CHAPTER IV

MARX, WORK-MOKSA AND THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS
"Marxism possesses theoretical bases, it embraces all human activity, but it no longer knows anything." All theorists who sought to revitalize Marxism have more or less shared this basic dilemma of Sartre. Throughout they carried the conviction about the superiority of Marxist theory and method despite its visible incapacity to account for many a theoretical and concrete social problems of their times. Their attempts to inject innovations and improvements without questioning the fundamental postulates of Marxism, merely added more complexities. While leaving to economists to judge the veracity of Marx's economic thought, the precise contention here is, that Marxism possesses no theoretical basis so far as the 'social' is concerned -- hence any discussion of 'social class' (including the new middle class), falls extraneous to Marxism.

It is not to be misconstrued as an appraisal of the validity or otherwise of Marx's voluminous writings covering diverse aspects of 'social'; what is meant is that social is peripheral; can not be contained in; and repeatedly jumps out of the Marx's method. Since what exists today is not unitary Marxism but many varieties of it viz., subjective Marxism of Frankfurt School; the structural Marxism of Althusser and his followers;

* Work-Moksa is to be conceived as the 'negation of work'. Historically, man, in a never ending process of qualification-requalification has sought the negation of 'existing form(s) of work', generating an ever broadening domain of work-Moksa. Work-Moksa is the 'social essence' on which 'social' originated and got constituted. Central to class, class formation, class struggle and class consciousness is work-Moksa.
the form determinant approach of German Marxist State theories; the historical Marxism of E.P. Thompson and others etc., is a sufficient testimony to the inherent arbitrary character of its theoretical and methodological premises. The feeling has crystallized that under the veil of thick philosophical mist, it can not be said with certainty about Marxism -- from where begins it and where it ends. For almost a century, much in Marxism has already been debated, however, the two significant issues to be contested in the present analysis are:

1) the absence of 'social essence' in Marxism, and
2) the faulty conception of 'work' by Marx.

THE FORMATIVE PROCESS OF MARX'S THOUGHT

Much is known of Marx's struggle for conquering the Hegelian philosophy. No doubt early in his life, he had recognized the apparent potential of Hegelian system, but until 1842 he did not develop any methodological device for translating its institutional implications. It was Feuerbach who moved first towards the construction of a materialist philosophy as an inversion of Hegelianism. For Hegel nature and man were two distinct entities, and his 'absolute spirit' was man's essence outside him -- the essence of thought outside the act of thought. Feuerbach by conceiving man as part of nature demonstrated the falsification of Hegelian 'mediated reconciliation' of man and nature. Starting with the

concrete man capable of perceiving objects and experiences of the concrete actuality, Feuerbach purged Hegelianism of its mystification. Bringing thus Hegel's subject which existed out of space and time, down to earth, he held that transition from the ideal to real occurs only in the philosophy of praxis.

Through the application of Feuerbach's 'transformative method' Marx worked out the institutional consequences and sociopolitical implications of Hegel's political philosophy by setting Hegelian categories such as 'civil society' and 'property' in a revolutionary relationship to the concept of state. He became critical of Hegel for investing empirical reality with a philosophical halo because it divested 'idea' of its true potential of appraising reality, and turned it into a mere rationalization. Tensions within Hegelian analysis of political structure are mainly because of his adherence to a theoretical premise that separates man from his 'social essence' -- dividing human being into a sphere of privacy (economic activity) and sphere of universal (realization of common good). Man's alienation is the outcome of this bifurcation of life into two spheres -- confronting civil society as a sphere of 'materialism' with the 'idealism' or 'spiritualism' of the state.

According to Marx Hegel's discussion of state ignored the social context of human relationship while simultaneously


* Soon it will be clear that Marx abandoned any consideration of individual or social essence never to reconsider again through-out his life.
rationalizing the existing social organization. Individual is introduced only after the accomplishment of state is completed and perfected, assuming as if 'state' and individual could be treated in a separate manner. Hegel's forced mediation between state and individual is as erroneous and superfluous as the original conception of gap. If Hegel, instead of proceeding from an imaginary subject (sovereignty), had started from the real subject (the underlying principle of state) such an anomaly could have been eliminated from his analysis. Thus Marx argued against any conceptual isolation of individual from his social context: since Hegel's theory conceived 'conditions of material life' completely extraneous to political realm, however, in practice, insisted Marx, they penetrate every corner and crevice of political structure. This convinced him that Hegelian philosophy could be reformed only by reforming the reality itself.

Accomplishing this much, Marx through an elaborate critique of Hegel's philosophy, covering such aspects as state, civil society, religion, monarchy, democracy, class, labour, property etc., concluded once for all that economic sphere ultimately determines politics and ascribed Hegelian postulate of the universality of political life as a mere dream. Onwards throughout his life he never wavered from this position and observed in retrospection, that a critical review of Hegelian

* As Hegel presupposed the existence of 'State', similarly Marx throughout treated 'social' as given and preconstituted.
philosophy had revealed him:

"that legal relations as well as forms of state ... have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel -- combines under the name of 'civil society' that, however, the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy."^4

The position is again reiterated when he described Hegelian dialectics as standing on its head that must be turned right side up again, and emphasized that his dialectical method is its direct opposite: "To Hegel ... the real world is the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into froms of thought"^5.

Gillian Rose^6 has argued that Marx's reading of Hegel overlooks the discourse or logic of speculative proposition. While speculative discourse recognizes the difference between concept and reality; but Marx's non-speculative presentation does not anticipate and can not account for the subsequent fate

6. Rose, G., *Hegel Contra Sociology*. London: The Athlone Press Ltd., 1981, pp.204-20; He argues that Marx's ideas are not realized; implies Marxism is a culture; the very thing of which it has no idea.
of the ideas represented. According to Rose, when Marx is not self-conscious about his relation to Hegel's philosophy or to Feuerbach's materialism he does not think actuality by means of Kantian or Fichtean dichotomies. But when Marx desires to dissociate himself from Hegel's actuality, 'the absolute spirit which nullifies the object' and from Feuerbach's passive materialism; he relies on, affirms abstract dichotomies between being and consciousness, theory and practice etc. He refuses to see the lack of identity in Hegel's thought, and therefore tries to establish his own discourse of lack of identity by using the ordinary proposition. But instead of developing a logic or discourse of lack of identity he produced an ambiguous dichotomy of activity/nature, that relies on a natural beginning and an utopian end.

While Hegel had no solution to the contradictions of bourgeois productive and property relations, he searched for a different concept of law but it could only be explicated abstractly. Rose's argument⁷ is that Marx did not seek resolution of these aporias in Hegel's position. Rather by inheriting them he retreated backwards to a pre-Hegelian position by reading Hegel non-speculatively and by reviving the dichotomies which Hegel had sought to expose as rooted in the bourgeois social relations. Marx's failure to understand Hegel's actuality meant that he did not develop any notion of subjectivity. Subjects are merely 'bearers' of economic

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⁷ ibid. pp.209,216.
functions, such as 'capitalist' and 'worker' and remainder of human personality is directly reduced to this defining function.

MARX'S BREAK WITH EARLIER FORMS OF MATERIALISM

However, of particular significance had been Marx's break with all earlier forms of materialism -- an initial formulation of which was made in Theses on Feuerbach. The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach's) is that the object, actuality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of the object or intuition, but not as sensuous human activity, praxis, not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism, the active side was developed by idealism -- but only abstractly since idealism naturally does not know actual, sensuous activity as such (Thesis-I).

There are epistemological tensions; "The Thesis has an antinomical form: materialism/idealism; actuality as object/actuality as active, as subjectivity, as praxis; theory/praxis". Marx's own position is presented by incorporating activity from idealism, and sensuousness from materialism to compound 'actual sensuous activity' as actuality. Marx reinforces the abstract oppositions between idealism and materialism, theory and praxis that he claims to be transcending. The argument of the fourth thesis that theory 'finds the secrets' and praxis 'nullifies' and revolutionizes has also been criticised.


Rose argues\(^\text{10}\) that it is a Kantian or Fichtean opposition of theory and practice. It does not amount to Hegelian position according to which theory re-cognizes the intuition or object that practice suppresses. In the first thesis Marx assimilates actuality in activity, and materialism is constituted totally in the 'sensuousness' of activity. However this reference to sensuousness is abstract since the notion of activity as that of a 'human, natural being' already includes it. Rose insists that any reference to sensuousness or to the sentient being can only be the initial stage in the exposition of productive and social relations which develop from that stage.

