

CHAPTER VI

TEBHAGA MOVEMENT AT KAKDWIP: THE EVENT STRUCTURE

In the mid-twenties, some parts of Jessore and Khulna (now in Bangladesh) had gone through a sharecroppers' agitation. There was also a sharecroppers' agitation in Rangpur and Dinajpur districts in 1939. But in none of these the demand was made by the sharecroppers for two-thirds of the share of their produce.¹ Even, the Kisan Sabha leaders had not mentioned tebhaga demand in their 70 page memorandum submitted in 1939² to the Land Revenue Commission, set up by Fazlul Haque ministry. (The Kisan Sabha leaders, though, have taken undue credit for initiating the tebhaga concept, by the extent that a writer had falsely claimed that the Kisan Sabha's memorandum contained the demand for tebhaga).³

The tebhaga concept actually originated from the recommendations of the Land Revenue Commission (published in March 1940) which stated that "all bargadars should be declared to be tenants" and "that the share of the crop legally recoverable from them should be one-third instead of half..."⁴ It was an imposition upon the landlords from above by a foreigner, who as the chairman of the Commission had made an indepth study of the agrarian problems of Bengal. His knowledge of the peasants' problems in Bengal appeared to have been no less than that of the Kisan leaders who, as sons of the soil, were supposed to know better.

The tebhaga movement had seven objectives viz.:

1. The sharecroppers must get two-thirds share of the produce.
2. The produce must be stacked in their own khamar instead of the landlord's.
3. The rate of interest should not be under any circumstances exceed one-eighth of the crops given as advance.
4. There should be no eviction.
5. All forms of exactions should be legally punishable.
6. The sharecroppers should not be made to part with their produce without receipts.
7. No land should be allowed to lie uncultivated.

The Kisan Sabha leaders, once they caught on to the tebhaga idea, did not confine the movement to only the two recommendations of the Commission, namely, tenancy and reduction of rent, relating to the sharecroppers. They knew it full well, acquainted as they were with the sharecroppers, that the fulfilment of the Commission's recommendations would not bring about any appreciable change in the condition of the sharecroppers. Their other problems such as, illegal exactions, usury, cultivation of fallow land etc., needed to be immediately solved.

The Commission's recommendations were published in March, 1940. In the following June, the Kisan Sabha leaders adopted a resolution in the fourth Annual Conference of the BPKS,

calling upon the peasants "to organize themselves for a severe struggle for the realization of their demand for two-thirds share of the produce they grow, as recommended by the Commission."⁶

In the harvesting season of 1940-41, the tebhaga movement erupted in some parts of Bengal.⁷ But surprisingly enough, it was short-lived. The CPI and its peasant organization, the BPKS, did not organize any such movement for the next five years because they had joined "the People's War"⁸ with the Soviet Union against Germany in 1941 and wanted to avoid confrontation with the imperialist government in India that might interfere with the war effort. It is obvious that the party considered the interest of the Soviet Union to be much more vital than those of the Indian peasantry. (In defence of the BPKS it has been argued that the tebhaga movement could not be organized from 1941 to 1945 because of the natural calamities of floods, famine and disease.⁹ However powerful, such apolitical factors could hardly have deterred an economic movement from breaking out for as long as half a decade. Also, the floods occurred only in two districts out of 28 in Bengal in 1942.) Even when the war came to an end, the BPKS did not go in for any peasant movement, a fact which becomes evident from the resolution adopted at its ninth annual conference in May, 1946.¹⁰ This is because the CPI had till then no definite policy of mass movement. It was in August, 1946 that the CPI Central Committee

held at Bombay a meeting which was attended by R.B. Dutt, it passed a resolution to the effect that vigorous "mass struggles" should be organized "for the realization of the essential task of the programme of National Democratic Revolution".¹¹ As a follow-up action, the Kisan Council gave the call for tebhaga movement in September, 1946,¹² to be launched in the next harvesting season, barely two months away.

