CHAPTER VI

EXTERNAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS

It is a historical fact that in international relations the Great Powers being the core of international system, exercise a major influence in its functioning and management. It is as true today as in the past. During this phase Great Powers due to their political maturity and stability, strategic-military superiority, economic, social, scientific and technological advancement, influenced and dominated the international scenario.

Until the liquidation of British colonialism and imperialism in the Indian subcontinent in 1947, this region was exclusively under the sphere of influence of a single Great Power—Britain. However, after the liquidation of the British empire, the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) started contending for influence in this region. Later, the People's Republic of China (PRC) also tended to join in this race.

Soviet Union, under Stalin, did not show much interest in the politics of the Indian sub-continent. It was after

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1. T.N Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections, (New Delhi, 1979); and

Ivan Kovalenko, Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security (Moscow, 1979)
Stalin's demise that Malenkov, for the first time, in his speech in the Supreme Soviet on 8 August 1953, praised India's role in the Korean crisis. This trend was further strengthened under the Khrushchev-Bulganin regime and a whole complex of friendly (Indo-Soviet) relationships emerged, especially after the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to New Delhi and other South Asian capitals in 1955. This was the starting point of economic cooperation and political understanding between New Delhi and Moscow. In the later phases, Soviet Union supported India over the Kashmir issue and took active interest in India's political and economic developments. However, an in-depth analysis of Soviet interest in the Indian subcontinent would indicate that its interest was power-oriented rather than ideologically inspired. The Soviet Union clearly preferred a government to government relationship rather than a party-to-party relationship with India. On the contrary the USA, in its early phase of relationship, built her political and economic presence in this region with the intention of containment of communism (both Soviet and Chinese). This American posture towards South Asia spurred Moscow to formulate a more dynamic and wide-ranging policy towards South Asia. Thus the Indian subcontinent -- geopolitically and socioeconomically

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3 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The Emerging Concept of South Asia and the Soviet Union", Asia Pacific Community (Tokyo), no. 19, Summar 1978, p. 82
the most important region in non-communist Asia -- became a major focus of Soviet interest. In the initial phase, the Soviet Union tried to maintain a symmetrical and balanced relationship with both India and Pakistan. But in the later phases it was confronted with the necessity of having to choose between India and Pakistan. The Soviet Union preferred India. Perhaps she could not do otherwise, because Pakistan made herself unavailable by joining anti-Soviet, American alliances. 4

(Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, found American Cold War diplomacy quite irrelevant to India and rejected the American alliance system. 5 However, India was receiving American economic assistance on concessional basis. 6 After India's denial to associate herself with the American alliance system, American decision-makers turned towards Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan in its initial phase was in search of a patron to balance her policies vis-a-vis India. Thus found an unique opportunity and accepted the American alliance system, primarily with the objective of her security concern against her principal rival India and secondarily to acquire military equipment at concessional rates, as its economy could not provide the actual rates. 7

7. G.W Choudhury, "India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided sub-continent (New York, 1975); /continued.../
Hence, the United States of America, between 1954 and 1962 was the pre-eminent power in the Indian subcontinent. In that phase she had assisted Pakistan with about $700 million in military assistance and about $2,200 millions in economic aid. In the same period American aid to Indian economic development totalled almost $7500 million. 8

On the Sino-Indian side, till the late 1950s, their relations were cordial and were based on a mutually recognised principle -- Panchsheel (Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai phase). 9 But after 1959 border clashes, relations took a negative turn and between 1959 and 1962 Sino-Indian relations deteriorated markedly over the question of China's Tibetan policy and the residual Indian rights in Lhasa and the border dispute. Ultimately in October 1962, war broke out along the frontiers in Ladakh and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). After the war, the Sino-Indian conflict was further deepened and both of them were in contest with each other in several sensitive areas of the world (for instance, in the third world affairs and Tibet). The issues engaged them were of international significance, ranging from ideology to territorial disputes; to bloc alignment.

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Footnote No. 7 - contn.

Ahmad L Sherwani, and others, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi, 1964);
Aslam Siddiqui, Pakistan Seeks Security, (Longmans, 1960); and


9. Jawaharlal Nehru, Op Cit, pp. 303-4
or non-alignment, to military aid, to arms proliferation and control, and to problems of war and peace. Simultaneously, Sino-Soviet relations which were cordial and friendly till the late 1950s, gradually deteriorated in the early 1960s. Moreover, the leadership in both countries were at loggerheads (Mao-ze-Dong and Khruschev) and Soviet economic assistance to Beijing was cut. During the Sino-Indian war of October 1962, the Soviet Union adopted neutral posture and the United States took the anti-Chinese stand. Thus the 1962 Sino-Indian war and its aftermath challenged all the assumptions of American South Asia Policy and called for a fundamental reassessment. Soviet-American Third World competition appeared, in South Asia in 1962, to be relevant because both parties shared common interest in the containment of China, with the initiation of the process of detente between Washington and Moscow. According to Bhabani Sen Gupta equidistance relationship among India, Soviet Union, Pakistan and America broken and to cite him:


14. For details about the assumptions, see, pages 257-266 of this chapter.
This pattern was broken when the Chinese came into the subcontinent with their border dispute with India and later with war. In the later years China by projecting itself as a total enemy of India and a total friend of Pakistan, had altered the structure of India-Pakistan friendship with Soviet Union and America. Chinese intervention cemented the Indo-Soviet friendship, lifted it to a strategic level and brought both of them closer to each other. On the other hand, it loosened the American commitment to Pakistan, and steadily pushed the Pakistan leaders outside Washington's conflict-control mechanism and projected herself in its place.15

Similarly, Sino-American relations were bad in the 1950s and 1960s because of America's policy of containment of Chinese communism, the expanding Chinese nuclear weapons developments, and the difference of opinions over the Taiwan issue. Under such international scenario, Sino-Pakistan special relationship started taking shape. And the initiation had done with the conclusion of a border agreement on 2 March 1963 between Pakistan and China. China's intention of signing this agreement was to score the diplomatic triumph among the Afro-Asiatic countries and to create an impression that Beijing intends to resolve the border disputes with her neighbours (including India) amicably through mutual consultations and negotiations and to clarify that she did not have any hegemonistic design. However, New Delhi, Washington and Moscow denounced Sino-Pakistani special relationship: But the bitter criticism came from Washington and it was termed as Ayub Khan's afiltration with Mao Ze Dong

and resulted in President Johnson's abrupt cancellation of his invitation to President Ayub Khan and the withdrawal of United States economic aid as a mark of protest. Thus United States relations deteriorated with its ally Pakistan. Moreover, United States continued to view South Asia as a zone of secondary strategic importance, found herself increasingly committed towards Vietnamese war and decreasingly interested in the security relationships in the subcontinent. The Indo-Pakistani war of September 1965 snapped the residual American security interest in the region, especially since Pakistan started the war and the USA embargoed military assistance to the region on 8 September 1965. Thus United States reduced its position to that of an economic aid donor and South Asia acquired a low place in USA's strategic priorities.

Moscow also began to harden her posture towards the growing friendship between Islamabad and Beijing and warned Pakistan about its desire to maintain a policy of equidistance towards Moscow and Beijing. Thus Ayub Khan's policy of maintaining equidistance (under his Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto) with Moscow, Beijing and Washington (which he had compared to "walking on a triangular tight rope") proved disfunctional.

17. Tapan Das, Sino-Pak Collusion and US Policy (Bombay, 1972); Kursheed Hassan, Op Cit, n.7
18. G.N. Choudhury, Op Cit, n.7, and New Times (Moscow), April 1963
Therefore, later his successor General Yahya Khan was confronted with the bitter choice of selecting between Moscow and Beijing. But finally, in 1970, because of American approval of Sino-Pakistan connections General Yahya Khan selected Beijing.

However, the important question that confronts any researcher is why Islamabad and Beijing developed "special friendship?" And what were the conditions that forced them to establish close links? And against whom?

It seems, it was the negative approach on the part of Beijing and Islamabad towards New Delhi, i.e., their anti-pathy towards India. As early as, in 1967, Z.A. Bhutto observed in his book *The Myth of Independence*:

"India's hostility towards these two countries (Pakistan and China) had given them a fundamental common interest, so that it was in Pakistan's national interest to seek China's friendship and in China's national interest to support Pakistan".

It might also be the culmination of changed balance of relationships among New Delhi, Washington and Moscow after the October 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. Pakistan suffered, rightly or wrongly from a deep fear-psychosis of external threat to

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20. By assigning Pakistan in the early 1970s the responsibility of a mediator for Sino-American rapprochement, President Nixon approved Sino-Pakistan special relations.

her security, as since her inception the main factor of her foreign policy was the quest for security. It was this objective which made her to conclude an alliance with the USA in the early 1950s and it seems it was the same objective which forced her to develop close connections with Beijing.

Other contributory factors seem to be the coolness experienced by Pakistan from her ally, the USA, the coincidence of American and Russian policies in South Asia and South-East Asia in relation to China and the growing linkages between New Delhi, Washington and Moscow (1962-1969). It might also be one of the reasons that Ayub Khan got a negative response from Nehru for his proposal for a joint defence against China in 1959.

However, there is no record that Islamabad and Beijing had had signed any military pact. In fact, when Beijing twice proposed such a pact to Pakistan in 1963, the latter did not take much interest in it. It might be the reason, when Bhutto, as the leader of the non-official delegation during his visit to Beijing in November 1971 amidst domestic political crisis proposed a military pact to Beijing as a counter balance to the 9 August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, Chou-En-Lai's reaction was negative and his comment was "we are working as friends and not ask for any treaty".

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22 Khurshid Hussan, Op Cit, n. 7; The Dawn, (Karachi), 2 October 1954
23 Ayub Khan, Op Cit, n. 7
The most important development in Pakistan's triangular diplomacy vis-a-vis the Great Powers, appeared, when the American attitude towards Sino-Pakistani relations relaxed and President Nixon, during his visit to Islamabad in August 1969, assigned the responsibility of courier to President Yahya Khan to find out the Chinese reaction to American policy of rapprochement with Beijing. The Chinese, who were opposed to such a scheme till 1969, changed their policy after the serious, Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, as by this time Beijing identified Moscow to be the first of her enemies. The Chinese were really concerned over a "preemptive attack" from the Soviet Union. Hence they agreed to normalise relations with the USA. On the USA's side, President Nixon seemed to have assumed that this was the proper opportunity for an understanding and rapprochement with Beijing. On the part of Pakistan she had used this opportunity to consolidate her ties simultaneously, with Beijing and Washington. In fact for which she was waiting since the early 1960s.

