CHAPTER III

THE CONFLICT AND THE CO-OPERATION SYNDROME: INDIA-Pakistan

An analysis of the post-colonial history of the Indian subcontinent highlights the fact that the two major nation-states in this region -- India and Pakistan -- have had a history of conflictual or antagonistic relations since their inception as autonomous entities. They have experienced various types of conflicts and hostilities. These hostilities and apprehensions led to four armed confrontations and produced unfortunate consequences and left a legacy of unsolved problems. However, at every stage after the war, both of them endeavoured to have normal relations. But their "basic structure of antagonism, threat and deterrence" remained and both had followed policies paradoxes to the era of detente and peaceful co-existence.

I

While both India and Pakistan have made significant contribution to the politics of the undeveloped and developing, Third World nation-states their mutual antagonism, hostility and conflict stand as a classic paradigm of disharmony and lack of confidence in tackling the problems of newly liberated nation-states during and after the era of decolonisation. These two subcontinental countries have been caught up in one or the
other type of conflict since their very inception. Broadly speaking, the conflicts between them can be classified into the following categories:

(i) Political conflicts
(ii) Economic conflicts
(iii) Societal conflicts, and
(iv) Religious or ideological conflicts.

1 For details of these conflicts see,


Russell Brines, Indo-Pakistan Conflict (London, 1968);

B.M. Kaul, Confrontation with Pakistan (New Delhi, 1971);

W.J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York, 1972);

Lars Blinkenberg, India and Pakistan: The History of Unresolved Conflicts (Denmark, 1972);

G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India (Meerut, 1971);

S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London, 1973);

Y.K. Gankovsky and L.K. Gordonpolouskaya, History of Pakistan (Moscow, 1964);

V.B. Kulkarni, India and Pakistan: A Historical Survey of Hindu-Muslim Relations (Bombay, 1973);

Norman D. Palmer, "Pakistan: The Long Search for Foreign Policy", in Lawrence Ziring and others, eds., Pakistan: The Long View (Duke, 1977); and

(i) Political Conflicts

Broadly speaking political conflicts can be categorised into two types, i.e. (a) Demarcation disputes, and (b) Accession disputes.

(a) Demarcation Disputes

The principal examples of demarcation disputes were Radcliffe and Bagge awards in the eastern region and Chak Ladheke; Teh-Saria Marja; Hussainiwala; Suleimanka Head Works; Kutch-Sind; Chchad Bet; Thar Parkar, Lahore-Amritsar border in the Western Wing. 2

(b) Accession Disputes

Disputes over Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. However, among these the dispute over Kashmir 3 has been the

2 S.M. Burke, op. cit., pp. 11-15.
3 Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Bombay, 1967);
G.L. Kaul, Kashmir: Then and Now (Srinagar, 1972);
P.L. Lakhanpal, Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute (New Delhi, 1968);
Alastair Lamb, The Kashmir Problem (New York, 1966);
----------, Crisis in Kashmir: 1947-1966 (London, 1966);
Pakistan, White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir Dispute (Islamabad, 1977);
----------, Kashmir Papers: Collection of Documents (Islamabad, 1968-1978);
B.N. Mullik, Kashmir: My Years with Nehru: Chinese Betrayal (New Delhi, 1977);
K.K. Misra, Kashmir and India's Foreign Policy (Allahabad, 1979); and
most prolonged and intractable and this is the main hurdle in the way of co-operative understanding and mutual confidence-building between India and Pakistan.

(ii) Economic Conflicts

An analysis of the course of Indo-Pakistani relations indicates that they have had conflictual economic relations chiefly on the following questions:

(a) Sharing of cash balances and exchange of currency
(b) Sharing of Army and Civil Service personnel
(c) Distribution of military equipments
(d) Evacuee property settlements,4 and
(e) Indus Waters dispute.5

(iii) Societal Conflicts

It is the significant characteristic of Indian history that the two major communities in this region, the Hindus and the Muslims, have had centuries of brotherly and

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Niranjan D. Gulhati, Indus-Water Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation (Bombay, 1973);

G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., n. 4, pp. 120-29.

David E. Lihenthal, This I do Believe (New York, 1949).
friendly relations. However, after the downfall of the Mughal Empire their relations deteriorated and in the subsequent years the government of British India further aggravated their differences by promoting the policy of "divide and rule". The ultimate consequence was the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, and this partition had created complicated problems such as:

(a) Rehabilitation of refugees
(b) Communal riots, and
(c) Minority protection.  

(iv) Religious or Ideological Conflicts

India is a land of many religions, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, Islam and Christianity. Islam entered India in the seventh century and was accepted as a mass religion by the eleventh century.  

From the very day of their independence and autonomy both India and Pakistan have had religious conflicts, as the very principle of partition of British India was "religion-oriented" (i.e. based on the concept of "two-nation theory" or "Pan-Islamism" - with special reference

6 V.B. Kulkarni, India and Pakistan: A Historical Survey of Hindu-Muslim Relations (New Delhi, 1960); and
M.R.A. Baig, The Muslim Dilemmas in India (New Delhi, 1974).

to the Indian Subcontinent). Pakistan declared "pan-Islamism" as its ideology and India "Socialism-secularism and non-alignment". Thus the outcome of these extremely antagonistic and controversial ideologies, was that within

8 Arif Hussain, op. cit.

Richard Week, Pan-Islamism and Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Columbia University, 1954);


Khalid Javed Makhdoom, Pakistan: Domestic Politics and Its Impact on Foreign Policy, 1947-60 (Karachi, 1976), i/f.

9 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi, 1961);

K. Raman Pillai, India's Foreign Policy: Basic Issues and Political Attitudes (Meerut, 1969);

K.P. Misra, ed., Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1969);

Deva Narayan Mallick, Development of Non-alignment in India's Foreign Policy (Allahabad, 1967);

M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Relations During the Nehru Era: Some Studies (Bombay, 1976);

J. Bandyopadhyaya, Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants Institutions Processes and Personalities (Bombay, 1980), pp. 312-17;

A.P. Rana, Imperatives of Non-alignment: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in Nehru Period (Delhi, 1976);

M.S. Rajan, Non-alignment: India and the Future (Mysore, 1976); and

A. Appadorai, "Understanding Indian Foreign Policy", International Relations (London), vol. 2, no. 2, April 1965, pp. 175-84.
the short duration of their separate existence, they have fought four armed conflicts and millions of nationals on both sides were massacred mercilessly. 10

In the light of the above analysis of conflict between India and Pakistan the question logically arises as to the reason why India and Pakistan fight or overreact to provocations from the other side?

