Section I.

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Even a cursory reader of the Pali Canon cannot help being struck by the amazing mass of its synonyemic collocations. Synonymic repetition is perhaps the most striking stylistic feature of the Tipiṭaka. Almost every page of the Pali Canon can yield at least a few examples of this style. The thin and the heavy clusters containing varying numbers of synonyms from two to seven and eight (and even more) can be classified on the usual Abhidhammic pattern of numerical classification into dyads (duka), triads (tika), tetrads (catukka), pentads (pañcaka) and so on. Thus for example:

1) Duka - iti petam bhutam iti petam taccham (D.I.5); yathasatti yathabalam (Apadāna.VII.63); ubho'pi netta nayanā, andhā upahata mama (Cy.p. 392) na bhaddakam maranam hoti, na bhaddika kalakirīya (A.III.15); parasattanam parapuggalananam (A.IV. 125); anekadhatum nanadhatum lokam pajanati (A.IV.125); mahasamuddassa sāgarassa āhara hoti (A.IV.190) etc.
2) Tika - \textit{Indo, vatrabhū, āyatam pita} (Jā.II.14); (\textit{catuddīpā ime})
\textit{rukkha, pāda, dharaṇiruha}
(Apadāna vol.VII.p.9); \textit{karunām}
\textit{paṭicca, anuddvayā paṭicca},
\textit{anukampā upādaya} (S.II.167);
\textit{daḷiddo, assako, anālīhiko (īnām adiyati)} (A.III.65); \textit{duppanno}
\textit{hoti, jalo, elamugo} (A.III.137)

3) Catukka - \textit{sabbe sattā, sabbe pañā, sabbe bhūta, sabbe jīva} (D.I.47); \textit{ma}
\textit{bhandānam, ma kalāham, ma viśgaham, ma vivadam} (Parivāra.p.340 = Maha-
vagga.p.190); \textit{sātheyyani, kuteyyani, jimheyyani, vaṅkeyyani} (A.III.300);

4) Paṅcaka - \textit{uraga, dujivha, dāthavudho, ghora-vigo’si, sappe} (Jā.I.285).
\textit{ālasye, kosajje, vissatthiye, pamāde, ananuyoge} (A.III.193); \textit{aggo ca, setho ca, paṭumkho ca, umatto ca, pavaro ca}
(A.IV.246).

Some of the verses in the Canon are so profusely studded with synonyms that should the canonical reference be not given one is quite likely to mistake such verses for those from some synonymous lexicon like the Abhidhāna-
padipika. Mark, for example, the following two verses:
a) śīrivannāma atha va pi kañcanāma
   yanti jātarupam haṭakām ti vuccati 11

(A.III.358)

b) asa ca pīha c’abhinandana ca
   anekadhatusu sara patithita1 (S.I.180)

The ‘a’ gives us only the various names
for gold and the ‘b’ those for desire or craving.
(SA.I.265 explains: kamkhā’ti tanha, abhinandana’ti
abhinandanavasena tanha va vutta, puthu’ti
nanappakāra tanha, .... pajappīta’ti tanha va
Nett.p.53).

In the conversational style pairing off or
massive accumulation of synonyms is always a
pervasive feature. Thus we find:

a) bhikkhū ... tamonuda’ti pi vuccanti,
   alokakara’ti pi vuccanti ... pājotakara
   ... obhasakara ... ukkādhara ....
   pabhāmkarā’ti pi vuccanti (It.p.255).

All these expressions are but to one purpose namely
to say that such bhikkhus are responsible for
enlightenment or knowledge.

b) ācikkhanti, desenti, pannapenti,
pañthapenti, vivaranti, vibhajanti,
uttānikaronti (Ud.p.139). This is merely
a series of linguistic signs intimately
associated together through the related
concepts of explanation and elucidation.
As a few examples of the several sets of nearly equipollent terms that we come across in the Tipiṭaka can be mentioned the following:

a) idhekaacco labhabetu, labhapaccava, labhakaraṇa (sikkhapadam vitikkamati) (Ps.p.48)

b) (dhammesu) cakkhuṁ udapādi, ṉanāṁ udapādi, pannaṁ udapādi, viḷaṁ udapādi, aḷoko udapādi (Ps.p.401)

c) (attho) ānāto, dīttho, vidito, sacchikato, phassito pannaya (Ps.p.412). All these are mere synonyms of what is 'understood' or 'realised'.

The fact that the Buddha has used profuse synonyms to make his meaning clear or to add stylistic grace to his speeches has been duly noted by the commentaries on the Tipiṭaka and the exegetical books like the Netti and the Peṭakopadesa.

The Netti (p.45. et seq.) in fact deals with this particular feature in a separate chapter called Vevacanahara ('mode of conveying through varied expressions'). It specifically mentions that the Blessed One refers to the same object (even in the same context) with 'varied expressions' (ve-vacana) (ekam bhagavā dhammaṁ annamānnehi vevacanehi niddisati). It gives the example of the synonyms of craving cited above (supra.p. 3). It further points out that the
usual formulae of the 'recollections' of the Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha, Cāga, etc. contain synonymous expressions and further gives as many as fifty 'diverse expressions' for nibbāna. It should be noted in passing that nearly half of the synonyms of nibbāna listed in the Nettī occur in one of the Uddānas forming a part of the Saṃyuttanikāya\(^3\). (S.III.320)

The Petākopadesa (p.96) also mentions the fact that in the suttas one thing is explained through many expressions and that this is a typical 'exegesis' (yojana PTSD.s.v.)

vevacanehi anekehi ēkaṁ dhammac pākāsitam |
| sutte yojana'ṭi suttavidu vevacano nāma so hāro ||

'One idea is explained by synonyms more than one', this type of exegesis (lit. application yojanā) in the suttas is known by the term 'the mode of conveying through synonyms' by the knowers of the sutta'.

The Saddanīti (p.901) has also some fine observations on the synonymic usages in the Pali Canon. In the first place it clearly states that in the Canon some synonymic words are used in collococation\(^4\). (samodhānam gacchanti). The instances given are the following: hatthi; kunjara; nāga; idāni; etarāhi; Buddha: Bhagava (Read. āsanaśmīm hi keci sāmanattha sadā ekato samodhānam gacchanti yathā ...)

At another place (p.323) while discussing
how the apparent synonyms vāṇka and balisa have been used together in the verse: yathā pi maccho
balisām vāṇkam māṁsena Chaditām (Ja.II.218), he refers to the views of some who would like to make vāṇka adjectival to balisa. A few others, he says, choose to see in this only a la figure synonymique and say: idam pana 'balisam vāṇkam'ti vacanam
'hatthinago, saroruham padumam, hattī ca
kuṇjaro nāgo'ti ādīvacanam iva parīvayavacanam.'
The view which Aggavāmśa himself seems to endorse is that vāṇka should be interpreted as a dicritical synonym specifying the curved form of the fish-hook (balisa). Interpreted this way, he says the (flower of meaning blossoms like a sāla-tree and the teaching becomes charming
(desanā ca vilāsappatā). In this the dicritical as well as the decorative functions of synonymic usages are correctly noted by Aggavāmśa.

In this Aṭṭhasālīni (= DhsA.) speaking about the synonymic repetitions Buddhaghosa points out their two main functions viz.:

1) To meet the needs of persons of different calibre and ii) An embellishment of the discourse. Thus while explaining the two couplets (viz. 'the conditional' and 'the associated with root conditions'. sahetukā and hetusampayutta) he says that there is no difference in meaning between them but they have been stated differently
partly to embellish the discourse and partly to facilitate
the understanding of the persons who thereby gain under-
standing (imesam dvinnam pi dukanaṃ kincapi atthato
nañattam na'tthi, desanavilasena pana tathabujjhantā-
naṃ va puggalanannam ajjhasayavasena vutta. DhsA.p.47
and the Expositor I.62.). Again explaining why there
should be five different suttas almost verbatim but for
the difference in their (synonymous) titles (viz.
Abhasutta, pabhāsutta, Ālokasutta, Obhāsasutta and
Pajjotasutta) he remarks: It is true that the sense
could have been conveyed by any of them singly. However,
all of them are used with a view to meeting the
inclinations (ajjhasaya) of various persons. The meaning
when diversified (lit. divided suvibhajjāmāno) becomes
'well-specified' (suvibhātta) as the persons of
different calibre can understand them in their own way.
(sattanām ajjhasayavasena suttāni desitāni
tadanurūpeneva idāni desana katā hi akeche
ākerehi vibhajjāmāno suvibhātto hoti; anāthā va
āno bhujjhati, anāthā, va āno. DhsA.p.148 and
the Expositor I.196-197).

'The Buddha knew all things in all their
aspects' (sabbe dhammā sabbākarena buddhassa bhagavato
The 'varied expressions' (vevacanāni) in his speeches
reveal the many related and fine aspects of the things
discussed. With these 'vari-words' the Bhagevā used to 'state, point out, set out, unfold, detail and reveal' the 'cream of teaching (Desanāmanda Ps.p.332). This process of stating (mikkha), pointing out (desana), explaining (pañña), setting forth (patthāpaṇa), unfolding (vīvaraṇa) detailing out (vibhaṇa) and making the things plain (uttanikamma) consisted primarily of using various synonyms. This was the kānengar or the pannattipatha (the path of explanation) which the Tathāgata frequently followed in his sermons.

Buddhaghosa explains pannattipatha mainly as a 'synonymic mode of explication' (paññatipatho'iti pandito, nipuna, vratto, medhavi, katarapotappado'iti adikassa nan北大karato napanasena pavattassu vohārasa patho. DA.II.504). The accumulation of synonymic expressions in the Tipitaka is largely due to this 'device of carefully matching synonyms' (paññattipatha) which the Buddha profusely used in his speeches.

With what has been said so far it should be clear that the Buddha has amply used synonyms with a view to clarifying his teachings. But perhaps being under the wrong impression that 'synonymic repetition' is always a fault in speech (dosa) the Bhaisajyavastu (Gilgit Manuscripts.vol.III.part I.p.10) tries to eulogise the Lord in the words 'vacanam punaruka—
-varjitaṃ esāyeva vyāharase, narottama'. Looking at the overwhelming flush of synonymic expressions in the canon one will hardly dare to endorse this statement. Perhaps what the Bhaisajyavastu implies is that the Buddha's speech was free from the fault of redundancy (punarukta). But synonymic repetition is not always redundant. It can serve many a purpose. Synonymic repetition (synonym dopplung, iterisone sinonimica) may imply 'a partial view of a problem best examined when envisaged in its totality' (Y. MALKIEL. Lingua. 1959. No.8.p.114). This is the case with many an Abhidhammic descriptive-definitions e.g. tattha katama jara? va jara, jīraṇaṭa, khandiccā, paliccā, valittacā, etc. It is really difficult to say in one word what old-age is. The attempt, therefore, should be to get near it by a maze of approximations. The profusion of synonymic usage also shows Buddha's approach to the particular problem from different points of view.

So, if at times the Lord is found adding word to word and expression to expression to the same effect it is because he thinks that this mode allows him to express the unit of his thought with a greater precision. Thus we find him saying: na brahmaṇe sakkaronti, .... garum karonti, .... mānenti, ... pujenti, .... apacayanti (D.I.79). All these words (generally meaning
'to respect') jointly mean what he wanted to say but which he could not say by any one of them singly.

It is with the approximate synonyms like soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa-upayasa (D.II.27) that the Buddha chooses to express subtle distinctions or delicate shades of meaning. Such fine discrimination can be grasped only by those who can think clearly and precisely. What is a nuance to a careful listener may prove a nuisance to a careless one. So far as the Buddha was concerned he never felt any idolatrous dread of repetition when the theme demanded it. If nibbaṇa is to be made known to the people they must be told in full of what it means and that is why it is detailed out as being sabbassamkhara-samatho, sabbupadhipatinissaggo, tanhakkhaya, virago, nirodho nibbaṇam (D.II.29). These words unfold a careful enlargement of what the Buddha meant by nibbaṇa.

In some cases the breadth of Gotama's purpose seems to be so generous as to make him neglect the minute differences in the closely related terms and we find him putting all of one affinity in collocations. In such cases the aim is to encompass effectively the intended meaning. The following are a few instances:

a) (iddhipada) bhavita, bahulikata, yanikata, vattthukata, anuttthita, susamaradha (D.II.81);
b) (saddo) vaggū ca, rañānīyo ca, kamanīyo ca, madanīyo ca (D.II.140).

In many cases synonymic repetition serves the purpose of emphasising some particular thing. In the following instances we can mark some ideas being expressed in clusters of synonyms without any expansion.

a) vupakatthe, appamatto, atapi, pañittato
   (D.II.118)

b) attamana ahesum, pamuditā, pitisomanassajata
   (D.II.151)

c) (etam) cattam, vantam, muttam, pahanam,
   patinissattham (tathagatena) (D.II.93)

The idea of straining and putting efforts is emphasised in 'a', that of 'being glad' is emphasised in 'b' and the 'c' emphasises the idea of 'abandoning'. This is a synonymic 'reinforcement'.

At some places synonyms are seen used for 'euphonic purposes'. Euphony (i.e. pleasing quality of sounds) governs the sequence of words as well as phrases. ṣakaccheti, sallapati, manteti D.II.176. (holds a conversation, speaks, exchanges words) have a rhythm of their own and when they come in succession not merely as words but as sentences the cadence improves all the more e.g. na brahmunā ṣakacchami, na brahmunā sallapemi, na brahmunā mantemi; Mark also the rhythmic sandasseti, samadapeti, samuttlejeti, sampahamseti (M.II.370).
As a phrase becomes more and more popular the words that compose it become mutually adhesive. To this type belong the stereotyped appakicchena appakasirena which have in addition a rhythmic balance and (manussa) ujīhayanti, khiyanti, vipacenti (Mahāvagga.p.78).

The Use and Abuse of Synonymic expressions:

We discussed above the purposes for which synonyms were used in the Canon. We also stressed the point that these synonymic collocations are not purely redundant character as they are meant to clarify and diversify the intended meaning. Right from the times of the Rgveda (for this see ch. III. v. 103 and appendix No. I). The usage of synonyms in collocations can be marked. It will of course be readily conceded that when no stylistic or semantic purpose is served through synonymic usages such usages will have to be counted as mere redundant expressions. Redundancy is a pathetic aspect of synonymic usage and has been finely ridiculated by Śudraka in his Mrcchakātika and CHARLES DICKENS in his David Copperfield. Śakara the half-comic villian in the Mrcchakātika is very fond of using redundant expressions. He says he had taken bath in waters¹, waters², waters³, in garden¹, garden², garden³ with ladies, females and women ⁸.

snato'ham salilajalaih paniyairudyane

upavanakāsane nissannah

nāribhīḥ saha yuvatibhīḥ stribhīḥ.... 11

(IX.1)
Vasantasena, the heroine, increased his passion, his love and his sexual desire mama madanamanangam manmatham vardhayanti (I.21). He was trying to seize Vasantasena by her hair, hair and hair for which he had three different words. 'esa'isi, vasu, sirasi grhita, kesesu, balesu, siroruhesu' (I.4).

It is not that no discrimination can be made between the words which he has used. In fact some of his collocations like udyana : upavana : kanana have their parallels in the Pitakam aranne kanane (Ap.p.52); aranne vipine (Ibid.p.93); kananam vanam (Ibid.p.100, 411); sunne vipinakanane (Cy.p.387).

But the fact is that Sakara did not mean any difference when he used these words together. He was merely piling synonyms upon synonyms. In the same drama when Maitreya, the friend of the hero, speaks about Vasantasena as sa-hiranyā sa-suvarnā a discrimination after the Pali commentaries can be made and hiranya can be explained as unfashioned gold and suvarna as golden-coins or golden-ornaments. It is thus clear that synonymy is a relative matter. If the synonyms are used without any purpose they become redundant if they are used with some purpose they are not redundant but are what ULMANN calls 'homoionsyms' (supra.p.105,118) or 'similar words' (not quite identical in meaning).

In his David Copperfield CHARLES DICKENS has
ridiculed persons who enjoy using arrays of synonyms. Such persons do not merely 'detaste'; they 'detaste, abominate and abjure'. We speak of tyranny of words but such persons like to tyrannize over the words too. This tendency of using synonyms unnecessarily marks a pathological aspect of synonymy. The instances in the Pali Canon are not of this category.

In Shakespeare we find Holofernes indulging in excessive usage of synonyms. 'caelo, the sky, the welkin, the heaven; ... terra, the soil, the land, the earth' (Loves Labour Lost. Act.IV.scene.II). Armado from the same play also shows this habit. But his display of synonyms at times serves the purpose of explaining his neologisms. It is Touchstone in As You Like It (Act.V.scene.1), who gives us a veritable object lesson in the stylistic usage of synonyms:

"Therefore, you clown, abandon, - which is in the vulgar leave - the society - which in the boorish is company, - of this female - which in the common is woman; which together is, abandon the society of this female, or clown, thou perishest; or, to thy better understanding, diest, or to wit, I kill thee, make thee away, translate thy life into death*.

Touchstone did not mean to specify why
synonyms are used but he incidentally has mentioned it. Synonyms are used as he says for 'better understanding', the same purpose for which the Buddha had to use diverse terms to express one thing. It must also be remembered that the Buddha was talking to different strata of the society with different cultural vocabulary (i.e. literary background). His anxiety was to speak to the 'better understanding' of each and every individual of his heterogeneous audience.

**Fluellen the German (Hy.5.IV.vii.36.ff.)** has also expressed incidentally some ideas in the context of synonomic usage which have parallels in the Tipiṭaka too. Says Fluellen: "The pig or the great or the mighty or the magnanimous, are all one reckoning save the phrase is a little variations". Now this is exactly what the Pali literature expresses in words _atthato ekām byañjanamevattha nānā_ and the Ardhamagadhi literature in terms _egatthiya naṇāghosa naṇāvamjana_ (Vattagam. vol.II.p.1070). The gist of both these is that 'the meaning is the same (one) the words (letters) being only different' or as Fluellen says 'all one reckoning save the phrase is a little variations'.

When the same tendencies and purposes of using synonomic expressions are observable in Shakespeare who in time and place was far removed from the Buddha it is no wonder that these are seen in fairly large degree in
the contemporary Jain Āgamas. Below are noted only a few synonymic collocations\textsuperscript{11} from the Jain Canon\textsuperscript{12}.

a) tenām kālennām, tenām, samaēnām
   (Ovavāiya.II.1.)

b) abhatthiē (v.l. ajijhatthiē), cintiē, pattthiē, manōgāē, samkappe (Bhagavāī.I.418.)

c) soccā nisama (Nāyadharmakahaō I.1001;
   Ovavāiya.II.23.)

d) vamādiē, namāsāmī, sakkāremī, sammānēmi,
   ...
   pāajuvasāmi (Thānānga. I.213.)

e) ānīṭhe, akante, appiē, asubhe, samānūnne,
   amānāme, dukkhe no suhe. (Sūyagāda. I.141.)

f) savve pānā, savve bhūyā, savve jīva,
   savve saṭṭā (Āyārānga. I.13; Suyagada.I.166.)

g) magganā, gavesana, cinta, vimāmsā.
   (Namdi.II.1072.)

h) samkā ve kamkhe va viigicchā va
   (Uttarājhayana.II.1002) etc.

For many years the Buddha and the Nīganṭha
Nāṭaputta (Mahāvīra, so called in the Tipiṭaka) were
contemporaries. They also preached mostly in the same
areas. There were at that time fourteen janapadas\textsuperscript{13}
and there must have been many provincial dialects too.
The problem of the original language of the Buddhist
Canon is not yet settled. Researches in Pali and some
available fragments of the Sanskrit Buddhist Canonical
texts like the Śāmyuktāgama are now proving that both the
Pali and the Sanskrit Canons are derived from a common
source which in all probability was composed in the
Eastern Dialect, the language of the daily life in the
land of the Buddha's activity. But as said above the
provincial variations (rather variants, janapadaniirutti-s)
must have been many. It is more than likely that the
Buddha himself in the course of his ĀKarikas ('tours on/foo') picked up many dialectical peculiarities prevalent
in these janapadas and through his speeches these
peculiarities ultimately found their way into the Tipiṇaka.
Such janapada-variatiants have added their own fund of
synonyms to the already existing bulk. An ardent
missionary as he was the Teacher (Śattha devamanussanam)
must have probably disciplined himself in such a way as
to be comprehensible to people speaking different dialects.
This explains the many collocations of dialectical
dia-morphisms\textsuperscript{14} such as appakicchena appakasirena;
manunna manapa, etc. The Buddha must have made it a
literary habit to repeat one dialectical form wherever
the other occurred. The employment of dialectical
variations serves the useful purpose of making the speech
more generally comprehensible; without such synonymic
doublings based on dialectical variations the meaning
would have remained obscure to many a person for whom the
speeches were meant\textsuperscript{15}. The hawkers, the doctors, the
pleaders and the political and religious leaders have to know and have to use many dialectical equivalents.

Fortunately the nidānas (formal introductions) of the suttas have meticulously recorded the particular provinces where the Buddha was staying at that time - whether Ānāga or Magadha - and the persons to whom he was addressing whether cāhāpatiparīsā, brahmaṇaparīsā, khattiya-parīsā or paribbajakā.

As an interesting instance of how people like the talk to be conducted in terminology familiar to them, the first part of the Upāli-sutta (M. II, 44-45) can be cited. Here the discussion centres round whether the sins of the mind are graver or the sins of the body. At the very outset Upāli states that his Master uses the term danda (punishment) for what is commonly called kamma (deed or act). Says he: "na kho, avuso Gotama, ācinnam Niganthassa Nāṭaputtassa 'kammam kamma"ti pannapetum ... 'dandam danda"ti kho, avuso Gotama, acinnam Niganthassa Nāṭaputtassa pannapetum. Further when the Nigantha asks Gotama of his idea of danda the latter asks him to speak of kamma instead of danda for as he says "it is not customary for the Tathāgata to call it danda. It is customary for him to call it kamma". This may show how one and the same thing can have different names in different philosophical schools and religious orders. It is quite likely that after some
time what was once a peculiar term of a particular school may gain common acceptance and be used by all. Thus it is not that the Jain Āgamas make use exclusively of danda. They also make use of kamma. Referring to the statement in the Upāli-sutta that it is customary for the Niganthas to speak of kamma in terms of danda H. JACOBI writes: 'This is true though not quite to the letter; for the word kamma occurs also in the Jain Sutras in that sense. The term danda, however, is at least as frequently used.'16 The Buddhists always use the term sangha for their order and some other ascetics used the term gana to denote their order. Now this was a mere terminological variation and for the people at large who did not minutely know the specific cults it must have made little difference. From their point of view the Buddha was described as saṅghī gani ganacariyo (D.I.113). The term vitarāga is found used in the Udāna but terminologically it is more peculiar to the Jains. The Buddhists used it in the form virāga which connotatively is the same as vitarāga. The point to be noted is that though some ideas may be common to many schools the scholastic terms to express these ideas may yet be different. Note the discerning remark of Dr. G. C. PANDE, about the term sabbakammanjaha used in the Udāna (p.36.) He says: 'The expression sabbakammanjaha, too, is uncommon, and accords more with the Jinist than with the Buddhist
emphasis' ('Studies in the Origins of Buddhism'. p.73).

When the Buddha had to speak to the people who were also addressed by Mahāvīra and the other ascetics and Brahmins we can understand how he must have been compelled to use the terms with which they were familiar. This explains why we come across strings of synonymous terms such as gutta, rakkhita, samvuta etc. (Dh.verses.35-36; A.I.7-8.) The first has a jinistic ring (cf. their doctrine of gupti); the second belongs to the common ascetic parlance and the third is common to Buddhism and Jainism.

The Buddha, thus, has purposely used many dialectical terms in collocations and their usage on a large scale has made his speeches teem with synonyms. His object in this was only to express himself intelligibly to persons from the different cultural strata. But people are always found biased to their own speech habits and particular jānapadaniśrutis (provincial expressions) and conventional terms (sanna). The Buddha could never bring himself to appreciate this. For him it was the meaning which was of more importance, than the words. It was precisely because of this that he was not in favour of fixing his teachings in any particular language like the Vedlic Sanskrit (Chandas). He was always anxious to avoid disputes of verbal nature. People from different jānapadas
recognise the self-same object under different terms. Some may call the pot a vessel (pāṭi), some a bowl (pattā), some others a cup (vittha) and some as goblet (sarava). In the circumstances if some one were to be very assertive and insist on the usage of one of these at the exclusion of others the Buddha must warn him 'not to cling to dialectical usage nor to go beyond the limits of convention' (janapadaniḥrttiṁ nābhiniśeṣeyya, saṁsāram nātīdhaveyya. M. III.318)²¹. The Buddha means to say that when the words pāṭi etc. denote the same thing why quarell over words? Any one of these can be used. Himself would have preferably used all so that all might understand him. In the above he has given a practical advice of not to diverge from general linguistic usage and not to pay undue insistence on provincialisms²². Some obvious instances (e.g. kiccha: kasira) excepted it is not easy to discuss all the dialectical synonyms in Pali. The problem of the home of Pali is yet undecided and it is not easy to draw safe conclusions from its 'features' for the areas covered by each feature are marked out by isoglosses which far from coinciding intersect each other at many places and produce an intricate net work of dialectical traits. Ultimately the once unified area of Pali gives way to a wider area covered with a gangled web of isoglosses.

We propose to study the synonymic collocations
in the Tipiṭaka but it must be made clear that the nature of the contents and the style of the Tipiṭaka are not the same (or even uniform) throughout. In the Suttas (as from D;M;A;S.) synonyms are used mostly to emphasise and clarify certain doctrinal and ethical points. Here the synonyms are of explanatory or epistolary type. When we come to the Vinaya literature we find the use (mostly of pairs) of synonyms for the purpose of precise differentiation\textsuperscript{23}, e.g. arāṇa; \textit{vana}; ākāsa; veheśa; khajja; bhojjja. This can be marked as a 'differential usage' of synonyms. The case of the Abhidhammic synonyms is still much different. In the Abhidhamma we find a profusion of equipollent terms mostly related to psychological categories\textsuperscript{24}. In the analysis such terms will be found of mutually overlapping nature displaying generic similarities and specific differences e.g. \textit{cittam}, \textit{mano}, \textit{vinnanam}, etc.

It is one thing to explain a term by one or two of its synonyms - a mode which we find in some types of oratory - and quite a different one to explain almost every important term in the text with almost all its possible synonyms. This type of synonymic explication can be styled as commentatorial mode, the presence of which can be found in abundance in the Niddesas and the Vibhangas (in the Vinaya) and vibhangas occurring is the Suttapiṭaka\textsuperscript{25}. The Sutta-piṭaka has incorporated in
itself two Niddesa books (Mahāniddesa and Čulanaiddesa) which are wholly of commentarial nature.

Thus broadly one can speak of at least four main types of synonyms. viz.

I) Suttantic – (epistolary or explanatory synonyms).
II) Vinayic – (differential synonyms)
III) Abhidhammic – (equipollent terms)
IV) Niddesic or Vibhangic – (Commentarial Synonyms)

It must be made clear that the above terms are used to mark the types and not the Piṭaka sources. To explain this further, we should always remember that in the Vinaya-piṭaka there are many suttanta-like portions and in the Suttapiṭaka there are quite some discussions of Vinayic and Abhidhammic nature. So when we say Suttantic synonyms the reference is to the type rather than to the source (i.e. Suttapiṭaka).

Pursuing further this thematic or topical approach we will have to deal with still more subvarieties of synonyms and this mostly regarding the Suttantic type. The Suttapiṭaka is too diverse in contents and style as to allow any specifies characterisation. There are in it dialectical portions as in many of the suttas from D and M; there are philosophical disquisitions as in the last vaggas of the Udāna and the last two vaggas of the Suttaniṭāta and there are poetic descriptions as in the Thag., Thig; the twofold Apadāna, Cū., Ud; Sn; and the
Jātakas. In these lyrical portions we find synonyms used for poetical purposes. To specify here we can mark the following varieties:

I) **Kenningar.**

II) **Periphrasis.**

III) **Upamanaic Synonymy.**

IV) **Synonyms for euphoric purposes.**

V) **Synonyms used for the sake of effective monotone.**

VI) **Synonyms for the sake of intensification.**

VII) **The stylistic 'dicolon' and 'tricolon'.**

VIII) **Poetic (synonymic) variations.**

IX) **Synonyms for the sake of intensification.**

Here follows a brief discussion of these varieties:

I) **Kenningar:** This is a special poetic form of synonyms often containing metaphorical expressions. This type is much in evidence in the names of popular objects and popular persons. According to this the Buddha will be called 'the foremost person (uttamaporasa)', 'the best among the bipeds (dvipadamsuttama)', etc. and the Order 'the best field to cultivate merit' (anuttara punnakkheta Apadana,II.7.12,115.) The vinnāna (i.e. nibbāna in that context) will be styled as sabbatopabha (‘resplendent from all sides’). This last instance is specially notable. This type of synonymic usage is due
to the fashion of ornamenting one's speech with what were called in the sixteenth century English 'aureate' or 'inkhorn' terms generally drawn from Greek and Latin. Shakespeare's 'multitudinous seas incarnadine' has enriched the stock of English synonyms for 'several' with the addition of one. \textit{vin\u0101nam\u0101 anidassan\u0101 annantam sabbatopabham} (D.I.190) has done the same in case of the synonyms for \textit{nibb\u0101na}. For \textit{nibb\u0101na}, D.I.25 uses such metaphoric expressions as \textit{madanimmadana}, \textit{pip\u0111avinaya}, \textit{\u0141layasamugch\u0141\u0161a}, \textit{v\u0161\u0161tapaccheda}, etc. all of which (and in the same order) are treated as synonyms for \textit{nibb\u0101na} by Netti (p.54.)

II) \textbf{Periphrastic synonyms}: This cannot be very sharply differentiated from kenningar but the stress here is more on the 'indirect way' of stating things. It is commonly defined as 'circumlocution'. Thus Padumuttara Buddha will be called \textit{Jalajuttaran\u0161mak\u0161} (Buddha). (Ap.II. p.5.)

III) \textbf{Upama\u0101nic Synonymy}: The Canon often compares intellect (\textit{panna}) to a weapon (\textit{\u0141vuddha, sattha}), to a mansion (\textit{pasada})\textsuperscript{27} etc. Curious as it may appear these upamanasa are also given the status of independent synonyms. Thus we find in the list of synonyms for \textit{panna} (Ps.p.132) the expressions \textit{panna-patoda} (goad), \textit{Pannasattha} (weapon), \textit{pannapasada} (mansion), \textit{panna-a\u0118oko} (light), \textit{panna-obhaso} (flash), \textit{pannapajota} (torch), \textit{pannaratana} (jewell), etc. The pervasive (\textit{pariyut\u0161h\u0161ana}) forms of \textit{dit\u0101ti} (speculation) are described in not less
than eighteen terms (Ps. pp. 153-154) all considered as being synonymous, viz. *ditthigata, ditthigahana, d-kantara, d-visukma, d-vipphandita, d-samyojana, d-salla, d-sambadha, d-palibodha, d-bandhana, d-papata, d-anusaya, d-santana, d-parilaha, d-ganthe, d-upadana, d-abhinivesa, d-paramasa*. This terrific battalion is bound to impress on the minds of people the peril in speculation. (or peril that is speculation). It is as if an attempt to 'rub it in' so that there remains no possibility of anybody being attracted to *ditthi*. This mode aims at 'impressive expressiveness'. It helps adding to the given meaning (*panna* or *ditthi* as the case may be) all of its implications necessary to produce the entire effect. (for synonymous upamānas see also DhsA. p. 148.)

IV) **Synonyms for euphonic purpose**: euphony or pleasantness of sound can also be a purpose for using synonyms. Immediately after his birth the Bodhisatta is reported to have uttered the lion's roar: *aggo'hamsmi lokassa, jettho' hamasmi lokassa, settho'hamasmi lokassa*, etc. Here *jettha* and *settha* rhyme with each other and produce a musical effect besides reiterating the meaning 'great' or 'foremost'. Synonyms are also used for observing formal consistency. The Upāli-sutta uses (M. II. 59) the synonyms *narassa* and *posassa* in one and the same verse just to fill in the
required number 'ten' for the scheme is to present the
eulogy of the Buddha in ten verses each one consisting
of ten epithets. The MA.III.97. explains:
narassa'iti punaruttam, annatha vuccamane ekekasathava
dasaguna nappahonti. To somewhat the same type belongs
handa viyayama, vvayama (D.II.204)28

V) Synonyms used for the sake of effective monotone:
   This is not a regular feature in Pali. A few
instances can of course be cited where homology of sounds
has been used as an evocative device e.g. a) varo,
varannu, varado, varaharo (Sn.p.303); b) vamuru,
saja mam, bhadde, saja mam, mandalocane, palissala
mam, kalyani (D.II.199); c) maggannu ca maggaviду
maggakkhavyi narahabo (Apadana. p.245).

VI) Synonyms for the sake of Intensification:
   Synonyms are also used to intensify the meaning.
This is mostly done by adding further intensive prefixes
to adjectives and verbal forms. The illustrations are
haṭṭhapahatta (M.II.368), amoditapamodita; nassati, vata
bho, loko, vinassati vata bho loko. (M.II.333).

VII) The Stylistic 'dicolons' and 'tricolonas' :
   Synonymic repetition in pairs (dicolons) and
in series of threes (tricolonas) is another stylistic and
poetic device. In some measure it is comparable to
affective gemination. The examples are: a) dicolon ; and
b) Tricolon:
a) dicolon: desetu, bhagava, dhammad, desetu, sugato, dhammad (M.II.333); pandito, bhikkhave, passo hattharohaputto, mahapann, bhikkhave, passo hattharohaputto (M.II.7); etadeva kho pana samyojanam, etam nivarana (M.II.30); na tam, deva, vañceni, na tam, deva, palambhemi (D.I.43); pappasa kammasssa kiriyava, pappasa kammasssa pavattiya (M.II.44.)

b) Tricolon: aham nikato, vañcito, paluddho (M.II.209); saraththiko, saragavesi, sarapariyesanam caramano (M.I.243); bhagavantam yeva khumsento, bhagavantam yeva vambhento, bhagavantam yeva upavadamano (D.I.79); te akara, te linga, te nimitta (M.II.27); attivami, harayami, jipuccchami (D.I.184.) This mode of synonymic repetition is more of a popular than of learned type.

VIII) Poetic (synonymic) variations: A poet never show poverty of vocabulary says Vamana: naikah sabdah dvih pravojah pravena (infra.p.189.). The Theras and the Theris exhibit different (synonymous) ways of describing the same thing:

upahata bhava sabbe, mulatanha samuhata !

samucchinna anusava, punussankharadala !

(Apadana.p.275)

Herein four different words have been used to mean 'destroyed'. Again in a verse (p.36) Apadana says:
ambara pupphavasso me, sabbakalam pavassati
which is followed in the next verse by the synonymous
tahim kusumavasso me abhivassati sabbada.
The Vv (p.125) says:
saccam kirahamsu nara sapanna
anannatha vacanam panditanam
where the second line is only a re-wording of the contents
of the first. But by far the best example is found in the
Sn. (p.309):
rago ca doso ca kutonidana
aratirati lomahamso kutoja
kuto samutt thava manovitakka
Herein instead of repeating the same word for 'whence
originated' the Yakkha (Su cilima) uses three different
words viz. kutonidana, kutoja, kutosamuttthava(ya).
So far we have dealt with the poetic subvarieties
of Suttantic synonyms. We now proceed to discuss the usual
type of Suttantic synonyms. The suttas are mostly the
sermons given by the Lord and the Lord always used many
synonyms in the same context to make the subject of his
speech more clearly defined. Such enrichment of speech
by many words or clauses of one sense was recognised as a
trope by Greeks under the term Sinonimia (like or
consenting names). The Romans called it Interpreter because
herein one term interpretes (by way of explaining) the
other. GEORGE PUTTENHAM (The Art of English Poesie ed.
it 'figure of store' because as he says 'Plenty of one
manner, in vulgar, is called store' (ibid). Interesting
it is to note that this device of exposition is known
by two more terms viz. metanoia or penitent. The idea
is as follows: The speaker speaks and feels sorry for
not having spoken adequately. He then tries to fit in
better words to suit the purpose. Because the speaker
as if repents over his earlier speech that the Greeks, call
this mode 'the figure of repentence' but 'repentence' is
commonly followed by 'amendment' and the Romans, therefore,
call it 'the figure of correction'. The process implied
in this explanation shows a sort of loud thinking on the
part of the speaker where his every successive amendment
is a veritable improvement over the preceding one and
adds and supplements it. This is what we find many times
in Pali. The Buddha says something but is not content
with it and goes on adding to it a second expression and
a third and so on. Thus we have balavām bandhanaṁ,
dalhām bandhanaṁ, thirām bandhanaṁ, aputikām
bandhanaṁ etc. (M.II.133) and dikkha, tibba, khaṇa,
kaṭuka vedana (M.I.300; painful, sharp, severe, accute
feelings.)

The Samyuttanikāyika Synonyms:

In 8 the suttas on kindred topics are arranged
together. Thus the Asamkhata-samyutta contains suttas
dealing with the various aspects of nibbana. The suttas are named after these aspects e.g. Asamkhata-sutta, Anāsava-sutta, Ananta-sutta, etc. The uddāna (the metrical list of the names of suttas) which is appended at the end of that Samyutta reads pretty like a nighantu of the synonyms of nibbana. To quote:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{asamkhata} & \quad \text{anantam} & \quad \text{anasava} & \quad \text{saccam} & \quad \text{ca} & \quad \text{param} \\
\text{nipoṇam} & \quad \text{sududdasam} & \quad \text{!} \\
\text{ajājaram} & \quad \text{dhuvam} & \quad \text{apalokitam} & \quad \text{anidassanam} & \quad \text{!} \\
\text{nippapancam} & \quad \text{santam} & \quad \text{!} \\
\text{amatam} & \quad \text{panītam} & \quad \text{ca} & \quad \text{sivam} & \quad \text{ca} & \quad \text{khemam} & \quad \text{tanhakkhave} & \quad \text{!} \\
\text{acchariyam} & \quad \text{ca} & \quad \text{abhhutam} & \quad \text{!} \\
\text{anītikam} & \quad \text{anītikadhāram} & \quad \text{nibbanam} & \quad \text{metam} & \quad \text{sugatena} & \quad \text{desitam} & \quad \text{!} \\
\text{avyapajjo} & \quad \text{virago} & \quad \text{ca} & \quad \text{suddhi} & \quad \text{mutti} & \quad \text{anālayo} & \quad \text{!} \\
\text{dīpo} & \quad \text{lenam} & \quad \text{ca} & \quad \text{tanam} & \quad \text{ca} & \quad \text{saranam} & \quad \text{ca} & \quad \text{parayaṇam'iti} & \quad \text{!} \\
\end{align*}
\]

This list of synonyms can be compared with the one given in the Netti (p.53 et seg), with the Abh. (verses 6-9) and with the list of synonyms for nibbana given in the Saddaniti (p.70. ft.). E. HARDY (Intro. to Netti.p..xxIV.p. f.n.1) is so much impressed by the synonymous titles of the suttas in the Asamkhata-samyutta that he remarks: "S. ²⁹ IV.p.368.sqq. indeed is written for the purposes of a nighantu and an earlier instance than this is hardly to be found". This statement of E.
HARDY cannot be endorsed fully. It is one thing to say that the said portion of S. can be looked upon as a nighantu and quite another to assert that it is specifically written for that purpose. The very design of the S (= 'the book of kindred sayings',) is that of a collection of suttas of kindred nature. It is no wonder then that we have the groups of suttas with kindred (synonymous) titles. If these titles are read along a continuum they are bound to appear like a list of synonyms. The Asamkhata-samyutta was thus not designed to be a nighantu; it turned out to be one.

