CHAPTER V

THE NORMALISATION PROCESS: THE POST-SIMLA PHASE

The widespread subterranean dissatisfaction and political crisis generated by the military regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan escalated into an overt crisis after the Tashkent Agreement under the leadership of Z.A. Bhutto, once the close associate of the Field Marshall. As it appeared, the political crisis and Ayub's deteriorated health led to his downfall. In the early months of 1969, Ayub Khan transferred power to his Commander-in-Chief General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. The General's lack of administrative capability and

1. For details on this issue see, Robert La Porte, Jr., Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, (New Delhi, 1976), pp. 39-74


2. However, to a large extent the extra constitutional activities of President Ayub's elder son Gouhar Ayub too played positive role in shattering the President's image and a strong feeling among the public had emerged against both Ayub and his son. This impression was gathered during this scholar's talk with a wide cross-section of Pakistani society, regarding Ayub's downfall.

3. During discussion with those Pakistanis who had closely watched the 1969 domestic disturbances in Pakistan, it has come in the knowledge of this scholar that this was not a peaceful transfer of power but a transfer through military coup. Otherwise, also if it was a peaceful transfer then it would have transferred to the Speaker of National Assembly according to the constitution. But such action had not been taken by the retiring President. This reason further supports the genuineness of the above argument.
his collaboration with Z.A. Bhutto, after the December 1970, general election, led to the dismemberment of the Country.4

Within a short duration of his taking over the reins of office Yahya Khan conducted a general election for the first time in the history of Pakistan based on adult franchise in December 1970. But unfortunately not a single political party was able to gain absolute majority in both the wings of the country. Sheikh Mujib's Awami League in the Eastern Wing and Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party in the Western Wing emerged as the two successful parties. This led to a lot of complication with regard to the question of transfer of power.5

West Pakistani political elites in general and General Yahya Khan in particular, were reluctant to transfer power to Sheikh Mujib, the elected leader of the Awami League, which secured the largest number of seats in the national assembly. However, eventually the political crisis escalated to such an extent that General Yahya Khan used military force to suppress the legitimate demand of Sheikh Mujib, to be the future President of Pakistan. Thus was paved the way for the civil war in East

4 Robert La Porte, Jr., Op Cit, pp. 75-97; Rounag Johan, Op Cit, pp. 185-204; and Safdar Mohammad, The Deliberate Debacle (Lahore, 1976)

5 Dilip Mukerjee, Zulfigar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power (New Delhi, 1972), pp 67-103; and Pran Chopra, India's Second Liberation, (New Delhi, 1973)
Pakistan. 6

During the period of the Civil War, the Pakistani forces committed arson, mass destruction and even genocide in East Pakistan 7 and thus provoked the Bengalis to demand for autonomy and freedom. Under these circumstances, India extended her full support and cooperation both political and military for the freedom of East Pakistan as an autonomous sovereign and independent entity. 8 After continuous guerilla war for more than six months, full scale war broke out between Pakistan and Indo-Bangladesh joint forces in the Eastern sector. Within a short duration of fifteen days, Pakistani forces under the command of Lt-General A.A.K. Niazi, unconditionally surrendered to the joint command of Indo-Bangladesh forces, led by Lt. General J.S. Arora. Thus Bangladesh emerged as the third independent sovereign entity in the Indian sub-continent. 9


Mohammad Ayoob and K. Subramaniyam, Our Liberation War, (New Delhi, 1972)

Kalim Siddique, Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan (New York, 1972)

Though the genesis of Bangladesh movement could be traced as early as in early 1950s and it is basically due to the wrong domestic policies that Pakistan dismembered in December 1971. See Salik Siddiquei, Witness to Surrender, (London, 1977), pp. 215-24

7 Qutubuddin Aziz, Blood and Tears (Karachi, 1974)

8 M.L Sondhi, Non-Appeasement (New Delhi, 1972) pp.129-30

9 Mohammad Ayoob, India-Pakistan And Bangladesh: Search for New Relationship, (New Delhi, 1975)
Simultaneously in the Western wing a major political shift occurred with the transfer of power to Z.A. Bhutto, the Pakistan People's Party leader. Bhutto, after taking over the reins of office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan tried to bring about the reunification of both the wings of the country. But at this stage it was too late for such an action. 10

Through various means, Z.A. Bhutto made an endeavour atleast to keep the link between the East and West wings of Pakistan. In this connection he made a frantic appeal to the world "not to accord recognition to Bangladesh in a hurry". In addition to this, he in his various statements personally appealed to Sheikh Mujib to start direct talks and dialogue for this purpose, as a precondition to Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh. However, Sheikh Mujib on 10 February 1972, ruled out the possibility of any negotiation or dialogue unless Pakistan recognized Bangladesh as a sovereign, independent nation. Consequently all avenues were closed between Pakistan and Bangladesh for any sort of direct contact. 11

Immediate issues before the policy-makers of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, after the 1971 war, were both political and human. For Pakistan the major issues were, the return of 90,000 Prisoners of War (POWs) surrendered in the Eastern

10 Asian Recorder (New Delhi), January-April, 1972
sector, and 5,139 sq. miles of territory occupied by India in the Western theatre, in Punjab and Sind.\textsuperscript{12} For Bangladesh, recognition by Pakistan of its separate entity, repatriation of the so-called Biharis (non-Bengalis in Bangladesh) who had opted for Pakistan and repatriation of Bengalis stranded in Pakistan to Bangladesh. However, for India, which had won the war, there was an opportunity to play a significant role in formulating a new structure of peace and in evolving the modalities for "genuine accommodation" and "co-operative understanding" among the countries of the subcontinent in general and between India and Pakistan in particular. The only major issue on which India could expect to get some immediate advantage was that of Kashmir, but New Delhi gave top priority to Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh, without bringing Kashmir to the fore.

Through a series of talks, negotiations, dialogues, mutual consultations or meetings the representatives of India and Pakistan agreed that Indo-Pakistan disputes should be resolved through bilateral consultation without the intervention of any third party. The two parties further agreed on a summit meeting between the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi and the then President of Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto, at Simla in

\textsuperscript{12} Mohammad Ayoob, \textit{Op Cit.}
the last week of June 1972. On his return from the Murree talks, the leader of the Indian delegation, D.P. Dhar, summed up his impression of President Bhutto with whom he had a seventy-five minutes meeting as follows:

"Bhutto was very keen that the two countries should turn their back once and for all on the unfortunate and tragic history which has characterised relations between the two countries for the last 25 years . . . I have come back with the impression that our feelings, as expressed by the Prime Minister from time to time, will be fully reciprocated".14

Bhutto himself, in an interview to Dilip Mukerjee of The Times of India, in March 1972 stated categorically as follows:

"... there was a time when we thought in terms of confrontation — military and political. It was to the advantage of Pakistan. Today, the situation is not there. It is a qualitative change. I cannot now pursue the policy of confrontation and want to return to consultation and negotiations".15

In another interview, in the same month, to Kuldip Nayar, of The Statesman, he said:

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13. G.S. Bhargava, Success or Surrender? The Simla Summit, (New Delhi, 1972), pp 55-64;
"Emissaries Level Talks", News Review on South Asia, (New Delhi, IDSA), May 1972, pp. 39-54

14 The Statesman (New Delhi), 1 May 1972, All references to The Statesman in this Chapter are to the New Delhi edition of that newspaper.

15 Times of India, (New Delhi), 16 May 1972. All references to The Times of India in this Chapter are to the New Delhi edition of that newspaper.
I am not ashamed of confrontation... Now let me explain the policy of confrontation. Pakistan was a member of two defence alliances but we were getting the raw end of the stick. We were diplomatically isolated in the Third World. Internally people were wanting to know what advantages the alliances had brought. There were no political gains, but there were military gains. We thought that being in these pacts, let us derive the benefits of those pacts. There was a time when militarily in terms of big push, we were superior to India because of military assistance we were getting. That was the position up to 1965. Now Kashmir dispute was not being resolved peacefully. We had the military advantage and we were getting the blame for it. So it was political prudence to say: let us finish it once for all and come to terms just as you know that the problem has been finished. That was the reason why up to 1965 it was thought that with this edge we would finish this problem because even morally we felt justified since India had agreed to the right of self-determination earlier. I know it better than others. It is not going to exist in future also.  

An analysis of the above statements of Bhutto and D.P. Dhar's impression of Bhutto highlights the fact that there was a major shift in Pakistan's posture towards India and a change in Bhutto's attitude towards India. Through these statements Bhutto was emphasising that he had firmly made up his mind to make an attempt to formulate a new hypothesis and premises, and to evolve the contours of a new policy of genuine accommodation for the stabilization of relations and co-operation with India.

India. Apparently this had resulted partly from the radical transformation of the political map of the Indian subcontinent, consequent upon the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state and party from the emergence of India as the major power in the region. 17

On the other hand, India which won the war and emerged as the major power in the region (South Asia) after the 1971 war, made an attempt to reevaluate the fundamental assumptions on which Indo-Pakistani relations had been based for a quarter of a century and to formulate a fresh structure of peace and to outline a new set of principles to govern Indo-Pakistan relations.

With these aims in mind, the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India met at Simla between 29 June and 2 July 1972 and signed a comprehensive treaty, containing the mutually agreed upon procedure to resolve the issues emerged from the 1971 war and other outstanding issues with a view to improving mutual understanding amidst an atmosphere of "genuine accommodation" and "friendly co-operation".