A tentative answer to the question may be as follows:

1. The normal avenues of diplomacy seem to be inadequate - for illustration, every time both the countries negotiate, they produced a new disturbance in their relations. Why?

A general review of Indo-Pakistani relations in the historical prospective indicates that the above-mentioned phenomena persist due to lack of confidence and trust in each other; apprehensions about each other's security; the intention to maintain "mirror images" at almost all levels of relationship; an intention to maintain separate political, socio-cultural and ideological identities, and an intention

10 The present study mainly covers the period 1972-1978, following the disintegration and dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as an autonomous and sovereign entity in South Asia. The study of the origin of Pakistan, its establishment after the partition of British India and the post-Partition analysis of Indo-Pakistani relations, 1947-1971, has not been dealt with, save very briefly, here and there, when the context demanded it. Moreover, it is the study of Indo-Pakistani relations (1972-78) within the framework of the theories of conflict and co-operation and its relevance in international politics in general and Indo-Pakistani relations in particular.
to maintain political, economic and military parity.

2. Misperceptions about certain issues in the communication pattern between the two neighbours—this is purely due to lack of free and fair flow of communication, misinterpretation of information, and wrong propaganda. Moreover, the academics or intellectuals in both the countries do not project new perceptions and new structure so as to highlight the necessity of permanent acceptance of the existing status quo in the Indian subcontinent.

3. Zero-sum approach to South Asian politics leads to de-stabilization of the regional environment.

4. Dependency links on the super-powers—decision-making behaviour in India and Pakistan during crises is affected by the definitions and perspectives of the super-powers.

II

The domestic political situation in Pakistan gradually deteriorated in the last phase of President Ayub Khan's administration. Thus once again political

   From Crisis to Crisis, 1962-69 (London, 1972);
Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Pakistan: At the Cross Roads* (Karachi, 1969);
Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan* (New Delhi, 1978);
Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York, 1972);
instability surfaced on the Pakistan's political scenario and this trend continued after his downfall in March 1969, because of his successor President Yahya Khan's lack of administrative capability, his collaboration with Z.A. Bhutto to suppress Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his lack of faith on Sheikh, the elected leader of the Awami League (in the eastern wing). General Yahya Khan failed to maintain an equitable or symmetrical relationship between the eastern and the western wings of Pakistan and peremptorily turned down Mujib's demand for regional autonomy for the eastern wing within the confederation of Pakistan, which ultimately generated a lot of mistrust among the Bengalis towards President Yahya and his policies. 12

This feeling of mistrust and apprehension further deepend after the 1971 General Election. And the ultimate military action in the eastern wing led to the bifurcation of the country, with the emergence of eastern wing as an autonomous entity and sovereignly—Bangladesh.

N.C. Sahni, Political Struggle in Pakistan (Jullunder, 1971);
Ian Stephens, Pakistan old Country, New Nation (Harmondsworth, 1972); and

12 Rounaq Jahan, op. cit.
These political developments and disturbances in Pakistan (1969-71) had a direct impact over India's relations with Pakistan. This was the phase where in both New Delhi and Islamabad experienced the peak of their hostility and conflictual relations, and it continued till the eve of the Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972.

The Bangladesh crisis of 1971 substantially altered the political structure of the Indian subcontinent with the emergence of another independent nation-state. Simultaneously the nature of social and economic relations in this region also altered with the demolition of the "two-nation

13 For details of the disturbances, see Robert Laporte, Jr., Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan (New Delhi, 1976).

14 See for detailed developments,


B.G. Verghese, End to Confrontation: Bhutto's Pakistan, Restructuring the Subcontinent (New Delhi, 1972);

John W. Mellor, ed., India: A Rising Middle Power (Boulder-Colorado, 1979); and

theory", which was the main principle of division of British India in 1947. It paved the way to the politics of negotiation, dialogue, mutual understanding, mutual confidence-building and mutual co-operation.

At Simla, both New Delhi and Islamabad arrived at a new consensus on the need to start a new phase of relationship based on mutual co-operation and understanding. And they agreed on various provisions to settle their outstanding disputes as well as those arising out of the 1971

15 Stephen P. Cohen touched on this point that there is a widespread belief (especially in India) that the loss of east Pakistan dealt a death-blow to the idea of Muslim separatism and communal policies in the subcontinent. If Pakistan could not hold together, and if a newly created Bangladesh could have close relations with India, then the "two-nation" theory does not make sense. Indeed, Pakistan's raison d'etre as a Muslim homeland had disappeared and it could (shorn of medieval notions of a religious state) move closer in ideology and policy to secular India.


E.L. Tepper, "The New Pakistan: Problems and Prospects", Pacific Affairs (Vancouver, UBC), vol. 47, no. 1, Spring 1974, pp. 56-58; and


16 Mohammad Ayoob, "India, Pakistan: Prospects for Detente", Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol. 8, no. 1, October 1976, pp. 149-69.
crisis, through bilateral discussion and consultations.

After the Simla Summit, both New Delhi and Islamabad made consistent endeavours to neutralise their traditional conflictual relationship through such steps as repatriation of POWs, return of occupied territory, resumption of railway links, resumption of trade links, free exchange of nationals on either side of the border and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.

These steps were further followed by socio-cultural exchange. However, the Kashmir issue is still a continuing dispute between New Delhi and Islamabad. But both have recognised that the inhabitants of this region have the ultimate right to decide about their future. Time alone will show when this dispute will be finally resolved.

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17 See main text of Simla Agreement in appendices; and


18 A.G. Noorani, "Search for New Relationship in the Subcontinent", World Today (London, RIIA), vol. 31, no. 6, June 1975, pp. 240-48; and

Satish Kumar, op. cit.

