CHAPTER VI

AFGHAN CRISIS, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The prolonged Afghan crisis portended an ominous threat to the security and peace at the national, regional and international levels. The threat to international peace and security as a result of the present crisis in Afghanistan can be perceived, comprehensively and seriously, in the wake of four decades-old Arab-Israel hostilities, fluid situation in the Horn of Africa and the seven-year old Iran-Iraq war or farther away in the unstable situation in the Indo-China. Regionally, the threat to India cannot be under-estimated on various accounts.

Concept of Security

Security is central to every country's domestic and foreign policies. However, the concept of international security has received scanty analytical attention, especially, not beyond the studying of the security policy concerns of particular countries. National security is very much dependent on regional security and vice-versa. Similarly, international security is closely linked to regional as well as national security.
The term "security" has been in wide usage and usually accepted as a centrally organizing concept. There is a plethora of literature dealing with contemporary security problems and issues. This falls in the sub-field of strategic studies. The military and economic policies of the countries, "the intersection of these policies in areas of change as dispute and the general structure of relations which they create are all analysed in terms of national and international security". The concept of security is analysed mostly in terms of policy interests of specific actors as groups with pre-eminent emphasis on military aspects. The period succeeding the First World War had evoked enthusiasm for collective security - an ideal concept to which both League of Nations and now the United Nations have failed to give practical shape.


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John Herz is credited with having envisaged the idea of "security dilemma" in early 1950s which implied that the security policies pursued by a country could lead to rising insecurity for others as each interpreted its own policies as defensive and similar measures pursued by others as portents of ominous danger. Even the idea of "security dilemma" has failed to catch up. Thus it is evident from this that security has remained almost an uncharted concept.

The concept of security has generally been viewed in the context of national security and even then it manifests into various connotations but all lacking in a consensual definition. Majority of strategic analysts agree that Arnold Wolfers exposition of the concept of


5. Buzan, n.1, p. 3.
security, though written during the thick of the cold war period of early 1950s, still holds good. According to Arnold Wolfers, the term "security" entails a wide range of goals - that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security. 6

The term "security" indicates to some degree of protection of values previously acquired. As Walter Lippmann has opined: "A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain there by victory in such a war". 7 This definition envisages that the strength or decline of security is closely linked to a country's ability to deter an attack or defeat it. Security as a value, has much in common with power and wealth, two other significant values in international relations. While wealth measures the amount of a nation's material possessions and power denotes its ability to control the actions of others, security objectively measures the absence of threats to acquired values and in a subjective sense, it denotes the absence of fear that such values


would get attacked. Even Wolfers calls the concept of security as an ambiguous symbol "that may not have any precise meaning at all". However, despite the ambiguity, Wolfers does not deny the potency of security in national politics. Some other political scientists - Hedley Bull, Bernard Brodie, has also contributed to the conceptual framework of security.

The scholars have defined the concept of security in the context of national security. Accordingly to Michael Louw national security includes "traditional defence policy and also the military aspect of a state to ensure its total capability to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and-

8. Wolfers, n. 6, p. 150.
9. Ibid., p. 142.
and international objectives. Similar definition is provided by Ian Bellary: "Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively higher expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur", Trager and Simmoie have also expressed the similar view: "National security is that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or exclusion of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries. John Mroz, regarded security as "the relative freedom from harmful threats".

These definitions tend to elaborate the concept of national security. Besides, they tend towards an absolute view of security and a significant power orientation.

Another trend emerging from these definitions is that there is no clear concept of international security. The policies designed to envisage national security are primarily conceived in the national or regional context.

taking into consideration the perceptible threats from a country or countries. As Lindsay has observed "the search for perfect security or global security defeats its own ends." 17

Each country's quest for its own security generally leads to an unrestrained race for armaments, alliances, strategic manoeuvres and the like. This trend has developed on an unprecedented scale after the Second World War which gave rise to the super power concept. The victorious allied powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, the war time allies, fell apart and emerged as main adversaries in the post-war period vying with each other for winning new spheres of influences to their respective fold.

Europe being the main theatre of the Second World War, got divided into two groups, one led by the United States and other under the leadership of Soviet Union, in the post-war period. This division was both political and military. The United States emerged as the leader of West European countries while the Soviet Union represented

five countries of East Europe. 18 However, the way for this division of Europe, was paved immediately after the war. The anti-Soviet sentiments were preeminent in the pronouncements of West European leaders, especially Churchill in his speech at Fulton said that "From Steltus in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the continent". 19 The US President Harry S. Truman said on 12 March 1947: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure". 20 The United States under Truman Doctrine declared the global containment of communism as a part of its foreign policy. The Soviet Union also responded with equal militant thrust.

The United States along with its West European allies founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

18. These countries are Hungary, Germany, Democratic Republic, (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.


(NATO) on 4 April 1949. 21 The Soviet Union in cooperation with its East European allies established the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) also known as Warsaw Pact in 1955. 22 Since their establishment, NATO and WTO, or US and USSR have never fought against each other either collectively or individually in Europe or any other part of the globe. However, there have been numerous occasions when both the super powers have been confronting each other in regional conflicts in Asia and Latin America. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, is the prominent instance in this regard. In West Asian crisis both the super powers have fought through proxy. In Afghanistan crisis, Soviet Union is directly involved. There developed predictable signs of super power rivalry in the Third world where both super powers are fighting each other by proxy. As Miroslav Ninck has aptly observed: "Whenever significant economic or strategic interests attached to a country or region and the same is not within one side's recognised sphere of interest... When it is marked by a measure of conflict or instability, one or both super powers will typically try to establish

21. The founding members of NATO are: United States, Belgium, France, Leisemmburg, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom.

22. The founding members of Warsaw Pact are: USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Rumania.
a local presence at the other's expense.\textsuperscript{23} The Afghanistan crisis provided a peculiar situation where the Soviet Union is directly involved and the United States by proxy. The induction of sophisticated US arms into Pakistan as motivation to enable the latter to serve as a front to the expansion of Soviet influence in the region has portended security implications for India.

Before we analyse the impact of Afghan crisis on India's national security, its implications for regional security and its potential dangers for international peace and security, it deems essential to have an indepth assessment of the developments leading to the advent of Saur Revolution in April 1978 and other developments which culminated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant impact of continued presence of Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan on national, regional and international peace and security.

The Saur Revolution, or the Communist coup which took place in Kabul in April 1978 was staged with the active participation of the activists of the People's

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and some sections of the Afghanistan armed forces. Noor Mohammed Taraki, Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal played a big role in the developments leading to Saur Revolution and subsequent developments. It seems essential in the present chapter to briefly trace the political careers of Taraki, Amin and Karmal vis-a-vis the activities of the PDPA to facilitate an in-depth analysis of the entire political scenario.

Noor Mohammed Taraki

Born on 14 July 1917, the year of Bolshevik revolution, in a small village of Sur Kalai in Ghazni province in southern Afghanistan, Noor Mohammed Taraki belonged to the Pushtun tribe. 24 While a teenager, he joined the Pushtun Trading Company in Kandhar and was sent to Company's office in Bombay (India) where he attended the night school and finished his matriculation. On his return to Kabul in 1937, he joined the Government service and worked in several posts including that of the

editor-in-chief of the official news agency. Taraki began writing that eventually gave him prominence within the limited Afghan intellectual circle and that also "attracted Soviet notice", Between 1948 and 1952, Taraki wrote a piece about Maxim Gorky, "which suggests that he was by then already in touch with the Soviet Embassy in Kabul and receiving material from it", However, there is no independent evidence to support the argument of Bradsher.

When Taraki became the President of Afghanistan after the Saur Revolution, the Soviet Press reported that Taraki "wrote many stories on acute social issues which have been translated into various languages including Russian... These stories relate the formation of the proletariat in Afghanistan and the transformation of peasants into city inhabitants and workers". The Soviets not only translated into Russian Taraki's writings but also the writings of other Afghans with Marxist leanings. The ostensible reference to Taraki was perhaps to show that his thinking was greatly influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology.

26. Ibid.
Bradsher has tried to prove that the acceptance by Russian media of Russian translation of Taraki's works provides "a seemingly legal and legitimate reason for Soviet money to be given to Taraki in the guise of royalties". This seems to be a far fetched surmise. No other Western scholar has envisaged such conclusive evidence. According to some Afghans who have known Taraki's closely, Taraki led an austere life and he published his works in Peshwar in Pakistan out of his own expenses.28

In 1952, he was posted to the Afghan Embassy in Washington, D.C. to serve as a press attache, while there, one day he called a press conference and criticised Sardar Mohammed Daud, then Prime Minister of Afghanistan, and decided to defect. Following his request for asylum being rejected by the United States, he returned to Kabul where he subsequently carried out a communist revolution.29 On his return to Kabul, he rang up Prime Minister Daud and said: "I am Nur Mohammed Taraki. I have just arrived.


Shall I go home or to prison? However, he was not arrested. He also worked for some time as a translator and interpreter for the US Aid Mission and the US Embassy in Kabul. In 1958, he quit the job and started a commercial translation service that supplied the American Embassy and other foreign missions with material from the local press and other matters. From 1962 to September 1963 he worked for the US Embassy.

Taraki who continued his writings as well, had written about a dozen books by 1964. Some of his works dealt with "Scientific socialist" espousing the cause of soviet economic development model for Afghanistan, supporting Soviet position against the West and even incorporating material from Soviet works on materialist philosophy.

32. Dupree, n.29, p. 6.
By 1964, when PDPA was formally launched, Taraki had attained prominence as a known Marxist and his assistance was vital for the formation of the PDPA. 35

Hafizullah Amin

Hafizullah Amin, another important leader of the PDPA, was not in Afghanistan when the party was formed. He was abroad. After finishing his school, Amin earned his degree from the science faculty of Kabul University and became principal of a High School in Kabul. 36 In 1957, he won a scholarship to Teachers' College at Columbia University in the United States. It is not clear as and when Amin got attracted to communism. According to an Afghan source who knew Amin back in Kabul in mid 1960s the latter had books on communism printed in New York. 37 However, Amin's official biography claimed that on his return from the United States in 1958 "he established close contacts with Nur Mohammed Taraki and made use of his political, revolutionary and scholarly views". 38 However Bradsher claims that Amin developed his Marxist

37. Bradsher, n. 25, p. 41.
views while he was in the United States. After becoming President of Afghanistan in 1979, Amin said in an interview that "my stay in the United States is not the reason for my political beliefs. My beliefs and thoughts emanate from the reality of the ideology of the working class".

Irrespective of his beliefs, Amin cultivated government connections to forge ahead. Between 1958 and 1962, he worked in a new teachers training institute in the Education Ministry of Afghanistan. Afghan sources claimed that Amin was influential in the selection of Afghan students to study in the United States, working with Daud's political police on deciding who was trustworthy. In 1962, he again proceeded to Columbia University for a doctorate in education. There he actively participated in the Associated Students of Afghanistan (ASA), an association of Afghan students in the United States. At that time the ASA was faced with the dilemma whether to affiliate with Moscow-run International Union of Students or the pro-West International Students'

41. Bradsher, n. 25, p. 41.
Conference. In 1963, Amin was elected as the President of the ASA. It is claimed that Amin used his growing popularity with the Afghan students in 1963 to launch "a progressive organisation" separate from ASA and also sent a word to Taraki that his group considered itself part of the Afghan leftist movement. 42

In 1964, while still in the USA, Amin wrote in a message for the ASA Yearbook that the Afghan youth movement:

"...must go forward with all possible speed toward social justice, individual freedom and a democratic political system... We faithfully conceive of a strong united youth movement which will work to speed up any progressive change and act as a counterforce against any oppressive or suppressive force in Afghanistan.(43)

The Afghan government annoyed over it urged the US government not to renew the visa of Amin and thus the latter was forced to return home in 1965 without completing his doctorate.

