CHAPTER IV

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SIMLA AGREEMENT

Foreign policy analysis of Indo-Pakistani relations since their inception highlights that there has been a persistent clash of interests on different issues and that a hostile or antagonistic pattern of behaviour has dominated their relations. However, from time to time both India and Pakistan have realised the necessity of peace and co-operation between them. To achieve this aim they have signed and concluded various treaties, agreements and conventions, notably the following:

(i) Liaquat-Nehru Agreement on minority Protection in 1950;
(ii) Mohammad Ali-Nehru Agreement of 1953 to resolve all outstanding disputes through negotiations, dialogues, compromise, and mutual adjustment or accommodation;
(iii) Ayub Khan-Nehru Treaty of 1959 on trade and financial matters;
(iv) Ayub Khan-Nehru Agreement on Indus-Waters of 1960; and

Among these agreements, only the Indus-Waters Treaty of 1960, had really created an atmosphere of mutual trust.

1 Differentiated nature of conflict and tension between India and Pakistan has been analysed and discussed in Chapter III, The Conflict and the Co-operation Syndrome: India-Pakistan, in this thesis.
and understanding and helped resolve successfully the sensitive issue of the distribution of Indus waters between the two countries, whereas the rest of the above-mentioned agreements either had short-term significance or completely failed to serve their purpose.

After the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, both the neighbours settled down to resolve their disputes across the table through negotiations and mutually agreed upon procedures. For this purpose, the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister and Z.A. Bhutto, the then President of Pakistan, met at Simla between the last week of June and the first week of July 1972 and ultimately signed an agreement on 2 July 1972.

The agenda at Simla mainly boiled down to two important and significant issues:

(i) Determination of the elements of durable peace and long-term co-operation within the framework of bilateralism.

(ii) Normalization of relations between the two neighbours in order to ensure stability in the subcontinent.

Through this act of "peace diplomacy" truncated and defeated Pakistan has succeeded in getting back the territory occupied by India in the western sector, repatriation of huge number of POWs surrendered to the joint Indo-Bangladesh Command, settlement of all disputes that aroused due to the
armed conflict of December 1971, kept alive the Kashmir dispute to resolve it at an appropriate occasion, on a single commitment that in future India and Pakistan would resolve all their disputes without invoking any third party, i.e., either the super powers or the UN. Thus the alone concession Pakistan made during this summit vis-a-vis India was the commitment to bilateralism. And this was the single vital objective which India had achieved.

As stated above, before the Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972, several other agreements had been concluded between India and Pakistan. But none of them helped resolve the persistent clash of interests between them—neither proved useful in the establishment of mutual trust, co-operative understanding and peaceful co-existence. Hence the obvious question before us is to analyse the extent to which the Simla Agreement differs from the other agreements signed between India and Pakistan since 1947. And how far it has been helpful in serving its purposes?

In this context, we may well begin with a comparative study of the views of the various policy-makers, both in India and Pakistan.

Indira Gandhi, the then Indian Prime Minister analysed the political situation in the Indian subcontinent at the time of the conclusion of the Simla Agreement as follows: "The situation at the Simla Agreement was quite different, with
what existed at Tashkant in 1966. Today India is more united in guarding its interests."² During the discussion in the Parliament over Simla Agreement, she further emphasised that -

Simla Agreement was in pursuance of domestic and international policies followed by India in these years. There was great change in Pakistan regardless of whether its leaders wanted it or not. There are vast forces at work both in India and Pakistan and all over the world for peace and co-operation.³

Sardar Swaran Singh, the then Indian External Affairs Minister in his report to the Parliamentary Consultative Committee of his Ministry said:

Simla Agreement was very much unlike the other agreements between India and Pakistan and particularly with the Tashkant declaration of 1966. The major differences were:

i) Tashkant Agreement was achieved through the good offices of the third party, the Soviet Union. While the Simla agreement was the result of bilateral negotiations without the interference of any third party.

