Chapter Five: Anusaya-concept

As a specific group of unwholesome phenomena (akusala dhammas), anusaya plays a unique role in the psychological ethics of the Pāli literature. Its significance basically lies in the meanings that Theravāda Buddhism applies to certain akusala dhammas as ‘underlying states’ in the deepest fathom of the human mind. This is the distinguishing fundamental feature of anusayas from the other defilements such as āsavas, upādānas, etc.

In the earliest literary sources in the Pāli literature, as PTSD states,¹ this term anusaya occurs absolutely without mentioning its cause or direction. However, in the Suttanipāta and the Theragāthā, etc., this term is not only specifically referred to as ‘mānānusayam ujjaha’² or ‘bhavarāgānusayañ ca pahāya’,³ but it is also collectively used in its plural form such as ‘yassānusayā na santi keci’,⁴ or ‘tuvān anusaye chetvā’.⁵ According to these references, this term has been used specifically as well as technically from the early literary stage, and its technical use in plural denotes certain dhammas which are more than one in number.

The content of the term and its schematisation appear later on in various lists through the lines of the four Nikāyas. Even though the four Nikāyas present some suttas entitled as Anusaya-sutta, these suttas merely mention the stereotypical sevenfold anusayas, but the

¹ PTSD, p. 44.
² Sn p. 59; Thrag p. 110.
³ Vv p. 83.
⁴ Sn p. 2.
⁵ Sn p. 101, p. 112; Thrag p. 80.
conceptual aspects of anusayas are referred to in different scattered contexts of other suttas through which we might bring out the conceptual origin of anusayas in the Pāli literature.

More developed aspects of the concepts of anusayas are observed in the later texts of the Khuddaka-nikāya onwards. Among the Abhidhamma texts, anusayas are treated by the Yamaka under the name of anusaya-yamaka tinged with diverse logical undertones. The Kathāvatthu, in particular, preserves the sectarian views on the nature of anusayas which indicate that there were polemical issues in the understanding of anusayas. The sub-canonical texts provide the schematic interpretation of anusayas. However, it is in the commentary period that the connotation of the term anusaya is technically defined and the Theravāda position of the concepts of anusayas is fully consolidated.6

The understanding of anusayas in the modern age appears mostly in line with the commentarial interpretation. In comparison with ‘āsavas’, Bhikkhu Ānānanda states, “if latencies are to be compared to subterranean currents at sub-conscious level, influxes might be described as streams manifested at the conscious level.”7 Nobukai Uesugi opines that it is not fair to consider anusaya as a subsidiary defilement. With reference to the accounts of the Nettippakarāṇa and the Udāna commentary, he asserts, “philosophically anusaya denotes a fundamental bias”.8 Some scholars consider anusaya as one of the three levels (i.e. anusaya, pariyuṭṭhāna and vitikkama) of the activities of defilements (kilesas).9

The Encyclopaedia of Buddhism treats anusaya with a general outline10 including the views of the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas in the Abhidharmakośa and its bhāṣya.11

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7 Bhikkhu Ānānanda, MM, p. 41. The ‘latencies’ and ‘influxes’ are his renderings of ‘anusayā’ and ‘āsavā’ respectively.
9 Thera Piyadassi, BAP, p. 209; Ledi Sayadaw, RE, p. 54.
10 See G. P. Malalasekera, EB 1 pp. 775-777.
11 The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya deals with anusayanirdeśāḥ in the fifth chapter. For the arguments on the nature of anusayas, see, AbhKbh, pp. 761-764. Also see AbhKbh (Tr.), pp. 768-771.
Keeping these viewpoints in mind, attention will be paid to trace the origin and development of the concepts of anusayas on the basis of the Pāli sources as have been briefly described above.

**Grammatical**

‘Anusaya’ is derived from the root ‘si’ (to lie) with the prefix ‘anu’. The prefix anu has the basic meaning ‘along with’ with the verb of motion. Etymologically, the meaning of anusaya is ‘that which lies along with.’

The verb ‘anuseti’ functions in various contexts. Syntactically, this verb often governs an accusative case:

“Rūpam ce bhante anuseti tena saṅkham gacchati.”

If, venerable sir, one underlies material form, he is reckoned with that.

Furthermore, it also governs other cases such as a locative case or as an adverb:

“Sukhāya kho āvuso Visākha vedanāya rāgānusayo anuseti.”

Friend Visākha, rāgānusaya lies along with pleasant feeling.

“Yam loke piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ, ettha sattānam kāmarāgānusayo anuseti.”

Whatsoever is desirable and agreeable in this world, the kāmarāgānusaya of living beings lies therein.

The two aspects that the verb anuseti governs in these sentences appear either to emphasize the prefix ‘anu’ or the root ‘si’. When the prefix is emphasized, the verb anuseti, taking

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12 PTSD p. 33.
13 For the meaning of ‘anusaya’, PTSD shows thus: bent, bias, proclivity, the persistance of a dormant of latent disposition, predisposition and tendency. See p. 44.
14 DPL records thus: repentance, inclination, thought and desire. See p. 45.
15 EB records thus: inherent tendencies, a persistence of dormant or latent dispositions of mind leading to various kinds of evil inclinations. See p. 775.
16 SN III, p. 35.
17 MN I, p. 303.
18 Ps I, p. 123.
'anu' as indeclinable, can be connected to the object in accusative. In case the root 'si' is emphasized, 'anu' is to be taken as the prefix, which is subordinate in the sense of 'along with.' In such an instance as seen in the above citations, the verb anuseti governs the locative case.

In the cognate expression, the commentaries particularly paraphrase the verb anuseti as uppajjati:

"Ettha kāmarāgānusayo anuseti ti imāsu dvīsu vedanāsu uppajjati."\(^{17}\)
'Kāmarāgānusaya lies therein' means it arises in these two feelings.

As an adjective, the past participle 'anusayita' occurs in the earlier literary stage.

"Dīgharattānusayino, yañ ca pana me vicikicchā-kathāṅkathāsallaṁ tañ ca Bhagavatā abbāḥan ti."\(^{18}\)
The dart of doubt and uncertainty which is adhered to me for a long time – that is removed by the Blessed One.

In the commentaries, it implies a specific state of kilesas:

"Tattha ca yassa yesu khandhesu appahiṇāṭhena anusayitā kilesā, tassa te eva khandhā tesāṁ kilesānam vaṭṭhu..."\(^{19}\)
Herein, when the defilements are adhered to someone’s aggregates in the sense of not being abandoned, only those aggregates of him become the base for those defilements.

When compounded with 'sa', this term indicates the state that a particular person is possessed of anusaya:

"Anāgāmi avijjānusayena sānusayo..."\(^{20}\)
Non-returner is the one who is possessed of avijjānusaya...

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\(^{18}\) DN II, p. 283.
\(^{19}\) Ps-a I, p. 171; Vism XXII, p. 591. Cf. Sn-a I, p. 5: Tathā kāmāvaccarakkhandhesu appahiṇānusayitānam kilesānam kāmāvaccarakkhandhā eva vaṭṭhu...
\(^{20}\) Yam I, p. 294.
Being compounded with the negative suffix, 'an' or 'nir' denotes the state that a particular person is free from anusaya:

"...so kāmanandiyā pi anusayaā...ayam vuccati bhikkhave bhikkhu niranusayo, ..." 21
He has no anusaya of delight for sensual pleasure... Bhikkhus, this bhikkhu is called the one who is free from anusaya.

"Yo kāmarāgāanusayena niranusayo, so patighāanusayena niranusayo ti? Āmantā." 22
Is the one who is free from kāmarāgāanusaya also free from patighāanusaya? Yes he is.

Only in the commentarial expression is it observed that the term anusaya is compounded with the word appaṁṇa or thāmagata which presents its own characteristic.

"Idhassupuriso appaṁṇanusayo samyojaniyesu dhammesu assadām anupassati,..." 23
Here, a person whose anusaya is not abandoned contemplates gratification in dhammas subject to fetters...

"Thāmagatāanusayam pajahati" 24
He abandons anusaya which is strengthened.

Similes

There are two types of similes which throw light on the concepts of anusayas, that is, the simile of 'the root of a tree' and that of 'the painter'. In the Dhammapada, 25 the simile of the root of a tree illustrates tanhāanusaya that presents the concept of anusaya in a general sense. In the Nettippakarana, 26 it refers to anusayas in conjunction with obsessions (pariyutthānas). Irrespective of its two different contexts, this simile applies the same concept of 'mūla' to anusaya in the general sense as well as in the technical sense. Hence,

21 AN III, p. 246.
22 Yam I, p. 306.
23 Ntt-a (Vri) p. 303.
24 Pcp. Yam-a (Vri) p. 319. See also DN-ṇ (Vri) III, p. 231.
25 Dhp p. 49. For the quotation, see below p. 327.
26 Ntt p. 14; yathā khandhavantassa rukkhassa anavasesamūruddharane kate pupphaphalapavālankurasantati samucchinā bhavati, evam anusayesu pahīnesu pariyutthānasantati samucchinā bhavati piddhātā paticchāhānā.
(Just as the continuity of flowers, fruits, hoots and buds is severed when the complete uprooting of the root of a tree with its trunk is effected, so too, the continuity of obsessions is severed when the anusayas are abandoned).
a passage of the Nettippakarana commentary stands cogent in lucidly visualizing the concept of anusaya by the root of a tree. While commenting on “yathāpi mūle” quoted from the same Dhammapada stanza, the Nettippakarana commentary illustrates tanhānusaya as follows:

“Yathā nāma patīṭhāhetubhāvena mūlanti laddhavohāre bhūmigate rukkhassa avayave pharasuchedādi-antarāyabhāvena anupaddave tato eva dālhe thire satti khandhe chinnepi assatthādirukkho ruhati, evameva tanhānusayasanikhāte attabhāvarukkhassa mūle maggaṅāṇapharasunā anupacchinne tayidaṃ dukkhaṃ punappunaṃ aparāparabhāvena nibbattatī na nirujjhatī.”

Just as when the underground part of a tree called the root by being a cause for support doesn’t have any disturbance by obstruction of being cut off by an axe, etc. it stands firm; even when its branches are cut off, a tree like Banyan, etc. still grows; similarly, when the root of the tree in the form of an individuality called tanhānusaya is not cut off by an axe of the knowledge of path, this suffering recurs continuously and does not cease.

The simile, herein, throws light in two ways on the concept of anusaya. The phrase ‘bhūmigate rukkhassa avayave’ and the term ‘anupaddave’ which describe mūla respectively indicate that anusaya is a certain dhamma which is (i) submerged and (ii) not being obstructed in the mind. In these two senses, tanhānusaya is herein elucidated as the root of individuality (attabhāva) which reproduces this suffering repeatedly, if not uprooted by the knowledge of path.

In the case of the simile of the painter, the Yamaka commentary elucidates the concept of anusayas in a negative sense. The commentary first explains that the meaning of anuseti should be understood as ‘not being abandoned’ (appahīna) and the term uppajjati in the context of anusayas also has to be understood by means of the same meaning. Through the simile of the painter, the commentary justifies the reason as follows:

“Tatthāpi appahīnavaseva uppattipaccaye sati uppattiyo aṇivāritavaseva vā. Yathā hi cittaṃkammadāni ārabhivā aparāniṭhittakammantā cittaṃkārādayo tesam kammanṭānam akaraṇaṅkhaṇepi mittasahajādihi dīthiṭhīṭhathāhāme “imesu divasesu kim karothā ’ti suttā, “cittakammam karoma, kathākammam karomā ’ti vadanti. Te kiṇcāpi tasmām khane na karonti avicchinnakammantā pana katakhaṇaṅca kattaṅbhakhaṇaṅca upādāya karontīyeva

27 Ntt-a (Vri) p. 233.
nāma honti. Evameva yamhi santāne anusaya appahinā, yamhi vā pana nevaṃ santāne upattipaccaye sati upatti anivāritā, tattha anuppajjanakkhañepi uppannapubbañceva kālantare uppajjanakañca upādāya yassa kāmarāgānusayo uppajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo uppajjatiyeva nāmāti evamattho veditabho.

In this context also, [the meaning of uppajjati has to be understood] by means of not being abandoned or by means of not being obstructed of its arising when there is condition for arising. Because [it is] just as the painters, etc. who have just started the artistic works, etc., but not yet finished their works, even when they are not engaged in painting, but are asked by their friends whenever they meet “what are you doing these days?” reply “we draw the pictures, we are engaged in wood carving”; at that moment when the artists reply, they do not actually do the paintings, etc., but because of the state that the artistic works are not being interrupted, the artists, in considering the past moment and the future moment, reply only that they draw the pictures. Similarly, because anusayas are not abandoned in certain continuity or because their arising is not obstructed in a particular continuity when there is condition for arising, even at the moment when they do not arise, their existence is referred to only with the reference to the earlier arisen state as well as [the possibility of] arising within the time. Therefore, it is only stated “in whose case kāmarāgānsaya arises, paṭighānusaya arises”. Thus, the meaning should be known.

This simile illustrates the concept of anusayas in two negative ways: anusayas are certain dhāmmas which are (i) not being abandoned (appahīna) and (ii) not being obstructed in certain continuity (santāna). In comparison to the artistic works which have begun but are not yet complete (aparīṭṭhita), and which are not being interrupted (aviccīhīna), the simile features that the activity of anusayas goes on when a suitable condition arises because they are neither abandoned nor obstructed just as the continuation of incomplete and uninterrupted artistic works.

Both types of similes consequently indicate that anusayas, unless uprooted or obstructed, still function on their own. While the simile of the root of a tree brings out the concept of anusaya as ‘deep rooted’, the simile of the painter places emphasis on anusayas as ‘not being abandoned’.

28 Pcp. Yam-a (Vri) p. 324.
5.1. Nikāyas treatment

As already pointed out, there are some suttas in the four Nikāyas, which treat anusaya as a subject matter. In the Samyutta-nikāya and the Aṅguttara-nikāya, the Anusaya-sutta occurs five times, the Anusayapahāna-sutta once and the Anusayasamugghāta-sutta twice respectively. Although these suttas mention the sevenfold anusayas or the abandoning of anusayas, the references in other suttas are rather more significant in the course of tracing the origin of the concepts of anusayas because they provide extensive clues in conjunction with vedanā (feelings), saṃyojana (fetters), saṃmādiṭṭhi (right view), etc.

As technical concepts, the seven-fold anusayas are referred to in different contexts. They are the anusayas of kāmarāga, patīgha, māna, diṭṭhi, vicikicchā, bhavarāga and avijjā (underlying tendency in the form of sensual lust, aversion, conceit, [wrong] view, doubt, lust for becoming, and ignorance). In the four Nikāyas, it is also observed that in certain

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29 In the Aṅguttara-nikāya, it is entitled as the Pathama-anusaya-sutta and the Dutiya-anusaya-sutta
30 Table 5-1: The suttas entitled with the term anusaya in the four Nikāyas, and their contents.
31 In the four Nikāyas, rāgānusaya is often referred to without distinguishing kāmarāgānusaya and bhavarāgānusaya
32 Variant renderings by scholars:
Underlying tendency (— Bhikkhu Nanamoli; Piyadassi Thera)
Inherence (— Bhikkhu Nanananda)
Latent tendency (— P. A. Thittila)
Latent bias (— Pe Maung Tin)
Latent disposition (— Bhikkhu Bodhi)
Proclivity (— Maurice Walshe)
instances, anusayas are referred to in the general sense. In such cases, the term anusaya is compounded with other unwholesome dhammas except the cases mentioned above.

The concepts of anusayas can be detected from the following viewpoints: (1) an independent reference to the activity of anusaya, (2) an understanding of the activity of anusayas along with vedanās, (3) an understanding of the concepts of anusayas along with samyojanas, (4) the word anusaya in the compound and ‘asmīti’ anusaya, (5) the arising and abandoning of anusayas and (6) the types of anusayas.

5.1.1. An independent reference to the activity of anusaya

There are passages in which the activity of anusaya is expressed through the verb anuseti. Although the nominal form of anusaya does not occur in those passages, the verb itself independently determines the range of its activity. The Nidāna-samyutta shows the activity of anusaya as ārammaṇa (a basis) for maintenance of viññāna (consciousness). In the Cetanā-sutta, the Blessed One declares:

"Yaṅca kho bhikkhave ceteti yaṅ ca pakappeti yaṅca anuseti, ārammaṇam etam hoti viññānassa thitiyā. Ārammaṇe sati pāṭīṭhā viññānassa hoti. Tasmiṃ pāṭīṭhite viññāne virūhe āyatim punabbhavābhiniḥbattī hoti. Āyatim punabbhavābhiniḥbattiḥ sati āyatim jāramarānam ... sambhavanti. Evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakhandhassa samudayo hoti."

"No ce bhikkhave ceteti no ce pakappeti atha ce anuseti ārammaṇam etam hoti viññānassa thitiyā. ..."33

"Bhikkhus, what one intends, and what one plans, and whatever one has a tendency towards: this becomes a basis for maintenance of consciousness. When there is a basis, there is a support for establishing the consciousness. When consciousness is established and has come to growth, there is the production of future renewed existence. When there is the production of future renewed existence, future birth, aging-and-death ... come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. If, bhikkhus, one does not intend, and one does not plan, but one still has a tendency towards something, this becomes a basis for the maintenance of consciousness. ..."34

As a basis (ārammaṇa) for maintenance (thiti) of consciousness, the syntax of the sentence shows three occasions in which different individuals might have cetanā, saṅkappa or

33 SN II, p. 65.
34 Bhikkhu Bodhi, CDB 1, p. 576.
anusaya as expressed by the relevant verb. It is rather difficult to consider that these three verbs indicate psychological processes sequentially. If that were the case, the first two verbs would denote pre-condition for the activity of anusaya. But these two verbs, nowhere in the Nikāyas, are connected with such a pre-condition for anusaya. Furthermore, it is verified by the latter part of the above citation which indicates that even in the absence of cetana and saṅkappa, anusaya would still be a basis for maintenance of consciousness. Hence, in its effect within the formula of paticcasaṅkappāda (dependent origination), the range of the activity of anusaya is much wider and deeper than those of cetana and saṅkappa which denote volitional formations (saṅkhāra).

The same Nidāna-saṁyutta provides another instance in which the establishment (patiṭṭhita) of viññāna leads to the production of renewed future existence (punabbhavābhinnibbatti). It states that if there is rāga (lust), nandi (delight) or tanhā (craving) for four nutriments (i.e. kābāḷikārāhāra, phassa, mano-saṅcetanā and viññāna), the consciousness is established and starts flourishing. Then, it leads to a descent of name-and-form (namārupassa avakkhanti), which in turn causes the growth of volitional formations (saṅkhāra) and the production of renewed future existence in a sequence. When we consider the activity of anusaya as a basis for the maintenance of consciousness in connection with this passage, the range of its activity apparently reaches the role of rāga (lust), nandi (delight) or tanhā (craving). In this regard, Bhikkhu Bodhi notes, after considering avijjānusaya and rāgānusaya as avijjā and tanhā in the formula of paticcasaṅkappāda, that “the way they [anusayas] maintain consciousness is thus no

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35 As for ‘saṅkappa’, ‘pakappeti’, see Bhikkhu Bodhi, CDB 1, p. 759, fn. 112.
different from the way the volitional formations, fuelled by ignorance and craving, serve as the condition for consciousness.\textsuperscript{39}

In the same Samyutta-nikāya, the activity of anusaya is also implied through the verb anuseti in relation to the five aggregates. First, the Blessed One briefly instructs the activity of anusaya to a bhikkhu as follows:

\begin{quote}
"Yam kho bhikkhu anuseti tena saṅkhāram gacchati; yam nānuseti na tena saṅkhāram gacchati ti.\textsuperscript{40}

"Bhikkhu, if one has an underlying tendency towards something, then one is reckoned in terms of it; if one does not have underlying tendency towards something, one is not reckoned in terms of it."\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

When the Blessed One asks the Bhikkhu as to how he has understood that brief instruction, the Bhikkhu answers that he has gained his understanding of the Blessed One’s abstract teaching through the five aggregates. If one underlies any of rūpa, vedanā, saṅñā, saṅkhāra and viññāṇa, he is reckoned in terms of it.\textsuperscript{42} The passage points out that the verb anuseti implies the activity of anusaya towards the objects, that is, the five aggregates with which one principally identifies.\textsuperscript{43} If someone has an underlying tendency towards any of the five aggregates, his ‘psychological state’ is supposed to be a mark of his defilements in the form of anusaya.

\textsuperscript{39} Bhikkhu Bodhi, CDB I, p. 758, fn. 112.
\textsuperscript{40} SN III, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{41} Bhikkhu Bodhi, CDB I, pp. 877-878.
\textsuperscript{42} SN III, p. 35: Rūpaṃ ce bhante anuseti tena saṅkhāram gacchati. Vedanāṃ... Saṅñāṃ...Saṅkhāre...Viññāṇam ce anuseti tena saṅkhāram gacchati. ...
Cf. SN III, p.36: Yam kho bhikkhu anuseti tam anumiyati; yam anumiyati tena saṅkhāram gacchati. Yam nānuseti na tam anumiyati; yam nānumiyati na tena saṅkhāram gacchati ti.
\textsuperscript{43} Bhikkhu Bodhi notes thus: “additionally we might suppose one is reckoned not only by way of the defilements, but even more prominently by way of the aggregate with which one principally identifies. One who inclines to form is reckoned as a ‘physical’ person, one who inclines to feeling a ‘hedonist’…” See CDB I, p. 1053, fn. 47.
5.1.2. Understanding of the activity of anusayas with three vedanās (feelings)

In relation to vedanās that constitute a primary condition in the perceptual process, the activity of anusayas presents the outcome of mental reactions towards particular feelings. The Cūḷavedalla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya specifically refers to three anusayas which show such a relation with their respective feelings. According to this sutta, rāgānusaya, patighānusaya and avijjānusaya lie along with pleasant feeling (sukhāvedanā), painful feeling (dukkhāvedanā) and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling (adukkhamasukhāvedanā) respectively, but do not lie along with all the pleasant feelings, all the painful feelings and all neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings.

The Kīṭāgiri-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya explains that a certain kind of pleasant feeling is conducive to the development of unwholesome dhammas, while another kind of pleasant feeling leads to the cultivation of wholesome dhammas. The same account is given in respect to painful feeling and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling respectively. Considering this aspect together with the account of the Cūḷavedalla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, it is certain that the mental reaction towards the three feelings mainly brings out the activities of these three anusayas. This is because the Chachakka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya clearly states as to how the mental reaction towards the three feelings leads the three anusayas respectively to get attached to a particular person.

