself, so that it assumes the form of individuality into which the entire mode of existence passes. Thirdly, it finds its own self as this particular individual in the unchangeable. The first unchangeable it knows only as the alien Being who passes judgement on the particular individual; since, secondly, the unchangeable is a form of individuality like itself, consciousness becomes, thirdly, Spirit, and experiences the joy of finding itself therein, and becomes aware of the reconciliation of its individuality with the universal."78 In the first instance, the unchangeableness is the form of consciousness of nothing but there is an alien entity that judges the individual. In the second instance as the unchangeableness is the form of

78 Ibid. p.128
individuality itself and becomes consciousness. In the third instance the individuality gets reconcile with universal because in Spirit, it is a joy of finding itself and becomes aware of itself.

In the process in which an unessential consciousness is thriving to achieve this oneness is itself threefold. The threefold relation one as 'pure consciousness' at the other time as a particular individual relating to the actual world in desire and the work finally as consciousness of its own being-for-self. In its first mode of pure consciousness, the Unhappy Consciousness does not relate itself as the object of thinking consciousness rather than it relate itself with itself pure thinking individuality because its object is pure thinking though their interrelation itself is not pure thought but it goes toward that thinking, so it is then called as devotion. This infinite pure inner feeling does have its object but it is something which is not grasped conceptually, so it appears as something alien. As a result consciousness grasps only its own divided existence and at the other hand, it cannot grasp the “other” as individual or as an actual. So, when it is sought as an individual then neither it is a universal individuality that grasped in thought nor a concept, but rather it is individuality in form of object in its actuality that arise out of self-certainty. Due to this reason it is something that vanished already.
The return of itself in the second relation appears as to us that of desire and working, which confirms the inner certainty of itself, attained after enjoying and overcoming an alien thing that exists independently. Since its inner self-certainty for itself is not for itself so its inner life remains the fragmented certainty of itself. The self-confirmation that it would receive through work and enjoyment is also fragmentary. Thus, Unhappy Consciousness has to nullify this self-confirmation so that it could find confirmation of its own dividedness. The division presents in the work and enjoyment is in relation to actuality or being-for-self, and a being-in-itself. The relation to actuality is consisted in changing and working of it, the being-for-self also belongs to the individual consciousness and in this relation it is also in itself that is it belongs intrinsically to a changeless. Thus instead of returning to itself it leads to the activity of attaining confirmation of itself, reflects this activity in other extremes by presenting as an pure universal or an absolute power from which movement is emanating in all directions.

The changeless consciousness renounces and surrenders the appearances in order to satisfy its self-feeling by achieving actual satisfaction in consciousness of desire, work, enjoyment, and the act of giving thanks (in which it acknowledges the other extremes as the essence and negates its ownself). The act of giving thanks is an act of counterbalancing the act of
other extreme by meeting the self-sacrificing good deed with an equal act of its own. In this kind of act it does actually more than the other, which sheds out a superficial aspect of itself.

In third relation the consciousness following the other two relations returned to its truest awareness of its own being, in and for itself. In the third relation reality as nothingness is a reality to a universal essence. In this relation of consciousness in form of opposition it regards immediate reality as nothingness. In its works and enjoyment loses all its universal content and significance but at the other side if there is as such, then there would be a being in and for themselves. But both retreat into the particularity to which consciousness is directed to negate them. At the same time consciousness is aware of itself as an actual individual in its animal functions. In its nothingness in and for themselves it has no importance or significance for the Spirit but otherwise as it is in them, so enemy shows himself in his characteristic form as an object of effort. The enemy start flourishing in his defeat but when consciousness puts focus on him then see itself as a permanently fouled or defiled. So he remains involved in it rather than try to freeing himself. He starts perceiving himself as very low in effort and peculiar instead of being an essential and universal. As he remains limited to itself and with its small activity in itself so he developed in a miserable and
impoverished personality. With these elements like misery and poverty it is also linked with the consciousness of ones unity with changeless. The mediated thought of changeless is a direct negation of actual being. The mediated relation is a process comprises of the essence as a negative in which consciousness is directed against its own individuality. Although as a relation it is equally positive in itself but make aware the consciousness of its unity and changeless. Thus Hegel consider the mediated relation in terms of syllogism as, “This mediation relation is thus a syllogism in which the individuality, initially fixed in its antithesis to the in-itself, is united with this other extreme only through a third term. Through this middle term the one extreme, the unchangeable is brought into relation with the unessential consciousness, which equally is brought into relation with the unchangeable only through this middle term; thus this middle term is one which presents the two extremes to one another, and ministers to each in its dealings with the other. This middle term is itself a conscious Being (the mediator), for it is an action which mediates consciousness as such; the content of this action is the extinction of its particular individuality which consciousness is undertaking.”79 Here in this the mediating element in consciousness gets free from the enjoyment and work in its own and one of the extreme poles