18. For the salient features and mutually agreed upon procedures, evolved at Simla, see Chapter IV, "Significance of the Simla Summit" in this thesis. And the text of Simla Agreement in the appendices. Plus "Indo-Pakistani Agreement", News Review on South Asia, (New Delhi, IDSA) July 1972, pp 126-68; for detailed Pakistani, Indian and World reaction on this agreement.
At Simla the relative priorities reversed completely between India and Pakistan. Since its inception Pakistan gave top priority to the Kashmir dispute as an anti-status quo power and secondary importance to the rest of the disputes. However, at Simla, on the contrary, Pakistan insisted on a step by step approach, first preference was to be given to those issues which arose from the 1971 war and secondary preference to the outstanding issues, including the Kashmir dispute. However, Pakistan for the first time gave a concession to India by agreeing to resolve Indo-Pak conflicts and disputes through bilateral discussion and negotiation. On the other hand, quite unusually, India gave first preference to the final settlement of Kashmir question and secondary priority to the issues that emerged after the war. This reversal of postures and differences of priorities, was the consequence of the altered geopolitical situation and the power balance in the subcontinent.

Practical implementation of the Simla Agreement was initiated with the delineation of the actual line of control in Jammu and Kashmir, followed by the withdrawal of forces to their respective lines of control, return of occupied territory by India, in the Western theatre of war, repatriation of Pakistani POWs held in India, the exchange of civilians, resumption of trade links, communication, postal services, railway links, overflights, cultural exchanges and diplomatic relations.

DELINEATION OF THE LINE OF CONTROL IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

Prior to 1971, Pakistan was the anti-status quo power as far as Kashmir was concerned and was interested in seeking a radical transformation of the then existing situation in Kashmir in its favour. India, on the other hand, had been the status-quo power in Kashmir. It was not interested in any major alteration of the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir, all that it was interested in was the settlement of this issue once for all on the basis of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union. With this aim, India more than once offered Pakistan a settlement of the Kashmir issue on the basis of 1949 ceasefire line, with minor alterations here and there to make the boundary more rational. But successive Pakistani rulers (right from Liaquat Ali Khan to Z.A. Bhutto) rejected this offer. Eventually, the situation (after 1971) underwent a fundamental change. Under the new situation New Delhi made an endeavour to accept the new ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir.

20. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Bombay, 1967),
Mohamad Ayoob, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: Search for New Relationship, (New Delhi, 1975)

The new ceasefire line or the actual line of control in Jammu and Kashmir as it came to be called after 17 December 1971, gave India certain strategic advantages, particularly in the Kargil Sector which it did not possess under the United Nations enforced ceasefire line (CFL) of 1949. India was under the impression that if Bhutto wanted Indian troops to vacate these strategic posts and go back to the 1949, CFL, then he would be willing to accept atleast the 1949 line as the international boundary between India and Pakistan. This was the rationale why the Indian spokesmen, made it clear that as far as Kashmir was concerned the CFL had ceased to exist and a new line of control had come into existence on 17 December 1971, the day when Islamabad accepted the unconditional Indian offer of the ceasefire line in the Western theatre of war.

The Indian argument was that since Pakistan itself had violated the Kashmir ceasefire line first, both in 1965 and 1971, it could not expect India to withdraw to the old line, especially when the territory occupied by the Indian armed forces legally belonged to India under the term of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union.

This Indian strategy was formulated with two ends in view. One was to completely disassociate the United Nations, as represented by its observer group (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan - UNMOGIP), from the Kashmir issue. The UNMOGIP's locus standi in Kashmir was based on the fact that the CFL had come to be established as a result
of UN resolutions. India argued again with a great deal of validity that the new CFL was the result of Pakistan's violation of the 1949 CFL, the hostilities that followed and Pakistan's acceptance on 17 December 1971 of India's ceasefire offer. Therefore, it had now become a purely bilateral affair. And as far as India was concerned, the UN observer group had no standing whatsoever in the matter. This was made clear to Pakistan in the third week of June 1972, when the then Pakistan Army Chief, General Tikka Khan, sent a message to General Tissara, the then Chief of the UN observer team, expressing a desire for strict enforcement of the ceasefire in Kashmir. When India received this message through General Tissara, the then Indian Commander-in-Chief General Manekshaw sent a reply directly to his Pakistani counterpart, reciprocating the latter's desire. But India took the stand that if at all any observer team was required, it should be composed of representatives of India and Pakistan only.\textsuperscript{22} And this issue should be kept strictly a bilateral issue.

The second rationale in support of this step was to give Pakistan a notice that since India refused to recognise the 1949 CFL any longer, Indian forces would continue to stay on the new CFL or line of control pending a final settlement of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. Since this final

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Times of India}, 28 June 1972.
settlement (given the equation of power in the subcontinent) could only be on the basis of Pakistan's acceptance of the partition of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of either the 1949 CFL or the line of control with minor modifications. Pakistan was squarely faced with the choice either of accepting such a settlement or putting up with Indian military presence across the old CFL and at strategic points captured during the hostilities of 1971. Pakistan realised that in the absence of permanent agreement it may have to settle for the 17th December line.

Moreover, India argued that delineation of the entire line of control in Jammu and Kashmir was called for in any case, because the old CFL in the state had disappeared on 17 December, 1971, had to be properly demarcated. The task of delineation had been made more important because of Pakistan's violation of the line of control in the Tithwal Sector. It must be pointed out here that on 17 December 1971, India held 479.76 sq. miles of territory across the old CFL in Kashmir and Pakistan held 52.57 sq. miles of territory across the old CFL in Chhamb sector.23

The withdrawal of Indian troops from the occupied territory in December 1971, was held up because of the lack of agreement on the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. India took the stand that these two processes were

inseparable and one could not take place without the other.

Initially, Pakistan disagreed with India's stand that the two issues of withdrawal across the international frontiers and the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir were interlinked and that one could not be completed without the other. However, anxious to work out an agreement by which Indian troops would withdraw soon from the occupied territory in Pakistan, Islamabad agreed to the linking of the two issues. Meanwhile, military delegations headed by Lt-Gen. P.S. Bhagat on the Indian side and Lt. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan on the Pakistani side met from 10 to 12 August 1972, at Suchetgarh and agreed upon the method and procedure for the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. 24

As a result of the Indian initiative and President Bhutto's positive response to this suggestion, the official delegations of the two sides met in New Delhi from 25 to 29 August 1972. The Pakistani delegation was led by Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, and Indian delegation by P.N. Haksar, Personal Advisor to the Prime Minister. Two sides agreed that the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir should be delineated along its entire length and respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised positions of either side. It was agreed that the delineation

24. The Hindu (Madras), 13 August 1972. All references to The Hindu in this Chapter are to the Madras edition of that newspaper.
should be completed by 4 September 1972, and that withdrawal of troops from across the international border should be completed by 15 September 1972. India and Pakistan also agreed that political leaders from Tharparkar could visit areas occupied by Indian forces in order to assure the inhabitants of the area that they would be welcome to remain in, or return to, their homes in Pakistan in safety and dignity from camps in India, and the Indian side had agreed to give necessary facilities to ensure full implementation of the Plan. 25

As a result of this agreement the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir was linked firmly with the issue of the withdrawal of troops to the international borders between India and Pakistan. While the agreement did not link the two issues formally, the respective schedules set forth in the document regarding the withdrawal of troops and delineation of the line of control in Kashmir implied very strongly that such a link did actually exist. The withdrawals were to take place only after the delineation was completed. Moreover, despite Pakistan's earlier objections to a fresh delineation of the entire line of control in Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistan had argued for a partial delineation only in those areas where the old CFL had been disturbed as a result of the fighting in December 1971), Aziz Ahmad accepted India's contention that the line should be delineated along its entire length.

25. The Hindu (Madras), 30 August 1972; and Public Opinion Trend (POT, New Delhi), 24 August 1972
This effort on the part of New Delhi was aimed not only at securing Pakistan's withdrawal from the two posts in the Lipa Valley it had captured in May, but more important, at forcing Pakistan to recognise the sanctity of the line of control on almost the same basis as that of an international boundary. New Delhi also wanted to make it clear both to Pakistan and to the world that the new line of control was a line completely distinct from the old CFL in Jammu and Kashmir and thereby to minimise external, including UN intervention on the Kashmir issue.

The delineation talks, ran into a deadlock despite several rounds of negotiations between senior military commanders of India and Pakistan. As a result of this, neither could the delineation be completed on schedule nor the Indian and Pakistani troops could be withdrawn to the international borders. The deadlock occurred over a small area called Thako Chak measuring only 3.8 sq. kilometers.

When the senior military commanders, Lt-Gen. Bhagat and Lt-Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan, were unable to work out a formula on Thako Chak, acceptable to both sides, the two chiefs of Army staff, General Manekshaw and General Tikka Khan, met in Lahore on 28 November 1972, to resolve the problem. The first meeting bore no fruit and at the end of the meeting it was announced in a joint statement that the matter was being referred back to the governments as the two army chiefs' interpretation of para
4 of the Simla Agreement was at variance.\textsuperscript{26}

The problem was finally resolved at a second meeting of the two Army Chief's held in Lahore on 7 December 1972. Apparently armed with fresh instructions from their respective governments, the two Chiefs of Army Staff were able to overcome the seemingly intractable Thako Chak problem. The joint statement issued at the end of the second meeting directed the senior military commanders to meet at Suchetgarh on 11 December 1972 and finalise the delineation of line of control in Jammu and Kashmir as adjusted by them (the two Chiefs). This line of control commenced from Chhamb Sector and ended in the Turtok Sector (Partapur).\textsuperscript{27}

As a consequence of the intervention of the two chiefs, Thako Chak was returned to India, but in exchange, Pakistan received a 1.2 sq. mile area in Uri Sector.\textsuperscript{28} From the Indian point of view the major gain was the recognition by Pakistan that the line of control ended in Chhammb and that the line between the rest of Jammu and Pakistan was the international border. The importance of Thako Chak in Indian eyes lay in the fact that it was situated on the Pakistani border with Jammu and not across the old CFL. Pakistan had argued that since it lay in Jammu and Kashmir, it was covered by para IV (11) of the Simla Agree-

\begin{itemize}
\item[26.]{\textit{The Statesman}, 29 November 1972}
\item[27.]{\textit{Ibid.}, 8 December 1972}
\item[28.]{\textit{Ibid.}, 12 December 1972}
\end{itemize}
ment which stated that the new line of control in Kashmir should be represented by both sides. According to Pakistan's interpretation, this provision of the agreement, Thako Chak, which had been occupied by Pakistan during the fighting in 1971, should have been retained by Pakistan.

