CHAPTER IV

RESPONSE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME I: PAKISTAN AND THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
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I: PAKISTAN AND THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

The Non-Proliferation regime, defined simply, means international framework of controls and undertakings built up around cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and designed to discourage diversion of nuclear material or technology to military purposes. The concept, however, has a much larger connotation, particularly when one comes to analyse the motives and attitude of the countries to the various arms control agreements -- the constituents of the non-proliferation regime.

Originally coined in the USA, the term "arms control" was meant to denote "measures regulating the arms race rather than stopping it". It had a connotation clearly distinct from that of reduction of armaments or disarmament. Subsequently, as seen in Chapter 1, diverse measures intended to freeze, limit or abolish certain categories of weapons, to prevent certain military activities, to regulate the development of forces, to proscribe the transfer of certain militarily important items, to reduce the risk of an accidental war, to constraint or prohibit use of certain armaments or to build up international

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1 Rodney Jones, Non-Proliferation : Islam, the Bomb and South Asia (Sages : Beverly California, 1981), p. 9.

confidence through greater openness in military field have come to be included in the rubric of arms control.

For the purpose of this study "arms control" has been used in the sense of nuclear arms control only. Those agreements which have a direct bearing on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons relevant to the region (i.e. South Asia) in general and Pakistan in particular have been considered. The various arms control agreements discussed in the study are covered under three systems namely:

1. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) System;
2. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) System;
3. The Nuclear Weapon Free Zone concept.

Amongst these, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty System has been considered in three sub-sections -- NPT system in general, the safeguard system and the peaceful nuclear explosion - purely for reason of convenience and proper understanding.

According to Alva Myrdal there is a "slight difference between verification and control. Control refers more generally to rules allowing developments in regard to treaty obligations to be followed, while verification is more specifically concerned with methods used for ascertaining facts about compliance. See Alva Myrdal, Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York, 1976), p. 293.
Partial Test Ban Treaty

The nuclear test ban issue came up for discussion in the UN in 1954 on Indian initiative. India and Soviet Union in the subsequent year sought negotiations on the issue. Both the countries again pleaded for ban on nuclear explosion in 1956, in the General Assembly. This was followed by a series of proposals on nuclear tests including an Anglo-French Paper, the US Paper and Yugoslav Proposal.

By 1956 initial attitude of the countries towards the question of nuclear testing was clear. The Soviet Union and India were calling for an early and separate agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests without supervision, maintaining that no significant testing could go undetected. The Western Powers, for their part regarded limiting (and eventually putting a ban on) nuclear tests, as part of a comprehensive disarmament plan.

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4 India called for "some sort of what may be called a standstill agreement in respect of actual explosions, even if arrangements for discontinuance and stockpiling must await more substantial agreement. Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for April and May and June 1954, Document DC/44 and Corr. 1.


7 Ibid., Annex 6 (DC/SC 1/38) and Ibid., DC/92 and DC/98.

The non-nuclear weapon states persisted in their efforts for the suspension of nuclear weapon tests, as the great powers, particularly USA and USSR, continued to differ over various technical issues till the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963. On the twin questions of control of atomic energy and disarmament, Pakistan "played but a modest part" in the United Nations.

In the Fourth General Assembly session, Sarwar Hassan appealed to the great powers to reach an agreement. The plea was reiterated by Sir Zafrullah Khan in 1951 when he moved a resolution seeking to set up a sub-committee to work for abolition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction. He "implored the great powers to attempt to reach an agreement which would serve the mankind". The resolution was adopted and as a consequence, the Atomic Energy Commission and Commission on Conventional Armaments was dissolved and a Disarmament Commission was established to deal with the question of both the atomic and other weapons.

9 T. T. Poulous, United Nations and Nuclear Proliferation (New Delhi, 1987), pp. 30-37 (Details of proposals in chronological order).
11 GA0R, 4th session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 34th mtg., pp. 196-97.
12 Ibid., 6th session, Annexes, Agenda items 66 and 16, p. 7; Ibid., 6th plenary session, mtg. 343, p. 113. The resolution was co-sponsored by Iraq and Syria.
13 Ibid.
Pakistan was a member of the Disarmament Commission from 1952 to 1954. There was little that Pakistan could do in it, since there was little that the Commission itself could do. In May 1954, the Colombo Powers including Pakistan demanded that "no further explosion of hydrogen bombs should take place". In April 1955 at the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali pleaded for outlawing nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. From 1955 onwards Pakistan's approach to the test ban issue was essentially along the Western lines, which treated the issue of test ban as part of the disarmament plan in general with emphasis on the verification system.

Thus addressing the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1955, Mohammad Ali said, "Pakistan's view was that if detection was not possible, the stage for prohibition of nuclear weapons had not been set. The dangers involved in the margin of detection were such as to make any responsible statesman hesitate to agree to a programme without watertight guarantees." It did not agree with the Indian stand that no significant testing could go undetected.

15 Ibid.
17 GAOR, 10th session, First Committee, 806th mtg, p. 261.
Pakistan fully concurred with Eisenhower's proposal and Marshal Bulganin's plan for control posts. Pakistan continued to support "comprehensive disarmament under an effective system of inspection and control". However, while it treated the issue as part of the comprehensive Disarmament Plan, it also said that the agreement on nuclear test ban "should not await an agreement on comprehensive disarmament". Thus it stood for delinking nuclear disarmament from general and complete disarmament.

Till 1958 Pakistan continued to vote against the Indian and Soviet proposals.

In 1959, in the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, this trend changed and Pakistan voted for the Indian resolution. Thereafter India and Pakistan adopted an almost uniform pattern of voting on all General Assembly resolutions.

18 Ibid., 10th session, Annexes, Agenda items 17 and 66, p. 8.
19 Ibid., 12th session, 649th Plenary mtg., pp. 216-17.
20 Ibid., 13th session, 769th Plenary mtg., p. 309.
21 For details of voting behaviour see Hasan, n. 10, p. 265.
22 GAOR, 14th session, Annexes, Agenda item 64, Doc. A/4183. India had co-sponsored the resolution along with 22 others urging the nuclear weapon states meeting at Geneva to continue the suspension of tests agreed to by US, UK and USSR in 1958.
that were passed till 1962. In all these resolutions Pakistan expressed a concern at wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

In the event of a deadlock on the question of detection of underground tests, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to sign a limited treaty banning tests in the three non-controversial environments -- in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The Moscow negotiations began on 15 July with the object of achieving agreement on such a partial test ban. This Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed on 5 August 1963 by the US, the UK and the USSR.