Presentation of suttas of kindred nature is not, however, the privilege of S alone. In A (Anguttaranikāya) also we find some suttas completely identically worded with the exception that each one of it uses a different word (vevacana, 'verba variale') for light viz. Ābhā, Pabha, Āloka, Obhāsa and Pajjota (supra.p.7.). Here too the purpose is not that of presenting a nighantu but only la figura variale, the employment of which can be traced even to the Vedic Samhitās. The A.V.(II.19) gives us in the first mantra: Agne yatte tapastena tam prati tapa and then in the following four otherwise exactly identical lines we have in place of tapas its synonyms viz. harah, arcīh, śocih and tejah. If strung together these synonyms will form a nighantu but they are not meant for that purpose.
The nature of the Samyuttanikāyic synonyms is that of associated words with each having a strict nuance of its own.

**Adjectival (or Diacritical) Usage of Synonyms:**

This is also a prominent feature of many suttantic synonyms. āttațo putto is the specimen (i.e. son, 'born of one's self'). Here the adjective āttața helps differentiating one class of sons from those of other classes. To clarify, four varieties of sons are enumerated viz. āttațo putto, khettațo putto, dimako putto, and antevaṣi putto (i.e. one's own son, sone of one's wife, son adopted, student looked upon as son, respectively). The putta thus becomes an ambiguous term. The ambiguity is relieved by the adjective āttața. The same is the case with pabbato selo (Ud. p. 93) or 'rocky mountain'. Here sela specifies pabbata which when used in its etymological sense (i.e. 'knotty', 'massive') can mean anything that has a joint31 (so hi sandhisamkhatehi pabbahi cittattā, pabbam assa atthi'ti pabbato). In this sense it can denote even an ant-hill (pamsupabbata) or a 'wooden-mountain' (dārumayo pabbato) to differentiate from which the adjective sela (rocky) is thought essential.

**Uncrystalized Synonymic Adjectives:**

In the suttas one finds many of the later crystalized nouns in their uncrystalized adjectival
stage. The examples are: \textit{pakkhi sakuno} (D.I.63. 'winged bird'); \textit{pāvaka saggī} (Dh.verse.140. purifier fire); \textit{pabbata selo} (Ud.p.93. rocky mountain) etc. At some places these are used in adjectival sense but they also occur singly which means that in those contexts they are used as accomplished substantives\textsuperscript{32}.

\textbf{Viniyog Synonyms:}

In the Vinaya-piṭaka pairs or series of near synonyms are used 1) for legal or technical differentiation and 2) for an exhaustive registration of the acts of kindred character. The typical instances are: \textit{aranṇa}; \textit{vana}; \textit{ākasa}; \textit{antalikka}; \textit{gana}; \textit{sangha}, etc. The process heads towards de-synonamization (infra.p.46). Thus \textit{aranṇa} is said to be 'every place except a village and the approach thereto' (SnA.p.83.) and \textit{vana} 'that which is not \textit{aranṇa}'. \textit{Sangha} is the order as a whole while \textit{gana} is just 'very many' members of the order (\textit{sangho nema bhikkhunīsangho vuccati}, \textit{gana nema sambahūla bhikkhuniyo vuccanti}. Pacittiya.p.432.). \textit{Khadaniya} is 'hard food' and \textit{bhōjaniya} is 'soft food' and they are nicely discriminated in Pacittiya (p.121). \textit{ākasaṭṭha} is that which is in the sky (say sun or moon) while \textit{vehaśaṭṭha} is that which is kept hanging in the air as on peg or some other type of hanger (i.e. that which is not kept on the ground but not also far off from it).
Parajika p.59.) For the differentiation in saṅgha, gana, puga and seni see Pacittiya p.302.

While framing the rules for the monks the Buddha had to take care to see that every kindred act is enumerated so that some cunning monks like the naughty Chabbaggiyas should find no excuse for doing something unbecoming for monks. In the bedroll of his phrasiology the Buddha had to huddle together bhandanā, kalaho, viggaho, vivado, nanavado, annathavado, vinaccataya voharo, medhakā (Farivara p.203)in order to define legally the vivadadhikarana (case of dispute).

Sampajānamusavādo or speaking untruth deliberately is defined (specified) as sampajānamusavādo nama visamyadana-purekkharasasa vaca, gira, vyapnatho, vacībhado, vacasika vinānattī (Pacittiya p.5.)

Samcicca (deliberate, 'having known') is explained as: jānanto, samjñānanto, ce'cca, abhivitaritva (Pacittiya p.169.) Naggā (necked) are defined as: anivatthā, aparuta vā (Pacittiya p.380) i.e. 'necked are those who have not dressed themselves' or 'have not covered themselves'. Saṅgha, gana, puga and seni are also differently explained. (Pacittiya p.302.)

The Abhidhammic Synonyms:

The Abhidhammapiṭaka merely deals with the Buddhist Psychological ethics. It supplies us with numerous definitions which 'consist very largely of
enumerations of synonyms or partly synonymous terms of as it were overlapping circles' (C.A.F. Rhys Davids' Buddhist Psychology II ed. London 1924 p.139). Like the Greeks the Buddhists did not evolve the method of defining per genus et differentium. Instead, we find the terms described by multiplying synonyms or what J.S. Mill might have called 'predication of equipollent terms' (Manual p.398). This is purely the method of a dictionary. Thus for example we find uddhacca (mental excitement) defined as 'the excitement of mind, which on that occasion is disquietude, agitation of heart, turmoil of mind, this is the excitement that there then is' 'yam cittassa uddhaccam, avupasamo, cetaso vikkhepo, bhantattam cittassa idam yuccati uddhaccam'. Here, the definition consists of mutually intercrossing terms. To help give one more example cakkhayatana ('the sphere of vision') is defined as 'the eye, that is to say, the sentient organ derived from the Great Phenomena, forming part of the nature of the self, invisible and reacting - by which eye invisible and reacting one has seen, sees, will or may see form that is visible and impinging - this that is sight, the sphere of sight, the element of vision, this that is 'a world', 'a door', 'an ocean', 'lucent', 'a field' 'a basis', 'a guide', 'guidance', 'the hither shore', 'an empty village'. This is that from which constitutes the sphere of vision'. Here in this definition in addition to the listing of the
equipollent and direct terms we also find in the second half of the definience all the metaphorical expressions (or adhivacanas) used in the Canon for denoting cakkhayatana.

In these complex Abhidhammic definitions one can discern several ways of defining combined such as bi-verbal definitions (i.e. where there is a mere substitution of verbal phrases), definitions in extension, those in intension. Sometimes we are supplied with negative definitions as when ārupāsa labuta is defined in terms of adandhanata and avitthata. It will have to be assumed that these two terms throw light on the term labuta, and are meant for those who know the meanings of them but do not know the meaning of labuta. It is of course not impossible to imagine a few such persons. Ordinarily, however, one may grumble about the usage in the definience of terms which are obscure or less well known than the terms defined. The occurrence of negative expressions in definitions even when the terms defined are not negative will also meet resistance.

But granting all the short-comings of the Abhidhammic definitions from the point of view of Western Logic one must not forget that these were meant mostly to elucidate the dhammas, which purpose, it must be admitted, they have served admirably well. Speaking about the use of equipollent terms in the definitions
JAYATILEKE (p.300) rightly says that 'the use of overlapping synonyms cannot by itself be considered a defect especially in view of the finding that words in use do not have exact connotation and that general terms unite things by virtue of 'family resemblances' rather than properties that all the members of the class referred to have in common'.

It will be interesting to see how C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS has explained the notion of definition in the Abhidhamma. Her way of explanation, itself illustrates the subject which she wanted to explain. Says she: 'hence their definitions consist in the laying together of mutually intercrossing, overlapping or partially coinciding notions'. Now the terms 'mutually intercrossing', 'overlapping' and 'partially coinciding' are just what they mean.

The second variety of Abhidhammic synonyms consists of diacritical terms used for specification. Thus vitakka and vicāra are specified as 'initial thought' and 'discursive thought' respectively (see Manual.p.10). Pīti and sukhā are differentiated as 'joy' and 'ease' respectively (Manual.pp.11-12) and hiri and ottappa are distinguished by 'shame' and 'fear of blame' respectively (Manual.p.20). These semantic differentiations are purely Abhidhammic and have little etymological and (historical) linguistic basis.

To mark the complete identity of meaning between two terms the Abhidhamma uses a typical reciprocative device e.g. yam cittam tam mano, yam mano tam cittam.
The *Middesika Synonyms*:

The fourth and the last group of the topical classification of Piṭakān synonyms is one of the Middesika synonyms.

Niddesa, generally divided into two books Cuḷaniddesa (Nd$_2$) and Mahāniddesa (Nd$_1$) is a commentary on some parts of the Suttanipāta and has been itself included in the Canon as a part of the Khuddakaniṃkāya. This two-fold Niddesa furnishes the most complete types of synonymic clusters. Their official aim is to comment but commenting like translating consists in the rewording of ideas and the Niddesas are never tired of re-wording with the result that we get many re-words (*puna-vacana*, synonym) for the ideas in the original and thus ultimately many a series of synonyms. The Niddesas are so fond of clarifying the ideas with synonyms that if the original text uses but one word we should be sure that the Niddesas will reward (I mean 're-word' also) it with plenty. If the Sn. (p.309) merely uses kutopahūta the Nidessa will run through the whole gamut: kutopahūta, kutojāta, kutosaṃjñā, kutonibbatta, kuto-abhinibbatta, kutopabhūta, kutonidānā, kīśāṃdāyā, kīṃjātika, kīmpabhāyā. On the word bhūripanna from the Sn. (verse No. 792) the Niddesa will burst into bhūripanno, mahāpanno, puthupanno, hasapanno, javanapanno, tikkhapanno, nibbedhikapanno, etc. It will be of interest to compare the list of synonyms of wise given at Nd$_1$ (p.79) with that given in
Saddaniti (p.72). In the first we read *vidvā*, *viṃjagato*, *nāṇī*, *vibhavī*, *medhāvī*, etc. and the second appears almost a versification of this in the form

'vidvā viṃjagato nāṇī vibhavī pandito sudhī'

It is not difficult to see how such Niddesas might have come into existence. Sn. (p.309) gives us in one gāthā three synonyms for 'whence originated' viz. kutionidāna, kutojā and kuto-samutttha(ya). The verse is as under:

rāgo ca doso ca kutionidāna
arati rati lomhaṃso kutojā
kuto-samutttha(ya) manovitakā etc.

It is easy to string these three to form a Niddesic list of synonyms such as we have at Nd¹.p.214 (supra.p.29). At the end of his masterly edition of the Saddaniti HÅLMER SMITH has given a *conspectus terminorum* in which on p.1140, he has listed all the different terms for a vérifier used in Pali. These are *maggitabba*, *gavesitabba*, *pariyesitabba*. For 'rare', the words used are: *dullabha* and *appaka*, for 'example' *sadhakavacane*, *udaharana* and *nidassana*. H. SMITH have culled these words from different Pali sources and this is exactly how the Niddesas are formed. They have formulated lists of synonyms culled from different parts of the Canon. It is good to remember that the term Niddesa originally means 'de-position' (Manual. p.XXVIII.). They are really funds
of explicative synonyms 'deposited' together.

The luxuriant accumulation of synonyms in
Niddesas have contributed a good deal in the development
of Pali lexicography\(^{37}\).

It is perhaps necessary at this stage to reiterate
that the four main classes of synonyms discussed above are
of purely thematic character. There are niddesas in the
other parts of the Canon as there are Abhidhammic portions
and even a whole book like Paṭisambhidamāgga (of purely
Abhidhammic nature) in the Suttapiṭaka and sutta-like
portions in the Vinayapiṭaka. The terms Suttantic,
Vinayic, Abhidhammic and Niddesic are, therefore, to be
understood only in thematic sense and not as references
to sources.

* * * * *

**The Structural or Formal Classification of Synonyms:**

The Piṭakas' synonyms can also be classified
formally on unitery basis. This approach will be purely
structural and the subdivisions can be marked as:

1) Word-synonymy
2) Sentence-synonymy
3) Paragraphic synonymy
4) Pāda-synonymy
5) Synonymous suttas
6) Upamaic synonymy
7) Synonym-compounds
8) Synonyms under grammatical categories
9) Paṭikkhepanānatta.
Here follows a brief discussion of these:

1) **Word-synonymy**: This consists of two or more synonymous words in a sentence. Many examples are already given. The following sentence carries seven synonyms: (manussā kāmesu) sattā, ratta, giddhā, gadhita, mucchita, aijhopanna, sammattakajata (viharanti) (Ud. p.155).

2) **Sentence-synonymy**: This consists of two or more synonymic sentences in a single context. The purpose behind such vera-sentenzia may be either stylistic or explicative. The Udāna (p.114) provides the best illustration: na'ṭthi imesam samannam, na'ṭthi imesam brahmanām; nat'tham imesam samannam, nat'tham imesam brahmanām; kuto imesam samannam, kuto imesam brahmanām; apagata ime samanna, apagata ime brahmana.

The deep structure of all these four sentences is identical the substructurers only differ. To the same type belong: na'ṭthi anto, kuto anto, na anto patidissati. (There is no end; where is the end? The end is not seen). To this variety also belong two sentences presenting the same matter variously as in samāsa (compounded) and vyāsa (uncompounded) forms e.g. mayadevisuto: mayadeviya suto. The sentences presenting the same matter in active and passive forms and the sentences consisting of saddhita forms along with their
explanations, also come under this category. Thus we have:

\textit{ye keci loke vandaneyya, vandanam arahanti ye} (Bu. p. 301). Here \textit{vandanam arahanti ye} is merely a constitutional analysis of \textit{vandneyya} (\textit{sadhita} form). The grammatico-structural variants presented in two sentences in the same context also belong to this category.

The example is: \textit{akara\=ka ime sama\=na sakya\=putti\=ya, na yimehi katam} (Ud.p. 115). These are essentially 'aequipollent sentences'. \textit{CARNAP} (Philosophy and Logical Syntax p. ) defines these as follows: "two sentences are called aequipollent if they have the same content".

3) \textbf{Paragraphic Synonymy:} In the Suttapi\=taka especially we come across whole passages of synonymic nature occurring in succession. The \textit{Adantavagga} of \textit{A\=guttaranikaya} (A.I.7-8) contains four successive paragraphs of synonymic character beginning with \textit{naham}, \textit{bhikkhave, annam, ekadhammam pi samanupassami, vam evam danta\=m mahato atthaya samvattati ...}. In the following three paragraphs \textit{danta} is substituted by \textit{gutta}, \textit{rakkhita} and \textit{samvuta} respectively. The fifth paragraph recapitulates the contents of the earlier ones by enumerating all the synonymic words together i.e. (\textit{evam}) \textit{danta\=m, gutta\=m, rakkhitam, samvutam mahoto atthaya samvattati}.

4) \textbf{\textit{Pada}-synonymy:} This is not essentially different from sentence-synonymy. The difference is merely formal.
Sentences occur in prose and padas occur in verses. The following are the instances of synonymic padas:

\begin{itemize}
  \item asātām satarupena, pivarupena appiyam (Ud. p. 82);
  \item kammā vattati loko, kammā vattati paja (Sn. p. 368);
  \item udabindu yathā pi pokkhare, padume vāri yathā na limpati (Sn. p. 395).
\end{itemize}

5) **Synonymic suttas:** It has been already pointed out (supra. p. 60) that in Sāmyuttanikāya and Āṅguttaranikāya we have whole suttas of synonymic character. To add one more illustration, we have two otherwise identical suttas presenting the various aspects of patīccasmauppāda with the only difference that one uses the word āhāra while the other upādāna (S. II-13; M. I. 94–95).

6) **Upamaic-synonymy:** The suttas very often use many upamās serving the same purpose (ekārthasa) in the same context. The stereotyped passage occurring at the end of many suttas in D and M is a fine illustration of this variety. nikkujjitaṁ va ukkujjeyya, patīcchannam va vivareyya andhakāre va telapajjotam dhāreyya (D. I. 95 and pessim). These different upamās illustrate the same point namely the fact that the Lord has enlightened some one in some context. This has been put in variously as 'he has put the thing in its right perspective, has disclosed what was hitherto hidden from the sight, has shown the right path to one deluded, (and) has held a torch in the darkness (of ignorance)'.
kukkuṭanugata maha (Apadanap.35) also belongs to this variety.

7) Synonym-compounds: The Tipiṭaka abounds with compounds of synonyms (a formation not sanctioned by Pāñjika Grammar infra. p.170). The instances are hatthināga (Ud.p.110); ahināga (mahānāga); giridugga (Jā.JI.331); vipinakānana (Cy.p.387); dharaṇīmahissara (Jā.JI.141); purisaṇugala (M.III.8); garukassanamahīvandana-pu janāsu (M.III.283); jalambuja or elambuja (Snp.399) etc. To describe these compounds I prefer to use the word 'synonym-compound' to 'translation-compound' or 'polyglottism' for the latter implies a compounding of a native and a foreign word (and native word working as a gloss to the foreign word.). A few compounds like elambuja represent, perhaps, polyglottism. At times, one member in synonym compounds serves an explicative function. Thus, for example, is hatthināga where the second member nāga is ambiguous as it may stand for an elephant as well as a snake. When ahi is compounded with it it will be restricted to 'elephant' alone. We have instances (in uncompounded forms) where synonymous words are used to clarify the meaning and to remove ambivalence. e.g. santo: sappuriso and santo: samane. Santa is ambiguous as it can be looked upon as a present participle of v asa- 'to be' and also as an adjective in the sense 'good'. In passing, it should be pointed out that some expressions if detached
out of their contexts look like synonym-compounds when actually they are not. Dr. MADHUSUDAN MALLIK ('Near synonym compounds in Pali' BPSC. vol.VI. October, 1966. p.20.) considers duddhakhīra (Sn.p.271. occurring in the first verse of the Dhamiya-sutta) as an instance of polyglottism. Actually, however, it is only a Bahuvrīhi compound describing the heardsman ('who had milked the milk' i.e. 'the cow' duddhām khīram vena so, duddhakhīro). The duddha is here a past passive participle and not as a noun meaning 'milk'.

8) Synonyms under Grammatical Categories: The Pīṭakā synonymas can also be classified according to their grammatical forms and parts of speech which they represent e.g. synonyms, syn-verbs, syn-adjectives, syn-particles, etc. (infra.p. 90.). So pahīno, ucchinnamūlo, tālāvatthukato and anabhavam gato (v.l. kato) is a string of four synonymous adjectives. Ujjhāyanti, kāyanti, vīpācenti (Ud.p.144) is a string of synonymous verbs. Synonymous prefixes are seen in samvarāṇa: nīvarāṇa and synonymous suffixes in kodho:kujhana:kujhitattam (For a detailed discussion of synonymic prefixes and suffixes see ch.VII.). Synonymous particles used in collocation are seen in najjo yathā vārivahā va sāgamā(Śrīśat) cp.Skt. hāmso yathā ksīramīvambumadhyat).

9) Paṭikkhepanānatta (Diversity or multiformity with regard to negative or opposite words); Not unlike
to the Upanishadic ekameva a-dvitiyam (Ch. Up. VI. 2. 1), yadeva sāksadāparokṣad brahma (Br. Up. III. 4. 1) and agrhya, na hi grhyate, asīrya, na hi sīryate asango na hi sajyate (Br. Up. II. 5. 15) the Pali Canon also frequently states the contents both in positive and negative ways. A sort of precision is sought by using a term formed by the negation of its antonymous expression. (i.e. the negation of its regular antithesis Read. noter aussi la précision apportée par un terme négatif selon la formulae. H. SMITH, Saddanītī. p. 1135). The examples are

a) ēka, a-dutiyā (Thag. p. 358)

b) sākehi kammehi a-papakehi, punnehi me laddhamiṁ manunnaṁ (Vv. p. 124)

c) dukkha kama, kṛaka, na sukha kama, kṛaka. (Thag. p. 255)

d) sīlām veditabbam tam ca kho dighena addhuna na ittām; manasikaroṭa, no a-manasikaroṭa; pannavatā, no duppanna (Ud. p. 1410)

e) atha purisa ṣaccacheva jīvitukāmo, a-maritukāmo; sukhākamo dukkhapāṭikulō (S. II. 85)

f) (abhinibbati) ahosi tesām yeva sattānam, anānnesam; sadisānaṁ yeva, no asadisānam; dhammeneva, no a-dhammena (D. III. 73)

g) (gāthā) sugītā, no duggītā, subhāsīta no dubbhāsīta; atthasamītā, no antthasamītā
(D. III. 76)

h) (bhariya paccupatthatabha) - sammananaya, 

anavamananaya (D. III. 147)

i) dulladdham vata me, na vata me suladdham 

(M. I. 237)

j) (mayam) sammadana, a-vivadana (M. I. 257).

The function of such expressions is the same 
as what Sayana has pointed out with reference to sthene, 

balsya, aavirsamasayya Ait. Br. I. 13). Sayana explains 
the style as tasyaiva avayavyatirekabhyam vyakhyanem 

prabalyam aavirsamasanam ca.

It is quite likely that in the Dh. (verse No. 

34.6) we have an instance of the same stylistic trait in 

etam dalham bandhamahnu dhira 

charina m sitihla dupeeumca\n
Here dalha is strengthened by its negatively 
worded synonymic expression a-sithila and further by 
spheresis the initial - a - is dropped. dradh\a and 
a-sithila is a popular pair and we have it in Taitt. Br. 

(III. 1.5) drdho sitihla syam and drdho ha va 
a-sithilo bhavati 38 .

In this variety which has been characterised 
as patikkhepanananatta the contents stated positively are 
also stated negatively and vice versa. The purpose behind 
this may be purely stylistic or else that of reinforcing 
the statements. In popular speech there is little difference
between punna and a-papa. For common people what is not moral is immoral and vice versa. They do not bother themselves to enquire about the third possibility namely whether a thing is 'a-moral'. It is only the Abhidhammic technical classification in triads that points out the third subtle possibility of a-papa not necessarily being synonymous with punna. The very first Tika from the Abhidhamma-matika goes as:

kusala dhamma
a-kusala dhamma
avyakata dhamma (Dhs.p.3)

But though technically (or Abhidhammically) punna and a-papa may not necessarily be synonyms, in the non technical (popular) Suttantic phrasiology these two are quite synonymous.

Implicational Synonyms:

Just as the words which are synonyms in common parlance may not remain synonymous in technical contexts so also the words which will be never suspected as being synonyms in common speech may turn out as synonyms in philosophical contexts. The verbal meanings of such expressions may be different but their philosophical implications are the same on the basis of which they may be treated as being philosophically synonymous. These, I choose to call implicational synonyms. Here implication, resultation or entailment are of importance; not the
verbal coinciding of meanings. Thus on a purely logical level the following two statements are exactly synonymous:

1) Either the girl is not singing or Bill is deaf.
2) If the girl is singing then Bill is deaf.

The Naiyāyikas have always seen in Arthāpatti a sort of redundancy for in it what is implied is again stated in words. Vatsyāyana (Nyāya-sūtra-bhāṣya on II. ii.1) points out that if anyone says that there is no rain when there are no clouds' it is implied that 'there is (or 'will be') rain when there are clouds' and therefore it is redundant to state it expressly. But what is philosophically implied is many times stated explicitly for the sake of clarification. Thus, for example, rupe catummaḥabhūtiko (D.I.30). Here the first expression rupe implies the second one i.e. catummaḥabhūtiko for according to Abhidhamma [material shape] 'rupa' itself means 'the four gross (olārika) elements' Philosophicallymicchādīṭṭhi amounts to sā-kiriya-vāda and natthikavāda and the three terms therefore become synonymous. (ahetukavāda, skiriya-vāda, natthikavāda M.III.141; see also in this connection M.II.85; A.II.34; S.II.422).

Sometimes it appears that the Canon wants to point out 'philosophical synonymy' between certain terms. At such places one term is replaced by another in the otherwise identical contexts. Thus we find cattāro upadāna
tanhanidana ... etc. at M.I.94 and cattaro añāra
tanhanidana ... etc. at M.I.321. Here in these two
suttas\textsuperscript{42} which aim at expounding paticcasamuppāda the
synonymy between añāra and upādāna is clearly hinted at.
This implication (i.e. añāra = upādāna) is present in
sabbe sattā añāra - ṭhitiṅka (Khuddakapāthap.4) which
is many times wrongly interpreted in the narrower context
to mean that 'all beings subsist on food'\textsuperscript{43}. We do not
require a Tathāgata to tell us such common place things.

Philosophically the core of ethical act or
kamma is cetanā (volition behind the kamma). This in
fact is the moral of the Tittira-Jātaka (Jā.No.319.).
The Buddha has no hesitation in identifying kamma with
cetanā ethically. He says: cetanāham, bhikkhave,
kammam vadayami; cetayitvā kammam karoti A.111.12).
Cetanā is the deeper content of kamma; kamma is the
outward expression of cetanā. For philosophers they mean
the same. Even jānma and mṛtyu which make 'a world of
difference' for common people are for philosophers
implicational synonyms. For them life means death and
death also means life. A person who is born necessarily
dies (jātasya hi dhruvo mṛtyuḥ dhruvam jānma mṛtasva
ca B.G.2.II.27.). Death being a necessary counterpart
of birth jīvaloka and mṛtyuloka are referentially the
same (and therefore synonymous). The fear of punarjānma
is really a fear of punarmṛtyu and instead of punarjānma
we read of punarmrtyu in the Brhmaṇa Lit. (punarmrtyum apaşıṇati. Sat.Bρ.1.1.4.14; II.3.3.9.) The ṯa refers to life in terms of mṛtyu (avidvā mṛtyum tirtvā. verse no.11.)

In modern contexts 'love' and 'charity' are not synonyms but their basic concept is the same which if understood makes these two synonymous. Thus the common Old English rendering of Latin c(b)aritas is luf as in Alfred's translation of Florae soliloquium while the authorised version has 'charity'. And for Shakespeare 'love' and 'charity' are inseparable: 'and who can serve love from charity?' (Loves Labour Lost.IV.iii.363.f.)

It may appear somewhat curious that the Pali Canon should use kaya synonymously with atta. A student of Vedanta who is so persistently taught to differentiate between soul and body (deha-dehi-viveka) will simply shudder at the thought of atta-h and kaya being thought of synonymous. But this is what is there in the Tipitaka. The technical term for a '(wrong) belief in the existence of soul as distinct from the five aggregates', is sakāvadīthi. 'Soul', of course, can be equated with body only in the reflexive sense. (A.Coomerswamy p.122). In English, for example, we use 'body' with 'some' (as in 'somebody') but not in the contexts of 'I' or 'he' (where we have strictly 'myself' and 'himself' and not 'my body' or 'his body'). In the Rigveda (VII.86.2) 'one's
body' uta svaya tanva sam vade'. Almost the same 'self-body-synonymy' do we find in the Tipitaka. e.g.
D.I.30 has anna atta dibbo rupi manamayo while
D.I.68 has annam kayam ... rupim manomayam.
In anicca vata samkhara uppadavayadhhammino
(Apadana.II.11) the words anicca and uppadavayadhhammino are Philosophically the same.
In vikkhinno jatisamaaro, nattai tassa
punabbhavo (Ud.p.116) what is stated positively in the first
pada is stated negatively in the second one.
Just as philosophically cetana and kamma are synonymous so also are kama and dukkha synonymous. The reason is plain; the kamas invariably result in pain.cf.
dukkha kama, kruka, na sukha kama, kruka !
yo kame kamavati, dukkham so kamavati, kraka !
(Thag.p.255)
Because the kamas always result in pain, the latter becomes another name for the former.cp. dukkham'iti, bhikkhave,
kamanametam adhivacanam (A.III.30).
A simple form of redundancy in expressions from the point of view of eating food is ekabhikkho Samano
Gotamo, rattuparato (D.I.6) where rattuparato is explicative of ekabhikkha i.e. 'Gotama takes food only once,
that is to say that he desists from taking food at night'.
D.I.5. uses appamattaka semisynonymously with
silamattaka. (appamattakam kho panetam, bhikkhave,
oramattakaṃ, ṣīlasmattakaṃ). It is not difficult to understand why ṗīla should be called appamattaka (meagre in quantity or insufficient) and ormattaka (low in quantity or grade). In the Buddhist education (sikkha) ṗīla is not 'all', it is just the beginning⁴⁵ (mukhametam, pamukhametam kusalenaṃ dhammanam). ṗīla forms the primary education (VinĀ. p. 787) the graded course being ṗīla-samādhi-pannā. These three were realised by the Enlightened One in succession (anubuddha ime dhamma gotamena vasassīna. A.II.3.). For the same reason ādi denotes ṗīla, majha denotes samādhi and pariyosāna refers to panna. These are purely Buddhist equivalents. The commentators well-versed in Buddhist educational terminology correctly interpret the words which qualify Dhamma. viz. 'Dhammo ādikalyayo, majhekalayāno, pariyosānakalyāno D.I.87 in the light of the above equivalents, cf.

ādimhi ṗīlam dasseyva, majhe maggam vibhaveyo |
paryosāsamhi nibbānaṃ, esa kathikasanthiti'iti

(DA.vol.I.p.176)

Translation of Synonyms:

At this stage it will be convenient to discuss the important and interesting question of translation of synonymic collocations. When the synonyms come in succession they naturally embarrass the translator who may not find adequate number of synonyms in the language of translation. Many Pali words do not have adequate English equivalents.
The translator has to use the nearest (but often improper) English word or else to make a wordly explanatory paraphrase by way of conveying the meaning. Thus it was scarcely possible for MAX MÜLLER to use different terms to denote āsava, kāma, vana and tanha in his translation of Dhammapada. For all these he had to do with 'desire'. FAUBSOLL, another worthy translator had to repeat 'desire' (without qualification) in translating at least thirteen different words all generally meaning vicious or excessive desire. These terms from the Sn. are: sitā (clinging, bond), nirāsaso and anāsaso (free from hankering after), sinheho (stickiness), chatata (hunger), kaye chandam (desire for body), ussāda (arrogance), tanha (thirst), panidhi (aspiration), akasam (puffed state, space), vissattika (attachment), jappitani (yearning), etc. The renderings of these terms given in the brackets are not accurate. All these words in Pali do not directly denote 'craving'; they manifest the diverse aspects of craving. One must sympathise with the English translators if they have made the poor 'desire' to do the duty of all the above words. In discussions one may well argue for tanha being not merely 'desire' - which in English has not that unhealthy sense which it has in Pali - and insist on 'craving' as being a better equivalent. The difficulty arises when tanha attacks not alone but with its well arranged battalions. Such synonyemic repetitions are really translator's despair. Who can be sure of the exact renderings of about thirteen like terms
in S.IV.352-354 all generally signifying great and sharp intellect? The terms are mahapanna (of great intellect), puthapanna (of wide intellect), vipulapanna (of abundant intellect), gambhirapanna (of deep intellect), appamattapanna (of alert intellect), bhuripanna (of enormous intellect), sīghapanna (of ready intellect), ṭasapanna (of swift intellect), javanapanna (of fast intellect), tikkhapanna (of sharp intellect), nibbedhikapanna (of penetrating intellect).

It is not that diverse words cannot be fitted in but it will be certainly difficult to justify our choice of the particular words. In the Ait. Br. (Adhyāya.37.) when four synonyms come in succession as varama, dadami, ityai, abhijityai, vijityai, samjityai A.B. KEITH (Ṛgveda Brahmanas in Translation. 1920.p.326) tries to diversify them as 'a boon I give you for conquest, for victory, for winning, for success'. There is nothing in the nature of these words to justify their respective renderings attempted by A.B.KEITH. The Pali teacher always tries his best to translate the Pīṭakān synonyms with the best possible equivalents but he has to confess that he is just trying to use as many different words as there are synonyms in the original and is at pains in maintaining as far as possible 'one to one relation'. Take the instance of the pair sukheti pīneti (A.II.71). Here if 'pleases' is already used to render sukheti he has to reserve 'gladdens' to represent pīneti. This is merely strategic. One may as well choose to translate the same pair as 'makes
happy and pleases' (PTSD.pineti.s.v.) in which case 'pleases' may represent piti and not sukha. There is nothing in the nature of piti and sukha as used in the Suttantic contexts which should connect them with some definite English words.

Sakkato, garukato, manito, pujito, apacito (Ud.p.113) is a usual synonymic pentad in the Tipiṭaka. The terms are so much overlapping that one can do no better than translate them just with a set of five synonyms in English meaning 'honouring' without insisting on any definite order of the English words. e.g. 'Revered, venerated, esteemed, honoured and worshipped'. There is nothing between the Pali and English sets of synonyms to warrant 'one-to-one' correspondence between their members. The order or the English set therefore is not strictly unalterable. In such cases it is generally a matter of purely subjective choice to set the order. Perhaps the only anxiety of the translator will be to see that the same order of English words is consistently followed in cases of subsequent repetitions of the Pali series of synonyms. This is just an academical discipline as for example the consistency in abbreviations is carefully maintained. In the above, maneti and pujeti are translated variously in English but it will be interesting to note that Saddaniti (p.549.No.1513) gives puja itself as one of the three meanings of the root mana (cf. mana pujaṃ pemanem _vimasayam_). Aggavamsa further explains this as tattha manetiiti pujeti. He is conscious of the discrimination introduced between them by the commentators. He says that under
the exegetical discipline of discriminating between synonyms they were obliged to distinguish _mCeti from urses. \((\text{Āṭṭhakathā} \ pana \ pujentī\'ti \ paccayehi \ pujentī; \ manenti\'ti \ manena \ piyavanti\'ti; \ so \ (attho) \ vevacanatthappakasasanavasena \ vutto\'ti \ gahetabbo \ manana-pujanasaddā \ hi \ pariyayasaddatā \ vevacanasaddā \ va.\)

It will be instructive to note a few remarks of modern scholars. In the context of icious which are explained by obhasana and aloka respectively, Miss I.B. HORNER remarks: 'though the latter is perhaps the more general in range than the former it is very difficult to decide on the exact English words to fit the Pali words or to indicate what precisely each of the latter intends'. (Translation of Milindapanho.\textit{p.53}). Here we give the scholarly observation in the PTSD (dukkha s.v.) on the accurate translation of dikkha: 'There is no word in English covering the same ground as dikkha does in Pali. Our modern words are too specialised, too limited and usually too strong ... we are forced, therefore, in translation to use half-synonyms, no one of which is exact. dikkha is equally mental and physical. Pain is too predominantly physical, sorrow too exclusively mental but in some connections they have to be used in default of any more exact rendering. Discomfort, suffering, ill and trouble can occasionally be used in certain connections. Misery, distress, agony, affliction, and woe are never right. They are all much too strong and are only mental'. The purpose of giving this
long quotation is only to impress how difficult it is for any meticulous translator to render with precision a single word dukkha in Pali. And how much more difficult would it be to translate the series of terms related to dukkha.

These intricately inter-related and subtly overlapping terms collectively represent the twelfth and the last member of the causal-nexus. They are: soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa-upayasa. The following conspectus of the various renderings of these kindred terms by eminent authorities will demonstrate the difficulty in translating synonymic series.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soka</th>
<th>Parideva</th>
<th>Dukkha</th>
<th>Domanassa</th>
<th>Upayasa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sorrow</td>
<td>lamentation</td>
<td>pain</td>
<td>grief</td>
<td>despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grief</td>
<td>sorrow</td>
<td>suffering</td>
<td>lamentation</td>
<td>despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grief</td>
<td>lamentation</td>
<td>pain</td>
<td>dejection</td>
<td>despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sorrow</td>
<td>lamentation</td>
<td>evil</td>
<td>grief</td>
<td>despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sorrow</td>
<td>lamentation</td>
<td>misery</td>
<td>grief</td>
<td>despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grief</td>
<td>lamenting</td>
<td>suffering</td>
<td>sorrow</td>
<td>despair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The sources:

1. BHIKHU NĀNAÑAMOLI. 'Path of Purification' p.592.
5. H. C. WARREN. 'Buddhism in Translation' HarvaRD 1915.p.84.)

The comparison is revealing; it will be unnecessary technical to set out the proof of the fact.

Translation being a replacement of textual material in SL (source language) by equivalent textual material in TL (Target language) it is intrinsically related with the synonynic resources of both the languages. Now, the synonynic resources of a language are unique structural peculiarities of any synchronous system. The relative richness and mechanism of Pali can be best grasped only by setting them against languages like English. The difficulties encountered in finding out matching number of synonyms in English and other languages to represent the Pali synonyms shows the relative wealth of the Pali synonymic vocabulary. To help give one more example I cite the following tetrads from A.II.417: skacco puggale ittarasaddho hoti, ittarabhatti, ittarapemo, ittaranpassado. Some one person is of 'unstable (Skt. itvara) faith', unstable devotion, unstable love, unstable favour'. JAYATILEKE (p.305) translates this as: 'here a person has very little faith, very little devotion, very little affection and very little belief or appreciation'. According to him saddhā is faith, bhatti is devotion, pema, a filial affection and pasada mental appreciation. He admits (ibid) that the Pali Canon uses saddhā in such a way that the regular meanings of bhatti,
pema and pasāda overlap with it. Indeed the Jñānapraśthāṇa-
sāstra (I.19; ed. by S.B.Śastri.1955) explains śraddhā itself
as cetasaḥ prasādaḥ or 'appreciation of mind'. The Canon
also uses cetago pasāda (M.I.152) in the context in which
one expects to find saddhā, thereby suggesting their inter-
changeability (or in other words, synonymy). It is very
necessary to note this for it makes one aware that though
for the sake of translational suitability saddhā is rendered
as 'faith' yet it does not have the connotation (of faith)
it has in western religion. Dr. GYÖRÖI-LUDOWYK very finely
explains this in her 'Note on the Interpretation of Pasidati'
(UGR.vol.I.pp.74-82). In western religions faith means 'to
believe in something which cannot be explained' and it
culminates in the attitude of Credo quia absurdum. She,
therefore, prefers to translate pasidati more Buddhistically
as 'a mental attitude which unites deep feeling intellectual
appreciation and satisfaction, clarification of thought and
attraction towards the teacher' (or Teacher ?) (op.cit.p.82).
This is the correct characterisation of saddhā but it will
be quite unwealdy to substitute this note-like rendering
every time for saddhā is also added to bhatti etc. as embarras
de riches. It is always better to translate it as 'faith'.

The Value of the Study:

In view of the discussion carried on so far one
may perhaps not feel it necessary to ask about the value of
the study of Pali synonymic collocations or the purpose such
a study can serve. It will be yet not out of place to indicate in brief the gain that can be derived from such a study.

In the first place one will readily admit the fresh approach towards the Pitaka exegesis indicated by the study of synonyms. Although the synonymic repetition is a prominent stylistic feature of the Canon it has not yet received a full and independent treatment that it most deserves. Let apart Pali synonyms, synonymy itself has remained to this date a little studied aspect; it is one of the recent departments which have been introduced into linguistic discipline. As yet there is not a single book specially devoted to synonymy or synonymics. Partly to supply this deficiency it is proposed to devote two full chapters to the study of modern Western and Ancient Indian theories of synonymy (vide. chs. II & III) respectively.