ii) Under the Tashkant Agreement the parties had agreed to withdraw their forces to the 1949 cease-fire line in Kashmir, whereas according to Simla agreement the Indian forces would hold the actual line of control.

iii) Under the Tashkant Agreement Pakistan insisted on the use of some of the United Nations machinery for conciliation but there was no such provision under the Simla Agreement.⁴

² G.S. Bhargava, Success or Surrender? The Simla Summit (New Delhi, 1972), p. 69;
³ Ibid., p. 72.
⁴ Ibid., p. 66.
Moreover, this agreement was concluded under unique environment, i.e., after the categorical defeat of Pakistani army, shattering of the theories of parity and two-nation and change in the very structure of Indian subcontinent with the emancipation of Bangladesh as the third autonomous and sovereign entity and with the emergence of more united and homogenous Pakistan. Similarly, Bipinpal Das the then Indian Deputy Foreign Minister, discussing the merit of Simla Agreement said:

"It is, a second and excellent beginning, a right step in the right direction, a herald of a new era, an era of peace, progress and prosperity not only for India and Pakistan, but for the whole of Asia and perhaps the shining light house in the entire world."

In his opinion Simla Agreement has four major achievements, and they will be cited as follows:

1. President Bhutto of Pakistan put his seal to a firm commitment that there will be no threat or use of force for settlement of disputes. This in his opinion, almost amounts to or comes very near to a no-war declaration.

2. For the first time in their history India and Pakistan agreed to settle all disputes through bilateral negotiations, without invoking any third party.

3. Pakistan had committed against organisational assistance or encouragement to any act detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and friendly relations.

4. Finally, there has been a de-internationalisation of the Kashmir cease-fire and denial of any further role for the United Nations in this matter.

5 Ibid., p. 69.

6 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
The above analysis of the policy-makers in India about the Simla Agreement emphasised that this agreement was signed in a completely different situation, than what the other agreements were before it. The important point to be considered and emphasised here is that India made it categorically clear its genuine desire for a rapprochement with Pakistan and tried to remove the long-standing Pakistani suspicion that India has not reconciled to the existence of Pakistan as a separate entity and is interested in undoing it, and her desire to initiate a new process of peaceful co-existence within the framework of bilateralism.

While India has a genuine desire to resolve the malign clash of interests with Pakistan, let us see what was the reaction of Pakistan and its decision-makers towards Simla Agreement? Z.A. Bhutto, the then President of Pakistan, said: "Peace in the subcontinent is not only in India's interest but equally in the interest of Pakistan".9

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7 For detailed account of political shift in the subcontinent after 1971 crisis, see Chapter III: Conflict and The Co-operation Syndrome: India-Pakistan, under the subheading: Post-Bangladesh Crisis Developments.

8 The conditions in December 1971 war was such that if India wanted to undo Pakistan it would have done it. But it had taken a different stand and unilaterally declared the cease-fire on 17 December 1971 in the western sector, probably with the intention to remind Pakistani policy-makers that India does not have any interest in undoing Pakistan.

9 Pakistan Times (Karachi), 3 July 1972.
However, Z.A. appraised the possible domestic and international negative impact on his government if he failed to establish friendly and cordial relations with India, and was aware that he would lose considerably his prestige among the Afro-Asian countries, as well as among his own people, because India had normal relations with all her neighbours. This caused great change in his thinking, so that an otherwise harsh and aggressive Bhutto realized the necessity of durable peace in the subcontinent and took steps for its attainment.