79 Ibid. p.136
existing for itself so consciousness rejects the essence of the will. As a result it becomes the responsibility of the mediator (priest) to advise the role, freedom of decision and action. This mediator is considered to have direct connection with the unchangeable Being, which serves as an advisor. Since the decisions are coming from another so one's action, with respect to one's doing or willing, ceases to be one's own. Therefore the objective aspect of action its fruit and labour in work and enjoyment are rejected by consciousness, as it renounced its own will, so it renounces the reality attained in work and enjoyment on the basis of the truth gained by own self-conscious independence.

The surrender of elements first as its own right of decision, then of property and enjoyment, and finally through the positive element denies itself the consciousness of inner and outer freedom, of reality as its own being-for-self. Thus the surrender of one's own will is negative only in one aspect otherwise it is positive at the same time in positing one's own will as the will of the other, and decidedly of a will that is not individual but rather universal.

For consciousness, accordingly its will certainly becomes the universal will, existing in itself- yet it itself does not regard itself as this in-itself. Conclusively Hegel synthesizes the mutual exclusivity of activity and being
(belong to individual consciousness) in themselves, and consciousness becomes aware of reason in the certainty of individuality, which is absolute in itself. It is all reality.

In the realm of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the idea manifests itself as the living and concrete being of man actually existing in the world. Hegel expound it as, “Spirit is the self-knowing actual Idea raised to the concept of the living Spirit which is necessarily wise and draws distinctions in itself and returns to unity with itself out of its distinctions.” The distinctions made out of unity with itself can be interpret on the basis of other interrelated aspects namely, psychological, that leads to subjective Spirit, ethical, that leads to objective Spirit, and ontological, that leads to absolute Spirit.

3.5 ETHICAL ASPECT

As in form of subjective Spirit, it could not able to attain the state of universal satisfaction i.e. freewill. So, it externalizes itself in the form of an objective Spirit. It means an external world of things enters consciousness as being-for-self of the ‘I’ and now aware of itself as self in an objective being. The essence of itself for itself is an actual consciousness as Spirit. Spirit is an actuality of substance, universal, self-identical, and an abiding essence.

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Thus, it can be a ground of all actions or self-action in each of their unity and identity. Hegel corroborates as, “The living ethical world is Spirit in its truth”.\textsuperscript{81} Hegel describes that when the Spirit first gains the abstract knowledge of its essence then the ethical life divided within itself into- the realm of culture, the world of belief and faith, its traces found in the element of thought.

In fact, the ethical substance as individual reality is a form of an existential consciousness, which is realized by all in common. The reflected consciousness in plurality is an underlying thread of self-conscious actuality. The self-conscious actuality of Spirit can be called as human law. Human laws are known and prevailing customs. So the human laws can also be interpreted as \textbf{abstract rights or formal rights}. Abstract rights are those rights, which apply only on human beings i.e. persons. Hegel by defining the abstract rights wants to make difference between man and animals on the ground of self-consciousness. Hegel explains that animals may have consciousness but they are not persons, since they are not self-conscious. Due to this reason they do not have rights. It is only the person has the right and duty to enjoy and perform.\textsuperscript{82} But currently there is lot of debate is going

\textsuperscript{81} Hegel. \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, 1998, etc., p.265
on the perspective of animal rights though they are not considered to be as persons. Personality involves the capacity of rights and constitutes the basis of an abstract system; therefore, also called as formal rights. It gives rise to an imperative of right: ‘Be a person and respect other as a person.’ Hence, it means freedom of one presupposes the freedom of other because the violation of one’s rights leads to infringe the rights of others. So for that, right is in the first place as a freedom that embodied in an immediate way, i.e. (a) possession, which is property-ownership. Freedom is here a freedom of an abstract will related to a single person or only to himself. In this manner, a person has a right to put his will into any and everything, because, he is not an end in itself, but derives his soul and destiny from his will. This shows that man has an appropriate right to possess things. Thus it means to have a power over a thing, constitutes possession. In fact, whatever I have made on my own is a result of my natural need, impulse, and caprice that satisfy my particular interest in possession of it. So my free will, will become objective to myself in form of an actual will, and this is the aspect that constitutes the category of property as a true and right factor in

83 Ibid. p.37
84 Ibid.
possession. Hegel also claims that Property has its modifications determined in the course of the will’s relation to the thing. This relation is:

1 ‘taking possession of thing directly (here it is in the thing qua something positive that the will has its embodiment).’