India argued that the problem of Thako Chak should be resolved under para IV (1) of the Simla Agreement which provided that Indian and Pakistani forces should be withdrawn to their side of the international border. New Delhi stated that while Thako Chak was situated in Jammu and Kashmir, it was captured by Pakistan not as a result of incursion across the old CFL but an attack across the international border between Pakistan and Jammu. Indian contention was that, apart from the old CFL, the boundary between any part of Kashmir and Pakistan proper was the international boundary between India and Pakistan, and, therefore, according to para IV (1) of the Simla Agreement, Pakistan must withdraw from Thako Chak. The point involved was not that of a small piece of territory but of a major principle, viz., that the border between any part of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan which was not disturbed by the fighting in 1947-48 should be considered an international boundary since the state of Jammu and Kashmir had legally acceded to the Indian Union. New Delhi was unable to win Pakistani acceptance of its point of view on Thako Chak although it had made minor territorial concessions in the Uri sector so that President Bhutto could justify the agreement to his people in Pakistan.
On the morning of 17 December 1972, the Indian and Pakistani troops took up their new positions on the readjusted line of control and the old CFL ceased to exist. It was reported that the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir resulted in a net accretion of 354 sq. miles of territory to India. Major gains were made by India in Tithwal and Kargil Sectors.\(^{29}\)

Following the delineation of the line of control Indian and Pakistani troops withdrew to their respective sides of the international border. This was acknowledged in a joint statement issued by the two countries on 20 December 1972. *The Dawn* of Karachi commenting editorially on the withdrawal of troops, called it, a gain for peace in South Asia and a significant step towards the erasure of the consequences flowing from the war of December 1971.\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\) *The Statesman*, 15 December 1972

\(^{30}\) *The Dawn* (Karachi), 28 December 1972; All references to *The Dawn* in this Chapter are to the Karachi edition of that newspaper.

There were talks about secret agreement between the then Indian Prime Minister Mrs Gandhi and the then President of Pakistan Z.A Bhutto, at Simla. It seems that the secret agreement was over the question of converting the 17\(^{th}\) December 1971 ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir into an international boundary between India and Pakistan. If we analyse the conditions prevailed during 1972, it would be concluded that neither Mrs Gandhi was in a position to accept this agreement openly nor Z.A Bhutto. For Mrs Gandhi it was difficult to convince her public, since whatever India had gained in the battlefield, it was almost lost across the table. Further disclosing this agreement to the General masses would have jeopardized her image. For Bhutto, it was much more difficult since he was about to establish over the reins of office and Pakistan had already lost its bigger portion (Eastern wing). Moreover, the later developments in Jammu and Kashmir both in India and Pakistan further support the possibilities of this secret agreement. In

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With the change in power balance and structural shift in the Indian subcontinent, significant perceptual changes observed in Pakistan's policy towards the Kashmir stalemate. It is important to note that at Simla while apparently adopting a hardline posture on Kashmir vis-a-vis India, President Bhutto introduced a subtle change in Pakistan's stand over this bone of content (Kashmir). He had shifted the primary responsibility for the "liberation" of Kashmir on the part of Pakistan to the people of Kashmir, when he had stated that there was only one way to "free Kashmir" from the Indian yoke and that the people of Kashmir should start "their own struggle for freedom". He, however, gave a solemn pledge that as soon as the people of Kashmir launched their freedom struggle, the people of Pakistan would go "all out in support and assistance" to the people of Kashmir.

Bhutto had given similar statements and impressions about Pakistan's stand towards Kashmir even before the conclusion of the Simla Agreement. For instance in one of his interviews to Dilip Mukerjee of the Times of India in March 1972,

/footnote No.30 - contn./

India Mrs Gandhi re-installed Sheikh Abdullah in 1975 as the Chief Minister of the Indian part of Kashmir. On Pakistan side Bhutto made efforts to integrate the Pak occupied Kashmir as the Pakistan territory by directly controlling its administration by the Central Government and by strengthening his party position in that part.
he said:

"It was not for Pakistan to secure the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris. The struggle for self-determination cannot be inspired from outside. Like revolution it cannot be exported. It has to be an indigenous struggle. If the people of Kashmir want a different future, you cannot stop them, nor we. If the people of Kashmir believe that they have been deprived of the right of self-determination, they will rise. Their struggle will be basically theirs. Outside support cannot solve their problem... I have not dwelt on Kashmir in my public pronouncements since taking over, not in the way I did before. I am not making it my dominant theme".31

It was for the first time since 1947, that the subtle shift in Pakistan Government's stand on Kashmir was spelt out through-the media. This was done apparently in an effort to ally Indian apprehension regarding Bhutto Government's posture towards this issue.32

However, the private opinion of political elites in Pakistan regarding the status quo in Kashmir seems to be that it is final and that it cannot be changed by force. But neither the Government nor the leaders are in a position to spell out this position at public forums, due to the fear of hostile public reaction.33

31 Times of India, 16 March 1972
32 Satish Kumar, "Trends in Regional Development in South Asia", in: M.S Rajan & Shivaji Ganguly, (Eds), Great Power Relations, World Order & Third World, (New Delhi, 1981) p. 272. According to him the lingering manifestation of Indo-Pak conflict had almost become a non-issue between the two countries after the 1971 war and its role has been reduced to that of a timebomb with a dead fuse.
33 This is the conclusion drawn after conducting negotiation with the policy makers, journalists, political elites and academicians in Pakistan.
While on Pakistan's side such a major policy change (perceptional change) observed on Kashmir vis-a-vis India on the Indian side a twenty years stalemate was broken, when talks between the representatives of Indian Prime Minister and Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of Kashmir started to make substantial progress. The talks culminated into a successful understanding and consequently an agreement was signed. Through this agreement (Indira-Abdullah Agreement) Sheikh Abdullah was installed as the Chief Minister of the State on 25 February 1975.

This agreement was the result and culmination of the realisation on the part of Sheikh Abdullah and the Government of India that after the Bangladesh crisis, the power balance in the subcontinent had undergone a fundamental change and that the time had now approached for both the sides to come to an agreement. Sheikh Abdullah and the dissident elements in the valley clearly saw that they could no longer use Pakistan as a factor in order to gain greater concessions from India. The changed balance of power had left India in a position of relative pre-eminence and it was under no compulsion to make any major revision in the status quo in Kashmir. On its part New Delhi also realised that time has ripe to reopen talks with Abdullah, from a position of strength.

Moreover, the Government of India could in the changed circumstances afford to appear to be magnanimous to Sheikh
Abdullah without being seriously charged of having been humbled by Pakistanis or dissident Kashmiris pressures. India too, realised that even if it denied that there was a problem of Kashmir to which Pakistan was a party, it would be highly unrealistic to say that there was no problem in Kashmir as long as recalcitrant elements in the valley had not been assimilated willingly into the system. An agreement with the Sheikh, which left the substance of accession intact and yet conceded certain trappings of autonomy (in the form of recognising the permanence of Article 370) to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was the best solution from the point of the Union Government. This, in essence, is what the Indira-Abdullah Agreement has achieved.

Pakistani reaction to this agreement was understandably hostile. Pakistan's major apprehension of the agreement was based upon the fear that its fall-out effects on Pakistani occupied Kashmir (POK) would be detrimental to Islamabad's interests. Since the situation in POK was far from stable and since the politicised elements in POK suffered from an acute feeling of lack of participation in the political decision making process in the territory, a settlement between Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi was expected to wet their political appetite and thus create additional headache for Islamabad at a time when it was facing grave problems both in Baluchistan and in North-West Frontier Province. It was feared that the demoralization effect of the changes in Srinagar or Muzaffarabad could create
serious strains in the relations between POK and Pakistan.

Paradoxically, however, the rapprochement between Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi could also solve Bhutto's problem regarding POK. This development was expected to be demonstrated beyond doubt that Pakistani claim to the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir was nothing, if not fake. It could thus assist Bhutto in achieving his long-term purpose of integrating POK with Pakistan by taking the wind out of the opposition's sails on this issue. Such an act would, of course, entail Pakistan's tacit acceptance of the integration of the bulk of the state with India. Domestic developments in the two parts of Kashmir could therefore by themselves transform the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir into the international boundary between the two neighbours.

Commenting on the Sheikh Abdullah - Indira Gandhi Agreement on Kashmir (of 1975), Khurshid Hyder, a Pakistani academician and diplomat engaged in research on Indo-Pakistani relations wrote as follows:

"... of direct relevance to the establishment of durable peace between India and Pakistan, is the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute, which has been the flash point of confrontation in the past. The Simla Agreement provides that a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir will be discussed by the representatives of the two sides. It also states that pending a settlement of the outstanding differences neither side shall attempt to alter the status quo unilaterally. The accord made in 1975 between the Prime Minister and Sheikh Abdullah was clearly in contravention of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan could not accept an agreement between India and any
power or party in the Indian held Kashmir as constituting a final settlement of the disputed question. That would be in violation of the principle of self-determination specifically accepted by the UN as well as India and Pakistan as the basis for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

More than once the Government of India offered to Pakistan, the settlement of the Kashmir issue on the basis of the 1949 ceasefire line with minor alterations to make the boundary more rational and strategically relevant. This in an indirect way indicates New Delhi's acceptance of the merger of POK with Pakistan, in return for the latter's declaration not to challenge the accession of the rest of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union. But the Pakistan Government rejected this offer outrightly. However, the current political and social conditions once again place the Kashmir question in the same vein. The only viable solution of this dispute seems to be the above mentioned Indian offer, as it is in the interest of all the parties to the dispute — India, Pakistan and Kashmiris, because it appears to be the most realistic way to resolve it.