The American policy makers attached great significance to USA's rapprochement with Beijing. Winston Lord (of the Policy Planning staff in the Department of State) views during house hearing on future foreign policy research and development clarifies this stand. To quote him:

25 Sisir Gupta, "The Power Structure in South Asia: Problem of Stability", The Round Table (London), no.238, April 1970. In this article the author discussed the possibilities of Sino-American rapprochement as early as in April 1970 and the possible shift of the balance of power in International system.
Our relations with the World's largest country and the World's most populous country are cordial elements in our pursuit of more secure and moderate international system.26

The Chinese also attached similar pre-eminence to their rapprochement with the USA. It seems the Chinese had taken this decision after a thorough scrutiny and it was a collective decision taken by Chairman Mao Ze Dong, Premier Chou En Lai, and the Generals of the People's Liberation Army.27

Elliot Richardson's views regarding the Chinese posture in World Affairs and the American role in it may be usefully cited:

"China's leaders want the United States to play a major role in Asia indefinitely, to head off Soviet domination of the region. I do not think the Chinese would want to see any shift in Asia for the foreseeable future. The Chinese have an interest in the preservation of a major US role toward the rest of the world, if only because Chinese security to a degree depends on a continuing American countervailing role against the Soviet Union".28

The Americans also attached great significance to the Chinese role in World Politics in general and South Asian Affairs in particular. James R. Schlesinger, former American Defence Secretary; (1973-75) views would substantiate this point further:


28. Morning Herald, 22 May 1975
... not so long ago that the most important strategic change which has occurred to the benefit of the US since the end of Second World War was not any major technological change, or weapons development but rather the shift of China from being an ally to become an adversary of the Soviet Union. This in itself gives an idea of the strategic importance of China in world affairs. It is not often appreciated that outside the super powers, China is the only country which has a fully independent nuclear strategy and strike force. 29

However, after September 1965, Indo-Pakistani war, the Soviet Union occupied the status of a pre-eminent power in Indo-Pakistani relations. And on the contrary, the United States of America lost its interest in this region, due to its engagement in some other parts of the world 30 (for instance in Vietnam) and tacitly encouraged the Soviet Union to take up the task of management, deescalation and resolution of local conflicts and disputes. 31

Although throughout the period of deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, Pakistan remained on friendly terms with China and held aloof from all the Soviet Projects (for instance, Alex Kosygin's plan for regional co-operation in Asia and Leonid Brezhnev's plan for Asian Collective Security). Yet, Moscow continued its policy of maintaining a symmetrical rela-


30. Reference about this point made in the preceding pages.

31. For instance Soviet mediation after 1965 Indo-Pak conflict at Tashkent in January 1966 and Soviet economic assistance to Pakistan between 1966-68 reached the maximum level in their history of relationship. Further the Soviet Union followed the balanced and symmetrical relationship between India and Pakistan. It seems the USA had approved Soviet role in the Indian subcontinent to counter balance the increasing Chinese role and Sino-Pak friendship during this phase.
tionship with New Delhi and Islamabad, in the hope of some later success. However the later important developments, like the Sino-American rapprochement and Mrs Gandhi's establishment as the uncontroversial leader at the Indian political scene had encouraged Russians to shift their balance of relationship in favour of New Delhi. 32

Alongside these major transformation, the international scenario, domestic disturbances appeared in Pakistan. Relations between the two wings of Pakistan, West and East, deteriorated to the point of a civil war. India took the bold step and supported the freedom movement of Bangladesh. On the other hand, China came out openly in support of the Pakistan Government's policy of suppression. 33 China condemned the freedom movement of Bangladesh, accused India of expansionist tendencies and charged it with the allegation of dismembering Pakistan. 34 Thus the prospects of another war between New Delhi and Islamabad appeared strong, as a consequence of India's support to Bangladesh's freedom movement and the vast refugees


33. G.W. Choudhury in most of his writings on 1971 Indo-Pak conflict highlighted the suggestion given by the Chinese government implicitly to Pakistan government for the political solution of Bangladesh issue and according to him Chinese had warned Pakistani government, against the genocide and atrocities committed by Pakistani army on Bengalis in the Eastern wing. Similar information is available in Zubeida Mustafa, "Chinese Policy Towards Pakistan", Pacific Community, vol.5, no.1, October 1973, p.123 and according to her, privately Chinese leaders tried to defuse the tensions by urging the Pakistan government to seek a political settlement with the Awami League and negotiate with India.; Jack Anderson & George Clifford, Anderson Papers, (New York, 1974); Robert La Porte, Jr., Power & Privilege: Influence And Decision Making, (New Delhi 1976); Rounaq Jahan, Continued...
flow to India. Once again (as in September 1965), the vital question before the Indian policy-makers was, whether China would intervene in Indo-Pakistani war in support of Islamabad. According to Indian calculation the possibilities were greater as the restraints imposed by the western powers in 1965 were missing. Moreover, the United States was involved in an effort to make a complete break with the past and start on an era of rapprochement with Beijing. However, the US had informed India, if China intervened, no response to that move would come from the United States.

Therefore, it seems in the Indian calculation a security treaty with the Soviet Union appeared as the only alternative open to India to balance the situation. Checking

"foot note No.33 contn."

Pakistan. Failure in National Integration (New York, 1972); For further details about this point see, Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), August-December 1971; New China News Agency (Beijing), August-December 1971; Washington Post August-December 1971

34 New China Agency, August to December 1971

35 Washington Post, June 1971 to 26 October 1971. However, there was disagreement on the strength of refugees migrated to India between Indian and Pakistani authorities. According to Indian authorities their figure was 10 million, but Pakistani authorities maintain that it was only 2.5 million.

36 Washington Post, 10 July 1971


39 M.S Rajan, Bangladesh & After, Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), vol.45, n. 2, Summer Issue, 1972, pp. 193-95
China was the common objective for both India and the Soviet Union, although for different reasons. Thus India decided to conclude a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow. With the conclusion of the 9 August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, New Delhi sought an assurance against Chinese intervention in Bangladesh's freedom struggle, while Moscow sought an ally in opposing Chinese 'hegemonism'. In fact this treaty played the role of a brake to stop China from getting involved in the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict in favour of Islamabad. In the Indian parliament over the conclusion of the 9 August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty consensus were found among all the political parties and Indians felt more relaxed and secured against the possible threat from the Chinese side.

The term of this treaty is twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years. The major provisions are covered in Articles 8, 9 and 4. According to Article 8 of the Treaty, both the signatories agreed upon that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party, and article 9 stipulates that "an attack on either party would result in mutual consultations with a view to eliminating the


41. According to the then Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, the purpose of treaty was "to act as a deterrent to any powers that might have aggressive designs on our territorial integrity and sovereignty."
threat. Both the parties agreed not to give aid to any nation that is at war with other signatory and to cite the article "Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third country that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the events of their being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of these countries." Article 4 declared Soviet respect for India's policy of 'non-alignment' and India's respect for the 'peace loving' policy of the Soviet Union. The main objectives of this treaty was to counter-balance the Sino-American-Pakistan axis and to make possible for India to move against Pakistan with confidence during the December 1971 war.

42. See, the text of Indo-Soviet Treaty of 9 August 1971 in the Appendices - Appendix III.

However, the outcome of the 1971 India-Pakistan war was the dismemberment of Pakistan and the birth of a new nation - Bangladesh. China refrained from involvement in the war. It seems and was widely believed that the Indo-Soviet treaty had discouraged Beijing from taking any action on behalf of Pakistan. Beijing showed its disapproval of the new nation, even after Islamabad had accorded recognition in February 1974. She also vetoed United Nations membership for the new nation till September 1974. 44

II

Geopolitical and strategic vitality and pre-eminence of a region depends on both objective and subjective factors. Though in geopolitical and strategic terms, for the Great Powers, South Asia neither commands the importance of the Mediterranean region which constitutes the vital under-belly of the Europe, nor does it possess natural resources such as those of Pacific region or Persian Gulf, which are vital to the economic life of these Great Powers.

realistically
Thus/speaking, South Asia is neither as vital and important an area as Mediterranean region, pacific region, nor the Persian Gulf for the Great Powers, yet it has certain inherent geopolitical and strategic importance for these

44 *New York Times*, 15 September 1974
powers by virtue of its size, area and population, its location adjacent the Indian Ocean and flanking the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Malacca and its being a centre of power, especially with the possession of nuclear capability - India being a threshold of nuclear power.

However, South Asia attracts the Great Powers interest mostly due to its colonial legacy, distressful economic conditions endured by the majority of its inhabitants, the need and dependence for the external economic and scientific assistance, intra-regional disputes and the regional structure of antagonism, disharmony and hostility notably between the two major nation-states in this region - India and Pakistan. On the contrary, the Great Powers policies towards South Asia take into account the fact of their external dependence on resources essentially raw materials, which underlines its determination to maintain pre-eminent and influential position in the international economic structure. As a consequence of the major involvement of the Great Powers in the intra-regional relations in South Asia, the regional actors have very limited options at the regional level.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka are neighbours. Some of them are neighbours due to their contiguous location and some of them due
to proximitus status. India and China have a common border which, but for the intervening Nepalese and Bhutanese territories runs continuously along the Karakoram-Himalayan range right up to Burma. The Karakoram range overlooks Kashmir, which is the disputed territory between India and Pakistan. Since a part of Chinese Sinkiang is along the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (Azad Kashmir), China becomes a contiguous neighbour of Pakistan. Similarly, India and Soviet Union are neighbours but by geographical proximity, not contiguity and hence they do not have a common border, Afghanistan is the buffer, a thin one though, for at its narrowest it is only twenty-five miles wide. Hence the Russian shadow is very much existing all along South Asia. With the growth of Russian power and technological advancement, Moscow's trans-frontier interests have extended. The Indian subcontinent is now looked upon as an important part of its southern border land, a vast buffer indeed between the metropole and the crucial Indian Ocean. On the contrary, India and Sri Lanka are separated by a thin seallane. However, the United States of America is neither a contiguous nor a proximitus neighbour, but it has acquired the special status of both the "continental" and "oceanic" neighbour of South Asia, due to its generally active international political and economic involvement and particularly her South Asian involvement.

45. With the Russian intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, this Russian status has further gained vitality and in fact Pakistan acquired the status of a buffer-state between India and Russia.