The sutta, at the outset, explains that depending on the meeting of the three conditions (i.e. the six sense organs, their objects and their consciousness), the feeling experienced is pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. It further mentions:

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45 MN I, p. 303: Sukhāya kho āvuso Visākha, vedanāya rāgānusayo anuseti, dukkhaṇāya vedanāya patighānusayo anuseti, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo anuseti ti.
46 Ibid.: Na kho āvuso visākha sabbāya sukhāya vedanāya rāgānusayo anuseti, na sabbāya dukkhaṇāya vedanāya patighānusayo anuseti, na sabbāya adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo anuseti ti.
47 MN I, p. 475.
"So sukhanam vedanaya phuttho samāno abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati; tassa rāgānusayo anuseti. Dukkhāya vedanāya phuttho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattālīm kandati sammoham āpajjati; tassa patighānusayo anuseti. Adukkhāmasukkhāya vedanāya phuttho samāno tassa vedanāya samudayaṁ ca atthangamaṁ ca assādaṁ ca ādinavaṁ ca nissaranāṁ ca yathābhūtāṁ nappajjānāti: tassa avijjānusayo anuseti."

When one is touched by a pleasant feeling, if one delights in it, welcomes it, and remains holding to it, then rāgānusaya lies within one. When one is touched by a painful feeling, if one sorrows, grieves and laments, weeps beating one’s breast and becomes distraught, then patighānusaya lies within one. When one is touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one does not understand as it actually is the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to that feeling, then avijjānusaya lies within him.

In the citation, the stock passage “abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati” indicates that such a mental attitude leads to nandī which is a synonym of rāga. The phrase “socati...sammoham āpajjati” denotes that it leads to patigha. The verb nappajjānāti signifies not knowing (aṇāṇa) of the escape in regard to a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. Therefore, the mental reactions towards the three feelings expressed through the verbs present the process leading to the activity of anusayas.

5.1.3. Understanding of the concept of anusayas along with samyojanas

The Mahāmūḷkha-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya gives a unique account that the terms anusaya and samyojana are brought together in the context of the five lower fetters (orambahāgiyāni samyojanāni), and that the term anusaya, therein, denotes nothing but a certain state of the same dhāmas belonging to the five lower fetters. While teaching the five lower fetters to the Venerable Māḷukyāputta, the Blessed One first refers to the simile of an infant with whom the wanderers of other sects might converse:

"Nanu Māḷukyāputta aṇāṇatithiyā paribbajakā īminā tarunāppamina upārambhena upārambhyissanti: Dharassā hi Māḷukyāputta kumārassa mandassā uṭṭhānaseyyakassa"
sakkāyo ti pi na hoti, kuto pan’ assa uppajissati sakkāyadiṭṭhi; anuseti tv-ev’ assa sakkāyadiṭṭhānusayo...”

(Each of the four remaining terms is also explained in the same way.)

Mālunkyaṭṭhutta, would not the wanderers of other sects confute you with the simile of the infant? For a young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘personality,’ so how could personality view arise in him? Yet the sakkāyadiṭṭhānusayo lies within him. ...

The Blessed One then explains what the five lower fetters are on the request of Venerable Ānanda as follows:

"Idh’ Ānanda assutavā puthujjano...sakkāyadiṭṭhipariyutṭhitena cetasā viharati sakkāyadiṭṭhiparetena, uppannāya ca sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā nissaraṇaṁ yathābhūtaṁ na-ppajānāti; tassa sā sakkāyadiṭṭhi thāmagata appatīvinīta orambhāgiyam saṁyojanam..."

(Each of the remaining four terms is also referred by exactly the same phrase.)

'Here, Ānanda, an untaught ordinary person ... abides with a mind obsessed and enslaved by personality view, and he does not understand as it actually is the escape from the arisen personality view; when that personality view has become habitual and is uneradicated in him, it is a lower fetter...”

In the first citation, the term anusaya denotes that sakkāyadiṭṭhi still lies within, yet is not manifested in an infant. The last sentence indicates that although the infant does not possess the notion sakkāyadiṭṭhi, when reborn in the circle of transmigration (samsāra), still possesses it in the form of anusaya. In the second citation, it is seen that sakkāyadiṭṭhi as saṁyojana is characterized by the term ‘uppanna’ (arisen) which is pre-amplified by ‘pariyutṭhita’ (encircled or obsessed) and ‘pareta’ (enslaved), and also by the terms ‘thāmagata’ (strengthened) and ‘appatīvinīta’ (uneradicated) which are brought forth by the absence of knowledge of the escape from the arisen personality view.

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52 MN I, pp. 432-433.
53 As for the four remaining terms, that is, vicikicchānusaya, silabhataparāmāsa, kāmarāgānusaya and vyāpādānusaya, the only difference of descriptions is the following part in the respective sentence: "...dhammesu vicikicchā?", "...silāsesu silabhataparāmāso?", "...kāmesu kāmacchando?" and "...sattesu vyāpādo?"
54 The translation of Bhikkhu Ānāmoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi except sakkāyadiṭṭhānusayo untranslated. See MLDB, p. 537.
55 MN I, p. 433.
56 Bhikkhu Ānāmoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi, MLDB, p. 538.
According to both quotations, the term *anusaya* compounded with *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* (i.e. one of the five lower fetters) signifies a ‘certain state’ of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* that is apparently implied by the terms ‘*thāmagata*’ and ‘*appatīvinīta*’. This is further evident when the Blessed One explains the abandoning of the five lower fetters:

“Sutavā ca kho Ānanda ariyasāvako...na sakkāyadiṭṭhipariyutthitena cetasā viharati na sakkāyadiṭṭhiparetena, uppannāya ca sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā nissaraṇaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti; tassa sā sakkāyadiṭṭhi sānusayā pahiyati...”\(^{57}\)

(Each of the remaining four terms is also referred by exactly the same phrase.) Ānanda, a well-taught noble disciple... does not abide with a mind obsessed and enslaved by personality view; he understands as it actually is the escape from the arisen personality view, and personality view together with *anusaya* is abandoned in him. ...\(^{58}\)

Syntactically, it is known that ‘sā sakkāyadiṭṭhi’ in the last sentence denotes ‘uppannā sakkāyadiṭṭhi’. The term *anusaya* in the ‘sānusya’ indicates ‘the state that *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* is strengthened (*thāmagata*) and uneradicated (*appatīvinīta*). In the case of the noble disciple, because he has the knowledge of escape from the arisen personality view, the arisen personality view does not reach the state that is strengthened/uneradicated. Therefore, as the arisen personality view is abandoned in him, the personality view in ‘strengthened/ uneradicated state’ is also simultaneously abandoned through the knowledge of escape from the personality view. It is intended with the sentence “*tassa sā sakkāyadiṭṭhi sānusayā pahiyati*”.\(^{59}\) In such a sense, the distinction between the two concepts, *samyojana* and *anusaya*, is that they are neither the same nor different in the account of the *Mahāmālunkya-sutta*. Being compounded with each *dhamma* of the five lower fetters, the term *anusaya* simply conveys a general sense of the term to the same *dhamma* of the five lower fetters, that is, ‘the state which is strengthened/ uneradicated, yet neither arisen nor manifested’.

\(^{57}\) MN I, p. 434.

\(^{58}\) See Bhikkhu ṇānāmoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi, MLDB, p. 538.

\(^{59}\) It is observed that the abandoning of *samyojanas* and *anusayas* is juxtaposed in the four *Nikāyas* and in other later texts. See AN II, p 157 and III, p. 74; Ps I, p. 171.
5.1.4. The word anusaya in the compound and ‘asmīti’ anusaya

The term anusaya occurs as the final component part of a compound in certain contexts. In such cases, anusaya presents a mutual relation with other components. In the context such as “...ye rūpe upāyupādānā cetaso adhitthānābhūhinivesanāsanayā, tesam khayā ... vimuttaṁ me cittan ti pajānāmi”, the term anusaya paraphrases upāyupādānā (attraction and grasping) and conveys a general meaning of the term. In connection with ‘adhitthānābhūhinivesā, it also implies the mental state that deeply grapples objects.

In the context of ‘ahaṅkāramamaṅkāramānānusaya’, mānānusaya reveals, as a technical concept, a close proximity to the other components. The Anusaya-sutta of the Saṃyuttanikāya refers to it as follows:

"Katham nu kho bhante jānato katham passato imasmiṁca saviṁṇānake käye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu ahaṅkāra-mamaṅkāra-mānānusaya na honti? Yām kiṃci Rāhula rūpaṁ atītanāgatapaccuppannam ajjhattam vā bahiddhā vā olārikaṁ vā sukhumāṁ vā hīnaṁ vā paṇitaṁ vā yaṁ dūre sansike vā, sabbaṁ rūpaṁ netaṁ mama neso ham asmi na me so attāti. Evam etam yathābhūtam sammappaṇṇāya passati. Yā kāci vedanā, yā kāci saṇṇā, ye keci sankkhārā, yām kiṃci viṁṇānaṁ ...
Evam kho Rāhula jānato evam passato...ahaṅkāramamaṅkāra-mānānusaya na honti.”

Venerable sir, how could one know, how could one see so that, in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, conceiving of ‘I’, conceiving of ‘mine’ and mānānusaya no longer occur within?

Any kind of form whatsoever, Rāhula, whether past, future or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near— one sees all forms as they really are with correct wisdom thus: ‘this is not mine’, ‘this I am not’, ‘this is not my self’. Any kind of feeling whatsoever...any kind of perception whatsoever... any kind of volitional formations whatsoever...any kind of consciousness whatsoever...

When one knows and sees thus ...conceiving of ‘I’, conceiving of ‘mine’, mānānusaya no longer occur within.

The passage indicates that ahaṅkāra, mamaṅkāra and mānānusaya are respectively related to the notions ‘this is myself’ (eso me attā), ‘this is mine’ (etaṁ mama) and ‘this

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60 MN III, pp. 30-31: “...with destruction of attraction and clinging regarding material form, of mental standpoints, adherences, and underlying tendencies, I have understood that my mind is liberated.” (Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi, MLDB, p. 904). Cf. SN III, p. 10; AN V, p. 111.
61 For ‘ditthiṭṭhānādhipārippukkāra-paññāna-bahūhinivesanāsukhānaṁ’, also see MN I, p. 136.
62 MN II, p. 252. See also MN III, pp. 18-19.
63 I have followed Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation with some modifications. See CDB I, p. 698.
64 For Bhikkhu Bodhi’s dissolution of the compound, see CDB I, p. 814, fn. 340.
am I’ (eso’hamasmi) which are basically evoked by misconceiving the five aggregates. 
Mānānusayā in this context signifies the conceit ‘I am’ (asmimāna) that is fundamentally 
rooted in self-existence.

In the Khemaka-sutta of the Samyutta-nikāya, ‘asmīti anusayā’ is referred to in a technical 
sense:

“Kiṭcāpi āvuso ariyasāvakassa pañcorambhāgiyāni saññojanāni paññāni bhavanti, atha 
khvassa hoti yeva pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato Asmīti māno. Asmīti chando 
Asmīti anusayo asamūhato.”

“Friends, even though a noble disciple has abandoned the five lower fetters, still, with regard to 
the five aggregates subject to grasping, there lingers in him a residual conceit ‘I am,’ a desire ‘I 
am,’ an underlying tendency ‘I am’ that had not yet been uprooted.”

As this passage reveals, chanda, māna and anusaya are interrelated with the notion ‘asmi’, 
and such a notion still exists even in a noble one who has completely abandoned the five 
lower fetters. When the noble one dwells contemplating the rise and fall with regard to the 
five aggregates subject to grasping, the residual conceit ‘I am’, the desire ‘I am’, the 
underlying tendency ‘I am’ that had not yet been uprooted –this comes to be uprooted.

5.1.5. The arising and abandoning/destruction of anusayas

As already seen in the earlier citations for the activity of anusaya, the arising of anusaya is 
related to the usage of the verb anuseti. Therefore, repeating the same references herein 
would be regarded as unnecessary. However, it is presumed that while the arising of 
certain dhammas is expressed through the term uppajjati, the verb anuseti takes the role of 
uppajjati in the context of anusayas.

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64 SN III, p. 130.
65 Bhikkhu Bodhi CDB I, p. 945.
66 SN III, pp. 130-131: So aparena samayena pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu udayabbayānupassī viharati. Iti 
rūpaṃ iti rūpassa samudayo iti rūpassa aththagamo. Iti vedanā. Iti saññā. Iti sankhārā. Iti viññānāṃ... 
Tassimesu pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu udayabbayānupassino viharato yo pissa hoti pañcasu 
upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato Asmīti māno Asmīti chando Asmīti ti anusayo asamūhato so pi 
samugghātam gacchati.
As for the abandoning/destroying of \textit{anusayas}, the four \textit{Nikāyas} present not only the accounts that are controversial to the relevant contexts of the activities of \textit{anusayas}, but also the accounts of developing wholesome \textit{dhammas} for the abandoning of \textit{anusayas}. Therefore, it will be convenient to discuss both the contexts separately.

(1) The accounts referring to the abandonment of \textit{anusayas} opposite to their activities

In the \textit{Cūlavedalla-sutta} of the \textit{Majjhima-nikāya}, Bhikkhunī Dhammadinnā explains that \textit{rāgānusaya}, \textit{patighānusaya} and \textit{avijjānusaya} have to be abandoned in regard to \textit{sukhavedanā}, \textit{dukkhavedanā} and \textit{adukkhamasukhavedanā} respectively,\footnote{MN I, p. 303: \textit{Sukhāyā kho āvuso Visākha vedanāyā rāgānusayo pahātabbo, dukkhāyā vedanāyā patighānusayo pahātabbo, adukkhamasukhāyā vedanāyā avijjānusayo pahātabbo ti. See also SN IV, p. 205.} but they do not have to be abandoned in regard to all the \textit{sukhavedanā}, all the \textit{dukkhavedanā} and all the \textit{adukkhamasukhavedanā}.\footnote{Ibid.} The reason for the latter statement will be made clearer by the account that the three \textit{anusayas} do not lie in the \textit{jhānas} still accompanied by \textit{pīti}, \textit{sukha} and \textit{domanassa} (i.e. generated from a zest for the supreme liberation), and \textit{adukkhamasukha} respectively.\footnote{\textit{Chachakka-sutta} of the \textit{Majjhima-nikāya} verifies that a key point for the abandoning of the three \textit{anusayas} is involved in the ‘mental reactions’ towards the three respective feelings. According to this \textit{sutta}, if one does not find delight in \textit{sukhavedanā} and does not find sorrow in \textit{dukkhavedanā} when touched by each of the three feelings, and if he understands truly (\textit{yathābhūtaṁ}) the escape in regard to \textit{adukkhamasukhavedanā}, then the three \textit{anusayas} do not lie within him accordingly.}

The \textit{Chachakka-sutta} of the \textit{Majjhima-nikāya} verifies that a key point for the abandoning of the three \textit{anusayas} is involved in the ‘mental reactions’ towards the three respective feelings. According to this \textit{sutta}, if one does not find delight in \textit{sukhavedanā} and does not find sorrow in \textit{dukkhavedanā} when touched by each of the three feelings, and if he understands truly (\textit{yathābhūtaṁ}) the escape in regard to \textit{adukkhamasukhavedanā}, then the three \textit{anusayas} do not lie within him accordingly.\footnote{MN III, p. 286: So sukhaṃ vedanāyā phuttho samāno nābhīmade tābhāvadati nājjhosaya titthati; tassa rāgānusayo nānuseti. Dukkhaṃ vedanāyā phuttho samāno na socati na kilamati na paridevati na urattālim kandati na sammoham āpajjati; tassa patighānusayo nānuseti. Adukkhamasukhaṃ vedanāyā phuttho samāno na socati na kilamati na paridevati na urattālim kandati na sammoham āpajjati; tassa avijjānusayo nānuseti.}
In the *Pathamagelañña-sutta* of the *Vedanā-saṁyutta*, we further notice that the understanding of the three feelings is ultimately instrumental in the abandoning of the three *anusayas*. While a *bhikkhu* dwells, mindful, and clearly comprehending and diligent, if there arises any of the three feelings, he understands (*pajānāti*) that the feeling arises depending on the body which is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen (*anicco saṅkhato paticcasamuppanno*), and that the feeling depending on such a body also has the same nature. When a *bhikkhu* dwells contemplating on impermanence (*anicca*), passing away (*vaya*), etc. in the body and in the three feelings, the three *anusayas* in regard to those three feelings are gradually abandoned by him respectively.\(^{71}\)

This type of contemplation (*anupassana*)\(^{72}\) is accompanied by the clear comprehension (*sampajñāna*) and the understanding about the nature of the body and the feelings, which are denoted through the verb *pajānāti*. Besides, as seen earlier in the context of *anusayas* in conjunction with the five lower fetters and in the context of *mānānusaya* compounded with *ahaṅkāramamaṅkāra*, it is evident that understanding is emphasized for the abandonment of the relevant *anusayas* through the two clauses "*sakkāyadiṭṭhiya yathābhūtaṃ nissaranānaṃ pajānati*" and "*...evametam yathābhūtaṃ saṁmappaṭānāya passati*" respectively.

\(^{71}\) SN IV, pp. 211-212: *Tassa ce bhikkhave bhikkhuno evam satassa sampajñānassa appamattassa atāpino paḥhitattassa viharato uppaṭjati sukkhā vedanā, so evam pajānāti. Uppannā kho me āyam sukkhā vedanā, sā ca kho paticca no aṭṭāpica, kim paticca imām āyam paticca, āyam kho pana kāyo anicca saṅkhato paticca samuppanno, aniccaṃ kho pana saṅkhataṃ paticca samuppannam kāyaṃ paticca uppānno sukkhā vedanā kuto nīcā bhavissatīti. So kāye ca sukkhāya ca vedanāya aniccaṃ uppaṭjati viharato, vayānupassī viharati, virāgānupassī viharati, nirodhiḥnupassī viharati, patiṇissaggānupassī viharati, tassa kāye ca sukkhāya ca vedanāya aniccaṃ uppaṭjati viharato vayānupassino viharato virāgānupassino viharato nirodhiḥnupassino viharato patiṇissaggānupassino viharato yo kāye ca sukkhāya ca vedanāya rāgānusayo so paṭhijati.*

\(^{72}\) For different kinds of contemplation, see DN Sutta 22, MN Sutta 10; Ps I, p. 58; Vism VIII pp. 239-240.
In the Sammādiṭṭhi-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, it is further observed that the correct understanding of each of the sixteen subjects leads to the abandoning of anusayas. For instance, the sutta refers to anusayas, as follows, in the subject of the wholesome (kusala) and the unwholesome (akusala):

"Yato kho āvuso ariyasāvako evam akusalam pajānāti evam akusalamūlam pajānāti, evam kusalam pajānāti evam kusalamūlam pajānāti, so sabbaso rāgānusayam pahāya, paṭighānusayam paṭivinodetvā asmiti diṭṭhimānānusayam samūhanītvā avijjām pahāya vijjām uppādetvā diṭṭhe va dhamme dukkhas' antakaro hoti...."  

When a noble disciple has thus understood the unwholesome and the root of the unwholesome, the wholesome and the root of the wholesome, he entirely abandons rdgdnusaya, he abolishes patighdnusaya, he extirpates diṭṭhimānānusaya as ‘I am’, and by abandoning ignorance and arousing true knowledge he here and now makes an end of suffering. ....

The terms ‘evam’ and ‘pajānati’ herein signify that the abandoning of those anusayas is achieved by the correct understanding of each relevant subject as previously explained in detail.

However, the Madhupindaṇḍika-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya renders a different account for the complete eradication of the seven anusayas. When a certain bhikkhu asks the Blessed One about his teaching of how one does not quarrel with anyone, and how it is that perceptions (sannd) no more underlie the brahmin who abides detached from sensual pleasure, the Blessed One abstractly replies as follows:


73 The sixteen subjects are: (1) the wholesome (kusala) and the unwholesome (akusala), (2) nutriment (āhāra), (3) the four noble truths, (4) aging and death (jarāmarana), (5) birth (jāti), (6) existence (bhava), (7) grasping (upādāna), (8) craving (tanha), (9) feeling (vedanā), (10) contact (phassa), (11) the sixfold bases (salāyatana), (12) mentality and materiality (nāmarūpa), (13) consciousness (viññāṇa), (14) volitional formations (saṅkhārā), (15) ignorance (avijjā) and āsavas.
74 MN I, p. 47.
75 The translation of Bhikkhu Ṇāṇamoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi except rāgānusaya, etc. untranslated. See MLDB, p. 133.
Bhikkhu, as for the source through which perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man: if nothing is found there to delight in, welcome and hold to, this is the end of rāgānusaya, of patīghānusaya, of diṭṭhānusaya, of vicīkicchānusaya, of mānānusaya, of bhavārāgānusaya, of avijjānusaya; this is the end of resorting to rods and weapons, of quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice, and false speech; here these evil unwholesome states cease without remainder.\(^{77}\)

It is specific that in this passage, each of the seven anusayas is referred to in the plural and these seven anusayas are called as “pāpakā akusalā dhammā”. As already seen in relation to the three feelings, the phrase “abhīnantabbaṁ abhīvaditabbaṁ ajjhositabbaṁ” signifies a sort of mental attachment to some particular objects. Not having any attachment to them denotes the abandoning of anusayas.

(2) Realizing certain natures of dhammas or developing wholesome dhammas for the abandoning/destruction of anusayas

In the Anusayapahāna-sutta and Anusayasamugghāta-sutta of the Samyutta-nikāya, the phrase ‘jānato passato’ reveals that the realization of the nature of impermanence (anicca) and non-self (anatta) leads to the abandoning/uprooting of anusayas. When one knows and sees the six senses, their objects, etc.\(^{78}\) as impermanent (anicca)\(^{79}\) or as non-self (anatta),\(^{80}\) anusayas are abandoned and are uprooted respectively.

Developing the five faculties (pañcimāni indriyāni),\(^{81}\) the concentration by mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasatisamādhi)\(^{82}\) and the mindfulness directed to the body

\(^{77}\) The translation of Bhikkhu ānāmoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi except rāgānusaya, etc. untranslated. See MLDB, p. 202.

\(^{78}\) Six internal sense organs, six external objects, six types of consciousness, six types of their contact, and three types of feelings felt by each of those six contacts.

\(^{79}\) SN IV, p. 32.