34. Khurshid Hyder, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Early Seventies", in Masuma Hassan, (Ed), Pakistan in the Changing World (Karachi, 1978), p. 102
IV

REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS

In the post-Simla phase of Indo-Pakistani relations, one of the important controversial issues faced both by India and Pakistan was repatriation of Pakistani Prisoners of War and civilians held in India and exchange of civilian internees between them. However, India and Pakistan on 1 December 1972 repatriated POWs captured in the Western theatre: 540 Pakistani POWs and 616 Indian POWs.

Major problem between Pakistan and Bangladesh during this phase was the repatriation of civilians, i.e., the repatriation of the Biharis (non-Bengalis in Bangladesh or the Urdu speaking population in Bangladesh) opted for Pakistan from Bangladesh, and the stranded Bengalis in Pakistan to Bangladesh. This issue of exchange of civilians gained urgency with the statement of the then Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujib, in an interview to the Associated Press (AP) on 26 February 1973, that 260,000 of the 400,000 Urdu-speaking "non-locals" (Biharis in popular parlance) in Bangladesh, who had opted for Pakistan, should be exchanged for Bengalis, whose strength was estimated about 400,000 stranded in Pakistan. Mujib was of the opinion that this exchange could be carried on before Pakistan recognised Bangladesh. He quoted as follows:
If Bhutto does not take them (non-Bengalis, i.e., Biharis), the World Community should purchase an island for them. I have no room for them... They are not my citizens.  

In his post election meeting in Dacca, Sheikh Mujib, on 18 March 1973, repeated his offer to repatriate Pakistani citizens in exchange for Bengalis in Pakistan. He warned Bhutto, that he would be inviting trouble if he did not accept the Biharis and return the Bengalis stranded in Pakistan.  

Pakistani reaction to Sheikh Mujib's statement came in a statement by a Foreign Office spokesmen in Islamabad as follows:

"Pakistan could not absorb large number of 'Biharis' from Bangladesh. They should be allowed to live in whatever wing of Pakistan they occupy. Because of conditions here, we are not in a position to absorb large transfers of population".  

During the Bangladesh Foreign Minister's visit to New Delhi on 17 April 1973, India and Bangladesh signed a joint declaration. The Indo-Bangladesh joint declaration made an attempt to delink political issues from humanitarian issues which arose from the December war. Bangladesh categorically stated its unwillingness to participate in any consultation with Pakistan, on any issue or at any level, except on the basis of sovereign equality.  

35 The People (Dacca), 27, February, 1973  
36 The Statesman, 19 March 1973  
37 Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 24 March 1973. All references to the Pakistan Times in this Chapter are to the Islamabad edition of that newspaper.  
38 As till this time Bangladesh was not recognised by Pakistan.
However, Bangladesh had spelt out a formula without prejudice to the respective position of New Delhi and Dacca, for the solution of the humanitarian problems, i.e., repatriation of Pakistani POWs and civilian internees held in India. The formula was broadly as follows:

"... simultaneous repatriation of the Pakistani POWs and civilian internees, except those required by the Government of People's Republic of Bangladesh for trial on criminal charges, the repatriation of Bengalis detained in Pakistan and the repatriation of Pakistanis in Bangladesh, i.e., all non-Bengalis who owe allegiance and have opted for repatriation to Pakistan."

This Indo-Bangladesh joint offer to Pakistan was one of the positive syndrome in the direction of normalization of relations in the subcontinent. The positive feature of the declaration was that both New Delhi and Dacca, particularly the latter made a very important and vital concession in order to accommodate the Pakistani viewpoint. This was evident from the fact that Dacca dropped its major precondition for the return of Pakistani POWs viz. Islamabad's recognition of Bangladesh. Initially, Sheikh Mujib and his Government firmly stuck to the stand that unless Pakistan recognised Bangladesh, there could not be any negotiation between the two countries on any issue, including the return of POWs. However, Bangladesh's

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39 Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 18 April 1973. All references to the Hindustan Times in this Chapter are to the New Delhi edition of that newspaper.
own desire to get its nationals, particularly experienced civil and military officials, back from Pakistan, had its influence in softening the Bangladesh posture. But this declaration offered Bhutto what he was seeking all these months, an assurance that the bulk of his POWs would be returned without further delay. The major provisions of this declaration, as far as Pakistan was concerned, was the decision to retain the POWs wanted by Dacca on criminal charges and the offer to repatriate all Pakistanis from Bangladesh.

The Indo-Bangladesh declaration was the outcome of great persuasion on the part of India. This was perhaps the maximum limit to which both New Delhi and Dacca could go to accommodate Pakistan's intransigent posture over recognition of Bangladesh.

However, the initial Pakistani reaction towards declaration was far from satisfactory. After three days of hectic consultations, the Government of Pakistan released a statement on 20 April 1973, in which it announced its decision to invite representatives of the Government of India to Islamabad for discussion on the Indo-Bangladesh joint offer. The statement runs as follows:

"Pakistan does not wish to enter into polemics over certain issues and deems it sufficient to reiterate its resolve to adhere to the letter and spirit of the Simla Agreement for the reduction of tensions".40

40. Pakistan Times, 21 April 1973
At the same time the statement declared that the Pakistan Government could not recognise the competence of the authorities in Dacca to bring to trial any among the POWs on criminal charges. It reiterated its readiness to constitute a judicial tribunal of such character and composition as would inspire international confidence for the trial of persons charged with the alleged offences.

Pakistani reaction to the joint offer was described by the then Indian External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, in a statement in the Lok Sabha (India) as regrettable and disappointing. He also stated that India and Bangladesh were evolving a joint reply to Pakistan. On 11 May 1973, Swaran Singh announced in the Rajya Sabha that Indian reply was sent to Pakistan and that the latter had been told that talks between the two countries could be resumed only if Islamabad accepted the 'essential' of the Indo-Bangladesh joint declaration, the essentials being the three way repatriation formula worked out in the joint offer.

Meanwhile, Pakistan moved the International Court of Justice on 11 May 1973, alleging that India intended to hand over Pakistani nationals, taken prisoner in 1971, to Bangladesh for trial on charges of genocide. Pakistan filed a request with the International Court of Justice for measures of protection, an equivalent to injunction. And it demanded as follows:
... the process of repatriation of POWs and civilian internees should not be interrupted by virtue of charges of genocide against some of them, and secondly, that the detenus charged with acts of genocide should not be transferred to Bangladesh for trial pending judgement of the International Court of Justice.\(^{41}\)

The International Court of Justice on 16 May 1973, announced that:

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\text{It would hold special session to determine whether it had jurisdiction to decide on Pakistan's request for the repatriation of 195 Pakistani POWs charged with genocide. The Court took this decision by 8 votes to 4 and asked Pakistan to file submissions by 1 October 1973.}^{42}
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Radio Pakistan on 15 July 1973 announced that Pakistan was withdrawing its case from the International Court of Justice following the Indo-Pakistan Agreement to hold talks on the joint offer made by India and Bangladesh.

Meanwhile, Bhutto once again gave the warning that he would be forced to try Bengalis in Pakistan if Dacca went ahead with the trial of 195 POWs wanted on criminal charges. In an interview to \textit{New York Times}, he said:

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\text{We have no other alternative, we cannot stomach or consent to the trial of the POWs in Bangladesh. It would cause revulsion in Pakistan and we have to react accordingly. Their (POWs) trials will unleash chaotic forces here, and we will have demonstrations by labour, and by students and by the general masses. The army will be upset. We do not like to have our}
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\[41\] The Statesman, 12 May 1973
\[42\] Times of India, 17 May 1973
nose rubbed in the ground this way. Public opinion will demand trials here. How can I put a lid on this kind of demand? We will be faced here with an unparalleled situation. We know the Bengalis passed on informations during the war. There will be specific charges. How many will be tried, I cannot say."

Consequent upon Pakistan's insistence that talks be held between India and Pakistan to clarify certain doubts raised by the Indo-Bangladesh offer. India proposed for official level talks between them on 24 July 1973. This was accepted by Bhutto on a condition that the venue for such talks should be in Pakistan.

Before the official level talks began, India and Bangladesh held discussions to evolve a joint strategy at the forthcoming negotiations. P.N. Haksar, Indian Prime Minister's Special Envoy, visited Dacca on 6 July 1973, for talks with the Bangladesh leaders.

The joint strategy evolved during consultations between Kamal Hossain, Bangladesh Foreign Minister and P.N. Haksar was that:

- India and Bangladesh should not give Pakistan any concession over the term of the settlement stipulated in the joint declaration. It was pointed out that India's apparently inflexible stand at the forthcoming Indo-Pak talks was the result of disappointment felt in both New Delhi and Dacca over Pakistan's intransigent attitude and the way this had frustrated all initiatives taken by India and Bangladesh.