It should, however, be emphasised that consensus cannot be imposed mechanically on India and Pakistan. The potential impact of the Simla Agreement can be seriously examined only with regard to the concrete conditions for a humane society in the subcontinent. The political evolution of Indo-Pakistani relations after the Simla Agreement can only be maintained if the re-establishment of diplomatic relations is followed up by guidelines to replace symbols of hostility by realistic and practical goals for co-operative co-existence. Indo-Pakistani problems and the larger problems of the sub-continent will only be aggravated if the perceptions of the decision-makers are shaped by a cynical faith in Clausewitz's ideas which are tenaciously held by military and bureaucratic circles throughout the world. A war between India and Pakistan, even of a short duration, cannot serve as

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10 However, India and Pakistan had re-established diplomatic relations in January 1976. Thus followed the last provision of the Simla Agreement.
a continuation of politics by other means. It is a pity that most studies of Indo-Pakistani hostilities have been written against a background which utterly ignores the broader view of peace and conflict issues developed by peace research and conflict resolution studies.

David E. Lilienthal had, as early as 1951, pointed to the basic character of peacelessness or hostility between India and Pakistan:

It is my own conviction that the controversy over Kashmir has been so heated that the real issue between India and Pakistan has largely been lost sight of. The real issue is not the plebiscite, but how best to prevent war between Pakistan and India; how best to promote and insure peace and a sense of community in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

The practical procedure in my judgement should be not the adjudicating of a dispute between two enemies, whether before the World Court or a board of arbitrators but the setting up of proper living conditions between brothers in the same household. Two people once united are now separated by extraneous things. The natural bounds uniting them are still far greater than the artificial barriers separating them.


In this book Ravi concludes that even a fourth round between India and Pakistan would not resolve their problems and neither it is in the interest of either of them. And hence indirectly suggests both the neighbours to make use of peace diplomacy in resolving their conflicts and controversies. Thus making the subcontinent a peaceful and co-operative region.

12 Colliers, 4 August 1951.
It required eight years of negotiations after Lilienthal wrote his article for the Indus-Waters Treaty to be accomplished. The process by which ideas promoted by peace and conflict resolution theory became practical proposal at the political and diplomatic level was long and tortuous. The thrust towards conflict in the subcontinent is multidimensional in nature and problem-solving is made more difficult by the persistence of parochial and outmoded tendencies, even among specialists on international relations. Johan Galtung has given a definition of the positive concept of peace through social justice.\textsuperscript{13} There is no reason why permanent tension should prevail in Indo-Pakistani relations especially as the postulates of tolerance and mutual goodwill prevail in the largest sections of the population of the two countries in spite of the scars left by partition.\textsuperscript{14} The Simla Agreement could therefore be a real turning-point provided there is bold reflection on its peace-building ethos by political leaders, diplomats and scholars, both in India

\textsuperscript{13} Sugata Das Gupta and Radhakrishna, \textit{Peace Research for Peace Action} (New Delhi, 1972), pp. 24 and 32.

\textsuperscript{14} This conclusion has drawn after conducting thorough consultations with a wide cross-section of Indian and Pakistani (during study trip to that country) societies. Further see,

Satis Kumar, \textit{The New Pakistan} (New Delhi, 1978).
and Pakistan. There is a vital obligation to look upon it as not only an instrument of legal issues but as a social instrument of popular education of peace and conflict resolution. The Rumanian scholar Pavel Apostol has suggested the following concept of peace education through a complex communication pattern and which would appear to be eminently applicable to India and Pakistan in the post-Simla phase for the attainment of enduring peace and to initiate the process of peaceful co-existence and co-operative accommodation.

Peace education has to employ not simply on certain type of human communication, but an integrative synthetic, holistic, synergetic type of communication, there is to say total or comprehensive communication. 15

It goes without saying that the Simla Agreement cannot be productive of lasting results if the old illusions are sought to be preserved. Its implementation in the true sense is only possible with a new dimension of political and economic actions and inter-societal communications. Peace pacts often carry seeds of future conflict if they do not help in the creation of an alternative model of political, economic and social relations. This means in the case of India and Pakistan a peace system has to be created in such a manner that the two countries should be able to give up their perceptions of each other as antagonistic and hostile

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neighbours.