The next month, the leaders of the Sabha started making preparations for the tebhaga movement. They frequented those districts where they had their organizations, to make the peasants conscious of the objectives involved through baithaks and meetings. Initially the leadership did not pay much attention to raising a strong volunteer force as also to strengthening the organization.¹³ For one thing, they did not have a clear idea about the potentiality of the sharecroppers' movement, and for another, the time available was too short to methodically prepare for a large-scale movement.¹⁴

The first phase of the movement started in December, 1946, and was a resounding success. As instructed by the party, the sharecroppers of a particular area would in a body harvest their crops quickly and stack it at their own khamars instead of at the landlords'. Speed was of essence if the landlords were not to be enabled to prevent them.¹⁵

Some of them were to stand guard with traditional weapons. In Chittagong division, the bargadars took away "the entire produce in some cases".¹⁶ In Faridpur district (now in Bangladesh) the bargadars adopted a different technique which was to refuse to "harvest the share of the crop due to the landlords unless wages are paid to them for the work".¹⁷ In 11 districts the sharecroppers managed to stack the crops at their khamars after having forcibly reaped them. There was hardly any opposition either from the landlords or from the Government, excepting the promulgation of an order under 144 Cr. P.C. following some reports of incidents in Diamond Harbour in 24 Parganas district.¹⁸ The landlords were simply taken aback at this development which was as sudden as it was unexpected. They had thought that the sharecroppers would, as they had done earlier, stack the entire produce at their khamars, which would give them a better bargaining position on the sharecroppers' demands.¹⁹

THE SECOND PHASE:

Stimulated by this success, the sharecroppers in their hundreds began joining the movement which spread like wildfire to 19 districts by January 1947.²⁰ The speed of its spread had an element of spontaneity, and as such, it went out of the control of the leadership.²¹

The landlords, meanwhile, resorted to a propaganda war to win over the middle class. They set afloat the rumour that this movement was directed against the Hindu landlords by the Muslim peasants. The movement would ruin those of their class who had their lands cultivated by sharecroppers. The urban middle class, whose lot was far worse than the rural poor, they said, could not allow such a thing. Some landlords played for time. Pretending to make a compromise with the peasants, they asked them to defer harvesting pending an amicable settlement of the dispute. Then with the help of hired lathials they forcibly harvested the entire produce of the land. The jotedars of Rangpur are reported to have followed this tactic.²²

At several places, the peasants clashed with the police. At Atwari in Dinajpur district they overpowered a police force which tried to prevent them from forcible harvesting; in the melee, four or five muskets (according to the official version, it was only one) were snatched away.²³ In some parts of Tamluk subdivision of Midnapore district the Government promulgated 144 Cr. P.C. armed forces were sent to some parts of Jessore.²⁴

The first deaths in peasant-police clashes occurred on 4 January, 1947, when at Chirirbandar of Dinajpur²⁵ two peasants and one police constable were killed. From then on the rural scene was surcharged with scattered violence. Early in January a jotedar killed a sharecropper at Nalitabari

of Mymensing district.²⁶ Another peasant was killed at Jamira of Howrah district in the first week of January.²⁷

At this juncture the Kisan Sabha leaders distributed hundreds of copies of a booklet, Krishaker Laraiar Kayda, outlining the strategy for the movement among the members of the Kisan Samiti.²⁸ The booklet laid special stress on the immediate formation of a volunteer force as also a Tebhaga Committee in every Union. Such a force would be divided into six groups, each with a specific task.²⁹ One group would keep watch on the activities of the police and jotedars, another, composed of militant and able-bodied youth, would act as a fighting squad. Propaganda was assigned to yet another group. Such a volunteer force, led by a captain, would work under the Union Tebhaga Committee. A Union Tebhaga Committee was to comprise all those people who, irrespective of their political beliefs, supported the tebhaga movement.³⁰