\(^{80}\) Ibid.: “Cakkhuṁ kho bhikkhave anattato jānato passato anusayā samugghātaṁ gacchanti ...pe ... sotam ... ghānam ... jivham ... käyom ... manam ... dhamme ... manoviññānam ... manosamphassam ... yampidam manosamphassapaccayā upajjati vedayitam sukhām vā dukkhām vā adukkhām asukhām vā tam pi anattato jānato passato anusayā samugghātaṁ gacchanti.”

\(^{81}\) SN V, p. 236: Pañcimāni bhikkhave indriyāni bhāvānā ti bhālikatāni anusayāsamugghātāya samvattanti. Katamāni pañça? Saddhindriyān ...pe ... paññindriyān. Imāni kho bhikkhave pañcindriyāni bhāvānāni bhālikatāni anusayāsamugghātāya samvattantī ti.

\(^{82}\) SN V, p. 340: Ānāpānasatisamādhi bhikkhave bhāvīto bhālikato anusayasamugghātāya samvattatī ...
leads to the uprooting of anusayas. When one develops insight preceded by serenity (samathapubbaṅgamam vipassanam) or serenity preceded by insight (vipassanāpubbaṅgamam samathaṁ) or serenity and insight coupled together (samathavipassanam yuganaddham), the path (magga) is produced in him. He develops and makes much of it; the fetters are abandoned and anusayas are exterminated.\textsuperscript{84}

According to the Abhinī ḫapaccavekkhitabbatṭhāna-sutta, one considers thus: “I am not the only one who is subjected to ageing, etc.” When he reviews that state (thāna) repeatedly, the path (magga) is produced. When he develops that path, the fetters are completely abandoned and anusayas are exterminated.\textsuperscript{85} Similarly, when one repeatedly reviews the nature of living beings in the following four ways, the path (magga) is produced respectively, and leads to the exterminating of anusayas: (i) all living beings are subject to illness (byādhisamathānā), (ii) all living beings are subject to death (maranaddhamma), (iii) all living beings are parted, and separated from the dear and agreeable ones (piyehi manāpehi nānābhāvo vinābhāvo), and (iv) all living beings are heirs of their own actions (kammaddhādā) — whether their actions will be good or bad.\textsuperscript{86} In order to completely understand and to abandon the seven anusayas, the noble-eight-fold path has to be cultivated.\textsuperscript{87}

5.1.6. The types of anusaya
The four Nikāyas present different types of anusayas as per their contexts. In the context of samyojana, as the Mahāmūluṅkya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya shows, the types of

\textsuperscript{83} AN I, p. 44: Ekadhāmme bhikkhave bhāvite bhahulikate avijjā pahīyati vijjā uppajjati, ...anusayā samugghātam gacchanti... Katamasmin ekadhāmme? Kāyagatā- satiyā.
\textsuperscript{84} AN II, pp. 156-157. Cf. Ps II, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{85} AN III, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{86} AN III, pp. 74 -75.
\textsuperscript{87} SN V, p. 60: ime ...sattannam anusayānam abhiṇāṇa parikkhayāya pahānāya ...pe... ayam ariyo atṭhaṅgiko maggo bhāvetabbo ti.
anusaya compounded with each dhamma of the five lower fetters are referred to as general concepts.

As technical concepts, rāgānusaya, patighānusaya and avijjānusaya are observed in the context of vedanās. In the Sammādiṭṭhi-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, rāgānusaya, patighānusaya and ‘asmīti’ diṭṭhimānānusaya are referred to in the context of sammādiṭṭhi and the phrase ‘asmīti’ diṭṭhimānānusaya seems to denote diṭṭhānusaya and māññusaya. In the context of papañcaśāññaśānkhā, the seven types of anusayas occur from rāgānusaya up to avijjānusaya. Herein, rāgānusaya seems to signify ‘kāmarāgānusaya’ because ‘bhavarāganusaya’ is mentioned separately.

In the Anusaya-sutta of the Samyutta-nikāya, the figure ‘satta’ is first mentioned as follows:


Although the seven anusayas are merely mentioned by name and not elaborated upon, this context appears to be fixed and stereotyped as presenting technical concepts. On the basis of these different contexts, it is hard to determine whether the number of anusayas as technical concepts is developed from three up to seven because there are no other contexts, which deal with anusayas as the subject matter except the suttas entitled with anusaya.

88 Ibid. Also see DN III, p. 254.
5.2. Khuddaka-nikāya treatment

In the earlier texts of the Khuddaka-nikāya, we merely observe that the term anusaya is used in both the technical and general senses. For instance, in the Uraga-sutta of the Suttanipṭa, it is stated:

"Yassānusayā na santi keci, mūlā akusalā samūhatāse,
so bhikkhu jahāti orapāram, urago jīnnam iva tacam purānam."  
That bhikkhu in whom there are no anusayas, in whom unwholesome roots are destroyed, leaves this shore and the far shore as a snake leaves its old worn-out skin.

In the Theragāthā, the following stanza also offers more or less the similar idea.

"Tuvam buddho, tuvam satthā, tuvam Mārābhībhū muni,
tuvam anusaye chetvā tinno tāres imam pajam."  
You are the Buddha, you are the teacher, you are the sage who has overcome Māra. Having cut off anusayas, having crossed over, you bring these people across.

Both the contexts reveal that anusayas are used in a technical sense in different contexts, expressed negatively and positively, and that one who completely eradicates anusayas can cross over to the other side of the samsāric river.

In the Dhammapada, the following gāthā reveals the concept of anusaya in a general sense.

"Yathāpi mūle anupaddave dalhe, chinnopi rukkho punareva rūhati;
evampi tanhānusaye anūhate, nibbattati dukkhamidam punappunam."  
"Just as a tree with roots unharmed and firm, though hewn down, sprouts again, even so while latent craving is not rooted out, this sorrow springs up again and again."

In this citation, the tanhānusaya is depicted as the very root cause of samsāric existence.

The term anusaya herein signifies a certain state of tanhā in general.

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89 Sn p. 2. Cf. p. 64.
90 I have followed K.R. Norman's translation with some modifications. See GD, p. 2.
92 K.R. Norman's translation except anusayas untranslated. See GD, p. 60.
93 Dhp p. 49.
94 Narada Thera, The Dhammapada, p. 262.
The conceptual development of anusayas is observed in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* and both the Niddesas (Cūla- and Mahā-) that chronologically belong to the later period of the *Khuddaka-nikāya*. It is apparently reflected by the accounts for the activities of the seven anusayas, the conceptual divisions of the seven anusayas with regard to their abandonment, and the others.

In the *Āsayānusayānāṇa-niddesa*, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* refers to the seven anusayas as follows:

"Katamo ca sattānaṁ anusayo? Sattā anusayā: kāmarāgāṇusayo paṭīghāṇusayo mānāṇusayo diṭṭhāṇusayo vicīkicchāṇusayo bhavārāgāṇusayo avijjāṇusayo. Yāṁ lōke piyarūpam sātarūpaṁ, ettha sattānaṁ kāmarāgāṇusayo anuseti; yāṁ lōke appiyarūpam asātarūpam, ettha sattānaṁ paṭīghāṇusayo anuseti. Iti imesa dvīsu dhammesu avijjā anupatiṭṭha, tadekaṭṭho māno ca diṭṭhi ca vicīkicchā ca daṭṭhabbā. Ayam sattānaṁ anusayo."[^1]

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[^1]: "What is the anusaya of living beings? The seven anusayas: kāmarāgāṇusaya, paṭīghāṇusaya, mānāṇusaya, diṭṭhāṇusaya, vicīkicchāṇusaya, bhavārāgāṇusaya and avijjāṇusaya. Whatsoever is desirable and agreeable in this world, kāmarāgāṇusaya lies therein (i.e. in the desirable and agreeable). Whatsoever is undesirable and disagreeable in this world, paṭīghāṇusaya lies therein (i.e. in the undesirable and disagreeable). So in these two dhammas, ignorance falls after, and the conceit, [wrong] view and doubt should be considered as coefficient with that (ignorance). This is anusaya of living beings."[^2]

This passage that holds the stylistic problem between the question and the answer—the question is asked in singular, yet the answer is given in plural—shows the activities of anusayas from the view point of the objects they lie along with. In comparison with the four *Nikāyas*’ account, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* shows two different aspects.

First, it explains the activities of anusayas through the desirable object (*piyarūpa*) and the undesirable object (*appiyarūpa*). These two types of objects correspond to *sukhavedanā* and *dukkhavedanā* respectively in the sense that they are inclined to lead in the same direction of the perceptual process. However, as for avijjāṇusaya, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* defines that avijjā joins with (literally, falls after) these two dhammas.

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(i.e. kāmarāgānusaya and patighānusaya). Secondly, it conjoins the activities of māna, diṭṭhi and vicikicchā with avijjā. The four Nikāyas merely treat the activities of the three specific anusayas in connection with the three respective vedanās only. The Paṭisambhidāmagga points out how the seven anusayas are related in formulating their activities on the basis of the desirable and undesirable objects.

In the context of vimuttiṇāṇa, the Paṭisambhidāmagga presents the differences in the conceptual natures of the seven anusayas according to their eradication. The eradication of seven anusayas is referred to through the four paths of noble persons. For example, the passage runs:

“Sotāpattimaggena ... diṭṭhānusayo vicikicchānusayo attano cittassa upakkilesā sammā samucchinnā honti...”  

By the path of the stream-entry, ... the defilements of one’s own consciousness such as ... diṭṭhānusaya, vicikicchānusaya are completely cut off.

Similarly, the gross kāmarāgānusaya and patighānusaya are completely cut off by the path of the once-returning, the subtle kāmarāgānusaya and patighānusaya are by the path of the non-returning. Mānūnusaya, bhavarāgānusaya and avijjānusaya are completely cut off by the path of Arahantship. This type of classification of the seven anusayas is frequently referred to in other contexts of the Paṭisambhidāmagga and the Mahāniddesa as well. However, as the above citation shows, the seven anusayas are, in this context, specifically designated as ‘attano cittassa upakkilesā’.

It is also observed in the Paṭisambhidāmagga that anusaya is directly amplified by the term thāmagata through which its nature is characterised. The Paṭisambhidāmagga explains:

97 Ps I, p. 72.  
98 ‘anusahagata’.  
99 Ps I, pp. 195-196; II, p. 37; II, p. 94, etc.  
100 Mnd I, p. 27, p. 141; II, p. 341, p. 507.
“Thāmagatassaanusayassajavanatthāya avaįjanakiriyābyākatā viññāṇacariyā, anusayassajavanā viññāṇacariyā.”

For the purpose of impulsion of anusaya as being strengthened (or inveterate), the act of adverting, functional and indeterminate is behaviour of consciousness. The act of impulsion of anusaya is behaviour of unknowing.

In both the Niddesas, anusaya is conceptually implied as jappā and tanhā in the list of synonymous idioms explaining jappā and tanhā in the list of synonymous idioms explaining moha or mohasallā, avijjānusaya is equivalent with moha or mohasallā. These are conceptual aspects that the Niddesas present in the commentarial style.

### 5.3. Abhidhamma treatment

Unlike the other technical terms such as āsavas, upādānas, etc. there is no importance given to anusayas in the Dhammasaṅgani. The Abhidhamma definition of anusayas is also not referred to in any Abhidhamma text. In the Dhammasaṅgani and the Vibhaṅga, the first two books of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, the term anusaya is merely referred to in the context of lobha, and avijjānusaya is equivalent with moha, both of which are akusalahetūni (unwholesome causes) or akusalamūlāni (unwholesome roots). Apart from the accounts of the Niddesas (Mahā- Cūla-) presented as a sort of glossary, both the texts treat anusaya as lobha and avijjānusaya in the category of akusalahetūni or akusalamūlāni. This fact indicates that they are ultimately unwholesome and causal dharmas from the psycho-ethical point of view. Moreover, the Vibhaṅga maintains the

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2. I have followed Bhikkhu Ānāmoli’s translation with some modifications. See POD, p. 79.
3. Cnd (Vri) p. 24
5. Cnd (Vri) p. 248.
7. ‘Anusayas’ are not treated as gocchaka in the Dhammasaṅgani while the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha includes them in the section of samuccayasāṅgaga. See Atths (Vri) p. 50.
same passage occurring in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*. It signifies that the same concepts of *anusayas* are classified in the *Abhidhamma* category.\(^{110}\)

Specific aspects in treating *anusayas* are observed in the *Yamaka* and the *Kathāvatthu*. While the *Yamaka* provides a schematic account, the *Kathāvatthu* reveals sectarian issues of the nature of *anusayas*.

### 5.3.1. Anusayas as depicted in the Yamaka

In the *Yamakappakaraṇa*, the seventh chapter, *anusaya-yamaka*, is devoted to deal with *anusayas*. This chapter, divided into seven sections (vāra), provides a unique account on the interrelation between the logically arranged seven *anusayas*. At the outset, it refers to the seven *anusayas*\(^{111}\) in the same sequence as that of the four *Nikāyas*. The section *anusayavāra* is preceded by explanatory notes on the seven *anusayas*:

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Where does *kāmarāgānusaya* lie? *Kāmarāgānusaya* lies along with the two feelings in sense-sphere. Where does *paṭighānusaya* lie? *Paṭighānusaya* lies along with the painful feeling. Where does *mānānusaya* lie? *Mānānusaya* lies along with two feelings in sense-sphere, and lies in the fine-material and immaterial spheres. Where does *diṭṭhānusaya* lie? *Diṭṭhānusaya* lies along with all the *dhammas* belonging to personality. Where does *vicikicchānusaya* lie? *Vicikicchānusaya* lies along with all the *dhammas* belonging to personality. Where does *bhavaraṅgānusaya* lie? *Bhavaraṅgānusaya* lies in the fine-material and immaterial spheres. Where does *avijjānusaya* lie? *Avijjānusaya* lies along with all the *dhammas* belonging to personality.


\(^{112}\) Throughout the entire chapter, *anusayayamaka*, PTS edition uses the seven abbreviated forms (e.g. ‘kāma’ for *kāmarāgānusayo*). Here, I have presented the original forms.

\(^{113}\) Yam I, p. 268.
As the heading ‘uppattiṭṭhānāvāra’ of the Vri. Edition for the above passage signifies, the term kattha denotes the place or source (ṭhāna) in which anusaya is active and the verb anuseti, in the cognate sense, implies the arising (uppatti) of anusaya in a particular source. The passage reveals that the Yamaka establishes vedanās (feelings), dhātus (spheres) and dhammas as the ‘sources of arising’ (uppattiṭṭhāna) of the seven anusayas, and it characterises the conceptual realms of the seven anusayas in their activities according to their relevant sources.

While the four Nikāyas seek the activity of each of the three anusayas (i.e. rāga, paṭigha and avijjā) in relation to each relevant feeling out of the three vedanās, the Paṭisambhidāmagga treats the activities of the seven anusayas through the desirable and undesirable objects. However, the Yamaka extends the range of the activity of kāmarāgānusaya to two vedanās (i.e., sukhā and adukkhāmasukha) belonging to kāmadhātu, and as for the source of the activity of avijjānusaya, it refers to all the dhammas belonging to sakkāya (i.e. the five aggregates). Considering the correspondence between dukkha-vedanā and the undesirable object already witnessed in the earlier sections, the Yamaka account on paṭighānusaya is in accordance with the others.

Regarding the activities of three other anusayas (i.e. māna-, diṭṭhi- and vicikicchā-), the Paṭisambhidāmagga explains that they are co-efficient with avijjā. However, the Yamaka refers to all the dhammas belonging to personality (sakkāya) as ‘the source of arising’ for the three anusayas (i.e. diṭṭhi- vicikicchā- and avijjā-), and it characterises the activity of mānānusaya in two vedanās belonging to sensual sphere (kāmadhātu), and in the fine-material and immaterial spheres (rūpārūpadhātu) as well. It also specifies rūpārūpadhātu as the ‘source of arising’ for bhavarāgānusaya. Although the Yamaka passage reveals the

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114 This edition divides the Anusaya-yamaka into Uppattiṭṭhānāvāra and Mahāvāra. And the Mahāvāra is divided into seven vāras such as Anusaya-vāra, etc. The above cited part of Anusaya-vāra in PTS edition, is termed as ‘Uppattiṭṭhānāvāra’ in Vri. edition. See Yam (Vri) II, p. 77.
similarity of the conceptual realms of *anusayas* with those of the earlier literary sources in certain cases, it apparently shows its own schematic view in categorising the ranges of the activities of *anusayas* through the ‘sources of arising’. The following table (5-2) illustrates the *Yamaka* account in comparison to those of the four *Nikāyas* and the *Pāṭisambhidāmagga*.

Table 5-2: The relation of the activities of *anusayas* through the sources of arising in different literary stages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four Nikāyas</th>
<th>Pāṭisambhidāmagga</th>
<th>Yamaka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anusayas</strong></td>
<td><strong>Vedanās</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāmarāga (rāga)#</td>
<td>sukha</td>
<td>piyarūpa-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paṭīgha</td>
<td>dukkha</td>
<td>appiyarūpa-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māna</td>
<td>tadekaṭṭha ♦</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diṭṭhi</td>
<td>tadekaṭṭha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicikicchā</td>
<td>tadekaṭṭha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhavarāga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avijjā</td>
<td>adukkhamasukha</td>
<td>Joining with two dhammas ♦</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# in the four Nikāyas, rāgānusaya is referred to in connection to sukhavedanā; * 2 vedanās denote ‘sukha’ and ‘adukkhamasukha’; ♦ ‘tadekaṭṭha’ indicates ‘co-efficient with avijjā’; ♦ it signifies that avijjā joins with kāmarāga and paṭīgha.

Proceeding with a further explanation, the *Yamaka* uses the corresponding terms *yaṭa / tassa* and *yaṭtha / tattha* to reveal logical interrelation between the seven *anusayas* belonging to a particular person and a particular ‘source of arising’ respectively. For instance, the questions begin as follows:

“Does *paṭīghānusaya* also lie in him in whom *kāmarāgānusaya* lies? Yes, it is. Then, does *kāmarāgānusaya* also lie in him in whom *paṭīghānusaya* lies? Yes, it is.

Does *mānānusaya* also lie in him in whom *kāmarāgānusaya* lies? Yes, it is. Then, does *kāmarāgānusaya* also lie in him in whom *mānānusaya* lies? In the non-returner,
mānānusaya lies, but kāmarāgānusaya does not lie in him. In three types of persons, mānānusaya lies and so is kāmarāgānusaya.\(^{115}\)

This classification is based on five types of persons — the ordinary person, the stream-enterer, the once-returner, the non-returner and the Arahant — who are identified with their abandoning of certain types of anusayas as follows:

(i) The ordinary person possesses seven anusayas.

(ii) The stream-enterer and (iii) the Once-returner still have kāmarāga, patīgha, māna, bhavārīga and avijjā.

(iv) The non-returner has māna, bhavārīga and avijjā.

(v) The Arahant has none.

Similarly, the Yamaka also classifies the seven anusayas on the basis of the ‘sources of arising’ described in the explanatory notes.\(^{116}\) These types of logical classifications demonstrate the similarity and interrelation of the conceptual realms between the seven anusayas vis-à-vis their activities in particular persons and in particular sources as well.


5.3.2. Polemical issues in the Kathāvatthu

In the Kathāvatthu, there are three kathās presenting polemical issues on the nature of anusayas. They are “anusayā anārammaṇā ti kathā”, “tisso pi anusayakathā” and “Añño anusayo ti kathā”. The “anusayā anārammaṇā ti kathā” debates on whether anusayas are without objects. The “tisso pi anusayakathā” argues about three aspects; anusayas are indeterminate (abyākata), without cause (ahetuka), and dissociated from consciousness (cittavippayutta). The “Añño anusayo ti kathā” examines the controversy as to whether anusayas are different from obsession (pariyutthāna) or not.

The issues raised in these kathās basically stand on the state of anusayas at a particular moment of cognition respectively referred to as “an ordinary person, when wholesome or indeterminate consciousness arises in him, is still ‘possessed of anusayas’ at that moment”. Consequently, the conceptual problem on those issues is mutually related in the contents of three kathās. Therefore, let us take “anusayā anārammaṇā ti kathā” as an example to observe how polemical arguments on the present subject are treated in the Kathāvatthu. In the “anusayā anārammaṇā ti kathā”, the first argument takes place as follows:

(1)

"Anusayā anārammaṇā ti?
Āmanā.
Rūpam nibbānam cakkhāyatanaṃ ...pe... phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṃ ti?
Na h’ evaṃ vattaṃbe ...pe....
Kāmarāgāanusayo anārammaṇo ti?
Āmanā.
Kāmarāgo kāmarāgapariyutthānam kāmarāgasāṇnojanam kāmogho kāmayogo kāmacchandanivaranaṃ anārammaṇan ti?
Na h’ evaṃ vattaṃbe ...pe...
kāmarāgo kāmarāgapariyutthānam kāmarāgasāṇnojanam kāmogho kāmayogo kāmacchandanivaranaṃ sārammaṇan ti?
Āmanā.
Kāmarāgāanusayo sārammaṇo ti?
Na h’ evaṃ vattaṃbe...pe...”

Q: Are anusayas without objects?

117 See Kv pp. 447-450.
119 Ibid. 405-406:
The first argument concerns the issue in compliance with rūpa, Nibbāna, etc., which may be classified as ‘anārammaṇa dhammas’ (dhammas without objects), and verifies that the view ‘anusayās are without objects’ does not stand for identifying anusayās with the nature of rūpa, etc. The questions are raised along a psychological perspective, and they point out the grounds on which the proposition ‘anusayās are without objects’ is established.

(2)

Kāmarāgānaṇusaya anārammaṇo ti?
Āmantā.
Katamakkhandhāparyāpanno ti?
Samkhārakkhandhāparyāpanno ti.
Sankkhārakkhandho anārammaṇo ti?
Na h’evam vattabbe...pe...
Samkhārakkhandho anārammaṇo ti?
Āmantā.
Vedanākkhandho, saññākkhandho, viññānakkhandho anārammaṇo ti?
Na h’evam vattabbe ...pe...

A: Yes, they are.
Q: Do you imply that anusayās are [identified with the nature of] material form, Nibbāna, eye-sphere...tangible object-sphere?
A: One can’t truly say that.
Q: Is kāmarāgānaṇusaya without object’”?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: [Then], lust for sensual pleasure, the obsession in the form of lust for sensual pleasure, the fetter in the form of lust for sensual pleasure, the flood in the form of sensual pleasure, the bond in the form of sensual pleasure, the hindrance in the form of desire for sensual pleasure– is this [also] without object?
A: One can’t truly say that.
Q: Lust for sensual pleasure, the obsession in the form of lust for sensual pleasure, the fetter in the form of lust for sensual pleasure, the flood in the form of sensual pleasure, the bond in the form of sensual pleasure, the hindrance in the form of desire for sensual pleasure – is this with object?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: [Then], is kāmarāgānaṇusaya [also] with object?
A: one can’t truly say that.