In a way the study of Pali synonyms has only one or two problems to consider. These are: How far are the given words synonymous and if they are not, what are the minute differences which they exhibit? A comprehensive study of these problems, however, requires an intelligent discussion of a wide variety of connected problems such as i) synonymic resources of the Pali language. ii) the stylistic and Philosophical aspects of the Pali synonym in collocations. iii) Synonyms and their bearing on other important aspects as metaphors and parables in
Canon (ch.V), Piṭaka etymologies and etiologies (ch.VI) and Piṭaka mythology (ch.VIII) to mention only a few. The Pali commentorial and exegetic literature have made a distinct and valuable contribution to the study of synonymics. Their exegetical methods are still unknown to a large number of western scholars who are studying synonymy from different points of view. It is but necessary that someone presents a systematic (though sketchy) account of the achievements of the Pali writers in this connection. To meet this demand a separate chapter (No.IV) has been written. The survey of the Ancient-Indian views on synonymy (ch.III) will also prove to be a fresh avenue to the uncanny Ancient-Indian Synonymic exegesis.

Along with the above indication of the main purpose of the present dissertation, the following additional advantages of the study of the Pali synonymic collocations should also be noted:

*Synonymic collocations serving as Sense-determinatives:*

It will be observed that if a particular word is obscure in meaning (or etymologically), the synonymic collocation in which it figures sheds a revealing light on its meaning and many times hints at its correct etymology. Thus without actually being a commentary such synonymic collocations serve as commentaries. To illustrate:

a) **attadīpaḥ, bhikkhave, viharatha, attasaraṇaḥ, annaṁsastraṇaḥ** (P.II.80) The early translators unaware of the intended meaning of dīpa erroneously rendered attadīpaḥ.
as 'be ye lamps unto yourselves (Dialogues of the Buddha I.W. RHYS DAVIDS). In the context dīpa stands not for 'lamp' but for 'shelter' or 'refuge' (Skt. dvīpa-island, 'a refuge for the shipwrecked'). The other synonym in the context sarāṇa (resting place) enables us to fix the right meaning of dīpa. The Middesas give dīpa, tāna, laṇa, sarāṇa parāyana etc. as synonyms. (Nd² pp. 145, 147).

b) The meaning of the word sampavāṅka is not clear. The meaning that is attested from the synonymous context is 'intimate friend' or 'close companion' PTSD (s.v.) says: 'perhaps sanj + pari + anka contracted to payanka > pavanaka' but this makes little sense. CHILDERS (sampavāṅka s.v.) confesses: 'apparently sampra + vakra, but how this comes to have this meaning I cannot tell'. Actually CHILDERS has suggested the correct etymology but he is not sure of the process through which vāṅka comes to mean 'a friend'. Had the synonymous collocation kalyanamitta, kalyanasahāva, kalyanasampavāṅka A.IV.8 been not there it would not have been possible even to understand that it means 'a friend'. DhAsA (p. 394) clarifies the semantic-shift as tam-sampavāṅkata'ti, teśu puggaleṣu kāvnya caeva, cittena ca sampavāṅkabhāvo; tanninnata tapasopanta tappabharata'ti attho. A friend is one towards whom you 'incline'.

c) ujjhāyati - Already PTSD has used the synonymous collocation as a means to ascertain the meaning of this somewhat obscure form ujjhāyati. Read: 'In phrase ujjhāyati, khīyati, vipāceti it seems to correspond to jhāyati² (Sk.
ksāyati) and the meaning is 'to become chafed or heated, to become vexed, angry, to take offence'; as evidenced by the combination with quasi-synonyms, ujjīhvayanti and vipācenti, both referring to a heated state, fig. for anger" (PTSD. khiyati s.v.). In deriving acchati fr. the Vedic āsāyati, āste the PTSD has again used the criterion of synonymic substitution and thus fixed the meaning 'to sit, to stay'. Because in many other contexts nisimna comes in place of acchati that PTSD explains acchati as 'to sit'. The method is correct but the PTSD has failed to hit at the correct synonymous root for in case of acchati it is not ॐ sad but ॐ kṣa – to dwell, kṣaya, 'a house, dwelling'.

d) khanti – The Pali word khanti represents Skt. kṣānti 'forebearance' as well as kanti - 'liking' Dr. P.V. Bāpat (KHANTI: KANTI: KṢĀNTI. CHARU DEVA SHASTRI Felicitation vol.Uni. of Delhi pp.635-642) had to explain that in many contexts such as Sn.p.107. khantim akubbamāno etc. the word stands for kānti and not kṣānti. The usual synonymic series attano khanti, attano ruci (MII.377); nānākhantika nānāruci (Ud.p.142) by using khanti in combination with ruci make it sufficiently clear that the word in such contexts stands for kānti alone.

being derived from pari + Vda (do). She cites some evidence from VinA. (pp.477-478) to show that the original idea of paritta was 'to cut on all sides (say, a grassy part of land) with a view to protecting it from advancing fire'. She refers to bhūmitacchana (isolating a piece of ground by cutting it from the rest and parikhākaraṇa (digging a trench). According to her in both these cases 'protection is subsequent and dependent on 'cutting on all sides' or 'circumscribing' (op.cit.p.123). Miss Kher cites the analogy of avatta in suggesting the derivation of paritta fr. pari + Vda (do). It is difficult to agree with Miss Kher when she says that 'protection is subsequent and dependent on cutting on all sides'. This amounts to considering the particular act and not the general idea. I think the case is exactly the reverse i.e. protection seems to be the original idea and 'cutting on all sides' appears to be a particular act or variety of protection. The usual synonimic pair kata me rakkhā, kata me paritta suggests the derivation of paritta from pari + Vtrai (tra). Paritta seems to be only a nominal variation of parittā along with parittāna (cp. vinigamana: vinigamana; kamana:kamana etc.).

f) The test of synonimic substitutability also helps us understand in a better way some philosophical ideas. Thus for example Dukkha-nirodha, the third Noble Truth is rendered as 'cessation of pain' but nirodha though etymologically stands for cessation does not in that context mean
'cessation' alone. It is not a mere 'stopping', it is more properly 'leaving behind' or 'transcending'. Thus we find in It. (p.194) the usual nirodha being substituted by atikkama:

dukkhaṁ dukkhasamuppaññāṁ dukkhasa ca atikkhamanāṁ !
ariyañcattāthāṅkikāṁ maggam, dukkhaṁ pasāmañgamināṁ ।

Elsewhere also we read not of 'stopping of dukkha' but leaving it behind or abandoning it as in sukhassa ca pahānaṁ dukkhasa ca (M.I.306); nirodha is also described as nissarana or escape (yam kho pana kīñci bhūtam samkhatam paticca-samuppānam nirodho tassa nissaranam D.III.212. Dukkha is a sacca 'existent'. One cannot destroy it; one can only get rid of it, disburden it, or abandon it (cp. pañino jālasamkhāto. Thag.p.265).

g) Relying on the passage daharo va samanó susukā- lakeso bhadrena yobbanena samannāgato pathamena vayassā (M.I.295) E.J. THOMAS (The Life of The Buddha. reprint.1966. p.58) asserts: "It makes the Bodhisatta leave the world not at the age of twenty-nine, but when quite a boy (daharo). G.P. MALALASEKERA (DPPN.p.791) does not agree with E.J. THOMAS in his interpretation of daharo as 'quite a boy'. He thinks and rightly so, that the word daharo indicates the 'prime of youth'. Really speaking had E.J. THOMAS interpreted the word in its synonymic context he would not have missed its correct meaning. In the Suttanipāta (Pabbajja-sutta. verse 16.Sn.p.33) we find the king Bimbisāra describing the 'young
Gotama' in words *yuva ca daharo ca'si pathamuppattiko susu* which show the paternal affection of the king for the Bodhisatta. For elderly persons a boy is only 'a child' and a young man 'a youngster'. Thus Gotama was for Bimbisāra a youngster (*yuva*), a small chap (*daharo*), a child (*susu*) in his prime (*pathamuppattiko*). It is this sense of *daharo* which is to be understood in the Dhammapada (*p.53.verse No. 382*).

*ye ha ve daharo bhikkhū yunāti buddhasāsane !
so'nam lokam pabhāseti, abbā mutto va candimā !*

(Translation: Indeed whosoever young monk engages himself in the Dispensation of the Awakened One that man pervades in the world with light (of knowledge) as the moon released from clouds). The Buddha, we know had disallowed accepting 'quite young boys' in the Order. (**Mahāvagg.p.81.**).

A study of the Pali synonyms carried along the lines indicated in the preceding pages will also help understanding of many non-Pali and non-Buddhistic matter. It will be observed that the Pali style of synonymic repetition is only an excessive development of the Vedic style. Many of the varieties of synonymic repetition that one finds in Pali have their Vedic antecedents. The method of the present study can, therefore, be fruitfully applied to a similar study of Jain and Ardhagādhi literatures. The use of unsubstantivised adjectives with their regular substantives creating a semblance of synonymic usage is a feature quite common to Vedic and Pali literatures. The Pali *pakkhi sakuno* ('winged bird', *D.I.63*) has parallel
in vayah patatri (R.V.), the quasi-synonymic prefixal variation which Buddhaghosa calls upaaggavasena vibhattimagama (DhsA.p.394) is observable in the A.V. VII.5.62. daha pradaha sandaha. The Udana synonymic collocation (Ud.p.133) garukato manito pujito apacito etc. is paralleled by abhinanditah pratinanditah manitah pujitah, etc fr. the Aranya Br.I.1.5.

The Pali synonymic series anutta akante appive asubhe amanunne amanape dukkhe, no sukhe occurs verbatim in Ang. Anitta akante appive asubhe amanunne amanape dukkhe, no suhe (Suttavigame.I.141.) Manapa and manama in the respective series are obscure in meaning. The Pali commentators explain manapa as manavaddhaka and the Prakrit commentators explain manama as mano amati gacchati. (i.e. in someway parallel to Skt. hrdajaingama). As is suggested earlier (supra.p.17) manama and manapa may only be dialectical variations of Skt. manojna which also is represented in both these series Pali and Ardhamagadhi as manunna and manunna respectively. It will be remembered that the diomorphic kiccha and kasira occur in Pali in collocation. It is also possible to derive, - as perhaps is hinted in the Pali explanation - manapa fr. manas and the root psyai - 'to swell'. It will mean the swelling (or expansion) of the heart (i.e. mind) indicating joy or pleasure. (cp. Vedic. apsayantu mamangani. Suptipatha of the kena up.) I shall not be assertive about any particular derivation of manapa or manama. My point in
discussing all this is only to show that an extensive study on the lines indicated here, is bound to be fruitful in finding out the derivations of many an obscure Pali and Ang. words.

We have stated above that \textit{nirodha} as a half-synonym of \textit{nibbana} implies not 'stopping' but only \textit{stikkama pahana} i.e. 'transcending' or 'leaving behind'. The same word is used in the Upaniṣads to denote 'stopping of re-birth' along with another related word \textit{parayana} which also occurs in Pali as a synonym for \textit{nibbana}. The passage fr. the Prasnopaṇiṣad (I.10) is: \textit{staparyayana etasmanna punaravartante ityāsa nirodhaḥ}. The same term \textit{nirodha} is used in Maitri Upaniṣad, I.4; VI.34. with a slightly different connotation. Any such investigation into a study of parallel synonymic terms will be a well come addition to our understanding of the earlier and later connections between Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. JAYA-TILEKE (p.22) has brilliantly shown a possible parallelism between the theory of the five sheaths (\textit{pañcakośa}) of the Taitt. Up. (II.2.5) and Saccaka's (M.I.282-286) idea of the 'individual' (\textit{purisapuggala}) as composed of five selves. The comparison is as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SACCAKA</th>
<th>Taitt. Up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i) The bodily self (\textit{Rūpa})</td>
<td>\textit{Atma anarasaṃmayah}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) The hedonic self (\textit{Veḍanatā})</td>
<td>\textit{Atma anandaṃmayah}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii) The mental self (\textit{Sānātā})</td>
<td>\textit{Atma maṇoṣayah}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv) The active self (\textit{Samkhāraḥ})</td>
<td>\textit{Atma pāraṃṣayah}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v) The cognitive self (\textit{Vinnanatā})</td>
<td>\textit{Atma vijnānaṃṣayah}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The comparison if studied in more details may disclose some secret of the Nikayic 'Aggegetism' (Panca-kkhandhavada) by which the Buddhism is said to have replaced the Upanisadic Atman (and atman also).

Just as a comparative study of Pali and non-Pali synonymic parallels is profitable in many ways so also the study of synonymic terms in the Nikayas is apt to reveal the Nikayic Philosophical development and further if we study the synonymous terms in the Nikayas in the light of their Post-pitakhan Mahayanic usages we may learn a good deal about the further development in Buddhist philosophy. To substantiate this rather cryptic statement I shall discuss vinna and its synonyms. About vinna E. A. SARATHCHANDRA (Buddhist Psychology of Perception. The Ceylon Uni. Press. Colombo. 1958.p.21) has his own theory. He prefers to translate vinna not as 'consciousness' or 'perception' but as 'a bare sensation, a sort of anecetic sentience'. (loc.cit.). He also says that vinna in the earliest texts was almost synonymous with sanna (op.cit. p.16.). Now SARATHCHANDRA is quite justified in treating the subject in his own way and drawing conclusions from the 'earlier texts'. One has only to be cautious while accepting these conclusions, for these texts sometimes use the words rather loosely. SARATHCHANDRA is right in maintaining that at the beginning, at least, there was hardly any distinction between the usages of sanna and
vinnana. But whether this can be taken to mean that no distinction was meant in the concepts will remain an open question. Along with sanna and vinnana there is a panna khandha also which concerns knowledge. In the case of panna and vinnana also we read 'whatever one knows one is conscious of and vice versa' (yaṃ ha'vuso pajanati tam vijanati, yaṃ vijanati tam pajanati. M.I.361.) But this has been said only to point out that panna and vinnana are closely associated, nay are inseparable but not that they are synonymous. Even Visuddhimagga says:

kenatthena panna? pajanatthena. kimidam pajanana? sanjanana vijanana karnaravisaṭṭham naṇappakārato jānanam. sannavinnananapanananam hi samane'pi ṡananaabhāve ... XIV.3.

This is very instructive. Since panna (understanding), sanna (perception) and vinnana (consciousness) are only forms of knowledge they are bound to be identical in certain respects. Within the limits of this common portion they will be identical and synonymous. Outside these limitations they will be different and cease to be synonymous. The distinct characteristics of panna and vinnana can be known by grasping the ways in which the two can be treated. panna is to be cultivated; vinnana is to be comprehended and this makes them different (panna bhavetabba, vinnanam parinīyeṣam; idam tesam naṇakaranam. ibid.). sanna and vinnana can also be made subject to such distinction. One has, therefore, to be careful in maintaining synonymy
between them on the basis of their common usages in the early texts. This will be an instance of alleged synonymy where actually there is not.

Now a counter-example showing how the Nikayic synonyms were subsequently de-synonymized by the later Buddhist Philosophers. The Tipiṭaka uses vinnana, citta and mana synonymously e.g. yam ca kho idam vuttam cittam'iti va, vinnanam'iti va mano'iti va D.I.20; cittam iti pi, mano iti pi, vinnanam iti pi S.II. 80 and Dhs.p.19, etc. Anāgam was the first to divide the vijñanaskandha further into three layers: vis. vijñana, manas and citta. According to him the vijñana-layer represents the 'anocetic sentience'; the manas-layer 'fashioning, thinking, reasoning etc' and the citta-layer the vasanās of past actions as well as the good and bad future potentialities. I have shown elsewhere that this triple scheme is almost an outcome of a careful examination of the various usages and implications of vinnana in the Tipiṭaka. A failure to understand the fact that vinnana represents a real semantic diversity has led to the rather unnecessary controversy regarding its exact meaning (for controversy see Jayatilaka p.434 and Har Dayal p.72 ff.)

The Wealth of Synonyms in the Tipiṭaka:

Even a simple enumeration of synonyms can lead us to infer the richness of the relations in which some specific concepts stand the Early Buddhism as represented
by the Pali Tipiṭaka. The number of synonyms shall also provide a key to its leit-motif and the speakers habit and modes of thought. Thus for example we have in Pali a host of words expressing causation. Buddhaghosa. (Vism. XVII. 68.) enumerates them as paccayo, hetu, kāraṇam, nidadam, sambhava, pabhavo’ti adi atthato skām vyājanato nānām. To this may be added upānisa (there is a special Upanisā-sutta in S.II.27.29). A study of these words for 'cause' is bound to be illuminative. Hetu and paccaya were of the commonest usage and were used quite synonymously in the suttantic portions (e.g. ko nu kho, bhante, hetu, ko paccayo? M.II.126; ayam pathamo hetu, pathamo paccayo A.III.271. In the Abhidhammic contexts hetu stands only as the first of the list of the 24 paccayas and is restricted to mean a psychological motive of an action' (Nyānatiloka’s 'Guide Through the Abhidhamma' p.118); paccaya also came to be distinguished fr. hetu as the genus of which hetu was the typical chief species' (PTSD. paccaya. s.v.) Nd p.215 adds a few more metaphoric expressions for 'cause' viz. mūla, samuṭṭhāna, āhara, arāmnāṇa samudaya. In the western Logic cause, condition, antecedent, etc. are not synonymous but related terms. A study of the Pali terms for 'cause' (better to say in the context of 'cause') show the complexity of the concept of causation.

Pitakas Hermeneutics:

Synonymy is concerned with the sameness of
meaning and meaning is hardly anything more than usage. In the Tipiṭaka we are concerned more with the typical Buddhist usages. It must always be remembered that Pali is thoroughly Buddhistic. Whatever there is in it, is in one way or the other connected with the Triple Gem i.e. the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha. There is hardly anything in it which can be called secular except some portions of the Jātaka which too do not have a secular purpose but which one can appreciate as secular literature.

With Pali, therefore, it is not merely a question of language, it is that of religion. It will not be correct always to interprete Pali words in the light of their Sanskrit and Prakrit equivalents (i.e. formal phonetic equivalents). One has to comprehend carefully the peculiar religious signification of such words. Thus even though ṛṣava may be ṛṣrava in Skt. it does not have the limited connotation it has in Skt. The Nibbacanas (ch.VI) and the Adhivacanas (ch.V) are cases of special lexica. Outside Pali and Buddhist Skt. brahmaṇa can never denote a baḥitapada-dhamma or kapataka 'what is pleasant or agreeable'. These are the typical Buddhist connotations of the terms and are entirely subject to 'hermeneutic interpretation'. Even in what may be called secular context Pali has special synonyms for certain things e.g. mātugama (= itthi), hindagu or indugu (= nara, puggala) satthuvaṃsa (= hiraṇṇa, gold) etc. Many Brahmanical and Vedic words cuh as Brahmaṇa, śramaṇa,
bhikṣu, Purandara, etc. are washed clean and baptized (better Buddhistized) and Paliaised with new meanings. Pali has moulded for itself a distinctly religious mode of expression out of the Vedic and the Brahmanical languages. It has transformed suitably the linguistic elements and (even) some philosophical conceptions current in the Vedic and Śrāmanic cultures. The glaring instances are appagabbha, venavika, tevijja, etc. (infra. p. 288). The Gítica meaning of Traividyā (B.G.IX.20) and the Vedic meaning of Purandara will not only be not useful in the understanding of Pali Tevijja and Purindada respectively but may even prove misleading. In Pali ditthi (mere speculation) is a bit derogatory while dassana (Philosophical insight) is commendable. For a Sanskritist drṣṭi and darsana form only a kṛdanta-variation. Yoga (lit. union) in Pali (A.II.12; D.III.179) is many times ‘a bond, attachment’ (cf. HAR DAYAL p. 134); sota (Skt. srotas-current) is used sometimes in a good sense as in ‘sotapanna and sometimes in an undesirable sense (meaning tanhasota); nekkhamma in Pali sounds like Skt. naiskarmya or naiskramya but is actually Skt. naiskamya (It. p. 224.) It is clear, therefore, that if requires an intelligent grasp of the Buddhist hermeneutics to understand the peculiar Pali synonyms of certain words. It is the reformatory religious spirit in Pali that one has to consider while ascertaining the meanings of Pali words and not merely the morphological correspondences of these words in Sanskrit.
Cardinal Newman once wrote: "They (Livy, Tacitus, Terence, etc.) write Latin; Cicero writes Roman" suggesting thereby that it is the cultural spirit more than the mere language which is of importance. In our context it is the Buddhist language more than the mere Pali (a stage in the MIA) which should be of importance. It is, therefore, not always safe to propose to discuss as ANAND COOMERSWAMY has done, the Pali words on their Vedic background (cf. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies.) (vol. IV. 1939. pp. 160-190).

The Objective, the Plan and the Method:

1) The study of the Pali synonyms forms a broad-line province between semantics, stylistics and lexicography. The object of the present dissertation is mainly to study the stylistic synonymic collocations in the Canon. The semantic differentiation is discussed only briefly and the importance of the study of synonymic collocations from the point of view of the development of Pali lexicography is merely referred to and not fully discussed as the present writer has already dealt with the subject in a separate article 'The Development of Pali Lexicography', (Proceedings of the Seminar in Prakrit Studies. Uni. of Bombay. 1971. pp. 237-248).

2) Synonymic usages in the Canon are of many kinds most of which are indicated in the present chapter. The study being more of a representative than of exhaustive type, all the varieties of synonymic usages are not discussed in details.
3) Adhivacanas and Nibbacanas being special synonymic resources of Pali are dealt with in full in separate chapters.

4) Two brief chapters are devoted to the study of i) synonymic prefixes and suffixes and ii) synonymous epithets and their bearing on Buddhist mythology, respectively.

5) The Pali exegetical books sometimes bring hyponymy and polysemy under-synonymy. This is typical and shows a lack of scientific classification on the part of these writers. This type of synonymy (merely in name) is excluded from the discussion.

6) In a natural language no two words can have precisely the same signification. The term 'synonym' in the title of the thesis is used in 'common acception' of the term. Words supposed to be synonymous are the subject in the large part of the discussion.

7) 'synonymy' is a complex and controversial concept. The idea, here, is not to stick fast to any definite concept of synonymy but to consider the different types of it as one comes across in the Tipiṭaka. The technique of 'multiple criterion' seems to be most suitable to the objective. It is proposed to cast the net of synonymy sufficiently wide so as to catch a large number of variety of synonymic usages such as exact synonyms, pseudo-synonyms, quasi-synonyms and even words of closely related meanings.

8) Since the study is restricted to the synonyms used
in collocations, the synonyms used separately are not discussed. Thus, for example, Ap.II.146 contains the word \textit{\textit{vadisudana}} in verse 105 and \textit{\textit{vadimaddana}} in verse 109. These are synonymous but are not discussed as they do not occur in collocation.

9) A distinction must always be made between semantics as a branch of logic and semantics as a branch of linguistics. The present study concerns the latter. It is, therefore, that in the third chapter while discussing the Indian views on synonymy such matter as modern symbolic logic etc. is not brought in for comparison. The linguistic-semantics is merely made use of.

10) The field explored is the whole of the Pali Tipiṭaka. It will be admitted that even a bare presentation of all the synonymic collocations in the Canon will require a bulky volume. Such presentation will of course have distinct advantages. Among other things, it will impress the exuberance of the synonymic expressions in the Canon. But it is obviously not possible to have a discussion of the various of synonymic usages in Tipiṭaka and to have at the same time an exhaustive register of all the instances. It is, therefore, proposed to confine (for the present purpose) to the discussion-aspect only. The presentation may follow in due course as a second and source volume of the dissertation.

11) Indeed, even to have a complete discussion of all the aspects of Pali synonyms is not possible within the span of a single volume. The present work, therefore, must remain
only as a prolegomena to a projected dictionary of Pali synonyms on stylistic and semantic principles.
Notes and References

1) Note that the PTS and the Nalanda editions of the text read the first line as या के तिक तधाम instead of तसः ए निः स सा. I have, however, adopted the text as given in the Netti. (HARDY’s ed.p.53)

2) Buddhanussati, Dhammanussati etc.

3) samodhana ‘placing together’ is quite parallel to collocation (cum-together + locare = to place).

4) atha तथा श्रान्नकम् नागाम् तद्यदम्यते hatthini" ti ettha नागसाधस्सा तद्यदम्यते सा नामान्नपरियाययावयावानसते’पि तद्यदम्यते ‘मनोरामा—

dantavuttam’ti attho सम्बन्धितo, तथा ‘हलिसाम
vाकम’ti इमाम् पि नामान्नपरियाययावयावानसते’पि
vाकम’ti kutilam’ti attho vattabbe; evah hi
sati attho सलाराज् विवा सुभुल्लितo होति देसानां
ce vīlasappattā (Sadhanītī.p.324.)

5) A.II.147-148.

6) For the various synonyms of nibbāna see PTSD (nibbāna. s.v.) and B. C. LAW. Indian Culture. Vol.II. July 1935-36.p.327 et seq.

7) The term is used by SAYCE and is referred to by YAMAGUCHI. (p.400)

8) I found no suitable expressions to diversify the three expressions for water and garden. Really speaking I should not have diversified नरि, yuvati and strī as lady, female and woman for Śakāra does not mean
these differences. His only idea is to show the richness of his vocabulary.

9) This will mean that the courtesan Vasantasena is very rich as she possesses both 'unfashioned gold' as well as 'golden coins or ornaments'.

10) addasam buddhacakkhuṇā lokāṁ volokento satte aparajjakhe maharajjakhe, tikkhindreva mudindriye ... suvinnapaye duvinnapaye (M.II.334.)

11) For a detailed list see Appendix. II.

12) The references in the brackets are by volumes and page numbers of Sutta-gāme, the Ārddhāgādhi Canon edited in two volumes by Pupphabhikkhū. Gurgaon (East Punjab) 1954.

13) For the names of the 16 jānapadas see PTSD. jānapada s.v. and RHYS DAVIDS. Buddhist India. p.23.

14) The phenomenon by which the same word assumes two different forms owing to dialectical differences is, I have chosen to call, 'dialectical dia-morphesem'. Thus Skt. kṛcchra appears in Pali both as kiccha and kasira.

15) The Buddha never kept people fuzzy about his Law (Dhamma) which was 'deep, difficult to comprehend, hard to understand, tranquil, not accessible to (mere) logic, subtle and intelligible only to the learned' gāmbhīro, duddaso, durāṇubodho, santo, panīto, atakkavacaro, nipuṇo, panditavedaniyo (M.I.217.)
16) H. JACOBI. Jain Sutras vol.45.p. XVII.

17) This is evident from the Upāli-sutta referred to above. There are many references in the Tipiṭaka to people who were first devotees of Nigantha Naṭaputta or belonging to some other creed and later on after discussions with Gotama were converted to Buddhism. (See DPPN. Śīha Senapati, Keniya Jatīlā, Upāli, etc. s.vv.)

18) For comparison one can note the following cultural variants existing in Marāṭhī. The Komkānastha - brahmin household word for the chili-paste used in Maharashtra as a sauce is kharda; the Desāsthas call it theca; the dinner-party offered by relatives in connection with 'engagements' in their relations is called kelavan by Komkānasthas and gadāngner by Desāsthas: The cooking instrument to turn bread and the like things on the pan is called variously as ucaṭna and ulathṇa; capati is mostly a non-brahmanic parallel of the brahmanic poli or wheel-bread.


Note also attatho hi sameti, byañjanato nanām
... appamattakaṁ kho panetām yaddidām byañjanam
M.III.33.

20) na, bhikkhave, buddhavacanāṁ chandaso āropetabbāṁ
... anujānāmi, bhikkhave, sakāva niruttīvā
buddhavacananam parivyāpuniṃ (Gullavagga.p.229).
For the controversy over a correct interpretation of
this injunction see WINTERNITZ. A Hist. of Indian
Lit. vol.II. Translated by Mrs. S. KETKAR. Calcutta.
21) See also JAYATILEKA.p.313.ff.
22) This golden advice should be properly emphasised in
the context of the present linguistic problems of
India.
23) There being no absolute synonyms in natural languages
the 'differentiation of synonyms' is no more a self-
contradictory expression. The Vinaya literature has
gone a step ahead. Here, it is not merely the
question of 'differentiation of synonyms' but more
precisely 'differentiation through synonyms'.
24) The Abhidhamma, it must be remembered, discusses
psychology only in concern with ethics. Note the
rather strange-sounding but sharply accurate rendering
of Dhamma-saṅgāṇī. 'A Buddhist Manual of Psychological
Ethics'.
25) Vībhanga is the name of a section of Vinaya-piṭaka but
as a literary type vībhāṅgas occur in the other parts
of the Canon too. For example in the Majjhimanikāya
are many vībhāṅga-suttas, such as M.III.Nos. 35-42.
There are Middesas also (though not expressly so
called) scattered over the Tipiṭaka.
26) sabbatopabha has been listed as a synonym of nibbana by Saddaniti (p.70) and the other term from D.I.190. viz. anidassanam has been recorded as a synonym for nibbana by Netti. in the chapter Vevacanahara.

27) pannapasadamaruyha asoko sokinim pajam
pabbatotho va bhumaṭhe dhiro bale avekkhati !
(Dh.verse.28 bc.)

when many upamās to one purpose (ekarth) occur in succession in the Canon one feels as if one is reading the lists of stock upamānas provided by the books on Sanskrit Poetics. cp. pravala-bimba-bandhuka-pallavairadharosthakau etc. kavyalocana.


28) viyayama and vyāyama is an instance of dia-morphism and sounds like the Vedic instances cited by Patanjali under: iyangadiparakarane tanvadinām
chandasi bahulam (Vārtika on Pañca) e.g. tanvam pugema: tanvam pugema; viyam pasva, viyuvam pasya;
svargam lokam; suvargam lokam; trayambakam yajamahea. It must be pointed out that I have preferred the reading viyayama byavama accepted in the Nalanda edition. The other variants are vigayama and
vityayama.

29) This reference is to the PTS edition of the text.

30) In fact in Mgs.I.17.4-9 these are enlisted in the same order.

32) For the rather unusual expression 'Psychological Ethics' see "Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics". p. xxxii.

33) See footnote No. 24 above.

34) For the explanations and occurrences of these adhivacanas see the notes on p. 175-76 of Manual.

35) For the explanations of these terms see 'A Modern Introduction to Logic' Miss STEBBING London. 1945. p. 422.

36) All these more or less synonymous expressions are used in the context of Sariputta in M. III. 88.


38) For this see 'Exegetical and Etymological Notes on a Few Pali Words' M. G. DHADPHALE. ABORI. vol. LV. p. 229.

39) Note also avahām akatakalyāno, kapatāpo tato cuto (Pv. p. 159.)

40) 'neologism' mine.

42) See also taphāsamudaya, āharasamudaya; taphānirodha, āharanirodho (M.I.64)

43) See for example Hatthavanagallavihāravamsa (p.16 of N.K. BHAGAVAT's ed. Bombay 1958.)

44) But in Sanskrit ātman stands for both, body and self (Amarakosa.III.109)

45) Vyākaraṇa is for the same reason called the 'first' science with which to begin mukham vyākaraṇam smrtam. It is 'first', not the 'foremost' (as some enthusiastic persons would like to call it.)


48) This qualification is necessary because in the Abhidhammic contexts sukha and piti are nicely discriminated to mean 'pleasure' and 'rapture' (infra.p.225.). In the suttantas they are used only stylistically.

49) The criterion implies here to find out whether pāṇna and vīñana are exactly synonymous is that of setting them in the same linguistic and contextual environments. The result of the technique is that we can use bhavetabba only in the context of pāṇna and parinñeya only in the context of vīñana. This shows their difference.
CHAPTER II.
Theories of Synonymy:
Modern-Western Views.
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Theories of Synonymy: Modern-Western Views

As the present work seeks to study the Pali synonyms on modern critical lines it is thought essential to treat in brief at the very outset, at least some of the modern (and western) views on synonyms and synonymy which would help the proper understanding of the subject. It is proposed, therefore, to devote the first chapter, exclusively, to a concise presentation of the ideas of the western modern thinkers on the subject of synonyms. The third chapter will be devoted, on the other hand, to the consideration of the views of ancient-Indian thinkers on the subject. These two sets of views (viz. Modern-Western and Ancient-Indian) are presented only for the sake of convenience. This twofold presentation will have yet another advantage also, for it will help us to acquaint ourselves with both the types of terminology, Western and Indian. Again a comparison of these two sets will bring out the differences in the Western and Indian traditions, in connection with the study of synonyms. Further these two sets of views will aid us in formulating sufficiently adequate schemata to work out Pali synonyms.

Synonym : Its Etymology

The word synonym is derived from the Greek prefix syn (= with) and onoma (= name). Thus originally it signifies a 'connected or related name' or 'a word which goes together with another name or word thus being its 'equivalent'. Its derivation from onoma (= name) if stressed over too much and if interpreted grammatically, will make it apply only to the
two words (rather names) having the same meaning. Such an insistence will result in an awkward situation for according to it vāṇḍana and palambha will be synonymous as these two are the names having the same meaning but vāṇḍesi and palambhesi only because they happen to be verbal forms and not nouns will not be synonymous although they carry the same meaning. To avoid such a contingency one has to ignore grammarians' pet distinctions between nouns, verbs, prepositions etc. So far as the sameness of meaning is concerned these formal grammatical differences carry little value. The awareness of the strict implication of the derivation of 'synonym' will however suggest a scheme of classification of synonyms under the various parts of speech such as nouns, verbs etc. It is suggested in one article (On the Meaning of the word KETUBHA. M.C. DHADPHALE, Fergusson College Magazine, Research Section 1968-69 pp.39-44.) that the Pali texts often mention separately a nighantu (= a dictionary of nominal synonyms) and a ketubha (i.e. a dictionary of verbal synonyms, kariyakappavikappo) and that the usual tags of verbal synonyms like acikkhanti, desenti, panñapenti, patthatapenti, vivaranti, vibhajanti, uttānikaronti, (Udāna, p.139) etc. are the veritable ketubhas in Pali. The prepositions and particles may be ignored because of their limited number. But nouns and verbs, because of their predominance deserve a special treatment. Yaska, the author of the Nirukta has a method of citing the Nighantu-words with the distinguishing tags name (name, noun) or karman (verb) accordingly as they are substantives or
verbal forms, respectively. Even the Nighantu prefixed to the 
Nirukta observes this two-fold division and along with the 
21 names for 'earth' (Prthivināmadhevyā), 15 names for 'gold'
(hiranyanāmanī), 8 names for 'directions' (dingnāmanī), are 
also given 18 verbal forms for 'shining' (kantikarmanah), 10 
verbal forms for 'eating' (attikarmanah) etc. The Nighantu 
again lists the synonymous prepositions and particles like 
hikām, nukām, sukām, ahiākām etc. (See III.12. nava uttarānī 
padāni sarvapadasamānāyā; III.13. contains particles 
expressing comparison). It is therefore not improbable that 
at one time there existed four types of the lists of synonyms, 
in accordance with the fourfold classification of words viz. 
nouns, verbs, prepositions and particles. Precision requires 
special terms to be used to mark the synonymy expressing 
itself through the various parts of speech. Some such terms as 
synonyms, synverbs, synprepositions, can be suggested. Being 
conscious that the word synonym originally has a reference to 
the like-names (nouns) alone, some authorities have preferred 
to use such other words as 'equivalent' or 'equipollent' to 
signify the sameness of meaning. But this is unnecessary for 
the word synonym has extended its scope so as to include in 
it synonymy of a very general type. This extended signification 
of the word carrying the fullest generality of the sameness of 
meaning is what is implied in the present treatment.

The General Notion Behind Synonymy

The idea implied in 'synonym' is expressed by its other 
synonyms (which in fact merely suggest the different aspects 
of a synonym) such as correspondent, similar, interchangeable
equivalent, same, identical etc. It is obvious that all these cognate ideas present a sort of identity in difference. None of these terms expresses the exact and absolute connotation of the term synonym. Exact synonymy, in fact, is extremely rare, if not impossible. The words commonly recognised as synonyms in a language are merely 'signs with highly similar signification' (QUINE, WORD and OBJECT, p.22). In the totality of their signification they are partly accordant and partly otherwise. The more such words coincide in shades of their meanings the more synonymous they become with one another. So when in a given context one word is cited as a synonym of some other word, the only implication is that in that particular context it can replace that word without much loss of the intended meaning. Outside the context the same pair of words may differ in varying degrees, both in meaning and in usage. Synonyms, therefore, are words in the same language with nearly identical or closely related significations in one or more of their meanings. They are interchangeable with one another on many, but by no means all, occasions. The subtle differences which they imply are more important, from the viewpoint of precision, than the apparent similarity in their purport. There are numerous dictionaries of synonyms in English, French and other languages which set out to discriminate the finer shades of meanings and the peculiarities of the usage of each of them. The specification of the agreement and differences of the so-called synonyms is supposed to be the office of a work on synonyms. The present work also proposes to treat in a
special chapter some of the important aspects of the semantic
differences in the Pali synonyms.

To continue the discussion, since modern Linguistics
interprets meaning in terms of the total distribution of a
word (i.e. a sum total of all the environments in which a word
occurs) it is extremely difficult to find exact synonymy in any
natural language. To explain, it is very difficult to mark
identity in the totality of the distribution of any pair of
words in any language. The presence of a pair or a string of
words with a totally identical distribution of meanings will be
a luxury any language can ill afford. Logically, the possibility
of the existence of real synonyms is ruled out even by the Law
of Identity which states 'A' is 'A'. Every word in a language is
a peculiar phonetic form signifying a particular meaning. So
the same word will mean the same thing under similar environ-
ments (contextual, emotional etc.). 'B' can never convey the
meaning of 'A' in the way in which 'A' conveys it. In the
consideration of synonymy the mode of conveying the meaning
is as much important as the sameness of the referent. Bhava
and Hara refer ultimately to the same divinity of Hindu
mythology and yet the words are not freely interchangeable. For
the originator or the creator (Bhava) can never mean a
destroyer or remover (Hara); but the creator and destroyer
have the same reference, so far as the Hindu Mythology is
concerned. Thus the difference between meaning, reference,
connotation etc. forms a very important consideration in the
study of synonyms. It is for the same reason that when the
dictionaries give some words as synonyms of others they are to be accepted with caution, for the dictionaries record but a vague sameness of the sense of any word. The very nature of a dictionary is such that it cannot help replacing one notion with another notion and notation. It presents approximation and at its best only some 'explicit definitions' (for this see A.J.AYER Language, Truth and Logic, pp. 59-60) as: occultist, an eye-doctor. An unwary recourse to the dictionaries, is therefore often misleading, for what a dictionary supplies as synonyms of some words in some of their senses is likely to be illegitimately generalised. Good dictionaries, it is true, try to explain the exact shades of meanings of the words and also demonstrate good usages of the term by actually quoting sentences from the writings of eminent writers in the language, yet the very form of a dictionary has its own limitations. It cannot avoid generalising, altogether. To compensate as it were the loss resulting from over generalisation the dictionaries of synonyms come forth. The ordinary dictionaries and the dictionaries of synonyms thus set out with opposite aims and in a way complement each other. The one goes on synonymizing the other desynonymizing. All this discussion should have made it clear that when synonymy is explained as the sameness of meaning the 'sameness' is rather to be understood as a general similarity or likeness. Total synonymy in a natural language is only a name, a semantic myth. Long ago, BLOOMFIELD (Language, p. 145) has observed this fact in the following words: "Each linguistic form has a constant and specific meaning. If the forms are phonemically different, we suppose that their
meanings are also different - for instance - that each of a set of forms like quick, fast, swift, rapid, speedy, differs from all the others in some constant and conventional feature of meaning. We suppose in short that there are no actual synonyms".