The Kisan Sabha wanted the Tebhaga Committee to act as a people's court and also to declare the following as "illegal": (1) Police camps at jotedars' houses; (2) forcible seizure of paddy by the police in the interest of jotedar; (3) use of firearms upon the peasantry; (4) beating of arrested persons; and (5) promulgation of 144 Cr. P.C. to prevent harvesting by the sharecroppers. The Samiti leadership enjoined the peasantry to violate 144 Cr. P.C. to carry on the movement.³¹

Volunteer forces composed of men and women were raised at many places. In some villages of Narail subdivisions of Jessore, for example, a volunteer force composed exclusively of about 300 women was formed under the leadership of Sarala Bala Paul, a Namasudra woman. So powerful was this force that it would resist effectively the police attacks several times and the police failed to arrest its leader.³²

Tebhaga Committees were formed in most Unions to act as people's courts. Since this body comprised all the supporters of the tebhaga movement, it was very powerful and took upon itself the responsibility of village administration. The landlords' indisputable sway over village life was replaced by these committees in some parts of rural Bengal.³³ In the words of the Commissioner of Rajshahi division it was virtually "an attempt to set up a parallel government especially in Dinajpur and Rangpur."³⁴

In a Dinajpur village, when the landlord fired upon the sharecroppers who were collecting their harvest, the peasant volunteers immediately surrounded him, got him "arrested" in the name of the Tebhaga Committee along with his gun and then produced him to their People's Court for trial. The court fined him Rs. 200; he had to pay the fine to secure his release.³⁵ When a small police party entered Barandar village of Narail subdivision (Jessore) to arrest

some peasant leaders, they were surrounded by hundreds of volunteers armed with traditional weapons. The police had to surrender.³⁶ In Durgapur (Jessore) even the SDO was surrounded in a similar case. The SDO of Basirhat sub-division of the 24 Parganas district feared that the tebhaga movement would bring about a "general breakdown of law and order".³⁷ The Commissioner of Dacca Division, as stated by the Chief Secretary, considered that "the matter is largely an economic dispute", and that "the government is likely to be seriously embarrassed if the police are called in to use force against the bargadars."³⁸ The Chief Secretary himself characterized the movement as "potentially dangerous".³⁹

BARGADAR BILL:

Probably in light of these reports, the Suhrawardy Government on 22 January, 1947 published the Bengal Bargadars Temporary Regulation Bill conceding the bargadars' demand for two-thirds share of the produce and for restricting the landlords' arbitrary power of eviction. The news of the Bargadar Bill was a shot in the arm for the agitating peasants. They no longer had any doubt about the righteousness of their tebhaga demands. Their militancy was also heightened by the news, which they showed by "burning and damaging the post office and the telegraph line" at Durgapur Bazar of Mymensing district on 26 January, 1947. The next day they captured the catchery of Susang zamindars and made it the Communist

party's "local headquarters".⁴⁰ The leadership also grew complacent and somewhat lethargic, thinking that victory was at their door.⁴¹

The landlords were more alert and tried every possible means to block its passage in the Assembly. The Bakargunge Landlord Association spread the canard that the Bill, if passed, "would cause untold hardship to the middle class people."⁴² The landlords of Burdwan staged a violent agitation against the proposed Government legislation.⁴³ Their Dinajpur counterparts protested against the Bill by sending a "flood telegrams" to the Government.⁴⁴ The Amrita Bazar Patrika lent its tacit support to the landlords by publishing letters against the proposed legislation.⁴⁵ With all this pressure, the end result was that the Government shelved the Bill.

With the closing of this avenue, the Government was left with no option but to use force to suppress the tebhaga movement. From the first half of February, 1947 the Government started taking "strong action by the police" against the Communists,⁴⁶ and delegated powers to the DMS under the Bengal Special Powers Ordinance. Following this, several serious peasant-police clashes occurred, leading to the death of a large number of peasants at several places - Khanpur and Tummia (Dinajpur), Hahaipatha and Mangalbari Hat (Jalpaiguri), Charura Beel (Malda) etc. The death toll

weakened the peasants' power of resistance considerably, and except in the Sundarbans, the tebhaga movement in most parts of Bengal such as in Chittagong, Dacca and Presidency divisions and also in West Bengal and north Bengal began to wane.⁴⁷ In March, 1947 there was a fresh flare-up of communal riot in Calcutta which spread to some other parts of Bengal. These further weakened the tebhaga movement.