120 The Dhammasaṅgani and the Vibhaṅga, the first two texts of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka define lobha as an unwholesome root through terms such as rāga, ogha, yoga, anusaya, pariyyutthāna, etc. which indicate that these terms are equivalent with lobha.

121 Kv p. 406:
The second argument shifts the point of argument into the category of four mental aggregates classified as ‘sārammanā’ ([dhammas] with objects).\textsuperscript{122} As to the question “is the aggregate of sankhāra without object?”, the negative and positive answers clearly show that both the views on the aggregate of sankhāra are mainly involved in the understanding of anusayas. Whether these two views are reasonable on the present subject in conjunction with the other mental aggregates is still questioned.

(3) \textit{Kāmarāgānusayo sankhārakhandhapariyāpanno anārammaṇo ti?}
\textit{Amaṇṭā.}
\textit{Kāmarāgo sankhārakhandhapariyāpanno anārammaṇo ti?} \textit{Na h’evam vattabbe...pe...}
\textit{Kāmarāgo sankhārakhandhapariyāpanno sārammaṇo ti?} \textit{Amaṇṭā.}
\textit{Kāmarāgānusayo sankhārakhandhapariyāpanno sārammaṇo ti?}
\textit{Na h’evam vattabbe...pe...}\textsuperscript{123}

(4) \textit{“Kāmarāgānusayo sankhārakhandhapariyāpanno anārammaṇo, kāmarāgo sankhārakhandhapariyāpanno sārammaṇo ti?”}
\textit{Amaṇṭā.}
\textit{Sankhārakhandho ekadeso sārammaṇo, ekadeso anārammaṇo ti?}
\textit{Na h’evam vattabbe...pe...}
\textit{Sankhārakhandho ekadeso sārammaṇo, ekadeso anārammaṇo ti?} \textit{Amaṇṭā.}
\textit{Vedanākkhandho, saṇñākkhandho, viññānakhandho ekadeso sārammaṇo, ekadeso anārammaṇo ti?}
\textit{Na h’evam vattabbe...pe...}\textsuperscript{124}

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Q:[Then], the aggregate of feeling, the aggregate of perception, the aggregate of consciousness – is this aggregate also without object?
A: One can’t truly say that.
\textsuperscript{122} Vbh. p. 67: \textit{Rūpakkhandho anārammaṇo; cattāro khandhā sārammaṇā.}
\textsuperscript{123} Kv p. 406:
Q: Is \textit{kāmarāgānusaya} included in the aggregate of sankhāra without object?
A: Yes, it is.
Q:[Then], is \textit{kāmarāga} included in the aggregate of sankhāra [also] without object?
A: One can’t truly say that.
Q: Is \textit{kāmarāga} included in the aggregate of sankhāra with object?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: [Then], is \textit{kāmarāgānusaya} included in the aggregate of sankhāra [also] with object?
A: One can’t truly say that.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. p. 407:
Q: Is \textit{kāmarāgānusaya} included in the aggregate of sankhāra without object, [but] \textit{kāmarāga} included in the aggregate of sankhāra with object?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: Is the aggregate of sankhāra partly with object, and partly without object?
A: One can’t truly say that.
Q: Is the aggregate of sankhāra partly with object, and partly without object?
A: Yes, it is.
The third argument appears to be a premise that leads to the fourth argument. In the fourth argument, the scope of the point of argument is clear. In other words, the two views on the aggregate of *sāṅkhāra* are due to differentiating *kāmarāgānusaya* and *kāmarāga*. Therefore, as to the question “is the aggregate of *sāṅkhāra* partly with object, and partly without object?”, the negative and positive answers are maintained on the same premise. But the denial on the other mental aggregates indicates that these two views on the aggregate of *sāṅkhāra* stand differently in keeping *kāmarāgānusaya* apart from *kāmarāga* only.

Passing over the other four arguments on *patīghānusaya* up to *avījñānusaya* which are treated in the same manner, we read the ninth argument as follows:

(9)

"Na vattabham "Anusayā anārammaṇā ti? Amanī. Puthujjano kusalābyākate citte vattamāne "sāṅusayo ti" vattabbo ti? Amanī. Atthi tesam anusayānaṁ ārammaṇaṁ ti? Na h' evam vattabbe...pe... Tena hi anusayā anārammaṇā ti" 125

In the ninth argument, the view ‘anusayas are without objects’ is refuted. As for that refutation, the above polemical argument clearly indicates that the proposition ‘anusayas are without objects’ mainly stands on the basis of the state of anusayas which is not being actualised at a particular moment of cognition: There cannot be two mental objects which are opposite (i.e. wholesome and unwholesome) at the same moment of cognition. Hence,

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Q: [Then], the aggregate of feeling, the aggregate of perception, the aggregate of consciousness – is this aggregate also partly with object, and partly without object?  
A: One can’t truly say that.  

125 Ibid. p. 408:  
Q: Should it not be said that ‘anusayas are without objects’?  
A: No, it shouldn’t  
Q: [Then,] should it be said that an ordinary person, while wholesome or indeterminate consciousness is arising in him, is [still] ‘possessed of anusayas’?  
A: Yes, it should.  
Q: [Then,] is there any object for those anusayas [at that particular moment]?  
A: One can’t truly say that.  
So, [you maintain that] anusayas are without objects.
the proposition cannot be proved unless one equally claims that ‘lust’ (rāga) also is without object at such a particular moment. That is why “anusayā anārammanā ti katha” significantly verifies the view ‘anusayas are without objects’ on the basis of a psychological perspective in connection with the category of four mental aggregates expounded in the other Abhidhamma texts.

5.4. The sub-canonical texts treatment

The textual form of sub-canonical texts on the one hand intermediates between the canonical texts and the commentaries, but on the other hand differs from the commentaries in its literary point of view. The sub-canonical texts, for example, deal with the concepts of anusayas in a more unique way. They, in this context, have such words as ‘bhūmi’ and ‘padatthāna’. These words are not used in the commentarial clarifications, but are rather used in a schematic manner, keeping in line with their respective traditions. Such a literary aspect is found equally in both the texts, the Petakopadesa and the Nettippakaraṇa, which refer to anusayas collectively as well as separately. They preserve the corresponding accounts in certain contexts, but reveal independent accounts in most of the cases.

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126 See ibid:
Puthujjano kusalāyākate citta vattamāne "sarāgo ti" vattabbo ti?
Āmantā.
Atthi tassa rāgassa ārammanan ti?
Na h’ evam vattabbhe...pe....
Tena hi rāgo anārammano ti.
Q: should it be said that an ordinary person, while wholesome or indeterminate consciousness is arising in him, is [still] “possessed of lust”?
A: Yes, it should.
Q: [Then], is there any object for that lust [at that particular moment]?
A: One can’t truly say that.
So, [you maintain that] lust is without object.

127 In the Milindapañña, anusaya is referred to in a collective sense in the context of ‘timsagunavara’.
E.g. Mil (Vri) p. 326: samucchinnāanusayo.
(1) *Anusayas as akusalamulāni or thiti*

The *Nettippakarana* explains how a person attempts to produce his will (*chanda*) with an undisturbed mind and not seeking sensual desires. With the passage quoted from the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the *Nettippakarana* explains that a person with an undisturbed mind produces will (*chanda*) for non-arising of the unarisen evil unwholesome *dhammas*, and for the abandoning of the arisen evil unwholesome *dhammas*, and he attempts to produce the unarisen wholesome *dhammas*, etc. In that context, the *Nettippakarana* points out that the unarisen evil unwholesome *dhammas* are *kāmavītakka*, *byāpdāvītakka* and *vīhimsāvītakka*. And as for the ‘arisen evil unwholesome *dhammas*’, it says:

"Katame uppannd pāpakā akusalā dhammā? Anusayā akusalāmūlāni. Ime uppannd pāpakā akusalā dhammā."

What are the arisen evil unwholesome *dhammas*? They are *anusayas* which are unwholesome roots. These are the arisen evil unwholesome *dhammas*.

Here, designating *anusayas* as ‘*akusalamūlāni*’ is not a usual expression, and the term *uppanna* is quite significant in understanding this expression in contrast to those three unwholesome vitakkas which are termed as the ‘unarisen unwholesome *dhammas*’. A similar unusual expression is also observed in interpreting the *Udana* verse: “Yassa papañcā thiti ca n’ atthi, sandhānaṃ palīghaṇ ca vītivatto...” The *Nettippakarana* interprets the above terms as follows:

"Papañcā nāma taṃhā diṭṭhimānā tadabhisamkhātā ca samkhārā. Thiti nāma anusayā ..."

The proliferations are craving, view and conceit, and the formations thereby actively determined by them. The maintenance is *anusaya* ...

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128 As for the ‘unarisen wholesome *dhammas*’, it refers to the faculties belonging to the ‘stream-enterer’ and as for the ‘arisen wholesome *dhammas*’, it refers to the faculties that belong to him who stands for [on the path] (*atthamakassa indriyāni*). See Ntt p. 19. As for the term ‘*atthamakassa indriyāni*’, see Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli’s note in *The Guide*, p. 32, fn. 99/2. Also see Ntt p. 19: Yena kāmavītakkaṃ vāreti, idām satindriyāṃ, yena byāpdāvītakkaṃ vāreti, idām samādhindriyāṃ, yena vīhimsāvītakkaṃ vāreti, idām viriyindriyāṃ.


130 Ibid.

131 Ud p. 77.

132 Ntt p. 37.
As Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli notes, this schematic understanding of anusayas is unusual. As seen in the Nikāyas treatment, anusayas are regarded as the basis for the maintenance of consciousness (viññānassa ṭhiti), but not directly defined as ‘maintenance’ itself. Further discussion on these unusual expressions will follow in the commentaries treatment.

(2) Anusayas as bhūmi or kāraṇa

The Nettippakarana presents the four divisions of kilesabhūmis (the planes of defilement) by which all the defilements are comprised. They are anusayabhūmi, pariyutthānabhūmi, saṃyojanabhūmi and upādānabhūmi. Out of these four planes, anusayabhūmi denotes a beginning point that leads to the arising of the entire mass of suffering:

"Sānusayassā pariyutthānam jāyati, pariyutthito samyujjati, samyujjanto upādiyati,
upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmarana... Evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhaṃ samudayo hoti."

In one who has anusaya, an obsession is born; one who is obsessed is fettered; when he is fettered, he grasps; with grasping as condition, there is existence. With existence as condition, there is birth, with birth as condition there is ageing and death... thus, there is the arising of the entire mass of suffering.

In the Petakopadesa, we also notice that the same idea is expressed in a different way. The text explains that wisdom (paññā) is lost due to the four reasons (kāraṇas), that is anusaya, pariyutthāna, saṃyojana and upādana. Beginning with the ablative case, it shows the same hierarchical process as that of the Nettippakarana. Even if approached in different

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134 Ntt p. 161: Imāhi catūhi kilesabhūmiḥi sabbe kilesā samgaham samosaraṇam gacchanti.
136 Ibid.
ways, the terms bhumi and kāraṇa signify the same idea in the sense of dividing the defilements into four sequential levels with anusayas at the beginning.\(^{138}\)

(3) The pataṭṭhānas of anusayas, and anusayas as pataṭṭhāna or hetu / paccaya

The relation between three vedānās and anusayas has been observed from the four Nikāyas onwards. In the Peṭakopadesa, however, the three feelings are specifically referred to as corresponding proximate causes (pataṭṭhāna) of the three anusayas respectively. Pleasant feeling is the proximate cause of rāgānusaya. Painful feeling is the proximate cause of patighānusaya. Neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is the proximate cause of avijjānusaya.\(^{139}\)

A causal relation between anusaya and pariyuṭṭhāna (obsession) is more specified in the context of pataṭṭhāna. The Peṭakopadesa says that anusaya is the proximate cause of pariyuṭṭhāna.\(^{140}\)

Through hetu (cause) and paccaya (condition), the Peṭakopadesa presents the relation of anusayas with the five dhammas which are known as nīvaraṇas (hindrances). Out of anusayas, patighānusaya is a cause of ill-will (byāpāda). Kāmasaṅgā and ditthānusaya are the causes of the restlessness and remorse (uddhaccakukkucca). Mānānusaya is a condition of doubt (vicikicchā) and vicikicchānusaya is its cause.\(^{141}\)

\(^{138}\) Cf. p. 433 on ‘kileṣa /upakkileṣa-concept’.


(4) Avijjānusaya and taṇhānusaya

In treating pātīccasamuppāda, the Pētakopadesa refers to avijjānusaya as follows:

“Tattha purimikā avijjā avijjānusayo, pacchimikā avijjā avijjāpariyutthānam. Purimiko avijjānusayo pacchimikassa avijjāpariyutthānassa hetubhūto parībhūhanāya bijāntu viya samanantaracetūtāya.”

Herein, the previous ignorance is avijjānusaya (the underlying tendency in the form of ignorance) while the subsequent ignorance is avijjāpariyutthāna (the obsession in the form of ignorance). The previous avijjānusaya is cause of avijjāpariyutthāna in causality-by-immediate-proximity like the seed and the sprout.

While explaining the sentence “taṇhānusaye anūhate, nibbattati dukkhamidam punappunam”, the Nettippakaranā specifically considers avijjā as condition for taṇhānusaya. In this context, the text indicates that taṇhā is ‘bhavatāṇhā’ (craving for existence). It is explained that with ignorance as condition, there is craving for existence.

It further mentions: “That by which one eradicates taṇhānusaya is tranquillity (samatha). Insight (vipassanā) is that by which one shuts off ignorance, that is, the condition for taṇhānusaya.”

(5) The abandoning/eradicating of anusayas

According to the Nettippakaranā, anusayas are abandoned by wisdom (paññā). When anusayas are abandoned, pariyutthānas (obsessions) are also abandoned. For, when anusayas are abandoned, the continuity of obsessions is severed by wisdom.
In the Petakopadesa, it is explained that one who is firm in the categories (khandha) of virtue (sīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (paññā), eradicates dosānusaya, rāgānusya and avijjānusaya respectively.\(^{147}\) Dosānusaya appears to stand for patighānusaya herein.

5.5. The commentaries treatment

In accordance with general characteristics that the commentaries preserve, the concepts of anusayas are elucidated therein. In introducing different views and in clarifying certain points, exegetic value on the present subject is amply available in the commentaries. Above all, the commentaries clarify the concepts of anusayas through the meanings that they apply and on the basis of that they firmly establish the technical realm of the concepts of anusayas for which we may call the Theravāda position.

Being aware of the fact that the commentaries basically interpret the concepts of anusayas according to the contexts, it will be reasonable to trace the general implication of the meaning of the term anusaya in the etymological accounts, and the nature of anusayas on the basis of its etymological interpretation. This is to be followed by the conceptual aspects that are presented in contextual interpretations and the others.

5.5.1. Etymological accounts

One of the most significant contributions of the commentaries to the concepts of anusayas is the exploration of its meaning/s through which the concepts of anusayas are

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\(^{147}\) See Pe pp. 115-116: Tattha yogāvacaro silakkhandhe thito dosam akusalam na upādiyati, dosānusayam samāhanati, dosasallam uddharati, dukkhavedanam parijñāti, kāmadhātu samatikkamati; samādhikhandhe thito lohham akusalam na upādiyati, rāgānusayam samāhanati lobhasallam uddharati, sukhavedanam parijñāti, rūpadhātu samatikkamati; paññākkhandhe thito moha-akusalam na upādiyati, avijjānusayam samāhanati, mohasallam dīthisallan ca uddharati, adukkham-asaṅkhaivedanam parijñāti, arūpadhātu samatikkamati, āti āti khandahe tīni akusalamālāni na upādiyati, cattāri sallāni uddharati, tīso vedanā parijñāti, te dhātuvaṅ samatikkamati.
fundamentally characterized. In etymologising the term *anusaya*, the commentaries specifically apply two meanings to *anusaya* through the terms ‘*appahinatthena/appahinabhāvena*’ and ‘*thāmagataṭṭhena/ thāmagata*’. Some commentaries give its etymology through *thāmagata* (being strengthened) as in “*te eva thāmagataṭṭhena santāne anusenti ’ti anusayā*”. Others present it through *appahīna* (not being abandoned) as in “*appahīna-bhāvena santāne anu-anusenti ’ti anusayā*... ”. Just as the *Vibhaṅga* commentary “…*thāmagataṭṭhena appahinatthena ca anusentīti anusayā*” there are commentaries which give its etymology through both the terms. Considering the fact that two of these three etymological accounts are observed in a single commentary, the etymological interpretation apparently takes place according to the contexts that emphasize *appahīna* or/and *thāmagata*.

Between these two meanings, *appahīna* and *thāmagata* bearing negative and positive values respectively in defining the term *anusaya*, mutual distinction might also be observed in the following case:


In what sense are they called *anusayas* (underlying-tendencies)? In the sense of *anusayana* (underlying). What is the meaning of underlying? The meaning is not being abandoned.

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148 Ps-a I, p. 280: “*anusayas are those which just lie along with continuity in the sense of being strengthened.*” Also see Mnd-a I, p. 102. Cf. Mnd-a I, p. 41: *thāmagataṭṭhena anu anu setī ti anusayo*; Dhs-a p. 254: *thāmagataṭṭhena anusetīti anusayo*, Mnd-a II, p. 429; Ps-a II, p. 440: *ditthi yeva thāmagataṭṭhena anusayo ’ti ditthanusayo*.

149 Thrag-a II, p. 245: “*anusayas are those which lie again and again in continuity by the state of not being abandoned.*” Cf. Sn-a I, p. 23: *Appahinatthena santāne anusenti ’ti anusayā...*; Mnd-a I, p. 236: *Ditthanusayo ti ditthi ca sā appahinatthena anusayo cā ti ditthanusayo*.

150 Vbh-a p. 509: “*anusayas are those which lie along with [continuity] in the sense of being strengthened and not being abandoned.*”

151 See DN-a III, p. 1040. *Appahinatthena anusayanīti anusenti ti. Thāma-gato kāma-rāgogovā kāmarāgānusayo*; Ps-a I, p. 57: *Sattasantāne anusenti anupavattanti ’ti anusayā, thāmagataṭṭhānām kāmarāgādānam etam adhivacanam*; also see Cnd-a p. 55.

152 See the above footnotes for the references of Ps-a and Mnd-a respectively.

153 Ps-a II, p. 399; Also cf. Mnd-a I, 236; Pcp:Yam-a (Vri) p. 318.
Because these [anusayas] lie along with the respective continuity in the sense of not being abandoned, they are, therefore, called anusayas. ‘They lie along with [the continuity]’ means that they arise after having obtained a suitable cause. Then, the argument would arise: the meaning of underlying is a mode of not being abandoned. It is not proper to say that a mode of not being abandoned arises. Therefore, do anusayas not arise? This argument – [an underlying tendency is a mode of not being abandoned... ]– is refuted. Anusaya is not a mode of not being abandoned. However, an underlying tendency (anusaya) is called the defilement which is strengthened (thāmagata) in the sense of not being abandoned.

This passage clarifies two points: (i) the meaning of appahīna is primarily implied to the action noun ‘anusayana’ (underlying) in the mental continuity of living beings,\(^\text{154}\) and by interpreting the verb anuseti as ‘to arise after obtaining a suitable cause’, it verifies that the meaning of ‘anusayana’ is not static as a mode (ākāra) of appahīna. According to the Pañcappakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā, “a mode of not being abandoned is called a mode of dhamma, not dhamma itself; and only dhamma can arise”(appahinākāro nāma dhammākāro, na dhammo, dhammo eva ca uppajjatīti).\(^\text{155}\) (ii) this citation distinguishes the usage of the term thāmagata from that of appahīna. In this regard, the tīkā of the Dīgha-nikāya gives a more specific explanation as follows:

\[\text{“Appahināṭṭhānī maggena asamucchinnabhāvena. Anuseniṭṭi santāne anu anu sayanti. Kāraṇalābhe hi sati uppānārahā kilesā santāne anu anu sayitā viya honti, tasmā te tadavatthā “anusayā”ti vuccanti. Thāmagatoti thāmappatto. Thāmagamanāhīca aṅhehi asādhāraṇo kāmarāgādināmeva āveniko sabhāvo daṭṭhabbo. Tatthā hi vuttam abhidhamme “thāmagatāanusayam pajahati”ti.}^{156}\]

‘In the sense of not being abandoned’: by the state of not being cut off by the Path. ‘They lie along with’: they lie again and again in continuity. Because the defilements that are suitable to arise when cause is obtained become as if they were to lie in continuity again and again; therefore, those defilements are called anusayas (underlying tendencies). ‘Thāmagata’ (being strengthened): thāmappatta (having got the strength). Thāmagamana (strengthening) should be observed as a unique intrinsic nature of kāmarāga, etc., which is distinguished from other dhammas. Therefore, it is said in the Abhidhamma “he abandons anusaya which is strengthened”.

While suggesting that anusayas are ‘potential to arise’ when a suitable cause arises, the tīkā here specifies the term ‘thāmagamana’ as the unique intrinsic nature (āveniko

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\(^\text{154}\) As for ‘santāne’ that anusaya lies along with, there are three types of references in the commentaries:

(i) \"te eva thāmagatathṭhena santāne anusenti ‘ti anusaya’\" <Ps-a 1, p. 280.>
(ii) \"sattasantānam anusenti anusayavattanti ‘ti anusaya,...’ \" <Cnd-a p. 55; Ps-a I, p. 57.>
(iii) \"...thāmagatathṭhena, appahināṭṭhena ca cittasantāne anu anu sayanato anusayā nāma\" <Mhv (Vri) p. 234.>

\(^\text{155}\) Pcp: Yam-mt (Vri) p. 152.

sabhâvo) of kāmarāga, etc., which holds a demarcation to the technical realm of anusayas. It is vividly clarified in the āṭkā of the Majjhima-nikāya as follows:

"Yadi appahīnaṭṭho anusayaṭṭho, nanu sabbepi kilesā appahīnā anusayā bhaveyyunī? Na mayam appahīnatāmattena anusayaṭṭham vadāmā, atha kho pana appahīnaṭṭhena thāmagatā kilesā anusayā. Idam thāmagamanāṅca rāgādīnāmeva āvenīko sabhāvo datṭhabbo,... 157

If the meaning of anusaya is applied as not being abandoned, then, will all the defilements which are not being abandoned not be anusayas? We do not claim that the meaning of anusaya is to be taken merely as the state of not being abandoned, but[,] we maintain that[,] in that case, anusayas are the defilements which are being strengthened in the sense of ‘not being abandoned’. This ‘strengthening’ (thāmagamana) should be observed as a unique intrinsic nature of rāga, etc., only....