Here Hegel tries to claim that in possession the will is directly present, and so for that it is recognizable in it. The things can be possessed in by directly grasping it, physically, by forming it, and by merely marking it as ours.

2 ‘Use (the thing is negative in contrast with the will and so it is in the thing as something to be negated that the will has its embodiment).’

The possession of property also involves the factor of use. Hegel says that in the use of thing my will is externally realizing the need through the change, destruction, and consumption of the thing. As the thing is naturally self-less so fulfils its destiny. The use of thing needed by my will may be based on temporary or partial possession, quantitative or qualitative utility, and on the value of thing.

3 ‘Alienation, the reflection of the will back from the thing into itself.’

The alienation in terms of possession reflects that it is not possible until there is no prior consent or willingness to alienate them. But it is a return of mine into my-self, whereby I make myself existent as idea, as a person with

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85 Ibid. p.46
rights and moral principles. It is the moment of will to realize the self-consciousness.

(b) A person by distinguishing himself from himself relates himself to another person, and it is only as owners that these two persons really exist for each other. Their implicit identity is realized through the transference of property from one to the other in conformity with a common will and without detriment to the rights of either. This is **contract**. The right of contract has its sub-categories, namely, contract of gifts, contract of exchanges, and contract of guarantees.

(c) The particular will of a person when actually correspond with the implicit will; it is through the former that the latter has its real existence. The particular will is explicitly at variance with the universal, and it assumes a way of looking at things in volitions that is in opposition to the principle of rightness. This is **wrong**. In contrast to the universality and simplicity when its right is become something particular then it acquires the form of:

1. Non-malicious wrong or a civil offence- this form of wrong is implicit or immediate.

2. Fraud- this is made by the agent himself.

3. Crime- in this the agent makes it a nullity altogether.
Here Hegel gives an importance to individuality in the sense of self-consciousness and not to a particular, contingent consciousness. Therefore, the ethical substance is an actual substance, and the absolute Spirit realized in the plurality of existent consciousness. This kind of Spirit is a community for us to which, when we enter through reason in its practical embodiment it is for us an absolute essence emerged out of an account of its truth as conscious ethical essence. As essence for the consciousness is our object. So the Spirit which is for itself preserves itself in the reflection of individuals, and also in form of an implicit Spirit or substance it preserves within itself. As an actual substance it is a nation, and as an actual consciousness it is the citizens of that nation. Hence this consciousness has its essence in the simple Spirit, and its certainty in the actuality of this Spirit as its truth. It exists not in something actual but in a Spirit that exists and prevails in form of custom. This Spirit can be called as the human law because it is essentially in the form of a reality that is conscious of itself.\textsuperscript{86} In a universal form it is the known law or prevailing customs, and in the form of individuality it is the actual certainty of itself in the simple individuality of the Spirit as government. Its truth lies in the authority which is openly accepted and manifest to all.

\textsuperscript{86} Hegel. \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, 1981, Delhi, etc. p. 267
In contrast, Hegel also expresses that an ethical substance can reveals itself in another law i.e. divine law. The divine law may springs out of an ethical substance, which is an immediate and simple essence that extends down to the inner essence of the individual in opposition to the fully conscious action. So the divine laws are the simple and an immediate essence of the ethical sphere, because actual universality will work as a force actively in opposition to an individual being-for-self and the ethical power of the state. Thus, Hegel arrives to a point in concern with the two laws as, “the one extreme, the universal self-conscious Spirit, becomes through the individuality of the man, united with its other extreme, its force and element, with unconscious Spirit. On the other hand, the divine law has its individuation or the unconscious Spirit of the individual its real existence- in the woman, through whom, as the middle term, the unconscious Spirit rises out of its unreality into actual existence, out of a state in which it is unknowing and unconscious into the realm of conscious Spirit. The union of man and woman constitutes the active middle term of the whole and the element which sunders itself into these extremes of divine and human laws.”\textsuperscript{87} Hegel affirms that the universal self-conscious Spirit is manifests in