However, in areas where the Kisan Sabha had strong organization, communal riot did not spread;⁴⁸ the propaganda and agitation for the movement continued in some places, specially in Tamruk of Midnapore, Kakdwip of 24 Parganas and Charura Beel of Malda district till May, 1947⁴⁹ after which nothing was heard of it. This was because immediately before independence in August, 1947 the CPI had shifted its policy from one of direct confrontation against the Government to that of active and full cooperation with the Congress Government. In June the Central Committee of CPI declared: "The Communist Party will fully cooperate with the national leadership in the proud task of building the Indian Republic on democratic foundation thus paving the way to Indian unity."⁵⁰ The offshoot of this policy was to put a stop to the tebhaga movement. To set all doubts about the matter at rest Bhowani Sen, the then Secretary of the Bengal Provincial Committee of the CPI categorically declared, "We appeal to the peasants not to launch direct action this year as they did last year."⁵¹

The tebhaga movement was "one of the main massive peasant movements of our age." It spread to as many as 19 districts (out of 27)⁵² of Bengal, within the span of four months, involving 6 million peasants.⁵³ It led to the arrest of 3,119⁵⁴ persons, and the death of 76 including three armed policemen.⁵⁵ Several muskets were snatched away from the police.

TEBHAGA MOVEMENT IN KAKDWIP:

Jatin Maity, Kumed Sahu, Gunadhar Maity and other local organizers in cooperation with Kangsari Halder, Manik Hazra, Rashbehari Ghosh, Yatis Roy, Abdur Razzak Khan -- all CPI leaders -- began organizing the tebhaga movement at Budhakhali from October, 1946. They held baithaks in all parts of Budhakhali and later, public meetins.⁵⁶ In these baithaks and meetings the leaders tried to convince the peasants that all the demands they were fighting for were just. As a medium of communication between the leaders and the peasants the baithaks were more effective, but the public meetings, where the peasants came in a body to hear their leaders from distant villages generated a sense of unity among them.⁵⁷ There were also processions with the women leading, which attracted the villagers. In 1947 about 1,000 peasants started in a procession from Frasergunge, and covering about 40 kilometres they reached Kakdwip to attend a public meeting.⁵⁸

The peasants composed their own songs about the movement which they would sing in the early hours of the morning, while

making a round of the village. Even though some posters and handbills were circulated, the songs became a much more effective means of propaganda. To ensure unity amongst themselves the sharecroppers had taken oath before they started the tebhaga movement. They placed a ghat (an earthen pot being a sacred symbol of Hindu religious ceremony), touched it and promised that they would rather die in the movement than allow the landlord to take away their crops.⁵⁹

Before harvesting began in December, the leaders held baithaks with the peasants, usually at night, and drew up an elaborate programme of action. The peasants had to fall in line with the decisions arrived at these baithaks by consensus.⁶⁰ According to the programme, hundreds of peasants, armed with traditional weapons, went in procession to the harvesting fields. The womenfolk accompanied their menfolk with brooms, sharp cutters, chilly powder. One group stood guard, while the others engaged in harvesting.⁶¹ The leaders gave them company lest they should be arrested by the police. The peasants would take the entire harvested crop in their own khamars and then keep watch on it.

With the commencement of the tebhaga movement, the Kisan Samiti took it upon itself to distribute lands among the peasants for sharecropping, thus bringing to an end the authority of the chakdars, manager, and naibs. These latter now dared not exploit the peasant women sexually. The

government meanwhile had undertaken survey and settlement work, and the sharecroppers took active part in it in large numbers so that their names might be recorded as sharecroppers.⁶²

From Budhakhali the tebhaga movement spread to other neighbouring villages such as Gobindarampur (Berar lot), Fatikpur, Rajnagar etc. within a short time. The leaders of Budhakhali would visit these villages to organize the peasants. Rishalakshmipur, in spite of its proximity to Budhakhali, was not caught up in the tebhaga fever because it had only a few sharecroppers.