According to the above clarifications of the two āṭkās, implying the meaning of thāmagata to anusayas is to distinguish the seven anusayas from other defilements that could be the state of appahīna. The Pañcappakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā, which also specifies the seven anusayas158 with the same idea of the Majjhima-nikāya-āṭkā, declares that thāmagata (being strengthened) means ‘endowed with anusaya’ (anusayasamaṅgi).159 This account clearly indicates that in the etymological accounts of anusaya, the meanings, appahīna and thāmagata, are equally valid to stand as a technical concept.

It is worth mentioning that both the meanings appahīna and thāmagata are already evident in the account of the Mahāmālunkya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya which refers to ‘thāmagata’ and ‘appatīvinīta’ while defining each of the five lower fetters (orambhāgyīni samyojanāni). These terms are also both equally applied to the concept of anusaya in that sutta. In another context, the Majjhima-nikāya commentary interprets the term appatīvinīta as “punappunam āsevitā thāmagatā appatīvinītā anusentī ti”160 (because of repeatedly being enjoyed, that is, being strengthened, not being removed, they lie along with). Therefore, it is certain that both the terms appahīna and appatīvinīta denote the same meaning.

157 MN-ṭ (Vri) II, p. 265.
158 Pcp: Yam-mt (Vri) p. 152.
159 Ibid. p. 153: Thāmagatoti anusayasamaṅgitī attho.
160 MN-a I, p. 182.
In comparison to the account of the Mahāmāluṅkya-sutta, the above etymological accounts of anusaya reveal that those defilements (i.e. kāmarāga, etc.) emerge from kāmarāgānusaya, etc. (i.e. the state of being strengthened, not being abandoned in the mental continuity of living beings). In other words, when those defilements are not uprooted with the help of the noble path due to not knowing an escape from them, they lie again in the mental continuity of living beings ‘as potential to arise’ until a suitable cause arises. That is the state of anusaya in the sense of appahīna/ thāmagata. This point is well illustrated in the following figures.

Figure 5-1: The process of the defilements (kāmarāga, etc.) which arise, and their state which lies along with santāna again in the sense of appahīna/ thāmagata.

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Anusetai (to lie along with santāna)} \\
\text{as ‘potential to arise’ when a suitable cause arises} \\
due to not knowing an escape from the arisen defilements (kāmarāga, etc.)}
\end{array} \]

The state of kāmarāgānusaya, etc. in the sense of appahīna/ thāmagata

Figure 5-2: The state of the defilements (i.e. kāmarāga, etc.) that have arisen from mental continuity.

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Kāmarāga, etc.} \\
(\text{uppajjati}) \\
\text{The process of the arisen defilements(i.e. kāmarāga, etc.) leading to the state of anusaya.}
\end{array} \]
5.5.2. Nature of anusayas

As already seen from the Nikāya period onwards, the nature of anusayas has been constantly referred to as ‘evil unwholesome dhammas’ (pāpakā akusalā dhammā), or imperfections (upakkilesā), etc. In the Kathāvatthu, the fact remains that the sectarian issues of the nature of anusayas appeared even in the canonical period. In the commentaries, however, the nature of anusayas is clearly re-established in support of the canonical aspects.

First, the Paṭisambhidāmagga commentary and others, as already seen above in etymological accounts, define anusaya as ‘defilement that is strengthened in the sense of not being abandoned’. On the basis of this definition, they further specify the nature of anusayas as follows:

"So cittasampayutto, sārammaṇo, sappaccayāṭhena sahetuko, ekantākusalo, atito pi hoti, anāgato pi, paccuppanno pi: tasmā uppaṭṭo 'ti vattum yujjati."¹⁶¹

[Such a] defilement, associated with consciousness, with object, with cause (hetu) in the sense of having a condition (paccaya), absolutely unwholesome, belongs to the past, to the future, and to the present. Therefore, it is proper to say, “it arises”.

¹⁶¹ Ps-a II, p. 399. Also see Mnd-a I, p. 236; Pcp: Yam-a (Vri) p. 319; Mhv (Vri) p. 316.
These commentaries give canonical support (pamāna) for the above citation as follows:

“In the Paṭisambhidāmagga, after having asked the question — does one abandon presently-arisen defilement?, while considering the existence of the present anusaya, it is said that [if he abandons the presently-arisen defilements], “even [with anusaya] being strengthened, he abandons anusaya.” In the Dhammasaṅgāni which defines lobha (delusion) as “avijjānusaya, the obsession of ignorance, the barrier of ignorance, delusion that is the root of the unwholesome — this is delusion at that time”, it is indicated that avijjānusaya arises together with unwholesome consciousness. In the Kathāvatthu of the Abhidhamma, all the views — “anusayas are indeterminate, anusayas are without cause, anusayas are dissociated from consciousness” are refused. In the Yamaka, the following passage occurs in the context of anusaya-yamaka: “in one whose kāmarāgānusaya arises, patighānusaya also arises”.

After mentioning the canonical support as above, these commentaries assert as follows:

“Tasmā ‘anusentī ’ti anurūpam kāraṇam labhitvā uppajjantī ’ti yaṁ vuttaṁ, tāṁ iminā tantippamāṇena yuttan ’ti veditabbaṁ. Yaṁ ’pi, “cittasampayutto sārammaṇo ’ti ādi vuttaṁ, tāṁ pi suvuttaṁ eva; Anusayo hi nām’ esa parinipphanno cittasampayutto akusaladhammo ti niṭṭhāṁ etthā gantabbaṁ.”

Therefore, what is explained as “anusentī” means that they arise after having a suitable cause” is suitable by this support. Thus it should be known.

The sentence beginning with “[anusaya is] associated with citta, together with object” is also correctly said. Herein, it should be concluded that anusaya is predetermined, associated with citta, and is an unwholesome dhamma.

Thus, the nature of anusayas is clearly verified in the commentaries. According to the Majjhima-nikāya-ṭīkā, “those seven anusayas are, in the ultimate sense, to be known as


163 Ibid. Also see Ps-a II, p. 400; Pcp: Yam-a (Vri) p. 319.
defilements which are in the future, the past and the present. They are called thus due to
their own intrinsic nature. Because dhammas do not differ in nature by the division of
time” (Te ca nippariyāyato anāgata kilesā dāṭṭhabbā, atītā paccuppannā ca taṁsabhāvattā
tathā vuccanti. Na hi dhammānaṁ kālabhedena sabhāvabheda atthi).¹⁶⁴

5.5.3. Contextual interpretations in the commentaries

(1) The seven anusayas

With regard to the seven anusayas, there are three major approaches in the commentaries.
The first is the case of the arising of anusayas in connection with akusala cittas dealt with
by the commentaries of the Paṭisambhidāmagga and the Mahānīddesa. The second is the
case elucidated by the Yamaka commentary on the activities of anusayas according to the
‘sources of arising’ (uppattiṭṭhānas) schematically planned in the Yamaka itself. The
common aspect in these two approaches is that these commentaries, in both cases, seek the
realm of the activity of each anusaya through two conditions — sahajāta (co-nascence)
and ārammaṇa (object). The third is that the commentaries of the Paṭisambhidāmagga and
the Vibhaṅga deal with the interrelation of the seven anusayas through the two objects —
the desirable and undesir able objects. In treating the subject matter, this account is
distinguished from the above two cases.

Before discussing the conceptual aspects of the seven anusayas in detail, it is justifiable to
first discuss how the commentaries, in solving the compound, conceptually interpret the
seven anusayas. The commentaries of the Paṭisambhidāmagga and the Yamaka show the
identified account as in “kāmarāgānusayo 'ti ādisu: kāmarāgo ca so appahīṇatṭhena
anusayo cā 'ti kāmarāgānusayo. Sesapadesu 'pi es' eva nayo” (In [the compound]
kāmarāgānusaya, etc., ‘an underlying tendency in the form of lust for sensual pleasure’
means lust for sensual pleasure (kāmarāga) itself is an underlying tendency (anusaya) in

¹⁶⁴ MN-t (Vṛi) 11, pp. 264-265.
the sense of not being abandoned \((apphīna)\). In the remaining terms also, the same method is applied).\(^{165}\)

The \textit{Dīgha-nikāya-ṭikā}, commenting on “\textit{thāma-gato kāma-rāgova kāmarāgānusayo. Ese nayo sabbattha}”.\(^{166}\) introduces a different view on dissolving the compound. According to the \textit{ṭikā},

\begin{quote}

[The compound] \textit{kāmarāgānusaya} is [to be dissolved as] lust for sensual pleasure itself is an underlying tendency. However, if some (teachers) assert “\textit{kāmarāgānusaya} is the underlying tendency of lust for sensual pleasure”, that is just their personal opinion. For there is no such thing called an underlying tendency in the form of lust for sensual pleasure \((kāmarāgānusaya)\) devoid of lust for sensual pleasure \((kāmarāga)\). If someone would understand by adding the phrase ‘its seed’, then, it should be remarked that in real sense, the seed also is not independently possible. In the remaining terms, the same method is applied.

According to these references, the compound should be taken as a \textit{kammadhāraya}, not as a genitive \textit{tappurisa}.\(^{168}\) It also indicates that the seven \textit{anusayas} are nothing but the respective unwholesome \textit{dhammas} themselves in the state of ‘not being abandoned’.

\textbf{(i) The accounts in the commentaries of the \textit{Paṭisambhidāmagga} and the \textit{Mahānīddea}}

Explaining each of the seven \textit{anusayas} in relation to \textit{akusala cittas}, the commentaries of the \textit{Paṭisambhidāmagga} and the \textit{Mahānīddea} bring them into the category of ‘\textit{akusalā cetasikā}’ (unwholesome mental factors) and they also set up the realm of arising of each of

\(^{165}\) Ps-a II, p. 400. Also see Pep: Yam-a (Vri) p. 319.

\(^{166}\) DN-a III, p. 1040: “lust for sensual pleasure which is strengthened is an underlying tendency in the form of lust for sensual pleasure. This method is applied to others as well.” Cf. Ps-a I, p. 118: \textit{Thāmagato kāmarāgākāmarāgānusayo. Evam sesesu ‘pi.}

\(^{167}\) DN-t (Vri) III, p. 232.

\(^{168}\) For the arguments on dissolving the compound, see G. P. Malalasekera, EB, p. 776.
the seven *anusayas* through dual conditions, *sahajāta* (co-nascence) and árammaṇa (object). According to both the commentaries,\(^{169}\)

1. *Kāmarāgānasaya* is *lobha* (greed) which arises by means of co-nascence and object in the types of consciousness accompanied by greed, and which arises by means of object only in the remaining favourable *dhammas* belonging to sense-sphere (*kāmāvacara*).

2. *Patiṅghānasaya* is *dosa* (hatred) which arises by means of co-nascence and object in the types of consciousness accompanied by displeasure (*domanassa*), and which arises by means of object only in the remaining unfavorable *dhammas* belonging to sense-sphere.

3. *Mānānasaya* is *māna* (conceit) which arises by means of co-nascence and object in the types of consciousness accompanied by greed, dissociated from wrong view, and which arises by means of object only in the remaining sense-sphere *dhammas* except the *dhammas* accompanied by painful feeling, and in the *dhammas* belonging to the fine-material and immaterial sphere (*rūpā�rūpāvacara*).

4. *Dīthānasaya* is *dīthi* (wrong view) which arises in the four types of consciousness associated with wrong view.

5. *Vicikicchānasaya* is *vicikicchā* (doubt) which arises in consciousness accompanied by doubt.

6. *Avijjānasaya\(^{170}\)* is *moha* (delusion) which arises by means of co-nascence and object in the twelve types of unwholesome consciousness.

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\(^{169}\) Both the commentaries show the same account on the six *anusayas* except 'bhavarāgānasaya' to which both the commentaries show the opposite account:

Ps-a II, p. 400: *Kāmarāgānasayo c’ ethha lobhasahagacittesu sahajātavasena, árammanavasena ca, manāpesu avasesa-kāmāvacaradhammesu árammanavasen’ eva uppañjamāno lobho.

*Patiṅghānasayo ca domanassasahagacittesu sahajātavasena, árammanavasena ca amanāpesu avasesa- kāmāvacaradhammesu árammanavasen’ eva uppañjamāno doso.

*Mānānasayo diṭṭhagatavippayutta-lobhasahagacittesu sahajātavasena, árammanavasena ca, dukkhaivedaṇavajjesu avasesakāmāvacaradhammesu, rūpā�rūpāvacaradhammesu ca, árammanavasen’ eva uppañjamāno māno. Dīthānasayo catisu diṭṭhagasampayuttasu; vicikicchānasayo vicikicchāsahagate; avijjānasayo dvādasasu akuśalacittesu sahajātavasena, árammanavasena ca; tayo ‘pi avasesa- tebhāmakadhammesu árammanavasen’ eva uppañjamānā diṭṭhi-vicikicchā-mohā.

Also see Mnd-a I, pp. 237-238.

\(^{170}\) 'Avijjānasaya' is referred to as the seventh in the sequence of the seven *anusayas*. Herein, changing the sequence appears due to the method of explanation.
Likewise, the three dhammas (i.e. wrong view, doubt and delusion) arise by means of object only in the remaining dhammas belonging to the three spheres (tebhūmakadhammā).

(7) Bhavarāgānusaya is lobha (greed) which arises only by means of co-nascence in four types of consciousness dissociated from wrong view, but which arises by means of object only in the dhammas belonging to the fine-material and immaterial spheres.

Out of the fourteen types of unwholesome mental factors (akusalā cetasikā), the seven anusayas are referred to as the six types of akusala cetasikas. As the realms of the arising of the seven anusayas, twelve types of unwholesome consciousness (akusala cittas) are served by means of co-nascence and all the dhammas belonging to the three spheres except the supramundane dhammas are bound by means of object. The ranges of the arising of the seven anusayas are illustrated in the following table (5-3).

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As for ‘bhavarāgānusaya, the Patisambhidāmagga commentary shows as follows: Bhavarāgānusayo catusu ditthigatavippayuttesa uppajjamāno 'pi sahajātavasena na vutto. Arammanavasen' eva pana riś-rūpārūpavacaradhāmmesa uppajjamāno lobho vutto. < Ps-a II, p. 400>
The Mahāniddesa commentary reads as follows: "Bhavarāgānusayo catusu ditthivippayuttesu uppajjamāno pi sahajātavasena vutto. Arammanavasen' eva pana riś-rūpārūpavacaradhāmmesu uppajjamāno lobho vutto" < Mnd-a I, pp. 237-238>. Vri. edition also shows the same accounts as those of PTS edition in both the commentaries.

Here, I have followed the account of the Mahāniddesa commentary because the Yamaka commentary, as being quoted below, presents the same idea as that of the Mahāniddesa commentary.
Table 5-3: The ranges of the arising of the seven *anusayas* by means of *sahajāta* and ārammana in the commentaries of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* and the *Mahāniddesa*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anusayas</th>
<th>Cetasikas</th>
<th>Sahajātavasena and Ārammanavasena</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Kāmarāgā | Lobha     | (i) *sahajātavasena* and Ārammanavasena: in the eight types of unwholesome citta (1-8)  
(ii) Ārammanavasena: in the remaining favourable dhammas in kāmāvacara |
| Paṭīgha  | Dosa      | (i) *sahajātavasena* and Ārammanavasena: in the two types of unwholesome citta (9-10)  
(ii) Ārammanavasena: in the remaining unfavourable dhammas in kāmāvacara |
| Māna     | māna      | (i) *sahajātavasena* and Ārammanavasena: in the four types of unwholesome citta (3-4 and 7-8)  
(ii) Ārammanavasena: in the remaining sense-sphere dhammas except dhammas accompanied by painful feeling, and in dhammas belonging to rūpadhāvavacara |
| Diṭṭhi   | diṭṭhi    | (i) *sahajātavasena* and Ārammanavasena: in the four types of unwholesome citta (1-2 and 5-6)  
(ii) Ārammanavasena: in the remaining dhammas belonging to the three planes (tebhūmakadhamma) |
| Vicikicchā | Vicikicchā | (i) *sahajātavasena* and Ārammanavasena: in an unwholesome citta (11)  
(ii) Ārammanavasena: in the remaining dhammas belonging to the three planes (tebhūmakadhamma) |
| Bhavarāgā | Lobha     | (i) *sahajātavasena* in the four types of unwholesome citta (3-4 and 7-8)  
(ii) Ārammanavasena: in dhammas belonging to rūpadhāvavacara |
| Avijjā    | Moha      | (i) *sahajātavasena* and Ārammanavasena: in the twelve types of unwholesome citta (1-12)  
(ii) Ārammanavasena: in the remaining dhammas belonging to the three planes (tebhūmakadhamma) |

(ii) The account in the *Yamaka* commentary

On the basis of the ‘source of arising’ (*uppatitiṭṭhāna*) of each of the seven *anusayas* schematically prescribed in the *Yamaka*, the commentary comprehensively treats the ranges of the activities of the seven *anusayas* through the two modes, *sahajāta* and ārammana.
(1) Kāmarāgānusaya

First, the commentary explains that kāmarāgānusaya lies along with the two feelings, the pleasant feeling and the indifferent feeling, in the plane of sense-sphere.\(^{172}\) It further says:

“So panesa akusalavedanāsu sahajātavasena ārammanavasena cāti dvihākārehi anuseti. Akusalāyā sukhhāya vedanāya caeva upekkhāya vedanāya ca sahajātopi hutvā uppajjati. Tā vedanā ārammaṇaṃ katvāpi uppaṭṭhātī atthe. Avasesā pana kāmāvacaraka uppaṭṭhātī atthe sahajātopi katvā uppaṭṭhātī.”\(^{173}\)

This kāmarāgānusaya lies along with unwholesome feelings through the two modes, that is, by means of co-nascence and by means of object. The meaning is thus: it arises after being co-nascent with unwholesome pleasant feeling and indifferent feeling as well. It also arises after taking these two feelings as object. However, it arises after taking as object only the remaining feelings, that is, wholesome feeling, resultant feeling and functional feeling belonging to the sense-sphere.

The commentary mentions the reason as to why the Yamaka treats the activity of kāmarāgānusaya in relation to the two vedanās:

“While kāmarāgānusaya is being active in two feelings belonging to the sense-sphere, it also lies along with perception (saññā), formations (saṅkhāras) and consciousness (viññāna) which are associated with these two feelings. Because it is not possible that while kāmarāgānusaya is being active in two feelings, it is not co-nascent with perception, etc. associated with those feelings, or it arises without taking as an object the perception, etc. associated with those feelings. Even if they are possible, still, these two feelings that have the state of pleasant and peaceful happiness in the sense of satisfaction are only prominent for the arising of kāmarāgānusaya among the other dhāmas associated [with these feelings]. Therefore, it is said, “herein, kāmarāgānusaya lies along with two feelings” because the prominent (olārika) items are quite coherent. When this kāmarāgānusaya is being active by means of object, it lies along with not only these two feelings and the dhāmas associated with feelings but also the desirable material form, etc.

In the Vibhaṅga, the following passage occurs: whatever there is material form which is

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\(^{172}\) Pcp: Yam-a (Vri) p. 319: Tattha kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsūtī kāmāvacarabhūmiyaṃ sukhhāya ca uppekkhāya cāti dvīsu vedanāsu.

\(^{173}\) Ibid. pp. 319-320.
desirable and agreeable in the world, *kāmarāgānusaya* lies therein." In this text (*Yamaka*), the following passage also occurs in the reverse-order in the *anusaya* chapter: "where *kāmarāgānusaya* does not lie, does *diṭṭhānusaya* not lie therein? In painful feeling belonging to the fine-material and immaterial-spheres, *kāmarāgānusaya* does not lie, but *diṭṭhānusaya* lies therein. In the *dhammas* which are not included [in the individuality group], neither *kāmarāgānusaya* nor *diṭṭhānusaya* lies therein." In this context, *kāmarāgānusaya* neither lies in painful feeling nor in the fine-material sphere, etc. [With reference to that statement], it is said that *kāmarāgānusaya* lies along with the remaining *dhammas* such as material form, sound, smell, taste and touch except for the painful feeling together with the associated dhammas, the *dhammas* having the scope in the fine-material and immaterial spheres, and the nine supramundane-*dhammas*. Why is it not explained here in the *Yamaka*? Because, it is not prominent to be explained. The feelings are prominent in the aforementioned method. But because these are not prominent, it is not told that *kāmarāgānusaya* lies along with those material forms, etc, but it is included without specific mention. Therefore, it should be known that *kāmarāgānusaya* also equally lies along with those [material forms, etc.].

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Nama cesa ārammaṇavasena anusayamāno na kevalaṁ imaṁ dviṣu vedanāsu ceva vedanāsampayuttadhhammesu ca anuseti, iṭṭhesu pana rūpādissupi anusetiyeva. Vuttaṁpi cetam vibhāṅgappakaranena "yam loke piyārūpom sātariṃ paricāryam, ettha satāṇāṁ kāmarāgānusayo anuseti" ti imasminpi pakaranena anusayavārassā paṭṭilomanaye vuttaṁ. Yattha kāmarāgānusayo nānuseti tattha diṭṭhānusayo nānuseti dukkhaṁ vihārāya vedanāya rūpādagottuṇāya eya kāmarāgānusayo nānuseti, no ca tattha diṭṭhānusayo nānuseti. Apariyāpapne ettha kāmarāgānusayo ca nānuseti, diṭṭhānusayo ca nānuseti" ti.

Ettha hi dukkhavedanāya ceva rūpādissu-ādissu ca nānusetiṁ vuttatā samuppayuttaṁ dukkhavedanāṁ sa-okaṁ rūpārippaṭṭaparadhamme nava ca, lokuttaradhamme ṣṭhitāva vavasesasu rūpasaddagandharasaphoṭṭhābhesu anusetitī vuttaṁ hoti.

Tam idha kasmaṁ na vuttiṁ? Anolārikatā. Hetthā vuttaṁvayaṁ hi vedanānaṁveva olārikatā imesam pana anolārikatā te etuṁ rūpādissu anusetitī na vuttaṁ, aththo pana labbhati. Tasmā etesupi kāmarāgānusayo anusetiyevāti veditabbo.
The commentary here crystallises the fact that the activity of kāmarāgāṇusaya is related to the other dhammas associated with two feelings as well as with the desirable objects such as the material form, sound, etc. However, in the Yamaka, it is explained through the prominent aspect (olārikattā) for the arising of kāmarāgāṇusaya.

