Chapter VI

CONCLUSION
The traditional approach to study Pakistan's nuclear developments has been based upon an analysis of nuclear programme. The studies conducted so far deal with the bomb -- the technical details, the funds, the \textit{modus operandi} etc.

A deviation has been made here by laying emphasis on the policy aspect, which has hitherto been a neglected field. At the same time, the importance of the programme aspect has not been undermined. In other words, the policy has been analysed keeping the nuclear programme in the background.

The main purpose of the study is an attempt to analyse the theory and practice of Pakistan's nuclear policy. A simple diagram is presented below which seeks to summarise (a) the correlation between nuclear policy and programme and (b) change in the policy \textit{vis-a-vis} changes (evolution of) nuclear programme.

In short, with Pakistan as an example, the model seems to study the relationship between the nuclear status and stature of a country. From 1948 to 1955 there is a direct relationship between theory and practice. So far as nuclear policy is concerned, Pakistan supported all disarmament moves at the global level, there was no call or desire to build nuclear weapons. Internal instability -- lack of proper infrastructure, both political and industrial -- prevented emergence of a nuclear programme. In other words, there was no non-conformity between the declared and actual policy.
Diagram to show Pakistan's nuclear policy postures (changes, factors etc)

1955 → 1972
ENTIRELY CIVILIAN

POLITICAL Pressures

→ BHUTTO
→ OTHER CABINET COLLEAGUES
→ + BUREAUCRATIC PRESSURES

→ GOVERNMENT (AYUB)

UNAMBIGUOUS REJECTION
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF WEAPONS OPTION

POST 1972
CIVILIAN + MILITARY

PROJECT 706 → TOWARDS N WEAPONS

→ W ASIA +
→ CHINA +
→ US –

→ SCIENTISTS ETC

→ GOVERNMENTS, BHUTTO, ET AL.

UNAMBIGUOUS REJECTION
IN THEORY, NOT IN PRACTICE

NON PROLIFERATION REGIME

1963
PBT
SIGNATURES - YES
RATIFICATION - NO

1968
NPT
SUPPORT - YES
SIGNATURES - NO
RATIFICATION - NO

(Conditional on India’s stand)
Safeguards - Multilateral

PRES - Nuclear haves should conduct for have-nots

1970'S and later
NPT
SUPPORT - NO
SIGNATURES - NO
RATIFICATION - NO

(Conditional on India’s stand)
Safeguards - Bilateral
(On joint ventures none on indigenous)
PRES - Reserve like rights

Diplomatic Initiatives
Nuclear weapon free zone
in South Asia
NO Success.
From 1955 to 1972: there are different patterns of relationship. PAEC was set up in 1955 under the chairmanship of Nazir Ahmad. An alliance was formed with the US, which supported the modest programme (extent of support discussed in Chapter III). One does not come across any hue and cry raised till 1965 about India's programme or a call to meet the Indian challenge. Pakistan's argument nevertheless was along the Western lines -- advocating step-by-step approach to disarmament. It treated the Partial Test Ban issue as part of the larger (General and Complete) disarmament unlike India which insisted on treating the issue on its own merits.

There was, however, a conflicting situation during the period with Bhutto pressurising for a nuclear weapon programme and his cabinet colleagues resisting the move. Ayub turned down Bhutto's plea on the ground that that was not a priority. Therefore Pakistan did not go in for nuclear weapons in this phase essentially because the leadership was not in favour of it. Thus there is no incongruence or contradiction or ambivalence in the nuclear policy. It amounts to an unambiguous rejection of nuclear weapon option, Bhutto's rhetorics on eating grass etc. notwithstanding.

However, the unambiguity ends here. Pakistan supported the Partial Test Ban measure, and acceded to it when it came for signatures but did not ratify it for reasons best known to itself. This was the first divergence from the path of nuclear non-proliferation. Although 11 years later it said that the
treaty had not served the desired purpose, the non-ratification at the time of accession cannot be explained.

The stand cannot be explained in terms of change in India's policy -- from "Never a-bomb" to "not now a bomb", either because the change in India's stand had come in the wake of Chinese nuclear detonation in 1964. Prior to that there was no discernible reason for Pakistan for not ratifying the PTBT. Even if Pakistan wanted to pursue a nuclear option, the PTBT did not foreclose it. It only limited conducting of tests to atmosphere. All in all, it reflects a poor planning and strategic move.