43 New York Times (New York), 28 May 1973
44 Hindustan Standard (Calcutta), 8 July 1973
In preparation for substantive negotiations with India and Bangladesh in the light of the Indo-Bangladesh joint declaration, Pakistan made an attempt to get authorisation from the National Assembly for the recognition of Bangladesh. However, it was a very sensitive issue, the Government of Pakistan consulted the Supreme Court for advisory opinion under article 187 of the interim constitution, then in force in Pakistan. The reference to the Court by President Bhutto stated as follows:

"The Government finds it necessary to move a resolution which would express the opinion of the National Assembly of Pakistan that the Government of Pakistan may accord formal recognition to Bangladesh at a time, when, in the judgement of the Government, such recognition would be in the best national interest of the country and would promote fraternal relationship between the two Muslim Communities of the subcontinent. The resolution will seek assurance from the National Assembly to take all legal and constitutional measures in this direction." 45

The full bench of the Court, presided over by the then Chief Justice Hamood-ur-Rahman, heard the arguments. In its advisory opinion the Court declared that:

"There cannot be any legal objection to move such a resolution, it will be nothing more than the expression of the Assembly and it will have no legal repercussions. It will not be in violation of any provision of the constitution." 46

45 The Dawn, 8 July 1973
46 Ibid
The way was cleared by the Supreme Court, for the Government to move a resolution in the National Assembly. After strong criticism from the opposition benches the resolution was adopted, authorising the Government to accord formal recognition to Bangladesh. The entire opposition in the Assembly boycotted President Bhutto's speech and did not participate in the voting on the resolution. It seems probable that the vital legal support to the Bangladesh's recognition from the Supreme Court provided psychological reassurance to Bhutto vis-a-vis the opposition and military establishment.

While these developments occurred in Pakistan's National Assembly, Bangladesh's National Assembly on the contrary passed the International Criminal (Tribunal) Bill on 16 July 1973 which provided for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide and crime against humanity, and other crimes under International Law. The legal stage was, therefore, set for the trial of the 195 Pakistan POWs.

After such preparatory activities by India and Bangladesh, Indo-Pakistani talks regarding the joint Indo-Bangladesh offer were held in Rawalpindi from 24 to 31 July 1973. The Pakistani delegation was led by Aziz Ahmad and Indian delegation by P.N Haksar. The talks were inconclusive and the joint statement issued on 31 July declared that during the course of talks certain issues arose which required further consideration by both sides. It was therefore agreed that discussion would be resumed at New Delhi.
A second round of talks were held in New Delhi from 18 to 28 August 1973. At the conclusion of these talks an agreement was signed on 28 August and it was released simultaneously from New Delhi, Islamabad and Dacca on 29 August 1973.

The salient feature of the agreement worked out between India and Pakistan, with the concurrence of Bangladesh Government, was the simultaneous three way repatriation of all Pakistani POWs and civilian internees held in India, all Bangalis in Pakistan and a substantial number of non-Bengalis who had opted for Pakistan. The first clause of the operative paragraph of the Agreement declared the immediate implementation of the solution of humanitarian problems without prejudice to the respective position of the parties concerned, relating to the case of 195 POWs referred to in Clauses VI and VII of this paragraph. According to Clause VI, referred to above, Bangladesh agreed that no trials of the 195 POWs would take place during the entire period of repatriation and that pending a settlement of this issue these POWs would remain in India. Clause VII mentioned that on completion of the repatriation of three categories mentioned in the Agreement, or earlier if they agree, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan should discuss and settle the question of 195 POWs. However, Bangladesh had cleared its stand that it would participate in such meetings only on the basis of sovereign equality.
As far as non-Bengalis in Bangladesh was concerned, it was accepted that the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and Pakistan, or their designated representatives, would thereafter meet to decide what additional number of persons who may wish to migrate to Pakistan may be permitted to do so.

However, Bangladesh, once again, made it categorically clear to Pakistan that it would participate in any meeting with her only on the basis of autonomy and sovereign equality.

Clause IV of the Agreement states that in the matter of repatriation of all categories of persons the principle of simultaneity should be observed throughout as far as possible was included obviously to ally any misgivings in India and Bangladesh that Pakistan may drag its feet once the repatriation of Pakistani POWs and civilian internees had been completed.

The substantial number of non-Bengalis to be repatriated to Pakistan was left vague in the document. However, Aziz Ahmad stated on 9 September 1973, that Pakistan had agreed to take back only four categories of persons from Bangladesh following the New Delhi agreement. These categories were:

(i) Persons of West Pakistan domicile;

(ii) Central Government employees and their families irrespective of domicile;
(iii) Number of divided families irrespective of domicile;
(iv) Some hardship cases.\textsuperscript{47}

The implementation of the New Delhi Agreement in the shape of three-way repatriation process began on 19 September 1973 and was completed in April 1974. In addition to three governments concerned, the international agencies, like United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Commission for Red Cross (ICRC), also extended their financial and transport facilities in this humanitarian task. Thus was established one more milestone in the normalisation of relations among the nations of this region in general and specially between India and Pakistan.

V

PAKISTAN'S REACTION TOWARDS THE INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

A major event which had temporarily detained the smooth normalisation process in the post-Simla phase and had created misconception, apprehension and misunderstanding between India and Pakistan was the successful Indian nuclear explosion conducted on 18 May 1974 at Pokhran in the Thar desert of Rajasthar. However, the Government of India was quick and categorical in its declaration that its nuclear explosion was exclusively meant

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Times of India}, 10 September 1973
for peaceful purposes. But unfortunately both official and non-official Pakistani reaction towards this test was extremely hostile or antagonistic and in their opinion it had altered the equilibrium, symmetry and tranquillity and had introduced a qualitative change in the subcontinental balance of power and had further accelerated the flood of conventional arms in the region. 48

A Foreign Office spokesman said in Islamabad on 18 May 1974 as follows:

"It cannot be viewed with the degree of concern matching its magnitude by the whole world and more specifically by India's neighbours. The concern could in no way be alleviated by India's contention that the test had been carried out for peaceful purposes. It was an incontrovertible fact, stressed by the Superpowers, themselves, that there was no difference between explosion of so-called peaceful nuclear devices and detonation of nuclear weapon". 49

A similar statement was delivered by Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan, while addressing the National Assembly on 7 June, 1974:

"... all roads lead to the conclusion that India was brandishing the nuclear sword to extract political concession from Pakistan and establish her hegemony in the subcontinent. He believed that India had gone nuclear with the object of intimidating and blackmailing Pakistan. But he was confident that the People of Pakistan would face the challenge bravely." 50

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48 Pakistan Times, 19 May 1974
49 S. Irtiza Hussain, "Implications of Indian Nuclear Explosion", Strategic Studies, vol. 2, no.1, April-June 1978, pp. 1-12
50 The Dawn, 8 June 1974
And, Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission had hinted as follows:

"Pakistan might be compelled to follow India's examples of exploding a nuclear device. Unless strong and decisive steps are taken by the nuclear powers, the membership of the nuclear club will not stop at six. Pakistan was pursuing a well-defined coherent nuclear programme which aims at providing the technical knowhow it need to meet its requirements." 51

Further, Bhutto continued that "Pakistan would not succumb to nuclear blackmail by India", and immediately announced a major diplomatic offensive to build up international public opinion against India on this issue. This included approach to the United Nations, sending top level diplomats to major world capitals, demand for a joint or individual guarantee from nuclear powers against projected Indian nuclear blackmail and an appeal to United States to resume arms supply to Pakistan since the Indian nuclear device reflected a major quantitative change in the subcontinent and upset the equilibrium, symmetry and tranquility. In hindsight it is now clear that even in the absence of an Indian nuclear 'blackmail', Pakistan was pledged to developing its nuclear potential and was not prepared to foreclose its options. 52

An example of Pakistan's negative approach towards the Indian nuclear device, was its unilateral decision to call off the bilateral Indo-Pakistani talks scheduled to be held in

51 Motherland (New Delhi), 22 May 1974
Islamabad on 10 June 1974, for discussing restoration of postal, telecommunication and travel facilities. An official communication received in New Delhi from Islamabad on 1 June cited the shock the People of Pakistan received at the Indian nuclear device as the rationale for this unilateral postponement. The Pakistani message added that negotiations and consultations would be resumed only after Pakistan mustered guarantee for security and protection and when favourable atmosphere developed in the subcontinent.

The Government of India took note of Pakistan's official and non-official apprehension or suspicion towards its nuclear experiment (explosion). The then Indian External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh issued a statement on 21 May 1974, regarding Indian intention to use nuclear energy purely for peaceful purposes. His statement runs as follows:

"It is singularly unfortunate that the peaceful nature of this nuclear experiment of ours should be misconstrued and misread in Pakistan. The apprehension arose in Pakistan was unfounded. We value our commitment under the Simla Agreement to settle all our differences with Pakistan by peaceful and bilateral means. Moreover, both countries have resolved that the past policies of confrontation and conflict are banished for ever. We hope that whatever misconception arisen in Pakistan about this experiment will be replaced after cool assessment. Pakistan's allegations of hegemonistic designs have no basis at all but to say the least uncharacterable"."53

53 Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), 1974, p.171
Commenting on Bhutto's reply to Indira Gandhi's letter, Swaran Singh said:

"In a vain attempt to build up the bogey of India developing a nuclear weapons capacity, Prime Minister Bhutto has even gone to the extent of distorting the nature and purpose of our scientific experiments in space research. India's programme of space research is open and well known to the scientists of the world. Its basic objective is to explore new values and methods of disseminating scientific and educational knowledge. Pakistan is deliberately trying to distort and misrepresent India's programme of peaceful uses of nuclear and space technology by imputing military motives. It is difficult to understand how a peaceful nuclear experiment could be considered a factor leading to the upsetting of the equilibrium and tranquillity in the subcontinent as alleged by Prime Minister Bhutto. India continues to believe firmly in the principle of sovereign equality of her neighbours. The success of nuclear experiment does not in any way alter this position." 54

The then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, had assured the then Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto, in her letter on 22 May 1974, about the nature of peaceful Indian nuclear explosion in these words:

"I would like to assure you that we remain fully committed to our traditional policy of developing nuclear energy resources entirely for peaceful purposes. The recent underground nuclear experiment conducted by our scientists in no way alters this policy. The underground test was conducted in carefully controlled conditions and is designed to develop technology for various economic uses of nuclear energy. We have entered into collaboration with several developing countries for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. There are no political or foreign policy implications of this test. We remain committed to settle all our differences with Pakistan peacefully through bilateral negotiations in accordance with the Simla Agreement. 55

54 Ibid, p. 193
55 Ibid, p. 194
To such Indian assurances and guarantees Bhutto reacted as follows:

"We have taken the note of your assurances that you remain fully committed to the development of nuclear energy resources for peaceful purposes only and that you will continue to condemn the military use of nuclear energy as a threat to humanity. We will, however, appreciate that it is a question not only of intentions but of capabilities. As you know, in the past we received many assurances from India which regrettably remained unhonoured. Furthermore, the Indian nuclear explosion is an event which cannot be viewed in isolation from its surrounding circumstances. Your rapidly developing programme for acquiring medium range missiles and with external assistance placing a satellite in orbit, thus obtaining a delivery system for nuclear weapons, and your projected building of nuclear Navy are most pertinent in this context. These are the matters of concern not only to Pakistan but to all countries which border on the Indian Ocean. Your nuclear explosion, however, introduced an unbalancing factor at a time when progress was being made step by step towards normalization of relations between our two countries and we had reason to look forward to equilibrium and tranquillity in the subcontinent. When Pakistan's attempts to obtain even spare parts under Treaty Commitments cause an outcry in India not only unjustified but totally disproportional, it would be unnatural to expect public opinion in Pakistan not to react to the cauvinistic jubilation widely expressed in India at the acquisition of nuclear status."