The non-existence of real synonyms is accepted even as a principle of semantic analysis by E.A. NIDA. "No morphemes or combination of morphemes are identical in meaning" (p. 151) NIDA even goes to the length of considering the alternate pronunciations of duty as (i) Duwty (ii) dyuwtiy as also carrying certain distinct connotations².

It is, however, in BREAL'S 'Essai de Semantique' that the view that real synonyms do not exist comes in the form of a linguistic law viz. the law of distribution which reduces the synonyms to the level of near synonyms. The law states that the words which were once synonymous are subsequently differentiated in various ways and thus cease to be freely interchangeable. Of course it is necessary to remember that this discussion of the absence of real synonyms applies to natural languages alone. The language of science shall not have any serious objection to allow totally synonymous terms to be used side by side. A suggestion will always be there that as far as possible the recognised scientific terms should be used in preference to their popular equivalents but so far as the question of emotional overtones or effective values do not seriously affect scientific language, it will not forbid the usage of synonyms. Whether one says water or H₂O, salt or sodium chloride, fricative or spirant, lingual or cerebral, it makes very little difference. Occasionally there may arise a
discussion that some term is not quite adequate to express the import and consequently it may be labelled as a 'misnomer'.

But this does not upset the synonymy as after a special consideration a particular term is totally disregarded in the context. So, for example, someone may argue that 'cerebral' is not a happy expression and therefore it should be dropped altogether and exclusive use of 'lingual' should be made instead. Here one term is discarded altogether, and no room is left for a discussion on synonymy. But such cases are rare. Fricative and spirant are still being used even by experts, synonymously.

Pāṇini, one of the most methodic and precise writers, allows three different terms to be used synonymously viz. adhikarana, sattva and dravya. The equisignificance existing between the definiens and definiens and the stipulative agreements in the form - the term 'A' should be understood as meaning 'X' - favour the existence of exact synonyms in scientific language. So in the ethico-psychological science of Abhidhamma mana and citta will be always considered as exact synonyms for they are thus equated and defined 'yam mano tam cittam, yam cittam tam manot'. This does not exclude the possibility that the natural language of the Suttapitaka will not discriminate between mana and citta on different grounds. In the context of Sanskrit also we find the philosophical terminology of the Upaniṣads stressing the synonymy between hṛdaya and mana (yascaitat hṛdayam manascaitat. Ait. Up.V:2) while the classical literature differentiating them in its own way.

**Synonymy and Homonymy**

These co-related notions generally explained as 'one
meaning—many names' and 'one name—many meanings' respectively have yet another and more significant difference from the functional point of view. For although both these notions centred upon the two aspects, viz. word and meaning, the first of these can remain constant but the second cannot. So we can have a word, like h(H)ari, which notwithstanding its different significations such as the God Visnu, Siva, lion, monkey etc., (see Amarakosa III.175.) is written and even pronounced exactly the same. It is not that the accent on the syllables changes and consequently the intonation differs when it means these various referents. There is thus a perfect homonymy. But it is impossible to have such a perfect synonymy for although there can be many expressions for one and the same referent it is impossible to find these expressions giving exactly the same meaning.

_Synonymization and Desynonymization_

Synonymy and homonymy are so to say two independently opposite operations of word and meaning, not affecting each other. If 'a' has three meanings to denote or if 'b' has three words to express its import there is nothing between 'a' and 'b' to affect each other. This is not the case with the opposite tendencies which are simultaneously operative in every language, namely Synonymization and Desynonymization. The second is merely a different statement of Breal's 'law of distribution'. The words which are synonymous at a particular period of their history cease to be synonymous subsequently as they are differentiated in their meanings.
The synonymization process works in an exactly opposite way, i.e. words which once had distinct connotations and different shades of meaning are looked upon as synonyms of each other. This is essentially a process of generalisation. So 'urvi' and 'prthvi' at one stage did not mean exactly the same thing. The former stands as an adjective qualifying the latter. This is the case with R.V.VII.38.2. In classical Sanskrit we find that they have become synonyms of each other. What is remarkable is that 'prthvi' is also not originally a substantive to require any adjective to qualify it. Derived from the √prath, it originally means 'a spread out one' and therefore the 'earth'. The only difference in the 'urvi' and 'prthvi', so far as R.V.VII.38.2 is concerned is that the latter is intended to be a substantive in that context and the former to be an adjective. This may not prove that the word prthvi in the R.V. is substantivized at an earlier stage than the word urvi. For even in the R.V. itself the adjectival usage of prthvi is perceptible in V.85.4. 'unatti bhūmīm prthivīm uta dyām'! Curious all the more it is that even bhūmi has originally an adjectival sense 'the ample one' from the adjective bhūman (= ample). One wonders whether there is any real substantive in the R.V. to denote the 'earth'. The inspection of its various synonyms might prove that all of them are traceable to their adjectival stage. These opposite processes of synonymization and desynonymization make one think about the possible factors which favour their operations. Some of these important factors are noted below:
Twofold Process

Synonymization
(factors which favour synonymization)

Desynonymization
(factors that prevent complete synonymy)

I) Factors that favour Synonymization:

a) To generalise, generalisation itself is the most effective factor in synonymization. The generalisation may result through many operations.

b) Substantivisation of adjectives: The adjectives like prthvi, bhumi, medini (= massive), urvi etc. can be used as synonymous nouns.

c) Constant Association: The firmness and constancy of associations between any two terms result in their identification. The constant usage ekameadvitiyam makes eka the equivalent of advitiya i.e. mukhya (see Amarakosa III.16 and Vikramorvasiyam I.1. vedantesu yamahurekapurusam)

d) Factors like the Extension and Contraction of Meaning: The old English term 'bird' has extended its meaning. It originally meant only a 'young bird'. Now that specification is dropped, its intention has been curtailed. The Skt. mrga has worked in the opposite direction. Formerly it meant only 'an animal' now it is generally restricted to mean a 'deer' although the original sense peeps through such expressions as mrgapati, mrgajala etc. The restriction in the meaning of mrga thus adds one more synonym for 'deer' and at the same time takes out one synonym of Pasu.

d) Indiscriminate usage on a large scale: The sharp lines of demarcation which exist between the cognitive,
emotive and such other differences in the case of the apparent synonymous terms are blurred out by the indiscriminate usage of such words by loose and inexact thinkers. This when standardised on the basis of precedence results in synonymy.

e) Dictionary Method of Explanation: A dictionary has to replace one notion with another notion and notation. In doing this the fine shades of differences are helplessly overlooked. The necessity of translation and paraphrasing which require some type of re-wording, are also factors not essentially different from this.

f) Influx of Classical or other Basic Languages: English, especially is greatly enriched by Latinisms and Hellenisms. This provides a double scale of synonyms – one from the native and the other from the Graeco-Latin, as for example, Frele – frail – fragile etc. In the context of Pali we have a double scale on account of the austric influx in the Middle Indic, which at times gives us the translation-compounds like hatthi-nāgo etc. The difference between such terms may be either semantic or stylistic.

g) Dialectical Influx: (supra. p. 47.)

h) Imagery: The upamanas may at times acquire the sense of their upameyas. This is detailed in the ch. of the Adhivacanas. (infra. pp. 255 ff.). Language is thus considered as a 'store-house of worn similies, a living testimony to the instinct of man to find likeness in all he sees' (SAYCE, Introduction to the Science of Language. Part I, p.340). The Mīghantu-lists prefixed to Yāska's Nirukta
contain so many metaphorical expressions along with the other clear-cut synonyms. We have parvata, giri and oamasa as the names of 'cloud' (meghanamani Ng.I, Sec.10), nauh as the name of 'speech' (vāngnamani Ng.I, Sec.11 which might have a reliance on some such usage as the Ait. Brāhmaṇa I.13. vāg vai sutarma nauh.)

i) Putative Sameness of Meaning: This is achieved through stipulative agreements and in special contexts it is proposed to mean a certain thing by a certain word. The synonymy is established. The definitions are not very different from these. This aspect is detailed in the cha. on the Pali Nibbacaṇiyas (infra. p. 280 ff.).

The above factors contributing to synonymization are only indicator. They are neither precise nor exhaustive. Every language in fact will have different synonymic resources of its own.

II) Factors preventing Complete Synonymy:

The factors aiding desynonymization are still more numerous and varied than those helping synonymization.

a) Plurisignation: Every word is practically plurisignative. It is plain that if every word almost always carries more than one meaning it will be highly difficult to find any other word covering the same range of meanings. So, for example, vardhate and pusyati are generally treated as synonymous. In many contexts they are interchangeable too. Yet vardhate invariably has at least two suggestions i) growth and ii) prosperity. The pusyati, on the other hand, has the
sense of 'developing' or 'bloom ing' (which has a poetic value absent in värđhate) imperceptibly accompanied by its original sense of 'nourishing' or 'feeding'. The more suggestions a word has the more difficult it is to find any other word exactly equivalent to it. Such words are really the translator's despair and he feels very happy when he hits upon a word in the translation carrying most of the shades and aspects of the word in the original. So is the English word 'wood' as a translation of the Vedic word vana, both of which mean i) wood (kāṣṭha) and ii) forest. Bhūtah pasya, i.e. 'See, brother, whereby is meant 'ponder', 'think', 'consider' and happily both in English and in Sanskrit 'to see' has the other sense 'to understand' besides the usual 'to look on'. "Oh, I see", we say.

b) Extension and Restriction of Meaning: These operations are effective in the process of desynonymization too. For when mr̥ga restricts its sense to 'deer' the synonyms for 'animal' suffer the loss of one. The word pāksin is originally an adjective meaning a 'winged one'. Now, to speak about a pāksin whose wings are cut off or who has not developed the wings (say, as in the case of the Vattapotaka Op.p.416. santi pakcha apatanā etc.) smacks of even a contradiction. Here, of course, the extended meaning of the term i.e. 'a bird', is to be understood.

c) Constant Association: This factor also plays an important role in differentiating words of similar import. The word trayā with its constant association with the three Vedas
has acquired a special sanctity which is not shared by trayam
which in its cognitive value has the same meaning (= a combina-
tion of three). In Pali, the word Tathagata has an anagogic
meaning which the plain word Buddha does not share. The latter
is a plain adjective clear in its sense of the 'Enlightened
One', the former has an additional mystic aura.

d) Socio-Economic Stipulation: This formation also brings
out difference where there is no distinction as in the case of
the pair — hiranya—suvanna—, where by convention the first is
restricted to mean 'unfashioned gold' and the latter to mean
'golden coins'.

e) Legal Jargon: The Vinayic terminology purposely
differentiates between aranana and vana by assigning the former
a specific legal meaning i.e. 'every place except a village
and the approach thereto' (aranana nama thapetva gamam ca
gamupacaram ca, Parajika.1.p.57. For the Vihayic Abhidhammic
and suttantic meanings of aranana see Vism.p.48.) The vana is
said to be that which is not an aranana in the sense specified
above. It is clear that these meanings are ascribed to aranana
and vana and are not original to them.

f) Emotive overtones: The word 'earth' has a more
emotive value than its synonym 'ground'. The point is that to
be real equivalents the synonyms must have the same value
(equivalent = iquus + valere i.e. of equal strength.) If
the values are catalogued in some such way as given below
they will provide an additional criterion for differentiating
the seemingly synonymous words. The values can be catalogued
as i) Emotive ii) Effective iii) Cognitive iv) Aesthetic v) Religious vi) Mystic (anagogic etc.) etc.

With this the discussion comes to a very important consideration, that of the way in which synonyms can be discriminated.

**Differentiation of Synonyms:**

Long back in the year 1939 W.E. COLLINSON (Transactions of the Philological Society p.54 ff.) suggested some nine different ways in which synonyms can be discriminated. i) General and specific. ii) More intensive and less intensive. iii) One term more highly charged with emotion than the other. iv) One term implying moral approbation or censure; the other being neutral. v) One term more professional than the other. vi) One term belonging more to the written language than the other. vii) One term more colloquial than the other (the further distinctions in a spoken language like the familiar, slangy and vulgar. viii) One term more local or dialectical than another. ix) One term belonging to the language of the child the other to the language of the grown-ups (e.g. daddy : father).

This classification of synonyms is quite comprehensive and useful too. Yet it can be reduced to some more basic principles, as for example:

i) **Equivalency** .. The difference in values.

ii) **Equipollency** .. Having the equality of force or power comprising the synonyms of intensity.

iii) **Variants** ..

   a) Dialectical, b) Poetical.
   c) Cultural. d) Contextual.
   e) Temporal. f) Professional.
g) Formal i.e. the grammatical aspect as to whether the expression is a noun or verb etc. e.g. vañcana and palamba; vañcesi and palambhesi.

h) Implicational i.e. Positive or negative (e.g. punna and aparap. Active or passive (for which see G.F.GRAHAM. English Synonyms 1916. p.120).

iv) Generic and Specific: Giving the area of agreement and differences and touching upon, in some measure, the hyponymy (e.g. mrga and saranga).

But even the above suggested scheme is of a general type. While studying the synonyms in a particular language and literature a special scheme must be found out to suit the synonymic findings in that particular language and literature.

Gradation of Synonyms:

Synonymy is definitely a matter of degree. Sets of lexical items can always be arranged on the scale of similarity of difference in senses. This would give the following results:

1) Exact or Strict Synonymes: Words (rather terms) freely interchangeable in every context. These belong mostly to scientific terminology. So are adarsanam and lopah in the context of Skt. Grammar.

2) Almost Synonyms: Words which in a majority of contexts are interchangeable. The difference between them is so slight and negligible that for all practical purposes one word is as good as the other. (It is a different
thing that for the same reason a poet might find difficulty in choosing a particular word but a commoner is relaxed for 'any one would do').

3) Apparent Synonyms: When subjected to analysis the words belonging to this class, exhibit difference in shades, emphasis, field of usage, values, attitude etc. They are co-extensive only in limited cases, and therefore are not freely interchangeable. A special name to designate this variety is suggested in homoionyme. (Actually, homoeonyms, a combination of homoe (= same) + names = similar names. The name Descriptive Synonymy is given to that branch of Synonymics which lists such apparent synonyms adding explanatory notes about the subtle differences of meaning underlying them.

Definitions of Synonyms:

To understand more fully and accurately what a synonym is it will be in the fitness of things to study some of the definitions given by noteworthy linguists and then to conclude about the subject matter as agreed upon by most of them. It must be remembered at the same time that since synonymy has many aspects and is viewed from different points of view such as logical, semantic, stylistic etc. it will not be possible to present a single unanimously accepted definition for all these types. So to make out one comprehensive and definite view out of the cloud of the various views on synonymy is not an easy task. It is, therefore, proposed to note the views on the various types of synonymy and to follow them separately.
with a view to studying such types of synonymy (such as the sentence synonymy, word synonymy, synonymy by implication, synonymy stylistically considered etc.) as are to be met with in the Pali Canon. A search for a definition of synonymity is even considered as 'a wild goose chase' (A.R. WHITE 'Synonymous Expressions'. Philosophical Quarterly 1958). Some writers, therefore, candidly accept that what they are offering is not a definition of synonyms but rather only a criterion of adequacy for the proposed definitions. Thus, for example, BENSON MATES: Two expressions are synonymous in a language L if and only if they may be interchanged in each sentence in language L without altering the truth value of that sentence. According to this criterion synonymy has to obey QUINE's rule of substitutivity. Now this condition will not be fulfilled in the context of 'Tegucigalpa' and the capital of Honoduras' and MATES will accept the result that therefore they are not really synonymous. This is merely one of the examples of the fact how very vigorously the views expressed on synonyms are maintained and the words and sentences, commonly regarded as synonymous are treated on that basis.

To proceed, NEILSON GOODMAN offers for synonymy the criterion of 'extensional identity'. GOODMAN starts with asking 'under what circumstances do two names or predicates in any ordinary language have the same meaning?' and he finds the criterion in the 'identity of extensions of two terms'. "Two predicates have the same meaning if and only if they apply to exactly the same things" (p.69). In examining this criterion
one can say that the 'identity of extension' can be accepted as a necessary condition of synonymy but certainly not a sufficient one. For what about the terms like khapsa and mrgajala which so often turn up in Vedantic discussions and which have the same (nil) extension? One cannot accept that because they have the same extension, they have the same meaning. Hara and Bhava refer to the same individual and yet they are not synonymous. In putting forth this criterion N. GOODMAN is perhaps relying too much on the referential theory of meaning. GOODMAN, however, argues for a more complex version of this criterion to make it fully adequate. The interesting result of this is that according to N. GOODMAN 'no two different words have the same meaning'. (p. 73).

If GOODMAN has relied on the 'extensional identity' LEWIS would like to take recourse to the distinction between analytic and syntactic statements while defining synonymy. Now LEWIS is more important for the kind of criticism he evoked from MORTON G. WHITE for the latter considers the analytic and the syntactic as an 'untenable dualism'. He thus attacks the very foundation of the synonymy as defined by LEWIS. He then turns to QUINE who defines a statement as analytic 'if and only if it was a result of putting synonyms for synonyms in a logical truth'. The logical truth of the following proposition considered as analytic is demonstrated.

(1) Every P is P. (By substitution) (ii) Every Man is Man. 
By putting synonym of 'Man' (iii) Every rational animal is man.
All this is all right. The only serious difficulty is that the notion of synonymy employed in defining a statement as analytic itself requires as much clarification as the very idea of analyticity which it is supposed to explain.

Granting the subtlety in the objection raised by WHITE to the criterion of analyticity as proposed by QUINE and which is made pivotal to the definition of synonyms by LEWIS, one can say that QUINE's idea of analyticity, especially that part of it which consists in 'putting synonyms for synonyms in a logical truth' can be fruitfully employed in treating the Abhidhammic definitions of the psycho-ethical categories, which usually consist in heaping together equipollent terms.

Another important theory of synonymy is the one presented by ALSTON (Philosophy of Language, p.44) according to which "two words are synonymous to the extent that they are intersubstitutable in sentences without altering the illocutionary-act potentials of the sentences perfectly synonymous words will be so intersubstitutable in every sentence." To understand this a peep into the term _illocutionary-act_ potential which ALSTON uses with predilection, is necessary. ALSTON is actually borrowing some terminology from AUSTIN (How to do things with Words) in explaining the types of linguistic action. This is exemplified with the sentence: Would you open the door?

i) _Locutionary_: The speaker merely utters a certain sentence e.g. Would you open the door.

ii) _Perlocutionary_: He brings about one or more results of this utterance. For example, he gets the hearer to open the door, he
irritates him, he distracts some one who is reading.

(iii) **Illocutionary**... He does something that falls between action (i) and (ii), for example, he asks some one to open the door.

(iii) unlike (i) is not merely an utterance of sentence (By say, giving an example or testing his voice). And unlike (ii) it does not go beyond the utterance of a sentence by essentially involving a certain effect. This is the illocutionary act, which is to be considered in determining the synonymy. At least ALSTON would propose to discuss the synonymy between any two forms on the basis of their carrying the same illocutionary-act potentials in the various contexts no matter what difference in meaning is brought out by factors like social environment etc. where 'sweet' might be relatively more vulgar than 'perspiration'. If 'I am sweating' has the same illocutionary-act potential as 'I am perspiring' the question of their being synonymous with each other is resolved. ALSTON has really made an important point. By basing the question of synonymy on the 'illocutionary-act potential' he has cut the knots of the usual difficulties that are experienced in the determination of synonymy, the difficulties which arise out of the 'behavioral' and the 'ideational' considerations of the words. For it is true, that if the differences like those presented by social environment, emotive forces, associations etc. are taken into consideration even when they are not implied then no two words will have exact equivalence. 'Earth'
it is true, conjures all sorts of association - Mother Earth, fertility, earthly qualities etc. but in telling someone what an 'earth' is we do not always go into an account of all these. We merely tell him that 'earth' means 'ground'. (ALSTON op.cit.). After all, synonymy is characteristic of our employment of expressions and not of the expressions themselves (vide A.R. WHITE Philosophical Quarterly, 1953). A NAEES (Synonymity and Empirical Research Methods) also deals with this point which appears to be a fairly simple one that research in synonymity can be conducted by asking the informants whether or not the two terms mean the same.

In the same context it is proper to note the observation of QUINE (Word and Object, p.63) on Stimulus Synonymy which 'on an optimum modulus, is an approximation to what philosophers loosely call sameness of confirming experiences and of dis-confirming experiences". The wording is clear. Even while describing ordinarily a synonym the word 'same' is often used as for example - 'a word having the same or almost the same meaning as some other' (Standard Desk Dictionary, 1971. synonym. s.v.). The usual implication of same should be understood from A.R. WHITE, "we use the same to mark our recognition that the object or character familiar to us under one aspect is the same object or character which was familiar to us under a different aspect. Hence it is impossible to find a criterion of the same-ness which excludes all differences". True. When we say pankaja is the same as satapatra we mean that the 'plant which grows in mud' is the same object which carries 'hundred petals'. In the
same way a person who is the son of queen Maya is the same as the Enlightened one (and there Mayadevisuta: Buddha).

I.i.REVZIN provides us with a definition of syntactic synonyms in the following words: Two constructions $A_1$ and $A_2$ are syntactic synonyms if there exists a phrase $A$ having the same meaning as $A_1$ and the same meaning as $A_2$ and in the configurational analysis, the two constructions $A_1$ and $A_2$ are configurations with the same resultant $X$. This definition is not very different from those noted already. The same principle of 'free variation' is suggested but in a terminology that is convenient to treat the synonymy underlying the various possible alternative grammatical constructions in Sanskrit and Pali. Grammatically tasmāi uvāca (Karakavbhakti) and tāni prati uvāca (Upapadavbhakti) will be instances of syntactic synonyms. From the configurational analysis which pertains to the external shapes and constructions of words and phrases we come to the consideration of 'inner synonymy'.

**Synonymy based on Implication:**

When do two statements mean the same thing? For a logician the external forms of sentences are of little importance. If their implication is the same they are synonymous. So the following two sentences are synonymous: 'Either the girl is not singing or Bill is deaf' and 'If the girl is singing, then Bill is deaf' (GEORGE A. MILLER. Language and Communication, 1951, p.160). Such a synonymy can be defined even in terms of 'bilateral implication' as 'if one sentence $S_1$ implies another sentence $S_2$, and if the converse also holds good, $S_1$ and $S_2$ are
equivalent, i.e. $S_1 = S_2$ and $S_2 = S_1$ then $S_1 = S_2$ (where '=' stands for 'equivalent to'). The Buddha has so many times suggested in his sermons that \textit{natthikavada} is implicationally synonymous with \textit{akiriya\text{-}vada} i.e. one who does not believe in the other world or the fruition of the karmas does not strive for merits etc. Philosophically even \textit{anadi} and \textit{ananta} will be synonymous concepts for one necessarily implies the other.

To proceed, PAUL ZIFF in his 'Semantic Analysis' (p. 172) has the following definition of synonym, to offer. "mi and mj are exact synonyms if and only if mi and mj are distinct words not in complementary distribution and Cmi and Cmj are one and the same set, thus identical". This definition has a pedantic appearance. Its value lies in its clear restrictions. The plural affixes \text{-}s- and \text{-}en- being the allomorphs of plural morpheme do not differ in meaning. But the affixes are not generally called as synonyms. Only to exclude these ZIFF chooses the wording 'not in complementary distribution'. Again \text{-}a- and \text{-}an- (as in 'that is a book' and 'that is an etching') virtually never occur in the same environment. The forms are thus in 'complementary distribution' and ZIFF inclines to suppose that the word synonym is not used in connection with forms in complementary distribution. Given these restrictions there exists no room for exact synonyms in any language and that is the point ZIFF wants to emphasise. It should be observed that ZIFF's belief that the word synonym is not used in the connection of affixes is true only in the context of the languages like English etc. Sanskrit and Pali do consider the
syonymy between the various affixes and suffixes and right from the Nighantus down to the Kośas and dhatupathas and books on Poetics we find collections of synonymous affixes, suffixes and particles. (vide Nig. III.13)

Finally let the definition of synonyms as given by ULMANN be noted. "Only those words can be described as synonymous which can replace each other in any given context without slightest alteration either in cognitive or in emotive impact'. What is vague or rather technical in ALSTON's definition in the wording 'Ilocutionary-act potential' is merely explicated by ULMANN with a reference to the non-alteration in either cognitive or emotive import.'

Synonymous Definitions:

To sum up it can be said that 1) all these definitions centre on one main aspect which is, ironically enough, given in synonymous words signifying interchangeability. We have RENSON MATE's 'Interchangeability'; QUINE's 'Substitutivity', NELSON GOODMAN's Extensional Identity; ULMANN's Interreplaceability'. C. CARNAP gives us the criterion of 'Intentional isomorphism' a variant of which A. CHURCH aptly dubs as Synonymous isomorphism (philosophical Studies. 5. 1954, pp. 65-73).

2) The 'interchangeability' is not allowed at the cost of the loss of 'illocutionary-act potential' synonymously 'without slightest alteration in either cognitive or emotive import'.

3) All the definitions imply then non-existence of perfect synonyms. 4) The conditions: to be synonymous the words must be different and must belong to the same language are generally understood and therefore are not specifically mentioned.
PAUL ZIFF alone makes a reference to distinct words.

It will be proper at this stage to write a brief note on the standard theories of meaning and their impact on synonymy.

Standard theories of Meaning and Synonymy:

Since synonymy rests on the sameness of meaning it is natural that the standard theories of meaning shall each have its own bearing on the subject.

1) **The Referential Theory** of meaning will consider two expressions as synonyms if and only if they refer to the same object in the same way.

2) **The Ideational Theory** shall make the association with the same idea/ideas a sufficient criterion of synonymy.

3) **The Behavioural Theory** will explain the usage of two expressions as synonymous only on the basis of their involvement in the same stimulus-response connections.

It now only remains to record in brief some widespread tendencies in connection with synonyms.

Some Widespread Tendencies in connection with Synonyms:

1) **Unwarranted discrimination in Synonyms**: A reference is already made (supra. p. 74.) to BREAL's Law of Distribution. It is also noted that in technical terminology two exact synonyms can live side by side for a very long time. So are 'spirant' and 'fricative' in phonetics. When such exactly synonymous terms co-exist for a long time, the experts tend to discriminate them. But even this has not happened with the cited pair. Many times the discrimination of synonyms
appears very much forced. It is a sophisticated process and not in a few examples the discrimination is done on very artificial grounds. The Sanskrit pair yasah and kirti might have some differences historically. When used in different contexts the same pair of words might have different meanings also. Yet inspite of these considerations one gathers the impression that the commentators are really pouring their own ideas while discriminating these words. So we have such ad hoc and arbitrary explanations as

a) Tilakarama-Kirtiḥ Sauryadija, yoso dandaśadīśa
prasiddhīḥ / (Ramayana.II.2.33)

b) The same authority elsewhere - Kirtih desanta-
akhyatih, yasah svadesakhyatih / (ibid.VI.21.16)

c) Kullukā-Kirtiḥ mṛtasya khyātirupa, yasah jivatāh
khyātirupam / (Manusmrti.XI.40)

It is obvious that there is nothing in either Yasah or Kirti that should connect them with the significations they are said to express ⁹.

To attempt to distinguish where there lies no difference is only a pathologic aspect of synonymy.

2) Radiation of Synonyms: This process plays a very important role in Sanskrit and Pali synonyms. Its essence is merely a case of analytical extension. When one word is given a transferred sense its synonyms also soon attract that sense. The Bandhūtā doctrine in the Brāhmaṇa Lit. can very finely explain the operation. If A is given a transferred sense S, B its synonyms will also come to signify S. If ava + √gam comes to signify knowledge ava + √1 (synonymous with √gam) will also
do the same. Here lies the explanation of the rather obscure
aveccappasāda which the Buddha recommends so often and which
Bhikṣhu NANAMOLI translates as 'confidence due to undergoing'
(THE GUIDE.1962, p.47) but which more properly is an equivalent
of 'belief after knowing' or 'an enlightened belief'. If
'overlook' acquires the transferred meaning 'to deceive'
'oversee' undergoes a parallel change. The basis of this
tendency is the analogous development heading towards parity
of signification.

3) The Law of Synonymic Attraction: Which are the subjects
which attract a large number of synonyms? It is very easy to
count the synonyms for a certain subject from the marginal
indicative figure of the synonymous dictionaries in Sanskrit
and Prakrits. Even if we concentrate on Pali it tells us that
the Abhidhanappadīpīka of the Moggallāna lists 46 terms for
Nibbāna, and the ch. Vevacaṇahāra in the Netti lists 50 terms.
Anticipating the results of this dissertation it can be said
that it is the Founder of the Law (The Buddha) and the goal
that he set before the people (i.e. the Nibbāna) top the number
of synonyms in Pali. The number usually is some indication
of the importance and it will not be improper to conclude about
the importance of a particular subject from the fact of the
number of synonyms, it attracts. In the West some concentra-
tions in Old English, have given the following results. BEOWULF
gives 37 words for 'hero' or 'prince' and 17 for 'sea'.
Interesting it is to note that the French dialect has nearly
200 variant expressions for 'mean' or 'avaricious'. This
statistical aspect throws a revealing light on the cultural
set-up of the users of language. Thanks to our Sanskrit and Prakrit dictionaries, many of which have even arranged the synonyms on the numerical basis and the Nighantus, the first of the kind, specifically mention the number of synonyms each word has. The number of near synonyms (as in Pali, - hetu, peccaya, karana etc.) also leads us to infer the richness of the relations in which the concepts (say like that of a 'cause') stand with those people.

4) Some Paradoxes about Synonyms: Yuen Ren Chao (Language and Symbolic Systems, p. 71) observes "things synonymous with the same thing are not synonymous with each other". This is due to the fact that synonymy not unlike the other aspects of meaning is relative and is a matter of degree. So, for example in a dictionary under the lexeme hari there will be a set of numbered meanings i) The God Visnu, ii) Siva, iii) Lion, iv) Monkey etc. These words may not necessarily be synonymous with each other.

Paul Ziff records another paradox (op. cit. p. 172 ff.) "The words synonym and synonymous are neither synonyms nor are they synonymous". This paradox aptly brings out the factor that in the determination of synonymy the 'meaning' alone should not be considered. To put it in another way our idea of meaning should be so comprehensive as to enable us to note the values of words also. 'Brother' and 'male sibling' are exactly synonymous. But they are not exact synonyms. 'Brother' conjures up the associations like 'brotherhood' etc. It carries the emotive value absent in the 'male sibling'. In the philosophy of synonyms connotation, denotation, meaning, implication, resolution etc. are all very markedly different categories which are not to be confused while treating the synonyms.
NOTES

1) See Buddhaghosa: nighandu'iti namanighandu. SnA.447.
2) For the view of NIDA see Semantic Analysis. PAUL ZIFF. p.172. ZIFF rightly criticises NIDA for having confounded meaning with connotation (ibid).
3) Encyclopaedia Americana. synonyms. s.v.

5) For the views of BENSON MATES, QUINE, NELSON GOODMAN, MORTON G. WHITE and other see Semantics and the Philosophy of Language. a collection of papers edited by LEONARD LINSKY. Urbana 1952. References in the brackets are given to the pages of this book.
6) C.LEWIS. An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. Open Court. 1946. 6-7 passim.
7) For this see chapter VII.
9) These instances are cited and discussed by Charudeva Shastri in his excellent Sanskrit article Paryayavacana-viveka published in the Proceedings of AIOC (Lucknow) Vol.II.1955.

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CHAPTER III.
Synonyms and Synonymy:
Ancient-Indian Views.
Chapter III

Synonyms and Synonymy: Ancient Indian Views

We discussed at a considerable length the modern views on synonyms and synonymy in the foregoing chapter. In this chapter we propose to discuss some of the ancient Indian views on synonyms and synonymy which perhaps will prove more useful in the context of the study of the synonymic usage in the Tīpiṭaka. It is surprising and gratifying too to observe that though synonymics never attained by itself the stature of a regular linguistic discipline as for example, the science of etymologies (Nirukta) and grammar (Vyākaraṇa) did, almost all the branches of learning have something of their own to say about this subject. A survey of the ancient Indian literature will attest that it has punctuated with attempts to explain some very important aspects of synonymy such as interchangeability, stylistic variations, dialectical variations, stylistic repetitions, redundancy, etc. The majority of these findings exhibit a surprising closeness to the modern investigations and a number of parallels can be found in modern theories of synonymy. In these ancient views one can also discern a remarkable similarity with the modern approaches to the subject especially so far as the modes of expressions, method of enquiry and over and above the interest which guides them in their
investigations are concerned. The following is a brief account of some of the pertinent Indian views on synonyms and synonymy:

The Rgveda and Synonyms:

To start with one finds in the R\text{V}, the earliest of the Indian literary records, profuse usage of synomyic terms. The instances such as \text{yutsu: prtanasu (VII.8.22); bhumi: prthvi (V.85.4); prthvi: mahi (X.60.9); urvi: prthvi (VII.38.2); asa: vajI (VII.7.1); atya: vajI (I.126.2); vayah: patati (I.49.3) candra: bhanu (I.48.9); krtva: majman (I.141.6) are well known. The Rgveda has of course no explicit observation on synonymy. It, however, speaks about certain identity in meaning or essence in spite of the diversity of expressions. It says: To what is one, the poets give many a name. They call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan (ekam sat vipra bahudha vadanti agnim yamam matarisvanamahuh. I.164.46). If the ontological truth of this\textsuperscript{2} is brought to bear on the problem of synonymy one can deduce the following Rgvedic view of synonymy: synonymy consists in their being diverse expressions used to denote the same essence. In West scholars have tried to define synonymy in terms of two words standing for the same Platonic idea\textsuperscript{3}. The Rgvedic concept approximates this view although its primary import is that of monism (i.e. one reality underlying many manifestations). The other Vedas\textsuperscript{4} merely use synomyic terms in collocations; they do not present any particular view on synonymy.
Before proceeding to the next phase of the Vedic literature, it is necessary to note the Vedic dogma of 'non-alterability of Vedic words and their order'. The Vedic mantras, it is held, do not admit of rewording or any type of alteration. One cannot say vanhīh praśina-rumibhiḥ satatyah navinairapi in place of Aṣṇih purvebhīr-sibhiridvo nūtanairuta (I.1.2).

Originally the idea might have originated in the stylistic and semantic considerations. But the traditional explanation emphasises the idea of Apūrva or 'potential merit' governing the value and sanctity of the original chose diction. The recital of unvedic paraphrasing of the Vedic mantras, it is held, do not entitle one to the merit to be accrued to by reciting the mantras as they are.

The Brāhmaṇas and Synonyms:

The next in the chronological order is the Brāhmaṇa Lit., which contains many suggestions useful in the context of the study of synonyms. The major part of the Brāhmaṇas form a commentary on the Vedic mantras and in course of explaining these mantras the Brāhmaṇas had to make use of the dictionary method of explaining the words by giving their near-synonyms. Generally by using the words vai and vau the Brāhmaṇas present the explicative synonyms of the words used in the mantras. The following are some of the typical methods employed by the Brāhmaṇas while explaining the Vedic mantras.
a) Explanation through synonyms e.g. vajno vai makhāḥ (Taitt. Br. III.2.8.3); ṛatravāḥ kṣapāḥ (Ait. Br. I.13)

b) The statement of the mystico-ritualistic significations i.e. Agni is said to be synonymous with pasu in certain contexts for Agni carries the oblations to the gods as a pasu carries load from one place to another. Agnirhi devanām pasuḥ (Ait. Br. I.15)

c) Synonymic metaphorical expressions: Yāska has already observed in Nir. VII. 24 that the Brāhmaṇas indulge in large number of metaphors. (bahubhaktivādīni hi Brāhmaṇani santi) and we find Brāhmaṇas being cautious and judicious in explaining the exact metaphoric significations of the particular expressions. e.g. vajno vai sutaramā nauḥ, kṛṣṇajinām vai sutaramā nauḥ, vāg vai sutaramā nauḥ (Ait. Br. I.13). In his article 'Linguistic studies on the Brāhmaṇas' UCR. Vol. XI. No. 3-4. July-October 1953. p.163. Dr. M.H. F. JAYASURIYA points out the diverse methods employed by the Brāhmaṇas in their explanations of the mantras. Some of these are: (i) archaic words of the ancient Vedic vocabulary being considered unintelligible are replaced by modern words. (ii) a word though not archaic, but considered rare in ṣā occurrence is replaced by a more usual word (iii) ritual words are replaced by their technical equivalents, etc.

d) Synonymy based on Bandhūta - There are many instances of 'inner synonymy' (supra. p. ii.) in the
Brahmanas. Most of these cases are based on the doctrine of Bandhuta. Instead of the term bandhu the Brahmanas also make use of such other terms as ṛupa, tanu, nāme, etc. (vide. The Creative Period. p.64). When the Tātt. Br. III. 8.14. says that 'ghee is indeed the (real) form (ṛupa) of Agni, and when he offers with ghee he thereby gratifies Agni himself', we have an instance of inner synonymy between ghrta and Agni; this is based on yājñic identification. The study of such instances will form a study of synonyms in depth. In Pali we have statements of religious, psychological and ethical inner relations giving rise to such special synonymy as ṛaga: raja; pāmāda: maccu. etc. (infra p.267)

Upanisads and Synonymy:

In the Upanisads which represent the final stage in the development of the Vedic Lit. we have the following in connection with synonymy:

a) The recognition of synonyms in language: The Upanisads believe that there are synonyms in a natural language. The Ait. Up. (V.2) gives a veritable list of the synonyms for praṇa. viz. saṃjñānām ajanānām vijnānām praṇānām ... sarvanyetāni praṇānasya nāmadhevāni bhayanti. It may be noted en passant that this list in the Aitareya is supplementary to the eleven words for praṇā occurring in the Ng. III. 9.

b) The Upanisadic mode of substitution and stating synonymy between any two words is notable in so far as it
has a parallel in the Tipitaka also. Thus, for example, the Ch.Up. (IV.10.5) while marking the synonymy between ka and kha says: yadvāva kam tadeva kham, yadeva kham tadeva kam. This reciprocatory mode of stating synonymy between any two words readily reminds one of the Pali expression annamannaññevacanaññi (i.e. synonyms of each other). The Aitareya Up. in V.2 says: yañcaitā hrdayam manasañcittat i.e. 'that which is hrdaya is manas itself'. This has a parallel in the Pitakāna yam mano tam cittam, yam cittam tam mano.

c) The Ch.Up. (VII.25.1–2) gives us a very happy expression for 'substitution'. It is adesa (lit. denotation. cf.S.B. on that passage adisyate ityadesah). The Upanisad first refers to Brahman with expression sāh. It then replaces sāh with Aham and further with Ātman. These replacements are called Ahamkaradesa and Ātmaadesa respectively. In Grammar also adesa means a substitute as opposed to atharin (= the original.). In the above Upanisadic passage sāh is the original expression and its substitutes are Aham and Ātman which are therefore its synonyms.

d) Besides the two referred to above there are many instances of synonymic substitution in the Upanisads. Thus for example sambhuti and asambhuti in the twelfth mantra of the Īśa are replaced by sambhava and asambhava in the mantra thirteenth and these are merely suffixal variations of their original. So also vidyā and avidyā
from the tenth mantra are replaced by śambhava and asambhava in mantra thirteenth. The fourteenth mantra replaces asambhava (or sambhava according to Śāmkara) by vināgā which is its synonym. It is suggested (Creative Period p. 90) that this synomytic addition is due to the fact that in the present version of the Īśa we have a blend of the original kāṇva and the original Madhyandina recensions; the former giving only vidya-avidya triplet and the latter only the sambhuti-asambhuti triplet.

e) Synonymic repetition for the sake of emphasis:

While commenting on the synonymic repetition in the above mantras of the Īśa Śāmkara remarks: na mantrām jāmite asti (i.e. Vedic mantras do not mind repetition.). Being interested in emphasizing the importance of the doctrine, the mantras repeat the same substance with synonymic alternatives. Śāmkara, again, has a very fine observation on synonymic repetition in his commentary on B.G.II.24. This and the other verses in the context merely repeat in various ways the substance of the verse II.23. Śāmkara comments: na etessām ślokānām pannaruktyām codaniyām. Yad ekena eva ślokena ātmāno nityatvam avikriyatvam avikriyatvam ca uktām 'na jayate mriyate va' ityadīna. tatra yadeva ātmaviśaye kinciducyate tadentsmat ślokarthat na sitircyate. Kincit sābdataḥ punaruktaṁ kincidarthatāḥ iti. durbodhatvadatmavastunāḥ punah punah prasāngām apadya sābdantaṁreṇa tadeva vajtuv nirūpayati Bhagavān Vāsudevah. 'kathāṁ nu nāmā
samsārināmavyaktam tattvam buddhigocaratam āpannam sat samsāranivṛttye syat'.