Contrary to what has been proposed by Pakistani authors, ratifying the treaty would hardly serve any purpose. The Non-proliferation Regime has come a long way from the first step, when countries like India have already conducted the test, despite being a party to PTBT. The negative impact of the non-ratification, however, remains. For instance Pakistan's insistence on India signing the NPT does not carry much weight for it (Pakistan) has not ratified a treaty in the direction, which India has. How can a country which has not ratified a partial move be expected to accede to a larger one?

From 1965 onwards Pakistan started talking in terms of threat from "threshold powers", although it continued to support the disarmament plans, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It voted for the treaty but did not sign it because India had not.
Pakistan's stand on NPT during this period, therefore, is not ambivalent at all. It had not embarked on a nuclear weapon programme and it supported all disarmament moves. The security perceptions vis-a-vis India were justified in view of Bhabha's statement (on making the bomb in 18 months) and its relations with the West (which had deteriorated considerably since the 1962 Sino-Indian war).

Besides, not signing the NPT did not imply non-support to the treaty. While Pakistan agreed that the obligations imposed on the nuclear haves and have-nots were not equal, it also said that in the given power realities, they could not be expected to be (equal).

From 1972-87 - From 1972 onwards there is a definite change in Pakistan's nuclear behaviour. While on the one hand a decision to make a nuclear bomb has been made, on the other it launched a diplomatic initiative for nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia to make the decision. A practice which could not be explained better than "calculated deception".

When the reprocessing deal fell through, the alternative option - enrichment - was resorted to. The well-knit strategy involved buying components which were not listed in the nuclear suppliers groups "trigger list" rather than the enrichment plant itself. The importation of components can thus be seen as an answer or solution to the denial
Thus from 1972 onwards there is a divergence in theory and practice of Pakistani nuclear policy -- the gap became wider as years passed by -- as the programme became more and more sophisticated (success in enrichment etc.), the proposals for denuclearization, particularly bilateral, increased.

So far as NPT is concerned this divergence ended in mid-70s when Pakistan started talking in terms of right of the nuclear have-nots etc.

As for Pakistan's policy on safeguards, from 1963 onwards Pakistan accepted full scope safeguards on all its installations, including the French reprocessing plant till it started building its own facilities. As has been stated earlier, Pakistan has, on more occasions than one, said that it would not accept any safeguards on the facilities to build indigenously as for the facilities imported, the stress is, of late, on bilateral safeguards as against the earlier stand in favour of multilateral safeguards. So far as mutual inspection is concerned, India has already rejected the proposal and there is no development on that front.

As for the PNEs while initially Pakistan supported the right of the nuclear have to conduct the tests for the have-nots, in the late 70s, Pakistan started talking in terms of "reserving the rights" on nuclear explosions. "Why should only the nuclear powers have the privilege of conducting the tests?", Agha Shahi had asked in 1987.
Interestingly, reacting to the Indian PNE, Pakistan had said that it was not a matter of intention, but capability. Years later when its own interests were revealed it started talking in terms of "peaceful intentions", issuing innumerable declarations of intent since then.

Thus, in contrast to Pakistan's stand on Partial Test Ban Treaty, which is ambiguous and inexplicable, its stand on other constituents of the Non-Proliferation regime is clear, the trends being proportional to the programme. Some questions, however, still remain unanswered. For instance, how does NPT become acceptable once India accedes to it? or if Pakistan considers itself to be part of the West Asian set-up, why be concerned about denuclearization of South Asia alone? Further, if geographical entity is a secondary issue why exclude China?

Pakistan's policy at the global level is, indeed, commendable in the sense that it did not succumb to the outside pressure be it France, Canada or the United States. so far as nuclear programme is concerned. Thus, while giving a befitting reply to the denial policies of the haveis, Pakistan has at the same time made best use of its relations with China and West Asia.

At this stage it is pertinent to look into a basic question of motivations behind Pakistani nuclear programme and the possible repercussions of Pakistan going nuclear.
A broad idea as to what motivates a country to go nuclear has been made in the first chapter. The various reasons listed include security, prestige, concern over a long simmering conflict that might involve a nuclear weapon power, provide military superiority to one of the parties in a non-nuclear conflict etc. These factors may act individually or collectively or in various combinations varying with time and the country concerned.

The motivating factors for Pakistan to go nuclear are not very different, except that they exist in much complicated form. Whereas attempts have been made to highlight one factor or the other as responsible for prompting that country to go nuclear, in effect, there are various factors interacting with an influencing each other (both regional and extra regional) which have turned Pakistan on a nuclear path.