The treaty has four articles following a short preamble. Essentially the first article prohibits the parties to carry out any nuclear weapon test under its jurisdiction or control.

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23 On 13 February 1960, India and Pakistan along with 20 other members demanded convening of a special session to consider the question of French nuclear tests in Sahara (though 42 were required and hence the special session could not be held; on 20 December 1960 India and Pakistan voted for Resolution 1577 (XV) and draft resolution 1578 (XV), requesting the nuclear weapon states to continue negotiations and voluntary suspension of nuclear weapons. See GAOR, 15th session, Plenary mtg. 960, p. 1492. In 1962 the two countries voted for a resolution expressing regret in resumption of tests and urging them to refrain from test explosions pending conclusion of nuclear tests ban, ibid., 16th session, Plenary mtg. 1047, p. 568. On 6 November 1962, they voted for a resolution 1762A (XVII) condemning all nuclear tests and urging all nuclear tests should stop by 1 January 1963. Ibid., 17th session, Plenary mtg. 1165, p. 686.

24 UN and Disarmament 1945-70, n. 8, p. 231.

25 Ibid.

26 For text see Appendix.
(a) in atmosphere beyond its limits, or (b) in any other environment - if such explosion causes debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions. It asked the nation states to refrain from encouraging or in any way participating in the conduction of a nuclear weapon test.

The second article talked of the amendment which in order to be effective was to be proposed by at least one third and approved by a majority. The third article dealt with the technical details like deposition and accession to the treaty and the last one with the withdrawal from the same. When the treaty came up for signing both India and Pakistan acceded to it, though Pakistan did not ratify it.

The Indian stand was explained in the 18th session of the General Assembly. Accordingly, India thought that "the treaty would substantially reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons" as the underground testing was a complicated procedure beyond the reach of most countries. It asked the First Committee to exercise its "moral rights to pressure dissenters", and urged them to enter into negotiations to end the underground tests.

27 GAOR, 18th session, Plenary mtg. 1239, p. 11.
28 Ibid., 18th session, First Committee, Mtg. 1310, p. 7.
29 Ibid., 18th session, Plenary mtg. 1341, p. 156.
Pakistan's response was enunciated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1220 plenary session of the General Assembly. He described the treaty as a "ray of light on the dark horizon". But he said, "as a measure of disarmament the treaty is more important for what it promises than for what it has achieved... it is but the first step on a thousand mile journey. It does not prohibit underground tests. It does not halt arms race, much less reverses it."  

Bhutto sought agreements to cease underground tests and prevent further spread of nuclear weapons and said, "unless these and other measures of nuclear disarmament are taken, the test ban treaty, although a welcome step in itself, may turn out to be of illusory value."  

In the First Committee meetings Pakistan said the scope of the treaty should be broadened. It regretted that the treaty "does not prevent the states from stockpiling nuclear weapons, manufacturing them if they already possess them or acquiring them from other powers". It said that priority should be given to destroying the existing stockpiles.

30 Ibid., 18th session, Plenary mtg. 1220, p. 3.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid., 18th session, First Committee, Mtg. 1312, p. 17.  
34 Ibid., 18th session, First Committee, Mtg. 1323, p. 1.  
It is important to note that despite these reservations Pakistan had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

In 1974, Pakistan representative, explaining his country's stand on the Partial Test Ban Treaty, said:

Pakistan remains committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament. We appreciated that the objective of the Partial Test Ban Treaty was to promote this goal. Pakistan therefore voted in favour of the treaty and signed it. However we have to point out certain flaws in the Partial Test Ban Treaty. The treaty prohibited nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water only. It did not prevent and indeed has not prevented the nuclear powers party to the Treaty from further developing and sophisticating their nuclear arsenals. Also by enabling India to explode nuclear weapons devices underground, the Treaty has failed to prevent further nuclear proliferation.

Pakistan's willingness to accede to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and to other international agreements on nuclear disarmament has obviously been affected by knowledge that India had embarked on a course of nuclear armament. In these circumstances Pakistan could not be expected legally to foreclose its option. 36

The ambivalence is indeed intriguing -- while in 1963, despite the reservations, Pakistan was ready to accede to the treaty. On the same ground 11 years later Pakistan thought of leaving its "options open". Also, while admitting that treaty could not prevent non-proliferation, particularly in the case of India, how it could legally foreclose Pakistan options, cannot be understood.

According to Akhtar Ali, "Non-ratification of PTBT is one of the many indictments of Pakistan's nuclear posture. Ratification of PTBT would not deprive Pakistan of its option to conduct underground tests similar to India's in 1974. Pakistan's non-ratification of the Treaty is indeed baffling, devoid of any rationale whatsoever." He wonders if "Pakistan could defy public opinion or defy the environmental concerns of the world community by making an atmospheric test, under the excuse that it has not ratified the PTBT."

According to Kaushik and Mehrotra, "It is understandable that Pakistan should have decided against ratifying the PTBT after the bomb debate has started in India leading to a change in its nuclear arms control policy in early 1965. Prior to that, Pakistan might have failed to ratify the PTBT because of some inexplicable bureaucratic intentions." They, however, do not rule out that the initial delay (August 1963 to the end of 1964) in ratifying the PTBT was intentional and deliberate. Bhutto as Foreign Minister, they argue, might be responsible for it."

According to Ashok Kapur, the India factor does not explain the attitude to Partial Test Ban Treaty for its nuclear

38 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
activities and nuclear policy were entirely peaceful. He says, "By its action on nuclear issue Pakistan indicated that it did not want a nuclear competition with India." He admits that "there is an oscillation between signing (joining PTB) and not ratifying (not joining PTB) the treaty", but says, "Nevertheless, this oscillation in Pakistani arms control bears no relationship to Pakistani nuclear activities which remained peaceful up to 1971."