When Amin returned to Kabul, the PDPA had already been launched. He also joined the PDPA in latter part of

42. Amin's Biography, n. 36.

Bradsher has opined that the fact that Amin was able to join PDPA as a Junior member and work his way into the party leadership showed that his role in the United States was accepted as a leftist one. However, Amin's direct links with Moscow still constituted a controversial matter. After his being killed by the Russian soldiers in December 1979 at Kabul, he was accused of being an American agent, an allegation without any evidence. After assuming power, in January 1980 with the help of Soviet troops, the Karmal government publicly demanded from the United States to hand over "all the documents pertaining to the cooperation of the treacherous and criminal Amin with the CIA".

Babrak Karmal

The third important leader of the PDPA was Babrak Karmal, who has served as President of Afghanistan since January 1980 till November 1986. When he took over as president, it was rumoured in Kabul that he adopted the name "Karmal" because it was an abbreviation for "Karl Marx-Lenin" but it cannot be substantiated. Another

44. Bradsher, n. 25, p. 42.
interpretation is that "Karmal" is a Pushtoo word which means supporter of labour. Unlike Taraki and Amin, who came from the rural areas, Karmal was a product of urban environment and belonged to the upper class, his father being a general in the Army.

After graduation, he entered the law faculty of Kabul University in 1949 and took keen interest in the student politics. He was also associated with Watan, a newspaper and was imprisoned from 1952 to 1955. Karmal's conversion to communism was attributed to Mir Akbar Khyber who was in the same jail. After his release from Jail, Karmal returned to law faculty and graduated in law in 1957. In 1958 he became a minor official in Afghan Planning Ministry. In 1961, he joined the Compilation and Translation Department of the Ministry of Education and again transferred to the Ministry of Planning where he remained until his election to the Wolesi Jirga in September 1965. He was therefore in Kabul "during the vital eighteen months when the PDPA was taking shape and despite later differences, had sufficient sympathy with Taraki's objectives" to participate in the founding of the PDPA.

47. Bradsher, n. 25, p. 40.

According to Vladimir Kuzichkin, a former KGB major, Karmal "had been a KGB agent for many years".\(^4^9\)

Thus it is evident from the above analysis, that the three major important leaders of the PDPA who later happened to be at the helm of Afghan affairs after the Saur Revolution were closely connected with Moscow when the PDPA was formed. Leon B. Poullada, the former US Ambassador in Kabul, was told by all reliable Afghan officials "who served as Minister of Interior in the 1960s, that after examining the police dossiers, he concluded that the leaders of the PDPA were "controlled, subsidized, and ordered directly by KGB elements of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul."\(^5^0\)

**Activities of the PDPA**

After laying the foundation, the PDPA leadership started recruiting members for the party in Kabul University and the high schools in Kabul were its main targets. The first parliamentary elections were held in August-September 1965 under the new constitution of 1964 in Afghanistan.

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49. *Time* (New York), 22 November 1982

Three PDPA members - Babrak Karmal, Nur Ahmad Nur Panjwai and Feizan Alhaq Pezan were elected to the Parliament while Taraki and Amin were defeated.\footnote{Bradsher, n. 25, p. 47.} So they could not represent the radical group in the parliament.\footnote{Taraki's Biography, n. 24, Kabul Times, 30 October 1978.} Anahita Ratebzad, who also won, and had been closely working with Karmal, was later counted as a PDPA member. When the session of Afghan Parliament in October 1965, Karmal and Ratebzad launched angry attacks on Prime Minister Yousuf and his interim cabinet for wide-spread corruption and nepotism. Karmal also organised a students' demonstration in Kabul against the Yousuf government.

On 11 April 1966, the PDPA published two issues simultaneously of Khalq, using Dari and Pashto languages. The PDPA later claimed the paper as its propaganda organ. The PDPA manifesto which Taraki himself had prepared, was published in these two issues of the Khalq. The Manifesto identified the "economic and political hegemony of the feudal class" as the source of Afghanistan's misery and backwardness and suggested the immediate solution as the

\footnote{Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two Party - Communism (Stanford, 1983), pp. 34-36.}
establishment of "a national democratic government, the foundations of which would be based on a national united front of patriotic, democratic progressive forces - workers, peasants etc... who are struggling for national independence..." 53 The Manifesto praised Soviet Union, without naming it, for its contribution to world peace and the weakening of imperialism. It also called for forging "friendly relations with the socialist countries, primarily with the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries." 54

The publication of such statements was bound to attract the wrath of authorities who did not arrest the PDPA leaders but the publication of Khalg was banned on 16 May 1966 after the appearance of only six issues. 55

Split in the PDPA

The closure of the PDPA's mouthpiece Khalg and increasing surveillance of the government over the activities of its leaders had led the PDPA leadership to review its attitude towards the Zahir Shah's government.

54. Ibid.
There were two groups - one headed by Taraki, Amin and their supporters and other by Karmal and his supporters. The Karmal group proposed a compromise with the government and assured the King "we are not communists". However, Taraki-Amin group was opposed to such a move because the government was not going to relent. Besides these tactical differences, there also developed a personality conflict and struggle for power within the PDPA. According to Male, "Babruk Karmal's willingness to cooperate and compromise suggested a degree of political opportunism which alarmed Taraki and his party colleagues, as did the possibility that Karmal might have a majority on the central committee of the party". Subsequently, Taraki enlarged the central committee by inducting eight new alternate members "in order to check unprincipled activities and rifts in the party".

However, Taraki's tact proved only partially successful because some of the new members turned out to

56. Male, n. 40, p. 43.
57. Ibid.
58. Democratic Khalq Party, n. 53.
the pro-Karmal. Further, Karmal's speech in the Wolesi irga in which he praised King Zahir Shah as the most progressive King of Asia and affirmed his "sincere and abiding faith in the King" 59 apparently disturbed the Taraki group. In the wake of these developments, Babrak Karmal resigned from the central committee of the PDPA on 24 September 1966 which was accepted. 60 However he did not resign from the party's membership.

All these developments culminated in the virtual split in the PDPA when Karmal group finally broke away from the PDPA in July 1967. Karmal's supporters who also broke away including full members of the founding central committee. Karmal started a paper entitled Parcham in 1968. Thus Karmal group came to be known as the Parchamites and Taraki group as Khalqis. However, both Parchamites and Khalqis were loyal to Moscow. 61

The Parchamites continued the publication of their party's paper Parcham from March 1968 to July 1969 while Taraki's Khalq was banned. Thus the Khalqis accused the

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
Parchamites of having connection with the King and even referred to Parcham as the "Royal Communist Party". \(^{62}\) According to Neumann, the former US Ambassador in Kabul, "Parcham was regarded as the official communist party. Babrak told me that personally he provided himself as his close relations with the Soviet Embassy. The Parcham line was always exactly the same as the Soviet line". \(^{63}\) Moscow, for obvious reasons, maintained close relations with both the groups keeping its options open and waiting to see how events would unfold. \(^{64}\)

**Khalq and Parcham During Daud Period (1973-March 1978)**

Sardar Mohammad Daud who was relieved of his power in 1963 had been building up strategic manoeuvrability to recapture power. King Zahir Shah's experiment of "New Democracy" under the 1964 Constitution failed mainly on two counts - confrontation between *Wolesi Jirga* and the Monarchy on the one hand and failure of *Wolesi Jirga* to enact progressive legislation. By 1965 *Wolesi Jirga* was being accused of interfering in the functioning of the government.

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63. Hammond, n. 31, p. 32.
Bureaucracy accused the **Wolesi Jirga** of using such issues like corruption and "Pushtunistan" as cover-up for legislative inadequacies. Gradually the **Wolesi Jirga** emerged as a genuine popular force leading to the decline in executive influence. Though there is no evidence to show that the traditional elite from the countryside was seen as a threat to the contemporary regime yet the growing popularity of the **Wolesi Jirga** was seen as a threat to the monarchy by the close of 1960s. Consequently the Afghan Parliament was adjourned in August 1969. The monarchy did not allow a genuine democracy to emerge because that would have resulted in a constitutional monarchy. The constitutional experiment was fouled by the contradictory pulls and the ill-disposition towards Daud's influence and popularity.

Sardar Mohammad Daud who was popular with the Afghan armed forces and the bureaucracy, after having tasted power for about ten years (1953-63) "probably found it frustrating to sit on the side-lines" especially at a time when the situation was ripe for him to stage a comeback. Thus he started exploring the possibilities of

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66. Hammond, n. 31, p. 36.
a rebellion from 1972 with various opposition elements -- both moderates and leftists, including military officers, Parchamites and Khalqis. In July 1973 when King Zahir Shah was away in Italy, Daud staged a bloodless coup on 17 July 1973 and announced the replacement of monarchy by "a republican system, consistent with the true spirit of Islam".

The Babrak-led Parcham and supported (welcomed) Daud's government. In return Daud rewarded the Parchamites by appointing them on Government posts, including Faiz Mohammed who was appointed the Minister of Interior. Daud also gave important positions to Abdul Qader and Mohammad Aslam Watanjan in the Afghan armed forces. Louis Dupree while quoting knowledgeable sources in Kabul wrote that Parcham was regarded as Sardar Daud's own "Communist Party".

The US Ambassador, Eliot, reported from Kabul in 1975 that it was widely believed that Parcham wielded


great power: "In the first few months following the coup, there were reports that Babrak Karmal and his principal lieutenants... formed a kind of sub-committee of the GOA (Government of Afghanistan)...

The pre-eminent position enjoyed by the Parchamites under the Daud government was disliked by the Khalq group which declared that "the Khalqis reject the system of one party governments in Afghanistan under present conditions .... It is vital that all patriotic and democratic elements should get united for the construction of new Afghanistan, the future of which definitely lies with Socialism". The ostensible objective of the Khalqis seemed to gain their say in the Daud government but "Daud had entered a temporary alliance with the Parchamites solely for convenience... and proceeded to dump the left as soon as he could safely do so".

Daud, a seasoned statesman and a strategist, followed a "lukewarm" foreign policy in the initial years


73. Male, n. 48, p. 55.
of his assumption of power. His endorsement of the Soviet plan of collective security in Asia was more governed by the domestic compulsions than a manifestation of Afghan foreign policy. His leaning toward Moscow was governed by the fact that he was more concerned with consolidating his grip over the domestic situation. After securing his domestic position politically, he no more needed the "crutches" of the leftists. He openly declared that he was not adopting a leftist attitude or accepting the claims of any ideological faction. On 28 February 1974, Sardar Daud said: "We have no connection with any group, and linking us to any group or movement is a sin".74

With a view to get rid of the Parchamites, he gradually started easing them out either by removing from the office or sending them on unimportant diplomatic assignments. He carefully avoided any mention of ideological or political reason for dismissing the leftists but instead used the plausible charge of corruption against them.75

During 1973-74, both Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA had developed serious differences especially

74. Halliday, n. 34, p. 29.
75. Bradsher, n. 25, pp. 57-58.
with regard to their policy toward Daud administration. Though Karmal-led Parchamites had joined Daud's government but Karmal was sure about having been ignored. Yet he believed that Parcham's alliance with Daud "had brought political power within his (Karmal's) grasp". The Khalq's contention that the revolution pioneered by Daud could only be completed if Daud formed a united front including the PDPA was rejected by Karmal. He rather advocated the dissolution of the PDPA. However the Khalq group led by Taraki and Amin opposed any such move and the resultant impact was the sharpening of difference between Karmal led Parcham group and Taraki and Amin led Khalq group.