Of critical importance is the sixth Thesis: Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is not an abstraction inherent in each particular individual. In its reality it is the ensemblé of the social relations. Feuerbach who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:

1) to abstract from the historical process, to hypostatize the religious sentiment, and to postulate an abstract-isolated-human individual;

2) to conceive the nature of man only in terms of a 'genus', as an inner and mute universal quality which unites the many individuals in a purely natural (biological) way.

It is in this thesis that Marx rejected 'human essence' as the theoretical foundation of philosophy and rooted his analysis in 'social' and human practice. All social life is

\(^{10}\text{ibid.}\)
essentially practical. All the mysteries which lead theory to words mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice (Thesis VIII). He argued that materialism which does not conceive sensuous existence as practical activity tantamounts to the observation of particular individuals and of civil society (Thesis IX). The standpoint of the old type of materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new materialism is human society or social humanity (Thesis X).

MARX'S MATERIALISTIC CONCEPTION OF HISTORY AND SOCIETY: MISSING SOCIAL ESSENCE AND HISTORICAL CAUSALITY

This criticism of the hitherto existing materialism epigrammatically summarized in the 'Theses on Feuerbach' was elaborated further in 'The German Ideology'.¹¹ The classical materialism viewed reality as a mere object of perception but Marx considered reality not only because it is shaped by men but also because it reacts on man himself. Marx argued that Feuerbach's conception of sensuous world is limited to twin aspects of 'contemplation' and feeling; thus taking refuge in double perception -- a philosophical one that perceives the 'true essence' of things and the profane one that perceives 'only the flatly obvious'.

Thus he only conceives man as an 'object of senses', but not as 'sensuous activity'. Since he remains in the realm of theory and does not conceive of men in their given social connection and their existing conditions of life; he never arrives at the actually existing active men but stops at the

abstraction man (the actual, individual, corporeal man). Hence he never manages to conceive the total living sensuous activity of the individuals composing it.

Marx extended the argument that Feuerbach's sensuous world is not an ever constant entity given direct from all eternity, rather it is the outcome of 'industry' and of the state of society -- an historical product of the commulative activity of all the preceding generations. While Feuerbach considered unity of man and nature expressed by man's being a part of nature, Marx saw man as shaping nature and in turn his being shaped by it. Thus for Marx, men by producing their means of subsistence are indirectly producing their material life. The mode of production is not simply the reproduction of their physical existence rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals -- a definite form of expressing their life. What they are coincides with their production and depends on the material conditions of production. Definite individuals who are productively active under definite conditions of production enter into definite social and political relations. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas etc., that is, real active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces (the mode of production of their material life), their material intercourse and its further development in the social and political structure. Consciousness is directly interwoven with the material activity and

12. ibid. pp.45-47.
the material intercourse of men; and can never be anything else than conscious being, and being of men in their actual life process. Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product and remains so, as long as men exist at all.

Furthermore, since the first historical act is the production of material life itself, and the aggregate of productive forces accessible to men determines the conditions of society; hence history of humanity must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of 'industry' and exchange. Finally, the productive forces determine the nature of social relations and all collisions in history (revolutions, social change etc.) have their origins in the contradictions between the productive forces and the forms of social relations. This is -- in Marx's language -- more or less a general depiction of Marx's materialistic conception of society and history.

Rejecting the notion of 'substance' and 'essence' of man etc. which formed the basis of all earlier philosophies (also all kinds of materialism, including that of Feuerbach), Marx rooted his materialist conception in the 'social' and 'social forms of intercourse' -- social relations, social consciousness, social change, laws of social development etc. set in the materialist view of history -- all in turn determined by the material conditions and the sum total of productive forces.

While Marx's abandonment of 'human essence' in abstraction,

13. ibid. see, pp.37,42,47-50 and 82-83.
is not to be disputed, however, what is to be questioned is that he inducted 'social' in his schema in a frivolous manner without the determination of any 'social essence'.

For the last four centuries two major types of 'causal determinations' have dominated the western philosophy:¹⁴ Mechanistic conception (cartesian in origin) that reduces causality to a transitive and analytic effectivity. Since in this model, the whole is conceived as merely the resultant or sum of its parts, the explanations emerging from this type of causality are unable to imagine the effect of the 'whole' on its parts. The other model of causal determination (Leibnitz in origin, and developed further by Hegel) is capable of 'thinking' the effect of the whole on its parts. It is based on the presupposition that the 'whole' is reducible to an inner essence, of which the elements of the 'whole' are then no more than its phenomenal expressions. A certain nature of the 'whole' is also presupposed (e.g. spiritual whole) in which each element is perceived as expressive of the entire totality.

Marx was making efforts to avoid reduction of social experience to linear causal terms, for such a formulation would overlook the specific human-historical experience.¹⁵ But instead of devoting himself to trace particular lines of historical causation, he engrossed himself more in the elaboration

¹⁴. This kind of argument has already been pursued by Althusser while rejecting the 'human essence'/phenomenon problematic in Marxism, see Althusser, L., and Balibar, E., *Reading Capital*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1970. While Althusser moved towards inventing 'Structural Causality', the present analysis aims at to establish the existence of work-Moksa as the social essence and historical causality.

of a set of categories for analysing social systems, taking into account that all social systems are continually undergoing change. In sum: Marx struggled towards an entirely new conception of causality which he was unable to formulate conceptually. Precisely this is the reason that Marxism became prone to diverse kinds of interpretations. Mechanistic causality dominated the schemas of the official theoreticians of Second and Third International (Kautsky, Bukharin etc.), and the 'expressive totality' was to be found in the Hegelian inspired interpretations of Marxism (e.g. Lukacs, Korsch etc.) or at best the field was left open for the like of Althusser to invent 'structural causality' etc. It has already been amply revealed that explanations flowing from 'mechanistic causality' leave the subject of history high and dry; Hegelian inspired interpretations emerging from 'expressive totality' have tended to degenerate towards the extremes of subjectivity; and Althusserian efforts making use of 'structural causality' have merely ended in 'empty' structuralism. Such attempts are mere rebounds on the already available faulty premises provided by Marx.

WORK AND MAN'S PROGRESS FROM PREHISTORY TO HISTORY:
MARX'S IMPERFECT CONSTRUCTION OF 'SOCIAL':

Marx's premises on which is based the transition from 'natural' to 'social' within the ambit of his materialist

conception of history are as follows: The initial standpoint is the existence of living human individuals and the first act to be established, according to Marx, is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Life involves before everything else the fulfillment of various needs (eating, drinking, housing, clothing etc.) which in turn demands the production of the means to satisfy such needs -- the production of material life itself. The satisfaction of certain needs -- the activity and the instruments involved in the satisfaction process -- leads to the creation of new needs. This creation of the new needs is the first historical act.

To begin with family is the only social relation which later on becomes a subordinate one; because increased population creates new needs, and increased needs create new social relations. Family in the beginning is also a repository of the natural division of labour. With the further division of labour, individual and family interests come into contradiction with the common interest of all the individuals having intercourse (social relations) with one another -- since the common interest exists, first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom the labour is divided.

"The production of life, both of one's own labour and of the fresh life in procreation, now appears as a twofold relation: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relation -- social in the sense that it denotes the

co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end." 18

From the very outset there exists a material connection of men with one another, which is determined by their needs and their mode of production, and is as old as men themselves. A certain mode of production is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation or social stage.

The objects of man's drives exist outside himself as objects independent of him, yet they are objects of his needs, essential objects which are indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his faculties. 19 For Marx, consciousness, in the beginning, is just the consciousness about the 'immediate sensuous environment' and the limited relations with other men and things, outside the yet emerging self-conscious individual. At this stage it is mainly animal like consciousness of nature (i.e. only man's instinct becomes a conscious one), resulting from man's confrontation with completely alien power of nature. Simultaneously it also means man's consciousness of the necessity of associating with other individuals around him i.e. a beginning of the conscious confirmation that he is living in a society. However, this beginning is as animal as social life itself. This animal like consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs and what is

18. ibid. pp. 48-49.

* We have consciously avoided the controversy; whether or not for Marx consciousness is a mechanistic, automatic response (Contd.)
fundamental to both of these; the increase of population. whereas animal needs remain constant and are determined by nature, man's needs now become 'social' and the pursuit of their creation and satisfaction constitutes historical development.

"Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction." 21

Although needs will continue relating to material objects but the consciousness that perceives such needs as human needs graduates to a social product of a concrete historical situation. To reiterate Marx's position, consciousness from the very beginning is a social product and remains so as long as men exist at all.

In sum, Marx's argument is: To start with, there is only metabolism between man and nature, and consequently emerges rudimentary form of physical organization. There are simple nature related needs and their fulfilment through man's activity (labour, and the fabrication of the instruments of labour) leads to the creation of more new needs. Further activity results in division of labour and individual interests are subordinated to common interests. Needs become 'social'

to merely material stimuli, or regarding his neglect to consider that men's minds must have an autonomous intentional capacity for the satisfaction of needs etc. Our particular interest remains here to see how Marx goes about in effecting a transition from 'natural' to 'social'.

and historico-specific and solutions demand ever more co-operation and new forms of social relations. Hence emerges the 'social' and the corresponding social consciousness. Simultaneously at work and affecting the whole process is obviously, the continuous increase of population. So as not to succumb to any metaphysical premises and not to ascribe to man any a priori essence, Marx made central to this whole process his work theory of anthropogenesis i.e. work played a tremendous role in dividing man off from the animal kingdom.

"The use and fabrication of instruments of labour, although existing in the germ among certain species of animals, is specifically characteristic of the human labour process." 22

Man is a tool-making animal. Nature becomes one of the organs of his activity, one that he annexes to his own bodily organs, adding stature to himself. This process makes man into man, differentiates him from animals and lies at the bottom of his ability, to create and change the conditions of his life. Man's environment shaping function itself becomes the empirical content of his existence. Engels especially stressed the qualitatively specific nature of this process of anthropogenesis:

"The most that the animal can achieve is to collect: man produces, he prepares the means of life ... which without him nature would not have produced." 23

Man, according to Engles adapts himself actively to his surroundings and later on gains mastery over nature. Man could only have achieved his power through conscious and constant labour activity. Thus work created an impassable abyss between man and the animals, and their lines of development not only became greatly different but branched off in absolutely opposite directions. Labour is the primary basic condition to such an extent that "labour created man himself". Thus both for Marx and Engels 'work' is the concrete expression of human activity that makes an everlasting imprint on man's world. From natural existence within prehistory, the argument is further extended to 'social in the domain of history.

"The social structure ---(is) continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals ... as they actually are i.e. as they act, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions ...."^24

For Marx, man's creative ability causes the historical emergence of labour and labour in turn is the source of human historical life and content. The contents of man's continual creation, ever dynamic and changing furnish the contents of the historical process. The conditions in which labour manifests itself provides the key to the understanding of human history. History is thus an expounding of the real process of production--

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starting from the material production of life itself -- and comprehending the form of social relations connected with and created by a certain mode of production i.e. civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all history.

Unlike the idealist view of history that looks for a category in every period, historical creation as anthropogenesis deriving from man's ability to create objects remains constantly on the real ground of history. An analysis of history must be a projection of human activity. Since Marx considered work as specific attribute of man, he thus conceived history as the continuum of modes of work over generations. Each social stage contains a material result, a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation to nature and among individuals which is handed down to each generation by all preceding generations. 25

So far as the above arguments remain limited to man's natural existence within the domain of prehistory -- the physical evolution of man, rudimentary form of organization and the natural division of labour etc. -- Marx's views are not to be disputed. But their logical extension in an obvious fashion from prehistory to history, assuming the above discussed factors as constitutive of 'social' is fraught with difficulties.

A close reading of Marx* reveals that his analysis so

* This analysis, no doubt rests particularly on Theses on Feuerbach, and The German Ideology, but this criticism is more or less applicable to all of Marx's writings, wherever he deals with arguments of prehistoric(natural) and historic (social) nature. Marx time and again reverted to such arguments in most of the works.
far as it concerns the issue of transition from prehistory (natural existence) to history (social) is imperfect, hazy and vague. The mode of argument is indistinct and faulty: Either there are to be found broad sweeping statements pertaining to the sphere of prehistory or the discussion abruptly shifts to the domain of history and is carried on unfettered exclusively within the pre-constituted 'social'. Wheresoever the argument simultaneously deals with prehistoric and historic concerns (often to be found in single sentences), it seems Marx nurtured a careful avoidance of clear and distinct display of 'social' as if deliberately downplaying the 'social content' of the argument and letting it sink in abstraction so as to bear resemblance with 'natural' part of the argument. Sometimes social categories are unassumingly allowed to traverse freely the prehistoric part of the argument. What is more, nowhere at one stretch has Marx worked out a conclusive and logical transition from prehistory (natural existence) to history (social).

An irresistible feeling emerges that perhaps Marx consciously avoided a direct encounter and confrontation with the 'transition period' (real moment of social origins) where prehistory ends and protohistory leading to history begins. With difficulty one can extract merely a rough sketch of Marx's movement from prehistory to history, that too only to reveal that pointed and distinct dealing of 'transition period' is absent. What exists are disjointed and fractured statements having utter disregard for eras and epochs. Whatsoever the appearance of continuity from prehistory to history is
furnished by Marx, rests entirely on the central category i.e. 'work' as creative and 'producing' activity.

As far as it concerned with man's physical survival and natural evolution work played a significantly decisive role and forever remains an (not sole) important denominator for man's existence; however the emergence of 'social' rested not on 'work' but on the 'negation of work'. For about one million years man lived in prehistory as 'man the tool maker', who could consciously act on nature's materials; and out of this for the last roughly one lakh years 'man' existed in such an evolved form that he had acquired sufficient capacity to mould, adapt, fashion nature through the conscious application of his mind and body, and could 'produce' .... in every sense of the work.

Significantly for about one million years 'social' never took off from ground beyond the rudimentary gregarious form. The sole reason being that man's activity, work and 'produce' were just sufficient to fulfil 'hunger' and basic compulsions of survival. Throughout prehistory work could hardly effect 'negation of work' in any notable sense, and the marginal free moment released from work, beyond the fulfil-ment of hunger was absorbed with quick regularity in routine survival pursuits. Thus work merely remained as nature-imposed routine and regular compulsion entrapped within the vicious natural cycle of day and night — hunger, work, sleep. It was only when

* During early stages of evolution man's primate ancestors survived without such a notion of work.
work could effect considerable 'negation of work' hence releasing a durable work-Moksa moment, that the first seeds of 'social' sprouted. It is this 'work-Moksa' -- the 'nectar' and 'essence' of 'social' -- the fountain-head from which social sprang up, originated and got constituted.

**METHODOLOGICAL LACUNAS IN MARX : PERIPHERAL TREATMENT OF 'SOCIAL' AND 'SOCIAL CLASS'**

It is difficult to desist from speculating - even though involved is the risk of stretching the argument too far -- that Marx perhaps himself was not satisfied with the whole project. 'Theses on Feuerbach, and 'The German Ideology' (except for one chap. of Vol.2.) were published only after his death. Marx wrote about the German Ideology: "We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of mice all the more willingly, as we had achieved our main purpose -- selfclarification". Perhaps somewhere he was feeling that this self-clarification was not so clear. However, once establishing the fragile continuity between prehistory and history based on the central category of 'work', and on which rested his frivolous premises of materialism; Marx, with the sheer power of philosophical logic started parading 'social' as mere approximations and exactitudes of 'material'. Reflections of 'material' in Marx's philosophical mirror were transformed into wonderful appearances of 'social'.

Almost like Hegel's state Marx treated 'social' as more or less given and preconstituted. His materialist conception of history remains as truncated and exists as a mere assertion resting on vague and sweeping statements of pre-historical nature of which Marx hardly had much knowledge.

The 'transition period' between prehistory and history during which 'social' originated was not paid any attention and he never troubled himself to explore and establish the true basis or some real essence of social. Marx's dialectics -- void of social essence (missing social content of dialectical categories) and because of truncated materialist history (disjointed context of dialectical movement) -- displays stubborn resistance in dialectical movement and is often gappingly stuck-up in the material morass e.g. the problematic of transition from a given mode of production to another one yet remains unresolved.