46. This particular point has been further analysed in detail in the subsequent pages in this Chapter.
However, the post-1971 developments in South Asia have further enhanced the vitality of this sensitive region, due to its geopolitical structure and the fact that Pakistan occupied the central strategic position in the intra-regional disputes and hostility. What becomes of her is a matter of grave concern not only to India, but also to the Great Powers.47

It is a historical fact that North-Western border land of India (i.e., Khyber Pass) played a vital role as one of the key elements in the determination of the Asian balance of power. By comparison India's north-Eastern frontier region is important only as the seat of a subordinate confrontation where India and China meet across a disputed border. On the other hand, the importance of the North-West is that there both Russia and China are directly involved.

Robert Jackson has analysed the strategic and geo-political vitality and significance of Pakistan in Sino-Soviet conflict and some of the rationals cited by him in support of his argument are as follows:

47. The main emphasis here is on the dismemberment of Pakistan, its defeat, post-war issues which arose due to the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict and, above all, the fear psychosis which prevailed in Pakistan regarding its national security and territorial integrity. T.N. Kaul, "New situation in the Indian Subcontinent", Indian Horizons (New Delhi), vol. 21, nos. 2-3, April-July 1972, pp. 14-20. Mohammad Ayoob, "The New Political Structure of Pakistan", International Studies (New Delhi, SIS), vol. 2, no. 2, April-June 1973, pp. 183-206. In this Article, the author has analysed the altered structure of Pakistan and indicated the geopolitical and strategic importance of that country in the policies of Great Powers (USSR, USA and PRC and the Muslim countries, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia) and the conclusion is that quite possibly Pakistan could learn more with West Asian countries, rather than with South Asian countries and the Indian subcontinent.
"Geographically both Pakistan and Afghanistan lies across Russia's overland access to India. Any power today as in the past, which is interested in minimising Russian influence in the Indian subcontinent must seek to deny her an easy passage through this gateway into India. In the Sino-Soviet confrontation this fact plays the significant role and fulfills the Chinese desire to control the expanding Russian influence in India, through Pakistan, otherwise Russia through Pakistan into India could enter and could exploit her economic superiority over China in the flow of trade and aid and other means of expanding influence. Like in many parts of the world, in the subcontinent, her position can be strengthened by her involvements and China can be seriously weakened by the reduction of her influence in the subcontinent. By reducing tension between India and Pakistan it would reduce the pressure on India and more of her energies for competition."

Pakistan's geo-political and strategic importance has further enhanced as Sino-Soviet tension shifted from their mutual borders to other areas of Asia of which the Indian subcontinent is one of them on account of its proximity to the most sensitive countries.

Thus Pakistan is important to both the Soviet Union and China in their South Asia Policy. It is the vital instrument which prevents the Soviet Union and India from joining hands across the Asian landmass and erecting a formidable geo-political barrier to the South of China. It seems Islamabad will enjoy this status as long as Beijing and Moscow continue to confront with each other and Sino-Indian relations could not develop.

Zubeida Mustafa, a Pakistani journalist, has strongly supported the above argument. She writes:

"Pakistani controlled Kashmir provides Peking with the only landbridge to South Asia and the Indian Ocean. This geographical factor cannot be overestimated especially in view of the struggle for power taking shape in the Indian Ocean. China has yet to develop her naval power in the Indian Ocean which she is bound to do sooner or later, but keeping in view this objective the Chinese have constructed strategic roads along the Southern edge of the Tibetan plateau, which bring them closer to the Indian Ocean. Thus highways have been built connecting Lhasa with Kathmandu and Yunnan with Laos and Burma. But the most important of these is the road which crosses the Sino-Pakistan border linking Sinkiang with Gilgit in Azad Kashmir."

Keeping in view of Pakistan's instrumental geo-political and strategic importance for China, Beijing constructed communication routes between Pakistan and China and in August 1970, overland communication between Pakistan and China were reopened through the famous traditional "silk route". This road, could not prove to be an effective overland communication route between Pakistan and China, due to its being a caravan route. Therefore, a new communication route was constructed and in 1971, the Karakoram high way was officially opened to traffic. This all weather route connects Khunjerab pass, Quila Nabi on the Kashgar-Tibet high way with Morkhum, lying just north of Gilgit.

50 Ibid, p. 116
Therefore, the main competition seem to be between Moscow and Beijing and not between Washington and Moscow. Hence, China's policy is to curtail and displace the Soviet Union in South Asia. Further, for Beijing South Asia linked with its interests in Southeast Asia and her general security posture vis-a-vis Japan and Taiwan, but especially the Soviet Union.

Zubeida Mustafa argues that Pakistan is equally important geo-politically and strategically for Russian and she analysed both the positive and negative rationales in support of her argument. To quote her:

For the Russians, Pakistan has proved to be of negative as well as positive strategic interest. Negatively speaking she can pose a direct threat to the Security of Soviet Union by supplying her enemies vital bases in close proximity to the industrial complex of Soviet Central Asia --- The latest struggle among the big powers for naval supremacy has brought into focus Pakistan's strategic importance as a littoral state of the Indian Ocean --- were Pakistan to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the western Naval presence in the Arabian Sea, it would place the Soviet in an extremely vulnerable position.

Positively speaking, Pakistan is of special significance to the USSR. With the changing pattern of the big power relationship, Russian policy aims have undergone marked shift. In the fifties Moscow had competed with Washington for influence in Asia but now its major objective is to isolate Peking on the mainland. This goal it has sought to achieve, first, by creating a sympathetic anti-Chinese bloc along the Chinese perimeter and secondly, by working to establish a powerful military presence in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan's cooperation is vital in both respects. She can provide shore bases to the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. A base in Pakistan would have been an added advan-
tage: it would give Moscow land access to the Indian Ocean to supply food, naval stores and fuel to its naval units. Russia is already linked with Afghanistan by an excellent net work of roads, and once Pakistan agrees to grant transit facilities, the age-old Czarist ambition of a warm-water port in the South would be fulfilled. Furthermore, by holding aloof from the Soviet proposed project for transit arrangements with Afghanistan and India, Pakistan has successfully denied land communication to the Russian with India compelling them to rely more and more on sea links. This prevents Moscow from consolidating its influence over New Delhi and expanding its net work of security arrangements which is directed primarily against China. Another major handicap for Moscow in its confrontation with Peking is that Pakistan shares a common border with China in a sensitive area and until now the missing link in the Russian Cordon Sanitaire along China's southern frontiers. Only by bringing Pakistan under the influence can the Soviet Union completely outflank the Chinese. 51

In addition to the importance of South Asia in Soviet Policy (as stated above), this region has further vital significance for the Soviet Union due to Russia's deeper concern for the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. The subcontinent not only dominates the Indian Ocean but also could provide the Soviet Union with the needed leverage to offset the growth of anti-Sovietism in the Persian Gulf, particularly in Iran. These conventional geo-political interests would appear to be more determinative in the making of policy than any reference to ideological unity. Moreover, Soviet Policy to deny the Chinese an exclusive sphere of influence in Vietnam and Laos makes it all the more essential that the Chinese sustain their involvement in Pakistan.

51 Ibid, pp. 114-115
Even the United States' threat to the Soviet Union stems not from its presence on the mainland of South Asia, but rather from her decision to establish herself as an Indian Ocean power. And due to Washington's improved submarine launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) capability, Moscow fears that American submarines operating in the Indian Ocean or near the Persian Gulf can cover a deeper arch of targets in the industrial complex of Soviet Central Asia, the Caucasus, Ukraine, and as far as Moscow. An American low frequency communication base is already operational in Australia, and despite Britain's declared end to its East of Suez Policy, there is a joint Anglo-American base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. Another United States' installation continues to operate in Ethiopia, and of course Iran is preoccupied with the development of bases on the Indian Ocean which might well be used by American naval and air contingents. Further the US had made an effort to improve its strategic nuclear capability and protect the vital sea lanes that carry the world's major supply of petroleum.

53. Ibid., p. 41
54. Ibid., p. 42
55. With these US's precautionary steps to hold its influence in the Indian ocean, it is widely accepted that the mainland of South Asia lost its significance in the American policy towards Asia and it does not require bases in any of the countries of the Indian subcontinent.
56. However, this position had changed with the downfall of Shah of Iran and with the establishment of Islamic Republic in that country. Further her entry into non-aligned group is one of the most important negative aspect in that direction.
On the other hand, Soviet Union does not enjoy a variety of institutional means of exerting influence at both the micro and macro levels of politics in the Indian Ocean. But her physical location extending across the heartland of Asia into Central Europe gives it a position of particular importance in the politics of Asia and Europe. Also the Soviet Union is a semi-landlocked power and is flanked by two major power centres, the European heartland under NATO in the West and China in the East. The acquisition of parity of strategic power with the US increases the importance of the Soviet Union as a global power and thus enhance the need for smaller states to stay away from the Great Powers' rivalries.

The origin of the involvement of the United States into South Asian affairs goes back to early 1950s, i.e., since the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent. However, its involvement increased to a larger extent in late 1950s and acquired momentum in the 1960s and 1970s.

In a chronological sequence the first and foremost reason for American involvement in South Asia was the containment of communism in Asia and a desire to deny the Soviet and Chinese opportunities to become the dominant powers in South Asia. Secondly, Washington desired to encourage the newly emerged noncommunist nationalist elites in post-colonial South Asia. Thirdly, a concern for a post-colonial world would have
precious little authority and an implicit desire for a world open and attentive to the United States. Fourthly, as South Asia is fundamentally linked in the global competition between the United States, the Soviet Union and China and is deeply involved in the Central balance of power.

However, since 1973, the new American concern over the oil resources in the Persian Gulf had enhanced South Asia's importance in Washington's policy. So did Pakistan's relations with China. In other words two adjacent regions are regarded as much more important than South Asia itself. Further America has interests both in the Persian Gulf and Arab-Israeli conflict and for the United States her relations with China are much more important than those with the South Asian countries. Probably this was one of the reasons for the shift in American policy vis-a-vis China in the early 1970s, i.e., one of China containment to "China Opening" or rapprochement. 57

A fuller analysis of American interest in South Asia highlights that its direct interests in the region have been few and far between. However, it has had extensive indirect interests.