When the Budhakhali peasants came forward with their tebhaga demands, the manager and naib sought to make a compromise. When they found that the peasants were determined to stack the crops at their khamars, they stopped giving bari. The Government meanwhile promulgated 144 Cr. P.C. in the Diamond Harbour subdivision in the second half of December, 1946.⁶³ The prohibitory orders notwithstanding, the sharecroppers harvested collectively and stacked the entire crops at their own khamars. They then wrote to the landowners, requesting them to take their one-third share of the produce.⁶⁴ The chakdars, managers and naibs, in active collusion with the police, instituted cases of looting paddy.⁶⁵ The peasants on their part retaliated by boycotting the chakdar, manager and naib and the four big ryot families who obviously opposed the movement.⁶⁶ So severe was

the social ostracism that those big ryots could not even sell their surplus produce or employ labourers to work on their lands.⁶⁷ The Government issued warrants to arrest all the leaders and the police made occasional visits to Budhakhali to arrest the leaders and those peasants against whom the landlords had made allegations. The men from the Intelligence Branch came and recruited police informers. But the police could not arrest the agitating peasants and their leaders because of the strict vigil kept by the peasants and their women on the movement of the police. Some peasants took shelter in other villages under assumed names.⁶⁸

In February-March, 1947 a police camp was set up at Budhakhali Ukiler hat. The peasants organized a social boycott of the police camp, but they could not sustain it for long.⁶⁹ But resentment at the role of the police in abetting the landlords' oppression of the peasants smouldered. The peasants raided a few cutcheries in a body with arms. On 23 February, 1947 several thousand sharecroppers attacked the Gobindarampur (Berar lot) cutchery of Maity who fired upon the raiders, injuring three of them.⁷⁰ The next day some 10-12,000 peasants carried off some 20-22 landlords' men including chakdar, manager, naib from their cutcheries. They were compelled to give receipts against the payment of their one-third share of the crop and then released. The others fled at night from the cutcheries in

neighbouring villages to avoid being kidnapped. The released men then conspired with the police to let loose another spell of oppression upon the peasants.⁷¹

HARIPUR-LOYALGUNGE:

When Budhakhali was preparing for the movement, Gajan Mali along with the Budhakhali leaders started organizing the tebhaga movement for the sharecroppers of his own village in the months of October-November, 1946.⁷² Their method of propaganda was much the same as that followed at Budhakhali. In the harvesting months of November-December and December-January most sharecroppers forcibly stacked their crops at their own khamars but some of them stacked the produce at the landlords' khamar as before.⁷³ The Samiti directed the latter to bring it back to their own khamars,⁷⁴ which they managed to do. Seeing their own weak position, some chakdars sent feelers to the leaders of the Samiti for compromise.⁷⁵ These landlords were requested to meet some of the demands of the sharecroppers. At this juncture the Government set up a police camp at the catchery of Hazra in the month of January-February, 1947, ostensibly to maintain law and order in the area but in reality to serve the interests of the landlords.⁷⁶ For fear of the police, some peasants then switched over to the landlords. Gajan Mali went into hiding.