To get over the impasse on this sensitive issue Bhutto suggested that:

1. India should undertake the obligation along with other nuclear states, to protect any non-nuclear state against a nuclear threat;

56 Ibid, p. 195
ii. If it wished to forsake the development of nuclear weapons, it should do so through one or more concrete and binding international agreements.

Holistic analysis of the above cited statements of the representatives of the Government of Pakistan indicates candidly that according to them there is not much difference between explosion of nuclear device and the detonation of nuclear weapons and it appeared that they were suspicious about the Indian intention to use nuclear energy for the peaceful and constructive purposes. However, they had an apprehension that India has carried out this test with the intention to establish Indian hegemony and to blackmail Pakistan and had raised the question that in the existing historical background, such promises had least credibility and had justified Pakistan's apprehensions over Indian nuclear device, by supporting the vertical linkages, i.e., it is natural for Pakistan to react over the Indian nuclear advancement, as India had reacted sharply in the past, over Pakistan's acquiring of arms from the Western countries.

On the other hand, the statements issued by the representatives of the Government of India pointed that India had committed to resolve all her differences, disputes and misunderstanding vis-a-vis Pakistan, within the framework of the Simla Agreement and her nuclear test was not a bar in achieving the long-term goals for the establishment of a peaceful and cooperative
relationship. India has categorically and candidly explained the peaceful nature of her nuclear device and maintained that it would be used only for the constructive and peaceful purposes and rejected the Pakistani apprehension as an unfounded element in the process of normalisation of their relations. Further, it had assured that the Indian Government was consulting the other developing countries for the evolution of techniques to use nuclear energy for the peaceful purposes.

In the light of the above analysis it is essential both on the part of Islamabad and New Delhi to evolve the mutually agreed upon techniques to remove apprehension, misconception and to lay the foundation of long lasting confidence building measures.

Pakistan's hostile or antagonistic reaction towards the Indian nuclear explosion was the culmination of various factors. The prime rationale was the realisation on the part of the Government of Pakistan that the Indian nuclear device had brought a further swing in the balance of power in the region and was reminder of the reality that the artificial power parity for which Pakistan had had worked for more than two decades was nothing more than illusion. This device had created a feeling

57 For details about India's intention to use its nuclear capacity for attainment of peaceful and constructive objectives, see, Pierre Gallois, "Indian Nuclear Explosion and India's Security", (Translated version), Foreign Affairs Reports, March 1975, pp. 81-100
of dismay, because Pakistanis felt that India had gone nuclear to intimidate and blackmail them. It had further confirmed India's dominant position as the major and pre-eminent power in the Indian subcontinent. At home Bhutto made an endeavour to extract political capital out of this device, to strengthen his position.

Keeping in view his expected visit to Bangladesh in June 1974, Bhutto intended to follow a hardline policy in order to de-escalate the Indo-Pak normalisation and to create an impression that Pakistan still intended to establish fraternal contacts with its erstwhile East wing (now Bangladesh) and to create an impression that the Indian nuclear device has widened the gap between India and Bangladesh.

Last but not least his intention was to use this event as a bargaining lever to extract military assistance from USA and to attract the sympathy both political and economic from its West Asian Muslim brethren, to accelerate its own nuclear programme, for which Pakistan was evolving the policy since 1962, but due to lack of adequate financial resources, it was lacking behind.

On the part of India with its enormous human and material resources, it was essential to create an impression among her neighbours through functional devices and methods that it had no hegemonistic designs and that it was not interested in interfering in the internal affairs of any of its neighbouring countries in general and in Pakistan in particular. However, it is necessary to create a feeling that she is quite satisfied
with the existing *status quo* in South Asia. It should make an
endeavour to remove the suspicion, fear-psychosis or mistrust,
developed among these small states due to her nuclear experi­
ment, through flexible and mutually agreed procedures and poli-
cies.

It was encouraging to note that after further assurances
by the Indian Government and as a result of the failure of the
Pakistani campaign to isolate India in the international com­
munity on this issue, Pakistan once again expressed its willing­
ness to resume bilateral negotiations with India. These talks
and negotiations, held in Rawalpindi in September 1974, were
concluded successfully thus paving the way for the early resump­
tion of postal, telecommunication and travel facilities between
the two countries. This agreement was further followed by
another protocol on the resumption of trade between them.

**VI**

**INDIA - PAKISTAN TRADE RELATIONS**

In a step by step persuasion of Simla Agreement a proto­
col was signed in New Delhi between India and Pakistan on 30th
November 1974,\(^58\) for the resumption of trade relations. This pro-

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\(^58\) *Times of India*, 1 December 1974
tocol has raised considerable expectations both in India and Pakistan with regard to the prospects of positive economic co-operation, including some sort of regional framework for trade expansion on the pattern of European Economic Commission (EEC) or Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the Indian subcontinent. However, there is a strong requirement that the economic system between New Delhi and Islamabad should be recognised as a part of an adequate analytical framework for improving mutual relationship.

One of the major areas where India and Pakistan could extend their mutual cooperation is the area of commercial sector. Indo-Pakistani trade relations were disrupted for more than a decade. Before the suspension of trade relations, India was a major exporter of coal to Pakistan, it also exported large quantities of metal products, paper, tea, spices, glass and glassware. It imported cotton, rice, natural gas, eggs, and fresh fruits from Pakistan.

The general masses in the entire subcontinent were confronted with serious difficulties owing to the suspension of trade between India and Pakistan. But, however, the altered geo-political and socio-economic conditions forced them to review their posture towards each other. The Simla Agreement provides a framework for the resumption of two-way trade.59

59. Article 3 of the Simla Agreement, signed on 2 July 1972, stipulates, that in order to restore and normalise relations between New Delhi and Islamabad in a step-by-step process, "trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible". In the light of this article both India and Pakistan could identify the items and areas for the mutual import-export purposes, and thus could establish the two-way process. /continued.../
But the more complicated issues like delineation of actual line of control in Jammu and Kashmir and the withdrawal of troops, the Kashmir issue, repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians, return of the occupied territory in the western sector, and the Indian nuclear explosion, kept them fruitlessly busy. However, in the beginning of November 1974, efforts were made for the resumption of trade relations and the speed with which both the delegations come to grips with the problem showed the mutual eagerness to put an end to a decade's ban on trade relations and to promote mutual commercial advantages. The trade protocol was signed on 30 November 1974, and it was also decided to conclude a comprehensive trade agreement, which was concluded on 23 January 1975. It came into force with immediate effect and was valid for one year with a provision for extension by a further period of two years. According to this trade protocol, to begin with, "trade would be conducted generally on Government to Government basis or through Government controlled trade corporations of the two countries, unless otherwise agreed and payments made in convertible currency".

The idea behind this provision presumably was to prevent speculative exchanges and illegal leakages and help establish trade only along mutually beneficial channels. Otherwise, there were possibilities that trade between the two countries would have given a fillip to smuggling.

For further details, see, A.R Komal, "Import-Export Structure & Trade Expansion in South Asia"; A report prepared for Committee on South Asian Studies, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, April 1982.

60 Times of India, 1 December 1974
61 Financial Express (New Delhi), 29 November 1974
One of the eminent Pakistani journalist wrote about the provision of convertible currency as follows:

"It would give Pakistan a little edge over India. The payments in international currency would offer more scope for trade expansion particularly because, there will be no constant compulsion to balance the trade agreement between the two countries". 62

The leader of the Pakistani delegation Ejaz Ahmad Naik, characterised the trade protocol as a major syndrome towards normalisation of relations in the Indian subcontinent within the framework of the Simla Agreement. 63

A.T. Chaudhri, further analysed that:

"... so far as Pakistan was concerned, the main advantage of trade resumption was in the normalisation of relations and in serving the cause of peace between the two countries. It also pointed out that Pakistan and India could set a good example of mutual cooperation for the other developing nations". 64

After the liberation of Bangladesh, Pakistan was buying Indian jute manufactured at a considerably higher price via third countries. 65

A major road block in the way of Indo-Pakistani trade was removed on 15 January 1975, when the modalities of shipping

62. A.T. Chaudhri, "The Trade Accord with India", The Dawn, 8 December 1974

63. Financial Express (New Delhi), 1 December 1974. All reference to the Financial Express in this Chapter is to the New Delhi edition of that paper.