A geographical study conducted by Stephen R. Cohen about American interest in South Asia indicates that her inte-

57. Hary Harding, China and the US: Normalization and Beyond (New York, 1978)
rest in the region was steadily decreasing after 1962-63, although with spurts of renewed interests in 1970-73. His study further adds that if one draws a line on a graph of the balance of American concern in the region it would show steady decline winding up at a position just below or perhaps equal to that of South East Asia. 58

Stephen P. Cohen is of the opinion that America's relations vis-a-vis South Asia in general were just a straight one-to-one relationship (bilateral) or one-to-two relationship (trilateral) but some times it was based largely in terms of the global balance of power or America's relationship with the Soviet Union and China (multilateral). 59

In the contemporary international system "Oceanic Relations" gained greater significance with the advancement of naval power of the Great Powers (however, China is not yet a naval power) and escalated vitality of sea resources, i.e., oil storage made it a unique resource of material advancement.

Hence the Indian subcontinent looks out across the sea while at the same time being deeply engaged in the politics of the continental land-mass in its hinterland. The external powers with interests in the subcontinent fall into two major categories. Those whose interests arise from what might be called the Oceanic aspect of the subcontinent's external relations and those whose interests stem from their "continental


59. Ibid, p. 21
The oil resources, the trade with the area, the magnitude of the area, the largeness of the population - in all these respects it is an important area. As a consequence of all these factors the Indian Ocean had acquired greater importance in American policy and it was considered essential by the United States to keep the area under its influence.

In support of this argument Admiral Elmo Russell Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of American Naval Operations' opinion is cited as follows:

"We have very important interests in the area. It has become a focal point of our foreign and economic policies and has a growing impact on our security. Prudence would suggest that we provide support for our foreign policy by having a credible capability to deploy military power into the area. Such capability should contribute to the stability of the region over the long run."

Therefore, America’s relations towards the Indian subcontinent have a curious mixture of both the types of connection - the "Oceanic" and the "Continental". However, its underlying attitude was founded on the pattern of relationship of the "Oceanic" type. On the other hand, it being a super power with continental interest is a 'continental' type, since one of the main concern of its foreign policy is the management of the area.

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60. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion of US Military facilities in the Indian Ocean (Hearing before the Committee on Near East and South Asia) 93rd Congress Report, 22 Session, 2 February - 6,12,19,20 March 1974, p. 134
of the balance of power in the subcontinent. Thus this com-
bination of approaches made the US the least stable and pre-
dictable of the powers with interests in the subcontinent.

According to Robert Jackson:

"It would not of course be true that the United States enjoys a completely irresponsible freedom of manoeuvre in the subcontinent. It is true that it has fewer permanent commitments, but it is nevertheless subject to the logic of its present paradoxical position as an Asian Great Power without any geographical connection. So long as it wills itself to assume an appropriate share of the burden of responsibility for maintaining the present system of World Order and its position in it the United States will be bound by the logic of that endeavour --- It will be dictated by the interests which, in its view, arise from the exigencies of the world balance and America's present place in it." 61

Hence the continued strategic involvement of the United States in the affairs of the subcontinent, such as... her role as arms supplier does not lend particular credibility to her verbal declarations about the marginality of the area.

The Former American Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, James Noyes, said:

"The quest for influence on the part of external forces clearly bears on the area's problems. South Asia's geopolitical location on the southern border of Sino-Soviet landmass, its close proximity to other areas where great power interests are particularly compelling and the basic fact that over a fifth of the world's population lives, within its boundaries

61 Robert Jackson, Op Cit, n. 52, p. 38
have invited outside interest and involvement. All the traditional weapons of peace time diplomacy are in use on the subcontinent. From the military point of view, these include the most potent one, arms transfers, as well as training, the presence of advisors and technicians, joint military exercises and visits by the units of major powers naval and airforce.62

Again says Robert Jackson:

Except for the underlying facts of continental geography there is nothing permanent about the present constellation of political forces in Asia or in the subcontinent. However, over and above, the basic Indo-Pakistani antagonism, China is hostile to India and both China and the United States identify the Soviet Union as their principal rival among the super powers. The consequence of this pattern of relations is that the United States policy is oriented towards China and therefore against India. If China and the Soviet Union were to draw closer together this would imply some easing of the conflict between India and Pakistan in so far as it is inflamed by the Great Power rivalries and therefore a shift in American policy back towards India, and return to the system of alliances around the Asian periphery upon which the United States position in Asia rested between 1949 and 1971. The permutations of this kind of game are of course endless. The point of sketching out a scenario is to confirm the judgement that in relation to the subcontinent, the United States had neither eternal friends nor eternal enemies, neither does it even have permanent interests in the subcontinent save those that may be thought to arise from its particular vision of the appropriate principles of world order.63

Thus in the Indian subcontinent, in the present context, the Great Powers relations vis-a-vis India-Pakistan is based on the following pattern:64

62. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States ... South Asia, 1973, p.83
63. Robert Jackson, Op Cit, n. 51, p. 40
64. Here (+) indicates/Positive relationship and (-) indicates enemity, hostile or negative relationship.
1. For the United States of America:

- A friend of an enemy is enemy
  - India + USSR
  - USA (-)

- A friend of a friend is friend
  - Pakistan + China/USA (+)

- An enemy of an enemy is friend
  - China - USSR
  - USA (+)

- An enemy of friends is enemy
  - India-China+Pakistan
  - USA (-)

As the American national interest serves on this pattern of relationship.

2. Likewise for the Soviet Union, similar concept will be applicable:

- A friend of an enemy is enemy
  - Pakistan+China+USA
  - USSR (-)

- A friend of a friend is friend
  - India - Nil/USSR (+)

- An enemy of enemies is friend
  - India-China+USA
  - USSR (+)

- An enemy of a friend is enemy
  - China-India/USSR (-)

3. For China, the pattern will be as follows:

- A friend of an enemy is enemy
  - India-USSR/China(-)

- A friend of a friend is friend
  - Pakistan+USA
  - China(+)

- An enemy of an enemy is friend
  - USSR - USA
  - China (+)

- An enemy of a friend is enemy
  - India- Pakistan/China (-)

The national interest of the United States, the Soviet Union and China serves on the above outlined patterns of relationship.
When we turn from the United States interests in the subcontinent to the interests of the Soviet Union and China, we are decisively moving away from the world of "Oceanic" linkages to the realm of "continental" linkages between adjacent landmasses. The underlying fact of Asian geopolitics is that the Soviet Union and China have a common frontier at the present disputed for much of its length which runs for thousands of miles from the Pacific to Himalayas. Despite the evidence of history, it might be argued that this fact alone need not induce a state of permanent tension between the two powers—although it is doubtful whether they will even be able to settle down to the uniquely amicable kind of relationship that developed along the Canadian border in the 19th Century between the United States and the British Empire. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a common frontier, taken together with the now sufficiently advanced state of development of nuclear military technology on both sides, has had the paradoxical but historically predictable effect of transferring the locale of active tension between China and the Soviet Union.

Pakistan's refusal to participate in Soviet schemes for regional cooperation in the subcontinent prevents Russia from her deepening influence on India and by engaging India, in regional preoccupations. Pakistan's hostility also redu-
ces India's capability to support the Soviet Union in its rivalry with China. If Pakistan were to settle down to the "good neighbourly" relations with India which Russia had been propagating from the mid 1960s, India's pre-eminence would have been decisively confirmed and it would be much better able to compete for regional influence with China. Although India may not have the capacity to join China in the ranks of the Great Powers, either independently or with Russian support, it would be able to play a more commanding role on the Asian stage (as a major regional power) if the disputes with Pakistan could be resolved amicably and in a peaceful atmosphere.

However, the system of 'good neighbourly' relations urged by Russia upon Pakistan is one which could, if realised, bring very great benefits to both India and Pakistan.

Thus, in this vital and sensitive part of the world, the Soviet Union, the United States, India, Pakistan and China interact and their interests are clashing. The Soviet Union having established special ties with India, and China with Pakistan, and the United States maintaining rather extensive economic and political relations with all of the countries in the region, besides her special relations at

65. Since mid 1960s Soviet Union was playing the role of a mediator between India and Pakistan and was trying to help them to resolve their disputes amicably. Further, it had maintained a symmetrical relationship with New Delhi and Islamabad till 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict and the domestic disturbance in Pakistan after the down fall of Field Marshall Ayub Khan's regime.
An analytical study of the foreign policy behaviour of a nation-state indicates that both domestic and external factors play equally important role in its planning and execution. In the case of South Asian nation-states, domestic factors like, colonial legacy, religious sentiments, language-linkages (linguafranca), socio-economic, socio-cultural, historical factors and political instability played important role along with external factors, like, strategic and geo-political vitality of the region, local rivalry and the Great Power interests in the Indian Ocean and the region's dependence for economic, scientific and technological assistance on the Great Powers. Thus the conclusion drawn from a historical study of the behaviour pattern of South Asian nation-states is that local powers interact with the external powers more than the interaction among the regional powers. In other words intra-regional interaction is in a stage of infancy in this region.

66. Sisir Gupta, as early as in April 1970, highlighted the possibility that none of the Super Powers was interested in completely pushing the other out of the area. And they learnt to treat the area as one of the areas of their agreement. For further details on this point, see, Sisir Gupta, The Power Structure in South Asia; Problems of Stability, The Round Table no. 238, April 1970, pp. 129-139
The Great Power involvement in the Third World conflictual areas is the culmination of the 'global inequalities of power structure'. It is true even in the case of Indian subcontinent. A full-length study of the Third World countries indicates that these countries deprived of their rights in almost all fields like socio-economic, socio-cultural, political, scientific and technological and had been the victim of exploitation by the colonial and neo-colonial powers (both capitalist and communist).

It is precisely in this context that the subject of regional conflict among the Third World countries and the Great Power intervention becomes both relevant and important. This is because the regional conflicts provide Great Powers with an unique opportunity to intervene in Third World affairs. Thus further undermining its incipient autonomy.

Moreover, Third World countries provide markets to the Great Powers - who manufacture large quantities of sophisticated weapons.

Ali M. Mazrui has analysed the objectives of arms supply by the Great Powers to the Third World countries as follows:

"There has certainly been a change from the old days of Pax Britannia. Whereas the old imperial motto was 'disarm the natives and facilitate control', the new imperial cunning has translated it into 'arm the natives and consolidate dependency'. While the British and French once regarded it as
important to stop "tribal warfare" they now regard it as profitable to modernise "tribal warfare" with lethal weapons.67

Thus the major role of the Great Powers, in Third World affairs has been primarily one of conflict management rather than of conflict resolution. This analysis is equally relevant with particular reference to the South Asian countries, in general and Indo-Pakistani relations vis-a-vis the great powers in particular.