(2) Patighānusaya

While commenting on “dukkhāya vedanāya”, the commentary states:

“Patighānusayassa pana “dukkhāya vedanāyā” ti vacanato dve domanassavedanā kāyaviññānasampayuttā dukkhaveidanāti tisso vedanā anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ. So panesa domanassavedanāsu sahajātavasena ārammanavasena cātī dvīhākārehi anuseti. Avasesadukkhaveidanāya pana ārammanavaseneva anuseti.”\(^{175}\)

However, with reference to “[it lies] in painful feeling”, the source of underlying of patighānusaya is ascribed to three feelings, two displeasure-feelings and painful feeling associated with body-consciousness. However, patighānusaya lies along with two displeasure-feelings through two modes, that is, by means of co-nascence and by means of object. However, along with the remaining painful feeling, it lies only by means of object.

Further, the commentary points out the reason as to why the Yamaka deals with ‘painful feeling’ for the activity of patighānusaya:

“Tāsu vedanāsu anusayamāno cesa tāhi sampayuttē su saññākkhandhādīśupi anusetiyeva. Yāya hi vedanāya esa sahajāto, tamsampayuttehi saññādīhipi sahajātovata. Yā ca vedanā ārammanam karoti, tāhi sampayutte saññādāyopi karotiṣyeva. Evaṃ saṇṭepi pana yasmā dukkhavedanāvā asātadukkhaveyayitattā nirassādāṭṭhena patighānusayassa uppattiṣyā sesasampayuttadhhammesu adhipikā; tasmā “dukkhāya vedanāyā ettha patighānusayo anuseti” ti vuttam, olārikavasena hi bodhaneyye sukham bodhetunti.”\(^{176}\)

While patighānusaya is being active in those feelings, it also lies along with the aggregates of perception, etc. which are associated with those feelings. When patighānusaya is co-nascent with a [particular] feeling, it is also co-nascent with the aggregates of perception, etc. associated with that feeling. When it takes a [particular] feeling as object, it also takes perception, etc. associated with that feeling as object.

Even if this anusaya takes as object the aggregates of perception, etc, still, painful feeling only is, in the sense of dissatisfaction, prominent for the origin of patighānusaya among the remaining associated dhammas because painful feeling has got displeasing and miserable sensation. Therefore, it is said, “in painful feeling, patighānusaya lies therein” because the prominent items are quite coherent.

\(^{175}\) Ibid. p. 321.

\(^{176}\) Ibid.
Citing the account of the Vibhaṅga, the commentary clarifies that *patighāṇusaya* lies along with not only painful feeling (*dukkhavedanā*) and the *dhammas* associated with that feeling, but also the undesirable material form (*aniṭṭhārūpa*), etc. when it is being active by means of object. In this context, it is said that *patighāṇusaya* lies along with neither of two feelings (i.e. pleasant and indifferent feelings) belonging to the sense-sphere nor [the *dhammas*] in the fine material sphere, etc. Except for these two feelings together with their associated *dhammas*, the *dhammas* having the scope in the fine-material and immaterial spheres, and the nine supramundane-*dhammas*, *patighāṇusaya* lies along with the remaining *dhammas* like material form, etc. Although it is not mentioned specifically that *patighāṇusaya* lies along with the material form, etc. even in the *Yamaka* because of its non-prominence, it should be known that *patighāṇusaya* also equally lies along with those (i.e. material form, etc.).

(3) *Māṇānusaya*

As for the ‘source of underlying’ of *māṇānusaya*, the commentary comments as follows:


With reference to “[it lies] in two feelings in the sense-sphere”, etc., the source of underlying of *māṇānusaya* is three-fold, that is, two feelings in the sense-sphere, and the fine-material and immaterial realms. In unwholesome feelings, the underlying of *māṇānusaya* in relation to co-nascence should be understood just as per the case of *kāmarāgānusaya* (i.e. it lies co-nascent with unwholesome pleasant feeling and indifferent feeling). However, among its associated *dhammas*, it lies, by means of object, along with the pleasant and neither-painful-nor-pleasant

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177 Ibid: Nanu cesa ārammaṇavasena anusayamāno na kevalam dukkhavedanāya ceva taṃsampayuttadhammesu ca anuseti, anīṭhāsu pana rūpādiṣu anuseteyeva? Vuttampi cetanā vibhagappakaranā “yam loke appiyarūpam asātarūpam, etha sattānam patighāṇusayo anuseti” ti...


179 Ibid. p. 322.
feelings in all the sense-spheres, and lies along with [the dhammas] in the fine-material and immaterial realms.

Along with Yamaka’s account, the commentary herein concludes that mānānusaya only lies (by means of object) along with the remaining fine material and immaterial dhammas except for painful feeling and the nine fold supramundane-dhammas.  

(4) Diṭṭhānusaya and (5) Vicīkicchānusaya

The commentary states “diṭṭhānusaya and vicīkicchānusaya do not lie along with supramundane-dhammas. But they arise in all the dhammas belonging to the three planes (tebhūmakā). Therefore, it is said: in all the dhammas included in the individuality, therein diṭṭhānusaya lies, so too is vicīkicchānusaya.”

While interpreting “sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesu” as ‘in all the dhammas included in the personality in the sense of being attached to the circle of transmigration (samsāravatta),’ the commentary points out the ‘source of underlying’ of diṭṭhānusaya and vicīkicchānusaya as follows:

“Tattha panete pānca cittuppādesu sahaṭṭānusayanavanavasena anusenti. Te vā pana pānca cittuppāde aññā vā tebhūmakadhamme ārabba pavattikāle ārammanānusayanavanavasena anusentitī. Evaṃ diṭṭhānusayavicīkicchānusayānām anusayanāṭṭhānām veditabbaṃ.”

In all those dhammas (tattha), these two anusayas lie by means of underlying through co-nascence in the arising of the five types of consciousness; or they lie by means of underlying through object at the time when they are active depending on the arising of the five types of consciousness or depending on other dhammas belonging to the three planes. Thus, the source of underlying of diṭṭhānusaya and vicīkicchānusaya should be known.


182 Ibid: Tattha sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesūti samsāravaṭṭanissatṭhena sakkāyapariyāpannesu sabbaddhammesūti attho.

183 Ibid.
(6) Bhavarāgāṇusaya

According to the commentary, because bhavarāgāṇusaya arises in four types of consciousness dissociated from wrong view, it would be said that bhavarāgāṇusaya “lies along with two feelings belonging to the realm of sense-sphere” by means of underlying through co-nascence. However, even while bhavarāgāṇusaya arises together with two feelings in the realm of sense-sphere, it obtains dhamma belonging to the fine-material and immaterial spheres only. It does not take any dhamma included in the realm of sense-sphere as an object. Therefore, it is said, “bhavarāgāṇusaya lies in the fine-material and immaterial realms” after formulating its limitation by means of underlying through object (ārammanāṇusayana). On the other hand, lust is twofold: lust for sensual pleasure (kāmarāga) and lust for existence (bhavarāga). Herein, it is said that kāmarāga lies along with two feelings belonging to the realm of sense-sphere. If bhavarāga also would be described like kāmarāga, then the preaching of kāmarāga would be as if it were perplexed. After dividing the defilement of ‘lust’ into two, the preaching is made thus in order to differentiate bhavarāga from kāmarāga.\(^\text{184}\)

(7) Avijjānusaya

Avijjānusaya arises in all the dhammas belonging to the three planes. Therefore, it is said, “avijjānusaya lies along with all the dhammas included in individuality”. In this context, it should be known that avijjānusaya arises by means of underlying through co-nascence in the arising of twelve types of consciousness. It takes any of the dhammas belonging to the

\(^{184}\) Ibid. p. 323: Bhavarāgāṇusayo pana kiñcāpi ditthivippayuttesu catūsu cittesu uppajjanato sahajāṭānusayananvasena “kāmadhātuva dvīṣu vedanāsu anuseti”'ti vattabbo bhaveyya.

Kāmadhātuva pana saviyapannam ekadhammampi ārammanam na karoti, tasmā ārammanāṇusayananvasena niyamam karvā “rūpadhātuva arūpadhātuva ettha bhavarāgāṇusayo anuseti”'ti vutta. Apica rāgo nāmesa kāmarāgabhavarāgavasena dvīdho. Tathā kāmarāgo kāmadhātuva dvīṣu vedanāsu anusetītī vutto. Sace pana bhavarāgopī kāmarāgo viya evaṃ vucceyya, kāmarāgena saddhiṃ desanā samkīnna viya bhaveyyati rāgakilesam dvīdha bhindivā kāmarāgato bhavarāgassa vīsesadassanaithampi evaṃ desanā katāti.
three planes as object. 

Table (5-4) illustrates the interpretation of the *Yamaka* commentary on the ‘sources of underlying’ of the seven *anusayas*.

Table 5-4: The ‘sources of underlying’ of the seven *anusayas* in the *Yamaka* commentary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anusayas</th>
<th>Anusayanaṭṭhānas</th>
<th>Arammanaṇavasena</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kāmarāga</td>
<td>akusalā sukhavedanā &amp; upekkhāvedanā</td>
<td>(i) akusalā sukhavedanā &amp; upekkhāvedanā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) vedaṇās (kusala-vipāka-kirīya) belonging to kāmavacara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) the remaining dhammas such as rūpa, sadda, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patīgha</td>
<td>dve domanassavedanā</td>
<td>(i) dve domanassavedanā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) kāyavinhīnasampayuttā dukkhavedanā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) the remaining dhammas such as rūpa, sadda, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māna</td>
<td>akusalā sukhavedanā &amp; upekkhāvedanā</td>
<td>(i) sukha-adukkhasasukha-vedanā belonging to kāmavacara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) the remaining dhammas belonging to rūpaṇipadhātus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diṭṭhi</td>
<td>dhammas belonging to the three planes.</td>
<td>(i) in the arising of five types of consciousness (1-2, 5-6 and 11)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(tebhūmakadhammā)</td>
<td>(ii) other dhammas belonging to the three planes (tebhūmakadhammā)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicikicchā</td>
<td>dhammas belonging to the three planes.</td>
<td>(i) in the arising of five types of consciousness (1-2, 5-6 and 11)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(tebhūmakadhammā)</td>
<td>(ii) other dhammas belonging to the three planes (tebhūmakadhammā)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhavarāga</td>
<td>akusalā sukhavedanā &amp; upekkhāvedanā</td>
<td>(i) dhammas belonging to rūpadhātu &amp; arūpadhātu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>belonging to kāmadhatu in the arising of four types of akusalacittas (3-4 and 7-8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avivijā</td>
<td>dhammas belonging to the three planes.</td>
<td>(i) dhammas belonging to the three planes. (tebhūmakadhammā)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(tebhūmakadhammā)</td>
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</tbody>
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* Except the painful feeling (dukkhavedanā) together with its associated dhammas, the dhammas having the scope in rūpārūpavacara, and the nine lokuttaradhammas

** Except the two feelings together with their associated dhammas, the dhammas having the scope in rūpārūpavacara, and the nine lokuttaradhammas

*** Except the painful feeling (dukkhavedanā) and the nine lokuttaradhammas

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\[^{185}\text{Ibid.}: Avijjānusayo pana sabbesupi tebhūmakadhammessu anuseti. Tena vuttam} \]
"sabbasakāyapariyāpannesu dhammesu ettha avijjānusayo anuseti" ti. Tassa dvādasasu cittappādesu sahajātāmāsanatā vedittabbā. Arammanakaranavasena pana na kiṭci tebhūmakadhammaṁ ārabhba na pavattatiti. Evam avijjānusayassā anusayanaṭṭhānam vedittabbam. \[^{185}\text{Ibid.}: Avijjānusayo pana sabbesupi tebhūmakadhammessu anuseti. Tena vuttam} \]
(iii) The accounts in the commentaries of the *Patisambhidamagga* and the *Vibhaṅga*

In the commentaries of the *Parisambhidamagga* and the *Vibhaṅga*, the ‘sources of underlying’ (*anusayanaṭṭhāna*) of the seven *anusayas* are more clearly elaborated in relation to the desirable and undesirable objects. The *Vibhaṅga* commentary explains them as follows:187


‘Rāgāṇusaya of living beings lies therein’: rāgāṇusaya of living beings lies in this desirable object in the sense of not being abandoned. Just as one who has plunged into the water has the water below and above and everywhere around him, similarly, in a desirable object, the arising of lust is completely habitual for living beings. So too is the arising of aversion in an undesirable object. ‘So, in these two dhammas’: thus in these desirable and undesirable objects which are possessed of lust for sensual pleasure and aversion [respectively]. ‘Ignorance falls after’: after being associated with lust for sensual pleasure and aversion, ignorance approaches [these two dhammas] by means of making an object. ‘Coefficient with that’: coefficient by means of being associated with that ignorance. ‘Conceit, wrong view and doubt’: nine-fold conceits, sixty-two-fold wrong views and the eight-based doubts. However, it should be comprehended that bhavarāgāṇusaya here is included in kāmarāgāṇusaya.194

In treating the subject matter, this account is also distinguished from the above-mentioned account of the *Yamaka* commentary. In particular, correlation between avijjā and the other *anusayas* is more clearly elaborated in the commentarial interpretation. The *Vibhaṅga-mūlaṭīkā* clarifies that in this context, *anusayas* lie along with the desirable object by way  

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186 See Ps-a II, p. 400.
187 The *Patisambhidamagga* commentary shows a minor difference from the citation of the *Vibhaṅga* commentary, which is referred to in the following five notes.
188 The *Patisambhidamagga* commentary refers to ‘kāmarāgāṇusaya’.
189 In the *Patisambhidamagga* commentary, this sentence is preceded by “Piyāram pūram sātarūpan ‘ti ca idha kāmavacaradhammo yeva adhippeto’.”
190 Ps-a II, p. 401: evam mesu dvīsu iṭṭhāniṭṭhārammanadhammesu.
191 Ibid: sahaje kaṭṭhavasena ekato thiito.
192 Followed by “tadekaṭṭho māno ca, tadekaṭṭhā diṭṭhi ca, tadekaṭṭhā vicikicchā ca, ‘ti yojanā’.”
193 Vbh-a p. 460. See also Ps-a II, p. 401.
of ‘underlying through object’ among [the two methods], namely, ‘underlying in continuity’ and ‘underlying through object’ (ārammanasantānānusayanesu ıṭṭhārammane ārammaṇa-anusayanena anuseti). And its anuṭikā further evaluates: “among two types of underlying, that is, ārammanānusayana and santānānusayana, just as lust (rāga) which is not uprooted by the path and which is capable of arising when a cause arises lies along with continuity in the sense of being strengthened, similarly, its ‘underlying through object’ should be understood with regard to the desirable object too”.

As for including bhavarāgānusaya into kāmarāgānusaya, the mūlaṭikā explains, “because bhava (existence) also has the state of vatthukāma (sensual pleasure as base), it is common to any lust (rāga).” Its anuṭikā further states as follows:

“Sabbe pi tebhūmakā dhammā kāmāniyyāthena kāmā’’ti-ādi pālivasena bhavarāgassāpi vatthukāmatā veditabbā.”

All the dhammas belonging to the three planes are called sensual pleasure in the sense of being attractive”, etc. – by this authority of Vibhanga, it should be known that lust for existence also has the nature of sensual pleasure as base.

(2) The accounts on ‘sānusaya’ in the commentaries

In the commentaries, the observation is of the three instances that ‘sānusaya’ is contextually clarified. The Majjhima-nikāya commentary treats with, as already seen in the Mahāmālunkya-sutta, ‘sānusaya’ in the context of orambhāgiyāni samyojanāni. The commentaries of the Yamaka and the Kathāvatthu refer to it at a particular moment when a particular person possesses anusaya. Although those accounts are evaluated entirely on the contextual bases, they more precisely enhance the understanding of the concepts of anusayas.

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195 Vbh-mt (Vri) p. 215.
196 Vbh-at (Vri) p. 212: Arammanānusayanam, santānānusayanantī dvīsu anusayanesu. Yathā hi maggena asamucchinno rāgo kāraṇalābhe uppañjanārāhoh thāmagataṭṭhena santāne anusetīti vuccati, evam ıṭṭhārammanepi tassa ārammaṇānusayanam daṭṭhabbām.
197 Vbh-mt (Vri) p. 215: Bhavassapi vatthukāmatā rāgavasena va samānattā.
198 Vbh-at (Vri) p. 212.
(i) The account in the Majjhima-nikāya commentary

Commenting on “anusetī ti appahinatāya anusetī anusayamāno saṃyojanam nāma hoti” (‘it lies along with’ means it lies along with [continuity] by the state of not being abandoned; [that which is] underlying is called ‘fetter’), the commentary gives the reason as to why the Blessed One criticises the elder Māluṅkāputta. The elder holds the view that “a person is fettered by the defilements only at the moment when they assail him while at other times he is not fettered by them” (samudācārakkhane yeva kilesehi saṃyutto nāma hoti. Itarasmīṁ khane asamyutto ti ten’ assa bhagavatā doso āropito). This statement clarifies that an infant simile in that sutta is alluded to the Elder by the Blessed One in order to criticise such a view. As already pointed out in the Nikāyas treatment, certain defilements in the form of anusaya are characterized by the terms ‘thāmagata’ and ‘appatīvinīta’ in the definition of each of the five lower fetters. Different views arise in relation to the statement of the Mahāmāluṅkya-sutta “tassa sā sakkāyaṭṭhi sānusaya pahiyyati” (his personality view which is [arisen] is abandoned together with anusaya). The commentary introduces the heretics’ view on this ‘sānusaya pahiyyati’ as follows:


With reference to “one abandons [the personality view] together with anusaya”, some say that “saṃyojana is one thing and anusaya is another”. Just as when it is said “the rice together with curry”, the curry is different from the rice; similarly, with reference to “together with anusaya”, they believe that anusaya must be different from the personality view in the form of obsession. These views should be refuted by the expression “after having covered himself together with the head”, etc. because a man is not different from his head. Then, someone argues, “if saṃyojana and anusaya are the same thing, then, the simile of infant which is, as a critic, given to the elder by the Blessed One is meaningless.” It is not meaningless; how? Because it is explained in detail from the word: thus is a wrong belief. Therefore, a particular defilement is called ‘saṃyojana’ in the sense of binding, and it is ‘anusaya’ in the sense of not being

^199 MN-a III, p. 144.
^200 Ibid.
^201 Ibid, pp. 144-145.
abandoned. It should be understood that, with regard to this meaning, the Blessed One uttered the sentence, “one abandons [the personality view] together with anusaya”.

What the Majjhima-nikāya commentary clarifies is that in understanding “sānusayā pahiyati”, saṁyojana and anusaya shouldn’t be considered as two different things. However, the commentary distinguishes between these two concepts through two different meanings, bandhana and appahīna, that it applies to the same defilements respectively.

Considering the fact that, the meaning of appahīna is evidently referred to in the definition of the five lower fetters in the Mahāmālunīkya-sutta, and even if the commentary distinguishes anusaya from saṁyojana through a different meaning, it is certain that the range of activity of saṁyojana includes the state of anusaya in the Mahāmālunīkya-sutta. This point is more explicit in the Majjhima-nikāya-ṭīkā which comments on “anusayamāṇo saṁyojanaṁ nāma hoti” as follows:

“Anusayamāṇo saṁyojanaṁ nāma hotīti anusayattam pharitvā pavattamāṇo pāpadhammo yathāvuttenatthena saṁyojanaṁ nāma hotī. Etena yādi pana anusayato saṁyojanaṁ pavattam, tathāpi ye te kāmarāgādayo “anusayā” ti vuccanti, teyeva bandhanaṁ yathāsaṁyojanaṁ iti dasseti.”

‘[That which is] underlying is called fetter’: after having pervaded the state of anusaya (underlying), the evil dhamma which is being active is called fetter in the sense as explained above (i.e. binding up the suffering with kamma and the circle of rebirth). However, by this phrase, the commentator shows the following: even if saṁyojana is active through anusaya (underlying), still, those which are lust for sensual pleasure, etc. are called ‘underlying tendencies’; they (anusayas) only are saṁyojanas in the sense of binding.

According to this ṭīkā, the scope of activity of saṁyojana includes the state of anusaya, but is distinguished from anusaya through the term pavattamāṇa (being active). In understanding the phrase ‘sānusayā pahiyati’, the context in the Mahāmālunīkya-sutta proves to be crucially significant. As already seen in the Nikāyas treatment, the context reads “...ariyasāvako ...uppannāya ca sakkāyadīṭṭhiyā nissaranāṁ yathābhūtam pajānāti; tassa sā sakkāyadīṭṭhi”. Herein, the ‘sā sakkāyadīṭṭhi’ denotes, as pointed out earlier, the arisen personality view which does not reach the state of thāmagata/ appahīna because a
noble one understands an escape from the arisen personality view. It also signifies that the arisen personality view herein does not include the state of anusaya. Therefore, 'sānusayā pahīyati' indicates that when the arisen personality view is abandoned, the ‘personality view in the state of anusaya’ is also simultaneously abandoned through the understanding of its escape. In comparison to the etymological accounts of anusaya which have been discussed above, the clause ‘sānusayā pahīyati’ as appeared in the Mahāmāluṅkya-sutta is illustrated in the following figures (5-4 and 5-5).

Figure 5-4: The range of the activity of samyojanas and the state of anusayas as depicted in the commentary of the Mahāmāluṅkya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya.
Figure 5-5: The range of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, etc. and "...sānusayā pahiyati"

*Sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, etc. which are arisen in the mind

(a) The state of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, etc. in the sense of *appahīna*/*thāmaga*

(ii) The account of the *Yamaka* commentary
While commenting on "yo kāmarāgānusayena sānusayo", the commentary interprets ‘sānusaya’ through the figurative expression as follows:

"Yathā ekantarikajādirogena ābādhiko yāva tamhā rogā na muccati, tāva tassa rogassa anuppattiṅkhaṇṇi sarogyeva nāma hoti. Evaṃ sasāṃkileśa vaṭṭagāmisattassa yāva ariyamaggena anusayā samugghātā na gacchanti, tāva tesam anusayānām anuppattiṅkhaṇṇi sānusayoveva nāma hoti."\(^{204}\)
Just as someone is suffering from an occasional sickness such as ageing, etc.; as long as he has not recovered from that sickness, he is referred to as a sick person even at the moment when that sickness is not arising in him. Similarly, a living being who is going round the circle of rebirth is possessed of defilements as long as his anusayas are not uprooted by the noble path, and is still considered as one ‘possessing anusaya’ even at the moment when those anusayas are not arising in him.