Kapur's arguments that there is an oscillation in the attitude is of course no contested by anyone and also it is difficult to explain the posture on the basis of the India factor, for India signed as well as ratified the Treaty. But his argument tends to underplay the India factor in the subsequent years — particularly from 1964 to 1971. As shall be discussed subsequently from 1964 onwards Pakistan raised the issue of India's intentions to go nuclear. In fact, from 1968 onwards the emphasis has been on preventing India to go nuclear and making India's attitude a basis, a condition to rationalize and legitimize its own nuclear stand.

A recent Carnegie Endowment report alleges that Pakistan ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty in December 1987. "This action", the report argues, "brings Pakistan in line with India

41 Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (New York, 1987), p. 120.
42 Ibid., p. 74.
43 Ibid., p. 120.
which has also ratified the pact, and could help counter Indian charges that Pakistan's offer of a comprehensive regional test ban is not serious."

How authentic the report is, cannot be said, for, it does not attribute this revelation to any official Pakistani source. Also, it is unlikely that Pakistan, having taken such a step, would keep it a secret, particularly when it has time and again repeated its offer of "confidence-building measures" which will be discussed subsequently.

In any case, even if Pakistan accedes to the Treaty now, it would hardly mean anything, particularly in the light of the subsequent arms control measures.

So far as the Partial Test Ban Treaty itself is concerned, over the years it has had limited success. While it has helped a little in curbing of pollution caused by the nuclear explosions. The non-parties have (France and China) continued testing it in atmosphere. Also with the underground explosion permitted in the treaty, release of radioactive produce into atmosphere has not stopped. The arms control objectives of the treaty have not even been partially achieved. By the time the PTBT was concluded two main 'testing states' -- USA and USSR -- had already carried out extensive service of explosion in the atmosphere and knew that this explosion could be carried out

underground. More underground explosions have been carried out after signing the treaty than during the period preceding the signing of the PTBT. This has enabled them to develop new generations of nuclear warheads and of related delivery vehicles. In other words, the nuclear arms race has been allowed to continue unhindered.

While it may be less convenient for a country to conduct nuclear explosions underground than in atmosphere, a country determined to acquire nuclear weapon capability would not be deterred by such technical difficulties. Thus, India, a party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, managed to explode a device underground without exposing itself to a charge of violation of the Treaty.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Perhaps the most important of all the nuclear issues and certainly the most important nuclear issue in the region is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The idea of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was coined by the United States to include the then potential industrial powers such as Japan and West Germany, which might have posed a threat by acquiring nuclear weapons. The USSR also supported the move.

45 Ranger Robin, Arms and Politics, 1968-78 : Arms Control in a Changing Political Context (Canada, 1979), pp. 104-9. According to him "... an arms control modality (the NPT) became the best available vehicle for the political arms control objective of preventing greater West German access to nuclear weapons."
Earlier in 1958, the proposal pertaining to the problem of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was mooted in an Irish draft resolution which demanded the Assembly to establish a committee to study the dangers inherent in the further dissemination. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 34 to none with 44 abstentions. In view of the overwhelming abstentions the Irish delegate withdrew the resolution.

At the subsequent sessions of the UN General Assembly in 1959, 1960 and 1961, the problem was discussed by the world body and a number of resolutions were adopted recognizing the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons. Pakistan and India supported the various Irish and Swedish proposals that were considered by the General Assembly and voted for all these General Assembly resolutions.

In all these resolutions both the countries expressed their anxiety over the imminent dangers posed by the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and pleaded for a treaty prohibiting the growth of the nuclear club. Thus addressing the 17th session of the General Assembly, President Ayub said: "The imminent peril demands that the General Assembly gives urgent consideration to the conclusion of a treaty to outlaw the further spread of nuclear weapons and the knowledge of their manufacture." Pakistan maintained its continuity in its policy

46 UN Doc. A/C-1/C 206.
47 Resolution 1380 (XIV), 1578 (XV), 1664 (XVI) and 1665 (XVI).
48 GAOR, 17th session, Plenary mtg. 1133, p. 150.
in the subsequent years. The then Foreign Minister Bhutto said that the Pakistani Government attached the highest importance and priority to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons as a next step in its quest for general and complete disarmament.

But the change came in soon after the change in the Indian policy after the Chinese detonation in 1964. At the 20th session of the General Assembly Pakistan delegate Agha Shahi opposed the Indian demand for "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers". India's criticism came in the wake of 1965 Indo-Pak war. The Pakistani representative Agha Shahi said that India represented the nth country problem since it had refused to open its nuclear establishments to international inspection and safeguards and had already erected a chemical separation plant on its territory. It continued to hold this stand when the question came to be debated in the UN General Assembly.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was put to vote in the General Assembly session held between 4 April and 12 June

49 Ibid., 18th session, Plenary mtg. 1220, p. 1.
51 General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted on 23 November 1965.
52 GAOR, 20th session, First Committee, Mtg. 1369, p. 96.
1968. Of the 122 non-nuclear weapon states present only 94 voted for it; however, a majority did not ratify it.

Before going into details about Pakistan's perception of the treaty it is essential to discuss the provisions of the treaty. The NPT has eleven articles preceded by a lengthy preamble. The preamble, in essence, calls for co-operation of all states in attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and assures the states that the products developed by the nuclear weapons states will be made available to all the parties to the treaty.

Article I enlists the rights of nuclear have-nots. It prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (including devices for peaceful nuclear explosives (PNES) in as much as they are identical to nuclear weapons, to any state, whether a signatory or not; whether a nuclear weapon state or not; whether directly or indirectly through an alliance. It also forbids nuclear weapon states from assisting non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons or devices.

Article II deals with duties of have-nots. It prohibits non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or devices including devices for peaceful uses. It is only the actual manufacturing of the


54 For detailed text, see Appendix II.
bomb which is prohibited. Thus parties to the treaty may legally make all the preparations for manufacturing nuclear weapons except assembling the warhead; this means that with sufficiently advanced technology it may be possible to implement a nuclear option policy within a very short period of time, perhaps a couple of months.