19 During this scholar's field-trip to Pakistan, possible solution of Kashmir dispute had come under discussion with the policy-makers and a wide cross-section of Pak society. It was observed that the general masses are not heavily involved in this issue. However, on the part of Pakistani policy-makers and military janata it was felt they are for the early solution of this dispute and are cultivating favourable environment for it. It seems the Government of Pakistan tentatively making up its mind to accept the conversion of the actual line of control of 17 December 1971 into a permanent international boundary. Because when this scholar proposed such possible solution to the President of Pakistan Gen. Zia in his meeting with him. Gen. Zia's reply was "may be."
The history of Indo-Pakistani conflictual postures highlights that for many years consensus and compromises were not a conspicuous part of the patterns of policy making. Until the Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972, there was no re-examination of the existing assumptions which could result in modifying the policy priorities and diplomatic-strategic attitudes of India and Pakistan but after the Simla Agreement the pattern had shifted towards bilateral consensus, trust and confidence-building. 20

Theoretically speaking, conflict itself may contribute to the process of integration and may therefore help in the building up of mutual confidence. 21 There are several ways to view the successive crises between India and Pakistan if the analytical emphasis is not exclusively on India's "non-aligned ideology" and Pakistan's "Pan-Islamic ideology", but on inter-system relations and structures and processes, which generate mutually acceptable policies and goals then it is possible to avoid extreme positions. In practice, there have been flexible responses by India and Pakistan and although it has always been a somewhat tenuous patchwork.


The phenomenon of conflict or tension is one of the distinctive features of human interaction and world politics. Conflict is meaningful only when it is eventually resolved and leads to harmony and co-operation. Peaceful co-operation is inevitable for the smooth interaction among the nations. It is conflict and hostility which ultimately leads nations towards harmony and peaceful co-existence. 22

Thus in order to obtain practical results in achieving reconciliation, accommodation, peace-building and co-operation on common objectives between New Delhi and Islamabad, the conflict potential between them has to be assessed with the help of a plurality of concepts. To develop options and to promote accommodation, and reconciliation, critical insight must be obtained into both constructive and destructive processes in the behaviour pattern of India and Pakistan. In order to formulate a realistic peace policy for either of the two countries, subjective perceptions of reality should be avoided.

The area of study for promoting measures towards accommodation and co-operation between India and Pakistan have therefore to be structured deliberately to avoid any distorted conception of reality, such as those which were formed when national feelings were exacerbated.

III

POST-BANGLADESH CRISES DEVELOPMENTS

The pre-partition political conflict between two major political parties during the freedom struggle -- the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League -- coloured the perception of the policy-makers of India and Pakistan regarding each other's motivations and strategies after their independence. 23 Both these neighbours exaggerated the danger to their national security, as they moved away from compromise, accommodation and reconciliation. 24 Pakistan was worried about her security due to the Indian vision of a United India and the acceptance of partition as a temporary necessity. On the other hand, India was worried about her

23 Shariful-Mugahid, An Study in Interpretation (Karachi, 1976);
Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Mid-Night (New York, 1975);
S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis, 1974);
Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (New York, 1967); and

24 N. Bhaskara Rao, Indo-Pakistan Conflict: Controlled Mass Communication in Inter State Relations (New Delhi, 1971); and
Aziz Beg, Pakistan Faces India (Lahore, 1966).
security due to Pakistan's alliance with the western bloc.

To substantiate this point following statements of few important Indian statesmen are cited here:

No less a personage than Jawaharlal Nehru, in his broadcast on 3 June 1947 said: "it may be that in this way (Partition) we shall reach united India than otherwise". 25 The then President of Indian National Congress, Acharya Kirpalani declared that "neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim for united India". 26 And Sardar Patel, the first Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister of India said: "Sooner than later we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country". 27

Such statements from top-level Indian statesmen created grave doubts among Pakistani ruling elites that India had not reconciled to the partition and desired to undo it whenever an opportunity presented itself. Under such security doubts, Pakistan gradually drifted towards the western imperialist powers and finally concluded military alliances in 1954-55 with them 28 and isolated itself from the mainstream of Asian, African and Arab national movements.

26 Ibid., p. 9.
27 Ibid.
28 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London, 1967);
Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London, 1976);
How the debris of war would be cleared and the structure of peace would be constructed always makes a fascinating study. After the Bangladesh crisis, the Indian subcontinent was engaged in an exercise of this nature and was trying to clear the ruins of the December 1971 war. However, the process was more complicated because of the birth of a third nation-state (Bangladesh) and because of the revolution of rising expectations.

The analysis of Indo-Pakistani relations in the 1950s and 1960s highlights that conflicts, disputes and tensions hindered their relations. However, the political situation in the 1970s was quite different. The question of threat and deterrence to each other's security existed no more. Both had accepted each other's status quo and recognised each other's autonomy and sovereignty. The doubts which Pakistan had about India's design to undo it had proved wrong. After the crisis, India emerged as the ultimate victorious

Z.A. Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi, 1964);
Bilateralism : New Directions (Islamabad, 1973);
S.M. Burke, Mainstrins of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis, 1974).
William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York, 1972); and
M. Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Relations (Karachi, 1951).

nation; yet she never tried to impose a "Carthaginian peace" on Pakistan. On the other hand, she followed equitable and symmetrical policies to settle all her outstanding disputes with Pakistan as also which arose from the 1971 conflict through bilateral negotiations and dialogues.

However, the following elements of commonality between India and Pakistan, plus the national and international developments in the post-1972 phase expected to play the vital and enduring role in the establishment of long-term co-operation between the two neighbours in this sensitive part of the world provided both these neighbours have genuine interest to achieve it within the framework of bilateralism and Simla spirit.

(i) **Sharing of Common Heritage**

By virtue of history, geography and culture both India and Pakistan have much more common than a former political relationship. They have a rich composite history and culture. The constraints of geopolitics bind the two countries together. Neither of them can afford to overlook the limitations of politics dictated by geographical boundaries. The common language (lingufranca), ethics and divided families bind both of them. The real point is that the history of estrangement between them is much shorter than the long standing pattern of interdependence. These inherited characteristics of basic

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30 John W. Mellor, ed., *op. cit.*

social and political patterns cannot be washed out of the existence but demand a new approach which will bring both of them close to an overall cordial and peaceful relationship.