What is more, there is another serious lacuna in Marx's method: The centrally retained starting-points are generally the needs, wants or interests etc. conceived as natural, individual or in abstraction; before moving towards any materialistic abstraction or reduction. Immediately Marx -- in an unassuming and obvious fashion -- would introduce in his analysis some or the other category(ies) of 'social' though of rudimentary nature e.g. natural division of labour, preliminary physical organization or co-operation etc.

* During the times of Marx, much of man's evolutionary past was still in dark, Darwins theory of evolution was nascent, and disciplines such as archaeology, prehistoric archaeology palaeoanthropology and palaeontology etc. had not yet come of age.
Soon the needs, wants or individual interests etc. conceived originally as 'natural' or in abstraction are transformed into 'social' needs, wants or common interests etc. Next Marx would set about consistently eliminating 'social' and gradually replacing it by the material content, through the examination of some entirely different process, say production. Hence in order to effect a materialist abstraction or reduction, Marx's elimination of 'social' is as erroneous as its erroneous induction in the first place. This methodological ambiguity is abundantly manifest in Marx's works.

Although Marx's discussion in 'Capital' moves within the already pre-constituted social, however, for instance in the analysis of commodity, precisely at work is the above discussed method. Capital opens with the description of commodity in terms of 'wants' etc. conceived in abstraction. Obviously, in the very next para the the social is partially inducted through the category of 'use' (commodity being a useful-thing) determined by 'socially-recognized standards' and contingent upon 'convention' (social). Next item introduced is exchange (again social). Then through the examination of labour-process, the social is eliminated by transforming and reducing the content of commodity into an abstraction i.e. as something containing 'objectified labour' whose central core and essence is 'value'.

writings while in reality it is extraneous and can not be con-
tained in Marx's method.

No wonder then, that Marx had never pointedly confronted
the question of 'social class' or striven after constructing a
consistent theory of class. Again no wonder that following
Marx, efforts made by Marxist scholars to squeeze some plausible
class theory out of Marx's works has merely amounted to flogging
the dead horse. Not to mention the quandary or state of
confusion in which lies the theoretically untamed and intractable
problematic of the new middle class in Marxism.

MARX'S FAULTY AND STATIC NOTION OF WORK

Reverting to the second contention made in the beginning
of this chapter: Labour as conceived by Marx29 is in the first
place a process of participation between man and Nature, whereby
man of his own accord initiates, regulates and controls the
material reactions between himself and Nature. Through the
natural forces of his body, man opposes himself to Nature, so
as to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his
own wants. Labour-process is the everlasting Nature-imposed
condition of human existence, and is the necessary condition
for effecting exchange of matter between man and Nature. It is
an eternal necessity for the existence of human race, without
which there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature

and therefore no life; and is independent of every social phase of that existence or rather is common to every such phase.

What is important Marx saw (already discussed) man as shaping Nature and his being in turn shaped by it. Man by "acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature". Consciousness for Marx is directly interwoven with the material activity and material intercourse of men. Consciousness from the very beginning is the product of man's confrontation with Nature -- a completely alien, all powerful and unassailable force. Man has consciously striven to conquer, subdue and transform Nature, thus annexing it and adding stature to himself. It could never occur to Marx that at certain stage of man's evolution, the subduing of this everlasting Nature-imposed condition could also emerge and form part of man's consciousness. Since he conceived work as merely something that 'produces', the whole idea fell extraneous to Marx's thinking.

However it was only when work had to acquire added capacity of effecting 'negation of work' beyond a mere producing activity, that the emergence of such a consciousness could become a feasibility. But Marx's premises of "...man and his labour on one side and Nature and its materials on the other, sufficed", arbitrarily and in a priori fashion --

30. ibid. p.173.
31. ibid. p.179.

Here it is to be seen an avoidance of direct confrontation with 'social' specific of Marx's style of writing. It is to be noted that meaning conveyed by 'social existence' or 'existence of social' is certainly different than 'social phase of that existence'. Marx's argument in actuality concerns existence, and the excursions of social are merely illusory.
through a philosopher's pen — uncritically allotted labour once for all to man's fate. In fact the philosopher had slipped on the very portals of the bourgeois notion of work. So far as work is simply conceived of producing and reproducing exclusively man's 'existence', Marx's premises of 'metabolism between man and Nature' are not to be contested. However for the materialization of an effective retreat in Nature's boundary so that concern is not mere 'existence' but 'existence of social', Marx's premises bursts asunder. For such a situation would demand that work attains an added capacity of 'negation of work' beyond something that merely 'produces'.

As the existence of social is contingent upon work generating 'negation of work' consequently producing a durable 'work-Moksa' moment; man since the dawn of 'social' had relentlessly been hammering this very bond between 'man and labour'. Precisely, the loosening and untying of this knot between 'man and labour' only did open up pandora's box, emitting and releasing wonderful categories of 'social' — hence social classes. For this thesis to proceed further it becomes hereby ever more compulsive to irretrievably abandon Marx.

WORK AND WORK-MOKSA DURING PREHISTORY:
A BRIEF EVOLUTIONARY CONTEXT OF MAN

Much of man's evolutionary past has been thoroughly revealed since Darwin's Classic contribution of the 'Origin of Species'.
controversies regarding the details of progressive changes and
the dynamic causes underlying evolution; the essential aspects
of the theory of evolution or the fact that man evolved from
apelike ancestors are scientifically no more disputed issues.
Sufficient evidence of palaeoanthropological nature has
accumulated to establish the hypothesis of man's evolutionary
relationship to the primate ancestors of the anthropoid group.
In the Tertiary period (Cenozoic Era), during the Miocene
Epoch (started 28 million years ago) when Mammals were at the
height of evolution, first man-like apes had appeared on earth.
Throughout the Miocene, Pliocene Epochs (duration 16 and 11 m.
years respectively) primate line, relating to man continued
advancing through successive biological levels by means of
mutation, normal variation and natural selection.

Of particular importance was the progressive evolution
of erect posture leading towards biped gate, growth in the size
and complexity of brain, development of stereoscopic vision
and speech areas, and other anatomical features. There also
occurred a gradual transition from arboreal habitats to ground
dwellings. Erect posture had great influence on the growth of

33 See, e.g. Simpson, G.C., The Meaning of Evolution, New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1949; Kerr, J. Graham, Evolution,
London: Macmillan, 1926; Clark, W.E. LeGros, The
Antecedents of Man, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1959;
and Norgate 1929; Boule, M. and H.V. Vallois, Fossil Men,
New York: Dryden, 1957; Clark, W.E. LeGros, The Fossil
Evidence for Human Evolution, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1955; Howells, W., Back of History: The Story of Our
Own Origins, Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954, etc. This is
in no way an exhaustive list.

34 The Time Periods used here are from: Dudson, O.E.,
Evolution: Process and Product; New Delhi: Affiliated East-
brain. It was specifically through the evolution of brain that higher primates achieved their pre-eminence over other animals; e.g. from middle Pliocene to late Pliocene periods the brains of the descendents of Dryopithecus had developed to a different and immeasurably superior level — helping an omnivorous, ground dwelling ape to change at length into a much more intelligent and prehuman creature.

This was an era of strategic advance from ape-brain to one with some of the potentialities of human brain. The development enabled man's primate ancestors to effectively utilize their environment for their own ends. Also the progressive developments in the complexity of structure of the late Pliocene pre-human brain were such as to make entirely new forms of behaviour possible. Towards the end of Pliocene the purely instinct-centred behaviour was gradually giving way to a learning-process (initially through trial and error) and its transmission through successive generations. Survival threshold was raised since they were better able to cope with environment conditions than were the forest denizens who acted merely through instincts.

Wild-existence was also changing into a process of self-domestication; first into a family and later on in the form of clusterings of families in bands or encampments for the sake of more efficient survival. The leaving behind of the arboreal habitats and adaptation of earliest hominids or prehumans to life on ground, associated with the progressive growth of the brain and the possession of stereoscopic vision led finally
to the specialization of the limbs. This development was of critical significance in that once the forelimbs and hands were relieved from direct share in locomotion; the growth in manual dexterity in handling the tools became a possibility. Thus by the end of Pliocene man's ancestors had already acquired the capability to handle and use crude tools directly adopted from natural materials such as wood, bamboo or suitable stones etc. However, man the tool-maker in the real sense had yet emerge.