Article III puts an obligation on the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty to accept safeguards as laid down in a special agreement with the IAEA, on their peaceful nuclear activities in order to ensure that there is no diversion to manufacture nuclear explosives. States may conclude safeguards agreement with IAEA either individually or collectively. The safeguards shall apply to all sources or special fissionable material: enriched uranium - 235, uranium 233 and pentonium - 239. Article III further prescribes that no state party to the treaty may provide supplies of fissible material or equipment to any non nuclear weapon state unless it accepts the safeguards provided for the treaty.

Article IV affirms that all states parties to the treaty have the right to undertake research, production and exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and it puts on all states in a position an obligation to assist other countries.

Article V obligates the nuclear weapon states to make available nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon states under appropriate international observation and procedure and subject to minimum changes excluding research and development costs.
Article VI stipulates that all parties to treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament. This is mainly an obligation for the nuclear weapon states.

Article VII says that nothing in the treaty affects the rights of nations to agree on nuclear free zones.

Article VIII says that a Conference to review the operation of the treaty shall be held five years after its entry into forces.

Article IX says that, inter alia, when the treaty has been ratified by the necessary number of states and has entered into force, other states may accede to it. It further defines Nuclear Weapon state as one which has manufactured and exploded a Nuclear Weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

Article X gives parties to the treaty the right to withdraw from it on three months' notice, provided they decide that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of the countries. The same article also gives the treaty an initial duration of 25 years.

Simultaneously with the commending of the NPT by the UK General Assembly in June 1968, the USA, the USSR and the UK carried a draft resolution on security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT through the Security
Council. As stated in the resolution, the powers, in accordance with the UN Charter, will assist a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT which is "a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used". The action should be taken through the Security Council, which means that it is liable to a veto from one of the permanent members. However, the resolution and individual declarations by the three powers, also stressed the inherent right of the individual and collective self defence if an armed attack occurs before the Security Council can act.

On 25 April 1968 Pakistan foreign office expressed its "full sympathy" with the draft. Pakistan's response to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, quite different from that of India, was first conveyed to the First Committee of the General Assembly in May 1968 by Agha Shahi. Accordingly, Pakistan welcomed the submission of the text of the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the US and the Soviet Union. It also paid its tributes to the two super powers and the UK for reaching such an agreement.

Pakistan further described the treaty as a landmark in the history of negotiation on measures of arms control and disarmament.

56 Pakistan News Digest, 1 May 1968, p. 7.
57 GAOR (on 13 May 1968), 22nd session, First Committee, Mtg. 1566, pp. 18-21.
Taking the text issue by issue he said: "First we agree that the draft treaty is designed to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons to than the existing five nuclear powers". He continued: "In principle Pakistan shares the view of non-nuclear weapon states that vertical proliferation and not only horizontal proliferation must be ended", but (quoting the Ethiopian delegate) he said, "the present difference between the nuclear powers compel us to consider the present approach as partial and practical goal short of ideal goal". He also said that to link the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with other measures restricting the arms race could result only in an impasse. Since the choice, according to him, before the world was "either to put an end to horizontal proliferation now or to pursue the goal of ending vertical proliferation as well as horizontal proliferation later, Pakistan supports the former."

Secondly, according to him, Pakistan agreed that the obligation on the non-nuclear weapon powers was much more than the nuclear weapon powers but in the given reality of power in the world and the great disparity in strength and resources of the non-nuclear weapon countries on the one hand and super powers on the other "we must confess on being sceptical that an even balance can be struck ... we do not think it would be realistic

58 Ibid., p. 12.
59 Ibid.
to impose obligations on the nuclear powers similar in all respect to those that the treaty places on non-nuclear powers".

Response to the third Article of the Treaty has been considered under separate subsequent subtitle - Pakistan and the International Safeguards System - for reasons discussed in the beginning of the chapter. It would be sufficient to say here that Pakistan felt that to impose equal obligations on both was possible only when the stage could be set for total nuclear arms control. "At present the stage is beyond our reach", said the delegate.

While responses to Articles IV and V have also been taken into consideration under separate subtitles - Pakistan and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion - it is important and interesting to note that Pakistan thought (according to the delegate) that the inclusion of these in the treaty of nuclear non-proliferation became the Treaty for the proliferation of benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the maximum number of states. "We would hope that the nuclear powers party to the treaty will respond affirmatively and promptly to the request of any non-nuclear party", he said. As for Article VI, he said, that Pakistan did not question the good faith of the super powers.

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 19.
61 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
However, while expressing support for the objectives of the NPT, Islamabad refused to sign it once it was open for signatures. The official Pakistan statement regarding the decision did not link its action to Indian posture but the implication was clear - The Pakistani refusal was a consequence of Indian rejection of the treaty. It was emphasized that for the treaty to gain adherence, it must be able to prevent all future proliferation and that the attitude of near-nuclear countries was of crucial importance to them. The treaty must ensure that "there will be no addition to the five-power nuclear club. Once there is a sixth member there is no nuclear non-proliferation ... Even if almost all nuclear weapon states signed the treaty, the near-nuclear weapon states do not, the purpose of the treaty would be defeated".

The Pakistani representative to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly said, "the value of the treaty would largely depend on the unqualified adherence that it commands." In this context the attitude of potential nuclear powers is of crucial importance. The press, however, was more explicit in saying that Pakistan had not signed the treaty because India had not.

65 Ibid., statement on 16 June 1968.
66 Dawn (editorial), 5 June 1968; Pakistan News Digest, 6 June 1968.
however continued to be the same for the next few years. In the plenary session of General Assembly in 1970 the Pakistani delegate said: "Indeed, provisions I, II and 7 of the NPT have no doubt that any state that manufactures so-called peaceful nuclear devices does in fact acquires nuclear weapons. Consequently, the preparations being made in some non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture/explode nuclear weapons cannot but tantamount to proliferation of nuclear weapons." In 1971, the delegate speaking in the First Committee said that the non-proliferation treaty should include all nuclear weapon tests, the nuclear powers, however, may be permitted to conduct tests for themselves as well as for the non-nuclear weapon power, under international control, nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes.