Dwarik Samanta, with the help of the police, then demolished the houses of Gajen Mali, Kshirode Bera, Atul Santra and a few others and evicted them. Gajen Mali and the others then filed a criminal suit against Samanta, and he was compelled to come to terms with them.⁷⁷ Samar Basu, the O.C. of Kakdwip thana, acted as an intermediary in the matter. It was on his initiative that the sharecroppers were allowed to cultivate the lands they had so long been cultivating. But the issue of granting receipt for the rent paid remained undecided. The landlords also reduced abwabs and gave their sharecroppers some 10 to 20 palas (one pala being 10 seers) of grains in excess of their customary share.⁷⁸

In June-July, 1947 the sharecroppers tilled the same lands as they had done the previous year. The landlords could not distribute their lands as they wished. Some of them had 144 Cr. P.C. promulgated in the lands, which failed to prevent the sharecroppers' movement.⁷⁹ Meanwhile the CPI had changed its policy. It now asked the Kakdwip sharecroppers to stack the total produce at their landlords' khamars.⁸⁰ The sharecroppers refused; they were determined to let the paddy rot in the field rather than bring it to the landlords' khamars.⁸¹

The sharecroppers deposited their produce with panchayat (community) khamars⁸² to bypass the landlords' charge of paddy looting; the landlords would not now be able to complain

that the sharecroppers had taken away the crops to their own houses. All the same, the landowners went on filing paddy looting cases against the sharecroppers. A number of police camps were set up at Rajnagar, Radhanagar, Frasergunge, Bijoybati and other villages. Some peasants came to terms with the landowners, while some Samiti activists took shelter away from home in order to evade police arrest. Some landowners then set fire to their houses and filed cases of house-burning against them.⁸³ Sometimes their cattle were taken away and sold. When one night the landlord's men in collusion with a dafadar (village police) made an attempt to steal a Santhal peasant's cattle at Loyalgunge, they were captured by the peasants who tied the dafadar to a wooden threshing machine for the whole night. He was released the next morning after he had apologized.⁸⁴ A long jarigan (folk-song) was composed on this incident.

The landlords had by now been weakened. While distributing the produce in 1947-48, they reduced their illegal exactions and the rate of interest on bari from 50 to 25 per cent.⁸⁵ This partial success rapidly swelled the number of supporters and participants in the movement.

DAKSHIN CHANDANPIRI:

Jatin Maity, Jagannath Maity, Gajen Mali of Loyalgunge and Makhan Ghorui of Sibrampur came to Chandanpiri in the month of October-November, 1946 to organize the peasant

movement there.⁸⁶ The mode of propaganda was the same as in the other villages. At the time of harvesting in 1946-47, since the landlords simply refused to concede their tebhaga demands,⁸⁷ the sharecroppers took away the harvested crops to their own khamars. The landlords instituted cases of paddy looting; some burnt their own houses to frame the peasants. Some took police help to take away the crops from the sharecroppers' houses.⁸⁸ Some sharecroppers thought it prudent to compromise with the landlords.⁸⁹ In some cases, where the landlords had some disputes with the sharecroppers, the latter were not allowed to take away the crops, which lay rotting in the field.⁹⁰ During the harvesting season of 1946-47, the tebhaga demands were not realized in Chandanpiri.

In the harvesting season of 1947-48, the sharecroppers stacked their crops at the panchayat khamars. The Circle Officer urged the landlords to recognize these khamars and he also urged them to accept the ratio of 56:44 of the total produce, the latter being the landlord's share. They were further asked to stop all illegal exactions.⁹¹

PEASANT ATTITUDES:

The peasants participating in the movement did not have identical interests, since they belonged to various categories such as landless sharecroppers, land-holding sharecroppers

ryots and landless labourers. Certain generalizations may be made regarding the attitudes of these different sections to the tebhaga movement.

1. Apart from other considerations such as strength of organizations, structural contradiction, quality of leadership, etc., a peasant movement in an area can ensure the largest participation in it if the area is overwhelmingly populated by a class of poor peasants with identical economic interest (as in the case of Kakdwip dominated overwhelmingly by the poor sharecroppers) and if the movement incorporates in its programme the main demands seeking to secure the maximum economic benefits to that class of peasants.

2. The poor peasants with identical interests were the most potential force of the tebhaga movement; the important factor determining their attitude of large-scale participation was their eagerness to struggle for subsistence.

3. The big ryots' past grievances against the landlords were a factor in their support for the movement.

4. Another contributory factor determining an attitude of support was the sense of fellow-feeling or community sentiment generated in the course of the agitation.