The gist of Śaṅkara's scholia is that because the 'verbal reduplication' (sabdātaḥ punarukta) and 'synonymic repetition' (arthataḥ punarukta) serve some definite purpose and produce salutary effect they are not to be considered as blemishes. The Lord thought it necessary to assert the nature of the Ātman, a thing not easy to grasp, in different words and modes of expressions. Incidentally, one can legitimately deduce from the above passage sābdantareṇa tadeva vastunirupanam as a working definition of synonymy according to Śaṅkara. Synonymy consists in 'marking the same thing (or thought) through different words'.

Synonymy and the Vedāṅgas:

Among the exegetical sciences only Grammar and Nirukta have some notable views on synonymy. The Niruktic views on synonymy have a direct bearing on the Vedic Lit. The Grammar touches upon synonymy without any direct reference to the Vedas. It is, therefore, that the Nirukta is treated first although it is said to be a complementary part of the Vyākaraṇa (Vyākaranasya kārttanyam Nir.I.15)

To the Nirukta of Yāṣṭiṣcārya, the only extant book on this science, are prefixed some Nighāntus (Ngs.) or word lists. These Nighāntus contain synonyms, homonyms and some special and obscure words and phrases from the Vedic literature (as also some that cannot be
traced to the available Vedic sources). The contents of the Nighantus are thus diverse. It yet appears that the lists of synonyms are the major and the most valued portion of the Nighantus—a circumstance which perhaps led Sayana to identify Nighantus with the lists of synonyms. In his Rgbaśyabhūmika (p. 122) Sayana says:

\[ \text{ekarthavacinam paryayasadānam sangho yatra pravēna} \]

\[ \text{upadīsyate tatra nighantusabdah prasiddhah}. \]

For Abhidhānacintāmanī Hemacandra (Ⅱ.172) Nighantu is merely a compilation of vocables not necessarily of synonyms.

a) The Nighantu contribution to Synonymics:

Briefly the following can be said to be the specific contribution of Nighantus to synonymics.

1) Ngs. were the first to recognise that there are synonyms in a natural language. They represent the first attempt in compilation of synonyms (and also homonyms and special vocables) under a definite scheme. Chronologically they are older by about a millennium than 'Onamastika' (c.400 A.D.) the first dictionary of synonyms in Greek.

2) It is certainly creditable of the compilers of Ngs. that while listing the specific synonyms they have paid due attention to the metaphoric expressions used synonymously or semi-synonymously with the ordinary direct synonyms of the given words. Thus we have Ilā as the name of Earth (I.1.); barhih and samudrah as the names of antariksa. The Nishantus thus become 'special
lexica' of the Vedas as the Adhivacanas and Nibbacanas occurring in the lists of synonyms in the Niddesas are of the Tipitaka.

3) While listing the synonymous words the Ngs. have also paid adequate attention to synonymy expressing through different parts of speech. Herein we have synonymous nouns (samananamani), synonymous verbs (samanakarmani) and also synonymous prepositions and particles. (upasarga and nipata). Durga commenting on Ngs.III.12. specially remarks: katham nama sarvam caturvidham padaparakara tatasmin samanaye samanatam syat ityevamarthamesyeva hi navasu samanatesu ubhave nipatopasargah darsita bhavanti.

4) It is not clear whether the compiler or compilers of the Ngs. had in their mind any specific plan for arranging the synonyms. The modern dictionaries on synonyms have also to face this difficulty and in many cases as we find the order is quite arbitrary. But the Vedic Nighantus, it can be fairly maintained (though it is not possible to show the truth of this finding in each case) - had a definite ritualistic basis for listing the groups of synonyms. Durga, commenting on Mir.VIII.4. cites a Vartika showing that Sakaputi gave arguments in his treatise—now lost, in favour of the order followed in the Ngs. regarding the sequence of the groups of synonyms. Durga also strives very hard to show the propriety of the order of synonyms observable in the Ngs. He justifies
it mainly on sacrificial background but also considers other associative and causal factors. Thus we have 
\textit{jvalatyevagnau karman\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}} \textit{kriya\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{nt}}} \textit{iti \textit{jvalann\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}}} \textit{mehbhya}}} 
\textit{uttara\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}} \textit{karman\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}} \textit{m\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}} \textit{ni (p.172). The list of \textit{manusya\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}}} 
\textit{-nam\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}} \textit{ni follows that of \textit{apaty\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}}} \textit{nam\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}} \textit{ni for \textit{apaty\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}}} \textit{nya\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ē}}}}} \textit{va hi}} 
\textit{vivrd\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}}} \textit{ha\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}} \textit{santi manusya\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}} ityuc\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}} \textit{yante. The words for \textit{strong}}}} 
\textit{follow the verbs meaning \textit{eating} for after all \textit{va eva hy\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{ya eva balav\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{ento bhav\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{anti. The}}}} 
synonyms for \textit{gold} should \textit{natural\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} come after the}} 
synonyms of \textit{earth} for \textit{prthivy\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{meva hiranyamutp\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{dya}} 
\textit{vat ityat\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{prthivyabhidhanananta\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{ram hiranyaman\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{m\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{nam\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ā}}}}} \textit{ni}}}} 
\textit{sam\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{mnat\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{ni.}}}

5) The last and the most important point is that the Ngs. always give the number of synonyms (supra.p.90) each word has, the importance of which factor is already discussed (supra.p.25) in connection with the 'Law of Synonymic attraction'. The Ngs. also seem to be conscious of the fact that the enumeration of synonyms in each case is not exhaustive for wherever it is so the Ngs. clearly mention it as in the case of the names for 'new' i.e. \textit{gar\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{va nava\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{nam\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}} \textit{ni (six only are the names for 'new').}}}
The Nirukta Contribution to Synonymics:

Nirukta (Nir.) is generally taken to be a 'science of etymologies or derivations'. Actually, however, it comprises many more topics than mere derivations.

Broadly Nir. stands for Vedic exegesis. In course of its exegetical discussions it often touches on some important
aspects of synonymy such as the multiple meaning, generic and specific differences, metaphorical synonyms, synonymous specific differences, metaphorical synonyms, synonymous epithets etc.

a) Multiple Meaning:

The mono-semy in the language requires a word to have only one meaning and the meaning to have only one sound-symbol to express it. This one-to-one relationship is however violated by almost every natural language and we have the two categories of multiple meaning viz. synonymy and homonymy. Both these are carefully noted in the Nirukta. Synonymy is defined (IV.1) as ekārtthamanekāsabdām [lit. words more than one giving one (and the same) meaning. ] Durga (p.265) explains: ekārtthāḥ prthivyādīḥ anekeṣeṁ gavadīsabdānāṁ yatra tattvabhūtah kathyate, aneke ca gavadīsabdāḥ prthivyāderekasyarthasya kathyante tadidamekārtthamanekāsadbaprakāraṇam. Yāska, however, instead of stressing this 'one meaning' (skarth) aspect too far takes a more realistic step in styling synonyms as samananaṁani (like or similar names) which is a fitting correspondent to ULMANN's 'homoionyms' (supra, p. ).

Discussing the theory put forth by the Nairuktas and the Grammarian Sakaṭayana that all the names in language are derivable from verbal roots Yāska refers to a possible objection to this in that it will mean that every object will have as many names as the actions with which it is connected. (athāpi yāvadbhirbhāvaiḥ samprayuṣyeta}
tāvadbhyo nāmadheyapratalambhah syāt Nir.I.12.). Herein Yāska is actually explaining a type of synonymic resource for in natural language in many cases we do find a thing or person having different names on account of its association with various actions. Read the following:

'The self-same snake may be regarded from various points of view; he may the 'crawler', the 'coiler' or the 'gleaning eyed'. When each of the several words is coined its special signification is felt. (T. G. Tucker, Intro. to the Natural Hist. of Lang. pp. 443-444.). Read also the following from ṇd. 1.p. 8: sappo vuccati ahi. kenaṭṭhena sappo ? samsappanto gacchatīti sappo; bhujanto gacchatīti bhujago; urenā gacchatīti urago; pannasiro gacchatīti pannago; sireṇa sapatīti sirīsapo; bile sayatīti bilāsayo; guhavām sapatīti guhāsavo; dvīhi jihvāya rasām sayatīti dvirassanu. etc.

Synonymous Epithets:

About the synonymous epithets Yāska opines that one should consider only the most prominent and well-known epithets and not the adjectives of the Vedic divinities used only in a few isolated instances (tadyānānam pradhanastutinām devanām taddaivatamityacaksate VII.1.) The most prominent adjectives further become epithets and these epithets in the further course of their development crystalize into synonyms of those respective divinities. This fact is implied in the above statement of Yāska. As to why these divinities should be known by
more than one expression Yāska says: It is because of	heir great eminence that these (three viz. Agni, Vāyu
and Sūrya) divinities are known by very many names. Their
different functions also entitle them to many epithets.
(mahābhāgyat ekaikasyah api bahunī namadheyāni
bhavanti; api va karmaprthaktvāt Nir.VII.5.)
The unalterable diction of the Vedas:

One of the arguments of Kautsa as referred to
by Yāska (Nir.I.15) in showing that the Vedic texts are
meaningless is that the Vedic mantras are marked by
niyatavacoyukti or unalterable diction. Durga explains
the contention of Kautsa as follows: abhidhānaniyatā
hi te bhavanti 'Agni ā vahī vitaye' (SV.I.111.)
iti mantrā na punar 'Vibhavaso āgaccha panaya'
iti (i.e. the mantras are regulated by a fixed diction.
It would not do to say Vibhavaso etc. in place of the
original Agne etc.). He further explains 'In the ordinary
speech the significant words are not strictly irreplacable
for one can always say goniṃabhyāja instead of gāmabhyāja
(iha loke arthavatām śabdānan aniyamena paryaya-
vacanātā dvāta gavādiprayoge ... tadyathā goniṃabhyāja,
gāmabhyāja.)

That intersubstitutability is the criterion of
synonymy is clearly indicated in this discussion. The
Vedic exegesis seem to suggest that there are no exact
equivalents in the language and the employment of improper
synonyms taken as equivalents of the words in the original
are bound to mar the intended effect. On this point the Vedic exegesis seems to be in agreement with the theory of \textit{kavyapaka} as advanced by \textit{Vamana (infra.p.196)} and \textit{Mecauly} who said: 'change the structures of the sentence; substitute one synonym for another and the whole effect is destroyed' (quoted in the \textit{New Eng.Dict. synonym.s.v.}). Though the original idea implied in the \textit{niyatavacoyktittva} must have been much the same as one underlying the concept of \textit{kavyapaka} and the above statement of \textit{Mecauly} the ostensible religious reason that is given to support it is the unproductivity of \textit{apurva} (religious merit) in the case of the synonymic paraphrasing of the original mantras. To explain, it is urged that the invisible potency which is produced by uttering the mantras as they are will not be produced if the mantras are replaced by their profane synonyms. The Vedas, therefore, cannot be paraphrased.

In passing it should be noted that \textit{Skandasvamin}, another commentator of \textit{Nirukta}, has also demonstrated the inter-changeability criterion of synonymy. In commenting on \textit{Nir.I.2} he says: \textit{anye varnayanti bhavasabdah sabdaparyayah}, \textit{tatha ca prayoga} \textit{-} \textit{yadva sarve bhavah svena bhavena bhavanti sa tesam bhavah} \textit{iti sarve sabda} \textit{svena arthena arthabhyutah sambaddhah bhavanti, sa tesam svabhavah} \textit{iti tatra vyakhya} \textit{yate} (the gist is that in place of the word \textit{bhava} we find the word \textit{sabda} used in the explanation).
We have already mentioned that Yāska has defined synonym as ekārthamanekasabdam. It will only be proper to investigate what he means by artha a word which is generally translated as 'meaning'. Yāska it should be remembered uses another word karyam to denote 'meaning' (cf. tani cet samanakarmanī samanairvacanaṇi, nānakarmanī cennanairvacanaṇi. Nir.II.7 and etavantah samanakarmano dhatavah I.20). In Skt. artha stands for 'purpose, use, application, reason, function' etc.; karyam also means 'function'. By using artha and karyam synonymously Yāska is almost anticipating WITTEGENSTEIN who maintains that the meaning of a word is only its use or function (cf. The Blue and Brown Books p.67). 'Don't look for the meaning of a word, look for its use' says WITTEGENSTEIN and Yāska has already done this for instead of saying kāntyarthāh and gatayarthāh he has always used with predilection kantikarmanāh (dhātavah) and gatikarmanāh (dhātavah). From what he has said in his Nirukta one can deduce Yāska's definition of a synonym in the words samanakarmanāh abadāh or 'words having the same function (not the static meaning). This alone can be the right interpretation of his ekārthamanekasabdam (cp. also arthānterāh parīṣēta Nir.II.1).

One more aspect of the study of synonyms as indicated by Yāska is the consideration of stylistic and provincial peculiarities. It is said for example (Nir.II. 2.) that the verbal form sāvati is used in Kamboja alone. Aryan generally make use of the nominal form sāvah; so
also the Easterners are found using the verbal form dāti
while the Northerners prefer to use only the instrumental
noun dātra.

It will thus be seen that the Nirukta is
conversant with many an aspect of the study of synonyms
and it will not be an exaggeration to say that synonymics
(i.e. the study of synonyms as a deptt. of Grammar) was
sufficiently developed by Yaska's time. The commentators
on Nirukta often quote a verse which sums up the complete
methodology of explaining synonyms. This method, they say,
is followed by Yāska in explaining the three sections of
synonyms in the Ngs. The method of explaining the
synonyms is as follows:

1) Tattvavacana or the statement of the word e.g.
   the word gauḥ is the synonym of 'earth'.

2) Paryayavacana i.e. the dictionary method of
   explaining a word with its synonyms or as
   Durga says 'explaining an obscure word
   with its more familiar equivalents'.

3) Bheda or constitutional analysis.

4) Samkhya the number of synonyms each given word has
   e.g. 'There are twentyone synonyms of 'earth'.

5) Samdighdhodāharana i.e. derivations so far put
   forth but which are still doubtful. e.g.
   Nirṛti i.e. earth from ni + Vṛtam.

6) Asamdighdhodāharana The opposite of the above
   No.5.
7) *Tannirvacana* lit. its interpretation i.e. 'the Ascetics always hold that a man of large progeny comes to grief'. (This is given in further corroboration of the explanation given in the context of the doubtful illustration stated above.)

It is clear that a long and continuous development of synonymics must have taken place before the whole method was crystalized in the form in which it is embodied in the *karika* referred to above.

**Durga's contribution to synonymics:**

Among the commentators of the *Nirukta*, Durgacārya stands out as the most eminent contributor to the study of synonymics. The following points his commentary *Rjvartha* should be of interest.

1) *Durga* admits the existence of near synonyms in the language as he himself has supplied (p. 25) many synonyms for the expressions *jayate*, *asti*, *vardhate* *viparinamate*, *apakṣīyate* and *vinasyati* from the *Nirukta* I.2. He explains *jayate* by *nispadyate*, *abhivyajyate* and *uttisthati*; *asti* by *vidyate* and *bhavati*; *viparinamate* by *jirytī* and *bhavantaramapadyate*; *vardhate* by *pasyati* and *upacīyate*; *apakṣīyate* by *dhvamsati* and *bhrasyati* and *vinasyati* by *mriyate*, *viliyate*, etc. His method of explaining a word in the text by almost all of its near synonyms is strikingly similar to the method followed by the Nidesas in explaining the Pitākān words.
2) To express the idea of synonym he has used the following words. a) paryāyasābda (p. 25) and paryāyavacana (p. 558) i.e. alternative word; b) punaruktanaṁa (p. 321) i.e. redundant word; c) ekasya anekabhiddhanta or 'one (meaning) having many expressions'. d) abhidhanabhede'pi ekarthata (p. 558) i.e. 'the same meaning inspite of the difference in expressions'. e) anarthantaram (p. 11) i.e. 'not being different in meaning'.

3) Durga rightly makes a distinction between an exact synonym and a synonym only in the common acceptance of the term. On the scientific plane he believes in the monosey in the language and asserts that every word must have only one meaning, and every meaning must have only one word to express it. He says (p. 12): yathāvāsyām yatprarthastatra tadabhiddhanyakah sābdah, yatra sābdah tatra tadvacyo'rthah iti sambadhau hi sābdārthau vācyavacakatvena nityamiti. Thus strictly speaking there can never be two or more words within the same language expressing exactly the same sense. He says: 'Just as the object of praise differs with the different praises so also that which is to be expressed (i.e. sense) must vary with the varying expressions (i.e. various synonyms). yathāiva hi stutibhedāt stutyabhedaḥ, evameva abhidhānabhedaḥ abhidheyaabhede'pi bhavitumarhati prasiddhataram ca idām loke 'pratyabhidhānaṁ arthabheda iti - na tathā ekasya anekabhiddhānataḥ. tasmāt prthak prthak agni-jatavedo-Vāisvānaradisābdānāṁ abhidheya iti
sthitih. Durga, one is tempted to remark, has wholly anticipated BLOOMFIELD by stressing pratyabhidhanam arthabhedah. In arguing that it is impossible to have total synonymy in a natural language BLOOMFIELD (Language p.145.) has said: "Each linguistic form has a constant and specific meaning. If the forms are phonemically different, we suppose that their meanings are also different." (vide supra p. 93).

4) Durga rightly takes Yaska on task for not having meticulously explained the significant differences between the 'one hundred and twentytwo expressions all generally meaning 'to move'. He says that although all these 122 expressions show a generic likeness they yet imply specific differences which it was the duty of Yaska to point out. Read: astra puner yadyapi gatikaranam dvavimsati-
satasamkhyanamavisistam gamanamekortha uktaastathapi
prasiddhyanurodhaya 'vasati', 'lothahate' 'scotate'
ityevamadayah pratiniyatasattvagamanavisaya eva
drastavyah. tadyathah ya eva utkatika urasa va
gacchati sa eva kasatiyuchyate, netaro ya uddho
gacchati; tathah ca ya eva nimnena pradesena
purusadih akamakarena gacchati sa eva lothate
ityucyate, nanvah; tathah ca yadeva dravadravyam
kincit sravati tadeva scotata ityucyate, nanvah:
evam gacchatikaranam ekarthatve pi sati, prasiddhi-
samarthyat gamanavisese su yathartham viniveso
drastavyah, deantasparaptistu calanapurvika sarvesam
sāmanāṁ kāryāṁ ityāta ekārthatvamēsāṁ uktam. sāmanyā-
sabdāśca kvacid vīsesāvacino bhavanti vīsesāsabdāśca
kvacit sāmanyavacinaḥ tadapupeksitavyam.

Here we have almost a specimen fascicle of a
thesaurus in anticipation of the method used later by
ROGET in explaining the niceties in the synonyms in the
English language. Durga's suggestion is that the explanation
of a word should be so comprehensive as to include the
idea which it conveys in common with its other synonyms
and at the same time should be so definite as to exclude
any other ideas than what are essential to it. So the
general sense 'to move' is shared by all these 122 verbs
beginning with varītate and ending with avuthuh; but each
one expresses a particular kind of motion to the exclusion
of others. Thus kasaṭi is 'to hopp'; lothate is more
passive in sense and means 'rolling'; sōtate is peculiar
to liquids only and means 'to trickle' or 'ooze'. The
verbs, therefore, need to be differentiated semantically
by pointing out the proper contexts in which they are to
be used.

5) On the ordinary language plane Durga has no
hesitation to admit 'multiple meaning' in forms of
synonyms and homonyms. He says (p. 558): ubhayaṁ hi
prasiddhiḥ - pratyabhidhamam carthabhedo drṣṭah 'gauh,
asvah' iti; abhidhanabhede'pi ca ekārthata drṣṭa
haastah karah, panih iti.
The Mīmāṃsā system and the Problem of Synonymy:

1) According to the Mīmāṃsā system the relationship between a word and its meaning is natural and eternal; it is not conventional (ṣutpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhah JŚ.I.1-5). A corollary from this will be that every word should have only one sense to be expressed and vice-versa. This excludes the possibility of many words having the same sense in other words synonyms. Jaimini has clearly stated in his aphorism anyāyaśācāneka-śabdattvam (I.3.26) that 'it is improper to assume many words (expressing the same sense)'. It is true that he has said this primarily in the context of the corrupt forms of words (apabhramśas). But taking into consideration the monosemy implied in his philosophy of word-meaning it can also be interpreted as being his general statement about synonyms in general.

2) On the practical language level, however, both Jaimini and Śabara have no hesitation in accepting the existence of synonyms (paryāyasabda). Words which are interchangeable in most contexts are recognised as synonyms. Under JŚ.II.1.4. Śabara observes: "In what way are the terms 'verbs' and 'words denoting activity' are synonymous? That they are so is indicated by the fact that the suffixes taken by the 'words denoting activity' are called akhyatikī (i.e. pertaining to verbs)." Here Śabara has probed synonymy with the criterion of 'intersubstitutability. The same criterion of synonymy
has been used by him while commenting on *JS.II.1.3*. He says: te dravyagunasadabā iti vaktavye tāni namāni iti sūtrītām atah namāni iti esām parvayyasābdah i.e. instead of saying that these are words expressive of substance and qualities, the aphorism has said that these are 'nouns' which means that the term 'nouns' is synonymous with the term 'words expressive of substance and qualities'.

3) Śabara has emphasised the point that though the ordinary language contains synonyms for many words yet in the performance of sacrifices only the words from the Vedas should be made use of and not their vulgar equivalents. Śabara himself has marked the other abhidhānas (i.e. synonyms) of the following deities: Agni (under X.4.23); Sūrya (under X.4.25); Vanaspati (under X.4.32) etc. but he insists that while offering oblations in the sacrificial rites the deity invoked must be referred to only by the name mentioned in the injunctive text. The other synonymous epithets will not do in the case.

4) About the question whether the corrupt forms of the words (and this covers what we have called 'dialectical synonyms') are to be reckoned as independent synonyms along with their original uncrupt words. The Mīmāṃsā system has presented a revealing discussion. Both Śabara and Kumārila have opined that corrupt forms which though they might have gained currency in public yet express their meanings only indirectly. Through similarity (sadṛśyāt)
with their correct originals they merely manifest the potentialities of their original un-corrupt forms. They do not have any independent and direct power (sakti) to reveal their senses. In his Tantravartika under JS.I. 3.26. Kumārila has clearly hinted this. He says: na ca esa nyayo yat sadraḥ sābdhāḥ skamarthāḥ abhinivisamanāḥ sarve avicchinnaparamparaṃ eva iti. prayāyamātrādarkasat abhyupagamyate sadraḥ sat sadhusābdepyavagate prayāyovikalpyate. tasmadamīśamekaḥ anadiḥ anye spabhramśah hastḥaḥ karaḥḥ pāṇiḥḥ iti evamadisu tu abhiyuktopadesat anadiḥ amīśamarthena sambandhah iti. The gist of this is that it is not proper to assume that these corrupt words are eternal and have eternal relations with their senses. It is our experience that because of their similarity with the uncorrupted forms (sādhuśabdā) we understand their meanings. Therefore, it is proper to conclude that one of them (namely sādhuśabdā) is eternal and the others are only its corrupt forms. It is a different case with words like hasta, kara and pāṇi which are independent and are all eternal having permanent relations with their senses.

The very fact that words like hasta, kara and pāṇi are considered as independent and eternal having a permanent relation with their (respective) senses it is clear that the Mīmāṃsā system does not favour exact synonyms. For each of these words has a different sense permanently connected with it. The Tantravartika (under JS.I.3.26).
clearly says: ekatmayorevacyavacakayoranyaksepat
parasparanyavati, anyatarasyapitvanekatva
vyabhicarat niyamahanih. 'There is an invariable
permanent relation between words and their meanings and if
this is violated from either side the permanency (niyama)
will be lost (hanyih).

The Mīmāṃsā defines the verbal meaning as
yatparah sadhah sa sadarthah. A superficial interpretation
of this, independent of the Mīmāṃsā view of the eternal
relation between words and meanings will equate this with
WITTGENSTEIN's view of meaning (i.e. meaning = usage.).
It may be argued that if one uses a word with reference to
a particular thing (yatparaḥ) that word would have that
meaning. But the Mīmāṃsā has not left the determination of
verbal meanings to the choice of people. Every word has
entered into an invariable and eternal relationship with a
specific meaning. If one misunderstands or misinterpretes
the meaning of a word he is at fault not the words. That the
relation of a word and its meaning is eternal and objective
can be the only admissible interpretation of the dictum
yatparah sadhah sa sadarthah. About the subjective
misapprehension Śabara says: evamayam puruso veda iti
bhavati pratyah, na tu evamayam arthah ('This is
how the man understands the word', this is what we think
and not that 'this actually is the meaning of the word'.)

In passing we should note that Kumārila
(Tantravārttika p.297) has severely criticised the view that
all expressions have only astyartha ('is' as their meaning), a view referred to by Bhartṛhari in his Vākya. II.119. The main objection of Kumarila to this is that if all words are supposed to have only one meaning there will be no difference of meaning between any two words and it will be impossible to carry on any linguistic discussion. What has been urged against 'all words having the same sense' can also be legitimately applied to 'some words having the same sense', in other words the so-called synonyms. It can be easily surmised that on scientific plane Kumarila declines to accept the presence of synonyms in language.

The Vedanta System(s) and Synonymy:

The various systems of Vedānta each in its own way stress the relation of identity (if relation it can be called at all) between the individual self and the highest soul. This is a metaphysical position and has very little to do with the problem of synonymy which pertains to the level of language, a lower level according to the Vedānta. According to Śāṅkara, words cannot express the Absolute Reality which is Brahman and according to Rāmacandra all the words in the language ultimately denote the Highest Being. Even granting all the essential differences between the metaphysical and linguistic levels in the context of the identity of self and soul one can still discern some formal similarity between them. The Vedantists speak of the identity between Jīva and Ātman.
and the semanticists speak of synonymy in terms of a relation of identity between two (or more) independently defined senses. The question whether 'A' and 'B' are synonymous is reduced to the question whether 'A' and 'B' denote the same entity viz. their sense. This is of course one of the many views about synonymy and the one resting more on the referential theory of meaning. (supra. p. 144). It may well be said that synonymy puts the Vedântic proposition of absolute identity or qualified identity as the case may be, on a language level. The question of 'one and many' is common to Vedântic metaphysics and Synonymy. It will be instructive, therefore, to note some peculiar Vedântic implications touching upon the problem of synonymy. These are as follows:

1) Inner Synonymy: According to the absolute Advaitism of Śrîkara everything indeed is Brahman (sarvam khalvidam brahman). The mahavakyas like tat tvamasi and aham brahma Asi leave no scope for any difference between Tat and Tvam as also Aham and Brahman. This further means that Tat and Tvam as well as Aham and Brahman are synonymous. This in fact is nicely demonstrated at Cha. Up.VII.25.1-2. The first passage runs as: sa eva adhastat, sa upariṣtat, sa pascat, sa pūrastat, sa deksinatāḥ, sa uttaratāḥ - sa eva idām sarvam iti. After this the Upaniṣad replaces sah with aham keeping everything else as it is. Here we find the statement of inner synonymy existing between sah and aham. In the
Sanskrit language these words are not synonymous but in the language of Vedānta they are definitely so. It should be noted that though śāṅkara quotes this passage frequently in support of his Absolute Monism yet not even once has he been tempted to speak of the linguistic expressions aham and sah being synonymous. Far from that he in fact begins his introduction to the Brahma-sūtras by pointing out that yuṣmad and asmad, like darkness and light, are poles apart. This is quite creditable of the great Vedāntist that he never confused the metaphysical and linguistic planes.

Aham and sah have the same reference but they do not have the same meaning in the language. A supple grasp of Śaṅkara’s teaching may even reveal (though no express statement to this effect can be produced) that he always makes a subtle difference between isosemic and isomorphic.

We consider whether 'A' and 'B' are synonymous. But we must understand that far from being this even the 'A' may not be synonymous with itself in all the contexts in which it occurs. In other words though the outward form of 'A' may remain the same there may exist a split in its meaning.

Take for example the following sentences:

1) Devadatta is clever.
2) Ātman is Brahman.

The 'is' in the first is the 'is' of predication; the 'is' in the second is the 'is' of identity. In the case of the second proposition we can say: $A = B$. In the case of the first we cannot say $A = C$. 
So it is patent that even the same word does not mean the same thing (or thought) in all the contexts in which it occurs. This is a great barrier to complete synonymy which accepts the words as synonymous if and only if they are substitutable in all the contexts in which they may occur. Śāṅkara, therefore, will never mark ghata and sarva as synonyms finding a flimsy support of the metaphysical proposition vacarambhanam vikaro namadheyam mṛttika ityeva satyam (Gha.Up.VI.1.4). Interpreted independently, vacarambhanam vikaro namadheyam 'names, mere linguistic modifications (ultimately expressing the same thing)' can be taken as a suitable expression to explain the concept of synonymy.

Elsewhere, on the ordinary language plane Śāṅkara is seen tactily admitting inter-replaceability of words as a criterion of synonymy. Commenting on BS.I.1.9.(svāpyayāt) he says that apīta, apigata and pralaya are synonymous in so far as one is seen used in place of the other. (apīta bhavati, apigata bhavati ityarthāḥ; apipurvasya eterlayarthatvām prasiddhām, prabhavapyaavau iti utpattipralayayāh prayogadarsanāt).

To conclude Śāṅkara stresses more the inner synonymy which exists on Vedānta-metaphysical level according to which the words which in ordinary speech are not synonymous turn out as synonymous e.g. Tat: Tvam. Another example of this is the following passage from the Br.Up. (IV.4.9.7): atha akamayamāno, yo'kāmo, nīskāma āptakāma
atmakāma na tasya prāṇa utkramanti. The vital airs do
do not transmigrate of him who does not desire, who does
not have desires, whose desires have left him, who has
gained all desires (in as much as), he desires (nothing
else than) Self'. Here the adjectives are mostly
synonymous and from the point of view of 'inner synonymy'
the expressions akama and apatakama which in ordinary
language are not at all synonymous, are quite synonymous.
In the case of the knower of Brahman 'reaching (reaping)
all desires' and 'having no desires' make little
difference.

Quite contrary to what Śāmkara has done Rāmānuja
has linked metaphysical and linguistic levels. For him all
the words in the language ultimately denote the Highest
Self or Paramātman. (sarve śabdāḥ paramātmane eva
vācakāḥ. SDS.p.104). In his Vedāntasamgraha.(p.83. also
pp.80-81), the Great Devotionalist says: brahmakarṇyataya
tadantaryāmitaya ca sarvasya brahmātmakattvam sarva-
śabdānām tatprakārasamsthitabrahma-vacitvam ca jānanti
i.e. 'because all things are the products of Brahman and
because Brahman is the inner-dweller in all the things, all
the things have Brahman as their inner core and, therefore,
all the words denoting separate things ultimately denote
the Brahman.'

Really speaking Rāmānuja has taken sufficient care
to avert the possible misunderstanding that because all words
pertain to Brahman they are synonymous. He has carefully
pointed out that since the outward forms of the denoted objects are diverse the words expressing them cannot be called synonyms. His main point is that if the principle that every word essentially expresses God is properly understood it will further help us to realise the exact significance of the Upanisadic text 'that thou art'. This mahavakya implies, according to him, qualified monism.

It is unfortunate that this point is not sympathetically understood by his adversaries (may be they intentionally misrepresented it) and he had to face the criticism as recorded in the SBS. His adverse critic says: "If all words mean only the highest being, then all words will only be synonymous, having one and the same meaning. This queer logic will result in showing the utter uselessness of human language, as all the words in the language so laborously used can serve only one purpose. It has been well said that the usage of synonymous at the same time (i.e. in the same context) is undesirable for the synonyms express their sense in turn and not in combination.

\[ \text{parayanam prayogo hi vaugapadyena negyate} \]
\[ \text{parayenaiva te yasmad vadantyartham na samhitah} \]

It is clear that Ramanuja is purposely misunderstood by his opponents. It is also unfortunate that he should have expressly said sarvasabdānām brahmācītvam when what he meant was only brahmanirdesākātvam. 'All the words ultimately refer to Brahman' not that they directly mean Brahman was his real position. Vācakatva is to be understood only in
the sense of nirdeśakatva. But the opponents are not expected
to be so congenial as to understand what he meant; they held
fast to what he said and used the rather unfortunate expression
brahmavacitva as a lever to overthrow his real contention.

Tactically Śāṃkara was on a safer side. He relegated
'all' to the category of unreal and 'only one' to the category
of real. The various objects were unreal as also the words
expressive of them. The reality was beyond the reach of words
and there is no point in discussing the sham problem namely
what words are expressive of the Highest or how many synonyms
are there for Brahman.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System and Synonymy:

1) The lakṣya-laksāna-synonymy:

The vast Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Lit. contains penetrating
discussion on synonymy especially the one between lakṣya and
laksāna. The Nyāyasūtras have plainly admitted the existence
of synonyms in language. Gautama, in fact, has explained some
concepts in some of his sūtras by merely supplying their more
familiar synonyms. This implies that according to him
synonyms make intelligible many obscure things. Thus for
example buddhi (cognition) is explained merely as being
synonymous with knowledge (jnānam) and 'intelligent findings'
(Upalabdhi) (cf. buddhirjnānamupalabdhirityanarthāntaram.
(I.1.15). Duḥkha (ill) is explained as having the characteri-
scopic of bādhana (trouble) (bādhana-laksānam duḥkhām I.1.21).
The commentator as a further elucidation merely supplies two
more synonyms viz. tapa and pīdā. The whole procedure is
based on the fact that a laksana is always lakṣyatavacche- 
dakasamaniyata (i.e. having exactly the same extension as 
that of a lakṣya). Thus the fallacious reason (hatvabhāsa) 
savyabhicara is explained by its synonym anaikantika 
(anaikantikah savyabhicarah I.2.5). It will be recalled 
that this mode of defining terms by supplying its synonyms 
is exactly what we find in the case of the Abhidhammic 
synonyms. (vide supra.p.85ff). The lakṣya (definiendum) 
and laksana (definiens) being interchangeable always 
prove to be synonymous. One can always H2O instead of 
water and vice-versa. The lakṣya-laksana-synonymy is so 
impressive that it is quite natural for one to use one in 
place of the other. In fact the lakṣya and laksana, it 
must be remembered are always relative. If one wants to 
define water then water becomes lakṣya. If, however, one 
wants to know what H2O is the Chemistry that becomes lakṣya. 
One is strongly reminded of the Pali expressions 
ananamannapecananī (mutually synonymous). This kind of 
synonymy at times causes a little confusion. This, we find 
in the case of savyabhicara: anaikantika as defined in the 
later Nyāya-vaiśeṣika manuals. A.B.GAJENDRAGADKAR and 
R.D.KARMAKAR, the Joint-editors of the Tarkasamgraha of 
Annambhaṭṭa (ed.Poona.1930.p.73) complain about the loose 
phrasiology of Annambhaṭṭa who in defining the first 
variety of savyabhicara says that it is what is known as 
sādharana anaikantika. Now, anaikantika is not the name 
of the hetvabhāsa; it is merely its explanation. The
considerate editors further remark that "the impropriety of Annambhaṭṭa’s terminology does not prominently strike a reader, because some books such as Tarkabhaṭṭa give anaikāntika as the name of the hetvabhāsa and savyabhicāra as the definition thereof. According to them sadhāranah anaikāntikah is a correct designation of the first variety of anaikāntika" (ibid.). It is for the same reason that we find very often in the Nyāya-discussions, the words padārthatva, jneyatva and pramitiṣayatva used interchangeably. The Siddhāntacandrodaya on the Tarmasamgraha defines padārthatva as jneyatva and pramitiṣayatva. The Tarkadīpikā defines it as abhidheyatva or namability and all the three definitions are purely synonymous.

2) Synonyms as means of ascertaining the capacities (sakti) of words:

Quite often in the Nyāya-discussions we come across a karika which enumerates eight different ways of ascertaining the meanings of words. The karika is as follows:

śakatiṃgraṇaḥ vyākaranopamanakosāptvākyadvyavahārastēca
vākyasya sesaśivīrtvavadanti sāmnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya
vṛddhāḥ

The explanation of the karika is as follows:
vivaraṇam tu tatasamārthakapadāntaresa tadarthakathanaṃ-
yatha ghatōsti ityasya kalachoṣti ityanema. This is the explanation of vivṛti or explication. kosa is a dictionary which explains by means of synonyms and āpta
(reliable authority) is only a living lexicon. Thus three out of the eight means stated in the karika pertain to explication through synonyms.

The Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas are khanda-paksavadins or those who believe that the sentences are divisible into their component parts which are words and that the words are sakta or capable of expressing meanings separately. It is also their belief that the meanings of the words are determined by samketa (lit. indication) and that this indication has come from God in the form 'this meaning should be known from this word' (asmat padat syam arthah bodhavyah). The fact that the Nyayasutras find nothing wrong in explaining the meaning of a term by its synonym implies that God Himself must have provided men with many words to express one meaning, in other words, synonyms. This may be a luxury but it has been graciously sanctioned by the Almighty. So for a thing (arthah) like 'lotus' we are given many "approaches" (padani-padyate arthah anena iti padam) like kamsala, padma, niraja, pankaja, etc. But how have we to understand that these are only different words having the same sense? Here these realist philosophers take recourse to the doctrine of samanya (generality). Samanya or genus is defined as being eternal (nitya), one (eka), 'one being present in many' (anekanugata) Samanya is a padartha and this latter is defined as padasya arthah i.e. 'the meaning of a significant word'. The doctrine of 'reification' is
implied in this explanation. According to this for every a significant word in the language there must be a reality corresponding to it which is its reference (or meaning). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are realists and being so they uphold the referential theory of meaning. Now if any one urges that because kamala, padma etc are many significant words and therefore must have as many corresponding realities he has to be answered on the basis of the doctrine of samānyā. Though kamala etc. are many words they have only one jāti or samānyā. In fact Udayanacārya has mentioned in a karika-20 the conditions which are incompatible with jāti - samānyā. The second of these (namely tulyatva) is that the apparent jātis due solely to synonymous expressions have no real existence and therefore ghatatva and kalasatva cannot be considered as being two different jātis; ghaṭa and kalaśa make only a verbal difference. It is clear that according to this system pada and śabda are not exact synonyms. There may be different śabdās denoting the same padartha.

3) Synonymy as defined in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System:

The definitions of synonym (paryayā), "redundant expression" (punarukta) and entailment (arthadapanna) occur mostly in the course discussions on the right method of philosophical debate. The Nyāyasūtras mention twenty-two nigrhaasthanās or conditions under which a disputant may fairly be considered to have taken the count. Repetition of the same word (śabdapunarukta) and repetition of the
same meaning (arthapunarukta) are the two main divisions of the punarukta-nigrahasthāna. The Nyāśutra (V.2.4) says: śabdārthayoh punarvacanāṃ punaruktam anuvadat (i.e. the restatement of word and meaning, except in the case of reinculation, form the fault of repetition.). Anuvāda or reinculation serves a special purpose and is therefore excluded from being considered as a fault. In the stock example (which need not be cited in full) the proposition 'The hill has a fire' is repeated verbatim in the conclusion. Here the conclusion is the reinculation of the proposition for it serves a definite purpose. (i.e. it shows the fifth member of the syllogism). The Vṛtti on the Gautama-sūtra, V.2.14. explains the usefulness of anuvāda in a slightly different (and I may say even better) way. It says that anuvāda is in the form of explanation and being thus it cannot be called purposeless (nispayojanam punar-abhidhanam hi punaruktam; anuvādastu vyakhyārupah saptayojaka eva iti bhavah).

The Bhāṣya explains śabdapunarukta with the illustration nityah śabdah nityah śabdah iti which is a meaningless re-iteration. The Vṛtti of Viśvanātha Bhattacharyya defines it as samantarakapurvapurvarupvikāśabdaprayogah, i.e. employment of the same word (sound-sequence) having the same sense and illustrates it with ghatah ghatah (a jar, a jar).

Arthapunarukta or repetition of meaning (synonymic repetition) is illustrated in the Bhāṣya by 'anityah śabdah,
nirodhadharmako dhvañah' (The sound is non-eternal, the articulation has a non-lasting nature). The Vṛtti defines this as samanarthakabhinnanupurvīkasabdasya nisprayojanam punarabhidhanam (i.e. repetition of the same sense through words having different phonemic sequence.).

The definition of the paryaya given in the Nyāyakośa (paryaya.s.v.) seems to be based on this Bhāṣya-portion. It is as follows: samanapraśṛtvinimittakavte sati vibhinnanupurvikatvam (i.e. a word having the same purpose of employing the word but having a different order of phonems).

The Tarkapraśāsa (śītikānti khaṇḍa.4.p.83) defines paryaya in the following words: asta paryayatvam ca sākṣatavacchedakaiyā sati, vibhinnasaṅktaavacchedakaśatvam, (i.e. when it is the case of the same meaning being expressed by different words.)

Arthādāpannata (= Entailment):

Under his sūtra V.2.15. Gautama goes to the length of saying that repetition also consists in ('unnecessarily' should be understood) making explicit what is already implicit in the statement arthādāpannaṣya evaśabdena punarvacanam. Vatsyaśayana explains this as follows:

utpattidharmakatvadandañcasyamityyuktā arthādāpanāngas yō'bhidbhājakah śabdah tena bruṣṭ 'anupattidharmakam nityamiti; tacca punaruktam iti vedītvyam; arthaśam-pratyaśvarte śabdapravogyā pratitah so'rtho'rthaṃpattvā i.e. if it is pointed out that 'that which is of the nature
of having an origin is impermanent; it is quite unnecessary to point out expressly its converse (which is so obviously implied in it) namely that 'that which is of the nature of not having an origin is permanent'. The words are employed only to make known the meaning and when the implied meaning is so obvious why use more words?

According to Vātsyāyana this is a case of implication of what is stated in another form. Under Nyāya-sūtra II.2.1 he says: vatrābhidhiyāmane'rthe yo'nv'orthaḥ prasajyate so'rthāpattīḥ; yatha meghesu asatsu vrṣṭirna bhavati, kimatra prasajyate? satasu bhavati i.e. when it is asserted that 'there is no rain when there are no clouds' it follows obviously that 'there is a rain when there are clouds' I have preferred to render Vātsyāyana's prasajyate by 'what follows' (i.e. contingent meaning or implication). This is what I mean by entailment.

Four Varieties of Āksiptti:

Visvānātha Bhāṭṭacārya in his Vṛtti under the above sūtra gives the following four varieties of implication or entailment:

i) Pūrva-paḍa-āksiptti e.g. vahnirūṣnāḥ. Here the first pada is vahnī which means fire and this implies that it is hot; it need not be expressly said that it is hot.

ii) Uttarapada-āksiptti e.g. usno vahnīḥ here the second word implies the meaning of the first.
iii) *Vidhyākṣipti* e.g. *bahirasti, gehe nāsti*. Here the first positive statement implies the contents of the second negative one i.e. 'he is outside' means 'he is not at home'.

iv) *Nigedhākṣipti* e.g. *jīvan gehe nā'asti, bahirasti*. Here the first negative statement that 'the living person is not in' implies the truth of the positive statement 'he exists outside (the house)'.

It should be pointed out here that many of the Pali synomyic repetitions discussed under the category of implicational synonymy (vide supra, p. 444) fall under one or the other of the above four varieties.

The above discussion will show how very rigid was the concept of implication (covering 'redundancy') according to the Nyāya philosophy. But inspite of this we find the Nyāya recognising an *avayavatireka* *hetuḥ*. Prof. S. DIIT has written an article 'The Redundance of the Vyatirekavyāpti of the Nyāya System' (Philosophical Quarterly 23, 1950, pp. 13-16). The article-writer is perhaps unaware that a lot of discussion about this has already taken place in the later Nyāya works. Referring to the Nyāya-sūtra V.2.14 (in the context of *Arthasaṅgīti*) Bhasarvajna clearly says in his *Nyāyasara* that when a similar example is already adduced it is superfluous to add a counter example to support it for the latter is implied in the former. [Read. *sadharmyodaharanapabhidhanam* (punaruktam)]
Nyāyatātparyādīpīka explains the further as follows:

dratānta hi vyāptiniścittvai nidersvate. sa cedekāsiva
siddha tada dvītīvo balādapi pauruktvyakukāśinikṣiptah
syat i.e. 'an instance is given only to confirm the
concomitance. When this is already achieved by one the
deliberate mention of the second is bound to fall in the
category of redundancy. The opponent raises an objection
to this but the proponent has an answer for that also.

Read: nanu hetoh anvayavyatirekāvagamārthamu ubhayam
abhidheyaṃ iti cet, na; anvayavyatirekino'nyatra
sadharma-vaiddharayodesaranyah anvayamabhavabhavat;
anvayavyatirekinyapī parapekṣāṁ vina yadi dvayam
abhidhiyate tada pauruktyaṃ eva; apekṣayām tu na
kascid doṣaḥ [ 'But is it not a fact that in order to
make known that the reason has both the types of vyāpti -
negative as well as positive - both the examples need to
be stated ?' 'No. Except in the case of the combined
type of the vyāpti we do not find the necessity of stating
positive and negative examples. And even in the case of
this combined vyāpti when both the examples are stated
even though one of them is not expected, it is a case of
redundancy. When, however, the statement of the second
is expected there is no fault. ] In fact it seems more
than probable that the Nyāya system recognised the
vyāstireki anumāna only with a view to avoiding the
necessity of admitting a fifth pramāna in the form of
Arthāpatti. All the cases of arthāpatti are brought by
Naiyāyikas under the vyatirekipramāṇa. The tarka (reductio ad absurdum) and in fact all those things which can be directly proved are proved by Naiyāyikas through vyatireki-vyapti. The Mīmāṃsakas and following them the Vedantists admitted arthapatti and therefore they could dispense with kevalavyatirāki-anumāna. The Vedaṭaparibhaṣā (Calcutta.ed. p.14.) has severely criticised the vyatireki-anumāna of the Naiyāyikas.

Intricacy in defining Synonymity:

Lastly I shall only refer to the portion of Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā, a polemic treatise of the Vedānta school wherein the untenability of the Nyāya dogma of the existence of Isvāra is rigorously discussed. We know that for the Naiyāyikas furnishing synonyms was quite an irreproachable method of explanation but Vedāntists are not ready to accept arguments based on synonyms. They want the Naiyāyikas to explain to them what a synonym really is?

The Naiyāyikas who have so far rested on the common view that there exist synonyms in language find it rather difficult to explain their assumption when confronted so much. The whole of the discussion has a modern ring about it. It shows how difficult it is to define synonymy and how hazardous it is to base philosophical arguments on the unproved category of synonyms. This polemic discussion has a surprising closeness to the modern American discussions on synonymy considered in the context of the analyticity of sentences and the allied topics. The whole discussion,
as is pointed out above, follows in the course of the
Vedantic examination of the Nyāya prameya of Īśvara.
'Being an entity' is said to be a common denominator of
all the prameyas. Śrīharṣa the Vedantic autor attempts
to show that it is not possible for the 'logicians' to
supply an adequate definition of what an entity is. When
entity itself cannot be proved the particular entity namely
'God' naturally stands unproved. Below is given the whole
argument in the form in which it occurs in Khandanakhandā-
khadya 9pp.1044-1045):

"What do you mean by God being an 'entity'?"
- asks the Vedāntin. (Here V)

"Well, it means a positive being"
- answers the Naiyayika (Here N)

"This is not a proper answer. You are merely
supplying me with a synonym" - retorts V and continues
"When you speak of the word asti (it exists) with reference
to a particular thing what is it that you exactly mean ?
Do you mean that what is signified by the word asti is
capable of being predicated of the thing or that the word
asti itself is capable of being used in connection with that
thing? If you mean the former, that is to say, that the
meaning of the word asti is capable of being predicated
of the thing then you have not stated what that meaning is.
If you say that sattā (generality of being or existence)
is that meaning then it may go contrary to your own position
for according to you jāti, vīśeṣa and saṃanya are devoid of
satta and you do say jātīh asti, vīseṣaḥ asti etc. So satta cannot be the meaning of asti. If you insist that satta is the meaning of asti then you can never say jātīh asti (generality exists) or vīseṣaḥ asti etc., for these do not have satta. Now if you come to accept the second alternative namely that you mean not the meaning of asti but merely the word asti, then abhava also can become an entity for in the context of abhava we do use the word asti i.e. we say abhavaḥ asti. Further if you insist only on the usage of the word asti and not its meaning then again you come in difficulty for that will mean that that alone can be accepted as an entity in case of which we can use the word asti alone. If anybody says 'Īśvaraḥ asti' God will become an entity but if anybody inadvertently says Īśvaraḥ vartate God will not be an entity as the word asti is not used". "But" says the Naiyāyika annoyed by this wordiness "kindly understand that the word asti is synonymous with vartate so it should make little difference whether the one is used or the other". To this the Vedantin smilingly says: "No, good friend, you are committing the same mistake. And who told you, dear, that asti and vartate are synonymous? Unless you point out the common denotation of asti and vartate you cannot call them synonymous and I am afraid it will not be possible for you to do this for the simple reason that vartate does not signify exactly that which asti does. At this the Naiyāyika comes forth with his definition of synonymy.
Says he: "asti and vartate are synonymous because their synonymity is comprehended in a general way from the reason of the fact that we find one person using vartate with regard to the same thing (say ghatah) in the context of which the other person uses the word asti”. But the Vedantin is not convinced. He says: "This idea of synonymy is also incorrect for in the case of many words such as prameye, abhidheya etc. we find one person using one word while other person uses a different one and yet these are not reckoned as synonyms". (The point in short is that for being synonymous the words must be used in the same sense and not that they should be made use of with reference to the same thing. Because one can use the expressions abhidheya and jneya in connection with the same thing, say ghatah, the words abhidheya and jneya do not become synonymous. They have the same reference but not the same meaning.)

The discussion in the Kkh (Ch.IV.Sec.1) the gist of which is given above deserves its rightful place in any modern book on the problem of synonymy. Some of the important points which emerge out of this discussion are:

1) It is very difficult to define synonymy.

2) It is not safe to make philosophical arguments depend on synonymy.

3) A common sense idea of synonymy seems to be this: "Two words are synonyms of each other if and only if they
share in common the same meaning" (ubhayasādharanaikarthanirvacanam antareṇa parāvayatvasya pratipadayitumasa-kyatvat).

4) In the further course of this discussion (Kkh. p.1047) Śrīhāraṇa quotes the view of Kumārila that it is possible to know the meaning of a word even when no entity corresponding to it exists. (atyantarasya jñanam arthe 'sabdah karo hi). This is a strong blow to the doctrine of 'reification' implied in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. Even though the word Īśvara may mean something it does not follow that it denotes something. "Here Śrīhāraṇa's view becomes strikingly similar to the view of some modern philosophers who contend that synonymity of terms should be explained in some way without recourse to the 'strange' entities called meanings."

The School(s) of Grammar and Synonymy:

The primary interest of Pāṇini, the pre-eminent Sanskrit Grammarian, was in purity of verbal forms rather than in their meanings. This can be inferred from his aphorism I.1.68 svām rupam sabdasābadādāsājana. Herein Pāṇini hints at the fundamental dichotomy between the forms and contents of speech. Kātyāyana explains this as 'sabdapurvako hi arthe sampratyaḥ, tasmādārthanirvṛttih i.e. the understanding of what is meant is invariably preceded by the knowledge of the (form of the) word. Hence in grammatical contexts the question of the thing-meant does not arise (primarily)'. But howsoever the Grammar may
like to confine itself to the formal purity of words it cannot divorce itself altogether from the consideration of meaning - a factor which many times decides whether a particular form of a word is correct or incorrect. This is how many times semantic context assumes importance in grammar. It is, therefore, that though Pāṇini's primary interest was in words he had to pay due attention the meaning-aspect as well. Thus we find Pāṇini (and following him the Vārtikakāra(s)) enjoining a particular operation in the context of the word mentioned in the sūtra as well as its synonyms.

The following are a few instances:

i) abhijñavacane \_lt \_ III.2.112

The Kaśikā explains that the word vacana stands for signification and the construction as laid down in the sūtra applies equally (vacanagrahaṇaṁ paryāyartham) to the synonyms of abhijñā namely smarasi ('do you remember ?'), budhyase ('do you know ?'); cetasyase ('do you recollect ?'), etc.

ii) tulyarthaiḥ ... II.3.72

Bālamanorāma explains tulyairiti babuvacanadeva paryavacane siddhāḥ i.e. the plural of tulya indicates the synonyms of tulya.

iii) jñatārupebhyaḥ parimeṇa IV.3.153.

Here, too, the plural signifies all the synonyms of jñatārupa ('gold' such as hātaka, tapaniya etc.).

(bahuvacananirdesat tadvacinaḥ sarve grhyante).
iv) _je prosthapadānaṃ_ VII.3.18

Bhaṭṭośījī explains that the plural in _prosthapada_ includes its synonyms such as _bhadrāpada_ etc.

Some of the Vārtikas also expressly say that some operations hold good in the context of the synonyms of the word about which the rule is laid down. So we find _pitparyayavacanasya ca svadyartham_ (No.6) and _jītparyayavacanasaya vi rajadyartham_ (No.7)²⁶.

Pāṇini not only implies the existence of synonyms in language but sometimes even gives us good instructive lessons in the differentiation of words commonly taken as synonyms. The following are the examples:

i) _mati-buddhi-puṭjarthyabhyaśca_ (III.2.18)

The seemingly synonymous _mati_ and _buddhi_ are here used together. This indicates that difference between them is implied. Bhaṭṭośījī explains this as _matirīha icchā_ , _buddheḥ prthagupadānat_ (i.e. _mati_ is to be understood as 'mind' in the sense of desire)

ii) _kratu-vajnebhyaśca_ (IV.3.68)

As _kratu_ and _vajna_ both of which referring to _somasadhya_ rites are used together the suggestion is that even the _ā-somaka_ rites should be understood.

(somasaddhyesa yaṣeṣu etau prasiddhau, tasya anyataropadanena siddhe, ubhavorupadanasaṁarthyaḥ
ā-somaka api grhyaṇete).

iii) _sukhapriyasyorhīte_ (VI.2.15) and _pritau ca_ (VI.2.16)

_Sukha_ and _priti_ in common speech are synonyms ²⁷
The Ṛśiśka says that by priti we have to understand 'excessive rapture' \(^{28}\) (as against sukha which is 'comfort').

It is thus clear that Pāṇini admits the existence of synonyms in Bhasa. He himself has used four different words to denote 'substance'. These are dravya (V.4.11); sattva (I.4.57); bandhu (V.4.9) and adhikaraṇa V.3.43. Obviously Pāṇini felt no idolatrous dread for having used four synonyms of substance in his scientific treatise instead of repeating uniformly one of them. He did not feel the usage of synonymous terms being in any way repugnant to his scientific method. He might have even implemented them as a refreshing variety in the otherwise dry and mechanical exposition. It is a wrong notion imposed by the fanatic of later exponents of Pāṇinian Grammar that the Sūtrakara is fastidious about brevity (laghava). Had this been so Pāṇini would have always preferred the monosyllabic va to the polysyllabic anyatarasyaṃ to express vikalpa or option. We, however, find him using both these terms. Far from being a deficiency this trait indicates Pāṇini's taste for varied expressions (vaicitryārtha). The predilection for stylistic variation in Pāṇini's Astādhyāyī is duly noted by the Paribhaṣākāras who clearly say that one should not make a fuss on the point of verbal brevity and prolixity. So far as synonyms in the sūtras are concerned Pāṇini cares little for brevity of mere verbal nature. Laghava has a deeper significance; it concerns more the semantic rather than the verbal aspect. Gaurava
(proximity) is virtually the same as what the Nyaya calls nisprayojana punarabhidhana (The usage of a word more than is necessary to express the intended meaning. But the length of the word is not to be taken into account). But the paryayas of greater magnitude are not always nisprayojana (purposeless). They may serve the purpose of stylistic variation. Thus commenting on the Paribhasa sutra No.122 'Parayagasabdham gurulaghavacarca nadiriyate' Siradeva in his Vrtti says: tena 'apo va' iti vaktavya 'aponyatarasyam'iti kimartha miti na purvapaksaaniyam; vaicityapyrusalametat paryayasabdam. Further in a different context Siradeva adds: yatra janayam na vidyate tatra vaicityaryarthamucyate.

The modern methodology of presenting scientific treatises may insist on the uniformal usage of the same term but this was not perhaps the concept in Paninian Grammar. He exhibits, on the contrary, a test for 'variageted expression' (vaicityartha). As Patanjali has said Panini used to diversify (citrayati) his sutras. (cf. evamartham khalvapi Acaryacitrayati kvacidarthana disati kvacinna). Kashiya explains this further as anekamargamasrayatyarthath. Panini's thinking seems to be that so far as the scientifics is not impaired there is no reason why diverse means and diverse expressions should not be made use of. Such departures in fact help break monotony. Thus instead of saying merely do khandane Panini preferred to say do avakhandane and he did not
think the addition of *ava* being in any way repugnant with the concept of *laghava*. The Tattvabodhini on the Siddhántakaumudi (2510) nicely observes: *svetyupasarga-prayoge vaicitryarthāḥ, khandana ityetasvata ukte'pi iṣṭasiddheḥ.*

*Paṇini, thus, had a regarded for 'stylistic variation' and had used four synonymous words for 'substance' in his *sūtras* probably for the sake of *vaicitra*. It is, therefore, illicit to style this as 'indiscriminate' and 'promiscuous usage' as I.S. PAWATE has unwittingly done. He said: "In the *Aṣṭadhyāyī* the Vedic literature is referred to promiscuously with the words *chandas, mantra* and *nīgama*; and the notion of 'option' is expressed indiscriminately with the words *va, ubhayatha, anyatarasyam, vibhaśa* and *bahulam*" (The Structure of *Aṣṭadhyāyī* p.66).

On the basis of such promiscuous usage of synonyms and some other irregularities from the point of view of the uniformity of terminology and strict consistency of methodology scholars like ROBERT BIRWE (Studien ZU Adhyāya III der *Āṣṭā. Paṇinis, Wiesbaden.1966 pessim*) put forth the thesis of the plurality of the authorship of *Aṣṭadhyāyī*. But even though it may be granted that *Paṇini* has incorporated in his book some *sūtras* of his predecessors it is hard to believe that while appropriating these *sūtras* to his scheme he could not replace some of the words in them by their equivalents which he wanted to follow consistently in his scheme. That he did not find it necessary to do is
another point in favour of his evident predilection for varied expressions.

The terms which Pāṇini has used for 'synonym' are: *tulyārtha* (II.3.72); *samarthā* (= of like meaning cf. *vyavahṛpanavo*: *samarthayoh* II.3.57.) and *punaraktā*
(IV.3.73).

**Patanjali on Synonyms:**

In his Bhāṣya on Pāṇi. I.2.45 Patanjali speaks of the presence of synonyms in Sanskrit. He says: "There are many words to express one meaning e.g. *Indra; Śakra; Kandu; Kośtha* etc. (bahavo hi *sābdāḥ ekārthāḥ bhavanti tadyathā Indraḥ Śakrah Puruhūtaḥ, Purandaraḥ; kanduh kośthāḥ kusūla iti. On Pāṇi.I.4.1 he says: "In populated world (*loka*) we find many indications (saṁjñā. names) for the same thing (*dṛṣṭava*)". The examples given are the same as cited above.

In the Tripitaka we find many 'synonym-compounds' and many 'collections of synonyms'. It has been observed (supra.p. 141) that synonyms express their meanings 'in turn' and not 'collectively'; Bhartṛhari34 has also noted that synonyms are 'independent words expressing the same meaning' (*sābdāntaranirapekṣah tamarthām bravīti*). This being so there cannot be nominal compounds of synonyms (or 'synonymal compounds'). Pāṇini implies this35 in II.1.58. If, however, there is even a slight difference of meaning in terms to be compounded the compounds become permissible. Thus there can be a compound like bhṛtya-
bhāraniya where bhṛtya indicates 'one who can be supported and bhāraniya stands for 'one who deserves to be supported'. This is very instructive. Panini, it is clear according to this, does not allow 'compounds of synonyms' but he does allow 'compounds of homonyms' (supra p.) or 'near synonyms' (which can be differentiatied). In fact many of the so-called 'synonym-compounds' (sometimes wrongly called 'translation-compounds') in Pali and Sanskrit belong to this type. Even the uncompounded pakkha sakumo is not 'bird, bird' but 'winged bird' (the first adjectival, the second nominal). Patanjali has very nicely elaborated the Paninian view regarding the compounds of synonyms in his Bhāṣya the relevant part of which deserves to be read in original.

Patanjali has also given a fine illustration of the fact that even in scientific discussions the 'dictionary method' (i.e. explanation with the aid of synonyms) holds good. In his explanation of Pan.I.3.1. the problem of defining dhātu (verb) arises. The Mahābhāṣya tries to explain the concept of dhātu by citing its synonyms. The interesting explanation goes on as follows:

yadi punah kriyavacano dhaturityetallakṣanam kriyeta. kā punah kriyā ? īhā; kā punarihā ? ceṣṭā; kā punćeṣṭā ? vyāparah. sarvathā bhavaṇ śabdāneva śabdānacaste na kiñcidarthajatām nidārsatyeyam jātiyaka kriyati. The opponent expects the proponent to explain the concept of dhātu. As the proponent tries
to explain it through words more and more synonyms of dhātu are accumulated; the opponent is annoyed by this by method and says that the proponent is merely adding words to words without explaining the meaning of dhātu. This is the gist of the passage. One can understand the dissatisfaction of the opponent but the problem remains as to how the position can be averted? Even when the meaning of the word is to be explained it can be explained through another word only. The meaning can never be separated from the word which expresses it. We have only to understand that the words in explanation are the words from 'metalanguage'. And the 'meta-linguistic' definiendum is bound to be synonymous with the 'linguistic' definiens. \( \text{H}_2\text{O} \) is necessarily to be identical with 'water'. This will explain why the Abhidhammic definitions many a time consist of equivalent terms. Superficial and circular explanations apart it is not possible to explain or define things without taking recourse ('adding words' as the opponent in the above discussion complains) to words. As Bhartrhari\textsuperscript{37} has correctly expressed all our understanding is necessarily connected with words.

Patanjali is of course conscious of the fact that there are no perfect semantic equivalents in a language. Ordinarily 'peace' and 'tranquility' may be equivalents. Their difference becomes apparent when we try to fit them in identical contexts. For example, one can speak of 'peace-conference' but not of 'tranquility conference'. 
The fact that there are no semantic equivalents which can be fitted in precisely the same linguistic and contextual environments is noted by Patanjali (under Pañ. II. 2. 29) in the words nivatavisayah sabdhah dravyante i.e. 'words (though they may be synonymous ordinarily) have restricted applications'. Thus for example the dictionary may mark the meaning of rakta, lohita and sōna with the single word 'red'. But though these words ordinarily mean 'red' they are restricted to specific objects. If the objects is horse then we can say sōnah asvah but we cannot say lohitah asvah in the context of the same 'red horse'. If the horse is black we will have to say asvo hemah; asvah krsnah will not do. For 'white horse' the expression must necessarily be asvah karkah and not asvah suklaḥ.

The doctrine of Sphoṭa and its bearing on synonymy:

The theory of Sphoṭa is peculiar to the school of Grammar. The word 'sphoṭa' originally means 'that which bursts forth'. It has been variously translated as 'expression, notion, concept, idea', (The six systems of Indian Philosophy, F. MAX MÜLLER. p. 402.) none of which expresses its exact import. Essentially it stands for the sound of a word as a whole as conveying the meaning apart its component parts (letters). The idea in brief is this: a word is composed of letters which are perishable nature. It is therefore impossible for a word to convey its meaning through these momentary component parts of
letters. We grasp the meaning of a word because of its eternal sphota which is a partless whole and which is revealed by the particular order of its component letters of perishable nature. When the last syllable in the order is heard the sphota is grasped\(^{38}\). Thus it is not the syllables which form a word but the eternal sphota of a word distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound that expresses the meaning.

Without entering into the further (and controversial) details of the theory of sphota it will be pertinent to confine our discussion with the problem whether each synonym (of a word) has a distinct sphota of its own or that all the synonyms of a particular word have only one identical sphota. The problem is very intricate and the opinion of the Grammarians is seriously divided on the subject. Some say that because sphota is different from the physical phonemas revealing it, it can be identical in the case of synonyms (which as per definition are words the meaning of which remains the same inspite of their diverse phonemic shapes). The others say that though sphota is different from the varṇas which reveal it it is yet invariably related to those varṇas in a 'vyāṅgya-vyāṅjaka' relation\(^{40}\). In other words there must be as many sphota-words as there are words in the language and therefore the sphota in regard to every synonym must be different. The following are a few specific views:

i) In his Sphotaśvada (ed. Pandita Krishnamacharya.)
1946. p. 76.) Nāgāraja favours the view that every synonym has a different sphota. He says: paraiveśu cāneka eva sphotaḥ, gauravam tu pramaniktvamadopāvaham i.e. different synonyms have different sphotas corresponding to them and even though this assumption appears as involving the fault of superfluity it is correct as it is confirmed by valid means of knowledge'. In his own commentary Subhodhinī the author explains the position further as follows: ghatakalasādiparyaveśu tattadvaramasamudayabhivyavangyaḥ sphota bhinna bhinna eva angikriyate ekatve katarasmin saktilpanamiti vinigamanā-virahat. i.e. 'in case of synonyms such as ghatā and kalāśa the sphota is accepted (presumed) as being different in each case for it is (as per the doctrine) to be revealed by the peculiar combinations of the letters particular to those words. If the sphota is admitted as being one there will arise the difficulty in the form of absence of means to decide as from which of the two the capacity (i.e. meaning) is to be grasped.

ii) In the ch. XIV Sphoṭanirnaya of his Vaiyakarana-bhūṣaṅasaras, Kaundabhaṭṭa discusses the problem with special reference to the view expressed by Parimala. Parimala argues that the presumption that the sphota of the various synonyms is identical leads to the following anomalous position: A person may be knowing only the meaning of ghata; and may be ignorant of the meaning of kalāśa a synonym of ghata. Now if the identical meaning of ghata and kalāśa is revealed by the same sphota it is quite possible that the
person may automatically come to know the meaning of kalasa (of which as a matter of fact he is ignorant.) also. The knowledge of the word ghata means the knowledge of the sphotaword ’ghata’ but the word kalasa has the same sphotaword then why should a man knowing ghata should not know the word kalasa as well? The intricate argument of Parimala can be still more simplified in the following way: The synonyms ghata (g) and kalasa (k) have the same sphota (s). Now g and k are linguistic expressions but s is an extra-linguistic entity (varnayatiriktaḥ sphotaḥ ). But the assumption is that the same s is revealed by both g and k. Now it is quite possible that in the reverse course s may be received (revealed) by k instead of by g and yet a person knowing only g > s may understand k > s. On the basis of the relation of convertibility of the sphota and its vacaka (or vyanjaka). If to avert this absurd possibility it is stated that to comprehend the meaning ’ghata’ it is not sufficient to know only its sphota; but also the particular order of syllables constituting it then it is simpler to assume, says Parimala, that the phonemic shape itself reveals the meaning. It will be possible thereby to do away with the cumbersome and unnecessary idea of the queer concept of sphota. In other words instead of speaking in an odd way that ’because the s revealed the phonemic forms of k and g is the same their meaning is the same’ it will be plainer to say that these two phonemically different forms have a common meaning s. If on the other hand it is maintained that the sphota differs with every
individual synonym then the same contention applies i.e. it is plainer to say that the various phonemic structures (klptavarṇaḥ) can themselves denote their meanings directly without any mediacy of their assumed sphiṭas. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in answering the objection raised by Parimala merely reiterates the usual argument of the upholders of the doctrine of sphiṭa namely that the varṇas and their saṃudāyas being perishable cannot either separately or jointly express the meanings (which can be understood only by the sphiṭas revealed by them). He also says that it is admitted by all that the capacities (i.e. meanings) of the diverse modes (paṃavya) are diverse. The difference in the sequence (anupūrvi) of the phonemic constructions brings in a corresponding difference in their meanings. If the phonemic forms of the paṃvyas are different their capacities must also be different. This is the same argument as is implied in Durga’s pratyabhidhanamārthaḥbhedaḥ and the statement of BLOOMFIELD quoted in that context (vide supra p. 138). This part of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa’s answer is based on the view of the Grammarians in the context of the relation of words and meaning. This view is expressed in the Vārtika No. 1 ‘siddhe saṃdārthasambandhe’. If the relation between the expression and what is expressed is eternally and unalterably fixed every perishable word must have a separate eternal form related to its meaning. This eternal form related to its meaning. This eternal form related to its meaning is its sphiṭa.
Padavākyaratnaśakara, a relatively recent treatise on Sanskrit Grammar refers to both the above mentioned views regarding the doctrine of sphoṭa in relation to paryāyaś. It (p.391 et seq.) gives many popular analogies in support of the view that the sphoṭa of the various paryāyas is identical. It is argued that the dravya is perceived as the same even when its samavāyas are different. In the same way the sphoṭa can remain the same even when expressed by the different paryāyas: sphoṭaśtu paryāyabhedena na bhīdyate, samavasyibhede'pi dravya-abhedā-dārśanāt. Further is adduced the illustration of a picture painted in six different colours. The picture is perceived as the same even when the colours which reveal it are not the same.

Yathā sadbhī rūpārādṛṣṭo citrasārāśnya bhāyayāstya
nīlāparākṣaḥ raktasvārāśnyaśrēṣṭhānāt vā samavāyaṃ, tathaikāśvāyā sphaṭasya kvacī ghaṭavāraṃmalaya kvacī
gālasārāśnya abhyāvyanānāṃ na vṛityāh. After this a verse said to be from Vākyapadīya is quoted to support that the sphoṭa of various synonyms is the same.

After this the Padavākyaratnaśakara states the second view regarding the relation of sphoṭa and paryāyas and this view is finally accepted. It is said that every synonym has a different sphoṭa and that is why the 'obtainment' (reception of meaning, sampad) of ghaṭa and kalaśa is different.

yadvā pratiparyāyam bhīna eva sphaṭaḥ; ata
eva ghaṭakalaśāyorekṣaṃpadam iti na vyavahārāḥ
Bhartrhari and the Problem of Synonymy:

1) Synonyms possible only on vakya-level:

The discussion on sphota naturally leads us to the Vakya of Bhartrhari which is supposed to be the best expression of sphota (I.94,95). Bhartrhari is (Vakya.II. 57 and passim.) an Akhandavakyasphotavadin or one who believes that the sentence is an indivisible (I.71-74.) unit and that the sentence (and not the words constituting it) which presents the sense. The division of sense-meaning into the separate senses attributed to individual words is unnatural and is restored to only for the sake analytical convenience (spoddhara. See also I.74,92; II.57). The varnasphotas, the padasphotas etc. are mere contrivances; the only reality being akhandavakyasphota.

Finding Bhartrhari holding this view, it even smacks of contradiction that he should have referred to certain individual words such as atma, vastu, svabhava sarira, tattva (Vakya.III.2.1.) being synonymous. When words can have no independent existence how can one be justified in reckoning some words being synonymous? But this is stretching the view of Bhartrhari over too much. When he says that certain words are synonyms of each other he only means that these words in their akhandavakya forms are synonymous. e.g. esa atma asti = etad vastu asti = esa svabhavah vartate etc. In short Bhartrhari admits synonymy only on akhandavakya level. For synonymy implies the consideration of sameness of meaning and it is the
vakyas alone which can give meanings and not the words.
But this is a higher theoretical plane. On the lower level
one is always free to speak of synonymy between words.
This follows as a jnapaka (indication) from Vākyā.1.84.
where nāda and dhvani have been used synonymously⁴⁸. This
brings us to the consideration of his view about 'meanings
of words', a question with which synonymy is vitally
connected.

Bhartrhari's view of 'meaning':

Bhartṛhari has a clear-cut answer to the most vexed
problem of deciding the meanings of words. In Vākyā.111.329,
he defines sense as:

\[ \text{vasmimatuccārite śabde vada vo'rtah pratiyate} \]
\[ \text{tamāhurartham tasyaiva nanyadarthasya laksanam} \]

(When a word is uttered its sense is also felt; that itself
is its sense. There can be no other characterisation of
sense). This definition of 'meaning of meaning' is to be
interpreted in the context of what he has said in Vākyā.111.400.
\[ \text{vinivyogadṛte śabde na svarthasya prakāśakah} \]. The
word does not reveal its sense unless employed in a particular
context. It is the usage which invests it with meaning.
This again comes on par with the view of Yaska and
WITTGEINSTEIN (supra.p.154) who held that meaning is
synonymous with 'usage'. The numbered meanings in the
dictionary are abstractions (i.e. abstracts of the usages)
and are apt only in the cases of the citations given (if
the dict. is illustrative). The question whether one word
is synonymous with the other is, therefore reduced to whether it is used with the same purpose (artha) as that of the other.\footnote{49}

Synonymy between words having nil extension:

By convention the words like khapspa and vandhyasuta are synonyms. They give a sense of a thing having no existence per se. Now the problem is that if one brings in the criterion of 'having the same extension' in the determination of synonymy it will be hard to justify these words as synonyms. For these are 'empty-terms' or 'vacuous terms' having nil-extension. At one stage of his repeated attempts of defining synonym NELSON GOODMAN gave the following criterion of synonymy: "Two names have the same meaning if and only if they apply to exactly the same thing or have the same extension" ('Likeness of Meaning', Analysis, Vol. X, 1949). According to this extensional identity' becomes a necessary though not a sufficient criterion of synonymy. The pairs vandhyasutra; khapspa or centaur: unicorn cannot stand this test for they have no extension at all (perhaps this itself can be taken as their having equal extension and thus being synonymous). NELSON GOODMAN therefore brings in another factor that of primary and secondary extension. He suggests that the words which do not have extension should be so employed in sentences as would endowed with sentential extension e.g. A picture of a centaur: A picture of a unicorn. Bhartrhari it can be said from what he has said\footnote{50} in
Vākyā. I. 130. would have suggested the following: One should try to base the idea of synonymity on the criterion of two or more significant words— even though they may not have any real reference or extension— serving the same purpose. It is the magic words that they make even the non-existing things like a fiery circle (alātacakra) to exist for a moment. Udayana in his Kusumānjali also observes svantasaśtvam hārthe jñānam saṁdāḥ karoti hi i.e. even though the thing may be utterly non-existing yet the word expressing it makes its knowledge possible. In the Vedantic discussions the world is said to be like a khañama or mrgagala and both these terms serve the same purpose (of denoting a non-existing thing); these therefore can be taken as synonymous though they have nil-extension.

The words express not the whole meaning:

The speaker tries to express the complete unit of the intended meaning. He therefore goes on adding various synonyms apparently to the same purpose. But this is not lavishness, as Bhāthrāhari has rightly said (Vākyā. III. 3. 54) the meaning is not expressed by any single word in entirety. Puṇārāja (Vākyā, Banaras ed. 1905, pp. 503-504) explains the position as anekaśaktirapi hārthe na śabdaṁ sakalyena spravyate (words do not encompass the full extension of the intended meaning). Even when a few words are used a doubt still remains about the fuller meaning. It is to express the meaning in extenso that the speaker goes on adding words to words which method can be
styled as that of 'synonymic elaboration'. The Buddha uses the word itthe and is not satisfied that he has completely said the 'whole thing' he therefore goes on adding to it kanta, piya manapa etc. All these words together (jointly) reveal the sense which he wants to express. Pratibha (II. 117,152) is roused by all these expressions\(^\text{52}\).

Corrupt words and synonymy:

According to Bhartrhari anabhrama or corrupt forms of words cannot be considered as being synonymous with their correct counter-forms. Corrupt pronunciation is solely due to the inability of the speaker to utter the word correctly. The regional influences also cause incorrect pronunciation. It is the correct word which alone expresses its meaning directly; the corrupt form expresses the meaning only through the mediacy of the knowledge of its correct form\(^\text{53}\). The corrupt form, therefore, cannot be looked upon as an independent word and its synonymy with the correct form cannot even be discussed for we discuss synonymy only between two independent words in the same language. This view of Bhartrhari is quite similar to the one held in this context by the Mimamsakas. (infra p.141.) \(^\text{54}\)

The Alamkarasastra and Synonyms:

The Alamkarasastra has direct and indirect observations on the usage of synonyms. Synonymic usage is viewed from two points of view viz. guna (merit) and dosa (flaw). The dosa-aspect comprises such things as tautology or meaningless repetition (skarthata), punarukta (redundancy),
gudhartha (circumlocution affected by manufactured synonyms),
concealment of meaning by the use of obsolete synonyms
(musita), superfluous expressions (arthanāra) etc.