(ii) Altered Geo-political Structure of the Indian Subcontinent

With the emergence of Bangladesh as an autonomous and sovereign nation-state in the subcontinent the map of South Asia has substantially changed and the geographical structure has acquired a new dimension.32

(a) For the first time a victor (India) had clearly emerged, which has led to a short shift in the balance of power between New Delhi and Islamabad. Pakistan was cut to size. Its efforts to claim and attain parity with India were doomed for ever.33 Pakistan lost a big part of its territory which it could not hope to regain easily. India not only come out of the conflict as a ultimate victor but also acquired a position which had been denied to her for a long time by Pakistan and its western allies by creating an artificial


33 Girilal Jain, "India-Pakistan and United States: Need to Re-examine Parity Theory", Times of India 20 December 1972, pp. 2-5.
It is now the strongest power among the countries in South Asia and hence in an enviable position, one commensurate with its size, population and resources. India's peaceful nuclear explosion on 18 May 1974 has further consolidated the natural power structure on the subcontinent, which is now characterized by India's primacy. The power gap between India on the one hand and its regional neighbours on the other is so great that any intra-regional conflict with a purely regional initiative becomes both dysfunctional and redundant. It is perhaps the realisation of this fact which makes a serious American scholar and diplomat to conclude that "for the 1970's, unless there are very many great changes, indeed, South Asia can be considered -- to be zone of peace and when peace prevails, cooperation become irresistible". Today it is an acknowledged fact in the Pakistani perceptions of India's preeminent political and strategic position in the Indian subcontinent. The former Director of Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies wrote recently:

34 See Chapter I, Introduction, n. 54 of this study.
35 Z.A. Bhutto, "His Predicament", Link (New Delhi), vol. 15, no. 33, 25 March 1973, p. 27.

Further late Bhutto had in many of his writings, speeches and interviews highlighted his concern on this point.
The dismemberment of Pakistan has improved the long-term position of India in the subcontinent and consequently in the region.... India is now better able to face China in the North and to deal with its scattered neighbours than at any other time in the past. 36

(b) The second major change was that Pakistan was on the threshold of evolving a viable national identity for itself, because of the failure of "two-nation theory" or "the Pan-Islamic theory". As long as East and West parts of Pakistan were kept together for an uneasy marriage, it was an "ideological state", but with the separation of its two wings, this false identity has disappeared. 37 When Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto assumed power in December 1971, he was faced with almost insurmountable problems of resurrecting the country virtually from the ashes, as he himself recalled it from his death cell. He had to define a new ideological basis for the existence of the "rump" Pakistan. Apart from dealing with certain immediate problems such as securing the release of the prisoners of war, avoiding the trial by Bangladesh of those prisoners of war who were charged with committing war crimes, the problems of Bengalis in Pakistan and the non-Bengalis in Bangladesh, and


recognising Bangladesh and above all putting the national economy back on the rails. 38

(c) The third major change seems to be that India's image as the sole external threat and deterrence to Pakistan's territorial integrity had declined as Pakistan acquired the geo-strategic vitality being the buffer state inter se, Soviet Union, China and India. Hence a strong, united and stable Pakistan is in the security interest of India. 39 And Afghanistan has replaced India more and more as the major perceived threat and deterrence to Pakistan's territorial integrity. 40 This has been so because the main focus of dissent in Pakistan has now shifted to Baluchistan and North West Frontier province (NWFP), from the erstwhile East Pakistan. 41

(d) The fourth major shift was that the external powers since 1947, in pursuance of their several strategic objectives

38 Z.A. Bhutto, If I am Assassinated (New Delhi, 1974).


40 Particularly this has been evident after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the establishment of pro-Soviet Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul.

41 The doubts expressed here had gained real relevance and credibility in the wake of developments in this region, in the post-Soviet intervention phase in Afghanistan and the problems emerged due to it.
exploited the divisive elements in the region and added to the divergence and incompatibility in the world views and strategic perspectives of South Asian states. With the emergence of India as a power of some significance, the position of the external powers in the region would, surely be affected. And the South Asian region itself can no longer be viewed legitimately as a vacuum to be filled by competing great powers for the simple reason that there is already in existence a regional power of considerable strength and influence. This is bound to change the nature of the great power interests and influences in South Asia. 42

(e) Another major change of considerable significance was the transformation in the character and composition of the ruling elites, in Pakistan. For the first time in the two decades an elected leadership had come to power in Pakistan (though once again with the overthrow of Bhutto regime on 5 July 1977, the democratic institutions in Pakistan failed and army consolidated its power) and mutual trust and personal rapport had developed in the Pakistani ruling elites.

(f) New Delhi's action during 1971 crises should not be interpreted as the first step in a broader Indian design to

42 The politico-economic environment prevailed in this part of the world in the post-1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict and the creditable role played by New Delhi in the affairs of South Asian countries in general and the developing and under-developed countries of Third World supports this argument.
absorb either or both wings of the former Pakistan. One might impute such a design if India's military action was viewed against the backdrop of her long-standing argument, that the 1947 partition was a mistake. Yet, for all India's insistence on her secular approach, her keen awareness of the difficulties that the integration of millions of additional Muslims into the Indian polity would involve. Hence it was however, categorically clear that along with the failure of "Two-nation theory or Pan-Islamic theory", the nationals of both Pakistan and Bangladesh will never tolerate any upper-handed attitude by India. The only solution available was that all the three countries have to satisfy with the present status quo and should have genuine interest in maintaining brotherly, friendly and amicable relations within the parameters of bilateral approach and symmetrical relations inter se them.

(III)

PUBLIC OPINION

After the long experience of confrontational and disharmonious relations, a positive desire has observed for

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43 Jagdish Raj, "Indo-Pakistan Relations since 1971 War on Indian View Point", Australian Journal of Politics and History (Brisbane), vol. 20, no. 1, April 1974, pp. 22-31; and

Balraj Madhok, "Battle for Bangladesh is Battle against Two-Nation Theory", Organiser (New Delhi), vol. 25, no. 1, 14 August 1971, pp. 11-12.
a durable and long-standing peace among the nationals of both the neighbours.\textsuperscript{44} Since partition there was no contract between the divided families on either side of the border.\textsuperscript{45} There was heavy public constraints to restore social relations so that when the old generation would vanish from the political scene, the post-independence generation could maintain constructive relations with the other side of the border. Particularly, in Pakistan this had created a major shift in the outlook to seek communication channels to come close to relatives on the

\textsuperscript{44} This conclusion has drawn after carefully conducting interviews with a wide gross-section of Indian and Pakistani (during field-study trip to Pakistan) societies, including policy-maker's, military personnel, academicians, journalists, political elites, businessmen, industrialists, students, labour class, and even a lay man.

\textsuperscript{45} Nayar Kuldip, \textit{Distant Neighbour: A Tale of the Sub-continent} (New Delhi, 1972); and

Indian side and they frankly acknowledged the folly of Indo-Pakistani tensions which had blocked social perspectives.