Karmal's supporters having been dismissed by Daud in late 1974 had been discredited for their association with Daud regime while Khalqis led by Taraki and Amin represented an alternative focus of loyalty and source of leadership for those radicals in the armed forces, formerly followers of Karmal, who soon had become disillusioned with Daud and the Parchamites. It was this shift in allegiance of a significant portion of the Afghan left.

76. Male, n. 48, p. 55.
77. Ibid., p. 56.
that enabled Taraki and Amin to seize power in April 1978 by ousting Daud.

Henry S. Bradsher basing his information on an aerogramme emanating from US embassy in Kabul on 30 April 1975 has argued that in view of the declining influence of the Parchamites with Daud, the Khalqis made attempts to make gains at Parchamites expense and sent a letter to Daud in late 1974 offering to provide honest officials to replace corrupt Parchamites, a offer which was reportedly rejected by Daud.78 However, this argument seems untenable in view of Khalqis' strong opposition to Daud as explained earlier.

In view of the declining influence of Parcham with Daud, the Khalqis made attempts to make gains at Parcham's expense. The Khalqis sent a letter to Daud in late 1974 offering to provide honest officials to replace corrupt Parchamites but Daud flatly refused to accept it.79

Thus by 1975, Daud government was almost purged of the leftists. Establishment of the National Revolutionary Party by Daud served as a final blow to leftists'

78. Bradsher, n. 25, p. 58.
79. Ibid.
hopes to regain the favours from Sardar Daud. On 30 January 1977, a new constitution was approved by Lova Jirga that established a presidential one-party system. In the wake of these developments, both Khalq and Parcham were at the horns of dilemma.

COMMUNIST COUP OF APRIL 1978 OR SAUR REVOLUTION

As we have seen in the preceding pages, both Khalq and Parcham, but for the latter having short honeymoon with Daud government, looked like having become worrisome after the disappointments of a decade as rivals. Both factions had pinned high hopes on Daud which soon turned into apprehensions following the promulgation of a new constitution in January 1977. Under these circumstances, they were afraid of the prospects of remaining indefinitely in the political wilderness. Thus Khalq and Parcham formally agreed in March 1977 to restore PDPA unit. Consequently in July 1977 both factions held a conference that "adopted a decision on the organisation reunification of the factions and on the development of a programme of

80. Dupree, n. 70, p. 39
joint action... (and) considered the question of the removal of the dictatorial regime of Daud. 82 This unity in the PDPA was mainly facilitated because of Moscow. Babrak Karmal, after coming to power, wrote in World Marxist Review that the unity in PDPA was achieved "with the help of our international friends and brothers". 83 However Karmal made no reference to Soviet Union. It is widely believed that Moscow used the good offices of the Communist Party of India (CPI) for uniting the two factions of PDPA. 84

Now the question arose about the avowed objective of Moscow behind the reunification of the PDPA whether to overthrow Daud regime or help PDPA assume power. According to former US Ambassador in Kabul, Theodore L. Eliot, the Soviet objective was a communist seizure of power. 85 Eden Naby, an Iranian scholar settled in the United States, who was in Kabul during 1978 has argued

84. For details see, Bradsher, n. 25, pp. 69-71.
that the Soviets had become so dissatisfied with Daud's policies that they urged the Afghan communists to oust him as soon as they had a good opportunity. This seems to be a plausible reason though no direct written evidence is available.

The internal political instability during 1977 was followed by a series of political assassinations. It gave rise to endless speculations in political circles. At the end of 1977, the Minister of Planning, Ahmad Ali Khorram was assassinated in Kabul. Thus in the wake of deteriorating law and order situation, the communists did not sit idle. The PDPA leaders undertook extensive tours of the country to mobilize support and new party cells were formed both in the armed forces and among civilians. In the beginning of 1978, the PDPA worked out a plan for seizing power with units of the armed forces. According to an official document, the supporters of the PDPA in army and air force practised their "revolutionary tactics" and "preparatory manoeuvres" no less than ten times so as to be ready when the day for

86. Cited in Hammond, n. 31, p. 50.
87. Hammond, n. 31, p. 57.
the seizure of power arrived. The document further added that "under the prudent guidance of Comrade Taraki and Comrade Amin, with his proletarian courage and bravery, met patriotic liaison officers, day or night, in the desert or in the mountains, in the fields or in the forests, enlightening them on the basis of principles of working class ideology".

However until 17 April 1978 the PDPA leadership was perhaps only making plans to stage a coup while the events occurring in the succeeding days provided impetus to their strategy which finally culminated on 27 April 1978. The sudden assassination of Mgr Akbar Khyber, a known ideologue of the Parcham group on 17 April 1978 signalled the chain reaction that eventually led to the coup. Two days later, the PDPA organised a funeral procession in honour of Khyber. A massive crowd between 10,000 to 15,000 people marched through Kabul streets raising slogans against the United States.


90. Ibid.

91. Hammond, n. 31, p. 52.
Alarmed by the situation, the Daud Government swung into action and top PDPA leaders like Taraki, Amin and Karmal were arrested. However Amin was, instead of being sent to prison, was put under house-arrest where PDPA members were permitted to visit him. The police also allowed Amin's teenage son to come and go freely and he carried plans for the revolt to other party members. Amin's version of the coup reveals that he appointed Colonel Aslam Watanjar as Commander of all rebel ground forces while Colonel Abdul Qader was ordered to lead the revolt in the air force. According to Thomas T. Hammond, it is possible, however, that Amin's role was much smaller or even non-existent and that the coup was actually carried out by armed forces on their own initiative. Theodore L. Eliot Jr., has also argued similarly that Daud arrested PDPA leaders but "foolishly failed to arrest any of the left-wing army and air force officers, apparently because he suffered from the delusions that they were still loyal".


95. Taraki's Biography, n. 24.
The opinions of both Hammond and Eliot seemed to be untenable in view of the fact that it was Hafizullah Amin who had worked hard to work out the coup plan. He played a crucial role in mobilising the frustrated progressive elements in the Afghan armed Forces. When Amin was brought to Radio Kabul to announce the victory by Watanjay and Qader, Amin suggested that Taraki should make the announcement on the ground that Taraki's voice would be recognized by "party members in remote detachments who would then seize power locally". Though Karmal opposed the suggestion but Taraki proposed that the announcement would be made by Watanjar and Qader.

While the PDPA leaders were under arrest, the "rebel armed forces" under Watanjar and Qader staged a military coup on the morning of 27 April 1978 and the same evening Qader declared on the Kabul Radio that "for the first time in the history of Afghanistan an end has been put to the Sultanate of the Mohammadzais (the Afghan Royal Family). All power has been passed into the hands of the masses". On 30 April 1978 it was announced that power in Afghanistan was being exercised by a

96. Eliot Jr., n. 85, pp. 85-86.
Revolutionary Council comprising military and civilians was headed by Taraki. On 1 May 1978, the names of other ministers of the new Government with their portfolios were announced. Kamal was placed as number two and Amin as number three after Taraki. On 9 May 1978 President Taraki while announcing the foreign policy of the new Afghan Government promised a policy of nonalignment and good relations with all neighbours and also singled out such goals as "to further strengthen and consolidate friendly relations and all round cooperation with the USSR".

Washington and New Regime in Kabul

There was no immediate official reaction by the United States to the Communist coup in Kabul. The US economic, cultural, educational and peace corps programme in Afghanistan continued. This studied alience maintained by Washington showed that it was "unconcerned that another country apparently had joined the Soviet bloc". While defending the US Policy, Theodore Eliot wrote:

The United States continued to keep an open mind toward assisting Afghanistan, maintained a


100. Hammond, n. 31, p. 62.
dialogue in Kabul on possible new Peace Corps or cultural programme and indicated a willingness to help to the extent proposal met our legislative and developmental criteria. This policy made sense because cutting off these programmes unilaterally would only reduce Afghan options and drive the Afghan government deeper into the Soviet embrace". (101)

This view was also shared by the then US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who wrote in his memoirs: "I concluded that our best chance to maintain a measure of influence in Kabul was to continue the limited economic aid. To cut off all assistance or refuse recognition would almost certainly weaken our position in Kabul". 102

The then national security adviser to the Carter Administration had approved of the restrained response to the coup in Kabul. He said: "It was an internal coup, there was no evidence of Soviet involvement and hence there was no grounds of an American protest. The regime was undefined and unconsolidated, there was doubt as to whether it could hold power. As long as we could have some influence on Kabul, why cut off aid? It was better to wait and see how things turn out". 103 However, former

103. quoted in Hammond, n. 31, p. 63.
US Ambassador to Kabul, Neumann told the US Department of State that he had known the new leaders of Afghanistan for years and they were definitely communists and would follow orders from Moscow hence the US should stop all aid to the new regime. Cyrus Vance also later realized that the US reaction to the new regime was too mild. He wrote:

In looking back I think we should have expressed our concern more sharply at the time of the April coup that brought Taraki to power. There were reasons why we did not protest more vigorously. Although there was little question that Taraki Government would make itself responsive to Moscow there was room for doubt about whether the Soviets had planned the coup or were involved in its execution. And there was reason to think the strong Afghan nationalism of Taraki, and even more of Hafizullah Amin, might keep Afghanistan from becoming a Soviet satellite... We concluded that our interests would best be served by letting Afghanistan continue its traditional balancing act between East and West. The United States had few resources in the area and historically we had held the view that our vital interests were not involved there. Moreover, our friends in the region had adopted a wait-and-see attitude. There was no disposition on their part to add to the instability by supporting opponents of the Marxists in Kabul. Although we were contacted from time to time about coup plots, my advice was that we not get involved. (105)

Though there was no official comment or reaction by Washington to the advent of communist coup in Kabul yet

104. Ibid.

105. Vance, n. 102, p. 386.
the American press reacted very sharply to these developments. An editorial published in the New York Times expressed concern that "a genuinely non-aligned country had fallen to an avowedly communist one that is likely to tilt towards Moscow". The strategic analysts in the United States also quickly concluded that Afghanistan had been pushed into Soviet Camp. An American analyst on Soviet Affairs opined: "The 'Great game' is over and the Russians have won it". Leon B. Poulard has also regretted that no attempt was made by Washington to break relations with the communist usurpers nor to express official disapproval of such a shift in political power in a strategic country like Afghanistan.

Moscow and New Regime

Links of PDPA leaders, who assumed power after the coup, with Soviet Union have already been analysed in the preceding pages. It is worth mentioning here that at the time of coup there were about 350 Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan who played a significant role in the coup. A broadcast from the Kabul Radio reported


The advent of Communist regime in Kabul had certainly raised high expectations for Kremlin. The Soviet daily Pravda while pronouncing the official Soviet attitude towards Kabul, wrote on 6 May 1978: "The interests of social development demanded a fundamental break with obsolete social relations... Complex tasks of forming the new power, the intrigues of international external reactionary forces and struggling for a better future for the Afghan people, lie ahead". The reports appearing in the Soviet media by mid-May 1978 indicated that Moscow was happy with the new regime.