The merited aspect (saunapaka) consists of use
of appropriate synonyms (saunapa) or the use of agreeable
synonyms (śavya), the use of synonyms for breaking monotony,
the use of synonyms as a delectable mode of putting the same
contents etc.

The Uncomplementary Aspect:

To take up the dosapaka firsts the following
things can be noted.

a) Redundancy: Bharata, the father of Indian
dramaturgy (and poetics) mentions (MS.XII.92) indiscriminate
use of many words to express the same thing as a fault under
the term ekartha (or being to the same purpose, tautologous).
It is a bit surprising to note that Abhinaya while
illustrating this defect should cite the following pada
of a verse: kundendunārahārahāsasitam yasaśte. Here there
are not many synonyms but many upamānas are used to serve
a single purpose namely to indicate that the fame is white
(bright, faultless). The fame is said to be as white as
kunda-flower, the moon, the neckless of pearls and the
laughter of Śiva. It is difficult for one who is not poetics-
oriented to imagine this as a fault. The celebrated hymn
to Sarasvati viz. ya kundendutusārahāradhāvala and many
of the wastefully charming elaborations in Śaṇabhaṭṭa will
have to be weeded out as tautologous. Abhinava is conscious
of this pleads in favour of the hymn arguing that an exception is got to be made in case of this hymn as the seemingly tautologous upamānas are used to produce an unshakable belief in the deity. But will not the same argument apply to the verse cited by him to illustrate the fault of ekārtha? The rest of the explanation given in this context by Abhinava is quite all right. He maintains that such a reduplication in śāstra (as opposed to kāvya) is not taken as a fault for there it serves the legitimate purpose of impressing on the mind of the enquirer the truth of the particular scientific statement. It is clear that the many upnāmas (illustrations, infra. p. 141) used in the Tīpīṭaka to emphasise and impress the same point will not be considered as tautologous according to this view.

In NS. XIV. 89 Bharata recognises arthāntara or superfluous expression as a defect of speech. This defect is due to an uncalled for repetition. When something that is already implied in the statement is (again) stated expressly arthāntara results. Already in his Mahābhāṣya (I.23), Patañjali has stated uktārthaṁ upamānaprayogah (infra. p. 210) 'What is once stated should not be repeated again'. The import of arthāntara is the same. It is also comparable to 'analytical propositions' in KANT (vide The Dict. of Philosophy. DAGOBERT D. RUNES. 1944. Analytic Judgment, Kantianism s.vv.). In such propositions the predicate can be directly deduced from the analysis of the subject. The arthāntara has a rigour of logic. Examined strictly with
this measure many of the statements in the Tipitaka will turn out to be superfluous.

Redundancy is recognised by Dandin and Bhamaha under the term ekārtha and is subdivided into 'repetition of word' and 'repetition of meaning'. In Kavyadarśa (IV.12) Dandin defines ekārtha as

\[ \text{avisesesa purvoktam yadi bhuyopi kathyate} \]
\[ \text{arthanā sabdāt vapi tadekarthaṃ matāṃ yatha} \]

"When what is stated previously is stated again (i.e. repeated) with a word meaning the same thing or with the same word it is understood as tautological). He gives an example of a verse containing the words amabhodhara, taditvat and stanayitnu which are synonyms for cloud. In the Tipitaka many such illustrations can be found e.g. najo yatha varivahā va saṣgarām; saṣgarām saritam patim etc.

Bhamaha defines ekārtha in his Kavyalakāra as 'two words referring to the same thing or sense

\[ \text{yadabhināraḥ samanyavyam tadekarthaṃ pracakṣate} \]. The word anyonya in this definition is strikingly similar to the Pali annammannavevacanani (infra p.202).

Vāmana (Kavyalakārasutravṛtti, IV.12) refers to ekārtha by the term punarukta and Kautīlya in the Sasanadhikāra of his Arthasastra (II.10) characterises it as punarukta with the explanation uktaśya avisesana dvitiyamuccaranaṃ punaruktaṃ i.e. 'second utterance of what has been said with no difference (in meaning or
implication).

Gūḍhārtha (circumlocution):

In the context of synonymous appellations Bharata (NS. XVI. 89) mentions a fault called gūḍhārtha which Abhinava explains as 'mention of a thing by its manufactured synonyms'. He illustrates this by ēkādhikānyavāmāna which is a synonymic parallel of Daśaratha (Ten chariots!).

Abhinava further observes that proper names do not admit synonymic equivalents (na hi vadṛcchāśabdāḥ paryayabhājāh). But in spite of what he has said we do find in Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrits many such round-about expressions and the trait has become a special stylistic feature of these languages. Rāṣṭhānāman ("having the name of the part of a chariot") has entered into dictionaries of synonyms as a regular name (abhidhāna) of the bird called cakra or cakravāk. Vātvyādhi one of Teachers mentioned in the Arthasastra is referred to by Śukra as Pavanavyādhi. In Pali we have Jalajuttaranamaka as an equivalent of Padumuttara (Buddha). The Saddaniti (p. 75) says that this has become a common feature in Pali and has a support of the Canon itself. Read. keci pana ettha vadeyvum- munindo, samānindo, samānissaro, yatissaro, ādīccabandhu, rāvibandhuiti evam pakāranam idha vuttānām abhidhanānām abhisamkharaniya-anabhisamkharanīyavasena abhisamkhatābhidhanāni anabhisamkhata-bhidhananātītī dvedhā dissentitathā hi katthaci sakyasīho'ṭi abhidhanām paticca sakyakesari, sakyami-
The manufacturing or coining of synonymous appellations is thus a usual trait in Pali. What is called gudharthā by Bharata and abhidhāna-abhisamkharaṇa by Aggavamsa is called gudhāsabdābhidhāna by Bhāmaha. The word gudha means not secret or recondite but only un-usual or abstruse.

Musīta (a form of Prahelika):

It is clear that Sanskrit and Prakrit poets take delight in using indirect or periphrastic expressions. Dandin (III.103) recognises this mode by the term pramusīta and the Agnipuruṣa (XVI.4) by the term musīta. It is explained in the latter mentioned as 'a concealment of meaning by means of obsolete synonyms'. (a-pradhānāntvam parśvaśvamūṣita nāma sa smṛta. Musīta or Pramusīta is however not considered as poetry proper but only as a literary pasttime (enigma or puzzle) and as a variety of prahelika.

Paryāyokti or Paryaya:

When poets prefer to substitute direct and simple expressions by their indirect and descriptive synonyms the figure Paryāyokti results. The river Ganga is mentioned as Bhūtesamaulīśrī or Amaradhuni. Bhoja (see RAGHAVAN. Vol.I.)
part II. p. 369) gives the illustration of *hayāngaṇaśyabutabhuk* as meaning *vadavāṇī*. Such expressions may not necessarily be beautiful, curious and that is why poets have indulged in using them. Rudraṭa says that in certain cases such expressions can be tolerated and can also be considered to be free from the flows of *samsāya* (doubt) and *apratīti* (incomprehensibleness). He says:

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padamaparapratītam vadyaugika rūdhasabd aparyayāḥ! kalpita marthe tasmin yatha śayayosin mukharicisman!  
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It must be noted that this is a different *Paryaya* or *Paryayokti* from the usual one registered in the books on Poetics.

The Complementary Aspects of Synonyms:

Synonyms are welcome:

There is perhaps no other language than Sanskrit (the vocabulary and stylistics of which are a heritage of Pali and Prakrits) which is so rich in synonymous expressions. The Sanskrit and Prakrit writers, therefore, can have ample choice in case of words. They can relieve the strain of monotony by using different words to the same purpose instead of repeating the same word over and again. A poet will disclose his poverty of expression if he repeats the same word when it is possible to use other synonyms of the word. RAELIEGH (Style, p. 49) speaks about "the stubborn reluctance of writers to repeat a word or a phrase ... when the thing repeats itself they will seldom allow the word to follow suit". Vāman in fact gives a dictum 'naikāh sabdāh dvīh prayojayāh prayāna i.e. 'generally' the same word should
not be repeated (even when the thought is repeated)' The truth in this dictum can be finally illustrated by the varied expressions which Rājasēkhara has used in his kāvyamīmāṃsā in the context of the stylistic predilections of the provinces (Ed. K. S. Ramaswami Shastri. GOS. No. 3. Baroda third. Ed. 1934. p. 22) - tatra dayitā-sūkṛttaya Vaidarbha, vallabhasamasagatayo Gaudā, privataddhitē Daśāśītātīyāh, kṛtprayogarucyasca Udīcyah, abhīstātinīrttayah sāreva'pi, santah' i.e. the people of Vaidarbha are fond of nominal forms; those of Gaudā love compound-forms; Southerners like Taddhitā-forms; Northerness have taste for kṛt-forms and to all of them are verbal forms dear'. Instead of repeating the word dayitā (which he could have easily done) the poet, simply poet has chosen to diversity delectably the import of that word with a series of its synonymic expressions. The poets in fact are so fond of putting the same contents in diverse forms that they do not mind 'repetition of meaning' (arthapunarukta). Sometimes such repetitions show their inability to choose between the two or more equally happy modes of expression. They like to present all of them to their appreciative readers. Malliṇā has noted this psychological trait of the poetic mind. Introducing the verse III. 13 from Maṅgaḥ's Śiśupālavadha he remarks: atha enameva arthām bhāgyantarena aha i.e. 'now the same meaning is given in a different mode' and in the gloss on the same verse he says: pravēna skārthamapi anekām ślokām uktivīsālābhāt likhanti
kavyaḥ. yathā Neispade ādeva 'nīva (I.1-2)
ityādi ślokadvayem tatha 'svakelileśa' (I.23-24)
ityaśiślokadvayem. In poetry 'manner' is as much (or
sometimes even more) important as 'matter' and therefore
though the 'matter' is the same the poet for the sake of
displaying various modes (uktivivesalābhartham) repeat it
in different forms. The double or the triple assortment
of meaning helps the poet to express his thought with
greater precision.

The poetic and the unpoetic modes:

Out of the many available synonyms and many
alternative modes of expression a few are marked as being
more poetic than the rest. The difference lies in the
unpolished and the polished ways of expression pertaining
to both words and meanings. Bhoja in his Sarasvatīkantha-
bharana gives the following examples:

a) Pasyati stri'ti vakye hi na rasah pratibhāsate !
vilokayati kante'ti vyaktameva pratiyate - !

The first line represents a sentence couched in
unpolished words ('sabdagramya), the second represents one
couched in polished words (sabda-agramya). In stylistics
the question of putting synonyms for synonyms to show the
logical truth value is not of importance. The importance
is given to words which suit the particular sentiment. It
must be observed that the usual illustrations given to prove
that in poetry striking or charming words are always to be
preferred to those which are not so are sometimes not quite
convincing. These illustrations contain merely charming and sweet words irrespective of whether the contextual propriety justifies them. It is said, for example, that सुस्को व्रक्षसतिस्थायग्रे is unpoetic (कव्यप्रकाशा.ed. A. B. GAIENDRAGADAR p.183) for it uses dry words while निरसतारुङ्गा विलसति पुरातत् is poetic as it consists of polished, soft and melodious words. But 'ahead is a dry tree' is such a dry and unpoetic context that one wonders whether it deserves the poetic paraphrasing meted out to it; सरसा words in निरसा contexts are detrimental to concept of propriety. (sucitya)

b) kaṇe kaṃsayeṣaṁ mām na tvām kaṃsaye kathāṁ!
   iti grāmvo'yarthaḥ vairasyāyeva kalpaté !
'O girl, I seek you and you do not seek me' in this the meaning is undegnifiedly spoken and therefore tends to loss of rasa (sentimental enjoyability). The same sense can be put in a poetical and dignified way as follows:
   kaṃmā kandarpacandalo mayī, vāmaksi, nidrayāḥ!
   tvayi nirmatsaro dīṣṭyā ityagrāmyartho rasavahāḥ !
('Indeed the vile of the Cupil, in my case is devoid of mercy, O lady of lovely eyes, but fortunately in your case he is free from malice'. This is a polished expression and, therefore, is productive of rasa.)

In poetry the usage of the proper words (out of the many available synonyms) is a very important achievement. It will be a parody of 'twinkle, twinkle little star ...' if paraphrased with the funny equivalents 'scintillate,
scintillate deminute asteroid. How I speculate as to your identity? In the paraphrasing (if this is allowable and achievable at all) of poems the synonymic substitutes must carry the same emotive value as that of their originals. The namavacitrya ('propriety of a particular name') Abhinavabharati.ch.14.p.365) must be carefully observed while substituting the words in the poems. One will not be justified by using madanaripu as a name of Śiva when his dalliance is to be described. (namavacitryam yatha madanaripuriti Bhagavatparvayasaṁ etadivaśārāgaravartane na 60 Prousoyā)

The Concepts of Sabdāpaka and Sayya:

It is a common knowledge now that inspite of the many apparent semantic equivalents in language one word does not mean exactly what the other does. There are no absolute synonyms in natural languages. It is for this reason that the choicest diction of good authors admit no alterations. MACAULY said: 'change the structure of the sentences; substitute one synonym for another and the whole effect is destroyed'. (Oxford.Dict.synonym.s.v.). The impossibility of substituting synonyms for the apt words used by the poets is called sabdāpaka (verbal maturity) by Vāmana. It is explained as:

yatpadāṁ tyajantyeva pariśttisahīṣṇutam! tam sabdanyāsanisnātah sabdāpakaṁ prācaksate 11(I.3)
i.e. 'when the words abandon the capacity of alteration by means of synonyms (the phenomenon) is called sabdāpaka
by those competent in the composition of words'. It is unfortunate that Ávantisundarí could not appreciate the real significance of this (see KANŚ.p.384) and labelled the śabdapāka view of the Vāmanians (Vāmanīyāh) as incapacity (asaṅkti) for as the argues great poets are able to express the same contents in different words. That they are able to do so is not gainsaid (supra.p.190) but the will not in any way negativate the fact that certain words are simply irreplaceable. Unlike śāstra, poetry is ubhayapradhāna i.e. where both the words and meanings are important. There are certain meanings which can be expressed only through certain words and not their usual synonyms. The śabdapāka concept has a parallel in FAUBERT's half-platonic view (developed by WALTER PATER) that each idea has its fixed counterpart61. The 'bed-friendship'62 of words and senses is happily expressed by Mallinātha with the term sāyya (Taratā on Bhāvalī pp.22-23). It is explained as: padanām parivṛttivaimukhyām vinimayāsahī- śnutvām etadeva maitrī sāyyeti cākhāvate yathāsmadiye Candrodāye:

nisākarakaraspersānnisāyā nirvṛttatmanā !

ami stambhādayo bhāvā vyāvijante rājyamanaye !!

i.e. the aversion of words to alteration by means of synonyms, the unbearability of interchange is what is called Maitrī (mutual-bond or relation) or sāyya (mutual repose) as it can be illustrated from my ('our' honorific) own poem Candrodāya (where the word nisa cannot be replaced
by some such ordinary synonym of it as *kaapa* which has the same verbal measure for the word *nīṣe* has to go with *nīṣayā*.) The *paka* is further divided into *śabdapaka* and *arthapaka*. Some authorities bring in *paka* only under the more extensive concept of *saṃśabdya* (for all this see S.K. DE. *Hist. of Skt. Poetics*. revised ed. Calcutta. 1960. Vol. II. p. 240).

Rajaśekhara defines *paka* as *padeniveśanīśakampate* i.e. where there is no scope for inserting (other ordinary synonyms).

**Vyaparasaicitrya and Synonymity:**

Ruyyaka has rightly said that in poetry one looks for delectable way in which the things are put. *Sabdavyāpāra* (verbal operation) and *vṛtti* (function) are the factors which weigh in the appreciation of poetry. The aesthetic meaning changes when the same cognitive meaning is put in different verbal modes. The *vyaparasaicitrya* thus helps the process of desynonymization. As mamata has observed (*under paryākhyena*) in a different context, the difference in expression brings in a difference in meaning even though the cognitive import remains the same63 (cf. *yadeva vacyam tadeva vyāgyam na tu yatha vacyam tatha*). In this context attention can be drawn to the six varieties of *paryāya-vakrtta* as defined and illustrated by Kuntaka in his *Vakroktijīvita* (ed. S.K. DE Calcutta. 1923. pp. 91–99). The six varieties can be briefly noted as follows:

1) *Abhidheyaantaratama* — most appropriate synonym i.e. that which is 'nearest' to the intended sense.
ii) tasyatisayapossakah - 'one that nurtures the excellence of that (i.e. the intended sense)'.

iii) tadalamskartumisvarah - 'one which can embellish desired meaning either a) by itself svayam or b) by an appropriate adjective visesanapi padantarena va.

iv) Svachhayotkarsapesalah - by the virtue of its particular phonemic form one synonym may be more charming than the other.

v) asambhayarthaparatvagarbham yasabhidhiyate - that which is more competent to express the implicit impossibility as in Raghu.II.34. alam, mahipala, tava sramena ... The context shows that even one able to protect the vast earth cannot protect a single cow (assailed by the divine power). The synonym mahipala is used ironically.

vi) alamkaropasamkaramanoharinibandhahana - i.e. 'a synonym apt to produce charming effect by the grace of its figurative character'.

The above six varieties unfold before the poets a classified choice. 'When the same thing could be spoken with different words one of them because of its certain merit is (to be) employed.' (yatranekasabdabhidheyatve vastunah kimapi parvasyapadam prastutanugunatvena prayujyate). The poets while making the choice of words should duly consider the above six varieties64.

The triple assortment of modes of conveying the meaning viz. vacyarthartha, lakṣyarthartha and vyangyarthartha so meticulously drawn by the Skt. poeticians has an important
bearing on the differentiation of synonyms. So far example the word Ganga only as a lakṣaṇika pada indicating the 'stream of Ganges' can convey saitya and pāvantva (coolness and sanctity associated with the waters of Ganges) which two cannot be conveyed by the direct (abhidhā) word Gangatātā. The word Ganga in Gangavāṃghosah is implicationaly synonymous with Gangatātā.

The non-existence of absolute synonyms:

That natural languages do not contain absolute synonyms is expressly pointed out by the commentary Balapriyā (p. 543. of the Saṭīkalocanopeta-Dhvanyāloka). Chowkhaṃba.ed.1940). The discussion arises in the forth Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka in the context of the words expressive of simile. The view that is combated is that because nibha, pratima, etc. all ultimately mean 'similar' they are quite synonymous and therefore it is not possible to 'peculiarise' them (cf. nantu nibha-pratimadīsabdānam smaṇārthaktyād kathāṃ tadvicityām ?). To this Balapriyā answers that these words are synonymous is a delusion (bhrama) caused by the habit of referring to these commentaries on kāvya which are meant specially for the beginners. These commentaries, in disregard to their fine shades of differences, explain the words like nibha, samkāṣa, upāma, etc. being (quite) synonymous. The novices in the study of poetry are not initially made aware of the niceties in these customary synonymous words. (cf. pratimaśabda ityevāṃ sarvatra vācyam kevalām balopavogikavyatikā-
parisīlanāsūrataḥ | myādesu | parvāyatvabhrama iti bhavah).

The advanced students of poetry must not mistake them for being absolute, synonymous.

**Pali Exegesis and Synonymy:**

The following are a few points about synonyms and synonymy as can be gathered from the Pali literature:

a) The general notion about synonymy.
b) The various terms for 'synonym'.
c) The modes of stating synonymy.

The more important discussion about the method of differentiating the synonyms and the *Pāṭisambhidā* method of synomyic is reserved for the next chapter. That the Pali commentaries and the exegetical treatises like Netti and Pēṭakopadesa have made significant observations on the synomyic usages in the Canon is noted already in the first chapter (supra p. 4 ff.).

a) The general notion about Synonymy:

In his book 'A Course in Modern Linguistics' (Indian ed. p. 130) G. F. HOCKETT defines synonym in the following words: *'morphemes which are distinct because of differing phonemic shape but which have identical meaning* and also as *'words of different phonemic shape but of identical or closely similar meanings'.* It is surprising to find that the Pali (and Jain Ardhamagadhi also) literature has fully anticipated this view of G. F. HOCKETT in the words ekatthā byañjanameva nānām (M.I. 366-367)
i.e. *(words) having the same meaning, the letters (composing*
them) only being different'. The discussion on this further points out that synonymy is always a relative matter. There are cases when words only are different but the things are not different and there are also cases when the words are different and the things also are different. (atthi...
paryayam paryayamagama ime dhama ekattha
vyajjanameva nanam; atthi paryayam paryayamagama
ime dhama nanaṭṭha ceva nanavajjana, ibid.). The Jain Canon (Nandisutra, No. 32) also describes synonymy in similar terms, viz. ekaṭṭhaṇa nāga ghoṣa nanavajjana
(penca) nāmadehi bhavanti.
The various terms for synonym:

The various terms used to denote 'synonym' reveal the various aspects of synonymy. The terms are

1) paryaya (Skt. paryaya). This is by far the most common term used to denote a synonym. It literally means um-gang or circuit. Derived from paryaya it signifies 'to come to (the same point) by moving about'. Derivationally it means circumlocution, a round about way or periphrasis (L > Gr. > pery around + phrasein, to declare). Paryaya is '(a different) mode of signifying (the same thing)'.

'In manifold ways does the Blessed one preach the Doctrine' (anekaparyayena Bhagava dhamaṃ deseti) is a sentence of repeated occurrence in the Pali Canon.

2) Vevacana ('variente semantique'). While paryaya is an expression common to many OIA languages vevacana ('a varied expression' or 'a semantic variant') is peculiar
to Pali (PTSD, vevacana s.v.). The expression occurs mostly in the commentaries and the books on grammar and exegesis but has also occurred at least once in the Vinaya. The commentary of Dhammapala on Netti explains the term in the following way: Here there is a diverse wording (vividham vacanam) that words (vacaka) but one meaning, and synonymous is the same as synonym (vevacana); or else the meaning is worded (vividham vacceti), thus it is synonymous the rest being as before. The Atharvaveda (Saunaka XII.1.45) contains the word vivacces (vacem vadanti bahudha vivaccesam) but the meaning is merely 'manifold speech' with no implication of 'varied expressions for the same thing'. The Netti., it should be noted, brings hyponymy also under the notion of vevacana.

The title vevacanahara is explained by the NettiA (HARDY's ed.p.203) as ekasmi atthe anekaparivayya saddayo.jena-lakkhane vevacanaharo 'The characteristic of the mode of synonymic explanation is to use (yo.jena) many synonyms to denote one meaning (or object attha)'. Vevacanasaya is de la figure synonymique. The term vevacanatthapakasana (Saddeniti.p.549) is used to denote 'explication of difference between apparent synonyms'. All pariyayas are necessarily vevacanas and vice versa. The Saddaniti (p.549) says: mananapulanasada hi pariyayasaddatta vevacanasadda va i.e. 'because the words are pariyayas they are also vevacanas'.

3) ekatttha or samanattha: These terms are quite
clear. They mean 'words) having identical or similar meaning' respectively e.g. itare dve dukā imina samanattha yeva (DhsA.p.310).

4) adhivacana: This literally means 'a word (vacana) in the context (adhī = adhikāra) of or with reference to a certain thing'. The adhivacanas are 'metaphoric designations'. The word is, however, used to denote ordinary synonyms also e.g. uraga, sappasetaṁ adhivacanaṁ (SnA.II.13). For the fuller discussion of the adhivacanic mode see Ch.V.

5) namananatta: The commentaries (see Saddhammapajjotika. I.19) frequently use this word which means 'manifold names (i.e. words) (having the same meaning)'. It is equivalent of 'synonym' (vide supra.p.85). The Saddhammapajjotika illustrates namananatta with the synonyms for 'wisdom'. viz. pandicca, kosalla, nepunna, vebhavya, cintā, upaparikkha, etc. The same illustration is given in the explanation of atthavasena vibhattigamana (ibid.p.I.19). 'the knowledge of diversity due to nuances in meanings'. This means that while speaking about the namananatta the commentators were well aware of the nice variations in the conventional synonyms.

6) punavacana: 'a word again' or 'another word'. This word is used is SnA.p.487 and is comparable to atirekanema used in the Mir. (supra.p.266).

7) padattthana: (PTSD.pada s.v.). The word really means a 'proximate cause' or 'antecedent condition'
(Jayatileke, p. 295). But a thing and its antecedent condition are so vitally connected that an ordinary person hardly finds anything differentiable in them. This makes them synonymous. So we read in the Netti (p. 81) *vanam vanathassa padatthanam*. But for the Niddesas both are synonyms. *Piti* and *pamoda* are ordinarily synonyms but according to Abhidhamma the latter is the antecedent of the former (*pamujjam pitiya padatthanam*).

8) *punarutta*: This means 'a redundant expression'. The Theravadana (II.154) says that the speech of the Buddha was free from this fault.

9) A few other terms: *abhidhana* (designation), *vyanjana* (indicative word), *abhilapa* (utterance), *nirutti* (expression) are the words sometimes used (in those contexts alone) to denote 'synonym'. The terms *pattati* (gnomen) and *samkhata* (so reckoned, so called) are also used to mean synonym. e.g. kusalā kusala-samkhata, sukka sukka-samkhata (D.I.140); *addhanamagga* is explained by DA. (I.35) as *addhanasamkhata magga*.

c) The mode of marking and stating synonymy:

1) *atthasappatibhaga* - The Snā (p. 343) uses two beautiful expressions viz. *vyanjana sappatibhaga* and *atthasappatibhaga* to denote 'counter-morphemic' and 'counter-semantic' respectively. *Sappatibhaga* means 'parallel' lit. 'having a counter-part'. If 'A' is the synonym of 'B' it must have a 'one-to-one' semantic relation with 'B'. This in Pali means 'A' is the *atthasappatibhaga* of 'B'.

2) *annamannata*: synonyms are words having the same
meaning. This means that the meaning binds two words together in a synonymic relation. The meaning is also defined as a reciprocal relationship between name and its sense but the 'sense' also can be denoted only by a '(meta) linguistic term'. This is how the 'word' and the 'word giving its sense' come in synonymic relation with each other. In explaining what the word ghata means we have to say that it means kalasa which is another word (giving the 'sense' of the former). If the ghata word and ghata-meaning have a reciprocal relationship between them the ghata-word and the kalasa-word will also have the same reciprocal relationship between them. This is how two words become synonyms of 'each other' or 'one-another'. The Pali commentaries always particularly say 'synonyms of each other' (e.g. aggami'ti adinim sadani annamanna vacanani. MA.III.93). The reciprocal relationship is more emphatically stated in the following manner: yam cittam tam mano, yam mano tam cittam. VinA.p.442. ('Whatever is 'M' that is 'C' whatever is 'C' that is 'M').
Notes and References

1) Here in these examples we notice synonymous adjectives like prthvi and maha later on crystalized into regular synonyms of earth and some instances of hyponymy e.g. atya : asva.

2) See also RV.I.161.5 'Priests and girls use different words to denote the same thing'.

3) Two predicates have the same meaning if they stand for the real Essence or platonic idea (LINSKY. p.67)

4) Thus for example the sixteenth Adhyaya of the White Yajurveda enumerates the hundred names of Rudra; the same Veda furnishes 11 names of Gauḥ in VIII.43 and various popular and sacrificial names of horses in XXII.19. At times we come across dialectical and stylistical variations in the Vedas in the form of 'saka-bheda'. To explain, RV.X.71.6 has secavidam sakhayam and in the Taitt. Ār. we get sakvidam sakhiyam. In XV.I.18 we have bhrstva vadha in the Mādyandina samhita and dviset vadha in the corresponding part of the Kānya Samhita. For an elaborate list of the synonymic expressions in the Vedas see Appendix No.1.

5) ekarthavaciam in Sayāna's explanation is obviously descriptive. He does not seem to suggest any important difference in ekarthvacisaba and paryayasaba.

6) Durga (p.596) commenting on RV.IV.58.7 referred to in the Nirukta says tatra upamanopameyasamanjasayacca
samarthyāt prasiddhimuparundhyā gārtadhārasabdāh
udakadhāravacakah sampadyate. Dayananda Sarasvati
in his UnādiKosāvyakkhyā (I.13) gives meghah,
śātruḥ, tamah, parvataḥ and cakram as synonyms of
Vṛtra.

7) The ordinary dictionaries enter the words alphabetically
ROGET’s THESAURUS is presented in the form:
classification according to ideas, followed by a
collossal index. But even this had to be presented
in dictionary form and the work is done by G.P.Putnam’s
sons and simultaneously by Garden City Books in

8) Atleast the socio-semantic development of vāja
(food > strength) will attest the truth of the remark.

9) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system considers gold as ākaraṇaṁ
tejāḥ or the ‘bright-element’ to be had from mines.

10) Yāsaka, however, is suggesting as though it is not a
fact.

11) savatīrgatikarmā kambojaśeṣeva bhāṣyate ...
vikarmaśāryesu bhasante śava iti. dātirlavanarthe
Prācyesu; dātṛmudicyeṣu (Mīr.II.2)

12) Read Durga’s comment (p.114):
kim laksana punarasaṁ vyākhyā? ucyate: tattva -
pariyāyaḥbheda-samkhyā-sāṁdighasāṁdighodhodāḥarana -
tanvārvacana-vibhāgena yadakhyanaṁ. tadyathā-
Commenting on Mīr.IV.1 Durga also quotes Brhaddevatā
which says:
tattvāṁ paryāśābdena vyūtpattiśca dvavarāpi
nigama nirṇavaśceti vyākhyeyāṁ naigama pade
Durga adds: atra arthasya apratīyamānasya
paryāśabhidhanena vibhajya pratipadānam vyākhyā,
śabdasyāpi vyūtpadānam vyākhyā,
tayorarthaparījñanamekasyāḥ kuryāṁ,
śabdaparījñanamekasyāḥ.

13) This word is given by Durga as an explanation of the
word atirekanāma used in the Nirukta.

14) tanyākhyaśānti bhāvasābdān paryāśābdena
upadīsānti. katham paryāśābdatā bhāvasābdānāṁ?
vata epāṁ vibhaktayāṁ ākhyatikyāṁ ityucyante.

15) As S. RADHAKRISHNAN has once said a relation that does
not relate is a relation that does not exist.

śam brahmaśemi Br. Up. I. 4.10; ayañmatam brahma
ibid. II. 5.19, 35c.

17) quoted by Mathurānatha in his commentary on
Tattvacintamani (Calcutta. 1892-1901. p. 481).

18) I am aware that some schools make a distinction
between śamānaya (generality) and jāti (genus). It
is not necessary for our present discussion to go
into further details of this kind.

19) 'Reification' means assuming, that because we have
a name for a concept the concept has substantive
existence.
20) vyakterabhedastulyatvam samkaroc thanavasthitih, etc.

21) 'connotation' is by for the nearest English equivalent of pravruttinimitta which implies 'an attribute (of the object concerned) that occasions the cause of the particular word (to the exclusion of others)'.

22) Read: taccanumānanvayirupakāmeva; na tu kevalanvayi sarvasyapi dharmasya asmanmāte brahmanistha tyantabhave bhavyapratyogitvena
byantabhave bhavyapratyogisadhyatvarupakevalānvayitvasya asiddheḥ na'pi anumānasya vyatirekupatvam sadhyabhave sadhanabhavaniruptityayapijñanasya sadhanena sadhyānumitau anupayogat kathī tam tarni dhūmadau anvayavyapitam aviduso'pi vyatirekijñanadanumithi?
arthapattipramānāditi brūman.

23) This is the explanation afforded by Śāṅkara. The other two commentaries viz. Citsukhī and Vidyāśāgari have a different explanation. They say that 'entity' or 'character of being' can only be the common denotation and this exactly is the bone of contention. So you are just begging the question.

24) suo'pyasti paryāya iti cenna. ubhayasadharanikärthanirvacanamantareṇa paryāyatvasya pratipāda-yitumāsakyatvāt. Iatraigasya astipadaprayoga-straivaparaśasya vartata iti pravogat samānyena
tavad paryayatvam sakyadhigamamiti cenn.
prameyabhidheyasabdānaṁ tathātvepi saparyayatvāt
(Akh.p.1045)

25) 'The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation' by B.K.
MATILAL. Harvard 1968.p.124. The padavākyartnakara
(p.425. et seq.), however, thinks that synonymy
between two words can be resolved only on the basis
of (the sameness) of meaning. ata eva sābdānaṁ
paryayatvamapi arthataḥ.

26) Both the Vārtikas are in the connection with
Pan I.1.68.

27) For their distinction in the Abhidhamma, see
infra.p.

28) atisayaprītih.


30) For a good review of R. BIRWE's book on this subject

31) There are still many points in the context of
synonymy that are implied in Paninian Grammar.
For example, on the many glosses on samarthah
padavidhiḥ (śānti II.2.1.) a lot of intelligent
discussion on the stylistic difference between the
synonymous-compounded and uncompounded-forms like
rajapurushah and rājnah puruṣah etc. can be found.

32) It is striking to find that in exegetical literature
the synonyms are generally illustrated with the
non-connotative proper names of Indra. See in this
context Manjusa (p.95) and infra p.

Dhammapala has also illustrated the presence of synonyms with the apppellations of Indra. Indra was a very prominent Vedic deity and the collocation of synonyms such as A.V.VIII.8.1. (Indro manhatatu manhita sakrah surah purandarah) might have suggested these illustrations. The Mahabhasya - dipika of Bhartṛhari (p.22) explains: paryayaśabdaḥ sabdaśanām nirapeksaḥ tamartham bravi - yathendrah sakrah purandara iti. na ca sakradayah indrarthāntaresu vartante. It is clear that Bhartṛhari does not interpret these as mere 'qualifying epithets' but as 'independent (sabdaśanām-nirapeksa) synonyms' (paryaya)

33) lokā tāvat ... ekasya dravyasya bahvyah samjnah bhavanti

34) see the footnote 32 above.

35) The sutra expects that we compound two words which have identical reference. (This is based on Vyadi's interpretation namely samanadhiḥkaraṇa = ekadhiḥkaraṇa).

36) Read: kva ca tavadidaṁ svat samanadhiḥkaraṇena iti? yatra savaṁ samanam. Indraḥ, Šakrah, Puruhūtah, Purandarah; kunduh, kośṭhah, kusula iti. naiṇāmaśātiyakānaṁ samagena bhavitvam, pratyaśeṇa va utpalattvayam. kim karaṇam? arthagatyaḥarthah
sabdapraveyaḥ; arthaṁ sampratyaśvyāmīti sābdah
pravyayate. tatra ekena uktatvāt tasya arthasya
dvitiyasya prayogena na bhavitvam; kim karaṁ?
uktārthanāmaprayoga iti. 'na tarhi idānimidām'
bhavati bhṛtyābharaṇīya iti' 'naitau samānārthau;
eko'śryartho kṛtyoparāρhā'ṛthe. sakyo
bhartum bhṛtyah; arhati bhṛtiṁ bharaṇīyaḥ.
vadī tarhi yatra kīmicit samanam kaścicca visesah
tatra bhavitvamahāpi.
37) na so'asti pratyyo loke yah sābdānuγamadṛte
anuviddhamiva iñanām servam sābdena bhasate
vagrupa cedukramaṇaḥ eradhasya sāvati
na prakāṣaḥ prakāṣeta sa hi pratyavamarṣini


Prabhācandra in his Prameyaκamalamaṛtanda (p.39)
explains sābdānuviddha accurately as arthasya
abhinnadese pratibhasah, tādātmyam va.
38) nāsairahitabhiyamantyena dhvanina saha
svṛttaparipakāyam buddhau sābdo'vadharyate

- Vākya.I.84.

"The word is grasped in the final cognition the seeds
of which have been sown by the sounds including the
final one and which has gradually attained maturity."
Read also the S.B. on B3.I.3.28. 'sa ca ekaikā-
varṇapratyaśhyātasamkarabīje antyavarṇapratya-
yajenitaparipakē pratyayini (= citte) ekapratyaśya-
visayataya ihaṭiti pratyavabhāsaṭe.
39) For a remarkably clear and accurate exposition of the doctrine of sphoṭa and its history see 'The Sphoṭanirṇaya of Kaundabhaṭṭa. chapter.XIV. of the Vaiyakaranabhusānasara'. by S. D. JOSHI. Poona,1967. See also Śaṃkara's commentary on the Brahma-sūtra I.3.28.

40) pratyekāṃ vyanjaṃ bhinnā varṇavākyapadesu ye ī teṣamantyantabhede'pi prakīrṇā iva śaktayah ī

- Vākyā.I.88.

In the IYER's ed.(I.86) we have: 'The word is coloured by sequence and knowledge is coloured by the known.'

41) Whether two or more synonymous words have the same sphoṭa has an apparent parallel in the question discussed in the West namely whether two names or predicates have the same 'essence' or 'Platonic idea'. Attempts were made in the West to define synonymy in terms of two words having the same Platonic idea.

(This view is referred to by NELSON GOODMAN in his article 'Likeness of Meaning' Analysis.Vol.X.1949.

42) etena paryayaasthalesu eka eva sphoṭa nānā va?

- nādyah. ghaṭapade gṛhitāsaktikasya kalaśapada-

dbdhaprasāngat. na ca tatparyayabhivyakte

śaktigrahaśataḥparyayasāprasāvat-1-

-thadhīheturī tācyām. evām sātī pratiparyayām
43) It must be remembered that Vyakarana originated as a Vedāṅga (ancillary science of Vedic studies). Panini (VI.1.123) has referred to one Śphoṭayana. The theory of śphoṭa has a distinct connection with the question of the eternity of the Vedas. The theory has principally a dogmatic origin; it will not admit of any examination on the scale of generative semantics. We cannot relate the question of the identity of the Śphoṭa with regard to its synonyms with the concept of identical substructure of the basic concepts of the synonyms like kamala, padma, etc.

44) Varna in Skt. stands for both vis. colour and syllable. But I do not think that in varnamala from the passage any pun is intended.

45) The verse is as follows:

vathā manikrpanadau mukhamekamanekadha

tathaiva dhvanisu sphoṭa eka eva hi vidyate
It must be remembered that the verse intends to point out not that the sphota of different synonyms is the same but that the different pronunciations of the same word reveal only one sphota. The verse is not traceable to the present Vakyapadiya. It is however found in Sphoṭatatvaniṁrṣaya of Śeṣakṛṣṇa as the verse No. 11. The same book also mentions the view that it is 'shorter' (ṭāghava) to hold that the sphota of the various paryayas is identical. That they appear to have varied characters is due to the compositional differences in the revealing words. Read:

pratītivailakaṁ ca vyanjakaivailakaṁ yakratam

After this the above kārikā is quoted with the further remark na ca sphoṣasya ekvat bhedaṁ bandhanasādṛṣya-vyavahāra- anapattih; vyanjaka bhedena eva bhedaṁ pattaṁ ektah.

46) The doctrine of Vākyasphoṭa is held by the following authorities: Bhaṭṭojijikṣita (Kaustubha); Kaundabhaṭṭa (Vaiyākaraṇabhusanāsara. verses.61-74); Nāgesa (Mañjuśa); Śrksna (Sphoṭacandrikā); Maṇḍanamāśra (Sphoṭasiddhi); Bharatamāśra (Sphoṭasiddhi); anonymous (Sphoṭasiddhi- nyayavistara.) etc.