The number of visas issued both by Pakistan and Indian Governments for the exchange of visit to the nationals of the respective countries in the post-1971 period established the credibility of this argument. For instance the Pakistan Government issued visas to Indian nationals as mentioned below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of visas</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>31,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>56,580</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>68,433</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>82,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 (up to November)</td>
<td>83,982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And the Indian Government issued visas to Pakistani nationals as mentioned below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of visas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>193,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>173,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>173,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 (up to March)</td>
<td>44,916</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are the figures supplied by the Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi and the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, in respective cases.
Many important social groups genuinely anxious and willing to forge a new relationship of peaceful co-operation between the two countries. 47

(IV)

GLOBAL PEACE AND DETENTE

The emergence of Bangladesh and a shift in the geo-strategic environment in the subcontinent had, however, coincided with the following international developments of far-reaching consequences, making it incumbent on all the nations and particularly the developing nations of the Third World, to have a comprehensive understanding of the perceptions underlying the policy moves of super powers, as well as of those powers which desire for this or near equivalent distinction.

(a) The growing response of detente and rapprochement between USA and China, with the possibilities of developing into a relationship of mutual co-operation and accommodation in the world affairs. However, yet the difference of perceptions over Taiwan issue still remained unresolved.

(b) The widening of the gulf between China and the Soviet Union with the possibilities of developing into a relationship of mutual conflict on a world-wide scale.

(c) Sharpening of the conflict between the Soviet Union and USA (neo-cold war) which may further be accelerated

47 The total argument is based on the personal observation and experience of this scholar.
and accentuated with the growing national and international crises and mass movements for radical transformation.

(d) Growing friendship between Soviet Union and India with the possibilities of mutual co-operation in world affairs.

(e) The 1970s marked a great shift in international politics. Multipolarity had replaced bipolarity followed by tripolarity, the SALT talks and the conference on European security and co-operation has enhanced the management of detente and peaceful co-existence. However, the anti-problems remained relating to the non-proliferation treaty, the North-South dialogue, South-South dialogue and a mutual force reduction between NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers and hardly any concrete steps were taken in this direction except the formal negotiations and consultations.

(f) The end of Vietnam war and the new perspectives of peace in West Asia (after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war followed by Camp David Agreement) however, presented new political opportunities in favour of conflict de-escalation, conflict management and conflict resolution. All this suggested a new framework for international relations.48

One has to take into account the indivisibility of these international political developments and processes

and the emergence of Bangladesh and the perceptions about its international repercussions cannot be and should not be identified in isolation from the global context. Similar tendencies appeared in Indo-Pakistani relations.

As early as in 1964, Z.A. Bhutto, then Foreign Minister of Pakistan (addressing the Press Club of Washington) made the following statement about the relevance of peace and co-operation in Asia:

> In order to meet the great challenge of the rising expectations, we need peace. Without peace we really cannot overcome the tremendous task and challenges of poverty. For this reason Pakistan's foreign policy, is committed to friendship and goodwill for its neighbours and in particular for the people of Asia. 49

Thus Bhutto subscribed the principle of "good neighbourly relations" with India and emphasized that peace in the subcontinent is not only in India's interest but equally in Pakistan's.

Then Mrs Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, too, repeated in several speeches the need for peaceful and cordial relations between India and Pakistan. According to her it was to maintain good neighbourly relations with Pakistan as one of the main goals of Indian foreign policy. On many an occasion she stressed the need to conclude a

no-war pact between the two neighbours.\textsuperscript{50}

Thus a strong desire, aspiration and will is:
observered on the part of both India and Pakistan for the
establishment and maintenance of friendly, amicable, cordial
and peaceful relationships. The basic question before any
researcher is about the application of the relevant techniques
for the achievement of these ends and goals.\textsuperscript{51}

Now it has
been acknowledged that in the post-Bangladesh crisis situation
the only relevant instrument needed for the initiation of
peaceful relationship and co-operative understanding between
New Delhi and Islamabad is that both these neighbours should

\begin{itemize}
  \item satisfy with the present \textit{status quo} and mutual confidence
  \item should develop between them. These ends can be achieved only
  \item when India exercises her policies with much confidence and
tolerance against Pakistan, as it is the principal power in
this region.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{50} However, the issue had acquired much importance in the
last few months of 1981 and after a great debate in
both India and Pakistan, ultimately India had given
the positive sign to Pakistan's proposal. And the
Pakistani delegation under the leadership of the
former Foreign Minister of Pakistan Agha Shahi visited
India in the first week of February 1982. This visit
was followed by the Indian foreign secretary to Islamabad
in August 1982. And made possible to manage a stop over
to Gen. Zia during his visit to South East Asian Nations
in the first week of \textbf{November} 1982 in New Delhi to have
a discussion with Mrs Gandhi on this issue. It seems it
is a time taking process and future will only show when
this issue will be permanent settled down.

\textsuperscript{51} Relevant techniques and methods for the management, de-
escalation and resolution of conflict had been discussed
in detail in Chapter II in this thesis under sub-
heading "Techniques and Methods for the Management, De-
escalation and Resolution of International Conflict".
We can come closer to a problem solving approach to Indo-Pakistani conflicts if we remember that the antagonistic goals of Indian and Pakistani national interest have been maximised by a failure to identify some of the elements that have prevented decision-makers on both sides from trying out new genuine options. Much of the conventional analysis of the conflicts in the subcontinent has proceeded on the oversimplified assumption that there are given equilibrium conditions governing Indo-Pakistani conflicts. Speaking in terms of a mathematical representation of the Indo-Pakistani conflict system, most of our conventional authors seem to proceed on the assumption that the set of equations governing these conflicts will remain unchanged. A striking failure in this kind of analysis has been the failure to take into account the operation of the prisoner's dilemma in Indo-Pakistani relations. The clash of interests between the two countries cannot be properly evaluated unless processes which produce disharmonies are fully comprehended. An adequate theoretical approach would have to cover the cases where setbacks in solving conflicts are encountered because there is a stalemate in adopting new strategic or political moves. It is clear that neither India nor Pakistan have gained from the prevalence of high level of tension between them. The desired state of affairs would be the reduction of tensions to a very low and tolerable level. However, for either New Delhi or Islamabad to unilaterally work for
reduction of tension would only intensify political prejudices and lay the decision maker who opted for harmony and conciliation open to the charge of inconsistency. The prisoners' dilemma in the context of India and Pakistan is shown in considering the possible outcomes:

1. India "co-operates" + Pakistan "co-operates".
2. India "co-operates" + Pakistan "defects" or "declines".
3. India "defects" or "declines" + Pakistan "co-operates".
4. India "defects" or "declines" + Pakistan "defects" or "declines".