It is of paramount importance to note here that until this stage, the much trumpeted notion of 'work' that Marx and others never stopped harping upon, while making it a central category and essential basis of existence, was absolutely absent. Despite that man's primate ancestors had successfully 'survived' and 'existed' throughout the evolutionary process. In the following, it is to be argued that at a later stage, the appearance of 'work' both in 'procuring' and 'producing' sense, merely constituted an additional basis solely for 'existence' and in no way should be confused as basic to the 'existence of social'. And that fundamental and essential condition for the 'social' to emerge and for its further constitution and perpetuation, had to be that 'work' remaining no more a simple producing activity should have attained the capacity of effective 'negation of work' and ultimately qualified for releasing a durable 'work-Moksa' moment.

With the end of Tertiary period began the Quaternary. Fairly early during the Pleistocene Epoch (Quaternary period),
man the tool-maker had appeared on the scene. More than a million years of Pleistocene, dealing with the story of man and everything that concerns him from that dim remote moment when he first emerged from his animal ancestry until the time when the existence of written records leads the investigator into the realm of history proper, constitutes the subject matter of Prehistory. The period that concerns with the end of Prehistory when contact with history is being made, but before literary history unassisted by the spade can really carry on the story, is sometimes referred to as Protohistory. Prehistory was more or less a dark age stretching over 99.5 percent of man's total period of existence, while recent tiny outer fringe of only about 5000 years falls within the purview of History. Prehistoric man confronted and existed through extremely difficult and most trying conditions prevailing on earth.

It may be noted in the passing that most striking feature of prehistoric times was 'The Great Ice Age' characteristic of four Glacial phases (when actual ice conditions prevailed) alternating with Inter glacial phases (when climate

was more genial). With the setting in of Pleistocene Epoch, there occurred a slow lowering of temperature of the planet, covering it at times by a vast sheet of ice e.g. a great ice sheet as thick as about two miles covered northern Europe and most of the British Isles. It extended over the whole of Scandinavia, the Baltic sea and far into Germany and Russia. Separate but less extensive glaciers also covered the Himalayas, Alps, the Pyrenees and other high mountaneous regions. The Pleistocene Ice Age merges rather insensibly into the Recent Period: Taken the epoch as a whole the present may merely be regarded as being part of the Great Ice Age because after experiencing the last glacial phase, the mankind is now passing through a warm phase which is generally considered simply another Interglacial period that commenced some 15000 years ago.

Prehistoric man existed not only during the relatively warmer spells of Ice Age -- the Interglacial periods -- but also during phases of intense refrigeration. His survival, when so many other groups of larger mammals perished, was mainly because of greater adaptability and superior intelligence which had accentuated since the day his ancestors had left the arboreal mode of life to live in the open country surrounding their forest habitats. Beyond that it is to be noted


* The Glacial and Interglacial phases of the Great Ice Age run into thousands of years, and were not of equal duration, but showed considerable disparity e.g. the Second Interglacial period which lasted for about 190,000 years was at least three times as long as either the First or Third Interglacials (duration 60,000 years each). The four Glacial phases were Günz, Mindel, Riss and Würm.
that certain parts of world during Pleistocene viz. African continent and whole of the Indian continent south of the Himalayas, experienced Pluvial (pluvium=rain) and Interpluvial phases corresponding to Glacial and Interglacial periods. Pluvial conditions were particularly very conducive and most suitable for the existence of man-in-evolution.

The story of prehistoric man can broadly be narrated on two fronts: At one level it concerns man's physical evolution, his continuous and gradual growth and development from ape-man to modern man. Authentic fossil evidences from all over the world have been procured to testify the existence of various types of men viz. Swanscombe man, Heidelberg man, Rhodesian man, Solo man, Peking man, Neanderthal man, Wadjak man, Cro-Magnon man and Homosapiens etc. which inhabited the earth during the prehistoric era. On the other hand it is story of man's activities generally imprinted in stone and left behind for reconstruction in the form of imperishable artifacts. Leaving aside the controversial Eoliths (dawn-stones) of somewhat doubtful nature, it can be said with fair certainty that man fabricated and manufactured stone-tools throughout prehistory.

Starting with the crude and rough hand-axes during the 'Lower Palaeolithic', man continued to painstakingly improve upon existing tools, while also simultaneously learning new techniques and methods, and thus strived to evolve and bring an ever increasing fineness, sophistication and more
importantly practical effectiveness in his stone-tools and other implements throughout the middle and upper palaeolithic, mesolithic until the Neolithic times. Most of the stone-industries of prehistoric times may be short-listed as: Abbevillian, Acheulian, Clactonian, Levallosian, Mousterian, Aurignacian, Solutrian, Megdaliniian, Microliths etc. Certainly a detailed discussion of both the above aspects runs beyond the scope of this work.

Thus while not entering into the technical details or touching the finer points of the subject it is to be hurriedly noted that significant discovery of 'fire' was made and subsequently tamed and made use of since the third Interglacial; and that somewhere corresponding to the upper palaeolithic times, Homosapiens had already appeared on the scence -- the authentic evidences of Homosapiens date back more than 100,000 years. Further, for all practical considerations, the mental potentialities of Homosapiens did not further alter in any significant manner throughout the remaining period.

Particularly, what is to be impressed upon and is of critical concern to this analysis, is that throughout prehistoric period 'work' qualified to 'procure' and 'produce'. From the very beginnings of prehistory man had gradually moved away from the instinctual threshold and onwards his activities were less and less dictated by pure instincts. Throughout prehistoric era, man lived at least in such an evolved form that he had acquired the capacity to imagine and conceive
before any action and could consciously apply his mind and body on Nature's materials to produce the desired results. With the passing of time he acquired an ever increasing skill and intelligence while planning and executing various kinds of work. The process of learning through practical experience and its transmission through generations was also in vogue.

But to all intents and purposes work qualified merely to become an additional supportive basis to man's existence and nothing more. The argument is not intended to undermine the role played by 'work' in man's physical evolution or to underestimate its significance and contribution to his survival pursuits during those extremely hostile conditions, however, the point to be laid stress on is that so far as the question of social was concerned, 'work' in such a state remained utterly irrelevant. The sole reason being the 'work' had not yet qualified for the 'negation' of work' and thus generated insignificant 'work-Moksa' moment.

AN EXPLANATORY NOTE ON WORK-MOKSA'

Before proceeding further it is necessary at this stage to clarify and elaborate the concept of Work-Moksa. It requires a peep into prehistory so as to reconstruct an hypothetical prehistoric scene. Imagine a group (may be a family) of 8-10 members including men, women and children. To prepare (manufacturing of stone-tools etc.), plan (surveying the topography etc.) and to execute a hunting-expedition, it takes
them certain time-period, say two days. At the end of the second day, it may be assumed they have successfully concluded their expedition by killing and capturing their prey i.e. some animal. They are sure the food will last for the next two days. Meanwhile another strong group of say 15 members appears on the scene and pounces upon them and their prey—a situation not at all unusual during prehistoric times. After initial scuffle, then a fierce fight and ultimately a determined but unsuccessful bid to retain their prey; the smaller band runs for life leaving behind the hard and laboriously earned 'product'.

The situation that now confronts the original group and the only option open to it, is to rework and again go through the whole process so as to satisfy an ever increasing hunger. Had the product survived with them, they would have lived in an emancipated or liberated moment or state of Moksa from the immediate compulsion of work, at least for the coming next two days or so. Hence the 'product' signifies or represents merely a certain work-Moksa moment.

To cite another example: A prehistoric family has some food procured from plants or left over from their last hunting expedition after initial consumption; which will last for another day or so. Keeping in view of their next hunting expedition they intend to manufacture some stone-tools so as to supplement their existing stock. Prehistoric man gathers some suitable stones with the help of family members. After proper scrutiny and careful examination, he
selects one of good quality and sets in to work on it. Through careful strokes and expert chipping he proceeds towards extracting a preconceived shape. After, say, half-a-day's labour he almost succeeds in fabricating the tool, thus producing the desired result. As ill luck would have it some last casual stroke splits the tool hence destroying the laboriously fabricated product.

Such a situation would demand that he reworks and again goes through the whole process. Had the 'product' survived, he would have been free for the rest of the day to do something else concerning his already planned future hunting-expedition. By now it is crystal clear that both what originally goes in the 'product' and what the 'end-product' signifies and represents in relation to the subject, is a certain equivalent of 'work-Moksa' moment.