109. Bradsher, n. 25, p. 84.
110. FBIS Trends, 3 May 1978, p. 2.
Hafizullah Amin, the then Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, while on his way to attend the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries at Havana, stopped in Moscow on 18 May 1978. He was greeted by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The Soviet media, and the joint communiqué on their talks, identified the two men not only by their government position but also as members of the politburos, that controlled their respective parties, the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) and PDPA. 113

During June-July 1978 Taraki managed to get rid of the leading Parchamites by appointing them as Afghan Ambassadors abroad. Nur Ahmad Nur was sent to the United States, Karmal to Czechoslovakia, Anahifa Ratebsad to Yugoslavia, A. Mahmud Bariiyay, Karmal’s younger brother to Pakistan. 114

During the initial months of 1978, Moscow tried to keep a low profile in Afghanistan. In July 1978, an agreement to provide $250 million worth of Soviet weapons to Afghan armed forces 115 was neither made public nor

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115. The text of this agreement in Afghanistan, n. 108, Appendix A.
Soviet media made any reference to it.

**Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation**

Despite its overt silence, Moscow was making every attempt to see that the PDPA remained in power and consequently Kabul in the Soviet orbit. A major milestone in this direction was laid during the first week of December 1978 when both countries signed a Treaty of friendship and cooperation on 5 December 1978 at Moscow. The treaty was signed during Afghan President Noor Mohammad Taraki's visit to the Soviet Union from 4 to 7 December 1978. This treaty was used as a pretext a year later by the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan. Article IV of the said treaty, *inter alia* said:

> The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good neighbourliness, as well as the United Nation's charter shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries. In the interest of strengthening the defence capacity of the high contracting parties, they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them. (117)

Under the treaty, though Moscow was not bound to prevent the downfall of the new communist regime in Afghanistan


117. Ibid.
It was already preparing the possibility of saving it from failure and keeping that country under Soviet influence even by force, if needed. After the conclusion of the treaty, Soviet Leader Brezhnev said that the relations between the two countries "have assumed a qualitatively new chapter - permeated by a spirit of friendship and revolutionary solidarity". The treaty came into effect with the exchange of ratifications on 27 May 1979.

The joint communiqué issued after Taraki's visit observed that the contacts between the PDPA and the CPSU would be expanded. Along with the friendship treaty another agreement was also signed between Kabul and Moscow to establish a permanent inter-governmental commission on economic cooperation. Thus Soviet Union had taken over the overall responsibility of Afghanistan's economic and military responsibilities even in December 1978.

The Taraki regime could not be said to be solely relying on Soviet Union especially in the realm of foreign

118. Ibid.
affairs. While addressing a press conference on 12 May 1978, Taraki said:

Our relations with all countries including the Soviet Union and all our neighbours... will be based on the extent of their support of our revolutionary government and their help in political and economic areas.... We will be non-aligned and our friendship with others will depend on the measure of their help and support to us. (121)

Taraki regime even expressed the desire of new Afghan Government to maintain friendly relations with the United States but reiterated that it would depend on the political and economic support Afghanistan received from the US. 122

Even in the early months preceding the Saur Revolution, the political conflict between the Soviets and the Taraki Government had become discernible. Hafizullah Amin, Foreign Minister in Taraki Government, had sought to widen Afghanistan's affairs as far as possible. In an interview with the Newsweek, Amin said in June 1978 that there was no change in Afghanistan's relations with the United States as a result of the April Revolution. 123


The Taraki regime made efforts to procure US economic assistance during 1978 which had been committed for $20 million on 25 October 1978, Amin in an interview with Washington Post said: "We want the United States of America to consider realistically the affairs of this region and further provide us with aid". 124

It is evident from the above analysis that despite the ideological unity with Moscow, the Taraki regime was trying to improve its relations with the West but the Soviets pushed the Afghan leadership to a more radical role after signing the Friendship Treaty of 5 December 1978. It was also designed to isolate Afghanistan from the West in a bid to bring it under Moscow's control. The Soviet encouraged the Taraki regime to pursue a heavy-handed radical programme and an adversary pattern towards the local opposition. The Soviets played a major role in persuading the Taraki regime to reject conciliation or compromise with the domestic opponents and thus triggered a stiff resistance. The murder of the US Ambassador in Kabul illustrates the complete manoeuvring by the Soviets.

Assassination of US Ambassador in Kabul

Adolph Dubs, the US Ambassador in Afghanistan was assassinated by four Afghans in Kabul on 14 February 1979.

He had presented his credentials on 17 June 1978. Dubs' assassination cast a pall on the already deteriorating US-Afghan relations as there were supposed to be many unresolved questions about the role of Afghan government in the affair and its subsequent uncooperative attitude.

The assassins of Dubs had held the US Ambassador as hostage in Kabul hotel and demanded from the Afghan Government the release of the arrested members of Settem-i-Melli, in exchange for Dubs.125 The US Embassy in Kabul advised the Afghan Government to prolong the negotiations while applying rescue operations. But the Afghan forces along with Soviet advisers stormed the hotel room which resulted in the death of Adolph Dubs and the kidnappers.126 According to Richard P. Cronin: "Soviet security advisers appeared to be directing the operation and the Afghan Government disregard US suggestion that an attempt to rescue Dubs by force be delayed".127

The US request for delaying the negotiations with the kidnappers was declined by the Afghan authorities. The four Soviet advisers who were present on the scene


126. Ibid.

provided weapons and directed the Afghan soldiers to fire which resulted in the death of Ambassador Dubs and two of the four kidnappers on the spot. 128

The Afghan government tried to underplay the incident by laying the blame of Dub's murder on Settem-i-Melli. It is interesting to note here that Settem-i-Melli had broken away from the PDPA in the 1960s. The haste with which all the kidnappers were eliminated proved the fact that Soviet advisers did not want to leave any trace of evidence which could indicate their own involvement in the whole affair. As Beverley Male has also opined:

The kidnapping of the American Ambassador by Settem-i-Melli is also unlikely in view of its pro-Chinese and Anti-Russian leanings. The choice of Settem-i-Melli as the culprit appears a convenient ploy to divert attention from the real beneficiaries of the kidnapping and murder of the US Ambassador - pro-Soviet elements in Afghanistan and the USSR itself. (129)

The Afghan government tried to underplay the incident by blaming some groups. As Beverley Male has also opined: "The choice of groups as the culprit appears a convenient ploy to divert attention from the real

beneficiaries of the kidnapping and murder of the US Ambassador. However, the official organ, Kabul Times, in a defensive editorial wrote:

The terrorists and the enemies of the people of DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) by committing such an inhuman and cruel act may think they would disturb or damage the ties and the government of the DRA and the USA are fully aware of the acts of their enemies. They know that such provocative acts will not undermine the friendly relations between the two nations. (131)

It is evident that the assassination of US Ambassador, Dubs, was purposefully effected by the Soviet to further alienate the Afghan regime from the west especially the United States. However the statement in Kabul Times especially the word "enemies" implies that the Kabul government was examining a wide spectrum of possibilities.

The outraged Carter Administration accused Moscow of involvement in the bungling that caused Dubs' death but Kremlin denied it. The US economic aid to Afghanistan was slashed. On 23 July 1978, Washington announced the withdrawal of most of its diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan because of "security reasons". Although

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130. Male, n. 48, p. 151.
133. Ibid., 24 July 1979.
the Carter Administration had announced a drastic curtailment of US economic aid to Afghanistan yet it was not totally stopped until 14 August 1979, when President Carter signed P.L. 96-53, the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979, into law. Section 505 of the said Act prohibited any further assistance to Afghanistan unless the President certified to the Congress that the Afghan Government had officially apologised and assumed responsibility for the assassination of Ambassador Dubs and agreed to provide suitable protection for all US personnel in Afghanistan. Thus, in the aftermath of Dubs' assassination, the US relations with Afghanistan had reached the lowest ebb.

Advent of Amin's Leadership

The advent of communist regime in Kabul was not welcome for the people of Afghanistan who had faith in Islam and were devout national and opposed to any form of alien ideology, they strictly believed in Islam and their own nationalism. Thus it was but natural for the people of Afghanistan to rise in revolt against the enforced communist rule. The upsurge in people's resistance

135. Ibid.
against the communist regime in Kabul got impetus during the winter of 1978-79. There also developed a network of guerrilla training camps and supply routes across the Durand Line in Pakistan. Tens of thousands of Afghans opposed to the communist regime took refuge in Pakistan and Iran and their number increased with the passage of time. A detailed analysis of this aspect is beyond the scope of present study. However, it seems sufficient to surmise that there was a growing resistance to the communist regime which was in power just with the help of armed forces. The communist government resorted to repressive measures which further alienated the Afghans.

Among these developments, the rift between Taraki and Amin was also widening. The PDPA, having been riven with factionalism from its inception, had never developed a tradition of collective leadership. Despite the patch up between Khalq and Parcham enforced by Moscow in early 1977, the factionalism and rivalry between Taraki, Amin and Karmal sharpened despite the PDPA wearing a mask of unity. By August 1978, the Khalq faction seemed to have further consolidated their position by relieving the powerful and potential Parcham leaders including Karmal.

from their ministerial posts and sending them out of Afghanistan on diplomatic assignments abroad. Despite this cosmetic touch, the differences between Taraki and Amin rather came on the surface and by December 1978 they had started trading charges against each other.

On 2 January 1979, Amin while criticising Taraki said:

"The other creativity of comrade Noor Mohammad Taraki was recognition of the fighting members of the party and always keeping track of their continuous work, a pious attitude towards them, much adopting a destructive attitude and always attaching great value to constructive possibilities.... He was not (a) dogmatist in party procedures. He used to determine the course of activities of the party according to the prevailing conditions thus steering the party to victorious Saur Revolution. (137)"

Through such a veiled criticism, Amin was accusing Taraki of dogmatism, of failing to give due recognition to the contribution of longstanding and loyal party members.

These developments were concomitant with the uprisings in various parts of Afghanistan. In the summer of 1978 there were uprisings in Nuristan and Badakhshan and in the following months the revolt against the communist regime spread until it involved everyone of the twenty-nine provinces and almost all of the ethnic groups.

in Afghanistan. These uprisings also cut a cross
ethnic division and some tribes that for centuries had
fought each other, now united to fight against the
communists.

In the middle of March 1979 reports reached Kabul
that a revolt had taken place in Herat province where a
section of Afghan armed forces had also joined the "rebels".
The Afghan government informed the foreign missions that
communication between Kabul and Herat had been cut.

On 19 March 1979, Kabul issued a statement accusing Iran
of instigating the rebellion in Herat. The resultant
impact was the death of government officials, soldiers
loyal to communist regimes as well as a number of Soviet
advisers and their families present at Herat. The most
commonly quoted figure was forty Soviet dead and the highest
four hundred. Though the Afghan government officially
acknowledged death of only one Soviet adviser, yet
unofficially government sources put the number of Russians
killed at nine. The communist forces with the help of

138. Louis Dupree, "The Democratic Republic of Afghani-
stan", 1979, AUFSR, no. 32, 1979, p. 4.
141. Male, n. 26, p. 162.
Soviet advisers bombarded the places of "rebellion" and brought the situation under control by 25 March 1979. The common slogans heard in Herat were "Death to Taraki" and "Death to Russia". Though the communist regime in Kabul had managed to control the situation in Herat, yet the popular resistance was gaining ground throughout the country under Mujahideen.