(1) The logic of political and military elimination of an opponent is no longer a realistic way of assessing either Indian or Pakistani policies. 16 The military metaphysic is both meaningless and dangerous and the Simla Agreement is based on a standard of rationality which requires changes in the self-image of the two military establishments. Ironically, Pakistan which had all along been opposing a no-war pact, 17 may find it both natural and necessary to interpret the Simla Agreement in terms which may in practice amount to the acceptance of the doctrine of a no-war declaration. 18 In 1977,

16 F.S. Northedge, ed., The Use of Force in International Relations (New York, 1974).

17 However, Pakistan changed its negative perception on this issue and in September 1981 it proposed to India such a pact. Since then a considerable home work has been done by both countries in the direction of its conclusion and in due course of time it will be signed.

18 A.J. Dastur, "The Simla Agreement : Portent or Prelude?", Quest (Bombay), vol. 78, no. 1, September-October 1972, pp. 63-66;

Dilip Mukerjee, "Pakistan's New Mood : Wide Support for Simla Accord", Times of India (New Delhi), 8 July 1972, pp. 3-5;

K. Pattanayak, "The Simla Pact as a Focus of Foreign and International Politics", Mankind (Calcutta), vol. 16, no. 1, August-October 1972, pp. 34-41; and personally in his interviews and press conferences late Z.A. Bhutto categorically highlighted this point.
the Janata Government in New Delhi and military administration in Islamabad recognised the importance of fulfilling the mutual obligations under the Simla Agreement as a way of promoting a relaxation of tensions at the time of political changes. The Simla Agreement framework has directly helped to avoid the application of offensive military and political strategies, and both sides have to weigh the advantages of the confidence-building psyche of the Simla Agreement against the dubious effects of new positions of strength and other tempting propositions.

(2) The Simla Agreement envisages growing co-operation between the two countries and enables them to achieve what may be called a community relationship. To quote David E. Lilienthal again: "The real issue is not the plebiscite, but how best to prevent war between Pakistan and India; how best to promote and insure peace and a sense of community in the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent." 20

The Simla negotiations involved a process of genuine rethinking away from rigidly adumbrated positions. It resulted in a set of understandings which has to be continuously widened through diplomatic and other relationships. While safeguarding their separate national existence both India and Pakistan have accepted the task of narrowing the gap which

19 Atal Behari Vajpayee, New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1979).
20 Colliers, op. cit., n. 12.
was created by negative developments over the years.

(3) The Simla Agreement provides realisable hopes for economic relations between India and Pakistan. The signing of the Trade Protocol on November 1974 was a pointer to the Trade Agreement of January 1975. A spirit of give-and-take and live-and-let live is necessary, especially since Pakistan has reservations about Indian private trade. The removal of the outright ban on private trade however shows that suspicions can be overcome. It is not in terms of individual items but with regard to the implications of the entire process of economic relations that we can see the basis for competitive co-existence. The ability and willingness of New Delhi and Islamabad to act in concert over North-South issues has definitely been strengthened by the Simla Agreement.

(4) When the hostilities ended, Pakistan found itself compelled to address the whole world about the alleged Indian design of territorial expansion and imperialism. It goes without saying that while safeguarding its strategic position, India showed scrupulous regard for Pakistani

21 Sreedhar, "India-Pakistan Trade Problems and Prospects", India Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 3, July-September 1975, pp. 233-48; and

sovereignty. Indian policy was thus calculated to assist a
more sober assessment of the new possibilities of equili-
brum between the two countries. It is unmistakably clear
that India recognises Pakistan's freedom to make its own
political decisions, and through patient negotiations Pakistan
was able to safeguard its interests bilaterally rather than by
invoking the threat of Indian imperialism.