WORK-MOKSA: SOCIAL ESSENCE AND HISTORICAL CAUSALITY

Reverting back to the argument, it is to be emphatically stated, that throughout prehistory 'work' remained in such a state so as to release only a negligible 'work-Moksa' moment, which in turn was readily absorbed in routine survival pursuits. Thus 'work' while being in every sense a 'procuring' and 'producing' activity, remained a Nature-imposed external condition and necessity; entrapped viciously within the 'natural cycle' of hunger, sleep and survival.

Available literature on the still surviving 'hunting and gathering 'people, amply reveals that there is no
sustained supply of food. 37 In the absence of any preserving and storing facilities, and where as much as twenty to thirty pounds of meat can be consumed by a single person in a day, 39 most types of food simply can't last for any extended period of time. Usually, there are more frequent shortages of food and the situation is distinctly marked by constant threat of hunger, starvation and survival. Life is lived largely on a day to day basis. 40 No wonder then, that for a very long period in prehistory, Homosapiens remained trapped within the vicious 'hunting and gathering syndrome'. Since 'work' hardly had acquired any potential to generate a regular and durable 'work-Moksa' moment, the 'social' could not emerge.

Thus even until towards the end of prehistory the situation had not altered in any significant manner, except the emergence of family solidities or bands and the attendant clusterings or encampments of families. — a rudimentary 'social' structured upon the meagre cumulative 'work-Moksa' moment. For instance, an outstanding feature of existing


40. ibid. (Holmsberg), p.34.
'hunting and gathering' bands is that they are invariably small. The average population numbers about fifty, and even in unusually favourable environment conditions it seldom reaches not more than a few hundred. At this stage, complex systems of social organization are just impossible and any marked social differentiation is virtually absent. Even Headman, Shaman etc. spend most of their time in the same basic activities as other adult males.

"... a chief must fulfill, in a superior fashion, those obligations required of everyone else. ... Like any other man he must make his bows and arrows, his tools; he must hunt, fish, collect (food). The official duties of headmen "... seldom take up whole or even the greater part of their normal daily life, and may require less frequent attention; and when not engaged on public business they follow the same occupations as all other people." In this kind of natural existence the entire population of a hunting and gathering band exists in the form of families or solidities and tends to function as a unit in most of the basic activities. There are no permanent settlements, and life is nomadic or semi-nomadic since territories are notoriously erratic in their yield.

What is more, there is no spare time for the prolonged

42. Holmsberg, A. op. cit., 1950, p.59.
44. For a discussion of 'solidities' see, Service, Elman, Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective, New York: Random House, 1962, pp.73-76.
care of chronically sick or old people. Common practice is to abandon such persons at the time of breaking the camp or to hasten their end by strangulation etc. with the consent of all except the victim. These observations on the hunting and gathering people give fairly great amount of insights about the natural existence which might have remained in vogue during the concluding phases of prehistory. For the social to emerge work had yet to qualify for the effective 'negation of work' in order to release a 'durable and regular 'work-Moksa' moment.

In the postglacial phase, during, the early part of Holocene (Recent) epoch (Quaternary period, Cenozoic era) and with the end of upper palaeolithic, some 10,000 B.C. ago started the Mesolithic. Mesolithic did not show any marked change from the upper palaeolithic in that it essentially remained a 'food-gathering' and 'hunting' stage. However man had started befriending and domesticating some wild animals while simultaneously identifying the potentialities of certain plants and their fruit bearing seasons for his basic existence. A real break with the prehistoric past was almost in the offing. About 8,000 B.C. ago began the Neolithic -- a concluding phase of stone-tool prehistory. By the beginnings of Neolithic, the knowledge that a single seed is capable of producing a similar plant -- bearing thousands of the same kind of fruits with the same taste -- had ultimately dawned upon man.

Man, who until then could merely 'procure' food from 'Nature' learned now to 'produce' it by agriculture. Agriculture and domestication of animals finally got established. That this development was a significant break with the past which revolutionized the whole basis of man's existence has already received sufficient attention and universal recognition. However its particular importance from the standpoint of this analysis lies in that 'work' qualified to a different stage, attained the capacity for the effective 'negation of work' and hence-forth could release a lasting and durable 'work-Moksa' moment.

For instance, an agricultural survey of the Yucatan, the home of Maya, has revealed that an average Maya corn farmer, using traditional methods, could raise enough corn with forty-eight days' labour to supply his family for an entire year. Thus the Mayan farmer has a considerable amount of free time which he can devote to other kinds of activities. It was this surplus time which made possible the building of famous Mayan pyramids, temples, palaces, colonnades, ball courts, dance platforms, courts, plazas and causeways. In horticultural and agricultural societies, this surplus time set in the cyclic process for the rise of a diverse range of cultures, governments, standing armies, political institutions and business enterprises of an exclusive or specialized

47. Ibid., pp. 155-56.
character, all unknown at the hunting and gathering stage. 48

This new qualification of 'work' which could subdue and negate the hitherto 'existing form of work' was readily accorded recognition and immediately formed part of subject's consciousness in history. Superficial readings of mankind's history in many a paradigms have repeatedly assigned the development of societies to the consequential effects of mode of production, technology, language etc or simply to the 'producing' nature of work. In such paradigms anthropological and historical 'causalities' are either treated synonymously or left indeterminate, confused or unclear. It is crystal clear that for this analysis, there is a clear disjunction between the anthropology and history of mankind whereby central historical causality turns out to be 'work-Moksa' and nothing else.

The historical mode of social existence was a consequence of work-Moksa and was structured within the expanding domain of work-Moksa. It was consciously adopted by the 'historical subject' with a clear recognition that this new mode of existence based on agriculture etc. qualitatively imparted a new potential to 'work'; and in turn helped transcending the already prevailing narrow existential cycle of day and night -- setting it squarely well within the more broader period of time (yearly or crop cycle). Henceforth work done during certain periods could generate some other durable and lasting 'work-Moksa'

48. For an elaborate discussion of such aspects in horticultural and agricultural societies, see, Lenski, G.E., Power and Privilege, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. This analysis is based on 'distribution' aspects of these societies, whereby historical causality at the most goes back to mode of production or technology etc.
moments. Work no more remained an activity closely monitored and dictated by Nature or minutely and tightly routinized external condition and necessity, everytime entrapped within the vicious cycle of survival. Rather for the first time the knot between 'the hitherto existing form of work' and 'man' was loosened raising immense possibilities for the conversion of the 'man of prehistory' into wonderful categories of social. Once work qualified to a new stage by consistently effecting 'negation of work' thus ensuring a continuous flow of durable 'work-Moksa'; an immense space developed for the 'social' to emerge.

Once work brought about a permanent retreat in Nature's boundary and forever resolved the crucial question of man's existence; not work but 'work-Moksa' became the central concern for the 'existence of social'. Therein commenced the never ending pursuit for work-Moksa and the attendant process of qualification-requalification of work -- each time transcending the existing modes of work. From the very beginnings of 'social' subject of history has on the one hand constantly striven towards the creation and expansion of 'work-Moksa', and on the other hand has struggled to seek entry into the 'negated moment'. Hence within the social the ever expansion of 'work-Moksa' or the ultimate negation of 'work' becomes the final goal of mankind.

The perspective brings in the active and struggling subject of history in the centre of historical stage and integrates it with the material conditions -- ever striving to
generate and seek admission in the work-Moksa domain. Historical 'causality' central to the phenomenon of 'social' (no more remaining extraneous to social or being simply limited to material) stems directly from 'work-Moksa' (social essence) -- forming and reforming subject's consciousness, orienting and directing his actions towards consistent 'negation of work' as the 'subject' simultaneously strives to capture the 'negated moment' -- effects continuous emergence and transformation of social forms.

The emerging' and 'existing' social forms by their unfolding around the ever-expanding sphere of work-Moksa come into contradiction while simultaneously entertaining mutual affirmation and preservation, also seeking each other's negation and abrogation (or annulment) disappear in a single continuous dialectical movement -- hence generating the process of socio-historical transitions and transcendence of successive social forms. To the Hegelian dialectics which Marx claimed to put on feet but since then remained stuck up in the material morass the present analysis hopes to provide with a motion. In sum: while basic to 'existence' is work, 'work-Moksa' is central to 'social existence'. It is the 'work-Moksa' -- the 'social essence' -- on which social not only originated and got constituted but also progressed and flourished by leaps and bounds history within so short time (protohistory) as compared with the staggeringly vast period of man's prehistoric natural existence.