The official reaction linked its action to the Indian attitude to the NPT explicitly. Soon after the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion by India, Pakistan said that it (Pakistan) would never permit India's hegemony. Bhutto had said: "We cannot see the relevance of this nuclear exercise to the immediate political setting ... India has shattered the nuclear non-proliferation treaty."

In 1975 came a sudden change in Pakistan's attitude of lending unqualified support to NPT. It decided not to

68 Ibid., 26th session, First Committee, Mtgs. 1342, p. 20.
participate in the review conference held in Geneva in May that year. A statement issued by the foreign office said that Pakistan wanted to participate in the conference as an observer because it could contribute to advancing the goal of non-proliferation. But, the official statement added: "Pakistan would not be able to make oral statements in the conference. It is hardly likely that the conference objective of securing wide adherence to the treaty can be achieved unless the views and concerns of non-parties are taken into fullest consideration". Pakistan however assured its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation on the subsequent day. "Pakistan will", a foreign office spokesman said, "continue its efforts bilateral and in all available multilateral forums to promote effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons".

In 1976 in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Pakistani delegate said:

The time has come to consider on an urgent basis the question of security of non-nuclear weapon states against a nuclear threat. In our view credible and effective measures would ensure safety of non-nuclear states from this threat and give positive direction to nuclear proliferation. We have been urging the nuclear states to undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states which are not protected by treaty guarantees, unfortunately this has not happened. 72

70 Dawn. 5 May 1975.
71 Ibid., 6 May 1975.
72 GCPR, 31st session, Plenary mtg. 8, p. 98.
In 1978 came the more vigorous reaction at the 21st Plenary meeting, the Pakistani representative said that:

We regret that the restrictive and discriminatory policies adopted by some of the suppliers states should have remained unchanged ... We firmly believe that if the non-proliferation regime is to be fully developed and truly strengthened it must be complemented and reinforced by security guarantees both of positive and negative character to the non-nuclear weapon states, thus striking a more equitable balance in the rights and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear states. 73

He also said that the unilateral guarantees given by the nuclear weapon powers at the 10th Special Session were so qualified that they fell far short of constituting a credible and meaningful undertaking. He further stated that the non-nuclear weapon States rightly fear that unilateral and bilateral security assurances would turn them protectorates of the guarantor of nuclear power or powers but multilateral guarantees would be integral to universal security system envisaged by the Charter. More qualified statements radically different and totally divergent from the earlier point of view were made subsequently. Thus in 1980 in 18th Plenary Session of the UN General Assembly General Zia said:

We cannot subscribe to a detente which is designed to keep certain areas of the globe tension free while exposing others to subversion and aggression in any shape or form. We want peace. We believe

73 Ibid., 33rd session, Plenary mtg. 21, p. 391.
74 Ibid., p. 392.
that it is indivisible and must encompass all parts of the globe. It cannot be selective in its scope or application. 75

The stand was reiterated in an official statement subsequently.

In 1982 again Pakistani delegate said in the UN General Assembly that the major nuclear powers need to realize that they "cannot repeat the experience of the non-proliferation treaty and seek the imposition of unequal arrangement on the non-nuclear weapon states. We therefore share the general view in the committee of disarmament that multilateral negotiations should commence without further delay with a view to conclude an equitable and universally acceptable nuclear test ban treaty." In 1983 also it made similar statement. The Pakistani representative said that Pakistan had been consistently advocating the strengthening of a nuclear non-proliferation regime both at global and regional basis and has taken several initiatives for this purpose unilaterally as well as in the international context. "However", he said, "we believe that concern for non-proliferation should not militate against the inherent right of the developing countries to benefit from the peaceful nuclear technology on a universal and non-discriminatory basis." At a dinner hosted for the

75 Ibid., 35th session, Plenary mtg. 18, p. 395.
77 GAOR, 36th session, First Committee, mtg. 43, pp. 47, 66.
78 Ibid., 37th session, First Committee, mtg. 18, pp. 41-45; Ibid., 37th session, First Committee, mtg. 30, pp. 8-10.
visiting IAEA director, Hans Blix, the chief of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, M.A. Khan, said that non-proliferation was essential but the policies must apply to both developed and developing countries. In December 1984 Sharyar Khan, Pakistan's Additional Foreign Secretary said: "Pakistan's position was clear - we support the ideals of the treaty but we are against the discriminatory aspect ... Pakistan will sign the treaty the minute India does so ... before the ink is dry. Insisting that we sign before our larger neighbour does so, is unreasonable."

Thus there is a radical change. From a total support to the non-proliferation treaty accepting it in the light of ensuring global inequality, Pakistan has now started underlining the unequal aspect more than ever, from proposing that the nuclear weapons states conduct explosions for the non-nuclear weapon states, it began supporting the "inherent rights" of the non-nuclear weapon to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear technology on a non-discriminatory basis.

The reason for this is obvious in the light of discussion of the previous chapters. Pakistan today is on the threshold of the nuclear weapons. The nuclear capability has given it the confidence and a better reason to "champion" the cause of non-nuclear weapon powers. Pakistan, with its

81 *GAOR*, 37th session, n. 78.
"Project Manhattan" (explained earlier) is in a better bargaining position that it was earlier. It is for this reason that Pakistan is in position of pointing out those inequalities and imbalances in the treaty which had been true right from the beginning but Pakistan for reasons explained earlier had accepted those in light of existing inequality and imbalances in the global power politics.

Pakistan remains a non-signatory to the treaty. Even while Pakistan had hailed the NPT as a positive step it had not signed it because India, the source of its main concern, had not done so. India had not signed the NPT mainly on the following four grounds:

(a) The imbalance of obligation between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states;

(b) the prohibition of certain peaceful uses of nuclear technology to the non-nuclear weapon states while not denying the same to nuclear weapon states;

(c) the imposition of provision relating to safeguards and controls which were all imposed on non-nuclear weapon states while none were imposed on nuclear weapon states;

(d) the nature of security it provided -- no guarantee to the non-nuclear weapon states against nuclear weapon states.