However, in South Asia, there is a meagre possibility for the domination of a single external power, because all the Great Powers (i.e., USA; USSR; PRC) are equally interested.68 Therefore, as long as these powers are in competition, military aid and motivational factors tend to play a more significant role. Thus the conclusion drawn by Louis J. Cantori seems to be relevant in this context:

"The intrusive powers are often as important in limiting conflict and encourage cooperation as they in intensifying strife".69

However, the importance of external environment of the nation-states had greatly increased relative to the domestic environment, as a result of unprecedented interdependence witnessed

68. Mohammad Ayoob, Op Cit, n.49, p.204
in contemporary international politics, particularly since the triangular domination on the international scenario, political and military tripolarity, presents a major structural problem and imposes the difficult task of generating unity and strength among most Third World developing and under-developed countries in order to introduce and encourage further a far greater degree of autonomy and cross cutting pressures associated with tripolarity.

To quote Nazir A. Kamal, a Pakistani strategist:

"Unless a countervailing power can be brought to bear on the resolution of the major economic and security issues, much will depend on the unreliable and rather unnerving factor of chance. As experience shows, matters of peace and war should not be left to the vagaries of big power negotiations. Sufficient pressure must be exerted on them so that their preoccupations do not put the world in constant jeopardy." 70

Thus global strategy and regional perceptions are important moulders of the foreign policy of every nation-state. And in the present perspective of international politics, the theories of conflict and co-operation are vital to bring a peaceful and constructive international change, based on the parallel growth of a general consensus and confidence-building. The petty preoccupations of the Great Powers (cold war phase) in the 1950s and 1960s

at long last paved way to a detente diplomacy so that they
could expeditiously take initiatives towards peaceful co-
existence and increase international cooperation, a process
that must unquestionably start by them because what they do
or do not undertake to do defines the limits of constructive
change in international politics.

At the Pacem in Terris III conference in Washington
on 8 October 1973, Henry A. Kissinger touched on a crucial
theme in defending the detente diplomacy on the conceptual
plane.

"We are at one of those rare moments where through
a combination of fortuitous circumstances and design
man seems in a position to shape his future. What
we need (above all) is the confidence to discuss
issues without bitter strife, the wisdom to define
together (emphasis added) the nature of world, as
well as the vision to chart together (emphasis added)
a more just future".71

Commenting on Kissinger's idea of a 'just future' within
the prospective of the essential world order, Corbal Bell
argued as follows:

"I would say that Kissinger's central task ... has
been to build the bilateral balance of power ..., into the more viable and flexible triangular balance
of the present, and to maintain that balance as the
infrastructure of a (hopefully) creative and peace-
oriented diplomatic order, which may in time be strong
enough to permit change and adjustment without the
catastrophe of central war".72

71. Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London, 1982),
pp. 491 and 685; Richard Holbrooke, "Kissinger: A Hero,
Perhaps, But not a Model", Boston Globe, 15 September,
1974, p. 34.; and David Finely, "Detente and Soviet
American Trade", Strategic Digest (New Delhi), April,
1976, p. 41

72. Corbal Bell, "Kissinger in Tretrospect: The Di-plemacy
of Power Concert" International Affairs (London), vol.539,
no.2, April 1977, pp. 207-08
Thus the tripolarised structure, in terms of both power and ideology, is rigid one and unless a three-way process of de-polarisation is initiated, relations will remain marred and will tend towards conflict and disintegration among Third World countries.

Nazir A. Kamal may be further quoted on this point:

"It is unrealistic to believe that, with the changes in the nature of power and other structural changes affecting the character of international system, a country can embark on a Hitlerite drive to alter the fundamental status quo or hope to get away with it. Moreover, the management of the dynamic internal, regional and international stability is itself in present conditions a major problem and a fundamental concern for most states, and their ability to cope with it depends in great part on the overall condition of international peace and security. In ages derived from the inter-war period tend to greatly distort existing realities which are in some major respects fundamentally different from preceding periods. The external environment is overbearing in terms of its impact on a state's viability both as a political unit and a social collectivity in the long run". 73

However, there is no guarantee that the proliferation and escalation of arms race itself would lead to meaningful arms control. In South Asian context the Great powers are mainly responsible for the escalation and proliferation of arms-race. Possibly this phenomena would upset the regional balance of power. Thus further undermining the objective

of peaceful coexistence. Though superficially arms proliferation in this region seems to be in the interest of super powers. But actually long-term process it is not. Therefore it is inevitable on the part of Super Powers and Great Powers to discourage this process and should provide enough opportunities by avoiding interference in their matter to create an environment of peaceful coexistence.

It is difficult to further assume that peace, international cooperation and progress can be achieved without an enabling concept which offers an alternative diplomacy for the realisation of an alternative system of relations among South Asian states. Although substantive arms limitation will bring about structural changes, as a diminution of a change in the power balance and the accompanying decline in the use of force in South Asian subsystem. Hence the requirement is the attainment of detente and greater cooperation among the countries of this region.

As such the concept of detente not only represents a lowering of tensions but also makes possible vision, however, vague and general it may be, for a more secure future for the human race. Detente subsumes peaceful coexistence, mutual restraint, respect for legitimate interests, increasing contacts, accommodation and communication. These elements are the building blocks for changing the structure of international system. However, the Great Powers continue
to negotiate on global issue with triangular preoccupation and domestic constraints, and at the same time are quite capable of coping with the limited pressure exerted by the developing Third World nation-states on them. Much, therefore, has depended on the domestic dynamics of policy formulation of the Great Powers. As yet there has been no improvement in attitudes, perceptions and basic assumptions. Rather there is a considerable hope for pessimism.

If detente and greater International cooperation is placed within the wider perspectives and framework of crisis management, conflict deescalation or conflict resolution, then its chief aim should be to enable the growth of general consensus for a peaceful international transformation towards a more diffused structure, away from the potential menace of tripolarity. Common interests abound ranging from a vital stake in the management of power politics to environmental protection. With the globalisation of politics and economics the perspective for detente among the great powers must be necessarily transitional, since the international system is an integrated and there can be no escape from this overbearing reality.

Detente as discussed above is a modus operandi for peace, cooperation and progress in the contemporary international system, and sub-systems. It envisages a lowering of
tensions not as a nebulous end in itself, but with a view to furthering international cooperation and collaboration on the numerous international issues which confront the nation-states. For the Great Powers it means the acceptance of a drift towards a greater multipolarity than that exist today. Hence, the future modalities of dynamic international change would determine the balance between conflict and cooperation, even war and peace. But unfortunately detente diplomacy had followed once again by the neo-Cold War phase.

IV

In the 1970s, United States of America abandoned her China containment policy, embarking on rapprochement and China Opening. This major shift in American policy has introduced subtle change in the geopolitical and geostrategic scenario of South Asia. 74 To cite Robert Jackson, again:

"The rapprochement between the United States and People's Republic of China opened up the prospects of a new balance of power in Asia - indeed a new global balance. The course of events in the subcontinent during this year of international transformation was deeply influenced by these changes in international relationships; and in its turn left its mark on the new structure of world power." 75

74. Shift in American Policy and its impact has been dealt with fully in Part II of this Chapter

75. Robert Jacson, South Asian Crisis: India-Pakistan-Bangladesh, (New Delhi, 1976), p. 151
In this phase Washington and Beijing shared a common concern about the excessive Soviet influence in South Asia, and growing Indo-Soviet relationship after the conclusion of Indo-Soviet Treaty. Moreover, America and China viewed India as an important channel for the expansion of Soviet influence in the Indian subcontinent, as Moscow had limited military and economic capabilities of its own in this region. Thus on the western power side there was of course a guarded fear-psychosis that India might give directly or indirectly boost to the expansion of Soviet influence in the region and might support Soviet naval expansion in the Indian Ocean, which of course regarded as a threat to their power interest.

Such Western apprehensions vis-a-vis Indo-Soviet 'special relations' had further cemented their relations, as India felt insecure about Western attitudes towards her.

According to Robert Jackson, the American rapprochement with China had certain necessary consequences for American policy towards the less important region of the Indian subcontinent. These were (a) both countries found a common perspective in their antagonism towards India; and (b) America recognises Chinese ambition and power interest in the Indian subcontinent.


77. Robert Jackson, Op Cit, p. 156
China's military aid to Pakistan, its involvement in the domestic insurrections in India (North Eastern area), and Beijing's support to Pakistan for its demand for the right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, a reference in the Shanghai communique signed during President Nixon's visit to Beijing on 27 February 1972, further added New Delhi's apprehensions towards Pakistan-China-American axis.

Besides this China and the USA developed rapport with Bangladesh after the *coup d'état* in August 1975, and the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman. Their relationship was further strengthened during General Zia-ru-Rahman's regime. Evidently it was assumed that Beijing's and Washington's desires were negative towards Indian intentions to have peace and cooperation in the Indian subcontinent and both want to fish in the troubled waters.

Thus the above analysis highlights that South Asia could no longer be fitted into a scheme of bipolarity. The developments after Washington's "China opening" crystallised into a triangular relationship.

President Nixon in his 1972 foreign policy report to US Congress said:

"It would be dangerous for world peace if our efforts to promote a *detente* between the super powers were in-
of Soviet Power. If we had failed to take a stand, such an interpretation could only have been encouraged and the genuine relaxation of tensions we have been seeking could have been jeopardised. The war in South Asia bound to have serious implications, for the evolution of the People's Republic of China. That country's attitude towards the global system was certain to be profoundly influenced by its assessment of the principles of which this system was governed, whether forced and threat ruled or whether restraints was the international standard.  

But, Leo E. Rose, reiterated that:

"The scope of Indo-Soviet cooperation on broader regional issues was seen by Washington and Peking as still sufficiently limited not to require vigorous counter measures. Rather, both countries sought to complicate New Delhi's collaborative role in its relations with Moscow through 'Carrot and Stick' policies of their own. The carrot offered was an improvement in their political and economic relations with India, the stick included hints at the expansion of assistance to Pakistan and since 1975 to Bangladesh."