64. A.T. Chaudhuri, Op Cit

services between India and Pakistan were smoothed. The shipping services had remained suspended since 1965 when hostilities between the neighbours started. All payments and expenses relating to shipping services between the two neighbours would be effected in freely convertible currency in accordance with the foreign exchange regulations in force from time to time in each country.66

Besides, the representatives of the State Bank of India and the National Bank of Pakistan agreed upon and signed the working arrangements for remittance facilities between the two countries in regard to trade.67

According to the Financial Times, both sides would enter into trade in a spirit of healthy competition with other world suppliers and not of making an ingress into each other's domestic and indigenous industry.68 This trend was highly appreciated in Pakistan. Article VIII of the agreement concluded between India and Pakistan made it mandatory on the parties concerned to treat items of import and export strictly for home (indigenous) consumption and laid down that under no circumstances would such items be re-exported to other countries. This clause was

66. The Hindu, 16 January 1975
67. Financial Express, 24 January 1975
68. Financial Times, (London), 20 January 1975
inserted at Pakistan's insistence. 69

Nusrat Hassan, Chairman, Cotton Corporation of Pakistan said:

"Pakistan would give top priority to India's cotton requirements even by restricting domestic consumption and exports elsewhere, if necessary." 70

And after a good deal of bargaining on both sides an accord on Rs.25 crore cotton deal was reached in Bombay on 31 January 1975. 71

All curbs on shipping were withdrawn from 1 February 1975. The shipping delegation of the two countries arrived at a tentative agreement on 27 March 1975 on freight rates broadly on the pattern of West Asia rates for articles covered under Indo-Pakistan trade protocol signed on 30 November 1974. The state owned Mogal Line of India and the National Shipping Corporation of Pakistan were nominated by their respective Governments to execute the job. Both the Shipping companies appointed each other as their agents on reciprocal basis. 72

Indo-Pakistani commercial relations were further cemented when a Pakistani purchase mission led by the Chairman of Pakistan Trade Corporation, Zharul Haq, came to India and identified specific areas in which commercial transaction could take place

69 Ibid, 29 January 1975
70 Economic Times (London), 31 January and 1 February 1975
71 Financial Express, 31 January 1975
72 Ibid, 1 April 1975
to the advantage of both sides. Pakistan showed its keen interest in buying iron, coal, coke and tobacco leaves from India.73

Another concrete step was taken after four days of hard bargaining at Karachi on 14 January 1976. According to the Karachi Agreement, Pakistan would purchase 5000 tonnes of pig-iron and 250 tonnes of bidi leaves.74 Further India agreed to supply 1.93 million tonnes of iron ore over the next seven years. The iron ore has already started feeding the steel mill of Karachi which had been set up with Soviet aid.75 The Pakistani team was also reported to have shown keen interest in automobile components, iron and steel, railway materials, ferro-alloys and chemicals.76 A distinct advantage of the above agreement has been that the two delegations had detailed discussions on the "content and modalities of future negotiations".77

The rapid strides on the road to normalisation taken after the conclusion of the Karachi Agreement gave a boost to the Indo-Pakistani trade. Islamabad talks between the then Indian Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, and his Pakistani counterpart Agha Shahi, from 12 to 14 May 1976, paved the way for normalisation of commercial relations.78

73 Ibid, 28 April 1975
74 Times of India, 16 January 1976
75 The Tribune (Chandigarh), 22 May 1980
76 Financial Express, 17 January 1976
77 Hindustan Times, 17 January 1976
78 Indian Backgrounder (New Delhi), vol.1, no.16, 19 July 1976, pp. 147-49
The Indo-Pakistani commercial relations have to be based on long term mutual cooperative understanding since this pattern helps better planning. If Indo-Pakistani commercial and trade relations continue as long-term cooperative process, it could pave the way for the South Asian Common Market, on the pattern of European Economic Commission (EEC) or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and further extend and strengthen the economic activities in the sub-continent. The trade transaction in the subcontinent in general and South Asia in particular depends on the permission to use overland routes for transport. This facility should be provided on reciprocal basis by India, Bangladesh, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Burma respectively, thus strengthening the would be concept of South Asian Economic Commission (Would be SAEC) or the South Asian Common Market.

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80 Similar suggestions had been given by T.K. Jayaraman in his thesis on "Prospects of Economic Integration in the Indian Subcontinent", submitted for his Doctoral degree at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, USA, in December 1975, see, Foreign Affairs Reports vol. xxvi, no.6, June 1977, pp.122-34; S. Iriza Hussain, "The Possibilities of Expanding RCD and the formation of an Asian Common Market", Strategic Studies, vol.1, no. 4, Jan-March 1978, pp. 1-10. According to him, unless the main causes of hostility and conflict are removed and disputes among the regional powers resolved in an equitable manner the very basis of a community and mutual confidence between participating states cannot be created. The latter has to follow, it cannot precede, the former. This suggestion is equally relevant for Indo-Pak rapprochement.

continued....
OVER FLIGHTS AGREEMENT

Resumption of airlink was a pending issue between India and Pakistan, since the hijacking episode in June 1971, when an Indian Airline Fokker Friendship aircraft on a scheduled flight from Sri Nagar to New Delhi was forcibly diverted to Lahore and subsequently blown up by a Pakistan mob, India retaliated by banning the overflights of Pakistani planes across its territory. Pakistan filed a complaint against India before the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Pokhran nuclear device once again stood in the way of bilateral talks related to such issues, due to Pakistan's unilateral decision to withdraw their normalisation process with India. However, even after Bhutto had dramatised the danger of Indian explosion to Pakistan to a considerable extent, a round of talks held in Islamabad to deal with various important issues including overflights. A joint communique released at the end of Indian team's visit, recorded an agreement on the exchange of delegations to discuss the resumption of overflights while no date was fixed for air talks. The Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh said the talks would begin as soon as possible. Towards the end of November another round of talks took place in Islamabad which also ended inconclusively.

/footnote No.80 - contn../

Satish Kumar, "Trends in Regional Development in South Asia," In: M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (Eds), Great Power Relations, World Order and Third World (New Delhi, 1981)
It may be recalled here that Bhutto had assured India that his country would withdraw the case from the ICAO to pave the way for the restoration of airlinks and overflights, as a part of the normalisation process. Despite frequent reminders from India, Pakistan avoided the withdrawal on one pretext or the other, retaining it as an additional bargaining counter for scoring some benefit. It appeared that Pakistan was not prepared to withdraw the case without some substantial concession.

After the liberation of Bangladesh, Pakistan lost its interest over the issue of airlink with India, till Bhutto once again initiated a diplomatic offensive eastward when Bangladesh was recognised in February 1974. Pakistan was using it as a bargaining lever to bring pressure on India, who needed the over-flight facilities more than Pakistan required. However, Pakistan reported to have demanded compensation for the losses suffered by it - $500 million - as a result of the cancellation of overflights. 81 India was also reported to have demanded compensation for the losses of its aircraft. 82

The talks were resumed in New Delhi in May 1975, but again foundered, even though Pakistan suffered more by the stoppage of overflights since all routes to the east are best directed through India. 83 Tense and secret diplomatic adventures were

81 The Dawn, 25 April 1976
82 Hindustan Times, 25 November 1974
83 The Hindu, 21 May 1975
resorted to report progress about the talks back to Islamabad and to retrieve minute-to-minute instructions by the Government. Moreover, another factor - the Salal Project was introduced in the talks.\(^{84}\) The Dawn mentioned that India's insistence on prior withdrawal of Pakistan's complaint from ICAO was the main cause of failure, and that Pakistan made a significant contribution to satisfactory settlement by offering not to activate the complaint at ICAO and to seek a bilateral agreement on Pakistan's claim of compensation.\(^{85}\) India, however, offered to withdraw its counter complaint including her right to claim compensation for the hijacked aircraft.

As Bhutto could see that India was not prepared to give concessions and was not keen on a summit, he agreed to withdraw the complaint from the ICAO. It must be remembered that Bhutto's diplomatic overtures to Nepal and the newly acquired friendship with Bangladesh dictated a reasonable response to the question of overflights.

Even after Bhutto had offered to withdraw the case it was considered uncertain whether he would do so straightaway or impose preconditions.\(^{86}\) Bhutto, primarily for domestic consumption, preferred to talk big when it would have been better

84 For details about the Salal Project controversy, please see in the following pages of the next section in this Chapter

85 The Dawn, 23 May 1975

86 The Patriot (New Delhi), 21 April 1976
to talk intelligently. His problem was that he preferred military "balances" to mutually beneficial trade with neighbours and had a penchant for melodrama and hyperbole. The Pakistani offer was widely acclaimed in both India and Pakistan.

Both India and Pakistan agreed to send a joint letter to the ICAO for withdrawing Pakistan's claim and India's counter-complaint pending before it. The agreement was warmly hailed by world leaders. It may, however, be pointed out that at the talks in Islamabad, Pakistan tried to add a rider to its offer of withdrawal of the case from ICAO by suggesting that the question of compensation could be settled through bilateral negotiations but India turned down this suggestion, because it could amount to indirectly keeping the issue open in a different form. However, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary gave up this demand when he found his Indian counterpart quite firm that the withdrawal of the case from the ICAO should be unconditional in every respect. It was decided that the joint letter to be addressed by India and Pakistan to the ICAO would make it amply clear that the two countries were not only withdrawing their cases but also waiving all compensation claims. Pakistan was in effect questioning the very basis of the Simla Agreement which had committed the two countries irrevocably to the principle of bilateral settlement of all outstanding issues.

87 The Patriot (New Delhi), 21 April 1976
88 The Statesman, "Talks with Pakistan", 21 April 1976
89 National Herald (New Delhi), "A Good Beginning" 16 May '76.
Thus by withdrawing from the ICAO, Pakistan reaffirmed its commitment to the principle of bilateralism enunciated by the Simla Agreement. 90

Indira Gandhi, expressed the hope that the Islamabad agreement could lead to a proper climate of understanding between the two neighbours. She expressed this in reply to Bhutto's message while overflying Indian territory on his way to North-Korea and China. Bhutto assured that Pakistan would implement the accord by the agreed date and continued that the agreement would go a long way to establish the positive climate of relations between the two countries. 91

Bhutto's message was quite explicit about Pakistan's readiness to implement the package in its entirety by the agreed date. And Indira Gandhi in turn reassured him that India was looking forward to an era of fruitful cooperation with Pakistan. 92

Another major syndrome for the normalisation of relations was the agreement concluded for the resumption of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors. Both of them further agreed to restore rail and road links after hectic consultations, in the middle of May 1976.