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82 Ibid., 22nd session, First Committee, mtg. 1567, p. 12. For an analysis of India's stand, see N. Ram, "India's Nuclear Policy: A Case Study in the Flaws and Futility of Non-Proliferation", IDSA Journal, vol. XIV, June 1982, p. 449; V. Ragsotra, "Prevention of Nuclear War", Address at the UN Regional Conference for World Disarmament Campaign, New Delhi, August 24, 1984; K. Subramanyam, "India's Nuclear Policy" in Omkar Marwah and Schulz, eds, Nuclear Proliferation near Nuclear Countries
This stand was explained by Mrs. Gandhi in Lok Sabha soon after the treaty came up for discussion. She said that the treaty was unacceptable to India as it does not confirm to the principle enunciated by the General Assembly, especially resolution 2028. India has maintained this position till today irrespective of the change in governments. Pakistan till today remains a non-signatory to the treaty; it is still conditional to India's signing it. In this respect Pakistan has been consistent.

Early in 1966 it argued that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be meaningless if it was not signed by the potential nuclear states. Speaking in the General Assembly on 10 October 1967, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan observed that the value of the treaty would largely depend on the "extent of the unqualified adherence that it commands". He said that even if all the nuclear weapon states signed and ratified the treaty and the near nuclear weapon states did not, the main purpose of the treaty would be defeated. In 1968 Pakistani representative said that he hardly needed to stress the point that "the treaty will possess little appeal and less weight if near nuclear weapon states do not subscribe to it". Agha Shahi indirectly said in November 1970 that no signing the treaty by certain states "prevents the other states which would otherwise do so from

83 GAOR, 2nd session, Plenary mtg. 1584, p. 13.
84 Ibid., 23rd session, Plenary mtg. 1681, p. 8.
acceding to its obligations". Speaking on the UN Day in Rawalpindi on 24 October 1968 the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated that its (Pakistan's) signature would depend on inescapable regional consideration. This was quoted and repeated in the First Committee of 24th General Assembly session. This was reiterated in all the subsequent meetings of the UN and became more pronounced after the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion in May 1974. Bhutto said: "We will never submit to India or Indian hegemony in the subcontinent."

Pakistan will, according to him, "never sign the NPT till India does so". In subsequent year in May 1975, M.A. Khan said that Pakistan had not signed the NPT because India had not signed it. The same stand was repeated in 1976 and 1977 General Assembly sessions. General Zia has also maintained the same stance. In an interview to a Canadian daily he said: "Pakistan was ready to sign the NPT provided the other countries did the same." Again in July 1983 he said that while his country's relations with India were improving Pakistan would not sign the NPT as long as our neighbour to the east does not follow suit. He also said: "Pakistan will

86 Ibid., 24th session, First Committee, Mtg. 1701, p. 3.
88 The Motherland, 22 May 1975.
89 UN Doc. A/C.21/SR/1/PV. 42 (1976); also n. UN Doc. A/PV. 21; A/C.1/PV. 43; A/C.1/PV. 50; A/AC.1/PV. 56-59.
not sign the NPT as long as it is treated discriminately. If
the NPT is applied to other nuclear nations, Pakistan will be
the first one to sign it on dotted lines." In 1984 President
Zia told Majlis-e-Shoora (Federal Council) that accession to
NPT by India, Israel and South Africa would immediately be
followed by Pakistan.

Having analysed the Pakistani stand on NPT in general,
the study would now be focussed on Pakistan's response to the
two major "sub systems" of the non-proliferation system. These
are: (a) International Safeguard System, and (b) the Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion. Discussing them one by one:

**Pakistan and the International Safeguard System**

Safeguards are the means to ensure that nuclear material
intended for power production or other peaceful uses is not
diverted to the manufacture of nuclear explosives. While
there is no single organization to regulate the safeguards
system forcibly, attempts have been made by the various
countries to check proliferation. Two of the most important
instruments in this direction are the Statute of the

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91 *Financial Express*, 21 July 1983; S.M. Sethna described
it as an "improper" stand on NPT. *see* *Times of India*,
26 July 1983.

92 "Pakistan Can Enrich Uranium, says Zia", *Oman Daily

93 Paul J. Szasz, "International Atomic Energy Agency
Safeguards", in Willich Mason, ed., *International
Safeguards and Nuclear Industry* (Baltimore, 1973),
p. 29.
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

The statute of IAEA controls the items held by the IAEA itself or supplied by it to its members and extends controls to national nuclear activities at the request of states concerned. It also helps the UN to coordinate agreements on safeguards (bilateral as well as multilateral). The NPT on the other hand does not establish a new safeguard system or even a framework for one. It insisted on the system by the IAEA. It - the NPT - requires all non-nuclear weapon parties to submit to IAEA safeguards by means of agreements to be negotiated with Agency by these states either individually or collectively, within specified time limits. The NPT also prohibits any party from supplying to any non-nuclear weapon state - whether or not party to the Treaty - certain types of nuclear items for peaceful purposes except subject to the IAEA safeguards.

The international safeguard system and the attitude of the non-nuclear weapon powers which includes Pakistan also is one of the major aspects of a country's nuclear policies. India, for instance has strong reservations about the safeguards, a reason why its nuclear installations are in a

94 The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency is a Treaty to which 102 states were parties. The Statute established the IAEA's principal organs -- General Conference, Board of Governors and the Director General Secretariat.

95 Article III of the NPT (see Appendix II).
As far as Pakistan is concerned its attitude to the issue of safeguard is perhaps the best evidence of the divergence in theory and practice of its nuclear policy and explodes its myth of a peaceful attitude and fighting against nuclear proliferation.

Theoretically, Pakistan had been supporting the cause of international safeguards till recently right from the beginning. As early as 1963 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had said in the General Assembly: "We support the decision of Board of Governors of IAEA to recommend extension of its safeguards to nuclear reactors exceeding 100 thermal megawatts and to study further the question of application of safeguards." According to him the multilateral safeguards were better since they were free from political expectancies. In 1964 again he said in the same forum:

Pakistan has always advocated and supported the system of safeguards against the use of atomic reactors for weapon purposes ... we continue to believe that the Agency's system of safeguards should become mandatory and universal and that it should be developed to cover all aspects of nuclear capability.