There is no doubt that security vis-a-vis India was the prime motivation for Pakistan to go nuclear. The three wars that Pakistan fought with India without securing favourable results, the last one in particular (1971) had a tremendous impact on Pakistan. Loss of half of its territory was a tremendous blow to the country's image and self-confidence. It also disillusioned Pakistan so far as the West as an ally was concerned. China also did not lend any significant help.
It was in the background of this insecurity that the meeting at Multan was held in 1972. It is possible that Pakistan would have anyway gone nuclear, with Bhutto at helm of affairs. The war with India, nevertheless, proved to be the triggering event. The atmosphere became further conducive with the subsequent Indian detonation two years later. It vindicated Pakistan’s stand (fears) and subsequently when disclosures about Pakistan’s nuclear plans were made, they were seen as guided by India’s moves. All said and done, security is seen as a major determinant of a country’s foreign policy and therefore, of its defence and nuclear policies.

Nuclear proliferation in general has been explained as an action and reaction phenomenon (chain model of Lewis Dunn). The situation is more so in case of countries like India and Pakistan where traditional rivalries mark bilateral relations.

Also, it is not unusual for countries to change their nuclear policy vis-a-vis other countries, particularly if it affects the security. For instance India itself changed its policy of never-a-bomb to not now a bomb in 1964, following Chinese detonation. Scientists like Bhabha had advocated for going nuclear.

In the background of historical relations between the two countries, Pakistan cannot be expected to bank upon Indian reassurances (of peaceful intentions), certainly not after the 1974 explosion.
What is intriguing, however, is that Pakistani moves on the one hand of acquiring the capability through all available means, and on the other, of launching a peace initiative the same year (1972).

Pakistan has taken full advantage of its "larger neighbour". As stated earlier, it has made all its policy conditional on India be it NPT, or safeguards of nuclear weapon free zone in the region. Thus in the name of security, not only vis-a-vis India but also Afghanistan, Pakistan has tried to extort maximum advantage, both morally as well as materially.

After security comes prestige. The inability of the West as well as China to help Pakistan during the 1971 war led Pakistan to identify extra regionally -- with Middle East. There is no denial to the fact that now Pakistan has all the necessary requisites to emerge as a leader of the Islamic bloc. No other country in the Islamic world -- be it Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia -- leaving aside the lesser developed countries of Tunisia, Mauritania, Morocco can prove to be better alternative to Pakistans as leader of the Islamic bloc. No other country had the skilled personnel, industrial infrastructure, leadership of Bhutto's stature even comparable to Pakistan. It has been explained earlier (Chapter III) how Pakistan made full use of the opportunity provided by the Arabs who were in search of developing a deterrent against the Israeli bomb. Thus the only thing which Pakistan did not
have -- the finance, was the only thing the Arabs had. As a prudent step the bomb was given "Islamic" connotation and the finances were met. There is no denial that the bomb has imparted Pakistan tremendous prestige in the Islamic world.

The bomb has political significance too. Once acquired the bomb would prove to be an "effective bargaining counter". As seen in Chapter III the counter has been very effective vis-a-vis US. This was a very calculated move visualized by Pakistan. The nuclear option would help in action as an "arm twisting" measure vis-a-vis the West. A nuclear Pakistan with conventional weapons would make it strategically more important and stronger in the region. The enhanced strategic status would be further helpful in getting more economic aid, the aid could be used for other purposes also, say, to put the "house in order". The arm twisting measure, however, cannot be applied vis-a-vis China. China has, on its own promised to (discussed earlier) help Pakistan.

After the U.S., it was from the Arabs that Pakistan thought of drawing aid from. Thus exploiting a rift between Kuwait and Iraq, Gen. Zia managed to get aid worth $800 million. In fact, as seen in the second chapter, Pakistan has achieved considerable success vis-a-vis Islamic world even better than that with the U.S.

The 'bomb' has also served to help deal with the internal problems. Till 1970s the Pakistani politics was
a fiasco, economy was in shambles and military thoroughly discredited (more so in 1971 war). After a long time in 1972 the civilian rule was staging a comeback in the territorially fragmented Pakistan. The bomb, with an Islamic connotation, helped Bhutto sought to fight the crises of legitimacy, participation and expectation.

It is not an exaggeration to say that Pakistan has met with considerable success as far as this motivation was concerned. Zia cannot afford to undo what Bhutto had already done in the nuclear field. His rhetorics of Pakistan going to the extent of eating grass to get the bomb had served as tremendous "moral boosters" at a time when the nation's morale was at its nadir.