Affirmation and preservation because of the common 'social essence', i.e. work-Moksa; contradiction and negation because of the struggles which ensue to seek entry into the 'negated moment' through the attendant process of 'qualification-requalification' of 'work'.

It is abundantly clear by now that the central category through which this analysis has sought transition from 'Nature' to 'social' is work-Moksa. After bidding a lasting farewell to the man of prehistory the 'historical subject' sprang into action in the centre-stage of history. The 'social existence', which prehistoric man could not establish since each and every moment of his 'work' had remained closely tied to survival; had to be accomplished within no time by the 'historical subject'. Once arose the possibility of 'work-Moksa'. The bitterness of work had already been enough tasted since eternity; the turn was now to relish the sweet nectar of 'work-Moksa'. Historical subject's comprehension of this new category of history was crystal clear: Not only that its inherent potential for the origin and constitution of social was readily recognized, but very soon it formed the core of his yet emerging consciousness. This subjective consciousness had to ultimately accentuate into a social consciousness -- a realization that emergence, formation and constitution of each and every category of social originally required a 'work-Moksa' moment.

Henceforward the whole socio-historical movement got centrally oriented and directed towards work-Moksa -- work-Moksa became the motive force of history. Mankind in the making of 'social' set about striving towards the ultimate
negation of work. At the very outset, of this historical process, the generation and availability of 'work-Moksa' moment was meagre, only a few could be successful in seeking entry into the 'negated domain'. Fruitful inferences can be drawn from societies still surviving on the threshold of primitive agriculture (using 'digging stick' etc.). Quite commonly, 'chiefs' are exempted from manual labour, they share the product of the labour of others and their material necessities are supplied by the people. Generally they are given larger and more convenient graden plots which are tilled by the other people. They receive first fruits of the crops of others and a share of all game and fish etc. Above all they are freed from common labour and are supplied by others with material needs. The rest of the people remain predominantly engaged in primitive agriculture.

The meagre work-Moksa moment at their disposal manifests in a whole range of part-time activities such as making of tools, weapons, drums, clothes, pottery, baskets, equipment for ceremonial gatherings, symbolic and artistic creations, and musical instruments etc. While diversifications in the economic, political and religious activities do occur,


however, such pursuits mainly remain as **part-time** specialities. Only in some instances a vocation such as that of the 'Priest' becomes **full-time** and its practitioner is freed from the task of earning his livelihood. Beyond that the limited work-Moksa moment at people's disposal chanellizes towards the construction of houses, ceremonial activities or takes the form of secret societies and social clubs etc.

The general people, in the main, remain engrossed in horticultural activities since societal work-Moksa potential is yet insufficient to permit any significant specializations beyond the ambit of horticulture. Compared to this, in more settled and efficient agricultural conditions sufficient work-Moksa moment became available which gave rise to the full-fledged and full-time practitioners of politics, religion, court, bureaucracy, warfare, commerce, arts and aesthetics. However, 'historical causality' effecting such a change, transition or transformation from primitive horticulture to more efficient and productive agricultural conditions and the

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52. For major priestly pursuits as full-time Vocations among the 'Zuni' see, Goldman, I., "The Zuni Indians of New Mexico", in, Margret Mead(ed.), *Co-operation Among Primitive Peoples*, (Rev.ed.), Boston: Beacon Press, 1961, (pp.313-353), p.23.
attendant technological evolution etc. remained work-Moksa.

In fact, throughout protohistory and history there ensued a conscious struggle at all levels for the consistent negation of work so as to ensure a continuous flow of work-Moksa and simultaneously for seeking entry into or access to the 'negated moment' -- both aspects involved a never ending process of qualification-requalification of work beyond its hitherto existing form. If by the very beginnings of 'social' the matter pertained to marshal the art of predatory wars, capturing men to do forced work in the fields -- the issue begs to be conceded howsoever inhuman it may sound -- it merely amounted to yet another qualification aimed at work-Moksa, in that particular historical context. If tillable land had to be become the bone of contention, the message had clearly got through that it was this very development (agriculture etc.) which had originally imparted a new qualification to work, capacitating it for the negation of work.

If later on, during more settled conditions of agriculture etc. emerged many a good callings, be it a potter, weaver, leather-worker, carpenter, blacksmith, trader or priest; it was nothing but work undergoing the process of qualification-requalification, underlied which the subjective motive force of work-Moksa. They all were people consciously struggling to seek stations within the domain of work-Moksa, while simultaneously affirmed and confirmed by the social-in-information.
If some (say agriculturist etc.) were busy (on the boundary between 'Natural' and 'social') in the negation of work', hence releasing and maintaining a regular flow of work-Moksa, some others (e.g. potter, blacksmith, carpenter or barber etc.) got engaged and struggled for its further negation -- contributing towards the expansion, preservation (prevention of loss) or perpetuation of work-Moksa.

Both from the point of 'subject' and 'social' each and every innovation, invention or discovery (howsoever rudimentary it might be) was directed by the central consideration of work-Moksa: for instance the significance of 'pot' lied in that it saved man the trouble of going each time to the source of water; "with two oxen and a plow a man could cultivate in a day a far larger area than can a women with a hoe"; 53 and the 'cart' brought home the 'produce' from the field in one round which otherwise required say 50 rounds of one person. As noted earlier, the emergence of various artisan activities remained contingent upon societal work-Moksa potential. During the initial stages these remained merely part-time pursuits.

For instance, among the Swazi of Southeastern Africa tanning hides, cutting shields and carving; basket-ware and pottery etc. are all part-time activities. The only full-time occupation not of a religious or political nature is that of a smith. 54 Similarly in the Neolithic villages during the New Stone Age in Europe neither miners nor axe-grinders were likely

to have been full-time specialists.\textsuperscript{55} It was only over a period, depending upon the availability of work-Moksa moment, that such artisan activities graduated to become full-time occupations.

Since the 'social' recognized no other essence than work-Moksa -- the significance of such innovations stemmed not so much from the fact that manual drudgery of labour was somewhat lessened; rather their real significance lied in generating the effect in terms of the 'true essence of social' i.e. work-Moksa. The process either enhanced the expansion of work-Moksa domain or helped in the preservation (prevention of loss) of the already existing work-Moksa moment. Again to the innovator or inventor the process made not much difference in terms of manual labour;* but it did certainly raise the threshold of his 'social existence' by increasing the certainty and durability of his work-Moksa moment. For instance, the 'produce' of an individual (original primitive agriculturist etc.) might get destroyed by fire, plunder or loot, thus threatening his 'social existence' and posing the danger of reversal to 'Natural existence' -- meaning thereby a complete loss of his 'work-Moksa'.

However, in such a situation the 'social existence' of full-time artisan such as 'potter', carpenter or smith remained

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* During the early phases of 'social' work-Moksa is not to be wholly understood in terms of release from the manual drudgery of labour. Even if 'working', eating and sleeping was ensured or to some extent regularized, the historical subject had certainly acquired his access to 'work-Moksa'. The most oppressed and down-trodden was aware of this fact, since the other side of the fence meant 'Natural existence' with no 'work-moksa' moment at all.
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\end{footnotesize}
unaffected, because he had already worked for say 20 individuals, and his share of 'produce' from the rest of the 19 was certain to flow in. By thus struggling for the 'negation of work', such an innovator i.e. potter, carpenter or smith etc. transformed the work-Moksa potential of his work by imparting it a new qualification -- hence transcending the work-Moksa potential of the already 'existing form of work' (i.e. primitive agriculturist etc.).

The process brought more durability and permanence in subject's work-Moksa moment, consequently effecting his 'social existence's distanciation from the original threshold. Notably the durability of work-Moksa yet remained confined within the 'crop cycle' etc. Also the flow of work-Moksa to the 'subject' (artisan etc.) remained contingent upon the existence of external medium (material or non-material): for instance, besides tools, for executing shaving activity even 'face' and 'beard' are nothing but an external medium to the 'barber'. In sum: the incumbents of such an entirely different and changed work-Moksa threshold (characteristic of artisan etc.) irrespective of calling or occupation constituted a distinct 'social existence'. Such a 'social existence' in terms of the durability of work-Moksa is to be conceived as a distinct 'social class'.