The crux of the matter is that India and Pakistan tended to develop a crisis of confidence from their inception and hence it was not possible to expect even the minimum of co-ordination of choices in their strategies. If the two sides can develop some effective way of communication as suggested by Pavel Apostol52 with each other and thereby achieve some co-ordination of choices, then the prisoners' dilemma can be overcome. A review of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies, however, shows that both sides have relied on one-sided interpretations of the other side's conflict-orientation. The dilemma in the Indo-Pakistani situation has thus been quite obvious. Since the two sides could not

52 For details see, the quotation in Chapter IV in this thesis, "Significance of Simla Agreement", n. 15.
communicate meaningfully, they proceeded to make choices which could have been improved if both had opted simultaneously for the mutually desirable solution. The so-called rational decision-makers in New Delhi and Islamabad choose to "defect" or "decline" rather than "co-operate". The resulting outcome was (4) above i.e. India "defects" or "declines" + Pakistan "defects" or "declines". This resulted in general deterioration of relations between the two neighbours.

If the influence of prisoners' dilemma had been correctly identified in the conflict system, then theoretical generalizations would have pointed to the need for given up narrow aims of policy and gravitating towards choice (1) above i.e. India "co-operates" + Pakistan "co-operates".

IV

In the initial phases of independence Pakistan's ability to create and use foreign policy options were limited. 53

53 M. Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Policy Relations (Karachi, 1951);
M. Ayub Khan, Friends not Master: A Political Autobiography (London, 1967);
Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London, 1976);
Ahmad L. Sherwani and others, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi, 1964);
S.M. Burke, "Management of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", in Lawrence Ziring and others, eds., Pakistan: The Long View (Duke, 1977);
S. Irtiza Hussain, "Strategic Dimensions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Strategic Studies (Islamabad), vol. 1, no. 1, April-June 1977, pp. 20-25; and
The pressure of the environment, both domestic and external, held the key to the real nature of the initial crises in its relations with India. In an effective conclusion to his article on "Bilateralism - New Directions" Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto called attention to an important element in Pakistan's "learning process" on wider issues of international politics as follows:

In matters of man and state, it is not possible to achieve a formulation which takes into account all variables and unforeseen contingencies. Some element of simplification is unavoidable in the quest for the bases of dealing with complicated questions. "By their fruits, we shall know them". Prior to the adoption of Bilateralism, Pakistan's foreign policy was, at worst, capricious and, at best, one of pragmatism planted on a half forgotten ideology. With the adoption of this principle, Pakistan has steered itself through the treacherous shoals and currents that menace the passage of strategically placed states in the complex contemporary age. Bilateralism has provided a safe chart for this kind of navigation. More importantly, it has helped Pakistan to fulfill, as well as it can, Islamic injunction of integrity in international dealings. The injunction is immutable. 54

Although Z.A. Bhutto did not have the detachment for Pakistani politics that would have enabled him to speak with academic objectivity, his examination of the pronouncements and policies

It was discussed with those days Pakistani policy-makers, like A.K. Brohi, Sajad Haider, Sulman A. Ali, Mian Ziauddin, Begum Ikramullah, Agha Hilaly, Agha Shahi and many others.

54 The Sun, 31 October 1976; and

Z.A. Bhutto, Bilateralism: New Directions (Islamabad, 1973), pp. 31-32
of M.A. Jinnah, President Ayub Khan, Foreign Ministers Zafarullah Khan, Manzur Qadir, and President Yahya Khan, underlined their anomalous position in identifying basic variables defining decisional situations.

While he paid lip service to the founder of Pakistan - "who was not given to exaggeration" - he had repeated without comment the sacrosant view that Jinnah felt constrained to talk of "a well organised and well directed" plot to force Pakistan "to come into the (Indian) Union as a penitent, repentent, erring son" and to that end "to paralyse the new born state". When Bhutto spoke of contradictions which surfaced in Pakistan's relations with the great Powers and with other powers, he was in fact referring to the structures which continuously obstructed the momentum which Pakistani foreign policy could have gained. While he did not analyse the role played by the failure to develop "long-sightedness" in relations with India, Bhutto's analysis of the wide variety of problems faced by Pakistani foreign policy does indeed integrated previously unreconciled approaches and therefore can be used for meaningful judgements on Pakistan-India relations.

Z.A. Bhutto dealt adequately with the "pre-requisite of clean and consistent bilateral relations" but he did not provide a perspective for analysis of inputs which led to inexorable conflict between India and Pakistan.
The principal concept provided by Peace Research is that of a "pathological learning process". Kenneth E. Boulding has clearly stated this cause of an aggressive foreign policy:

perhaps the main reason why conflict in spite of its many generally beneficial effects, is continually tending to get out of hand and to become destructive and malign is that the conduct of a conflict frequently results in a pathological learning process. If somebody hits me on the nose, I learn something, but I am unlikely to learn either long sightedness or scientific method, and I am particularly unlikely to learn how to refine the learning process itself. As conflicts degenerate into violence, they are particularly likely to corrupt the learning process. 55

Mutual confidence cannot be established by following traditional maxims, because even new issues which arise, are compressed into old hostile images, related to the existing matrix of conflict. Kenneth E. Boulding explores how a destructive and malign conflict can be alleviated:

Conflict management, therefore, is something which does not necessarily arise out of the account of conflict itself. It has to be fed into it from outside. That is to say, it is when conflict exists in a social matrix and also an organisational matrix which can lend to a lot of input into the system from outside the parties that it is almost likely to result in constructive learning and bening processes. 56


56 Ibid., p. 246.
If this analysis is correct, it is in one sense ironic that the one Pakistani decision-maker who has correctly perceived Pakistan's shifting balance of influence in the situation vis-a-vis the great Powers has allowed the trauma and frustrations of subcontinental politics to create flows in his reasoning by his reluctance to acknowledge the structural effects of Bilateralism on India-Pakistan relations.

Johan Galtung has provided the structural design for ever increasing positive action and this could be applied to willing co-operation between India and Pakistan. Galtung refers to these structural innovations as "Associative Interaction".