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid. p.278
man, and the unconscious individualized Spirit in the woman, both serves as the middle term in the same syllogism to unite the divine with human law. But it is an individual deed that brings the laws into conflict, as in opposition of the laws the role of an individual and deeds is not yet confirmed. Hegel suggests that, on the basis of one’s sex we can decide which law one will obey. At the same time he also interprets that the ethical consciousness knows itself what it has to do, and decides itself naturally to which law he has to belong. This immediate decision is something implicit to the significance of the natural being. It is not something accidental or sure that nature assigns one law to one sex and other law to other sex, but other way round it is the two ethical powers themselves give themselves an individual existence and actualize themselves in the two sexes. Further Hegel conceive that the ethical consciousness cannot divest itself from both laws, and so could not escape from the guilt by using one law as opposed to other law. The guilt is not an individual guilt but the guilt of whole class or sex, until unless the ethical consciousness is at the behest of one law and holds them to be violent, and wrong. Its action then is a part of law, and so involves a real guilt. The conflict of two laws in different individuals leads to the destruction of both. Hence, in the equal subordination of both sides, it is the thing to carry out absolute right first.
According to Hegel, now the Spirit lives in two worlds, one is of self-alienation and other is of faith. The former world involves the principle in which Spirit is not aware of its notion, and has the false limitation of being opposed to the faith. The world in which we are living, individuals counts as real on account of culture (*Bildung*). Hegel says, “The cultured individual exercises his ability and talents in a cultured.”88 Here Hegel considered that every individual in the world of culture tries to mark his making in the world he makes, for which he is not conscious of doing so. In his opinion every individual has its place, and opening for his talents in the world; the place he achieves is based on the fixed judgement of good and bad. As nature dirempts its element into air, water, fire, and earth so in the same manner the social conditions dirempts itself into (1) a Spirit of over-all uniformity, (2) a Spirit of individual diversification, and (3) a Spirit which embodies both aspects and unites them in its self-consciousness.89 The uniformity of Spirit comes before as the pure and detached consciousness at one hand, and as the good element involves in the actual consciousness of the society. The Spirit of an individual diversification comes before as the bad element. The good element is considered as the reality in the society, in which the individual endeavors are integrated in the power of state, whereas, the bad element is

88 Ibid. p.557
89 Ibid. pp.557-558
represented by the riches aimed at by their personal, self-motivated efforts. Self-consciousness sees its substance, content, and end in two spiritual powers as the being-in-self is the state power and its riches as the being-for-self. Self-consciousness reflects on these two powers and sees former as good and latter as bad. But as both involve their opposites so these judgments can also get reversed. Self-consciousness judges its own judgments, and finding goodness in the judgement that recognizes themselves in the state powers and riches as the judgement of bad. As Hegel depicts that the judging of state power as good it means it takes a noble-minded attitude towards it and can intent for political or social service. At the same time, if he judges riches aright then can become dispenser of wealth. The noble-minded consciousness disposed positive attitude toward the state and negative toward its own selfish purposes, achieves the heroism of service. Consequently, a self-surrender to the state power gives the latter its own individual will, makes it monarch.

Hegel further posits the self-conscious unity of self and essence as the substance of Spirit; each has for the other the significance of alienation. Spirit is the consciousness of an objective real world, which exists on its own account. But the consciousness confronted with the self and essence in actual consciousness by pure consciousness. The actual consciousness
through its externalization passes on the actual world and latter returns back to the actual self-consciousness. At the other end, the same actuality in form of person and objectivity is universal, just as an actuality has its beyond in the present world, but actuality is alienated from it. Inevitably, Spirit constructed a world which is double, divided, and self-opposed. The present world is the world of ethical Spirit that exists in the unity and in distinction from one another, so, they are in equilibrium with the whole. With this nothing is negative to self-consciousness qua even the departed Spirit present in blood-relationship, in the self of family, power of the government as the will, and the self of the nation. However, the external world has significance only as an objective reality, and consciousness lies beyond actuality, therefore, nothing in Spirit that is within itself, but something that is outside and alien to it. The equilibrium of the whole does not lie in the unity that can remain with itself or in the happiness that returns into itself, but rests on the alienation of opposites. Hence the whole is a single moment in a self-alienated actuality, where self-consciousness as well as its objects is an actuality in pure consciousness beyond the first and not a present actuality, but exists only for faith.