5. Economic motivation is the main factor determining the peasants' participation in a movement.

6. Apart from economic motivation, political belief of one kind or another (e.g. belief in the Congress or in the

CPI) is a factor that determines that attitude of participation or opposition to the movement of a small section of peasants.

7. The factors that account for an attitude of passivity and non-involvement are: (a) the remote possibility of any gain, the non-involvement of a section of poor agricultural labourers in the tebhaga movement being a case in point; (b) a state of self-sufficiency in the status quo (the case of some middle peasants); (c) the desire to avoid conflict; and (d) fear of the landlord and police.

8. The factors which determine the mixed attitude (i.e. maintaining good relations with the landlord and the CPI leaders at the same time) of some section of peasants are fear, opportunism, the desire to avoid being identified and the like.

The tebhaga movement, the most significant event in Kakdwip area, besides securing for the peasants some immediate benefits brought about some far-reaching changes which prepared the ground for their militant struggle in the next phase of the movement.

In sum, the Tebhaga movement in Kakdwip can be seen as the usherer of class consciousness among peasants and particularly among the sharecroppers. The unity they achieved put an effective stop on class exploitation and physical abuse. The cognitive change among the oppressed led to their transformation from mere serf to that of the citizen. The gain

in political recognition through the assertion of their rights was also reflected in the improvement of the economic conditions of the sharecroppers. The sharecropper could dream of his own khamar of gola (barn) and this made him realize the importance of unity and need for organization. The change in the power hierarchy, symbolized by the demise of the all-powerful kutchery was just the impetus that was needed for the success of the next phase in the movement.

In the next chapter, we focus exclusively on the three villages of Kakdwip, viz., Budhakhali, Haripur-Loyalgunge and Dakshin Chandanpiri to provide a picture as to how the movement operated at the micro-level.

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37. Ibid.
38. K.P. Sen, S.D.O. Basirhat to Home (Misc.) Land Rev. Dept. 3-3-47, file no.6N 38-47.
39. SRPSB for the first half of January, 1947, para 3, sd/H.S.E. Stevens, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, Calcutta, the 17th January 1947.
40. SRPSB for the first half of Feb. 1947, para 7, sd/H.S.E. Stevens, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, Calcutt the 18th Feb. 1947.
41. Bhowani Sen, "Banglar Tebhaga Andolan" in Sumit Chakravorty (ed.), op. cit., p.17.
42. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 9-3-1947, p.8.
43. SRPSB for the first half of March, 1947, para 4, sd/H.S.E. Stevens, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, Calcutta, the 18th March, 1947.
44. Bengal Legislative's Assembly Proceedings, vol.72, no.1, p.526.
45. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 2-3-1947, p.4.
46. See note no.40, para 6.
47. SRPSB for the second half of February 1947, sd/H.S.E. Stevens, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, Calcutt the 4th March, 1947, para 6.
48. Manikrishna Sen, "Tebhaga Andolane Rangpur", in Sumit Chakravorty (ed.), op. cit., pp.61-3; see also Krishna Benode Roy, "Tebhagar Sangram" in Sumit Chakravorty (ed.), op. cit., p.23; see also the same author, Chashir Larai, pp.2, 35 and Tebhagar Larai, p.28.