We shall refer to the interaction as associative only if it is in accordance with some basic rules. More particularly it should be: (1) Interdependent or symbiotic, leading to so much interdependence that for one part to hurt the other is to hurt itself, (2) Symmetric, or equitable, being made in such a way that no party gain much more from it than the other; and (3) Institution building or transcendence, building institutions that belong to both parties together, not only to one of them. 57

In addition to the above mentioned Z.A. Bhutto's suggestion for the change of concepts and perception to initiate a new phase of co-operative relationship between India and Pakistan, within the framework of bilateralism, a critical study of Manas Chatterji's model for the resolution of conflict and

improvement of Indo-Pakistani relations have been attempted here. An important case study was attempted by Manas Chatterji in his article "A Model of Resolution of Conflict between India and Pakistan" in his contribution to the Cambridge Conference of 1968 of the Peace Research Society.\(^{58}\) He did not attempt a detailed historical survey but depended on published work dealing with Kashmir, Sino-Indian relations, Indo-Pakistani conflicts, super power relations with India and Pakistan. He focused specially on the geo-political aspects of the Indo-Pakistani conflict:

For example, when we look at the map of the Indian subcontinent, we find that the geographical boundaries of two other major powers, namely, China and Russia, meet the boundaries of India and Pakistan. In considering political relations between India and Pakistan, this factor is of crucial importance. \(^{60}\)

Another concern of the scholar was with "diverse forces that are acting within the contending parties". These related to: (i) Rate of economic growth; (ii) Population growth, and (iii) International peace and stability.

The Chatterji model was concerned with the problem of disarmament, the three factors considered in a Richardsonian

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59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., p. 87.
analysis were: (1) mutual suspicion and mistrust, (2) cost of military expenditure, and (3) grievances.61

In respect of India the assumption was made that there was a two pronged threat from China and Pakistan and India's rate of military expenditure, was dependent on the military expenditure of Pakistan and China taken together in a previous period. The cost of military expenditure for India was reckoned by taking into account the amount of economic development sacrificed by military expenditure and the amount of economic benefit which would have accrued if India and Pakistan were co-operative friends. India's grievances against Pakistan were chiefly the Sino-Pakistani collusion and Pakistan inspired insurgency in North-East Tribal areas of India.62 In respect of Pakistan, the Chatterji model considered the basic problem in Pakistan (in 1968) was feud between East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan. The cost equation for Pakistan included the factor of interregional dissension. As regards grievances, two factors were taken into account: (1) Kashmir problem, and (2) Repression of Muslim minorities in India. Thus response curves were developed for India and Pakistan as an


62 However this particular grievance had lost its credibility after the dismemberment of Pakistan in December 1971.
application of the game theoretical approach to the military expenditure of macro-equilibrium in the subcontinent. Further the main factor of foreign aid from United States and Soviet Union were brought into complete investigation of the dynamic programming problem, on the argument that "the military expenditure in each country equals the maximum amount each country can afford plus the foreign aid".

No specific proposals were made after this exercise in the mathematics of conflict resolution, but the model argued for a strategy which would include the following consideration:

In simple language, the growth path of defence expenditure should be such that at each point of time each country will give "best" response to the other and at the same time keep within its budget. It is interesting to note that if at the time period foreign help from USA and USSR decreases very much, or if these countries co-operate in seeing peace in the Indian subcontinent, or say in a particular year excessive population or low GNP or both force the governments to slow down defence expenditures, the value of B1 and B2 (termed as decision parameters for growth of military expenditure) will be restricted.

The quantitative analysis given by Manas Chatterji gives a framework for the understanding of decisional outcomes of escalation which was evident in Indo-Pakistani relations. Unfortunately Chatterji did not seriously envisage the possibility of processes which moved the world towards detente.

and also the decisional stages which changed the dynamics of the Indo-Pakistani conflict by increasing the socio-political significance of peace-building functions. Some criteria which do not find a place in the Chatterji model are the following:

1. A realistic model of resolution of conflict between India and Pakistan should examine not only the geopolitical aspects but should examine the social, economic, political elements, so that the study takes into account all the evidence in favour of peace-building operations.

2. The examination of the prisoners' dilemma points to the need to define clearly the priority of confidence-building measures in Indo-Pakistani relations. In the light of experience which creates mutual confidence, both


In this article a study had been conducted by the above mentioned authors about two neighbouring countries, who fought wars and had conflictual relations with each other (Egypt and Israel). But ultimately both decided to live in peace. In this article emphasis had been made on the economic transactions and their impact for the welfare of producers and consumers of two countries and their efforts for the attainment of peace. However, this study had been conducted with special reference to Egypt-Israeli peace plan. But suggestions given by them has much more relevance for the attainment of Indo-Pakistani peace. Through the application of this hypothetical study on bilateral economic transaction India and Pakistan could also be benefited.
countries can create better communications and thereby co-ordinate their choices of strategy.

3. The model should not rule out the feasibility of co-operative relationships developing between India and China. Conversely the role and limitations of the Sino-Pakistani relationship should be objectively determined.

4. The role of new initiatives and ideas regarding an issue like Kashmir should be examined more carefully. The model should not be dogmatic about the scope and intensity in relation to conflict dynamics of the Kashmir issue.

5. The response curves for India and Pakistan cannot be determined mechanistically. Conclusions about military expenditures cannot be drawn in isolation from the general political and diplomatic trends.

6. The model should not over-emphasize the operations of the superpowers and China in the subcontinent. The role of foreign aid may be crucial in certain cases. But as big human communities both India and Pakistan can define their goals through a proper assessment of the costs of their political policies. The socio-political aspects should not be ignored in favour of the strategic equations between the super powers.

7. Specific proposals for conflict resolution can be advanced by understanding the socio-political objectives of India and Pakistan considered separately and also as
participants in a common peaceful co-existence. A positive view of co-existence requires outlining of areas for high priority action by India and Pakistan without waiting for what outside powers will agree to do or abstain from doing.

We have enough evidence at our disposal to suggest that India and Pakistan themselves can achieve a much higher degree of realistic assessments for the possibilities for co-existence and peaceful competition. The rationale of peace between India and Pakistan is therefore related to an intrinsic logic for overcoming conflicts which are obsolete politically as well as economically and technologically.

There remain formidable obstacles to peace between Indians and Pakistanis but the experience of three decades clearly points to the lesson that both countries can enhance their capacity to influence events by working for a stable and lasting peace between them. Conflict analysis and peace research can make a lasting contribution to the construction of peace at national, regional and transnational levels and this should therefore become a major area of interest among Indian and Pakistani scholars, diplomats and statesmen.