The Herat episode had worried the Soviets who not only augmented the number of Soviet military advisers but also equipped the loyal communist forces with sophisticated weapons.

There is no overt evidence to show that Soviets were instigating differences between Taraki and Amin in order to pave the way for inducting the more trusted Parcham faction. After the Herat incident, Moscow strengthened its efforts to provide political guidance to the PDPA and its government in Kabul. Consequently Vasily S. Safronchuk, a trained economist and career diplomat was sent to Kabul. He had direct access to Taraki and other influential leaders of the PDPA and top Afghan officials.

143. Male, n. 48, p. 162.
144. Mujahideen means freedom fighters.
He operated independently of Soviet Embassy in Kabul. Amin, however, was alarmed by Safronchuk and Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, Pazanov away from Taraki, thus ensuring that he himself became the main contactman with the Soviets.

By May 1979, the intelligence reports reaching Washington suggested that "the Soviets are already moving forward with plans to engineer replacement after present Khalqi leadership of DRA, perhaps the exiled Parchamist leaders including former Deputy Prime Minister, Babrak Karmal, now believed hiding in Europe". At the same time the US embassy in Kabul reported a Soviet Embassy official there expressed frustration with the politically inexperienced Afghan government but observed that "at this time" there was no apparent alternative leadership.

Safronchuk and Pazanov had been advising and guiding the Taraki Government which was urged to broaden the government's base by bringing in non-communists as well. On 13 July 1979, Moscow media reported a PDPA politburo decision for the establishment of a "United

147. Ibid.
National Front" to include all progressive public and political forces" against the resistance but significantly this idea was not publicized within Afghanistan. 148 This only remained a mere declaration and nothing happened until the middle of 1981 when Babrak Karmal established the National Fatherland Front.

Though United Front could not be launched by the Taraki regime at the behest of Moscow, the Soviet adviser Safronchuk did advise Taraki and Amin to making a show of going to mosques for prayers in an effort to appease the feelings of Afghans especially those opposed to the regime in Kabul.

The tussle between Taraki and Amin had reached a climax by August 1979 and the Russians had also developed disenchantment with Amin, which is analysed in the succeeding pages. On his way back from Havana after attending the Sixth Summit Conference of non-aligned countries, Taraki stopped over Moscow on 9 September 1979 where he met Soviet president Brezhnev and Foreign Minister, Gromyko and reportedly Babrak Karmal. It is widely believed that during this period Taraki in connivance with Moscow planned to get rid of Amin. 149

148. FBIS Trends, 18 July 1979, pp. 3-4.

149. This point is supported by various Western analysts, see Hammond, n. 31, p. 85. Also see, Male, n. 48, p. 184.
Consequently, Taraki on his return to Kabul on 11 September 1970 called a meeting of his Council of Ministers overtly to report on the Havana Summit and covertly to discuss the plan of dismissing Amin. On 14 September 1979 Taraki rang up Amin to come over to People's Palace to discuss some problems. Amin, sensing a plot, refused in the beginning but later on agreed when the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, Alexander M. Ouzanov, guaranteed Amin's safety. The moment Amin arrived at the People's Palace, there occurred a shoot-out which resulted in the death of several persons, including Major Taroon who was standing in front of Amin. Amin later credited Taroon for saving his life. Amin escaped unhurt and with the help of his supporters surrounded the People's Palace and arrested Taraki.

On 15 September 1979, the Afghan Revolutionary Council announced that Taraki had asked "to be relieved from Party and state posts on health grounds" and Amin became the new president of Afghanistan.

150. Kabul Times, 16 September 1979. Also see Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 5 October 1979, p. 12.

151. Ibid.
Soviet Union and Amin Regime

Amin had developed a distrust towards Moscow especially after what happened on 14 September 1979 when an attempt on his life was made in the presence of Russian Ambassador. On 17 September 1979, Soviet leaders, Brezhnev and Kosygin, while sending congratulations to Amin expressed the confidence that "fraternal relations between the Soviet Union and Revolutionary Afghanistan will be further developed successfully on the basis of the treaty of friendship". The monotonous message lacked the usual Soviet warmth. Another fact indicating Soviet disenchantment with Amin was that Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin after visiting India in early October 1979 on his way back to Moscow did neither stop over Kabul nor send usual message of greetings.

Shah Wali, Foreign Minister in Amin's cabinet accused the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, Puzanov/not only of harbouring four former Ministers but also of being...

153. Halliday, n. 34, pp. 34-35.
154. On 14 September 1979, four Ministers, Major Sherjan Majdooryar, Colonel Mohammed Aslam Watanjar, Col. Sayeed Mohammad Gulabjoy and Asadullah Sarwari, were dismissed by Amin and after the shoot-out incident, they reportedly took refuge in Soviet Embassy in Kabul. See Hammond, n. 31, p. 83.
involved in a conspiracy to assassinate Amin and asked Moscow to recall the Soviet Ambassador which was done in November 1979.\textsuperscript{155} The new Soviet Ambassador in Kabul who was Fikriat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeev assumed charge on 28 November 1979.\textsuperscript{156}

Prior to his assumption of power, Amin as a Foreign Minister and later on as a Prime Minister under Taraki had seldom shown his disenchantment for Moscow in his public pronouncements. He said on 22 July 1979: "Any person and any element who harms the friendship between Afghanistan and Soviet Union will be considered the enemy of the country, enemy of our people and enemy of our revolution. We will not allow anybody in Afghanistan to act against the friendship of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{157} However, at the same time he also seemed worried about the increasing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. On 17 July 1979 he said: "Those who boast of friendship with us, they can really be our friend when they respect our independence, our soil and our proudful traditions".\textsuperscript{158}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[155.] Cable No. 07444 from US Embassy in Kabul to State Department, 11 October 1979, ibid., p. 86.
\item[156.] Kabul Times, 1 December 1979.
\item[157.] Ibid., 23 July 1979.
\item[158.] Ibid., 21 July 1979.
\end{enumerate}
opines that Amin was too much of a realist to imagine that the PDPA could survive without Soviet assistance and in any case too good a socialist to wish to see relations with the Soviet Union deteriorate further. 159

According to Western political analysts, Moscow was anxious to draft Karmal as Taraki's successor and it could be done only after eliminating Amin. And such planning was done in mid-August 1979. 160 General Pavlovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Land Forces visited Kabul in August 1979 and stayed there for about two months along with a group of Soviet army commanders. They reportedly drew up the blueprint for the entry of the Russian troops in strength into Afghanistan and the operations thereafter. 161 Taraki's visit to Moscow on 9 September 1979 had been utilised by the Soviet leadership to implement it.

Amin never made public his distrust or disenchantment with Moscow but he seemed to be equally concerned with increasing Soviet influence in Afghanistan. In early October 1979, Amin, while acknowledging the Soviet military

159. Male, n. 48, p. 184.
160. Ibid., Also see Bradsher, n. 25, p. 116.
aid, said: "Soviet Union is providing whatever we can use .... (to defend Afghanistan)... but we will defend our country.... (and will) never give this trouble to our international brothers to fight for us". Thus it can be surmised that Amin was interested in maintaining good relations with Moscow but at the same time was opposed to increasing Soviet influence in Afghanistan.

United States and Amin Regime

After Adolph Dubs' death, Washington had almost become lukewarm toward the communist regime in Kabul. On 11 September 1979, Amin had told the American Charge D' Affairs, J. Bruce Amstutz, that he wanted to have "friendly relations" with the United States. However Amstutz did not take it seriously.

Following the assumption of power by Amin, on 15 September 1979, the US State Department became more interested in the question of Amin's attitude toward the United States. Amstutz called on Amin on 27 September and found that the latter was "all charm and friendliness" and once more spoke in favour of better relations with

162. FBIS Trends, 3 October 1979, pp. 15-16.

Shah Wali, Foreign Minister in Amin's government, met the senior officials of US State Department in New York on 27 September 1979. In early October 1979, Archer Blood, a US diplomat went to Kabul and met Amin. The former told that Amin "wanted American aid without offering anything in return".

The Carter administration made the issue of "violation of human rights" in Afghanistan as a starting point with Amin. The violation of human rights might have taken place prior to Amin seized power. The report prepared by the State Department devoted six pages to violation of human rights in Afghanistan. The report contained sweeping generalizations without providing evidence of specific instances of atrocities which could be documented or checked.

Archer Blood in his assessment to the US Department of State that Amin was "content for the time being with a polite but limited relationship, which both countries would refrain from exacerbating by word or action".

164. Cable No. 07218 from Kabul to the State Department, 27 September 1979, p.1, ibid., p. 87.
165. Cited in Male, n. 48, p. 200.
167. Cable No. 07726 from Kabul to State Department, 28 October 1979, pp. 1-6 cited in Hammond, no. 31, p. 87.
Even the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance summed up: "At maximum we regard our current dialogue with the Afghan as a means of exploring the possibilities for a less contentious relationship and we are not overly sanguine that even this limited objective can be sustained". 168

The above analysis reveals that the US missed a golden opportunity by not making the strategic advantage of the situation. As Poullada has aptly observed: "American weakness and complaisance, over developments in Afghanistan convinced the Soviets that America had abandoned the field to them there, and that they could safely move into the vacuum with tacit American consent". 169

SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

The world was taken by surprise by the events of 27-28 December 1979 when sizeable number of Soviet troops equipped with sophisticated weapons invaded Afghanistan in which Hafizullah Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal was installed as the new ruler of Afghanistan. The foundations of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had been laid much earlier and the December-end 1979 episode was the final act.

168. Cable no. 282436, State Department to US Embassy in Islamabad, 29 October 1979, p.1, ibid, p. 87.
169. Poullada, n. 50, p. 248.
According to Thomas T. Hammond, the information for preliminary planning by Moscow could have been collected when General A. Epishev, the head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet armed forces, made an inspection tour of Afghanistan in April 1979. 170 This was followed by the visit of Afghanistan by General Ivan G. Pavloskii, Deputy Minister of Defence, from August 1979 to October 1979. 171 Pavloskii had earlier undertaken a similar mission in Czechoslovakia in 1968 prior to the Soviet invasion of that country and he led the Soviet invasion of that country and he led the Soviet troops into his Czechoslovakia. Thus \[x\] was a logical choice to make the assessment for launching Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Along with preparation of such strategic planning, there was also augmentation in Soviet military and civilian advisers in Afghanistan during October-November 1979. The Afghans had almost lost control of the essential levers of power to 1,500 or more Soviet officials in the civilian ministries and between 3,500 and 4,000 Soviet officials and technicians in the Afghan armed forces. 172

172. US, Department of State, Chronology of Recent Developments Related to Afghanistan (Washington, D.C., 1980).
An estimated half of the 8,000 officers and non-commissioned officers of the Afghan army had been purged in October 1979. 173

In late November 1979, Moscow put its troops in a state of limited readiness and reservists were called up to fill up understrength combat divisions in the central Asian military district. Bridging equipment was moved to the Afghan border. 174 The Warsaw Pact countries had also placed their troops on an advanced stage of readiness. By mid-December Moscow had airlifted about two battalions of troops with heavy weapons into Bagram Air Base whose management had already fallen into the Russian hands. 175

While making strategic and military preparations to invade Afghanistan, Moscow also continued efforts to make Amin agree to invite Soviet troops into Afghanistan. On 28 November 1979, a Soviet Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Lt. Gen. V.S. Paputin arrived in Kabul to discuss "mutual cooperation and other issues" 176 with the Government.