As per this citation, the *Yamaka* commentary interprets ‘sānusaya’ on the basis of the state of ‘not being abandoned’. It is also noteworthy here that the state of ‘possessing defilements’ (sasāṃkileśa) is equated with that of ‘sānusaya’ (possessing of anusayas).

\(^{204}\) Pcp: Yam-a (Vri) pp. 325-326.
(iii) The account of the Kathāvatthu commentary

In the Kathāvatthu, it is observed that the polemical issues arise due to different sectarian views in the process of understanding 'sānusaya'. The contexts of 'sānusaya' in the Kathāvatthu reveal that the polemical issues are mainly involved in the mental state of a particular person who possesses anusaya even at the moment when wholesome (kusala) or indeterminate (avyākata) consciousness (citta) arises in him. The commentary informs that the view 'anusaya anārammaṇā' is held by the Andhakas and a certain section of the Uttarāpathākas. Regarding the question 'sānusaya', the commentary states as follows:

"Sānusayo ti pañhe pana appahinānusayattā sānusayatā anuṇṇatā, na anusayānaṃ pavattisabhāvā." 205 Yo hi appahiṇo na so atīto nānāgato na paccuppanno ca. Maggavajjhakileso paṇ' esa appahiṇatā va athitii vuccati. Evarūpassa ca idam nāma ārammaṇān ti na vaṭṭabbaṃ, tasmā ārammaṇaṃ patikkhitam. Tam paṇ' etam na kevalam anusayassa, rāgādinaṃ pi tādiṣaṃ eva, tasmā anusayānaṃ anārammaṇatā sādhakaṃ na hoti. 206

With regard to the question '[is he] possessing of anusaya', the state of possessing anusaya, however, should be known as the state of anusaya which is not being abandoned, and not as the intrinsic nature of the activity of anusayas. For that which is not being abandoned is neither the past nor the future nor the present. However, it is said that this destructible defilement by the path is present only because of not being abandoned. And as for such a form [of defilement], it cannot be said that this (particular thing) is indeed its object. Therefore, that (i.e. anusaya has the object at the particular moment) is denied. However, that (i.e. non-reference to object) is not only the case of anusaya but also the case of 'lust', etc. is the same. Therefore, 'anusaya being without object' is not proved. 207

Through the compound word 'appahinānusayattā', the commentary here clarifies the application of 'sānusaya'. The term anusaya itself, as seen in the etymological account, denotes 'not being abandoned' and its intrinsic nature is 'potential to arise' in the sense of being strengthened. However, this commentary clearly illustrates the fact that 'sānusaya' denotes anusaya, having the meaning of 'not being abandoned'. is not abandoned. Furthermore, the commentary emphasises that the view "anusayas are without object" cannot be proved by the state of 'sānusaya' which does not have any object at the particular cognitive moment of wholesome (kusala) or indeterminate (avyākata)

205 PTS Ed. records a variant reading, EGP sambhāvā.
206 Kva a pp. 116-117.
207 Cf. B. C. Law, DC, p. 114.
consciousness (citta). That is because the same situation is also related to ‘lust’ etc, from which the opponent distinguishes anusaya in the Kathāvatthu itself.

Regarding the views ‘anusayā abyākatā, ahetukā, cittavippayuttā’ in the “Tissopi anusayakathā”, the commentary mentions that the Mahāsaṅghikas and the Saṅmitiyas hold these views. These views also arise on the basis of ‘sānusaya’, which signifies that at a particular moment when wholesome or indeterminate consciousness arises in an ordinary person, he is still possessed of anusaya.

Another polemic issue related to ‘sānusaya’ is presented in the “Añño anusayotikathā”. The commentary says that the Andhakas hold this view: any of the seven anusayas is different from pariyutthāna (the state of defilement that is manifested). Regarding ‘sānusaya’, it says:

“Sānusayo ti ādi pana tasmim samaye anusayassa appahinattā sānusayo ti vattabhataṁ, anuppannattā ca pariyoṭṭhitto ti avattabhataṁ dipeti, na anusayapariyoṭṭhānāṁ aññattaṁ, tasmā asādhakan ti.”

However, the question ‘is he possessed of anusaya?’, etc. shows that ‘sānusaya’ should be referred to because of the state of not being abandoned of anusaya at that [particular] moment, and that it (sānusaya) should not be referred to as [that which is] obsessed because of the state of not being arisen; but it is not that (sānusaya) shows the difference between anusaya and pariyutthāna. Therefore, that proposition (i.e. anusayas are different from pariyutthānas) is not proved.  

In these three instances, the commentary verifies that on the basis of the state of ‘sānusaya’ at a particular moment, even though the opponents hold different views on the nature of anusayas, their propositions are not properly served for their arguments.

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208 Kv-a p. 150.
(3) An independent reference to the activity of anusaya

The Samyutta-nikāya commentary explains, “the verb anuseti implies anusaya under the state of co-nascence (sahajāta-koṭiyā) and decisive-condition (upanissaya-koṭiyā) for the twelve [unwholesome] volitions (cetānas).”\textsuperscript{210} The Śīka clarifies that “anusayas also lie along with the mundane wholesome volitions (lokiyakusalacetānas); however, their occurrence (pavatti) is prominent in the unwholesome (akusālas). Thus, it is said that they are active “of the twelve unwholesome volitions”.\textsuperscript{211}

With regard to a passage “even if one does not intend and one does not plan, but one still lies along with something, this becomes an object for the maintenance of consciousness”, the commentary interprets as follows: by the clause ‘if one lies along with [something]’, it includes anusaya which appears in the resultants (vipāka) with limited functions belonging to the three planes under the state of not being abandoned (appahinakoṭiyā). ‘This becomes an object’ means when there is anusaya, this group of anusayas becomes only the condition because the arising of kamma consciousness (viṇṇāna) is not obstructed.\textsuperscript{212}

However, the Nettippakarana commentary interprets the same context as follows:

“No ce, bhikkhave, ceteti”ti-adinā akusalakammameva paṭikkhiṭṭati. Ayaṅhetttha saṅkhepattho, yadipī kottiyā yonisamanasi kāra akusalacetanā nappavattati, anusayā pana appahināti, te kusalaassā abhisankhāraviṇṇānasassā paṭīṭhā honti yevāti. Sati ca abhisankhāraviṇṇāne ayatīm punabhavabhūhinibbatti hoti vattuṃ vattatiyeva.”\textsuperscript{213}

By the phrases “No ce, bhikkhave, ceteti”, etc., it rejects unwholesome kamma only. This is herein the abstract meaning: even if unwholesome volition does not arise due to some sort of proper attention, anusayas are however, not abandoned; they still become the supports for wholesome kammic consciousness. It is indeed proper to say that when there is kammic consciousness, there is the production of renewed existence in the future.

\textsuperscript{210}SN-a II, p. 70: anuseti ti, dvādasananaṃ cetanānaṃ sahajāta-koṭiyā c ‘eva upanissaya-koṭiyā ca anusayo gaḥito.
\textsuperscript{211}SN-ṭ (Vri) II, p. 70: Kāmaṃ anusayā lokiyaakusalacetanāsupi anusentiyeva, akusalesu pana pavatti pākatāti “dvādasananaṃ cetanānaṃ ‘ti vuttam.
\textsuperscript{213}Nṭ-a (Vri) p. 360.
While commenting on “uppaññanti anusenti samuddācaranti”, the Majjhima-nikāya commentary interprets: the word uppaññanti denotes those that are not born are being born through birth. The word anusenti refers to those that are enjoyed (āsevita) again and again, being strengthened (thāmagata), and not being eradicated (appaṭivinīta). The word samuddācarati is used for those that have reached the body-door and speech-door.214 The fikā verifies that ‘enjoyed again and again’ means the enjoyment obtained through arising again and again in the infinite circle of transmigration. In this context, the meaning of anusaya is explained in the sense of relishing defilements.215 ‘Being strengthened’ means reaching the firm state. In this context, anusayas are shown with regard to their intrinsic nature. ‘Not being eradicated’ means not removed by cutting off because it is told that the unabandoned, strengthened defilements lie along with [continuity]. By the term appaṭivinīta, their possibility to arise again when cause is obtained is indicated.216 The fikā further mentions that ‘samuddācaranti’ means they overpower. By this term, it denotes the state of obtaining transgression (vītikkama). However, by ‘uppaññanti,’ only the state of obsession (pariyutṭhāna) is indicated.217


(4) Understanding of anusayas in relation to vedanās

The Itivuttaka commentary explains the three anusayas (i.e. rāga, patīgha, and avijjā) with their three respective feelings (i.e. sukha, dukkha and adukkhamasukha) respectively. It implies the remaining anusayas in conjunction with the three anusayas:


In this context, diṭṭhānusaya and mānaṇusaya should be considered as a part of rāga. For by taking delight in pleasure, those who fall into wrong view adhere to the personality views such as “[this is] eternal”, etc., and [by taking delight in pleasure], those who are inherited with conceit mutter conceit such as “I am superior”. However, vicīkicchānusaya should be considered as a part of avijjā. For, in the Patīccasamuppāda-vibhāṅga, it is said “with feeling as condition, there is doubt”.

According to the Majjhima-nikāya tīkā which comments on “na sabbāya sukhāya vedanāya so appahīno” (it is not that rāgānusaya is unabandoned in all the pleasant feelings), it is said that rāgānusaya due to the base of aggregates not completely understood through insight does not obtain any support in the aggregates that are completely understood. The meaning of anusaya is intended by means of object. The meaning of anusaya also has to be understood through the base that is called ‘bhūmiladdha’.

(5) Anusayas as akusalamūlas or ṭhiti

While commenting on “yassānusaya na santi keci, mūḷā ca akusalā samūhatāse”, the Suttanipāta commentary contextually reveals the relation between the three akusalamūlas and the seven anusayas:

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218 Itv-a II, p. 11: Anusayo-ti imāsu tisu vedanāsu sukhāya vedanāya rāgānusayo anuseti, dukkhāya vedanāya patīghānusayo, adukkhamasukkhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo anuseti.

219 Ibid.


221 Ibid: Vatthuvasenapi pana anusayaṭṭho veditabbo, yo “bhūmiladdhan”-ti vucaṭṭe
"Tattha, yasmā na sabbe anusaya akusalamūla, kāmarāgabhavarāgānusaya eva hi lohākusalamūlēna saṅghaham gacchanti, patighānusayāvijjānusaya ca ‘doso akusalamūla, moho akusalamūla’ ica eva saṃkham gacchanti, dīṭṭhīmānāvicikicchānusaya pana na kiñci akusalamūlaṁ honti, yasmā vā anusayābhāvavasena akusalamūlasamugghātavasena ca kilesappahānaṁ patthesi, tasmā yassā anusayā na santi keci mūla akusalā samuhaṁse iti Bhagavā āha.”

Herein, all anusayas are not unwholesome-roots; for kāmarāgaṇusaya and bhavarāgaṇusaya are only included in greed which is an unwholesome root. Patighaṇusaya and avijjānusaya are only reckoned as “hatred is unwholesome root, delusion is unwholesome root” respectively. However, dīṭṭhānusaya, mānānusaya and vicikicchānusaya are not considered as any of the unwholesome roots. Or, it shows the abandoning of defilements by means of the absence of anusayas and the destruction of unwholesome roots Therefore, the Blessed One uttered “yassānusayā na santi keci…”

As already seen in the Nettippakarana, anusayas are schematically referred to as ‘akusalamūla’s’ in the context of the arisen evil unwholesome dhammas. Its commentary clarifies the reason why they are called unwholesome roots:

“Akusalamūlāṇī anusayā eva sabbesam akusalānam mūlabhāvato evam vuttā, na lohādayo eva. Ime uppannā anusayā bhūmiladdhuppanṇā asamugghāṭitauppanṇāti-ādi-uppannapariyaśabbhāvato nāmavasena uppannā nāma, na vattaṁānabhāvenāti attō.”

They are so called ‘unwholesome roots’ because anusayas themselves, not greed, etc. become the roots of all the unwholesome. The meaning is that these arisen anusayas are referred to as ‘arisen by having plane’ through the nature expressed by disposition of ‘arisen by not being abolished’, etc., they are not referred to as ‘arisen as actually occurring’.

In treating anusayas as akusalamūla, the conceptual significance basically lies in the term uppanna interpreted as bhūmiladdhuppanṇā herein.

A similar conceptual implication is also observed in the commentarial interpretation of anusaya as ĉhiti. Commenting on ‘yassa papañcā ĉhiti ca natthi’, the Udāna commentary mentions:

“...tasmā yassa agga-puggalassa vutta-lakkhanā papañcā tehi katā saṃsāre ĉhiti ca n’ atthi. Nettiyam pana ĉhiti nāma anusayo ti vuttam. Anusayo hi bhav’ uppattiyā mūlan ti.”

...therefore, in a person who is the highest, there are no papañcas (proliferations) which have the characteristics described above, and no maintenance in the circle of transmigration which is caused by papañcas. However, in the Netti, it is said, “maintenance is called anusaya.” For, anusaya is the root of arising of existence.

223 Ntt-a (Vri) p. 205.
224 Ud-a p. 373.
In the same context, the Nettivibhāvanī-ṭīkā explains, “craving (tanhā) which is underlying continuity in the sense of not being abandoned is called ‘maintenance’ (thiti) because it becomes the cause of sustaining of living beings”.

5.5.4. The special aspects of anusayas in the commentaries

(1) Anusayas at the moment of rebirth-linking (paṭisandhi)

In the dhātuvāra of the Yamaka commentary, it is explained that anusayas lie along with a person even at the moment of wholesome or indeterminate consciousness, and that at that particular moment, they remain as ‘potential to arise’ when a suitable cause arises:


The meaning of the verb “anusenti” is taken as ‘uppajjantī’ in the anusayavāra. Here (in dhātuvāra), it should not be taken in that sense. Why? Because of non-arising at the [particular] moment. For while a living being is being reborn in the realm of sense-sphere, only the resultant consciousness arises [at that moment] and the materiel phenomena originating from kamma arises as well; [but] there is no unwholesome consciousness. Anusayas arise at the moment of wholesome consciousness, not at the moment of resultant consciousness. Because of non-arising [of anusayas] at that particular moment, the meaning [of anusentī] should not be taken in that way. How should it be interpreted [under dhātuvāra]? It should be interpreted according to the context. And how should the contextual meaning be taken? In the sense of not being abandoned. Just as because of the ‘state of not being abandoned’ of greed, hate and delusion, a person who has endowed with wholesome consciousness and indeterminate consciousness is called “[the one who is] possessed of greed, hate and delusion.” Similarly, because they (anusayas) are not abandoned by the development of path, it is considered that different anusayas lie in different persons even at the moment of rebirth-linking. It is not that they are only considered, but that they only lie along with [continuity] due to not being abandoned. Thus, it should be known.

The passage emphasizes that the arising of anusayas solely takes place at the moment of unwholesome consciousness, and that at the moment of wholesome consciousness and

225 Ntt-vṛt (Vṛi) p. 281: Santāne appahiṇāṭhena anusayā tanhā sattānaṃ tiṭṭhanahetuttā thiti nāma.
226 Pcp: Yam-a (Vṛi) p. 329.
indeterminate consciousness, *anusayas* remain in the potential state to arise till they are completely abandoned through the paths of noble persons. It is clear in the description that even at the moment of rebirth-linking consciousness, *anusayas* lie along with continuity in the sense of not being abandoned.

(2) *Anusaya in relation to bhūmiladdha*

The concept of *anusaya* plays a crucial role in constituting the concept of *bhūmiladdha* with the meaning of not being abandoned (*appahīnaṭṭhena*). According to the commentaries, the difference between *bhūmi* (plane) and *bhūmiladdha* (that which has got a plane) is as follows:

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Tattha ca yassa yesu khandhesu appahīnaṭṭhena anusayitā kilesā, tassa te eva khandhā tesāṃ kilesānam vatthu anānesāṃ santakā khandhā."
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‘Plane’ means the five aggregates belonging to the three planes [of existence], which are the objects of insight. ‘That which has got a plane’ is the group of defilements which is capable of arising in those aggregates. For the plane becomes ‘that which has got a plane’ through the group of defilements; therefore, it (the group of defilements) is called *bhūmiladdha*. The plane is not meant in the sense of objects. For by means of object, the defilements arise with respect to even any of all the aggregates including past or future, and also with respect to the fully understood aggregates of those who have destroyed ṅcavas. If that were *bhūmiladdha*, then no one would abandon the root of existence because it would be unabandonable. However, *bhūmiladdha* has to be understood in the sense of base (*vatthu*). For wherever arise the aggregates which are not fully-understood by insight, therein the group of defilements which are the root of the circle of transmigration lie along with those [aggregates] from the [instant] arising. It should be known that the group of defilements is *bhūmiladdha* in the sense of not being abandoned. And herein, when the defilements are underlain (or inherent), in the sense of not being abandoned, in someone’s aggregates, only those aggregates of him become the base of those defilements, not aggregates belonging to others.

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227 Cf. Vism XXII, p. 591: sā bhūmi laddhā nāma hotī'. Also see Mhv (Vri) p. 89.
228 Ps-a 1, p. 171. Cf Dhs-a p. 67.
As signified by ‘anusayītā kilesā’, bhūmiladdha is here primarily based on the concept of anusaya. The Visuddhimagga-mahāṭīkā explains, “the group of the underlain defilements (anusayitaṃ kilesajātaṃ) has to be understood as ‘that which has got a plane’ (bhūmiladdha) in the sense of not being abandoned (appahīna) which is merely called ‘underlying’ (anusayana)”. In this context, the root defilements of the circle of rebirth (vaṭṭamūlakilesā) are intended as anusayas, but not ignorance and craving for existence.

(3) The abandoning of anusayas

In the commentaries, the concept of anusaya is depicted in the three gradations of defilements in the context that the commentaries broadly classify the teachings of the three pīṭakas from the perspective of abandoning. According to the commentaries, in the Vinaya-piṭaka, the abandoning of transgression is intended because morality (sīla) is opposite to the transgression of defilements; in the Sutta-piṭaka, the abandoning of obsession is intended because concentration (samādhi) is opposite to the obsession of defilements; in the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, the abandoning of anusaya is intended because wisdom (paññā) is opposite to anusaya.

The Paṭisambhidāmagga commentary specifically refers to the conceptual affiliation between saṃyojanas and anusayas through their abandoning. While commenting on ‘saṅnojanā pahiṃyantī’ and ‘anusayā byantiḥontī’, it explains that the fetters, which are eliminated by different paths, are abandoned by means of samucchedappahāna (abandoning by cutting off). The abandoning of fetters occurs through the abandoning of anusayas; otherwise, there is no other way of abandoning. In order to prove this point, the

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229 Vism-mț (Vri) II, p. 471: tasmā tam anusayitaṃ kilesajātaṃ, teneva anusayanasaṅkūṭena appahīnaṭṭhena bhūmiladdhanti veditabham.
230 Ibid. p. 472: Idha vaṭṭamūlakilesāti anusayā adhippetā, na avijjā, bhavatānaḥ ca.
abandoning of *anusayas* is mentioned. However, in the same context, the *Visuddhimagga-mahāṭikā* interprets thus: herein, the abandoning of fetters occurs through the cessation of *anusayas*; when the fetters are abandoned, not even a single *anusaya* will remain.

According to the *Visuddhimagga*, among the seven *anusayas*, *diṭṭhānusaya* and *vicīkicchānusaya* are eliminated by the first knowledge, *kāmarāgānusaya* and *paṭīghānusaya* are by the third knowledge, and *mānānusaya*, *bhavarāgānusaya* and *avijjānusaya* are by the fourth knowledge. This account is similar to the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* that presents their abandoning through the fourfold paths of *ariyapuggalas*.

5.5.5. *Anusayas* in the later commentaries

The *Visuddhimagga* presents a passage “with feeling as condition, still without *anusaya*, no craving can arise, and so, the perfect saint is free from this.” Its *Mahāṭikā* explains that the statement ‘vedanā paccayā tanhā’ is made without specifically mentioning *sukha*, etc., but generalizing the arising of craving (*tanhuppattippasāṇa*) in the presence of every condition accompanied by feeling. It further verifies the reason the word *anusaya* is dropped in the phrase through the interrogative sentence as follows:

"Namu ‘anusayasahāyā vedanā tanhāya paccayo’ti vacanassa abhāvā atippasanganivattim na sakkā kātunti? Na, vaṭṭakathāya pavattattā. Vaṭṭassa ca anusayavirāhe abhāvato"

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233 Vism-mt (Vri) I, p. 313: Ettha ca samyojanappahāṇam nāma anusayanirodheneva hoti, pahinesu ca samyojanesu anusayānāṃ lesopī na bhavissūtī ca ...
235 Ibid. p. 486: Vedanā paccayā cāpi yasmasa nānusayaṃ vinā hoti, tasmā na sā hoti brāhmaṇassa vusimato ti.
236 Vism-mt (Vri) II, p. 306.
anusayasahtīva paccayoti attathato vuttamevetam hotiti. Atha va “avijjāpaccayā”ti
anuvattamānattā anusayasahtīva paccayoti viññāyatī.” 237

Is it not impossible to prevent overgeneralization in the absence of any such statements as
“feeling accompanied by anusaya is a condition for craving”? No, because of dealing with the
exposition of the circle of rebirths. Since there is no circle of rebirths without anusayas, [the
feeling] only accompanied by anusaya is the condition [of craving]. From that meaning, this
exposition is made. Or, it may be recognized that [the feeling] only accompanied by anusaya is
the condition [of craving] because it follows upon the words “with ignorance as condition”. 238

With regard to ‘tanhānusaya’ used in the general sense in the Dhammapada, the
Visuddhimagga-Mahātikā technically interprets it as ‘kāmarāgabhavarağānusaya’. 239

In the Abhidhammatthasangaha, the seven fold anusayas are also classified as six-fold 240
and the Vibhāvini-tikā clarifies the reason to be that kāmarāgānusaya and
bhavarağānusaya are regarded as one thing through the intrinsic nature of craving. 241 In
the context of ‘cutipaṭisandhikkama’ (the process of death and rebirth-linking), it is
mentioned that saṅkhāra is enveloped by avijjānusaya and rooted in tanhānusaya. 242

Ledi Sayadaw’s comment 243 on the Anusaya-yamaka presents the latest view on
understanding the concepts of anusayas. In his comment, the seven anusayas are treated
under three levels of defilements (i.e. anusayabhummī, pariyutṭānabhummī and
vitikkamabhummī). 244 According to his comment,
When kāmarāga is active while causing the movement of the parts of body and speech,
such an activity is called the plane of its transgression (vitikkama). When kāmarāga,

237 Ibid.
238 I have followed Bhikkhu Nāgamoli’s translation with some modifications. See POP(II), p. 657, fn. 40.
239 Vism-mañ (Vri) p. 192: Tanhānusayeti kāmarāgabhavarağānusaye.
240 Aths (Vri) p. 50.
241 Ath-vi (Vri) p. 195: Anusaya chaḷaṇa honti kāmarāgabhavarağānusayāṇam tanhāsabhāvena ekato
gahitātā.
242 Aths (Vri) p. 40: avijjānusayaparikkhittena tanhānusayamulakena saṅkhārena janiyāṇam...
patisandhisaṅkhātaṃ mānasam uppañjamāṇāmeva patiṭṭhāti bhavantare.
243 Under the title of “Landana-pāt-devi-pucchā-visoṭṭhāna”, it is appended in the PTS edition of the
Yamaka.
244 Yam I, p. 258: Tisso hi kāmarāgassa bhummīyo: anusayabhummī, pariyutṭhañabhummī,
vitikkamabhummī; tathā patiṭṭhassa, mānasā, dīṭṭhiyā, vicīkicchāya, bhavarağagassa, avijjāya.
without having taken the movement of the parts of body and speech, achieves its arising only in the mind-door, then, such an activity is called the plane of its obsession. Without having taken its arising even in the mind-door, when it has a specific state following mental continuity constantly, it is called the anusaya-plane of kāmarāga. For, by not achieving its arising, kāmarāga appears in the form of sleeping in mental continuity; when an object which becomes the base of attachment (rajjaniyavatthubhūtam ārammanām) comes within the range (ābādha)245 of any of the six sense doors, then it causes bhavaṅga (life-continuum) unwisely to advert; after that, it achieves the plane of obsession and causes to arise javana-consciousness accompanied by kāmarāga; then, if the object is weak, when that object ceases, that kāmarāga ceases and it remains in the plane of anusaya again. If that object is strong, without staying (atthatvā) in the plane of obsession, it achieves the plane of transgression, and is active while causing the movement of the parts of body or speech. Herein, when a certain condition appears, kamarāga again achieves the planes of obsession and anusaya in succession; as long as such an object does not come into the range of any sense organ, it only lies along with the continuity of wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate consciousness. Even if kāmarāga is underlying the continuity of wholesome or indeterminate consciousness, it does not become wholesome or indeterminate because it belongs to the category of unwholesome. 246

245 According to PTSD, ‘ābādha’ literally means affliction, illness, or sickness. But here, I read ‘āpāthaṃ āgacchati’ according to the context.