(5) The military aid from United States had injected a
new element into the situation in Pakistan which was perceived
as a threat to its vital interests by India. The efforts to
create an identity between Pakistani interests and the
"Free World" have failed. The trauma of the 1971 war led
Pakistan again to seek military help from abroad. However,
there can be no return to the position of the 1950s. No one
can succumb to the absurd claim that Pakistan can balance
India. 22 Military aid to Pakistan is of course a matter of
continuing interest to India, 23 and its sharp reaction is more

22 "Gen. Zia's interview to an Indian Journalist", Sunday
(Calcutta), vol. 9, Issue 52, 13-19 June 1982, p. 19;

Even among most of the Indian military analysts have
consensus on this point but at the same time precau-
tionary steps on the part of Indian administration
was suggested.

23 India, Rajya Sabha, Discussion on Resumption of US Arms
Supply to Pakistan, 25 February 1975 - Debate, vol. 91,
no. 7, cols. 245-55;

India, Foreign Minister's (Y.B. Chavan), Statement
in Rajya Sabha on US Arms Supplies to Pakistan,
March 1975; pp. 97-103.

Ravi Rikhye, "Pakistan re-armed", Armed Forces Journal
(New Delhi), vol. 115, no. 5, January 1976, pp. 12-13;
a process of diplomatic bargaining. But it is clear that sober and national decision-makers whether in Washington, Beijing or the Muslim world capitals cannot repose much confidence in the supply of modern weapons and equipment to Islamabad as the answer to regional security. The overriding importance of the Simla Agreement is precisely that it was able to remove for nearly a decade the illusions or fears which were generated by advocates of the militarization of Pakistan as a contribution to stability in South Asia.

(6) The bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan did not provide much scope to the outside powers like United States, Soviet Union or China to directly affect the peace-making and confidence-building task. This has resulted in creating a new psychological climate in the subcontinent which is likely to endure. There is now a pronounced desire on the part of the outside powers not to openly take sides with New Delhi or Islamabad so as to widen their options. China, of course, continues to express in very general terms support for Islamabad but for a long time this has not been


anything more than propagandist noise.\(^{26}\) If this trend continues it would enable both New Delhi and Islamabad to maintain relaxed attitudes and cope with new problems in a genuine spirit of mutual confidence.

(7) The Simla Agreement prevented a loss of face to Pakistan and can therefore be regarded as an act of long-sightedness and statesmanship on the part of India. The problems confronting the politicians and the military elites in Pakistan are highly complex. The Simla Agreement can be regarded as a declaration of self-restraint by India against converting its military superiority into narrow political advantage. As far as the internal politics of Pakistan is concerned it is not predictable. In the case of India also the Emergency showed that we have to take into account the possibility of breakdown of the democratic order. The Simla Agreement has in a sense institutionalised peace between the two countries irrespective of internal developments. In the ultimate analysis, however, it must be remembered that to have long range policies of peace and co-operation it is necessary to make real progress towards social justice to affirm the oneness of all mankind and to establish the

\(^{26}\) Particularly China's positive response to normalize relations with India during the Janata Government's period (including talks on border dispute) is the plus factor in this regard. However, even the present regime's call for normalization with China gained positive response by Beijing.
"community relationship" in David E. Lilienthal's terminology, between India and Pakistan.

(8) The Simla spirit can be used for constructive purposes, for example, to develop common ideas on disarmament. A review of Pakistan's reactions to the testing of an Indian nuclear device on 18 May 1974 shows that profound suspicions exist of India's nuclear policy. The Pakistani scientist and Nobel Laureate Professor Abdus Salam reacted in the following manner at the Pughwash Conference in the same year:

Thus India's capability for peace or war is confined to the plutonium technology's kiloton range ... it will not extend to uranium and hydrogen technology's range of megatons, as for example China's does. With a ratio of 1000 to 1 in hypothetical destructive power, Indian plutonium capability certainly cannot be considered as a response, in any foreseeable future, to the Chinese far less as a response to any of the other Big Powers. But even after conceding this, what about a kiloton capability in the context of small powers and particularly in the context of our own subcontinent? As I said before Pakistan's borders are just 70 miles away from the site of Indian explosion. And then Pakistan and India have fought three wars in 25 years, in one of which Pakistan was dismembered into halves. No wonder the public opinion in Pakistan was in a state of extreme shock when they heard of the explosion on 18 May. 27

It is quite evident that Professor Abdus Salam has identified one of the crucial problems that would concern the development of future relations. At the same time, there are

good possibilities of reducing mutual suspicions. In fact, the Indian Government has time and again affirmed its determination not to use nuclear technology for military purposes.

The founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah himself pointed out: "I do envisage an alliance, pact or treaty between Pakistan and India in the mutual interest of both and against any aggressive outsider." 28

We have examined in the preceding pages the concatenation of pressures under which India and Pakistan were unable to avoid the emergence of conflict. The arguments and lengthy exposition of writers like Sisir Gupta for example on the Kashmir question 29 or Arif Hussain on Pakistani ideology 30 could not add up to long range goals for political actions since they failed to seek for new phenomena in reality. Peace Research and Conflict Resolution literature offers a warning against the inherent propensities of such formalistic research. In an environment of lack of a peace-oriented theoretical framework, these studies were unable to derive general principles of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. If the Simla agreement is not to be dismissed as simply a case of political opportunism, then it is necessary to make a case study not merely in a legal way


but in relation to the logical developments between the past, present and future. It is admitted that India and Pakistan still harbour resentments against each other but the inherent logic of the Simla Agreement is that both sides have found a practicable solution to the largest spectrum of disputes between them.  

Further, in the light of genuine internal processes in both India and Pakistan the potential of Kashmir dispute to disrupt relations between the two countries has been strictly limited. It is of course possible that some sudden event may tip the scale again in the direction of war psychosis. It is however, more important to develop a typology of Indo-Pakistani conflicts and to study Kashmir as a direct field of Indo-Pakistani experience. There is empirical data to suggest that Kashmir need not be a barrier to active peaceful co-existence between New Delhi and Islamabad.

For political decision-makers in both countries, the Simla Agreement serves as an index of the peace-building

31 For practical solution of the largest spectrum of disputes in the light of Simla Agreement, between New Delhi and Islamabad, Chapter V: The Normalisation Syndrome: The Post-Simla Phase, in this thesis and issues discussed therein.

capacity of the two states. It helps to give a sense of
direction to Pakistan's search for national identity and it
has given an opportunity to India to show its sense of res­
ponsibility as a power which seek a viable peace system with
its neighbours.

In the area of regional arms control and disarmament
the Simla process moves away from hostile propaganda and
psychological warfare. India and Pakistan on pragmatic
grounds can work together for mutual understanding of enduring
significance. This will of course require a careful analysis
of the political and economic consequences of disarmament
and its positive impact on the developmental activities.

The Simla spirit should not only affect the policy
making elites in the two countries along with the hope for
economic development which can bring benefit to millions, the
forces and ideas generated by the Simla settlement involve the
two societies in the broadest sense. In spite of different
political and ideological patterns the process of peace-making
can proceed on the basis of genuine improvement in communication
channels and economic and social intercourse of two neigh­
bouring societies.

If the Simla Agreement is not to be regarded merely
as change in "diplomatic style", a legitimate question before
us is whether peace should be stable, long-term and in the
interest of general masses or it should be oriented to real
politis, short-term and in the interests of elite groups at
the cost of the general masses.

The answer to this question is that the analysis of real conflict situation points to the lesson that peace must be long-term, enduring and stable and in the interest of general masses, of India and Pakistan irrespective of the hypotheses & conjectures of political elites in power. The main aim of peace should be to end the hostilities and avoid the risk of confrontations and to establish new kinds of linkages at several levels, i.e., political, social, cultural, economic, financial and ideological, etc. etc.