175. Ibid.
of Afghanistan. According to Thomas T. Hammond, Paputin's real mission was to help prepare Kabul for the invasion by getting control of the Afghan policy, to pressurise Amin to step aside in favour of Karmal, persuading Amin to invite the Soviet Union to send large number of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, if all those failed, assassinating Amin. 177

On 17 December 1979 there occurred a shooting incident at the official residence of Amin in which his nephew, Asadullah Amin was injured and then flown to Moscow for treatment. 178 Asadullah was the head of Afghan intelligence service and Amin's top security aide, was thus removed. Between 11 and 15 December 1979, Soviet forces transport planes gathered in the Moscow area and in the Central Asian area and tactical fogerlia air craft were shifted from bases near the Afghan borders. 179 A logistical build up on the Soviet side of the Amu Darya was completed by about 23 December 1979 and so were the redeployment of transport aircraft and the preparations of airborne troops. 180  At 11.00 p.m. on 24 December 1979,

177. Hammond, n. 31, p. 98.


troops of the 105100 Air borne began to land at Kabul airport. The airlifting of Soviet troops to Kabul had started by 23 December 1979 and by 27 December 1979, their strength was sizeable enough to take control of Afghanistan. Thus by the evening of 27 December 1979, the Soviet forces had launched the invasion and asserted its control over Kabul and other strategic places in Afghanistan. In a late evening broadcast, on 27 December 1979 by Babrak Karmal as reported by Soviet news agency Tass, said:

... who upto the present have been subjected to intolerable violence and torture by the bloody apparatus of Hafizullah Amin and his minions, these agents of American imperialism.... The day of freedom and rebirth... has arrived.... The Central Committee of the United Peoples Democratic Party and the revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan proclaim true people's power... We have once again raised the banner of national Jihad... a just war of the Afghan people for true democratic justice, for respect for the holy Islamic religion... for implementation of the aims of the glorious April revolution.(181)

In another broadcast on 27 December 1979, the Kabul Radio announced the request of Afghan government for Soviet armed assistance:

Because of the continuation and expansion of aggression, intervention and provocation by the foreign enemies of Afghanistan, and for the purpose of defending the gains of Saur revolution, territorial integration, national independence and preservation of peace and security, and on the basis of the treaty of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation dated 5 December 1978, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan earnestly demands that the USSR render urgently the political, moral and economic assistance, including military aid to Afghanistan. The Government of the USSR has accepted the proposal of Afghan side. (182)

This statement was the justification for Soviet invasion of Afghanistan implying that Afghanistan requested Moscow with to send their armed forces and the latter complied accordingly. All these statements were broadcast by Tashkent Radio dubbed as Kabul Radio. Kabul Radio continued its normal broadcast till 10.30 p.m., while Karmal's pre-recorded speeches were broadcast over Tashkent Radio. Evidently the Russians had failed to capture Kabul Radio before 10.30 p.m. The above sequence of events reveals that the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan with the help of its armed forces and installed Babrak Karmal as a puppet in Kabul whose strings were in the hands of Kremlin. A statement published in Pravda on 31 December 1979 stated that the Soviet Union had decided to grant Afghanistan (182).

insistent request... (for) immediate aid and support in the struggle against external aggression... and to send to Afghanistan limited Soviet military contingent that will be used exclusively for assistance in the armed interference from the outside. The Soviet contingent will be completely pulled out of Afghanistan when the reason that necessitated such an action exists no longer.(183)

By 1 January 1980 fifty thousand Soviet troops were in Afghanistan and more were on the way. Thus by January end 1980, the number of Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan was estimated between 80,000 to 100,000.184

The emergence of Karmal regime backed by Soviet troops pushed Afghanistan into Soviet orbit and its nonaligned status was completely undermined. The signing of the Afghan-Soviet friendship treaty in December 1978, and a series of military actions at the operational level were steps towards the final takeover of Afghanistan by Moscow in December 1979.

IMPACT ON INDIA'S SECURITY

Security perceptions of a country are determined by its geopolitical situation, historical past and its


perceptions of current conflicts of interests with other countries. In case of India, its security perceptions have been governed by Indian Ocean and the buffer status of Tibet, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The rapid process of militarization of the Indian Ocean and the presence of military bases of super powers have made the security vulnerable to their manoeuvres. The annexation of Tibet by Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) in 1950s and the outbreak of Sino-Indian hostilities in 1962 in which India suffered a military debacle, threat to India's security became more grave from China as well.

Afghanistan's buffer status during the nineteenth and early twentieth century when the Anglo-Russian rivalry was at its zenith had assured India's security. However, the strategic importance of Afghanistan for an independent India underwent change in 1947 following the emergence of Pakistan in the West. The principal strategic divide was no longer the Khyber pass but along the border between India and Pakistan. Both India and Afghanistan were at odds against Pakistan and each kept a degree of pressure on Pakistan.  

186 India's relations with Afghanistan had

been friendly and cordial. Similarly India's relations with the Soviet Union had become warmer and closer than India's relations with any third country. Both countries had signed a treaty of friendship in July 1971. By the time Soviets intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979, relations between Moscow and New Delhi were very friendly and warm.

INDIA'S PERCEPTION ON SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 27th December 1979, the then Prime Minister, Charan Singh summoned the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi on 30 December 1979 to express India's concern and stated that in India's view the sending of Soviet troops to Afghanistan would have "far reaching and adverse consequences" for the entire region. When the issue of Afghanistan came up before the UN Security Council during the first week of January 1980, India remained silent over it. By that time Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government had assumed power in New Delhi and the Afghanistan issue having been vetoed by Moscow in the Security Council was being raised in the UN General Assembly. The Indian representative to the

187
United Nations, Brajesh Mishra, told the General Assembly on 11 January 1980:

India is deeply concerned and vitally interested in the peace, security, independence and non-alignment of this traditionally friendly neighbour (Afghanistan).... We are against the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country. However, the Soviet Government has assured our Government that its troops went to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan Government... and we have been further assured that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn when requested to do so by the Afghan Government. (188)

The Indian representative did not dwell on the issue whether the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed any threat to India's security or not. However, he added that "building bases, pumping arms to small and medium-sized countries and interfering in the internal affairs of nations with a view to isolating and dividing non-aligned countries are activities that pose a threat even to our own security". 189

The subsequent pronouncements made by the Indian Government on Afghan issue reflected the profound ambiguities in India's approach. The pronouncements made by the Indian Government in the Parliament or in the United

189. Ibid.
Nations veered around the fact that Soviets troops were invited by Afghan Government and the former would soon withdraw while the joint statements issued after the visit of western leaders to India called for the "withdrawal of foreign troops" from Afghanistan. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told Lok Sabha on 30 January 1980: "... we have been told that it was Amin himself who asked for Soviet troops... we have been told by the Soviet Ambassador". 190 While addressing a press conference at New Delhi on 16 January 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said that India did not support the Soviet action in Afghanistan. 191 An analysis of the pronouncement made by Indian Government on Afghan situation from time to time is beyond the scope of present study.

The Soviet armed incursions into Afghanistan though posed no direct threat to India's security yet the US decision to rearm Pakistan created genuine feeling of concern in regarding the security, stability and peace in the region. 192 A.K. Damodaran a former Indian diplomat has dismissed the idea that the Soviet presence in


Afghanistan could threaten South Asia as "myth of which Anglo-Saxon strategists have revived from the days of the great game". However according to K. Subramanyam, the Director of New Delhi-based Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, the presence of Soviet forces "down to the Khyber Pass has had an adverse impact on the sub-continental security environment and that is somewhat similar to the Chinese occupation and the annexation of Tibet and the US permanent presence in the Indian Ocean".

Some people including political leaders have expressed the apprehension that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan has made the Soviet entry into Pakistan easier and after crossing Pakistan, Moscow would be in a position to put direct pressure on India. Though it seems to be a far-fetched assumption in view of the cordial relations between New Delhi and Moscow yet the long term implications arising from the Soviet


military presence in Afghanistan for India's security cannot be ruled out.

In order to understand these implications, an analysis of Pakistan's threat perceptions and massive US arms supply to that country is called for. The formal invasion of Afghanistan envisaged seeming divergence between American and Pakistan threat perceptions. The Carter Administration viewed Soviet action in Kabul as a "clear and unjustified aggression which threatens vital US interests". Washington already shaken by the Iranian revolution and the Tehran hostage crisis responded with the "Carter Doctrine of hands off Gulf" and declared to take military and diplomatic initiatives designed to reassert American leadership and position which the United States seemed to have ceded to the Soviet Union after Afghan crisis.

In the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Islamabad responded with a much more conscious and subtle policy. On one hand Zia's regime immediately took steps to


mend its strained relations with Washington and on the other it tried to mobilize the international public opinion especially of the Islamic community in Pakistan's favour.

In the middle of January 1980 Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visited Washington. The Carter Administration agreed to reaffirm its commitment to Pakistan under the 1959 bilateral security agreement but reportedly refused a Pakistan request to upgrade the said agreement to a treaty owing to the problems of securing assent by the Senate. Instead the Carter Administration offered a two year $400 million aid to Pakistan which President Zia-ul-Haq rejected as "peanuts". Though the Carter administration tried to convince Pakistan that the proposed offer would be only the first instalment in a longer term programme, yet President Zia justified his rejection on grounds that the $400 million offered by the United States would not purchase security for Pakistan but rather would "buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union, which is now much more influential in this region than the United States".

199. Ibid.
The National Security Adviser to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, after his visit to Pakistan in early February 1980, stated that the proposed US aid programme for Pakistan would not be submitted to the US Congress until the completion of military discussions between the US and Pakistan and the formation of a wider group of the aid donors.201

In the meanwhile presidential elections were going on in the United States. Thus Pakistan had neither accepted nor rejected so far the aid offered by Carter Administration but rather decided to await the outcome of the presidential election. The advent of Reagan Administration in Washington proved instrumental in attaching more significance to prepare "front line states" around Soviet Union as an affront to thwart the growing influence of Soviet Union. The enthusiasm which it displayed for this effort magnified Pakistan's own sense of its leverage and Islamabad played its game well.


The US Under Secretary of State, James Buckley, visited Pakistan in early September 1981 which resulted in the conclusion of a US Pakistan agreement in Islamabad on 15 September 1981, under which the US committed a $3.2 billion package aid to Pakistan over a period of six years to provide economic assistance and military sales credits.\textsuperscript{203} It was also provided that the United States would provide Pakistan 40 F-16 fighter bombers.\textsuperscript{204}

By the beginning of 1985, Pakistan had received the final instalment of F-16 fighter bombers along with other sophisticated weapons from the United States. Such a situation was found to alarm India which expressed its grave concern over the US arms aid to Pakistan. At a time when Carter Administration offered Pakistan in January 1980 aid worth $400 million which the latter rejected, India had expressed its apprehensions. The then Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi told the Lok Sabha on 30 January 1980, "Billions of dollars have been asked for and hundreds of millions have already been committed to Pakistan in military aid by USA".\textsuperscript{205} Prime Minister

\textsuperscript{203} For details see, Richard P. Cronin, "Congress and Arms Sales and security assistance to Pakistan", in US Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Congress and Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.1982) pp. 107-110.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
Mrs. Indira Gandhi while speaking in Rajya Sabha on 30 January 1980, again expressed India's concern over the resumption of US arms supplied to Pakistan. It has been our sad experience that arms given to Pakistan for whatever purpose have always been used against India. 206

India's apprehensions of threats to its security from the rearming of Pakistan by the United States on the pretext of Afghan crisis are genuine and based on the past experiences. Though New Delhi is not opposed to Pakistan's right to procure arms for its self-defence, acquisition of arms in disproportionate manner gives rise to the motives behind such a move. However, powerful weapons the Washington may supply to Pakistan, the latter cannot afford to risk a confrontation with the Soviet Union and thus the ultimate target is India. Besides, contrary to the promise made by the then US President Eisenhower to India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954, the United States could not prevent Pakistan from using American arms against India in 1965 and 1971 wars.