As we know, the ethical world is divided into human and divine law in its knowing and not-knowing, but it returns into the self as negative power. So
in the same manner these two realms of self-alienated Spirit also return to
the self. If the former was the immediate valid self of a single person then
the second self that return out of its externalization into itself, will be the
universal self, but the consciousness which has grasped the notion, and the
spiritual world that fixed on actuality with all non-spiritual existence get
dissolve in pure intellectual insight. This insight apprehends itself and wipes
out all objectivity of things by converting intrinsic being into a being for
itself. As faith and culture belongs to the common element of pure
consciousness, so as they are in common also return from the actual world of
culture. Consequently, faith and culture represents three aspects: first, each
is an intrinsic being on its own account, apart from all relationship with the
actual world in an antithesis to pure consciousness; and third, each is related
within pure consciousness to other.\textsuperscript{90} Hegel poses that for faith its absolute
object is the pictorial reflection of the real world with the historical character
of that real world. With this, he also infers that the Spirit of religious faith
lives in the world of culture, and tries to rise above the transcendent
religious object. In faith they practice the acts of devotion to be nearer the
goal, but the goal is located in a remote region of time and space. But for
pure insight notion or concept alone has reality, and it overthrow every kind

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid. p.324
of independence other than the self-consciousness. Thus, Hegel suggests that in first appearance the notion of pure insight is not fully realized, but it is in form of an aim to be realized. For which only rational reduction will be valid for everyone, because differences between individuals do not count, as they are differences of degree, not of kind; pure insight is something which everyone can exercise and possess. Hegel follows that the hostility to faith as an alien realm of essence lying in the beyond, is the enlightenment. Here he wants to say that enlightenment is same as religious faith, but it opposes with religious faith only in one sense; it denies the pictorial content of religious faith, and causes all to disappear. Hegel defines the enlightenment as an internal conflict of faith. It means enlightenment unites all the destructive, negative poses of consciousness in one. In terms of enlightenment religious faith is the main mass of the people, unconscious error and superstition. Hegel studies the enlightenment as a religious crisis in which reason renounces the faith due to ignorance of an intrinsic identity and as an aspect of alienation. Faith has the divine right, the right of absolute self-identity or of pure thought against the enlightenment, but receives at its end only wrong. On the other hand enlightenment changes all the moments

91 Ibid. p.296
of faith in something different then they are in it. But enlightenment has only
the human right against the faith for all wrong it commits, it is the right to
non-identical, which is consisted of a right belongs to the nature of self-
consciousness, as against simple essential being or thought. So the two equal
rights of Spirit are not able to satisfy each other and can left for confronting
with each other. Faith spiritualizes the world, and pure insight identifies the
spiritualized world with the human Spirit. These two rights of Spirit
maintain the absolute right because self-consciousness is the negativity of
the notion. Negativity is active not only in its own account but it grasps its
opposite also. As faith itself a consciousness and enlightenment is self-
consciousness, so it cannot able to deny rights to enlightenment. In this
negative activity at the same time, pure insight realizes itself, and produces
its own object, the unknowable absolute being and the principle of utility.
Hence in this way actuality lost its substantiality and nothing left in it as
intrinsic being; both the realm of faith and actual world is overthrown. This
insight gives rise to absolute freedom. According to Hegel, Spirit knowing
itself in all its uses is an absolute freedom, which sees nothing sensuous or
supersensous beyond itself. The world is its will, and its will is general will.
The general will is not capable of being mediated by a representative. The
general will is the true will, the self-conscious essence of any and every
person. Consequently, an absolute freedom has a positive outcome in form of purely formal moral will, universal, and individual. With this, the freedom of self-alienated Spirit has returned into itself, and abandons the sphere of culture and passes onto other sphere of the moral consciousness.

Inevitably, an individual person first gets alienated from its own concepts in the world of culture, faith, and enlightenment, then try to achieve a universal meaning in the unity of its own inherent universality in form of freedom. According to Hegel, the individual's relation to his own spiritual universality is both immediate and mediate. It is immediate in the sense that the individual knows only his duty and does it, while in mediate the individual does not do his duty as an unreflecting member of the ethical world, nor as an alien of an external authority, but develops rational understanding of what he should do and why he should do, that abolishes all otherness, and becomes the whole being of the ethical world. So at the moral level only that thing is having a sense or has reality, which is known and present to the conscious agent. The unknown external set of facts of nature are get transformed into the world as a known base of an action.