246 Yam II, pp. 258-259: Tattha kamarago, yadā kayangva-vacangani călento pavattati, tada tathā-pavatti tassa vitikkamahummi nāma. Yadā kayanga-vacangacālanām apatvā manodvāre va eva uṭṭhānam pāpunāti, tada tathā-pavatti tassa pariyuṭṭhānabhummi nāma. Manodvāre pi uṭṭhānam apatvā niccakālam cittasatāṅnānugato avatthākāraṇīvase, tassa kāmarāgassa anusayabhūmhi nāma

Concluding remarks

The significance of anusaya in psychological ethics lies in the meanings that Theravāda Buddhism applies to certain akusala dhammas as ‘underlying states’ in the deepest fathom of the human mind. The following conceptual features depicted in different literary stages have duly verified it.

Holding etymological meaning as ‘that which lies along with’, the term anusaya has been referred to as a specific as well as technical term from the earliest literary stage onwards. However, its conceptual features such as the connotation, the nature, the types, etc. are depicted in different contexts in the four Nikāyas.

As denoted by the clause ‘yam anuseti’, the verb anuseti signifies the activity of anusaya which becomes an object (ārammaṇa) for maintenance (thiti) of consciousness (viññāna) even in the instance that one does not have cetanā and sañkappa. In relation to vedanās, the activity of anusayas presents the outcome of mental reactions towards particular feelings. Three anusayas (i.e. rāga, patigha, and avijjā) lie along with pleasant feeling (sukha-vedanā), painful feeling (dukkha-vedanā) and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling (adukkhamasukha-vedanā) respectively, but they do not lie along with all the pleasant feelings, all the painful feelings and all the neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings. In the stock passage “abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosaya tiṭṭhati”, it has been clarified that the mental reactions towards the three feelings present a process leading to the activities of the three relevant anusayas.

A unique account of the Mahāmāluṅkhya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya presents the earliest background of the two meanings for which anusayas stand. Even though the context deals with orambhāgiyāni samyojanāni (the lower fetters), the term anusaya, being compounded with each factor of the five lower fetters, reveals that this term signifies a
certain state which is thāmagata/appatiṭvinīṭa (strengthened/ uneradicated), not yet arisen or manifested.

With specific reference to the compound ‘ahaṅkāramamaṅkāramānānusaya’, mānāusaya has been related to the notion ‘eso’hamasmi’. It signifies the conceit ‘I am’ (asmimāna) which is fundamentally rooted in self-existence. A similar idea stands in the same line with ‘asmīti’ anusaya in the Khemaka sutta. It denotes that such a notion still exists even in a noble person who has completely abandoned the five lower fetters.

It is worthy to note that the verb anuseti stands for uppaṭijjati and a key point for abandoning the three anusayas is involved in the “mental reactions” towards the three respective feelings. It is verified by the account that if one does not take delight in sukhavedanā and does not find sorrow in dukkhavedanā, when touched by any of the three feelings, and if one understands truly (yathābhūtaṃ) the escape in regard to adukkhamasukhavedanā, then the three anusayas are not embedded in him accordingly. In the context referring to papaṅcasāṅśaṅkhā, the seven anusayas are called “pāpakā akusalā dharmā”. Therein, the clause “abhinanditaṃ abhivaditaṃ ajjhositaṃ” signifies a sort of mental attachment to some particular objects, and not having any attachment to them denotes the abandoning of anusayas.

It has also been discussed that the understanding of the nature of certain objects is also ultimately instrumental for the abandoning of anusayas. In this regard, the phrase ‘jānato passato’ indicates that the realization of the nature of impermanence (anicca) and non-self (anattā) leads to the abandoning/uprooting of anusayas. Developing the five faculties (pañcimāni indriyāni), concentrating by mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasattisamādhi), and directing the mindfulness towards the body (kāyagatāsati), bring out the uprooting of anusayas while the paths proceeded by serenity and insight lead to the abandoning of
anusayās. In order to completely understand and abandon the seven anusayās, the noble-eight-fold path has to be cultivated effectively.

As for the types of anusaya, the four Nikāyas present different types of anusayās in compliance with their contexts. For instance, as technical concepts, rāgānusayā, paṭighānusayā and avijjānusayā are observed in the context of vedanās. Rāgānusayā, paṭighānusayā and ‘asmīti’ diṭṭhimānānusayā are referred to in the context of sammādiṭṭhi, and the phrase ‘asmīti’ diṭṭhimānānusayā’ seems to denote both ‘diṭṭhānusayā’ and ‘mānānusayā’ synthesized together. In the context of ‘papañcasaññāsaṅkhā’, the seven types of anusayas occur from rāgānusayā up to avijjānusayā. In the Anusaya-sutta of the Samyutta-nikāya, the figure ‘satta’ is first mentioned and appears to be fixed and stereotyped as a technical concept. However, there is no certain reference to determine whether the fixation of the number is developed from three up to seven because except for the sutta entitled with anusaya, there are no other contexts dealing with anusaya as the subject matter.

The conceptual development of anusayās is observed in the passage of the Patiṣambhidāmagga referring to the activity of seven anusayās from the viewpoint of objects. First, the activities of kāmarāga and paṭigha are explained through the desirable object (piyārūpa) and the undesirable object (appiyārūpa) respectively. However, as for the activity of avijjānusayā, the Patiṣambhidāmagga defines that avijjā joins with two dhammas (i.e. kāmarāgānusayā and paṭighānusayā). Secondly, it clubs the activities of māna, diṭṭhi and vicikicchā together with avijjā.

With regard to their eradication, the Patiṣambhidāmagga features the different conceptual realms of the seven anusayās. By the path of stream-entry, diṭṭhānusayā and vicikicchānusayā are completely cut off. The gross kāmarāgānusayā and paṭighānusayā
are completely cut off by the path of once-returning, and the subtle kāmarāgānusaya and paṭighānusaya are eradicated by the path of non-returning. Mānānusaya, bhavarāgānusaya and avijjānusaya are uprooted by the path of Arahatship. In this context, each of these seven anusayas is specifically designated as ‘attano cittassa upakkilesa’.

Unlike the other technical terms such as āsavas, upādānas, etc. there is no importance given to anusayas in the Dhammasaṅgāni and even the Abhidhammic definition of anusayas is not referred to in any Abhidhamma text. In the Dhammasaṅgāni and the Vibhaṅga, the term anusaya is merely referred to in the context of lobha, and avijjānusaya is equivalent with moha. This fact indicates that anusayas are ultimately unwholesome and causal dhammas from the viewpoint of psychological ethics. The Vibhaṅga maintains the same passage in line with the Paṭisambhidāmagga (i.e. the seven anusayas explained on the basis of the desirable and undesirable objects).

It is in the Yamaka that vedanās (feelings), dhātus (spheres) and dhammas are formulated as the ‘sources of arising’ (uppattiṭṭhāna) for the seven anusayas in the Abhidhamma perspective, and the conceptual realms of the seven anusayas are characterized according to their relevant sources of arising. Kāmarāga lies along with the two feelings of the sense sphere; paṭighānusaya is with the painful feeling. Māna lies along with the two feelings in the sense sphere and it also take the fine-material and immaterial spheres as its sources of arising; diṭṭhānusaya, vicikicchānusaya and avijjānusaya lie along with all the dhammas belonging to personality (sakkāya); bhavarāgānusaya lies in the fine-material and immaterial spheres. At this point, we find that the Yamaka’s account combines those of the four Nikāyas and the Paṭisambhidāmagga and further extends the range of the activities of the seven anusayas according to its scheme. The table (5-2) duly illustrates this point.
Polemical issues on the nature of *anusayas* are presented by the *Kathāvatthu* in the three *kathās* —‘anusaya anārammanā ti kathā’, ‘tisso pi anusayakathā’ and ‘Añño anusayo ti kathā’. The issues raised in these *kathās* are primarily based on the state of *anusayas* at a particular moment of cognition when a wholesome or indeterminate consciousness arises in an ordinary person, he is still ‘possessed of *anusayas*’. An example from ‘anusayā anārammanā ti kathā’ has verified that the proposition, ‘*anusayas* are without objects’ cannot be proved unless one equally claims that ‘lust’ (*rāga*) also is without object at such a particular moment.

In the sub-canonical texts, several schematic and innovative understanding of *anusayas* have been observed. In the *Nettippakarana*, *anusayas* are regarded as unwholesome roots (*akusalamūlas*), and are referred to as “the arisen evil unwholesome dhammas”’. In another context, it also refers to “*thiti nāma anusayā*.” In the fourfold division of *kilesabhūmis* (i.e. *anusaya-, pariyutthāna-, saṃyojana- and upādāna*) in which all the defilements are comprised, ‘*anusayabhūmi*’ is a beginning point leading to the arising of the entire mass of suffering. The same idea is proved in the *Peṭakopadesa* that also presents the same four divisions under the name of reasons (*kāraṇas*) due to which wisdom (*paññā*) is lost.

Through ‘hetu’ (cause) and ‘paccaya’ (condition), the *Peṭakopadesa* reveals the relation of *anusayas* with *nīvaranas* (hindrances). Out of the five *nīvaranas*, *paṭighānusaya* is a cause of ill-will (*byāpāda*) and *kāmasaṅgā* and *diṭṭhānusaya* are the causes of restlessness and remorse (*uddhaccakukkucca*). *Māṇḍanusaya* is a condition of doubt (*vicikicchā*) and *vicikicchānusaya* is its cause.

While dealing with *avijjānusaya*, the *Peṭakopadesa* explains that previous ignorance (*avijjānusaya*) is the cause of subsequent ignorance (*avijjāpariyutthāna*). The previous *avijjānusaya* is the cause of causality-by-immediate-proximity just like the seed and the
sprout in cultivation. The Nettippakaraṇa specifically considers avijjā as the condition of tanhāanusaya. In this context, the text indicates that tanhā is ‘bhavatanhā’ (craving for existence).

While introducing different views and clarifying certain points, the commentaries provide an ample exegetic value to the present subject. Above all, the commentaries firmly stand by the Theravāda position on the technical concepts of anusayas by reconsolidating the earlier sources. In dealing with the etymological accounts, the commentaries specifically apply two meanings to anusaya, ‘appahīna’ and ‘thāmagata’, whose identical meanings have already been referred to as ‘appatīvīnīta’ and ‘thāmagata’ respectively in the Mahāmālunghya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya. The etymological interpretations apparently take place according to the contexts that emphasize ‘appahīna’ or/and ‘thāmagata’. Between the two meanings that bear negative and positive values respectively, there are mutual distinctions:

(i) Appahīna is primarily implied to the action noun ‘anusayana’ (underlying) in mental continuity of living beings. By interpreting the verb anuseti as ‘potential to arise when a suitable cause arises’, it is further ratified that the meaning of anusayana is not static as a mode (ākāra) of appahīna.

(ii) Thāmagata signifies the unique intrinsic nature (āveniko sabhāvo) of kāmarāga, etc. and it distinguishes the seven anusayas from other defilements that could be the state of appahīna.

With due comparison to the account of the Mahāmālunghya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, it has been corroborated that when those defilement are not uprooted with the help of the noble path due to not knowing an escape from them, they lie again in the mental continuity of living beings as ‘potential to arise’ when a suitable cause arises. That is the state of anusaya in the sense of appahīna/ thāmagata. This point is adequately illustrated in the figures (5-1, 5-2 and 5-3).
The nature of *anusayas* has been constantly intimated as ‘evil unwholesome *dhammas*’ (pāpakā *akusalā dhammā*), or imperfections (*upakkilesā*), etc. from the Nikāya period onwards. As already mentioned above, the *Kathāvatthu* reveals that the sectarian issues on the nature of *anusayas* appeared even during the canonical period. In the commentaries, however, the nature of *anusayas* is clearly re-established by rejecting certain points in support of the canonical aspects. The commentaries conclude, “*anusaya* is predetermined, associated with *citta*, and it is an unwholesome *dhamma*”.

Conceptual developments in the commentaries have also been discussed with regard to contextual interpretations. As for the seven *anusayas*, the given references reveal that the compound should be taken as a *kammadhāraya*, not as a genitive *tappurisa*. The seven *anusayas* are nothing but the corresponding unwholesome *dhammas* themselves in the state of not being abandoned.

In the three major approaches dealing with the seven *anusayas* in the commentaries, the following points are apparent:

(i) In considering the fact that *anusayas* have not been categorized as per the *Abhidhammic* scheme in the first two *Abhidhamma* texts, the account of the arising of *anusayas* in connection with the twelve *akusala cittas* is a significant commentarial contribution in extending many dimensions of the concepts of *anusayas*. Out of the fourteen types of unwholesome mental factors (*cetasikā*), six types of *cetasikas*, namely, *lobha, dosa, māna, diṭṭhi, vicikicchā* and *moha* arise in relevant *akusala cittas* by means of co-nascence and by means of object. They are referred to as relevant *anusayas*. This aspect is duly illustrated in the table (5-3).

(ii) In the activities of *anusayas*, the *Yamaka* commentary points out that the ‘sources of arising’ (*upattiṭṭhānas*) of the seven *anusayas* has been explained through the prominent aspect (*olārikattā*). It comprehensively deals with the magnitude of the
activity of each anusaya by means of two modes — sahajāta (co-nascence) and ārammana (object). The table (5-4) illustrates the realms of the seven anusayas in two ways.

(iii) As for the activities of the seven anusayas explained through the desirable and the undesirable objects, the Vibhaṅga commentary clarifies that after being associated with lust for sensual pleasure and aversion, the ignorance approaches them by means of making an object. Conceit (māna) and others are coefficient by means of being associated with that ignorance. According to the Vibhaṅga mūlāṭikā, the activity of anusayas in this context is that of ‘underlying through object’ out of two methods: (i) ‘underlying in continuity’ and (ii) ‘underlying through object’ (ārammaṇasantānānusayanesu).

While commenting on “[sakkāyadiṭṭhi] sānusayā pahiyanti”, the Majjhima-nikāya commentary clarifies that saṁyojana and anusaya should not be considered as two different things. However, it distinguishes these two concepts through two different meanings: bandhana (binding) and appahīna (not being abandoned). It further proves that the scope of activity of saṁyojana (in the Mahāmāluṇkhya-sutta) includes the state of anusaya, but is distinguished from that of anusaya through the term ‘pavattamāna’ (being active). This fact signifies that anusaya is the inactive ‘underlying state’ of defilements. Therefore, it has been verified that “[sakkāyadiṭṭhi] sānusayā pahiyanti” denotes when the arisen personality view is abandoned, the anusaya (i.e. the state of thāmagata/appahīna) is also simultaneously abandoned through the understanding of its escape. In comparison with the etymological accounts of anusaya, what the clause indicates is illustrated in the figures (5-4 and 5-5).

In the Yamaka commentary, ‘sānusaya’ (possessing of anusaya) is interpreted on the basis of ‘not being abandoned’. Just as a living being who wanders in the circle of rebirth
possesses defilements, as long as his *anusayas* are not uprooted through the noble paths, he is still considered as the person ‘possessing *anusayas*’ even at the moment when those *anusayas* do not arise in him. The *Kathāvatthu* commentary also reveals that ‘sānusaya’ (at that particular moment when a wholesome or indeterminate consciousness arises in an ordinary person) is indicated as the ‘unabandoned state’ of *anusaya*, but not as the intrinsic nature of activity of *anusayas*. To put it in another way, ‘sānusaya’ indicates that *anusaya* meaning ‘not being abandoned’ is not abandoned, but it does not indicate ‘potentiality to arise’ when a suitable cause arises.

In the clause “yam anuseti”, the *Samyutta-nikāya* commentary clarifies that the verb ‘*anuseti*’ implies *anusaya* under the state of co-nascence (*sahajātakotiṭṭhā*) and decisive-condition (*upanissayakoṭṭhā*) for the twelve [unwholesome] volitions. The *tiṭṭhā* further verifies that “*anusayas* also lie along with the mundane wholesome volitions (*lokiyakusala*acetānas); however, their occurrence (*pavatti*) is prominent in the unwholesome (*akusalas*). Thus, it is said that they are active “in the twelve unwholesome volitions”. According to the *Nettipakaraṇa* commentary, when *anusayas* are not abandoned, the *anusayas* can still be supportive for the wholesome kammic consciousness even if an unwholesome volition does not arise due to a wise attention.

As discussed in the contextual interpretations of the commentaries, *anusayas* are often characterized in the sense of *appahīna*. The *Nettipakaraṇa* commentary explains that *anusayas* are called ‘*akusalamūlas*’ because they are the roots of all the unwholesome *dhammas* in the sense of *appahīna* (not being abandoned). A similar conceptual implication is also observed in the commentarial interpretation of “ṭhiti nāma anusayo”. The *Uddāna* commentary interprets, “maintenance is called *anusaya*” because *anusaya* is the root of activity of existence. In the *Nettivibhāvinī-ṭiṭṭhā*, “craving (taṃhā) which
underlies the continuity in the sense of not being abandoned is called ‘maintenance’ (thiti) because it becomes the cause of sustenance (tiṭṭhanahetu) for living beings”.

With the meaning of ‘not being abandoned’, the anusaya plays a crucial role in constituting the concept of bhūmiladdha. According to the commentaries, the bhūmiladdha (that which has obtained a plane) means ‘kilesajāta’ (a group of defilements), capable of arising in the five aggregates. The Visuddhimagga mahāṭikā explains that the group of underlain defilements (anusayitam kilesajātam) has to be understood as bhūmiladdha in the sense of appahīna. In this context, the root defilements of the circle of rebirth (vattamūlakilesā) are implied as anusayas, but not as ignorance and craving for existence.

The Yamaka commentary significantly reveals that anusayas remain potential at the moment of rebirth-linking (paṭisandhi). When a living being is born in the sense-sphere, only the resultant consciousness arises at that moment accompanied by the material phenomena originating from kamma, but there is no unwholesome consciousness. Anusayas arise at the moment of unwholesome consciousness, and not at the moment of resultant consciousness. Because anusayas are not abandoned by the development of Path, different anusayas lie along with the continuity in different persons even at the moment of rebirth-linking.

The Visuddhimagga states “with feeling as condition, no craving can arise still without anusaya...” Its Mahāṭikā interprets, since there is no circle of transmigration without anusaya, only the feeling accompanied by anusaya becomes the condition [of craving]. The Visuddhimagga Mahāṭikā technically interprets tanhāanusaya as ‘kāmarāgabhavarāgānusaya’. The seven anusayas are classified as sixfold in the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha and the tikā justifies this with the reason that kāmarāgānusaya and bhavarāgānusaya are combined as one through the intrinsic nature of craving. In the
context of ‘cutipatisandhikkama’ (the process of death and rebirth-linking), it is mentioned that ‘sankhāra’ is enveloped by avijjānusaya and rooted in tanhānusaya.

Ledi Sayadaw’s comment on the Anusaya-yamaka represents the latest view on the concepts of anusayas. Accordingly, the seven anusayas are treated under three levels of defilements (i.e. anusayabhummi, pariyutthānabhummi and vitikkamabhummi). Following the access to condition, kāmarāga, etc. achieve the planes of obsession and anusaya in succession; till an object comes into the range of sight, it only lies along with the continuity of wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate consciousness. Even if kāmarāga underlies the continuity of wholesome or indeterminate consciousness, it does not become wholesome or indeterminate because it belongs to the category of the unwholesome.

The gradual evolution of the anusaya-concept carried well up to the commentary period though the original traits pervaded in the four Nikāyas remain unaffected. As has discussed so far, it is, however, in the commentaries that Theravāda Buddhism firmly establishes its position in understanding the anusaya-concept through the two meanings, appahīna and thāmagata. It is in the sense of appahīna that anusayas are referred to as ‘the roots of all the unwholesome dhammas’ and it has been proved by the concept of bhūmiladdha.

Subsequently the conceptual affiliation to anusayas has carved a niche for itself among the other technical terms. Particularly, in regard to the arising of anusayas in the twelve unwholesome cittas and their abandoning through the path of noble persons, anusayas hold the common conceptual traits with other technical terms. This point will be discussed later on in the seventh chapter.

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