At Simla both the Indian and Pakistani political elites put their seal on a document to end their confrontation and misunderstanding through long-term co-operation and peace and both governments took positive steps to achieve this purpose and particularly Z.A. Bhutto, once the bitter opponent of India, played the role of peace-maker, in the subcontinent and within the short duration of three years resolved all the disputes, both outstanding the those emerged due to 1971 war. However, the present domestic situation in Pakistan is quite difficult to assess and it seems to be unpredictable.33

In these circumstances the significant question is whichever party remains in power, would it follow the

33 Here the thrust is on the immediate phase after the overthrow of Bhutto regime in July 1977. But gradually the Martial Law Regime had strengthened its hold and had lasted for more than five years, which is the usual period for re-alignment in the democratic set-up.
same policy agreed upon, at Simla *vis-a-vis* India.

The possible reply to this question seems to be that for Pakistan (irrespective of whichever party, whether popular political party or Military-Bureaucratic administration remain in power) there is no other alternative other than strictly following the Simla spirit and living in peace with India because it cannot afford war against India. Moreover, the Pakistani elites, either political or military-bureaucratic are well aware of this reality. \(^{34}\) Even if they are interested to take revenge of their convincing defeat in 1971 war, it would take at least a couple of decades to prepare for such action. Thus the future phase more suits for peace and co-operation between India and Pakistan.

Realistically speaking, India and Pakistan are no longer entrenched in an ideological battleground and it would appear to be the right time for both India and Pakistan to concentrate on economic, social and cultural co-operation. Attending to these vital issues will be a surer foundation for stability and progressive change.

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\(^{34}\) President Gen. Zia's interview to an Indian Journalist, *Sunday*, vol. 9, Issue 52, 13-19 June 1982, p. 16; and after discussing in detail with different sections of Pakistani society this result has been drawn.
But the logical question which asserts itself is about how a small country like Pakistan could trust a large country like India?

The reply to this question is that contrary to widely held beliefs in Pakistan, India has convincingly shown that it is not interested in any further dismemberment of Pakistan. Her post-1971 policy vis-a-vis Pakistan has shown that it is not opposed to the existing status quo with Pakistan. However, the following concrete measures and steps both on the part of India and Pakistan would further assist in the process of confidence and trust-building:

1. Strengthening of Pakistan's national security and identity:
   In spite of the turmoil it passed through in 1971-72, the "adversary partnership" with India lead Pakistan to take careful account of the political and diplomatic resources available to it.

2. Realistic behaviour of Indian and Pakistani leadership adopted at Simla after the December 1971 war:
   Similar sort of behaviour should be the permanent phenomena in India-Pakistan relations as it guarantees the stability and peace in the region. And it should recognise that - problem solving system, growth of interdependence, holistic perspectives, are the basic requirement in their day-to-day dealings.
3. Bargaining strategies and moral norms:
   In their mutual accommodative processes notions of justice internal to the subcontinent should be the permanent characteristic.

4. Functionalist Approaches:
   For instance,
   - avoidance of military solutions,
   - trends towards peaceful co-existence,
   should be adopted.

5. Political accommodation and estimation of methods of settlement available in international dealings should characterise their relations.

6. Pragmatic, open and flexible approaches should be the part of their policies.

All these measures would possibly create a long-term impact on South Asian society and would possibly provide a model of peace and co-operation not only between India and Pakistan but in the mutual dealings of other South Asian nations.

Our analysis leads to a somewhat optimistic outlook on the possibilities for the control of conflict behaviour between India and Pakistan following the Simla Agreement. Our main purpose has been to show that peace research and conflict resolution methodology is capable of formulating

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For details see Chapter II, Conflict and Co-operation: Nature and Interaction, under the sub-heading Techniques and Methods for the Management, De-escalation and Resolution of International Conflict.
reasonable hypotheses about the nature of the conflict system prevailing between India and Pakistan and for indicating the likely choices for the control, management, de-escalation or resolution of conflict. We have argued that the Simla Agreement goes to the root of the conflict dynamics in the subcontinent with peace theory which seeks to terminate conflicts and promote active peaceful co-existence.