It is interesting to note that Mrs. Gandhi did the same in 1974, when the charisma she had acquired after the 1971 war (as a liberator of Bangladesh) began to fade away because of the deteriorating internal economic conditions. The detonation, (even though had dire consequences), was thought to serve as an effective instrument to divert the public attention and boost up her personal image. It may therefore be stated that it should not be surprising if the detonation follows an equal deterioration of the socio-economic and political conditions in Pakistan. While the 'immediate' threat to the regime is unpredictable, the timing of the detonation is anybody's guess. A detonation might take place tomorrow or it may take years to materialize, of course, depending upon the technical feasibility.
Pakistan would do well to learn the lessons from India, for the consequences there would not be different so far as acquisition of raw material (fuel) from the West is concerned.

The question of domestic repercussion has a more speculative answer primarily because of the instability (if not fluidity) within Pakistan. It has already been stated that the impact of the legitimacy the bomb provides was one of the motivations for Pakistan to go nuclear and also that it is not possible for General Zia to undo anything in this field. His statements that "Pakistan would not barter its sovereignty" and the choice of the matter (of going nuclear) and that if there was a choice between holding elections and pursuing nuclear programme he would forego former, are evidence to the effect.

Secondly, Pakistan's economy is going through its worst phase. It suffers from all the problems of a developing country -- like inflation, unemployment, rising prices etc. As seen earlier, the Muslim countries have in the post-72 era met the financial needs of the country. Even when the U.S. decided to cut off the aid, Saudi Arabia had announced an aid worth $ 140 million. Once the bomb is made, the value of these aids would go further up and the financial crises would easily be met. Further, in Zia's fanatic Islamic drive the bomb might play a role in bringing all the dissident religious groups together. The bomb might even heal the dissensions which are beginning in the military set up of General Zia.
The bomb may have yet another positive effect on the military establishment. The loss of face it suffered after the 1971 war might be made up again after the detonation. There might be many more repercussions depending upon the timing of the explosion, but the three outcomes — those of legitimacy, economic aid and unifying force — will continue to be vital ones. The external repercussion for the sake of convenience can be analysed at two levels — regional and international. The two are, however, not separate but exist side by side primarily because the bomb is no longer a regional phenomenon, the spill over effect is bound to take place. Besides, Pakistan itself has started identifying extra regionally with the Middle East.

Within the region (even beyond), the only country Pakistan needs a deterrent against is India. Pakistan could not have got the requisite assistance had it tried to acquire the bomb against India. Howsoever strong the Islamic solidarity be, however strongly Pakistan might have identified itself with the Middle East, it is still not a sufficient reason for the Arabs to provide a deterrent essentially against India. Indo-Arab relations have never been unpleasant, leave aside being antagonistic. In fact, during the period Pakistan was a member of the Western alliance system, India was a better friend of the Arabs. Besides, for the Arabs the number one enemy is Israel. Bhutto understood this too well — as is evident from his statement "The Christians, the Jews, the
Hindu, and Communists have the bomb". After all, a bomb against Israelis is not different from a bomb against Indians.

The question which now arises is - What will India do? There is no doubt that a nuclear detonation by Pakistan would bring the nuclear arms race to the subcontinent. The Indian detonation has already set the trend in that direction.

An obvious conclusion is that once Pakistan acquires a bomb, it would no longer be possible to "keep the options open", it will develop a bomb and thus would begin horizontal proliferation and soon be followed by vertical proliferation. Given the way nuclear proliferation and arms race proceed and given the trends in Indo-Pak relations which are conditioned by the action-reaction phenomenon, it would not be surprising to see both the countries engaged in an endeavour to outsmart each other qualitatively as well as quantitatively in the nuclear arms race. This will definitely have an extra-regional repercussions also (discussed subsequently).

The picture, therefore, is essentially comparable to that of the U.S.-Soviet arms race. But the Americans know, the Russians know and so do the rest of the (including the Arabs), that the bombs are not for use. No country has done it against another after their first use (against Japan). The stockpiling of nuclear weapons has proved to be an "exercise" in futility. If it is bad for the developed world, it is worse for developing ones.
As far as the option for total renunciation is concerned, it is important to note that every nation goes by its own historical experiences. When it comes to Pakistan, it is unlikely that India would take Pakistan for granted, particularly in the background of the *modus operandi* of Pakistan's nuclear programme. It has been rightly argued that the argument that if India has lived with a nuclear China - why not with nuclear Pakistan does not hold good. The two situations are indeed not comparable.

The only viable alternative is that of multilateral agreement which includes commitments from all the nuclear haves, particularly China. This involves a commitment on the part of a large number of countries. In the given reality of power politics, the solution is too idealistic to materialise.