96 Two of India's nuclear power stations -- Tarapur and Rajasthan Atomic Power Stations -- are under safeguards but these are only under pursuit clause i.e. limited to only to the operation and not under perpetuity clause which binds future installation also.

97 GAOR, 12th session, Plenary mtg. 1220, p.

98 Ibid., 19th session, Plenary mtg. 1319, p. 10.
In 1965 the same was repeated along with a regret that India had not opened its installations to IAEA safeguards and inspection.

When the Non-Proliferation Treaty came to be discussed, on the issue of international safeguards Pakistan said:

Even if all the nuclear weapon states were to accept inspection by International Atomic Energy Agency of their nuclear installations as are devoted to civil uses, the principal balance of obligations and responsibilities would still remain unrealized. For as long as the nuclear weapon states are permitted to continue explosions as is the case under the Treaty it would be impossible to place obligations on them equal to those imposed on non-nuclear weapon states (such as imposition) this, in the given reality of power balance would not be realistic.

Thus instead of criticizing the great powers for imposing unequal obligations, Pakistan accepted the system in the reality of existing power balance. The trend continued in the 1970s also. In 1971 talking about the international safeguards the Pakistani delegate said that verification system should be based on combination of appropriate national and international measures which would ensure effective imposition of prohibition.

Soon negotiations on the deal with France, discussed earlier, started. Bhutto assured the French in 1976, "we would consider
adequate safeguards. In 1980 again the Pakistani delegate said that "our experience is that IAEA safeguard system is reliable and technical scope is so developed that it applies to every category of nuclear installation. But in line with its policy on NPT there was a change. For the delegate said in the same meeting in 1980, "we are of the firm view that the safeguard system must be universalised on a non-discriminatory basis". The delegate also explained how Pakistan had accepted and taken additional measures on safeguards on the basis of suggestions made by IAEA.

In 1981 Agha Shahi said: "The United States says your programme is a threat, you open it up for inspection. We say don't be discriminating. They say give an assurance we have given an assurance." On mutual inspection, he said:

We are ready to talk to you (India) ... to exchange mutual assurances. If you want, let us agree to reciprocal inspection - if you don't agree to international agreement. And I say, all right, even without inspection let us engage in a binding declaration, not to manufacture nuclear weapon. What more can we do? Short of saying, you come and inspect us and you will not ask us inspect your facilities. 104

Of late the change is more pronounced. Thus A.Q.Khan said that Pakistan was ready to accept the safeguards so far

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102 Hindustan Times, 5 March 1976.
103 GOB. 37th session, Plenary mtg. 72, p. 72.
as Chashma Project is concerned but installations designed and built by indigenous efforts, resources, and expertise would not be subjected to international safeguards.

President Zia also made a similar statement. He said that while Pakistan was willing to give guarantees and right to inspect the nuclear unit at Chashma, to countries which would assist this project "we will not accept controls and inspections for the rest of our programme ... We will only allow inspection or international supervision of our nuclear programme if other countries of the arms submit to some rules." Speaking to Karachi Chamber of Commerce in May 1984, Gen. Zia said: "Pakistan is ready to accept all safeguards for Chashma but it is not fair to expect that Pakistan will submit to such safeguards for its entire programme when other countries have not done."

The entire attitude of Pakistan's policy on the safeguard system becomes clear if it is visualized in the background of second chapter where the clandestine mode of its acquiring the nuclear capability is discussed. So long as Pakistan did not have active nuclear (weapon) programme, nor did it have will to go nuclear, it supported the Western manoeuvres of extending hegemony in the nuclear world (perhaps it felt secure under the influence of the West). Thus it accepted full scope safeguards

105 Muslim, 3 March 1984.
for all its installations since 1963. Even though it decided to build a reprocessing plant with stringent safeguards, it did not abide by its code. Thus having acquired the capability or on the verge of it, Pakistan has thus opened its option wider by playing a dual game - that of advocating the cause of the safeguard system and has at the same time made attempts to acquire nuclear weapon capability through the unsafeguards.

**Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) and Pakistan**

Nuclear explosion conducted by a country for research and development of its civilian nuclear programme are called peaceful nuclear explosions or PNEs. For all practical purposes there is no difference between a peaceful nuclear explosion and nuclear explosion for war purposes. Therefore, to call explosion a peaceful one is a declaration of intent. Going by NPT standards, a country which has conducted an explosion by 1965 is a nuclear weapon power. Neither India nor Pakistan by that standard be called a nuclear weapon power.

While the status of India has become doubtful after the May 1974 PNE, Pakistan technically speaking is a non-nuclear power even though it might have made efforts to acquire the capability to conduct a PNE. Theoretically again Pakistan has supported the cause of nuclear weapon powers by supporting the efforts of limiting the nuclear club to five under the garb of "Non Proliferation". In the year 1968 the Pakistani delegate

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108 Morarji Desai's efforts to call the Indian explosion a blast and not an explosion does not hold any technical viability.
said in the UN "international regulation for PE should be established within the framework of IAEA. The framework of such a regime, while providing access to the required technology, should also guard against the danger of dissemination of nuclear weapons". More pronounced statements were made subsequently. In 1970, the Pakistani delegate to the UN said:

Indeed, the provisions I, II and V leave no doubt that any state that manufactures so called nuclear devices does in fact acquire nuclear weapons. Consequently the preparations being made in some non-nuclear weapon states cannot but tantamount to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a contingency would undoubtedly constitute a qualitatively new situation endangering the security of the world....

Pakistan continued to support the cause of cessation of all nuclear tests.

In 1971 again, the Pakistani delegate said that the treaty (NPT) should prohibit all underground nuclear tests. The nuclear powers may be permitted to conduct for themselves as well as for other non-nuclear weapon states, under international arrangement for peaceful purposes. As regards the non-nuclear weapon states the treaty should prohibit all underground explosions whether they are in the category of nuclear weapons or not – in other words the non-nuclear weapon states must not conduct explosions of any kind whatsoever

109 GAOR, 23rd session, First Committee, Mtg. 1627, pp. 4, 5.

110 Ibid., 25th session, Plenary mtg. 1353, p. 10.
including the so called peaceful nuclear explosions.

When India conducted its first nuclear explosion followed by declaration of intent -- that it was for peaceful purposes in all the forum including a letter from the Indian Prime Minister to all the countries, Pakistan reacted vigorously. Bhutto wrote back saying "You will appreciate the fact that it is a matter not of intentions but of capabilities. As you know in the past we have received many assurances from India which regrettably remained dishonoured."