Hegel further has taken into account the moral view of world. In this phase self-consciousness makes the duty an absolute substance and essence, which is itself the absolute substance and essence. To this absolute substance, other
being is opposed to it, a Nature that is meaningless, and governed by laws, which has nothing to do with morality. The contradiction leads to two views: in accordance to one view the moral and natural orders are given for it as mutually independent and irrelevant. From other point view, however, only duty counts, the natural order being considered as dependent and unessential. The moral life develops the conflict between these points of views. In the former point of view nature provides the chances to perform the duty, but it is not certain that it may or may not reward the performance with complete success and happiness. In latter point of view it is not purely moral, so nature in order often fails to provide match in the demand of duty and the requirement of justice.\textsuperscript{93} To the moral consciousness the nature is not something alien, but it is something that present in itself in the form of contingent, sensuous urges and tendencies that constitute the internal opposition to the pure will. The moral consciousness remains one consciousness; however, its essence lies in ending such conflict. But the conflict cannot be uprooted as sensuous urges are the real element of morality. It gets ended only by conforming moral requirements to sensuous urges. Thus, Hegel postulated two harmonies: first postulate was that of an inherent harmony of morality with nature, and second postulates a self-

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid. p.569
conscious harmony of morality with internal nature or sensuous impulse.
Both the harmonies are brought together in the actual movement of action,
and it appears each required by the other. So both have the harmony for
inherent and consciousness.

In view to these postulations of ultimate harmony, the end of the world
betterment is insufficient (insincere), because the performance of duty is the
essence of action and an action is only worthwhile thing in the world. But
the performance of duty is essentially relates to the world of nature, so
according to Hegel, moral laws must become laws of nature. But if moral
laws become the laws of nature like good, then morality itself vanishes,
since it presupposes a non-conforming nature.

Consequently, since morality is always incomplete, so happiness cannot be
deserved out of it but can be a matter of grace. It emerges out as an empty
morality to which Hegel termed as ‘beautiful soul’ or unhappy
consciousness, which is too fine to commit itself to anything. It lacks force
to externalize itself and endure existence. Its light dies away within it, and
vanishes like a shapeless vapour.\textsuperscript{94} Therefore, pure morality inheres only in a
divine cognizance; as it is the only thing that pluralizes the duty, but at the
same time nothing can be pluralize until our moral insight did not do so.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. pp.399-400
Morality faces the contradiction even with the concept of god, because whole valid morality of god is in fact a thought without moral validity. So it is opposed to reality and then also ought to be real. Consequently, consciousness is aware of its deep insincerity in all these positions, so it moves inward and takes the position of pure conscience.

Hegel here enters in subjectivity of the self in relation to morality. Morality is not something outward but it is an affair of an individual’s inward conscience. It implies the harmony between the individual will and the universal will. It is the individual will in accordance to universal will or in other words an individual ought to be. So the right of the moral will involve three aspects: (1) Purpose- it states that only purposive action comes under the moral consideration, because a person cannot held responsible for the action without purpose. (2) Intention and Welfare- the particular aspect of an action is the inner content of it. The inner content of an action is based on the intention and related welfare from that action. The awareness of my general character in action constitutes the worth of the action and the reason to think good to it is called as intention. Its content is my special aim, the aim of my particular, merely individual, existence, i.e. Welfare. For instance, the genuine social work to help poor, needy, old, and people in

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95 Hegel. Philosophy Of Right, trans. T. M. Knox, 1957, etc., p.79
distress can be a act of one’s particular emotion, but at the same time also seek a universal end of giving pleasure to all through his actions. (3) Good-goodness is the unity of the individual will with the universal will. It is a category that retains and contains in the unity of an abstract right, purpose, intention, and welfare, though, they are independent and self-subsistence. Hegel concludes, “The good is thus freedom realized the absolute end and aim of the world.”96 It is the notion of the will ought to do, so as to realize the universal end. It is the will that governed by law, which is rational. Freedom is not the autonomous principle of individual freedom, but realized in moral will. On the other hand, wickedness is the individual will opposes itself to the universal will. It is the self-will of whim and caprice, which is exercised to satisfy its own ends. Thus Hegel conceives of ethical systems or institutions, which are the identity of subjective and objective good. These ethical systems with their laws are the embodiments in objectivity of the individual’s rational or good will. Thus obeying the ethical system means in turn obeying oneself. It did not curtail the individual freedom. According to Hegel, ethical institutions are manifested in three stages: (1) Family-The divine law has its own self-consciousness and sees self-in-other in immediate consciousness. It means the immediate substantiality of Spirit,