206. Ibid., p. 10.
Strategic thinkers in Pakistan have generally agreed on the case for military parity between India and Pakistan on the plea that India's geographic and demographic size coupled with armed might pose a threat to Pakistan. However, India's security environment includes not only Pakistan but also China with whom India's relations are strained.

The existing military balance between India and Pakistan is more favourable to Pakistan. Though Pakistan is nine times less in size and its population is seven times less than India yet the strength of Pakistan's armed forces i.e. just half to that of India. This in terms of ground forces, Pakistan already has a military parity with India, while its Air Force being equipped with F-16 has an advantage over India while Indian Navy has an edge over Pakistan's Navy as is evident from the following Table 6.1.

Both India and Pakistan have deployed 14 infantry divisions and two armoured divisions each on either side of the Indo-Pakistan border. Apart from this, India has 10 mountain divisions deployed against China and five infantry divisions in the volatile region between Bangladesh.

and Burma to deal with insurgents in the Indian states of Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura and Assam. Besides India has also taken into account the fact that Bangladesh has raised five infantry divisions and modest air and naval capabilities with Chinese assistance. On the other hand, despite claims of the great Soviet threat, Pakistan has only two divisions facing Afghanistan. A proposal by the US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski that there ought to be a redeployment of forces from the Indian to the Afghan front was rejected by Pakistan claiming that India constituted the more serious threat. 208

Until the late 1960s the balance in combat aircraft was in favour of Pakistan because of US supplied F-109 starfighters, F-86 Sabres and B-57 Canberras compared to Indian purchases or licensed production of British and French Hunters, Caraberras, Mysteries and Gnats. But by early 1970s the balance in the airforce had tilted in India’s favour with Indian acquisition of imported soviet Sukhov-TB fighter bombers and Indian made Mig-21s, MF-24 Maruts and Ajeets, as compared to Pakistan's acquisition of French Mirages and Chinese Mig.-19s. In 1990s, the

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forces balance of Ait has again tilted in favour of Pakistan with latter's acquisition of F-16 combat fighters and the proposed supply of AWACS by the United States.

Apart from this, China with its nuclear capability poses a serious threat to India's security. In view of Sino-Indian hostilities, the Pakistan-China entente cordiale and supply of Chinese weapons to Pakistan have added a new dimension to the security environment of India.

The foregoing analysis is helpful in surmising that no direct threat to India's security from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But the resumption of arms supplies to Pakistan by the United States on the pretext of strengthening the "front line state" as an a front to Moscow, has portended serious implications geopatria- jeopardizing India's security.

IMPACT ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY

South West Asian countries comprise Persian Gulf region and Western Indian Ocean region. This region has always been the focal point of super power rivalry, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has made the Super power rivalry more sharp.
Until 1977 both super powers had maintained modest military presence in the area. However, by 1978, the situation took a dramatic turn the resultant impact of which was discernible in the augmentation of military activities in the Indian Ocean by the United States and the Soviet Union. The strategic emphasis of both the super powers had shifted from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf and the... the states of the Western Indian ocean region. The fall of Shah in Iran proved instrumental in the decline of American influence in the Persian Gulf and the region was marked with political instability. The loss of the US influence in the Iran supplemented the US-Soviet rivalry especially in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the United States tried to maintain power equilibrium by propping up Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq to serve the US strategic interests in the region. Washington perceived the Soviet action in Afghanistan as a military threat to US interests in the region. Under the prevailing geopolitical situation, the security and safety of the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf, the mineral resources of strategic significance which are available in the Indian ocean states and the crucial sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) within the region have become a stake thus envisaging a possibility for the
US-Soviet rivalry assuming new dimensions in this region with global repercussions.

Both US and the USSR have immense economic and strategic stakes in/ south west. However, the major US economic interests in this Gulf region is oil. In 1983, the US oil imports were about 10 per cent from the organisation of petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The interruptions in oil shipments from the Persian Gulf can cause serious damage to US economy. According to the estimates taken by the US Congressional Budget office, the loss of Saudi Arabian Oil alone continuously for one year could mean the loss of $ 272 billion for the US and the inflation rate would increase by 20 per cent ²¹⁰ curtailing or interruptions in oil shipments to the US or other NATO allies from the Gulf region could paralyse the economies of those countries.

Besides importing oil from the Persian Gulf, the US and its NATO allies import raw material of strategic significance from many countries of the Indian Ocean.


The Republic of South Africa is the major supplier of strategic raw materials to the United States. The major minerals imported by the US from South Africa are Chromium, Manganese, Vanadium and Platinium.²¹¹

Chromium and manganese are vital to steel industry. The United States imports these strategic minerals from foreign sources. Vanadium is also used as an addition to iron and steel especially in weight reduction. South Africa meets over half of the US requirement of vanadium. The platinum group metals are used as catalysts in automobile emission control systems. South Africa is the major supplier of platinum to the United States. The bulk import of copper and cobalt by the USA is done from Zambia and Zaire. Madagascar and India export mica to the US. Thus oil and non-fuel minerals which are of crucial strategic and economic significance for the United States are available in the Persian Gulf and Indian ocean region. Eventually this region assumes strategic importance for the United States.

The Soviet dependence on import of oil and strategic non-fuel minerals from the Persian Gulf and other countries of South West Asia is not that acute as that of the United States. In the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union can seek access to these raw materials. In that eventuality it would have to increase Soviet sphere of influence which is possibly only at the expense of the United States. On the other hand, Moscow can also obstruct the US access to these resources, irrespective of its own requirements. In either case, the direct showdown of force between Moscow and Washington could entail serious implications for the global security.

Currently, the Soviet dependence on import of oil and strategic non-fuel raw materials from the PG-WIO region is very modest. The Soviets are almost self-sufficient in petroleum and rather export the same to its allies. In 1977, a study undertaken by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had forecast a sharp decline in Soviet oil production anticipating slowdown of production from the West Serbaran oil fields. However, the recent studies have shown that Soviet Union's oil prospects are

213. United States, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Prospects for Soviet Oil Production (Washington D.C., 1977)
bright enough. 214

The United States does perceive a Soviet threat to its economic and strategic interests in the Persian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean region. The US Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced in 1980: "As one assesses the recent step up of Soviet proxy activity in the third world.... then one can only conclude that the era of "resources' war" has arrived. 215

The following table shows the relative dependence of the US and Soviet Union on foreign raw material resources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Raw materials</th>
<th>USA percent</th>
<th>USSR percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Titanium (rutile)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Columbium</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mica (sheet)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Baurite</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Cobalt</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is evident from the above table that the United States is the major importer of raw materials which are of economic and strategic significance from the RG-WIO region. While the Soviet dependence on the imported raw material is almost insignificant, Moscow imports only 42 per cent of its domestic requirements of cobalt whereas it exports the same to East European allies. Besides, Moscow is also the leading producer of certain strategic minerals. It exports these minerals
even to the United States. Soviet Union supplies chromite, manganese, plutonium group - metals and even vanadium to the USA.

Under these circumstances, the Soviet - US confrontation over the access to oil or non-fuel minerals may seem remote but not implausible. Thus the second eventuality - the Soviet denial to US access to these resources, assumes somewhat greater credibility. The region comprising Persian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean possesses certain vital sealanes of communication (SLOCs). Various Gulfs and Straits falling within the region are of geopolitical and strategic significance to both super powers. Europe is linked to Asia and East Africa, via the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Another route facilitates the shipment of oil from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Hormuz. The Cape route, a strategic sea route, links the Indian Ocean to the South Atlantic and through this route goods and commodities are shipped to the United States and other West European countries. Hence these SLOCs are of immense economic and strategic significance and each of them being vulnerable to interruption can jeopardise the security of the contiguous regions. The US naval targets within the north-west Indian Ocean,
where these three SLOCS intersect are within the range of Soviet backfire bombers based in Southern Afghanistan. The Mozambique channel which is only 400 kms wide has its narrowest point between Mozambique and Madagascar and thus it can serve as a choice point on the cape route. Soviet Union has been striving hard to gain base facilities in Mozambique and the United States is endeavouring to gain a foothold in Kenya. The situation in the Gulf region, especially in the wake of Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia's disability to emerge as the guardian of the Gulf and politically instability rocking other countries of the region portend an explosive scenario.

Both the super powers have massive military and naval deployments in the region comprising PG-WIO. These deployments have been justified by either side as a defensive tactical measure. The developments following 1978 especially after the fall of Shah of Iran and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 have been instrumental in the augmentation of super powers military activity in the region.

The United States established the Rapid Development Force (RDF) in 1980 with a view to provide rapid projection of armed forces in the PG-WIO region for tactical reasons of deterrence, combat and diplomatic pressure.\textsuperscript{217} The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was chartered 10 October 1981 and upgraded to become the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) on 1 January 1983, with its headquarters at Macowll Air Force Base in Florida.

The RDF, having over 200,000 troops is drawn from all services of the United States. The composition of the RDF includes one Airborne division, one air mobile or air assault division, one mechanized infantry division, one light infantry division, one air cavalry brigade, an augmented machine amphibious force, seven tactical fighter wings, two strategic bomber squadrons, three carrier battle groups, one surface action group and five maritime patrol air squadrons.\textsuperscript{218}

The RDF is deployed at the key strategic spots where the US has managed to acquire base facilities. The...
prominent spot is the Diego Garcia base acquired by the US on lease from the United Kingdom. This coral island lies some 3,400 kms from the strait of Hormuz. The US has developed sophisticated naval and airfield facilities on this island. Besides, the United States also has an access to the Kenyan port of Mombasa and Somalian port of Berbera. The US has also base facilities in Djibouti Haegiva in Somalia, Masira in Oman and Thumrait and Khasab bases in Muscat. The United States also maintains a naval presence in Bahrain and has naval facilities in Port Sudan, Mogadiscio and the French island of Reunion.

The Soviet Union is also pre-eminentiy maintaining strategic posture in the PF-WIO region. The strategic advantage accruing out of Soviet geographic proximity to the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia provides Moscow a leverage over the US, and unlike the latter, it needs no direct massive naval presence in the region. Moscow maintains an air borne force of seven divisions and about 7000 men in this region which is available for immediate


deployment. The Soviet airlift fleet comprise 100 IL-76s, 50 An-22 and 550 An-12 Aircraft. The Soviet amphibious capacity in the RG-WIO region is also adequate though the first Ivan Rogov Class amphibious ship was deployed in the Indian Ocean in 1981. According to a US military analyst the Soviet Union possesses only minimal capabilities to project and sustain military power far from its borders. He further adds: "As to assess the prospects for future improvements in Soviet force projection capabilities one finds rather modest effort in areas that would support direct force projection into distant places. This assessment is based on old facts. The current scenario has undergone tremendous change.