48) At another place, however, when he is referring to the view of 'some others' Bhartṛhari has used nāḍa and dhvani in different senses. See AYER 'Bhartṛhati
on Dhvani. ABORI.XLVI.p.59.

49) As pointed out earlier (supra.p. ) the term artha is splendidly ambiguous (in the Empsonian sense of the term) in that it comprises both 'meaning' and 'purpose'. Its ambiguous meaning is 'meaning that is purpose'. But MATILAL (p.43) notes his dissatisfaction: 'Sanskrit unfortunately has only one word artha which can ambiguously stand for 'meaning' or 'signification' or 'denotation' or 'connotation'.' For the appreciation of the word artha in padartha see 'The six systems of Indian Philosophy. F. MAX MÜLLER.p.376.

50) styaṃtastathābhūte nimitte styanāśraye tv

51) This is against the 'reification' advanced in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (infra.p. ). The Śloka-vaśītaka of kumarila (Chowkhambe.ed.p.64) gives a slightly different wording. viz. styaṃtāstisvipsa janamārthe sadbāh karoṭi hi i.e. word or speech can generate cognition even of entities which are totally non-existent.

52) Pratibhā means artha-pratibhā or the meaning that arises in the mind on hearing the utterance of a sentence. For this see Vāda. II.117,148,152.

53) Punyāraja says sarvasya bhavabhramāsya śadbhūreva prakṛtiḥ. For apabhramśa see Vāya. I.148,153-154 and p.216 of the Poona University ed. of the text.
54) I have not discussed some other points in Bhartrhari like the view referred to by him in Vākyā. II. 119 namely that all expressions have only astvārth or 'is' as their meaning. This view is also criticised by Kumārila and Santarakṣita. For a discussion on all words meaning 'to on' see the 'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy'. F. MAX MÜLLER. pp. 405-406.

55) Elsewhere the following illustration of ekartha is given: saradindu-kunda-ghnasare-nīhare-haramyānāla-merāla-surasāla-nīra-kaīra-sīrisāṭtabāsa-kālāsa-kaśa- (saṃkāsa)

56) Note this is arthāntara and not the usual anarthāntara.

57) Aggavāma does not stress gudhatva but merely 'manufacturing', abhiṣaṅkharana.

58) "... for instance for the word vesyā we find as many as 235 synonyms in Sanskrit nomenclature .... I dare say there is no other language which contains more synonyms ...." LUDWIG STERNBACH. Bhāratīya-Vidyā. vol IV. part 1. pp. 104-114.

59) The force of 'generally' is as follows:
Sometimes the implication demands the repetition of the same word e.g.

udaye savita rakto raktascaśtameva tathā
sampattau ca vipattau ca mahatmekarupata II

Here since the intention is to show the uniformity (tathātvam) in the behaviour of the great, the
uniformity of word is also to be observed. It will
mar the effect if raktaścāstamane tathā is changed
to tāmraścāstamane tathā.

60) some manuscripts wrongly drop na.

61) Is it not comparable to pratiparyayām sphotah bhidyate ?
(supra.p.174).

62) No sting of 'strange-bed-partners' in this.

63) The aggrieved subordinate always chirps that his
superior could have told him the same thing in a
different way.

64) The varieties as explained above are defined by
Ūnmesa II.verses.10-12.

65) yani vā pana annani'pi atthi buddhavevacanāni
vā dhammavevacanāni vā sanghavevacanāni vā.
(Paññikā.p.34.)

66) vividhāni ekasmin yeva atthe vacanāni, vivacanāni
vivacanāni eva vevacanāni pariyayasadda'ti attho
(Netti.PTS.ed.p.XXXIX.)

67) Read: sammāsakappo'ti nekkhammasamkappo,
avypadasamkappo, avihimsasamkappo;
idad vevacanā. Nekkamma etc.
'come under' (hypo) the concept (name) of samkappa.
These are not synonyms but subdivisions or varieties.

68) byahataṃ punaruttām vā apatthām vā niratthakām
naddasam munino tassa tato pabbajito aham II

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CHAPTER IV.
Pitakan Synonyms and Pali Exegesis.
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PITAKAN SYNONYMS AND PALI EXEGESIS

Pali Exegetical Literature:

Having discussed in the preceding chapter the Indian views on synonyms and synonymy it is now to proposed to note in the present chapter the assistance of the Pali exegetical literature to the understanding of Piṭaka synonyms. It is obvious that the indegeneous methods should prove more useful in the treatment of Pali synonyms as they have arisen out of the existing examples.

The Pali exegetical literature consists mainly of the numerous atṭhakathās on the Piṭaka books and a few later treatises like Netti and Petakopadesa. These latter two are to the Tipiṭaka what the Vedāṅgas are to the Vedic literature. They have arisen out of a hermeneutic need. The Atṭhakathās are the first-rate work on the Tipiṭaka as the Mahābhāṣya is on Panini's Astadhyāyī.

The Atṭhakathās as perhaps may be suggested by their name are not mere expositions (kathā) of meanings (attha). They are interpretations derived from the whole range of the Tipiṭaka linked with exegetical details and supported by citations from the other parts of the Canon. Their purpose on the whole, however, is
more informative than critical or evaluationary. So far as the synonyms are concerned these Āṭṭhakathās and the other exegetical literature have foreshadowed, as may be patent from the following discussion, many a modern approach to the study of synonyms.

The Commentorial Ways of explaining Synonyms:

The commentorial ways of explaining synonyms and synonymic collocations can be conveniently discussed by broadly classifying them as follows:

1) A candid acceptance of synonymic embellishment in the Tipiṭaka.

2) Semantic differentiation in words esteemed synonyms.

3) The justification of using many synonyms in the same context.

4) Synonyms explained through similes.

1) Candid Acceptance of synonymic embellishment in the Tipiṭaka.

It is creditable of the commentators that they never thought of bringing unwarranted differences in synonyms used in collocations. They knew that synonyms are always to be treated in their specific contexts and not as isolated items. Thus even though it was possible to show some difference in hetu and paccaya on Abhidhammic grounds Buddhaghosa refrained from doing it as in the context paccaya was added to hetu only stylistically (naththi hetu naththi paccayo’ti ettha paccayo hetuvevacanameva. MĀ.III.119.). Read also
mamsakhalam'ti ekam mamsarasim; mamsapunjam'ti tasseva
vevacanam. MA.III.119; akara'ti adini sabbaneva ca
annamannavevacanani MA.III.38; aggam'ti adini sabbani
annamannavevacanani. MA.III.93; santoti imam samvijate
mano'ti padasseva vevacanam. MA.III.9; vyapado'ti va
dosoti va dvapi ete kodho eva, namena nanattam
agata DhsA.p.137; ettha paccayo va hetu nama DhsA.
p.59; appamanoti vipulo'ti attho, ularo'ti tasseva
vevacanam DA.II.433; samkampati'ti samantato kampati,
itaram ca dvaya (viz. sampakampati and sampavedhati)
tasseva vevacanam DA.II.434; samghiti samcho asa
atthiti tadiso ca'ssa gano atthiti gani, purima-
padassva va vevacanam DA.I.287.

2) Differentiation of words esteemed synonyms:

The commentators were painfully conscious of
the linguistic niceties, discriminating between shades of
meanings and distinguishing synonyms. They had an uncanny
awareness of the differences between words of similar but
by no means identical meanings. Thus the words satta,
pana, bhuta and jiva are differentiated on biological
grounds (MA.III.120 = DA.I.161,) as follows: satta are
creatures like camels, oxen and donkeys (otthagonapadrobe-
bhadyo); pana 'breathers' are those who are endowed
with (only) one or two faculties; bhuta, 'born ones' or
'beings' are those enclosed in eggs or membraneous
sheaths (andakosavattikosesu bhute sandhaya vadanti;
jīvas 'living beings' include even living plants
vegetables and crop such as paddy, barley, wheat etc.
(sāli-yava-godhumadayo).

khadaniya and bhojaniya are distinguished
(DA.I.28; III.927.) as 'hard and soft food' respectively.
The first comprising pastry etc and the second odana
(rice), kummasa (gruel), sattu (meal, flour), maccha
(fish) and manusā (meat).

The synonyms saddhā, bhatti, pema, and pasdo
are differentiated in PugA.p. as punnapunam
bhejanavasena saddhā va bhatti (i.e. faith is
devotion in the sense of continuous adoration), pema is
two fold viz. (a) affection of (saddhāpema) faith and
(b) filial affection (gehasitapema), pasdo is, however,
identical with faith (pasdo saddhāpasado). (for
critical observation on this see JAYATILEKE p.385.)

veviccha (multifarious wants, greediness,
avrice) and kadariya (stingyness, selfishness) are said
to exhibit a difference in degrees only. The first
being the name for mild selfishness the second that for
strong selfishness. (cf. veviccham'iti mudumacchariyassetam
namam, kadariyam'iti thaddhamacchariyassetam namam DhsA.
pp.375-376).

The tradition seems to favour certain difference
between sura (valient, courageous) and viṣa (etymologically
virtuous but traditionally heroic, namely, mighty) and in
accordance with this the commentators gloss विरा as the 'best of the सुरा (सुरा’ति अभिसकाजति, विरा’ति उत्तमसुरा वुकाति). Here वुकाति means 'traditionally said'.

Between सक्कहरा, pebbles and मरुमब (a sort of earth) the difference is that of size. Pebbles measure from the size of a kidney-bean to that of a closed fist; those measuring lesser than a kidney-bean are termed वलुक (v.l. वलिक) or sand. (cf. सक्कहरा’ति मुग्गमत्ततो यवा मुत्थिपपाणमवा मरुमबा, मुग्गमत्ततो पेने हेथिः वलिक’ति वुकाति. VbhA.p.64.)

कलाहा (dispute) and विवदा (quarrel) are said to be in a sense identical but sometimes विवदा is differently characterised as the first stage of कलाहा (cf. एकना अकारेना कलाहो विवदो’पि तत् येव; यो कलाहो सो विवदो, यो विवदो सो कलाहो; अथा वा अपरेना अकारेना विवदो वुकाति वुकाति कालाहसा पुब्बहासो

When गरुळ and वेणात्य्या occur together the first is to be interpreted as a generic name and the second as a family-name. (गरुळम् वेणात्य्याम’ति एत्थे गरुळो’ति जात्वासा नामाम्; वेणात्य्यो’ति गोत्तवासाम्. Saddhammajotika. p.300).

The Saddanīti (p.549.) remarks that the अच्छहकाथास were interested in showing minute differences in words esteemed Synonyms. Thus though मनसी and पुजेति
are not very different so far as their etymological meanings are concerned yet the exegetical tradition has always seen specialised meanings in them and the Āṭṭhakathās dully follow the tradition. (Read: tattha māneti'tī pujeti; Āṭṭhakathāsau pana māneti'tī manena pivayanti, pujeti'tī paccayehi pujenti'ti attho vutto. so vevacanappakāsanavasena vutto'ti gahehabbo.). Thus according to the commentarial method of explaining synonyms (vevacanappakāsa) māneti is 'holding one dear by honouring him' and pujeti is 'to honour one by offering him the requisite things'.

For Abhidhammic differentiation between sati and sampajānena see Buddhist Psychology.p.90. et seq; for the difference in vittakka (initial thought) and vicāra (discursive thought) see DhsA.p.115 and Buddhist Psychology.p.89. for the difference between hetu and paccaya see PTSD hetu. s.v.; for an accurate differentiation between sāmkappa (longing), chanda (zeal), kāma (desire) and rāga (greed or attachment) see Path of Purification by Bhikkhu NĀNAMOLI.p.146.

3) The Justification of using many synonyms in the same contexts:

a) Justifying the synonymic compound purisapuggalo the VbhA.p.497 says: purisapuggalo'ti satto; kāmaṃca puriso'ti pī puggalo'ti pī vutto satto yeva vutto hoti. ayam pana sammutikathā nāma yo yathā jānati tassā tathā vuccati. The gist of this
is that though purisa and puggala mean the same thing yet both the words have been used to facilitate the understanding of those who know only either of them.

b) vacanasiliththata (verbal harmony)

The VinA.p.185 says: hetu paccayo'ti ubhayametam karanaadhivacanam evam atthato ekam pi voharavasena vacanasiliththataya ca tatra etam ubhayam pi vuttam. By vacanasiliththata is meant the usage of matching synonyms which is considered a graceful style in Pali tradition. Regarding the synonyms parapuggala and parasatta used in collocation the Vism.XII.8. gives desanavilasa as a reason in addition to the one specified in 'a' above. (Read. parasattanam ... parapuggalanam'ti idampi iminā ekatthameva, veneyyavasena pana desanavilasena ca byañjananāttam katam. Vism.XIII.8.)

c) Synonyms as fervent expressions:

In the Upālīgaṇathas (M.II.59.) tusita and mudita occur in the same context. Buddhaghosa says that the repetition is due to the fact that the devotee (Upāli, the then recent convert) wanted to praise his new Teacher in different words. One has to understand the mind of Upāli who wanted to praise the Tathāgata in 'many many' words. (cf. muditassati muditavihariyasenam muditassa punaruttam eva va etam pasamsavasena hi ekam pi guṇam punappunam
vadati yeva). It is because of this psychological trait that we find hymns and eulogies teeming with florid synonymous epithets.

   d) **Synonyms for metrical and formal exigencies:**

   In the same Upāligathas we find the word manujassa repeated by its synonym narassa only for the sake of 'formal' regularity. To explain, the object of the Upāligathas is to present 100 names of the Buddha divided in 10 verses each containing exactly 10 epithets. Under this plan the gāthā (no. 2) would have been deficient in 'one' had the expression narassa not been used. Buddhaghosa says: manujassa’ti lokavohāravasena ekassa sattassa; narassa’ti punaruttam, aññatha vuccamane ekagathaya dasagunā na'ppahonti. MA.III.97.

   It may thus be fairly maintained that the commentaries have taken due notice of nearly all the existing varities of synonymic usages. Since many of these have been already noted in details in the first chapter we have refrained from elaborating them here.

4) **Synonyms explained through Similies:**

   The Pali commentators believe that the nice differences in the synonymic expressions can be explained by visualising them under appropriate similies. In addition to verbal glosses (called saddanaya), therefore, they also adduce fine similies to drive home the exact shades of differences. Thus acchariya (wonderful) and
abhuta (marvelous) have been explained through similies: 'both mean surprising (ubhayam pe'tam vimehayavaahasaya adhivacanam) yet acchariya can be differentiated as andhasa pabbatārohanam viya niccam na hoti'ti acchariyam (MA.III.3; DA.I.43).

Vitakka and vicara have been specialised in the following way: kumbhakārassā dhāppabharena cakkam bhāmayitvā bhājanam karontassa upplanaḥhattho viya vitakko, ito c'iito ca saṅcaranattatho viyo vicāro (DhsA.p.115.) 'Applied thought (vitakka) is like the supporting (unmoving) hand of a potter who is making a pot after having spun his wheel with a big stroke of his hammer; sustained thought (vicāra) is like his (other) hand moving here and there'. (For more similies see Vism.IV.91.)

In common usage pīti (happiness) and sukhā (pleasure) are synonymous. They become different in Jhānic formulae where pīti (actual thrill or rapture) falls in samkharakhandha. DhsA.pp.117-118 gives a graphic description to bring out the technical difference between them: yathā hi purisa ca mahākantaramagga paṭipanno bhāmaṃpareto tasito pipāsita paṭipathām purisām diṣṭa 'kattha paṇīvam atthi'ti puccheyya. so 'atavim uttaritvā va jatassaravanaśāndo atthi, tattha gantvā labhissāśi'ti vadeyya' so tassa kathām autvā hattathāpaṭtatho bhaveteyya. tato gacchanto bhūmiyo paṭitiṇi
In this long drawn graphic description the difference between *piti* and *sukha* is illustrated by the simile of a weary and thirsty traveller (in the desert?) *Piti* is likened to the thrill excited by the lovely sight...
of a natural lake (jātissara; rendered also as oasis in Compendium.p.56) viewed from a distance and sukha is compared to the actual pleasure derived from drinking the cool and refreshing waters of the pond. Piti is thus the harbinger ('precursor' Compendium,ibid.) of sukha. (for the translation of the passage see The Expositor.I.155-156.)

The above instance is apt to show how very zealous the Pali commentators were in explaining words of similar import through telling similies. Upamā, in Pali exegesis was a recognised mode of explication. (cf. upamāto vinicchayo veditabbo VbhA.p.68; Vism.AIV.210; Milanapāṇho. chs.II-IV.pessim.)

Another interesting instance of picturesque explanation of the difference in synonyms is given at VbhA.p.494 (= DhsA.p.151. with a slight difference as noted on p. below.) The synonyms explained here are jimha (oblique, crooked), vāŋka (curved) and kuṭila (bent, crooked). All these in the given contexts mean moral crookedness or dishonesty. The difference in the words is brought out by VbhA as: jimhāṭī candavāṅkāṭa, vāṅkāṭati gomuttavāṅkāṭa, kuṭilāṭī nāṃgalakoṭi-vāṅkāṭa. Thus jimhāṭā is like a streak of moon; vāṅkāṭā is like a zig-zag mark of cow-urine and kuṭilāṭā is like a curved plough-share. The graphic representation of those will be as follows:

jimha: ּ ; vāṅka: ּּּּ ; kuṭila: ּּּּּ
It is a usual experience that a good illustration explains a point better than a learned philological discussion.

The Āṭṭhakathās are also punctilious in analysing terms of nearly identical import. Thus the synonymic tetrad paññā (abandoned), uccchinnamulā (uprooted), tālavatthukatā (lit.made a palm rendered groundless i.e. destroyed.), anabhāvamkata (brought in line with naught). The last word was a difficult crux to many a modern scholar who tried to break it in an + abhāva which startled them with the exactly opposite sense. The Vinā (p.133.) rightly splits it into anu + abhāva (saññā h'ettha padaccchedo 'anu abhāvam kete). The Āṭṭhakathās also meticulously note the Vinayic and Suttantic connotations of the terms. Thus Vinā (II.285-286) says: vinayaparīyavena tayo jana sambahula'ti vuccanti; tato paraṁ sangho; suttantaparīyavena tayo tayo yeva, tato paṭṭhaya sambahula. This means that according to the vinayic tradition three persons form majority while according to the Suttantic tradition it requires more than three to form majority. For aranna defined differently in Vinaya and Abhidhamma see Vinā.p.301.

Occasionally we find the commentators referring to other interpretations of the term. Thus while explaining the synonymic string abhirūpo, daasanīyo, pasāđiko, paramāya vannapokkharatāya
samannāgato Buddhaghosa explains the last expression as pokkharātā vuccati sundarabhāvo, vannāsā pokkharātā vannapokkharātā; porāṇa pana pokkharam ti sarīram vadanti, vanna vannāy eva tesa matena vanna ca vannapokkharāni ... i.e. pokkharātā is beauty, vanna is beauty of complexion. The Ancient Teachers, however, explain pokkharām as body. According to their opinion the expression means endowed with body and complexion (of highest quality parama).

Although the commentaries on the various parts of the Tipitaka have been written by different authorities such as Buddhaghosa, Dhammapāla and Buddhadatta⁷ one finds identical explanations of many of the synonymic clusters — a fact which points at a common commentorial tradition which probably they followed. The identical explanations of the synonyms sabbha (pit, dig), papata (precipice, cliff) and naraka (ground split opened) can be cited in support of this. Buddhaghosa explains it as sabbhe'ti samantato chinne, papate'ti ekato chinne, narake'ti phaliteṭṭheṇa idha pana tihi pi imehi aranna eva vuttam (MA.III.334); Dhammapāla explains the traid identically as sabbhe'ti samantato chinnatate, papate'ti ekato chinnatate, narake'ti bhūviya phalitavivare; idha pana tihi pi padehi vattha patitam annena gahetum na sakka tādissam pabbate'ntaraṃ eva sandhava vedati (ThagA.III.58.)
In very few cases do we find different interpretations given by the various commentators. The difference at such places is also mostly trivial. Thus in the case of synonyms for crooked discussed above (supra p. 227.) we find DhsA. p. 151, explaining jîmha as gomuttavāṅka and vāṅka as candalekhavāṅka respectively which are given as the explanations of vāṅka and jîmha respectively in VinA. p. 494. But, here too we have to remember that as yet we do not have critical editions of the Āṭṭhakathās which might reduce these minor alterations to scribal errors. It is not that the commentaries of Buddhaghosa, Dhammapāla and Buddhadatta do not exhibit any important differences. Our only contention is that they have not shown remarkable differences in their explanations of the recurring synonymic tags in the Tipiṭaka.

A few shortcomings in the commentorial explanations of Synonyms:

The instances where the Āṭṭhakathās seem unconvincing in their explanations of synonyms are very few. Mention can be made of the expressions attamāna and vitti occurring in the synonymic cluster pīti, pāmojjā, amodāna, pamojana, bāso, vitti, odaggyām, attamanatī Dhs. p. 75.) The first member of attamāna represents Skt. ātta (pp. of ā + dā) : but Buddhaghosa confused it with Skt. ātman and explained attamāna as
sakamana which makes very little sense. The usual device of extending the form by prefixal addition (upasaggana padam vaddhitam) would have clarified the position a good deal. attamana (Skt) is udattamana (mind uplifted by joy.) Buddhaghosa also failed to explain vitti from the same cluster. He knew the meaning correctly but did not know the exact process through which it came to have that meaning viz. happiness. He tried to explain the expression as a metaphorical shift thinking that it means primarily 'wealth' and, therefore, metaphorically 'happiness'. (cf. vittii'ti vittam dhanassesatam namam, vittisarikkhataya vitti; yathā hi dhanino dhanam paticca somanassam uppajjati, evam pitimato pi pitim paticca somanassam uppajjati, taasma vittii'ti yutta. DhsA.p.143,) Really speaking in vitti we have only a specialisation of the meaning of the root vid 'to experience, to feel'. The original meaning is neutral i.e. only feeling or bare experience without any specification as sukha-vedana, dukkha-vedana or adhikha-asukha vedana. In Marathi it is specialised (in popular not in scientific speech) in one direction i.e. painful feeling. Pali has taken the other course i.e. sukha vedana.

samkhalihita one of the three semisynonymous expressions in the context of 'holy life' (brahmacariya) is also unhistorically explained by Buddhaghosa who
marked it a metaphorical explanation meaning '(clean) as a polished conch-shell' or 'comparable to cleanly washed conch-shell' (likhitasamkhasadisam, dhotasamkhasappati-bhagam. VinA.p.203). Actually, however, Samkha (Skt. Samkha) and Likhita were two authorities in Dharmaśastra known for their strict disciplinary ideas about 'good behaviour' (brahmacarya). The expression, therefore, means 'holy life as implied in Samkhalikhita (smriti)'.

Sometimes the commentators explain the synonyms only grammatically say by merely supplying their suffixal variations (paccayanānatta) without actually explaining them by their semantic equivalents. Thus we read: sāttheyam'ti sāthattani, kūteyyāni'ti kūtattani, vāmkeyyāni'ti, vāmkattani, jīmheyyāni'ti jīmhattāni.

MA.III.7. Sometimes we come across the familiar expedient of inclusion the term to be explained in the explanation. Thus nāna and panna fr.D.II.272. were explained by DA.II.460 merely as nānam'ti nānatthena, pannā'ti pājānana'tthena. In this method the words are glossed off through grammatical strategies without any semantic elaboration. e.g. daliddo'ti daliddivena samannagato, assako ti nissako, anāhiye'ti na addho 'poor is one possessed of poverty, without riches meant devoid of riches, 'non-wealthy' means 'not wealthy'.

The other instances of unconvincing explains
consist mainly of forced differentiations. Thus, for example, Buddhaghosa explains \textit{akicchālābhā} as \textit{niddukkhalābhī} and \textit{akasirālābhī} as \textit{vipulābhī} (MA.III.31.) This can hardly be endorsed as \textit{kiccha} and \textit{kasira} are only dialectical variations of Skt. \textit{kṛcchra} and as such admit little differentiation. At M.III.450 Buddhaghosa himself glosses \textit{appakasira} by \textit{akiccha}, showing that they are quite synonymous. The synonymic triplet \textit{nānabhāvao} vinabhavo annathabhavo (D.II.111.) is also unnecessarily differentiated as implying technical differences: \textit{vis. nānabhāvo'ti jatiya nānabhāvo}, vinabhavo'ti maranena vinabhavo annathabhavo'ti bhavena annathabhavo. True, the twelve nidānas of the causal nexus are distributed within the past, present and future births but it is hard to see any such idea in the synonyms under consideration. It is, however, not difficult to understand the psychological urge behind such forced discriminations. When two or more synonyms occur side by side in many places one is naturally tempted to discriminate between them. Thus we find Buddhaghosa discriminating rather unnaturally between \textit{pandita} and \textit{medhavi} as \textit{vyatta} and \textit{khandha-dhatu-sayatanādisu kusalo} respectively (DA.II.585) and \textit{magga} and \textit{patipada} respectively as \textit{lokuttaramagga} and \textit{pubbahāgapaṭipada} (DA.II.354.)
The lakkhaṇādi scheme and differentiation of synonyms:

The Pali exegetical tradition has evolved its method of defining a concept. It is called lakkhaṇādi method (Vism. I.20). According to it, it is essential to state the lakkhaṇa (essential characteristic) rasa (basic function), paccupatthana (antecedent condition) and padatthana (resultant condition) of the thing to be defined.

The lakkhaṇādi and the Paṭissambhidda methods are not primarily methods of synonyemic analysis. Their aim is more general, that of semantic analysis. But for the same reason they can be fruitfully applied to finding out minute differences in seemingly synonymous words. Buddhaghosa and other commentators have actually used both these methods to serve the purpose of analysing synonyms. Thus in Vism. XVI.48. Buddhaghosa differentiates soka and domanassa on the basis of the lakkhaṇādi method: soko nāma nātibyasānañādihi phutthassa cittasantapa. so kincapi athato domanassameva. hoti. evam sante'pi antoni.jhanalakkhā no cetasa pariżhapanarasa etc. 'sorrow is a burning in the mind of one affected by loss of his relatives, and so on. Although it means the same as dejection, nevertheless, it has inner consuming as its characteristic and an all sided consuming in the mind as its function'.

Pāmujja, piti and passaddhi come very close to each other. They can, however, be nicely differentiated
with the assistance of *lakkhanādi* scheme. The Netti (p.29) makes apparent the subtle causal relation between them by subjecting them to *lakkhanādi* analysis: *pamujjā* pīti *padatthanam, pīti passaddhiyā padatthanam, passaddhi sukhasa padatthanam.* The sorites is: exultation (*pamujja*) results into joy (*pīti*); joy results into composure (*passaddhi*); composure results into happiness (*sukha*).

The *Patisambhida method and Synonymic analysis:*

A lot of discussion has already taken place about the exact meaning of the term *Patisambhīda* (see *Har Dayal* p.259 ff.). We shall like only to note our opinion that it represents Skt. *pratisamvid*, the form in which it occurs in many Sanskrit Buddhist texts. *Har Dayal* (p.261.) has noted two earlier occurrences of its components viz. *samā* (*Taitt. Up.* I.ii.3.) and *cittasamvid* (*Yogasūtra* III.34; translated by *S.H. Woods* p.262, as 'consciousness'). We may add the following to facilitate a clear understanding of the term: The prefixes *sam* and *prati* occur in collocation in *R.V.* II.1.15. *tvam tantsām ca prati ca'śi* (0 Agni, you go with them and are a match to them*'). In *Ait.Ār.* we have *sampratīvid* used twice (*II.3.4; II.3.6.*) in the same sense (*Sayana renders it with *samyagabhijnah* in both the places.*) In *Kauśitakī Up.* we have the word in uncompounded (*I.2.*) and compounded (*I.4.*) forms.
The former as sam tadvide prati tadvide'ham ('To know the knowledges that is truth and to know the knowledge that is against the truth'. E.B. COWELL. This translation is in keeping with the commentary Dipika) and the latter as sampratividāh. In spite of the remark in the PTSD (paṭisambhīda s.v.) to the contrary we strongly feel that it is the Pali paṭisambhīda which is a corrupted form of the Sanskrit original pratiśmāvid rather than the latter being 'a new formation (in the Buddhist Sanskrit) resting on a confusion between bhid and vid'. The PsA.I.306 clearly says paṭividita'ti abhimukhabhāvena vidita pākata nema honti, tena paṭisambhidapadassā attho vutto. The consistently recurring explanation in the commentaries of the various paṭisambhidās unmistakably shows that the commentators see vid ( = nāṇa knowledge) in Paṭisambhīda and not bhid (difference). The explanation is as follows: hetumhi nāṇam dhammapati-
sambhīda, hetuphale nāṇam atthapatisambhīda (DhsA.p.22) and nāṇassava nabheda (PsA.I.3.) HAR DAYAL has also discussed (p.26.) whether the idea of 'knowledge' or that of 'analysis' is more prominently implied in the word. It should be clear, however, that the word combines 11 both the ideas - , the root indicating 'knowledge' and the prefixes (prati - distinct, separate; sam - adequate, complete) indicating 'analysis'. 
Patisambhida is, therefore, 'analytical knowledge' or literally 'complete (sam) knowledge (vid > bhid) pertaining to each of the particular (prati) viz. dhamma, atta, nirutt, patībhāna'.

Synonyms explained through Patisambhida:

It will be of interest to see how synonyms can be explained adequately through the four patisambhidas. Already Ps. (pp. 401-402) has explained the synonymous cluster cakkhum udapādi, nanam udapādi, panna udapādi vijā udapādi, aloko udapādi on the basis of the four patisambhidās. The explanation can be represented by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B) Attha</th>
<th>C) Nirutt</th>
<th>D) Patībhana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(eye)</td>
<td>dassana'ttho (sight)</td>
<td>cakkhū'tti</td>
<td>The knowledge of 1 A, B, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(knowledge)</td>
<td>nata'ttho (knowing)</td>
<td>nanā'tti</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 2 A, B, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(intellect)</td>
<td>pajaṇana'ttho (intellecting)</td>
<td>panna'tti</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 3 A, B, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(science)</td>
<td>pativedha'ttho (grasping)</td>
<td>vijā'tti</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 4 A, B, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(flash)</td>
<td>obhāsa'ttho (illuminating)</td>
<td>aloko'tti</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 5 A, B, C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be clear from the above table that dhammas and niruttis are verbally the same and patībhāna is only the knowledge of the dhamma (object), its atta (meaning) and its expression (nirutt). It is said¹² (Ps. p. 402)
that there are thus five distinct knowledges about the five dhammas, five distinct knowledges about their respective attahas and five distinct knowledges about their respective niruttis. Thus, in all, there are twenty distinct knowledges (pañcasu dhammesu nanani, pañcasu atthesu nanani, dasasu niruttisu nanani, paṭibhanapatīsambhidaya ārammanā ceva honti gocara ca. Ps. ibid.)

paṭīsambhidās combine linguistic and metalinguistic analysis:

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the scheme of the four paṭīsambhidās combines linguistic and metalinguistic analysis. Take the instance of ghaṭa: There is a material object (i.e. ghaṭa¹); there is a linguistic expression for it (i.e. ghaṭa²); there is a metalinguistic explanation in the form of its given meaning (i.e. ghaṭa³ = ghaṭa² or kalasa.) Lastly there is also a knowledge of it in the form ghaṭa⁴. The essence of the fourfold paṭīsambhīda can be succinctly put in the following form: *The knowledge (paṭibhāna) of the meaning (attha) of a linguistic expression (niruttī) denoting a thing (dhamma). When analysed the four concepts are separate. In ordinary language, however, we may not always be aware of the four being different for dhammas and niruttis (and meanings also) are sometimes unavoidably identical in their verbal forms. So many
words do not have synonyms and if any one asks what A (say) means we have helplessly to answer that A means A. This is a tautology but one which cannot be helped. Even in cases of synonymizable words certain tautology is apparent. Thus even if we say ghaṭa (word) means kalasa it is not a matching of linguistic sign with something outside the language for if ghaṭa is a word kalasa (which we call its meaning) is equally a word, a linguistic expression, supposedly having the same meaning. The search for an explanation of linguistic phenomena in terms of what is not language is a wild goose chase. For 'explanation' always implies a statement 'in language'. The atthapatisambhīḍā, therefore, explains the dhammapatisambhīḍā merely in metalinguistic words. There, thus results certain synonymy between the two. This fact has been very minutely noted by Sanskrit grammarians. Thus the Paramalaghumaṇjaśī (with the comm. Jyotsnā) 

KALIKAPRASADĀ SHUKLĀ. Baroda, 1961. p. 40) quotes Patañjali (the Yogasūtrakāra, Yoga-sūtra, III. 17) who said that the sāmketa that a certain word means a certain thing has the nature of adhyāsa, for words and their meanings are inseparable. (sāmketaṣtu padarthvortariṣcarydhyaasārūpayah smṛtyatmako yo'yaṁ śabdah so'ṛtho, yo'ṛthah sa śabdah). The commentary Jyotsnā further elaborates this as: kaḥ śabdah, ko'ṛthah iti dvividhe'pi śabdārthavisayake prasne
ghaṭa ityāyam śabdah, ghaṭa ityā arthaḥ
ityākārottaradarṣanāttayoh adhyāsasiddheḥ.) The same
truth is implied in Bhārtrhari's jñānām prayoktur-
bahyo'rtah etc. (Vākyā.III.3.1.): When words are
used we get the following:

i) svaraṇa sound-shape (= niruttī.)

ii) bahyo'rtah 'external object. Here external =
'extra-linguistic' i.e. dhamma.

iii) jñānām = 'the knowledge that a particular
sound-shape is used to express a particular
meaning i.e. patibhāna.

Bhārtrhari has thus almost covered the whole
patisambhida scheme in this kārīka. Because ghaṭa can
be synonymised as kalasa the verbal forms of dhamma and
attha patisambhidās will be different. But in case of
words which do not have suitable synonyms the verbal
forms of dhamma, attha and niruttī will be identical.
It requires an intelligent analytic grasp of things,
their meanings and their expressions in order to
comprehend the words in their entirety. Vyāsa (under
Yoga-sūtra.III.17) pertinently observes: gauriti
śabdah, gaurityartho, gauriti jñānām ya esam
pravibhāgaśajñāh sa sarvavid. One who understands
analytically bull as a word, as a meaning and and as a
knowledge is alone a knower of all. This pravibhāgaśajna
who is sarvavid is called pabhinnapatisambhido in Pāli
PTSD (patisambhida s.v.) explains four patisambhidas as follows: attha - meaning 'in extension'; dhamma - reason, condition, causal relation; nirutti - meaning 'in intension'; patibhāna - 'intellect to which things knowable by the foregoing processes are presented'. We propose to simplify the four as follows:

a) dhamma - object, bearer of meaning, signifie
b) attha - meaning, signification

c) nirutti - linguistic expression, significant

d) patibhāna - wit, the knowledge which reveals the connection between 'a', 'b' and 'c'.

Notes and References

1) The word अत्थकथाः is explained as अत्थो धात्विश्वायती
estayati (Saddanīti.p.541.) "by which the meaning is stated". The general nature of अत्थकथाः is explained as:

यवत्थां म अविवानेति यवज्ञनाः तथापदानुगां इ
निदानवात्तसुभाद्धम एसा अत्थकथाः मताः इ।
(Saddanīti.p.541.)

According to this an अत्थकथाः is supposed to explain the text by bringing out the implications (यवज्ञना) and meaning (अत्थ) contained in the words (पदानुगा). It has also to point out the occasion (निदा or background) and the plot (यवत्थु, subject matter). For the various commentaries, their origin and development see WINTERNITZ (vol.II.pp.183-185), A Buddhist Manual of Ethics, London.1900.pp.xx. et seq; Buddhist Legends. Burlingame.1922.part.I.p.26 f; G.P. MALALASEKERA. Pali Lit. of Ceylon.pp.83-124. I have not as yet seen L.R. GOONESKERE's Buddhist Commentary Lit.
BPS.1967.

2) Netti published with extracts from Dhammapala's commentary by E. HARDY. PTS.1902. Translated by नानमोली under the title 'The Guide' PTS.1962. I think the title Netti can be better translated as 'Exegesis' (fr.Gr.ex-out and ἑγεισθαι - to guide.)
3) Peṭakopadesa translated by NAMOLI Piṭaka
    Disclosure. PTS. 1964.

4) There is no adequate expression for marumbe; it
    is sub-soil and is sometimes called 'mantle' or
    more technically 'regolith'.

5) see PTS. anabhavamkata.s.v.

6) see note no. 12 to ch.no.VII.

7) To Buddhadatta is ascribed the commentary on
    Buddhavamsa named Madhuratthavāsamini.

8) Even the works ascribed to Buddhaghosa such as DhsA
    and his encyclopaedic Visuddhamagga shows remarkable
    differences in certain cases, meticulously noted by
    P.V. BAPAT and R.D. VADAKAR in the intro. to their
    ed. of DhsA. pp.xxxv-xxxix. Dhammapāla was decidedly
    later than Buddhaghosa and therefore was able to
    gather more and more-trustworthy information about
    certain things. It is urgent that some one takes
    up a study of the advancement in Dhammapāla over
    Buddhaghosa's achievement. We are in our humble way
    trying to collect material from this point of view.

9) This our statement is controversial. Dr P.V. BAPAT
    (Samkhalikhita Brahmacariya ABORI. Vol. XXIII. pp.61-66.)
    holds the view that the Pali commentarial explanation
    of samkhalikhita brahmacariya can very well be
    vindicated as it is supported by the Sarvāstivādī
    tradition as represented by the Chinese translation
of Āgamas. One can, however, always suspect error creeping in at an early date. See also Hist. of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy. B.M. BARUA, p.241, f.n.6.


11) G.P. NāṇAMOLI's rendering of the term as 'discrimination' Path of Purification. pessim

12) Bhikkhu NāṇAMOLI's translation of the text of Patisambhidammapagga is in preparation and will be published by PTS under the title 'The Path of Discrimination'.

13) Read: sarvo hi vyavahāraḥ sābdamūlah, na hi sābdamunuccārya kascid vyavahartum śaknoti (Bhāvapradīpavyākhya)

14) HÜSERL (Indeen zu einer reinen Phnomendologie. J. GESER, p.28f.) also holds that we must distinguish between Word, Meaning and Object. See also Meaning of Meaning. OGDE and RICHARDS, London 1930, p.270.
15) JAYATILEKE (p.311.) rightly criticises AUNG and 
Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS for holding the erroneous view 
that *attha* in this context does not refer to 
'vertual meaning'.

16) cp. *pratibhadvā* *sarvam* (Yoga-sūtra.III.46.) 
'from illumination comes all knowledge'. The 
*pratibhā* as implied in Bhartrhari (Vākya.II. 
117, 148, 152) is also in some respects comparable 
to *patibhāna*. According to the doctrine of 
*pratibhā*, the meaning is comprehend at the *paśvanti* 
level as a burst of inspiration (ABORI.LVI.p.69.).

In Pali *patibhāna* is both 'knowledge' and the 
'inspiration of knowledge' (cf. *patibhanam* 
vuccati *ūnām* pi, *ūnapassa* upatthitaiva*canam* 
pi. Pañcappakaranā, p.223, and see DHADPHALE. 
pp.21-22.)