To sum up the sequence of the process of normalisation followed by India and Pakistan during Indira Gandhi-Bhutto phase,

90 Indian Express (New Delhi), "Relations with Pakistan", 21 April 1976
91 National Herald (New Delhi), 29 May 1976
92 The Hindu (Madras), 20 May 1976
it highlights that both the countries sincerely followed the normalisation process. However, on certain occasions on some issues there were misunderstandings, apprehensions and misconceptions. But both of them tactfully and diplomatically overcame such issues. The issue of POWs created a delicate situation at different levels in their dealings and India had dragged her feet over this issue which fouled the good atmosphere created by the delineation of the actual line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus India frittered away the advantage it had acquired by adopting a reasonable stand towards Pakistan at Simla over the issue of occupied territory in the Western sector and suffered both politically and economically over the issues of POWs and refugees. Pakistan, of course, reluctantly made certain concessions by accepting India's proposal on the ceasefire line (which is otherwise used by some authors as the Actual Line of Control).

However, the old determinants of Pakistan's India policy began to reassert themselves when India's assurances of using the nuclear technology for peaceful purposes were rejected by it after the Pokhran explosion. Not only that, even the talks which were to be held on 10 June 1974 were postponed, so were the resumption of trade, postal and telecommunication and travel facilities, rail, road transport, overflight and diplomatic
relations. But after a great deal of persuasion from India, Pakistan had once again reciprocated the process of normalisation and ultimately, they succeeded in resolving all their disputes and differences in the light of the Simla Agreement.

VIII
NORMALISATION DURING JANATA PHASE

There were strong apprehensions and doubts about both India and Pakistan, after Janata Party came into power in India, that the process of normalisation which had set into motion so eagerly and assiduously by both the countries, inspite of certain global and regional constraints, could be thwarted. But soon after taking over the oath of office on 24 March 1977, Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai stated at a press conference that:

"India wanted friendly relations with all countries. If the treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union stood in the way of friendship with others, then it would have to go." 93

However, this statement made a favourable impression in Pakistan and it was felt that India might return to the policy of genuine nonalignment. 94

93 Peking Review (Beijing), 25 March 1977
94 This impression gathered after consulting diplomats, journalists, policy-makers and political elites in Pakistan.
Similarly, the then Indian External Affairs Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, said in the Lok Sabha, that:

"The Indian Government had reiterated their resolve to continue to adhere to the policy of nonalignment and it would be the Government's endeavour to develop and further strengthen relations with all countries on the basis of beneficial bilateralism, equality and reciprocity". 95

Further, he assured Pakistan that:

"The process of normalisation would be strengthened further. There should be no apprehension, that the new government would do anything to reverse the process". 96

In one of his articles, Professor Ashen Chaudhury wrote:

"Janata Government in India followed a balanced and correct policy towards Pakistan during the years it stayed in power. Janta Party leaders neither made a derogatory comment on Pakistan's internal situation nor did they issue any clemency appeal in respect of Bhutto". 97

It is significant to note that the process of normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan was smooth during the Janata regime. In February 1978, the Indian Foreign Affairs Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Islamabad and held talks with President General Zia-Ul-Haq and Agha Shahi, his Foreign Affairs advisor. This meeting paved the way for further nego-

95 India, Lok Sabha Debate, vol.2, no.5, 16 June 1977
96 Ibid, vol. 15, no.58, 15 May 1978
tiation and consultation on many issues of mutual interest and to a large extent it had cleared the atmosphere of distrust and apprehension. Vajpayee also conceded during the press conference that trade between India and Pakistan should grow in a balanced manner. During his good-will visit to Islamabad, India and Pakistan agreed to facilitate exchanges, simplifying and liberalising the visa procedure, stationing press correspondents in each other's country, developing trade on a two-way basis and also resuming talks on the Salal Project.

Two months later, Agha Shahi, paid a return visit to New Delhi for consultations with the Indian leaders about the Salal Hydro Electric Project. This was an old issue between the two neighbours. India wanted to build a dam and a power station across the river Chenab in the Indian part of Kashmir. Pakistan contended that the construction of a dam across Chenab would enable India to interrupt the flow of water, or to flood western Punjab while India maintained that it would be impossible to cause flooding without damage to its own territory. After two rounds of negotiations on this issue an agreement was concluded on 14 April 1978 that in order to permit free flow of water to Pakistan, the height of the dam would be reduced from 12 meters, as originally planned to 10 meters.98 The agreement on Salal

98 *Kessings Contemporary Archives* (London), Column, 24019
Project pgt an end to one of the outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan.

A day after Agha Shahi's visit, the then Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai, told a Pakistani journalist:

"... he was prepared to solve all problems with Pakistan through negotiations and there was more understanding between India and Pakistan today than in the past thirty years".99

**IX**

**CONCLUSIONS**

Holistic analysis of the normalisation syndrome discussed above pinpoint that the post-Simla Indo-Pakistani relation initiated a new phase in the history of the Indian subcontinent. A significant feature which has left a deep impact on their relations, is the realisation on the part of both the Governments and the general public in Pakistan and India that conflictual postures and mutual hostility in their actual dealings will not resolve their problems. On the contrary mutual cooperation in all fields,100 based on the principles of symmetry, equality, co-existence, horizontal linkages, rather than vertical and fraternity would only help them to establish enduring and long-

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99 *Ibid*

100 Such as, eradication of illiteracy, poverty, trade relations, scientific research, transfer of technology, third world cooperation, cultural exchanges, educational cooperation in tropical medicine, agriculture, forestry, veterinary sciences, textile technology, etc. etc.
lasting peace and would provide opportunities for their all round development. A major domestic change in the post-Simla phase observed in Pakistan was the success of a civilian and democratic system in its entire history - (though domestic instability started after 1977 General elections). It was really a rare phenomenon in politics. Another major change candidly identified was that never before had a sizeable population and the intelligentsia in both countries supported the normalisation process, as they did, after the Simla Agreement. And it had observed that the policy makers and political elites had given much significance to these ideas, during their policy planning and execution. And in fact these factors are instrumental in moulding the thinking of the political elites and policy-makers towards the relevance of peaceful coexistence.

The major conflictual avenues during this phase, were:

(i) Delineation of the line of control;
(ii) Withdrawal of troops to international border;
(iii) Repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians;
(iv) Recognition of Bangladesh;
(v) The Indian nuclear explosion conducted at Pokhran on 18 May 1974; and
(vi) Return of occupied territory in the Western sector (by India)

However, diplomatically and tactfully both neighbours succeeded in settling these problems, thus initiating a new "cooperative phase", in their relations. And the major cooperative avenues during the same phase were:
i. Resumption of Trade and Commercial relations;
ii. Resumption of Air and Railway links;
iii. Resumption of Postal, Telecommunication and Transport facilities;
iv. Resumption of Diplomatic relations.

It needs to be stressed here that though various normalisation measures are in the interest of the people of this region, these by themselves cannot overcome the deeprooted prejudice, fear psychosis and suspicions or ensure lasting peace and stability. To shift from conflictual and confrontational relationship to a cooperative, cordial or fraternal relationship based on consultation, negotiation and mutual consensus, and to fulfill the positive aspirations of the people of India and Pakistan, it is imperative that both these nation-states should accept and execute strictly the universally recognised principles of coexistence, cooperation, equality, mutual desire for friendship, and mutual respect for non-interference, territorial integrity in their mutual dealings and should settle all outstanding disputes on the basis of justice and equality.

It is quite natural for a small state (Pakistan) to be suspicious of the motives of its big neighbour - India. Moreover, it is imperative for the big state to remove suspicion and fear-psychosis from her small neighbours and to create an impression of good neighbourliness through her broad-based and flexible policies. It should avoid actions which may generate a feeling of uneasiness and insecurity among the smaller states.
Generally speaking, Pakistan's relations with India have had to be patterned afresh. Since confrontation has lost all its relevance in view of the changed geo-political, socio-economic, socio-cultural and power realities and because of the fact that Pakistan feels itself much more weaker and insecure. Another vital factor is the historical significance of the Khyber Pass and Pakistan's acquiring the geo-strategic vitality and importance as a buffer state between India, Soviet Union, China and to a certain extent the West Asian Muslim countries. Hence, a united and strong Pakistan is in the interest of India's security. Under such circumstances Indo-Pakistani relations must evolve gradually in such a framework that the identity of Pakistan as a separate and sovereign identity and its basic interests should not be threatened. On the part of Pakistan (it being a small state), it has to give up its imaginary vision of maintaining parity with India - a power which is vastly greater than her (in all respects). It has to live distinctly but in harmony and should resist all her activities and attempts which can create misconception, apprehensions, misunderstandings with her big neighbour - India.

101 For the detailed study of the fresh techniques and patterns applicable in Indo-Pakistani relations, please see, Chapters I and III of this thesis


103 In the past USA's demonstration to build up an artificial power parity between Pakistan and India was not only futile, but had, in fact, proved to be counter-productive for Pakistan and Pakistan lost its East wing in the process.
Then and then only, enduring and stable peace, cooperative and working relationship could be achieved in this sensitive part of the world. Thus the convergence of interests and political, social and economic activities in the post-Simla phase have revealed fresh incentives and motives for maintaining peaceful settlement. Further improvements can be achieved if there is not surprising transformation in the new military balance.