The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan and its development of several airfields in Southern Afghanistan have improved Soviet strategic position vis-à-vis the United States in the region. Almost all the airfields, especially in Shindad and Kandahar have been put into military service thus bringing the Persian Gulf within the

range of Soviet tactical aircraft and reducing the distance to Ethiopia and South Yemen as well.\textsuperscript{223} Besides, the Soviet backfire bomber operating from the Afghan airfields are capable of hitting the naval targets in the north-west part of the Indian Ocean. Thus, with these capabilities, Moscow is capable of threatening the SLOCs which are economically vital for the United States and other West European countries.

Table 6.3

CONFLICT POSTURES AND ALIGNMENT STRATEGIES

A. Conflict postures within or relevance to Southern Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>Global</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ind-Pak</td>
<td>USA-USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind-China</td>
<td>USA-CHN (before 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak-Afg</td>
<td>Chn-USSR (since 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-VTM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBD-Ind (potential)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Conflict postures and Alignment tendencies based on balance of power principles.

\textsuperscript{223} New York Times, 14 November 1982.
Inter-related conflict postures  Past/present  Alignment tendencies

PAK-IND, IND-CHN Therefore PAK + CHN
IND-CHN, CHN-USSR " IND + USSR
AFG-PAK, PAF-IND " AFG + IND
CHN-USSR, USSR-USA " CHN + USA
VTM-CHN, CHN-USSR " VTM + USSR
VTM-CHN, CHN-IND " VTM + IND
Potential
BGD-India, India " BGD + PAK
BGD-IND, IND-China " BGD + China

C. Actual alignment groups in Southern Asia
Group one: Pak, China, USA, BGD
Group two: India, USSR, AFG, VTM


In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet squadron in the Indian Ocean has grown over 30 vessels, including a dozen combat ships. The Soviet Union has also been seeking more naval and air facilities wherever possible. It has been concentrating on South Yemen which lies along the Bab-al-Mandab strait, a strategic check-point between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It
already maintains base facilities at Socotra, a South Yemen island in the Arabian sea and in Aden. Moscow already enjoys naval and airfield, facilities at Asmara in Ethiopia. It is fastly developing the naval facilities in the Dahlak Islands off the Ethiopian port of Massa. The Soviets are also making efforts in acquiring base facilities in the Maldives, Madagascar and Seychelles.

The forces deployed by both Washington and Moscow in the region are equipped with nuclear weapons as well. The United States aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean carry nuclear weapons as do over 80 per cent of the large surface ships. The US Central Command Force previously known as Rapid Deployment Force, is also equipped with sea-launched land attack cruise missiles. The Soviet Backfire bombers are also equipped with nuclear weapons and the regions of south west is within the range of SS-20 missiles.

Thus the above analysis makes it evident that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its continued military presence in that country portends obvious dangers to regional as well as global security. The situation in the Indian subcontinent is already volatile. The gulf region is politically unstable because of the
ongoing war between Iran and Iraq. The situation in West Asia is already fragile because of Israel's intransigence. All these scenarios add to the escalation of tensions which can threaten the global security.
### Military Balance Between India and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Armed Forces</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular</strong></td>
<td>1,260,000</td>
<td>482,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve: Army</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>513,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Army</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Regional Commands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Corps Hq.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Armed Divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mechanical Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Infantry divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mountain divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Indep. armed brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Independent brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mountain brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Para brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Independent artillery brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Independent engineering brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanks:</strong> 700 T-54/55, 300 T-72, 1500 Vijayanta, 150 PT-76, AFV MicV 350 BMP-1, APC: 500 OT-62/64 BTR-60.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks: 405 M-47/48 (incl.A5), 51 T-54/55, 1050 Type 59, APC: 500 M-113, 45 UR-416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
India

Artillery:

Guns: Yug M-48 76mm, 25-pdr (88mm) (retiring), 100 100mm, 200 105mm (incl Abbt SP), 550 M-46 130 mm (some SP), 5.5- (140mm) (retiring), S-23 180mm; how: 75/24 75 mm mountain, 105 mm (incl M-56 pack), D-20 152 mm (incl. M-56 pack), D-20 152 mm; mortar 81 mm, 500 120 mm, 26 160 mm; SSM: FROG-7

ATK: RCL: M-19 57mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, M-40 106 mm; guns: 6-pdr (57mm), AT3W: SS-11-BI

Milan, A7-3 saager

AD: guns: 20 mm, ZS4-23-4 23 mm
SP.L 40/60, L 40/70 40mm; 500 3.7-in. (94 mm); SAM: 180 SA-6, SA-7, 485A-8A, SA-9, 40 Tigercat

Pakistan

Artillery:

Guns: Some 1000 25 pdr (88mms).

Type-59 100mm, 130mm, 5-5 in (140 mm) and 155mm; how. M-116 75 mm packs. 105 mm incl. packs; 12 M-7 SP 75-M-148

100 M-109 A2SP 155 mm, A7-115 and 40M-110 A2 SP 203 mm; MRC: 122 mm; mor. 107 mm, 120 mm

A7K: RL: 75mm, 3.5 in. (89 mm)

RCL: Type 52 75 mm, 106 mm, A 76W

Cobra 200 70W, AD: guns: 4.5mm, 37 mm, 40 mm, 57 mm, 85 mm.

SAM 100 stinger 6 crotale; 6 CSA-11

Aviation

Liaison: ac: 1 sqn with 45 mashshaq (saab al safari); hel: 4 sqns.

Observation: indep flts: ac: 45 0-IE, Cessna 4, 21, 50 mashshaq (Saab, Safari)

Turbo commander, Queen Air; heli some 2AH-15 Cobra with 70W, 16 MI-8, 25 puma, 23 Aloci ette III, 1.3 Bell 476.
India

Navy: 47,000 including naval air force

Submarines: 8 Sov. F-Class

Carriers: 1 Br. Majestic (capacity 188 attack, 4 ASW Ac/hel.)

Cruiser: 1 Br. Fiji (trq.)

Destroyers: 3 Sov., 8 Kashier; 11 GW with 4 Stgx SSM; 22 SA-N-1 SAM, 1 Ka-25 hel.

Frigates: 23: 2 Gadavari with 2 Stgx, 1, 4 SA-N-4 SAM, 2 Seaking hel: 6 Leander (4 with 2x4 Seacat SAM, 2 with 1x4, 1 hel); 2 Br. with 3 Stgx SSM, 1 Alouette hel: 10 SOX Petyer II: 3 Br. Leopard (trq.).

Corvettes: 3 Sov. Nanuchka with USS-N-2SSM, 1 SA-N-4 SAM.

FAC (6): 14: 6 Sov. Osa-1, 8 Osa-II with Styx SSM

Patrol Craft: 8: 2 Osa-1, 1 Abhay, 5 SDB-2 large.

MCMV: 19: 6 Sov Natyer Ocean; 4 Br. Ham, 6 Sov. Yevgenya, 3 Seashore hunters

Amph: LST: 2 (1 Br.); LST: 7 (6 Sov. II Polish, Polnocry); LCU: 4.

Pakistan

Navy: 15,200 (including Naval Air)

Submarines: 11, 2 Hgosta, 4 Daphna, 5 SX-404 midget

Destroyers: 8, 1 Br. with 2x4 Seacat SAM, 1 Alouette hel: 6 US Gearup with 1x8, ASROC ASW 1: 1Br. Battle

FAC: 16 Ch: 12 Shaughai-II, Suchwan 8 ch: 4 Huangfeu, 4 Huku

Patrol craft: 24: Uch, Hainau, 1 To cou, 4a Spear, 18 MC-55 Coastal

MCMV: 3 US adjutant and MSC-268 Coastal

Spt: 2 tankers, 11 Br. Dido cruiser

Naval Air: 3 combat ac: 6 coastal hel.

AWS/MR: 1 Sqn. of 3 Atlantic with Ag-3a ASM

AWS/SAR: 2 hel sqns: 6 sea king ASW with AM-39, 4 Alouette III.

Commns: 1F-27 ac

ASM: AM-39 Exocet
Navy (Contd.)

Naval Air Force

2000, some 36 combat ac, 26 combat hel.

Attack: 1 sqn. with 15 sea Hawk FGH-6, 8 Sea Harrier FRS MK-51 (2T-60 laq) 10 ac in carrier

ASW: 1 ac sqn with 5 Alize 1050 (4 in carrier):

5 hel sqns with 5 Ka-25 Hormone A (ui Kashins),

10 sea king, 11 Aloute III frigates.

MR: 2 sqns: 5 L-1049 Super Constellation, 3 II-38 May

Comms: 1 sqn with 10 Aloutte III.

Trg: 2 sqns: 2 MJT-16 Kiran, 2 sea Hawk FB-5,

10 BN-2, Islander ac: 4 Heughes 300 hel;

Other ac incl: 5 Alize 1050, 4 Sea King

Air Force

113,000: 846 combat ac; some 60 armed hel.

5 Air Commands

Bombers: 3 sqns (1 maritime role): 35 Canberra B(1) 58/B(1) 12 (to be replaced),

13 Jaguar

Air Force

17,600: 375 combat ac

F6A: 8 sqns 1 with 17 mirage; 4 with 50 mirage, 3 with 41 ch.Q-5.

Interceptor/F6A, 11 sqns: 9 with 170 Ch-J-6; 2 with 30 F-16.
India

Air Force (Contd.)

F6A: 12 sqns; 2 (1 )with some 7 mirage 2000M;
1 with some 10 s , F-56 A; 2 with 50 jaguars
GR-1, 6T-2; 3 with 40 SU-7BM (to retire, 1 sqn with
MIG-27 to form 1985); 1 with 50 MF-24, Marut (Mig-23
BN to replaced; 3 with 90 Mig-23 BN Flogger H.)

AD: 20 sqns 2 with 40 MiG-23 MF Flogger B: 14 with
260 MiG-21/FL1.
PF MA/-MF/bis: 4 with 92 Ajeet

Reece: 2 Sqns; 1 with 8 canberra PR-57, 4 MS-748;
1 with 7 Mig-25R; 1 Mig-25U

Tpt: ac: 1 sqns; 5 with 95 AN-32, 2 with 30 AN-12B;
2 with 20 DMC-3; 11 with 16 DMC-4; 2 with 28 MS-748,
3 II-76 Candrd; hel: 6 sqns with 72 Mi-8.

Comms: 1 Hq sqn with 7 HS-748M
Liaison: fits and dets: 16 HS-748, C-47

Liaison: 7 hel sqns Chetak and Cheetah

Trg. Command: 3trg and conversion sqns with 11 canberras,
25 hunter, 40 MIG-21, 16 SU-7, 13 Mig-23,
5 Mig-27, 5 Jaguar, 60 HT-2, 83 HJT-16,
15 Marut, 20 HPT-32, 44 TS-11, 27 HS-748,
AC: 20 Cheetah hel.

AHM: R-23 R/T, HPe 7PC, R-60, Apmd, @-550, Magic AA-2, Atoll
ASM: AS-30, AS-IIB (AT6W)
SAM: 30 bus, 180Divina, V75SM/VK (SA-21, SA-3).


Pakistan

Reece: 1 sqn with 13 mirage

Tpt: 2 sqns; 1 with 13C-130 BE, II-100, 1 with 1 Mystero-Falcon
20, 11 F-27-200, 1 Super King
Air, 1 Bonanza

SAR: 1 hel sqn with 6 MM-43B,
4 Aloutte-II

AAM: Sidewinder, R-530, R-550 Magic

Forces Abroad: 30,000

Saudi Arabia-20,000
remaining in Jordan, Libya,
Oman and UAE