Coming to the extra regional implications, Namboodiri in his book *Islamic Bomb* analyses the following extra regional aspects of the bomb. He says that Pakistan's Islamic Bomb will have the following repercussions:

1. Israel would be deterred from carrying out a full scale invasion and occupation of Arab countries.

2. A nuclear reappraisal by Israel to the concerted Arab offensive would also be deterred.

3. Oil-rich Arab states with nuclear weapons would be able to withstand American and other external threats.

4. The possibility of subnational organizations getting access to Islamic nuclear devices might create enormous uncertainty in the minds of Israelis which of course would be of advantage to the overall Arab cause,
5. A Pakistani nuclear bomb would not only deter nuclear attack but also a conventional attack from India also.

6. The nuclearization of Islamic world would strengthen the Islamic solidarity of Muslim population all over the world whether they are in Soviet Union, Central Asia sinking in the Indian subcontinent or elsewhere.

Namboodiri has tried to emphasize that it is possible that an Islamic dialogue will start in West Asia as soon as a credible, deliverable weapon is made available by Pakistan.

It is no longer a secret that Pakistan linked its bomb to the Islamic world primarily to secure an easy flow of financial assistance from them. No other group would have provided it with the requisite money to make the bomb. Besides by developing the nuclear weapons in the hope of serving the cause of Islam, Pakistan can (a) hope to become a preponderant Islamic power - that Pakistan has all the potentialities of emerging as a leader of the Islamic bloc has already been explained; (b) diffuse the criticism (of the bomb) to all the Islamic countries instead of its being concentrated entirely on Pakistan and (c) as said earlier, can get better aid from the non-Islamic countries.

All the questions can be answered on a speculative basis. For all one knows once the bomb is made, the Islamic connotation itself might be dropped. The Arabs, the Indians and the Pakistanis know for sure that once the bomb is made, it will be the same irrespective of whether it is used, to use Bhutto's language, against the Jews, Hindus or Communists.
As far as the Islamic bomb enabling the rich Arabs withstand the external threats is concerned, hopes can only be limited, since the OPEC itself is facing a split. Keeping in view the Israeli action in 1982 in the Middle East it would be too much to expect the PLO to utilize the bomb for creating uncertainty in the mind of Israelis. As far as the conventional attack is concerned the bomb would definitely serve as a deterrent. So are assertions regarding its lending strength to the Islamic solidarity the world over. Akhtar Ali is of the view that the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan may create, at best a strategic uncertainty in Arab-Israeli security calculations, as suggestions would be there of a possible transfer of nuclear weapon to Arabs. Physical transfers may never take place.

It is interesting to note that with the passage of time and delay in the making of the Israeli bomb the extra-regional implications are gaining grounds parallel to that of regional ones. Just as the first major repercussions of the Islamic bomb in the region was the generation of arms race in the subcontinent the first major internation repercussion would be nuclear proliferation globally. The spill over effect of the bomb and the South Asian nuclear race would effect the potential nuclear weapon countries of the world (i.e. the countries which have the similar infrastructure, personnel, requisite leadership and resources) will definitely be turned in this direction. This includes countries like Mexico, South Korea, Brazil etc. The twin factors of security
and prestige will play an active role. Similarly an effort towards disarmament will have an important bearing on these countries in particular.

In the existing situation, it would be politically naive to expect Pakistan to work for disarmament mainly because it would like countries mentioned above to accept disarmament taking into account the political and economic advantages. Pakistan has and will reap from the bomb. Thus even if India takes an initiative in the direction of nuclear disarmament it will still be difficult to pacify these potential countries. We thus come to the ultimate question - can anything stop Pakistan from going in for nuclear weapons. In other words can anything stop Pakistan from going towards nuclear proliferation?

From the available sources and the way things are proceeding the answer would be in the negative. The U.S. efforts ranging from cutting off aid (soon after it was clear that Pakistan is making a bomb) to influencing France to renounce the agreement to sell reprocessing plant, can at best delay the bomb. Apparently the bomb is outside the reach of any external power to the extent that they can sabotage it.

In case the Arabs withdraw their moral and material support, Pakistani efforts will be affected adversely. Even then it is difficult to say that Pakistan would renounce its programme. But an Arab withdrawal is only possible in the event of an Arab-Israel detente which is a further remote
possibility. It has already been shown that the Americans have failed to stop Pakistan, the French or the Soviet Union cannot do it either. Even the Arabs cannot do it. Only Pakistan's own will to stop and renounce its nuclear weapon plants -- as a service move towards nuclear non-proliferation -- can stop it from going nuclear.