Regarding US interests in the Indian subcontinent Robert Jackson once again cited as follows:

"It would not of course be true that the US enjoys a completely irresponsible freedom of manoeuvre in the subcontinent. It is true that it has fewer permanent commitments in the region than the other Great Powers, but it is nevertheless subject to the logic of its paradoxical position as an Asian Great Power without any geographical connection. So long as it desires itself to assume an appropriate share of the burden of responsibility for maintaining the


present system of world order and its position in it, the United States will be bound by the logic of that endeavour. Its policy towards the subcontinent can be dictated by the interests which, in its view, arise from the exigencies of the world balance and America's present place in it.80

As far the Sino-American rapprochement was concerned, the Chinese were satisfied with the initiation, and the process of normalization was satisfactory between 1972-73. But the Watergate crisis, the subsequent decline of President Nixon's prestige and power, and finally, with Nixon's exit a stalemate developed in the Sino-American relations.

According to G.W. Choudhury, the Chinese attributed this stalemate to two factors, namely:

(i) Nixon could see clearly the dangers from the Soviet Union and he was, therefore, anxious to promote better relations with Peking as a counter balance in the global balance of power.

(ii) With his departure from office, the US foreign policy initiatives seemed to move from the US President to the US Secretary of State—an assessment with which many Americans would agree.81

David Bonann further highlighted this point after President Nixon's exit, the Chinese had expressed their disapproval of Kissinger's handling of US Foreign Policy in a subtle way. They were of the opinion that as Marxists and former allies of the Soviets, they know the "socialist imperialists" in


Moscow better than the former Harvard Professor does. It could not be denied that the Chinese have a closer historical experience of Soviet arms and methods than Henry A. Kissinger has, and that their warnings about the Russians deserve serious attention. 82

American Sinologists, engaged in working out US policy alternatives towards Beijing, obviously considered the fact that China is the central power in the Asian region. Any important issue in this region cannot be decided by ignoring her. According to G.W. Choudhury, "the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union in the Third World, can only be met by meaningful cooperation between Washington and Beijing. China has the potentiality to become a super power with tremendous appeal to Afro-Asian countries". 83

Zbigniew Brezezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor observed that:

"PRC is not a par with the United States or the Soviet Union in the overall power equation. Yet China in effect balances Soviet expansionist ambitions eastward". 84

However, the sudden disappearance of Chou En-lai and Mao Ze-Dong in the same year (1976) from the Chinese political scene, paved the way to many predictions by Sinologists and

82. David Bonann, "The Wizard that was", Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 July 1976
83. G.W. Choudhur, Op Cit, p. 604
such questions gained importance, as the future of Sino-American relations and prospects for Sino-Soviet rapprochement. But the later observations have ruled out such possibilities, because neither Sino-Soviet relations had improved nor the Sino-American rapprochement was effected. The sole reason for this constant policy seems to be that the decision taken by Chinese for the normalisation of relations with Washington was not the "brain product" of a single individual like Chou En-lai or Mao Ze-Dong but it was a collective decision taken by Mao Ze-Dong, Chou En-lai and the Generals of the People's Liberation Army through consensus.

In fact in the post Mao Ze-Dong phase China under the Chairmanship of Hua Kua feng and Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping established diplomatic relations with Washington. Both President Carter and Chairman Hua announced from Washington and Beijing respectively on 15 December 1978 that the US and the PRC would establish full diplomatic relations from January 1979. It was the final provision of the Shanghai communique signed by President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on 27 February, 1972. It is the greatest achievement of post-Mao leadership. During this phase, Russian also made endeavour to normalise relations with China, but according to G.W. Choudhury, "due to crude Soviet diplomacy friendly Soviet gestures were not successful". 85

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During his visit to Beijing, at his farewell dinner on 22 May 1978, Zbigniew Brezezinski told his Chinese counterpart:

"Our commitment to friendship with China is based on shared concerns and is derived from long-term strategic views. We recognise China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nations which seeks to establish global and regional hegemony."

The Soviet Union was unhappy over the warming up of the Sino-American relations and the improvement in their diplomatic ties. The Chinese and the Soviet Union are looked into a bitter, irreconciliable struggle, each wanted to see the other as weak and isolated. China wanted US support against Soviet efforts to gain military domination over Moscow the rest of Asia, the Middle East and Western Europe. Syed Anwar Hussain, comments on this issue as follows:

"The earlier Soviet-American collaboration against China would now seem to have been imprudent: It is an elementary rule of power politics that a Great Power ought not to join another great power against a smaller power. Were China to collapse, it would be the Soviet Union, the Power in China's neighbourhood and not the United States, who would profit such a term of events. Her capabilities augmented, she would pose an even greater threat to American interests than she was able to do before. Hence China's advancement to a position of power where she is no longer subject to Soviet intimidation is a necessary condition for her effectiveness as an actor in the balance of power system envisaged in America's new Asia Policy."

86. New China News Analysis, 20-22, May 1978
Further, Dusko Doder analysed the Soviet response towards Sino-American rapprochement as follows:

"The Soviet leaders appeared to be alarmed by the improved Sino-American relationship as an extremely grave challenge to their global interest. The real source of alarm was the possibility of Sino-American cooperation or even tacit understanding which was viewed by Kremlin leaders as a prospect for a significant switch in strategic balance at Moscow's expense." 88

Ever since President Nixon's "China Opening", the US used the China Card in its diplomacy. The purpose of using the Chinese Card was to take benefit of Sino-Soviet conflict or tension and to build up China as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union. Thus Washington was the gainer due to the Sino-Soviet conflict. However, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev charged on 25 January 1978, that the US was pursuing a short-sighted and dangerous policy by playing the Chinese Card against the Soviet Union.

In the post Simla phase both the US and India tried to normalise their relations, which had been deteriorated since the days of the 1971 US 'tilt' towards Pakistan. 89 However, President Nixon, in his message to Congress on 9 February 1972, spoke of a dialogue for better understanding with India. 90 And Henry Kissinger assured the then Indian Ambassador, T.N. Kaul, in Washington that:


89. Jack Anderson and George Clifford, Anderson Papers (New York, 1974)

"India was the 'pre-eminent' power in South Asia and had to play her due role in the region as a leading non-aligned country and in the world. There was no clash of national interests between India and the US. America did not wish to weaken India. A strong, stable, non-aligned and peaceful India would add to the stability and peace of the region. It would stem the tide of Chinese expansion. America did not wish to create a sphere of influence in your region, but she did not want it to become a sphere of Soviet or Chinese influence either." 91

Similar views were expressed by Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi while briefing the new Ambassador to Washington. She said, "there is no reason why relations between India and US could not be as good as that between India and Soviet Union". 92 If American assistance to India and Pakistan had been economic and if it had resolutely kept off from arms aid, the history of the region would have been different. 93

It seems that the era of building up Pakistan to be a bastion against communism in America's Asian policy is hopefully over. America's Asian policy in 1970s seems to have good relations with both the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. To cite Chanchal Sarkar,

/foot note No.90 contn../

T.N. Kaul, Kissinger Years: Indo-American Relations, (New Delhi, 1980)

91. T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in War and Peace, (New Delhi, 1979), p.209

92. Foreign Affairs Report, August 1972; and T.N. Kaul, Reminiscences, Discreet and Indiscreet, (New Delhi, 1982)

93. Leela Yadya, "India's reaction to US, Military Aid to Pakistan", in Surendra Chopra,(Ed.), Studies in India's Foreign Policy" (New Delhi, 1980) - In this article the author examined the reasons on which US had been supplying arms to Pakistan since early 1950s and simultaneously analysed the rationales why India had always opposed American policy of arms supply to Pakistan.
The world perception, Asian involvement, and the regional strategy of the United States have all changed significantly in the last couple of years and with them has changed America's attitude towards the Soviet Union, and even more drastically, to China. This is what had made the relations between India and US more rational, although as, we shall see, the ingredients for real warmth do not exist.

With the change in the Presidency in the US in the middle of 1974 an opportunity was opened for India to normalise relations with Washington. The then Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh met President Gerald Ford in September 1974. This was the first meeting of any high Indian official since the 1971 pro-Pakistan 'tilt' with an American President and both agreed for the improvement of relations with each other. Later, in October, US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger visited New Delhi and discussed with the Indian leaders on the issues of mutual interest, like, India's nuclear explosion, the American interest in the Indian Ocean and South Asia. Henry A. Kissinger had given an impression during his address in the Indian Council of World Affairs that America recognized India as the major regional power, a position which was denied to her since her independence. But subsequent developments revealed that yet US had not reconciled with the reality of India, being major power and it had pursued its policy of containment of India.

95. Foreign Affairs Reports, November 1974, South Asian News Review (New Delhi), October 1974
96. Subsequent developments, like, the American perpetual propaganda against Indian nuclear explosion, her denial of shipment of enriched Uranium to Tarapore Atomic Power Station under treaty obligation, guarantee for the comprehensive nuclear safeguard; and the American rejection to accept Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, i.e., American Naval build-up in the Indian Ocean against the Indian intentions.
In fact a full-length analysis of Indo-American relations highlights that there is no major conflict of interests between the two countries - neither strategic, ideological, commercial nor territorial. Most of the differences between them related to the pattern of relationship of either of them with other countries, like Pakistan, China, USSR, Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, the main clash of interest with India is over her size, resources and population, and her desire to become an "independent power centre" in the region, among the Third World nation-states and her intention to exercise her influence independently in international arena in general. US is antagonistic to the Indian aspirations. Therefore, US opposed Indian efforts to be the 'pre-eminent' power in South Asia. Patwant Singh highlighted this fact as follows:

"The reason for Washington's attitude can only be that since there is no sacrosant possibility of India's action being always identifiable with American interests in Asia, it would not be in the US interest to voluntarily help, generate power whose future like Chaina's she will not be able to control".

97. Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhid during her visit to USA in July 1982 in her Press Conference in Washington emphasised this point. However, before Jawaharlal Nehru too had similar opinions and views on this issue. Please see, Jawaharlal Nehru, Op Cit pp 815-16

However, the important areas of disagreement in the 1970s between New Delhi and Washington were in regard to the question of nuclear weapons, comprehensive nuclear safeguards, the related question of shipment of American enriched-Uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and the American naval build-up in the Indian ocean. As a consequence of these differences the clash of interest emerged and their relationship remained throughout at a low ebb.