The Indian explosion was, of course, ill-timed. Conducted a little earlier it would have given credibility to the Indian stand on NPT or conducted a little later after the country had achieved self-reliance it would have lent an independent status. The conduct of the explosion in 1974 led to a cut off of all aid from Canada and the US. This affected the nuclear programme adversely for Tarapur is running much below its capacity.

Pakistan claims to have embarked upon a nuclear weapon programme after the Indian detonation. While Pakistan might have had on its own decided to conduct a nuclear explosion but the Indian detonation justified its earlier declared fears from the neighbours. Initially it also provided Pakistan to launch its so called quest for step by step approach to non-proliferation through regional denuclearization. This

111 Ibid., 26th session, First Committee, Mtg. 1842, p. 9.
112 Dawn, 8 June 1974.
however has been discussed in the subsequent chapter.

In 1976 again, Pakistan called for a "total cessation" of underground nuclear tests. The threat of nuclear holocaust according to the delegation would continue till all the stockpiles were not destroyed by the nuclear weapon powers. The delegate talked in terms of threat of security to non-nuclear weapon states from the nuclear weapon states. The inherent right to benefit from peaceful nuclear technology, it must be stated, was through the tests etc. conducted by the nuclear haves. It is quite possible that because Pakistan had no plan for nuclear test, it thought of supporting the move. And now that Pakistan has a infrastructure nuclear tests etc. the stand has changed. It has started talking in terms of its non-nuclear power to conduct the test. On 28 October 1979, TASS reported that Gen. Zia said that he reserved his right to decide to detonate nuclear explosive device if that was needed for further development of Pakistan atomic power energies. But reacting to Indian statement in August 1980 Pakistan was worried about India's statement that it reserved the right to carry out more nuclear tests. In January 1981, Gen. Zia emphasized the peaceful intent of Pak's nuclear power

113 UN Doc. A/PV. 8, Plenary mtg. 8, 1976.
programme saying that entire programme was to fulfil Pakistan's nuclear technology for being a Muslim, a developing and a non-aligned country.

In May 1981, Agha Shahi, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, said:

... I even told them (US) that the question of peaceful nuclear explosion is also not a foregone conclusion when and if we attain the capability, we will take into account all the various factors. Let us wait and see what the committee disarmament does on peaceful nuclear explosions.

I am told the three nuclear powers -- the USSR, the US and the UK -- have drafted a protocol on these nuclear explosions. And the other countries -- Argentina, Brazil and others said: why should only nuclear weapon powers have the privilege of carrying out nuclear explosion? So we may have a regime for peaceful nuclear explosions and ... we are not engaged in manufacture of nuclear weapon. About nuclear explosions, we shall see if and when we get the capability. We will find out what international regime is envisaged. 117

Even after the Pakistani efforts to acquire the bomb came into light, Pakistan continued to adopt the same posture as far as stated position is concerned. Thus Gen. Zia said in 1981:

We have not considered any explosion - peaceful or non-peaceful. We are not for creation of a device which has to be exploded whether you give it a garb of peaceful explosion or military explosion. We stressed that the programme is very modest and is at a


117 The Hindu, 2 May 1981, p. 3.
very early stage and that it is exclusively meant to acquire technology of uranium enrichment. 118

In 1983 Pakistan supported the draft treaty "no first use of force". 119

In line with this changed attitude explained earlier while discussing its attitude to NPT in general, Pakistan has of late talked of "right of non-nuclear weapon states". Talking about the implementation of NPT the delegate said: "Pakistan has been consistently advocating the strengthening of a non-proliferation regime on a regional and global basis and has taken several initiatives for this purpose." He also said: "... however we believe that concern for non-proliferation should not militate against inherent right of the developing countries to benefit from peaceful nuclear technology on a universal and non-discriminatory basis." 120

Similar statements, referred to earlier in the safeguards issue, have been made when both A.Q. Khan and Gen. Zia have refused to accept safeguards for "indigenous" programmes in 1984 also.

Thus there are two definite trends in Pakistan's attitude to NPT:

118 Times of India, 1 March 1976.
119 GAOR, 36th session, Plenary mtg. 51, p.
120 Ibid.
(1) From 1968 to mid-70s: Pakistan in this phase accepted NPT in principle, but could not accept it "till it commands unqualified adherence by all, especially the new nuclear countries. Kapur's argument that Pakistan's line of actions were clear: "reject the NPT ..." and "None". Pakistan's nuclear activities during the 1980s were determined by Pakistani fears about bigger and militarily stronger, culturally or ideologically threatening and nuclear India are not correct. In fact there is no inconsistency in Pakistan's anti-India posture in both the phases. Secondly, in the 1960s India itself had not taken any decision on conducting the nuclear test.

(2) From mid-70s to present: Pakistan has criticized the very objectives of the NPT - as discussed earlier calling it discriminatory and since the 70s it has laid emphasis on the security guarantees, rights of non-nuclear weapon states. The most startling fact is that despite calling the terms discriminatory, it has expressed that it would sign the treaty "the minute India does so". There is thus no divergence so far as "signing - if India does so" posture is maintained.

While there is no contradiction in the phase I (1968 to mid-70s), Pakistan's attitude to NPT in the second phase is self-contradictory. How can the treaty, which it thinks

121 Kapur, n. 41, p. 102.
122 Ibid., p. 103.
is discriminatory, becomes acceptable if India adheres to it? This trend of making adherence conditional is in conformity with its stand on nuclear weapon free zone proposal, mooted in 1976, the time bomb decision was made.

After the entire clandestine operation of nuclear explosion by Pakistan is known, a nuclear explosion by Pakistan would not be taken as a peaceful nuclear explosion. India, despite best of its intention is suspected internationally (for reasons already explained). It would suffice to say that Pakistan would do well to learn from India, for the repercussions there would not be very different.