49. SRPSB for the first half of April, 1947, para 8, sd/ H.S.E. Stevens, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, Calcutta, the 17th April 1947; see also SRPSB for the second half of May, 1947, para 8, sd/H.S.E. Stevens, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, Calcutta, the 4th June 1947.
50. "Statement of Policy", People's Age, V, June 29, 1947 as quoted in Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, op. cit., p.260; see also Secret Fortnightly Report (hereafter SIR) for the second half of September, 1947 for West Bengal, para 6, in this secret report the then Chief Secretary states, '... Secret Police Reports are to the effect that the Communist party in the Province has decided for the present to support the Congress Government here.' sd/- S. Sen, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, Calcutta, the 3rd October, 1947.
51. People's Age, VI, Nov. 30, 1947, p.10.
52. The 19 districts are: Dinajpur, Mymensing, Jessore, Midnapore, Jolpaiguri, Rangpur, 24 Parganas, Khuln, Howrah, Hooghly, Bankura, Birbhum, Burdwan, Malda, Pabna, Bogra, Dacca, Nadia, and Faridpur. See Krishna Benode Roy, Chashir Larai, p.2.
53. Bhowani Sen, "Bangla Tebhaga Andolan" in Sumit Chakravorty (ed.), op. cit., p.12.
54. D.N. Dhanagare, op. cit.
55. Smt. Lakshmipriy, Sautia and Purna Chandra Samanta, written statement, 11.10.71.
56. Bijoy Jana, Sharecropper, Budhakhali, statement.
57. Bijoy Jana, Peasant activist, statement, Budhakhali.
58. Jagannath Maity, Local leader, statement, Budhakhali.
59. Smt. Maity Bala Jana, woman leader, Budhakhali, statement also Haripada, Kanji, peasant volunteer, Budhakhali, written statement.
60. See note no.57; also Dhananjoy Das and Smt. Kanan Bala Das, joint statement.
61. Bijoy Jana, statement; Dhananjoy Das and Smt. Kanan Bala Das, joint statement; Jatin Maity, written statement; Purna Chandra and Lakshmipriya Sautia, joint statement.

62. Abdul Razak Khan, CPI leader, statement, Calcutta.
63. SRPSB for the second half of December 1946, para 8, H.S.E. Stevens, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, Calcutta, the 3rd January, 1947.
64. Manik Hazra, statement.
65. Gundhar Maity, statement.
66. Pyuri Mohan Ghorui, substantial ryot, written statement, Budhakhali, also Kani Bera and Bhusan Jana, joint statement.
67. Ibid.
68. Smt. Kanan Bala Das and Dhananjoy Das, joint statement.
69. Kanai Bera and Bhusan Jana stated that the Budhakhali peasants refused to tell anything to the police in response to the call for the boycott.
70. Kangsari Halidar, "Kakdwiper Tebhaga Andolan" in Sumit Chakravorty (ed.), op. cit., p.67. See also Souri Ghatak, "Shaheed Tirtha Gobindarampur" in Sumit Chakravorty (ed.), op. cit., p.115.
71. Ibid.
72. Shyamnandlal, Peasant volunteer, Haripur, written statement also Gunadhar Mali, elder brother of Gajen Mali, statement.
73. Amulya Kamila, Sharecropper and organizer of Tebhaga Movement at Haripur Loyalgunge, written statement, Haripur.
74. Jaget Mohan Kuiti, son of Ananta, local leader, statement, Haripur.
75. Ibid.
76. Amulya Komila, statement; also see Indra Kumar Ghosh, written statement, Kakdwip.
77. Atul Sentra, statement.
78. Amulya Kamila, written statement, Haripur.
79. See note no.74.

80. Kangsari Halidar, statement, Seracol.
81. Ibid.; see also Kangsari Halidar, "Kakdwiper Tebhaga Andolan" in Sumit Chakravorty (ed.), op. cit., p.67. In his article Halidar has not mentioned the CPI line of cooperating with the Congress Government after the Independence and the Party's direction given to the sharecroppers to stock their produce at the landlords' Khamar.
82. Ibid.
83. Sujoy Barik, statement.
84. Ibid.
85. See note no.78.
86. Hrishikesh Maity, Landlord's employee, Dakshin Chandanpiri, written statement; also Basant Mandal, Chakdar, Dakshin Chandanpiri, written statement.
87. Sudhir Maity, sharecropper of 100 bighas, Dakshin Chandanpiri, written statement, B.S. In Maity's house the Kisan Samiti office at Dakshin Chandanpiri was first opened.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ramesh Chandra Maity, sharecropper, Dakshin Chandanpiri, statement.
91. Ibid.