A further transcendence and distanciation was to be effected by the 'man of trade.' For a moment it may be noted that
trade whether in 'salt' or 'diamonds' made sense only within the work-Moksa moment: the possibility, both for its consumer and of someone adopting such a pursuit could not have arisen, had the original work-Moksa moment remained absent. For instance a vocation such as trade is completely absent among primitive bands still surviving at the 'hunting and gathering stage'. Only in some horticulturist societies, it exists as part-time activity that too limited to items such as bows, arrows, mats, feathers, shells, stones, axes, bones and harpoons etc. More or less, same is true of Neolithic period.

Historically trading pursuits gradually evolved from the ranks of agriculturist, artisan etc. and with the more settled and efficient agrarian conditions a complete shift occurred from part-time commercial activity. Such a shift remained contingent upon the work-Moksa potential of a society. It is not to be misconstrued that historically a pursuit such as trade was something of a soft-option or manually less arduous or free from risks etc. Despite that if the 'subject of history' had struggled and moved in that direction and adopted such a pursuit the sole reason lied in that it meant greater durability of subject's work-Moksa moment.

Reverting back to the argument: any event of disaster

59. For evolution of merchant class from the ranks of peasantry etc., see, Thompson, J.W., Economic and Social History of the Middle Ages, New York: Appleton: Century-Crofts,1928, p.772.
(flood or drought etc.) was tantamount to the total loss of work-Moksa -- threatening the social existence(s) of all the individuals belonging to the disaster-area. However a trader remained unaffected and outlived such a disastrous situation because already during his struggle for the negation of 'existing form(s) of work' he had infused a new potential into in his work thereby extending the domain of work to spatially situated geographic regions. Moreover, the requisite was not that trade remained restricted to some specific 'produce' (say grain etc.); rather could include anything (simultaneously) ranging from salt, metals, utensils, cloth or condiments etc. procured from different and spatially placed 'social existences'. This way the 'social existence' of 'trader' transcended the narrow 'crop cycle' or 'yearly cycle' etc. and his work-Moksa moment no more remained bonded with the fate of some single 'social existence' (having a particular threshold) situated in a specific area.

By thus imparting a new qualification(s) to his work while consciously struggling for the 'negation of work'(existing forms) trader enhanced the durability and longivity of his work-Moksa moment and effected a further distanciation from the original threshold(agriculturist etc.). No wonder then that trading communities fully realized this aspect and even eliminated the chances of any retreat through religious taboos or social sanctions. For example, one of the basic tenents of Jainism -- a religion of predominantly business oriented Jain community -- prohibits its members from devoting to agriculture etc. since it amounts to the destruction of living organisms.
Implicit in the logic is the social construct which helps to maintain a distinct exclusivity of such a 'social existence' and eliminates any possibility of reversal to the original threshold (agriculture etc.)

The incumbents of such pursuits i.e. trade, commerce or business etc., irrespective of the nature of vocation, so long as they belonged to and maintained a particular threshold having specific work-Moksa durability, constituted a distinct 'social existence'. Thus emerged historically 'social existences' and got structured upon the 'work-Moksa' potential of the 'social'. In terms of durability of work-Moksa moment (in time and space) such 'social existences' are to be entertained as 'social classes' within the 'social'.

However, likewise earlier (agriculturist, artisan etc., in this case too (trader etc.) the very medium (material or non-material) for the expression of qualification(s) yet remained external to the 'subject of history'; and any disruption in the 'medium' meant hindrance in the flow of work-Moksa. Historical subject's incessant derive for the ultimate 'negation of work' through the qualification-requalification process; and consequently his unceasing search for an ever-during work-Moksa moment culminated in the absolute reduction, suppression or elimination of the external medium (material or non-material). Historical subject struggled to acquire and infuse such qualification(s) as required less of an external medium and found evermore expression through the very self of the subject; making them valid and applicable
in a more broader domain (universal, in time and space) -- hence incurring the least obstruction to the flow of his work-Moksa moment. Therein lied the Kernel of the 'man of cognition' which meant negation of existing forms of work, further distanciation from the original threshold, and the emergence of yet another 'social existence' constituted by Priest, scholar, official and clerk, having a perdurable work-Moksa moment. Therein lied the genesis of the new middle class and the basis of its origin, formation and constitution in history. The incumbents of this 'social existence' irrespective of their vocation, while seeking their own perdurable work-Moksa moment also significantly contributed towards the creation of social conditions conducive to the expansion, preservation and perpetuation of work-Moksa in 'social' -- since to reiterate social recognized no other essence except work-Moksa. It may be noted in the passing, that the culmination of the whole process is to be found in 'Fakir, Yogi': 'Fakir' eliminating the external medium (material and non-material) still lives within the social; while 'Yogi' moves further and by seeking elimination of even 'social' and 'self' searches for a true moment of 'Moksa'. However, to this analysis, so long as 'Fakir' or 'Yogi' receives his work-Moksa moment -- the issue again begs concession -- it is yet another qualification aimed the consistent negation of all other existing forms of work.

Historically, the emergence of such 'social existences' (above discussed) as constitutive of 'social' was a simultaneously ongoing process of social transformation -- underlied which was the motive force of work-Moksa. These 'social existences'
characteristic of different thresholds of work-Moksa.

i.e. agricultural etc., artisan, trader, 'man of cognition' etc. formed almost during the same time in which the 'man of sword' created his 'social existence' specific of the 'landlord'. Though the process is subject to variation in form, contingent upon the socio-historical specificities of different societies, however, theoretically in essence such 'social existences' are to be conceived as 'social classes'.

Work-Moksa remains the most cherished goal of mankind while work is there waiting for its ultimate negation in future.

The 'essence' of 'social' is 'work-Moksa' and that of 'social class' is durability of 'work-Moksa' both in time and space. Historically, the 'subject' has consciously struggled for the expansion, preservation or perpetuation of work-Moksa thus creating and building the social, cultural, legal, political and ideological institutions of society. The contention here is that what has originally gone into each and every category or institution of any society is nothing but work-Moksa moment and their further existence and perpetuation without a work-Moksa moment is beyond argument. It is the historical subject's struggles around work-Moksa whereupon got structured social inequalities among above discussed classes. Further, it has already been conclusively argued that the process of social formation and 'structuration in time' of such social inequalities demands a dialectical understanding of structural,

cultural and historical specificities of a given society. 61

Central to class formation, class struggle and class consciousness is to be seen work-Moksa. It is work-Moksa around which classes organized and reorganized, sought negation of existing form(s) of work; transcended the existing 'social forms' and raised their work-Moksa thresholds — hence producing a dynamic historical movement towards an evergreater expansion of work-Moksa sphere in a society. As classes struggled around work-Moksa; developed and resolved contradictions, transcended successive work-Moksa thresholds, made bids for hegemonic positions and effected socio-historical transitions; their success or failure remained contingent upon the creation of social conditions and institutions, generation of social and class consciousness, ideologies and political practices etc. conducive to the expansion, preservation or perpetuation of work-Moksa. Hence the question of emergence, constitution and the realization of the full potential of a class remained hinged to work-Moksa.

For instance, outstanding is the case of the rise of bourgeois class in Europe that by the sheer creation of regular and stable work-conditions conducive to better and increased work-Moksa content and the attendant politico-ideological and other institutions of democracy; relieved enormous populations from the uncertain drudgery of agricultural domain and thus circumvented and outwitted the feudal institutions. Further that capitalism has survived and

flourished mainly by creating social conditions of hitherto unknown dimensions of work-Moksa needs no documentation. 62

The process, that the new middle class broadened, strengthened and enormously expanded the work-Moksa domain; made a dent in capitalism 63 by turning it into a work-Moksa generating system; grew explosively within 'civil' and 'production' spheres while helping to build undisruptive and stable societies all over the world; is a culmination of the same dynamic socio-historical movement towards an ever-expanding domain of work-Moksa. The new middle class is yet another perdurable mode of work-Moksa.

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62. "... the working class ... in the more advanced industrial societies ... seldom had the numerical preponderance the peasent class once had. ... of the total male labour force ... usually it has totaled less than 50 percent. ... the farm population has been reduced to small minority ... a turning point is reached, and the working class, too, begins to decline, at least in relative terms". Lenski, G.E., op.cit., 1966, p.376.

63. For capitalism as a freedom generating system and the crucial significance of new middle class in this transformation, see, Przeworski, A., *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press, 1985.