96 Ibid. p.86
has its determination in the feeling of its own unity, which is love. Love is a consciousness of one’s unity in another. In ethical life it leads to give rise to a natural ethical community i.e. family. It is completed in these three phases: (a) Marriage, (b) Family property and capital, and (c) The education of children and dissolution of family.\textsuperscript{97} Marriage is a kind of love which culminates into an ethical bonding through reason by renouncing the respective personalities to become one. It can be find at the physical level in form of natural sexual union, as well as on the level of mind into self-conscious love. According to Hegel, on the subjective side marriage has source in particular inclination of the two persons who are entering upon the marriage tie, or in the foresight and contrivance of the parents, and so forth; on the objective side its source lies in the free consent of the persons, especially in their consent to make themselves one person, to renounce their natural and individual personality to this unity of one with the other. Hegel in objective terms considers it as a self-restriction and in fact their liberation, because they attain their substantive self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{98} So marriage is the foundation of family. Hegel treats family as an entity in which members are mutually dependent on each other. But it is represented by the husband. In this way, it is in the prerogative of husband to go out and work for its living,

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid. p.111
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid. p
to attend its needs, to control, and administer its capital. In spite of this property belongs to each member and each member has a right to maintain it. In case of dissolution of family, divorce, or death they are empowered with legal assistance. With corresponding rights there are duties to the family. According to Hegel, the family comes to dissolution when children get educated to freedom of personality, attain the age to be recognized as persons in the eye of law, become capable of holding free property of their own, and ready for founding the family. By the dissolution of family, it passes in to the higher institution in the second stage of ethical life viz. civil society.

(2) Civil society- In Hegel’s view, the notion of civil society deduced logically from the disruption of family. After the dissolution of family, the members become independent social atoms where they become end in themselves and treated other as the means to their ends. The civil society passes through three stages: (a) system of wants, (b) administration of justice, and (c) police and corporation. In system of wants each person seeks to attain his private ends like food, clothing, housing etc.; for which each depends on other. It has sub-categories viz., mutual dependence, labour, and wealth or capital. With this, there are three classes of people depending upon

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99 Ibid. p.118
the kind of wants they have, such as agriculture class, industrial and commercial class, and universal class—it is the class which works for the universal interests of society and state. The category of wants switch over to the second phase of civil society i.e. administration of justice.

Administration of justice recognizes the mutual dependence of rights and duties to enact laws which are universal. It is in objective form. Hegel holds that laws are deduced from notion not from expediency. The laws should be written laws and must be displayed in public. So there is need of an authority like court of justice to vindicates the right and punishes the wrong in their universality. It passes to other category of police and corporation. Police is required for the regulation of law and order, for the well-being and protection of one person from the other. On the other side, corporation is an institution established by a group of person having similar interests. It is a kind of an association common in the world of commerce to pursue its own interests rather then the universal ends of society. From this category it passes to the third stage of ethical life i.e. state.

(3) State - it is the synthesis of the family internal relations and the civil society of external relations among persons. It is the supreme embodiment of an individual freedom that assumes the highest form of right. According to Hegel, “the state is the actuality of the ethical idea. It is ethical mind qua the
substantial will manifested and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it.\textsuperscript{100} Therefore, the state is rational, since it is absolute and universal. The category of state passes through three stages: the constitutional law or internal polity, the international law, and the world history. The state is a kind of mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality. The state is therefore an absolute power on earth. Thus, it can be construed that the ethical life in its objectivity consisted of abstract and divine laws

Conclusively, as a whole Hegel’s philosophy passes dialectically through three stages viz. Logic, Nature, and Spirit. The first stage is absolute as it is “in-itself”, the second is the absolute as it is “for-itself”, and the third is the absolute as it is “in and for-itself.” Hence, logic is the absolute in its pure identity; nature is the absolute in its pure diversity; and Spirit is the absolute in its identity and diversity. It is the absolute that realized in human experience. Thus, Hegel’s philosophy is a process of an abstract to concrete, development from lower to higher degree, and growth from potentiality to actuality towards explicitness from implicitness. The end of philosophy is the revelation of the depth of spiritual life, which is an absolute idea.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid. p.155