We can conclude by outlining roughly the contours of the developing peace order between India and Pakistan.

First, the identification of issues at Simla and the operational definitions of Indian and Pakistani national interest do not include dogmatic concepts of an ideological nature. The path is opened to an Indo-Pakistani detente through political and socio-cultural rapprochement without irreversible commitments made on ideological grounds.

Secondly, the Simla Agreement does not ever-emphasise the relationship of peaceful change to the power context of Indo-Pakistani relations. The agreement is not by any stretch of imagination an expression of Indian arrogance of power. It rather depicts India's readiness to compromise and her willingness to co-exist with Pakistan.

Thirdly, the Simla agreement takes into account the long-range domestic requirements of both Indian and Pakistani politics. The Simla spirit in fact, derives its significance not from any exaggerated expectations but from the fact that the constructive work at Simla was done in a realistic
context and the final document reflects accurately the domestic realities in the two countries.

Fourthly, the divergent goals of national security interest were reconciled as far as possible at Simla. Both India and Pakistan will have to devote much thought and effort to strengthen the equitable basis on which their strategic approaches can be regulated. Simla has set an example which should help in overcoming the legacy of suspicion and mistrust in strategic relationships.

Fifthly, in spite of all the ambiguities that remain after Simla, the fact remains that the agreement was an excellent example of "peace diplomacy". It should serve as a precedent to Indian and Pakistani diplomacy for strengthening effective participation in regional and global politics.

Finally, the Simla conference overcomes the conflict strategies in the critical area of economic relationships. Both India and Pakistan have a mutuality of interests in promoting rapid economic growth and the Simla agreement in its economic provisions is the expression of a common will of the two developing countries to gradually increase their economic contacts. The recognition of the role of economic factors will undoubtedly give a forward momentum to the efforts of the two countries to achieve a mature relationship in which the expansion of bilateral contacts proceeds without explosive tensions and conflicts.
Even a writer who uses conceptual framework based on war-making capabilities arrives at a definition of long-range goals from which the present study may not differ, although there cannot be any identification of peace research with studies harnessed to the purpose of defence establishments. The Indian defence analyst Rohit Handa concludes his chapter on "In Search of a New Strategy" in his book *Policy for India's Defence*, in the following words:

As a result in May 1975, both New Delhi and Islamabad remain locked in a vice, and powers other than the neo-imperialists are at the old game of getting India and Pakistan to squeeze their limited resources into preparations against each other while ignoring their true and mutual frontiers, namely the great Asian Powers to the East and North, the oil-rich countries to the West and the traditional opportunities of Europe and North America.

If the neo-imperialist device is dismantled, the subcontinent could look outwards, and not necessarily with greed, towards the lands from which their adventurous and intrepid ancestors descended on India. A whole new horizon for fraternal relations awaits a subcontinent whose conventional armed forces depleted in numbers after the fading away of internal animosity and its periphery under a unified command backed by the nuclear power.

Besides an outward looking subcontinent can, free from the burdensome defence expenditure of one internal front, also devote itself to the major tasks of rehabilitating its economy and checking the suffocating growth of population, which by the year 2000 is expected to pass the intolerable limit of 1000 million in the Indian part alone. 36

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The lesson from the bitter and destructive conflicts in the subcontinent is to avoid judgements of professional strategists without examining the specific aspects of interaction between conflict systems. A strategic thinker like Rohit Handa is obsessed by the need to widen India's nuclear choice. His analysis fails to focus on the gradual erosion of inflexible strategic responses to what were at one time regarded as difficult world issues. Similarly between India and Pakistan, where pacifism may not be practical politics, yet the best way to limit the range and destructiveness of their mutual conflicts is to increase the openness of political debate between the two countries. By speculating on scenarios for use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, it is hardly possible to promote non-provocative or peaceful alternatives. It is only by eliminating the danger of war that India and Pakistan can link themselves to the wider perceptions of regional interests which can indeed provide a check against the exploitation by outside forces.