After December 1971, India-Pakistan conflict, India emerged as the pre-eminent regional power. Pakistan's capacity to counter Indian desire to become the 'pre-eminent' power declined. As stated above even America recognised India as the 'pre-eminent' regional power. But this American recognition seemed more apparent, than real. In reality there was no change in American policy towards New Delhi. Daniel Moynihan's (an ex-US Ambassador to India) statement would further clarify American views on this point:

"The United States had a treaty with Pakistan. Pakistan is an ally. Similarly, India has a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Clearly, if you want to have a good relationship with New Delhi, we cannot ask the Indians to break off their relationship with the Soviet Union. Nor can they ask us to break off our relationship with Pakistan."100

During this phase, America tried to 'contain' India through a group of states, i.e. China, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

99. Henry A. Kissinger, Op Cit, n.43
100. New York Times, 10 December 1974; and John Frazer, India No Margime for Error, The Readers Digest (Bombay), December 1974; pp. 44-45
Thus its emphasis shifted from intra-regional to inter-regional balance to counter Indian aspirations. It is important to note that during the period 1950-1971, America sold to Iran military weapons worth $1.2 billion. But during the period of 1971-76, Iran purchased military weapons from US worth $11.8 billion. Similarly arms sales to Saudi Arabia during the period 1974-76 totalled $5.8 billion. In fact, during this phase, till the Islamic revolution in Iran, it was the only major rival in the regional politics against India. Moreover, Iran and Saudi Arabia were constantly supporting Pakistan against India. Even during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis Iran's assistance was active towards Pakistan and after her defeat Pakistan relied heavily on Iran for the psychological uplift necessary to pull it out of the despair of defeat.

The ouster of Shah of Iran, the establishment of 'Islamic Republic' in Iran, its withdrawal from CENTO, and its decision to pursue non-aligned foreign policy had altered the nature of US-Iranian relations. This shift in the US-Iranian relationship has again revived Pakistan's importance in American strategy. The Patriot in an editorial concluded that it was no secret that the US needed Pakistan more than before as a base for strategic operations in the region.


102 Department of Defence, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance, December 1976, p.12

However, India strongly opposed American naval presence in the Indian Ocean. As it was rapidly developing its naval base at Diego Garcia and turning it into a major strategic base. Indian opposition to this American scheme was based on the concept that the presence of outside powers would have an enormous impact on local security calculations.  

Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then India's External Affairs Minister informed the Lok Sabha:

"The increased military and naval presence in the area and fears of involvement of Great Powers can have adverse political and economic consequences which would not ease but only add to the tensions in this vital region."  

But, Washington had justified her naval presence in the Indian Ocean to counter-balance the Soviet presence. It argued that America and most of her western allies were dependent on West Asian oil. Patrick Wall has supported this view and elaborated it as follows:

"America's growing energy and mineral crisis demands for its solution, unimpeded access to strategic minerals and material in Africa, as well as to the Middle East Oil."  

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106 The Patriot (New Delhi), 31 December 1978

107 Asian Recorder (New Delhi), 30 April-6 May 1979, p.14859


109 Patrick Wall, "Recent Developments and Conclusions", in Patrick Wall, (Ed), "The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West* (London, 1975), p. 177
Thus he had emphasized the importance of Middle East in American Policy. However, Russel Sappurr refuting American argument for her naval bases to counter-balance the Soviet presence, comments as follows:

"Reality appears to be far from the American contentions. It can be argued that the US do not require naval bases in this area to safeguard its national security in this age of ICBM's and MIRV's. It may be stressed that the Soviet Union is perfectly well targeted by second-strike US missiles submarines stationed in the pacific and the North Atlantic".110

The American presence in the Indian Ocean is dictated by its ambition to perpetuate its preponderent position in international politics. American acquisition of Diego-Garcia is perceived as a "part and parcel of the design to acquire a stronger interventionist capability in the Indian Ocean in order to exert American influence and control over the littoral countries in the area".111

Even the joint communique issued during Prime Minister Desai's visit to Washington in June 1973, indicates that both the US and India differed on the question of American presence in the Indian Ocean. While "Desai expressed the hope that the talks between the US and the Soviet Union would result in the eventual removal of the Great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean, and the American side emphasised over the 'stabilization of the military presence' of the Great Powers in the


Indian Ocean.  

After remaining in opposition (major political parties) since India's independence, the collective opposition under the banner of Janata Party secured massive mandate in March 1977 General Election. With this change it was expected that the Indo-US relations would undergo some change and the initiation of a new chapter was expected in their mutual relations.  

As there was simultaneous change in US (from 1 Jan 1978) administration and in Pakistan after the coup d'etat and overthrow of Bhutto regime on 5 July 1977. Moreover, in this phase, initially Indo-US relations were improved as President Jimmy Carter was "genuinely" interested to normalise the relations. On Pakistan's side Pak-US relations were deteriorated to a certain extent.

During his official visit to New Delhi from January 1 to 3, 1978, former American President Jimmy Carter stated that "the world's two largest democracies -- India and US were bound together by a common belief in basic moral values and respect for human spirit". Morarji Desai also shown positive response towards Carter's ideas and said, "with President Carter's visit to India, unbreakable bounds of friendship would be estab-

114. *Hindustan Times*, 2 January 1978
lished between the two countries. The Joint Communique signed by India and US during Carter's visit contains many common foreign policy objectives. An analysis of this communique highlights that both New Delhi and Washington principally agreed on the need for enduring and stable peace and cooperation in international politics.

According to B.R Nayar, Indo-American Relation shown signs of improvement in the earlier phases of Janata Government. But this improvement proved to be short-term as misunderstanding grappled on some issues, like, American decision not to resume Uranium shipment, the dim prospects for the renewal of bilateral economic aid. Thus this phase of rapprochement of Indo-US relations proved to be short-term, as in the later phase further misunderstanding surfaced on such issues as the comprehensive nuclear safeguards, supply of enriched uranium, American arms supply to Pakistan and American presence in the Indian Ocean. Later in June 1978, the Indian Prime Minister Desai visited Washington but the outcome of the visit was not satisfactory.

On Pakistani side, Pakistan-US relations which were at a low ebb, in the initial phase of President Carter's adminis-

115. Ibid
116. Hindustan Times, 3 January 1978
117. B.R Nayar "India and the Super Powers: Deviation or Continuity in Foreign Policy?", Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XII, no. 30, 23 July 1977, p.1187
118. The Hindu (Madras), Editorial, 20 June 1978
tration improved, due to the changing international situation and such developments, as the overthrow of Shah's regime in Iran by the fundamentalists, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the turn in Arab-Israeli confrontation and above all the increased importance of Muslim countries in the eyes of US Administration with the intention to use Pakistan as its stooge to improve its relations with these Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{119}

In the initial phase of Janata Government, there were expectations that the Indo-Soviet 'special relations' would be effected as the new Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai was known to be 'a staunch anti-communist' and against the 9th August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.\textsuperscript{120} Yet India's policy \textit{vis-a-vis} Soviet Union did not undergo any major transformation. India's relations with the Soviet Union throughout the Janata phase remained warm and friendly and no radical transformation observed in their relations.\textsuperscript{121}

American arms supply to Pakistan was another critical component of its policy, pursued, often over-shadowing humanitarian or economic progress in South Asia. This policy had a


\textsuperscript{120} \textit{News Week} (New York), "India after Indira", 4 April 1971

substantial impact on India-Pakistan relations. It had added to the disturbances in the Indian subcontinent, as it prevented the normalisation and the achievement of stable peace between India and Pakistan.

In the initial phase of India's Foreign Policy making Jawaharlal Nehru felt that the US defense assistance would encourage Pakistan in its aggressive posture, thus increasing tension and conflict between India and Pakistan. To quote him:

"The military aid to Pakistan by America is a step towards war, not peace, not only towards world war, but a step which will bring war right to our frontiers. It is an anti-Asian step." 122

In fact, the US Government was deliberately trying to promote an arms race in the Third World in general and India-Pakistan in particular, as it would be beneficial to the American business circles. India does not fall in line with the US interests because it was trying to achieve self-reliance in defence. Thus Washington had been working to weaken India by encouraging hostility in the neighbourhood and undermining the sources of strength within India.

Atal Behari Vajpayee, then Indian External Affairs Minister on 30 June 1977, said in the Lok Sabha that "the

122. India, Lok Sabha Debates, vol.17, 13 March 1958, col.6153
For further details and negative relevance of American arms supply to Pakistan see, Surendra Chopra, UN Mediation in Kashmir: A Study in Power Politics (Kurukshetra, 1971) p.121; He had rightly pinpointed the objective of American arms supply to Pakistan in this book. To quote him: "The US Govt. wanted the tension to continue for it was only then that Pakistan could permit the US to extend its influence in Pakistan".
Government of India has normalised relations with Pakistan and seeks to explore the possibilities of increasing beneficial cooperation between the countries of this region. We brought to the notice of the US government our concern at the danger of arms sale which could upset this process.  

Further the Minister during his conversation with the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, told:

"Pakistan need not arms but economic aid to solve its problems, as there is no threat from India but internal instability loomed large in Pakistan. He pointed out that Pakistan was in shambles with serious economic and political problems. Yet India had not taken advantage of the internal turmoil or of Pakistan's conflict with Afghanistan and attack Pakistan. He said that India had urged Afghanistan to respect international frontiers in its dispute with Pakistan."

The basic objective of the US arms aid to Pakistan was not that the US had any special liking for Pakistan but that it has been working in its global interests and Pakistan seemed to serve the US interests well. Earlier, US government provided military aid to Pakistan in accordance with its policy of containment of China and latter India, the latter did not follow the US line and her objective was to achieve the status of a regional power and to play a significant role among the Third World countries. With the change in the US policy from one of China containment to that of rapprochement and China Opening, the US used Pakistan as a mediator. Secondly, the US

wanted to maintain her hold on Pakistan as she was strategically important for the former. From a base in Pakistan the US could operate and expand its influence in West Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean area. This policy was the result of the US oil interests and her desire to dominate the Indian Ocean. Further, she intends to use Pakistan as a buffer to prevent Soviet expansion into the Indian Ocean.

On the Sino-Indian side during this (1972-78) phase, their relations did not show much improvement, as both India and China were preoccupied with the domestic politics. In fact till the death of Chou-En-Lai and Mao-Ze-Dong, Sino-Indian relations were of an 'usual nature'. However, with the change of leadership in Beijing, both India and China made once again an endeavour for the normalisation and rapprochement. In January 1976, diplomatic relations between Beijing and New Delhi was enhanced to the ambassadorial level and further efforts were made to resume talks on the border dispute. But the consequences were not satisfactory, as somehow relations were not improved and this phase of rapprochement proved to be of a short duration. With the change of government in New Delhi, the Janata leadership showed positive response towards Sino-Indian normalisation. However even in the Janata phase except formal negotiations and talks, further progress was not achieved and relations failed to improve and remained at low ebb.  

125. The Hindu (Madras), 12 December 1979; and New China News Agency, 13 December 1979. The reason seems to be that after the Indian External Affairs Minister Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in 1979, China's aggression on Vietnam has ruled out the future possibilities for the Sino-
On Sino-Pakistan side their relationships were further strengthened during Bhutto (1972-77) regime and several mutually beneficial trade, socio-cultural and economic agreements were concluded between Islamabad and Beijing. However, after the coup d'etat on 5 July 1977, for a short duration Sino-Pakistan relations were not as cordial as in the Bhutto regime. But gradually their relations once again gained momentum and acquired the same level as it was during the Bhutto regime. Thus falling within the category of "special relations".

V

CONCLUSION

(a) Systematic Analysis:

It is not possible to give an exhaustive treatment of all the issues involved in relating the external political and strategic environment to India-Pakistan peace and conflict problems. The complexity and delicacy for diplomatic strategic actions in international politics are well brought

126. Foreign Affairs Reports, December 1977. When Gen. Zia visited Beijing for the first time after coup d'etat as the Head of the Pakistan government, China's leaders had not given proper response to his visit, neither he was treated on the similar pattern as his predecessors were.

out by Raymond Aron in his monumental work *Paix et Guerre* (Peace and War) where he explains that it is possible to distinguish four levels of conceptualisation:

1. Theory
2. Sociology
3. History
4. Praxiology

The external political and strategic constraints and pressures operating on both India and Pakistan would certainly merit an adaptation of Raymond Aron's schemata in order to promote understanding of India-Pakistan relationship as an integral part of global problems. Many of the studies on the pursuit of diplomatic and strategic objectives by India and Pakistan have tended to ignore the international structure and the complex nature of current world politics. This had led some writers to underestimate the political strains created by ('outside forces' in the relations between New Delhi and Islamabad). In other cases, the role for confidence-building that could result from the broadening of external relationships has been totally ignored. To identify the impetus for practical measures for reducing tensions it is necessary to make a realistic appraisal and examination of the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, China and important countries in West Asia like Iran and Saudi Arabia. External
constraints and pressures on India and or on Pakistan have not been uniform, there have been over the years elements of ambiguity in the support given by one or the other major power to India or to Pakistan. The pro-Pakistan sympathies of some United States Administrations led to huge military assistance to Pakistan,128 but it did not mean that the United States was not concerned with India's stability. However, economic considerations played a most important part in promoting "agnoising reappraisals" by Washington for understanding the realities of non-aligned India129 although Pakistan remained a faithfully ally. Similarly, the Soviets cautiously kept their options open for improvement of relations with Pakistan although their room for manoeuvre became very limited as the Bangladesh crisis mounted. The obstacles to the improvement of relations between India and China have been formidable after 1962, but even in this case the interests, hopes and fears of China vis-a-vis India and Pakistan have to be studied very carefully always keeping open the possibility of new perceptions.130 The dynamic process of what has been called Iran's Foreign Policy renaissance has brought with it a


new emphasis on cooperation with both India and Pakistan,\textsuperscript{131} (the concept of Regional Cooperation and Development-RCD). There is evidence that Iran has forced adjustments on Islamabad which are a departure from the strategic and political arguments used by "hawks" in Islamabad against New Delhi.

Because of new trouble in this area following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the entire West Asian region from the Persian Gulf to the northern flank of the Arabian Sea tended to occupy a bit significance for both the superpowers. This has eventuated in the American decision of a new military aid pact to Pakistan, which in turn had generated new tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad. Needless to say that owing to these developments the task of confidence-building and goal synchronization between these two countries has seen more difficult than before.

However, the peace prospects for the future between India and Pakistan can only be anticipated if the decision making groups in both countries understand the need for an organised framework in which historical and ideological differences can be related to goal changing as a process. John W. Burton notes the implication of this aspect:

"Goal changing is a process associated with conflict, especially as costs of attainment increase, and as other options are perceived."\textsuperscript{132}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{131} Udo, Steinbach, "Iran's Foreign Policy Renaissance", \textit{Aussen Politik}, vol. 253, no. 74, 1974

\textsuperscript{132} J.W Burton, \textit{Conflicts of Interest: Subjective or Objective?} (New York, 1965), p. 105
\end{flushleft}
A systematic analysis of India-Pakistan relationship in the wider framework is essential for an effective follow-up of any set of peace proposals. There is a growing realisation that the "outcome of the conflict" has increased the "costs of attainment" in the case of both India and Pakistan, and the same is the case with the "actors" who have generated external political and strategic pressures. The trend is now towards developing "additional options and satisfactions". To quote Burton again:

"...in any situation of conflict there are latent opportunities for sharing new options and of increasing satisfactions to be divided, as when security can be sought by mutual understanding. Accordingly, the outcome of the resolution of conflict could be such that both sides could gain satisfaction, or both between them could share gains on a scale not possible if conflict continued. In such conditions a conflict could be ended by processes designed to lead parties to discover additional options and satisfactions in peaceful relations."

It is a question for empirical verification whether political and strategic perceptions are moving in the direction where they can throw up new forms of resolution of conflict between India and Pakistan, and whether these initiatives for reduction of tensions can produce optimistic results in the largest international context. To be sure, the post-Simla phase identifies the pre-eminence of conflict resolution approach in India-Pakistan relations.

133. Ibid., p. 109
(b) Spheres of Influence:

The Political constraints and pressures on India and Pakistan have been the result of the attempts at incorporating them in one or the other sphere of influence. The Great powers have been engaged in a world wide search for satellites. The policy of non-alignment was inaugurated by India to avoid dependence on political and military blocs. Pakistan on the other hand sought an equilibrium of forces through political and military pacts. The balance sheet for Pakistan has not demonstrated the validity of the premises and contours on which her decision-makers entered SEATO and CENTO. There is every evidence that structural changes in the international system have made peace-keeping operations an important instrument for adjusting relations among the great powers. The longer view about the subcontinent may reveal more of adjustments rather than confrontations for spheres of influence. While negotiating with each other, India and Pakistan may have to take into account the objectives of those who still pursue cold war issues. But it is equally true that the pattern of the Great Power struggle is changing from political and military arenas to social and economic arenas. This requires changing orientation and diplomatic outlook on the part of New Delhi and Islamabad to search for new ways of

134. However, in concrete terms Pakistan has not gained much benefit due to alliances with western bloc. In fact it was not able to save Pakistan from dismemberment in 1971 war. See, Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London, 1976) and the works of such authors, as G.W Choudhury, Zubeida Mustafa, S. Irtiza Hussain and others on this issue.
developing community of interests between themselves and relating them to the interests of other regional and global powers.

(c) **Cooperation and Confrontation**

If we view India-Pakistan relations as "a field of relations", the expected future developments in their relationship must be evaluated realistically. There are factors making for both cooperation and confrontation. The task of peace-oriented diplomacy is to try to transform the confrontational elements into those of peaceful competition. But there are bound to arise matters on which controversy cannot be avoided. It is the general level of confidence between the two countries which will determine the outcome with regard to the issues on which there are strongly divergent point of views. In this interaction the internal processes within the two countries are also important. Negotiation and compromise will promote cooperation, while socio-cultural harmony within the two societies will help in a "reciprocal learning process" which will ultimately eliminate confrontationist propaganda and promote peaceful coexistence. 135

(d) **Polarisation:**

The ideological polarisation of the cold war made peaceful coexistence difficult for India and Pakistan. The goals,

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processes and trends set by Washington and Moscow resulted in the raising of ideological passions throughout the world. In the Indian subcontinent the effect of the global cold war was to undermine trade and technological ties between India and Pakistan. Instead of working through accommodation and cooperation towards a general settlement, the dominant thrust of Soviet and United States politics was to encourage the creation of an explosive gap in India-Pakistan bilateral issues. The trauma of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 led to the emergence of an "irresponsible" Chinese role in the subcontinent. International polarisation was thus a real stumbling block to the development of bilateral Indo-Pakistani relations. In order to create a framework for the settlement of bilateral issues, it is also essential to think of creative global roles for India and Pakistan and to understand the multi-polar dimension of the international system. India and Pakistan can work out roles as participants in global and regional politics without being continuously and conspicuously in conflict with each other on account of foreign policy decisions made in Washington, Moscow, Beijing or in the capitals of some Muslim countries. The opportunities for compromise and consensus can only be worked out after a certain measure of confidence-building and diplomatic strategie normalisation has been achieved. Both India and Pakistan can set up a new diplomatic tradition by respecting their particular roles in a pluralistic world. There are political-strategic problems between India and China but there is no reason
to think that a one-sided military partnership between Pakistan and China or Pakistan and US Vs India and Soviet can endure. The politics of the "containment era" cannot be the basis of new diplomatic manoeuvres in an era of detente and peaceful coexistence.

The solution of most of Pakistan's problems are contingent upon regional politics and here the scenario for the future can be peaceful and optimistic if local disputes with India are not complicated by acquiescence to operating norms of third parties. It is by priority to bilateral long-term interests that India and Pakistan can avail of the opportunities that may arise in the future.

(e) Mutual Frustration

As sovereign states, both India and Pakistan have the legal and moral right to defend any encroachments upon their sovereignty. It is however, important to recognise that elimination of outside interference does not mean that it is always necessary to frustrate the actions and aims of another country. Unfortunately, both India and Pakistan have often narrowed the scope of their political actions into adopting a veto to whatever the other side proposed. Both countries could have cooperated to protect the rights of countries which are poor or underprivileged in the committee of nations. 136 It is also

136. However, this pattern seems to be shifted towards cooperative actions since Pakistan had joined the non-aligned movement in September 1981.
also quite a different matter to employ techniques of political bargaining. Both Pakistan and India made it a matter of "prestige" that any proposal mooted by the other side should succeed at an international forum. Even over trivial or procedural issues the Indian and Pakistani delegates have clashed at meetings of the United Nations or its specialised agencies. A reorientation of policies can only come about if while scrupulously respecting each other's sovereign rights, Islamabad and New Delhi overcome their mutual suspicions and participate jointly and cooperatively in international economic, social, cultural and scientific activities. It is fruitless to follow policies which could result only in mutual frustration. If political realism is the basis of their political endeavours in the future then the practice of vitriolic attacks on each other must be given up and the level of interchange of political views and opinions and of other forms of interaction must be raised. It may eventually be necessary to evolve a deeper mutual understanding—presumably by moving step by step in that direction.