V

The literature of the history of conflict between India and Pakistan makes it clear that consensus and compromises were not a conspicuous part of the patterns of policy-making.
Until the Simla Conference of 2 July 1972, there was no re-examination of the existing assumptions which could result in modifying the policy priorities and diplomatic-strategic attitudes of India and Pakistan. The significant historical and contemporary factors can be considered under the following headings, in order to give careful consideration to the future prospects of peace-building ethos and co-operative co-existence between New Delhi and Islamabad.

1. Separatism

There are ample reasons to understand the policy paradoxes faced by Indian and Pakistani decision-makers in terms of the character of "separatism" which shaped the development of conflict before and after partition. It is however equally clear that both India and Pakistan have also employed realistic and flexible policies with a high degree of co-operation, for example, the arrangement under the "Indus Waters Treaty". The weight of evidence does not indicate that separatism always produces malign conflicts. If we take the historical situations in Europe after the Second World War we come across examples of vigorous action for economic and political co-operation even among those plagued by a much higher degree of
The establishment of a peace system is consistent with different political goals provided co-operative co-existence can be achieved along with control of violence.

Willy Brandt, *A Peace Policy for Europe* (London, 1969);

P.P. Cherkasov and others, *European Security and Co-operation Premises, Problems, Prospects* (Moscow, 1978);

Richard Mayne, *Recovery of Europe from Devastation to Unity* (London, 1970);

E. Lipson, *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London, 1972), edn. 8;

Max Beloff, *Europe and Europeans: An International Discussion* (London, 1957);

Hodges Michael, ed., *European Integration: Selected Readings* (Harmondsworth, 1972);


Josef Korbel, *Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary* (Princeton, 1972);

Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration* (London, 1973);

Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question: Theories of Regional, International Integration* (London, 1974); and

2. **Interdependence**

A careful study of many factors involved in political, economic and social relationships between India and Pakistan show that the long-term interests of both countries can be achieved by expanding the area of co-operation and acknowledging the importance of inter-dependence. It would only compound errors of the past to imagine that India and Pakistan can confront each other like two fortresses. Whatever trials of strength have taken place they have not proved that ties of common human existence between the two countries can be destroyed. Military and political settlements cannot therefore ignore that the vital inter-dependence of India and Pakistan derives from the fact of geography and history.

3. **Exploitative Relationship**

The absence of the elements of co-operation, co-ordination, mutual understanding and mutual confidence-building between India and Pakistan had had the result of outside parties exploiting the social and political crises in the subcontinent. The standards and systems imposed

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66 G.W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers* (New York, 1975);

M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly, eds., *Great Power Relations, World Order and Third World* (New Delhi, 1981);

by external political actors on India and Pakistan tend to be of an exploitative nature, when the mutual conflict between them is a standing invitation for external intervention. A bilaterally negotiated peace between India and Pakistan is the best guarantee of preventing over involvement of third power.

4. Political Rationality

Conflict between India and Pakistan has often broken out, as it was, as a result of a "chain-reaction". In the case of the open hostilities there was a clear "gambling" attitude on the part of the Pakistani side thus showing that there was no implicit assumption of rationality. If India and Pakistan want to take their destinies in their own hands in accordance with the norms of political rationality, then the experience shows that the task of diplomacy and foreign policy should lie in the termination of crisis as speedily as possible by initiating discussions and negotiations and demarcating the main areas of co-operation.

Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India-Pakistan and Bangladesh (London, 1978);
Syed Anwar Hussain, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of the Entente Cordiale (London, 1974);
Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London, 1976);
Assad Homayoun, Pakistan-China Relations up to 1970 (London, 1972); and
5. Symbolic Actions

Both the neighbours -- India and Pakistan -- need to review the premises and hypothesis on which many of their symbolic actions are based in order to safeguard against conflict escalation. Peaceful co-existence requires new communication channels and the language of threats and propagandistic approach has to be given up. To replace the existing structure of threat, antagonism and deterrence and to adopt bilateral negotiations the two countries have to deliberately find new bases for accommodation. Here symbolic actions of generosity and goodwill are important for ending periods of tension. Even token co-operation is significant as it helps to create a climate of peace and to reduce the dangerous kinds of rivalries and tensions.

6. Strategic Measures

The military decision-makers view their problems primarily in terms of the need to bolster their own security. India and Pakistan work under the same pressures to build up armaments.

Observers agree that the special relations between

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67 Anatol Rapoport, Conflict in Man-Made Environment (Harmondsworth, 1974), pp. 52-63.

68 However to mention them:

Robert Jackson, Zubeida Mustafa, G.W. Choudhury, Syed Anwar Hussain, Harish Kapoor and others. This point has further discussed in-depth in the Sixth Chapter: "External Political and Strategic Constraints", part IV, of this thesis.
China and Pakistan does not irrevocably affect the long-term development of Sino-Indian relations. Beijing has time and again shown a flexible attitude towards countries with whom she had misunderstandings. The Pakistanis find themselves in the awkward position of claiming that maximal objectives are realised by their special relationship with China, whereas Beijing always gives the impression that the Chinese are working for minimal objectives, which rules out serious military involvement against India in the future.69

In the reassessment of its vital national interests, Beijing does not want to drive the Indians into completely identifying themselves with the Soviet strategic conceptions. India's refusal to fall in line with the Soviet requirements of Asian collective security has reversed the logic which the Chinese were earlier applying to New Delhi.70

A major military confrontation between India and Pakistan can only result in increasing internal strains and pressures in both countries. The range of options of both countries are limited during escalation of conflict. Whatever

69 Latif Ahmad Sherwani, India, China and Pakistan (Karachi, 1967); and

Syed Anwar Hussain, op. cit.

70 Z.K. Brezezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York, 1975);

A.G. Noorani, Brezhnev Plan for Asian Security: Russia in Asia (Bombay, 1976); and

strategic measures India and Pakistan take against each other they cannot lower the cost of military conflict. This realisation should lead the decision-makers to overrule their strategic experts whenever it is possible through compromise, bargaining and mutual accommodation to reduce their over-extended commitments, suitably modify their political aims, and above all strengthen the internal cohesion of the Indian and Pakistani economic systems.

7. Leadership Problems in India and Pakistan

If the principle of symmetry is to be applied towards the creative solution of political, economic, societal and religious conflicts, a certain maturity of consciousness in the subcontinent must crystallize into opportunities for the leadership in the two countries. Leadership problems in war politics are different from those in peace politics. The influence of the Kashmir problem on Pakistani politics is on the decline according to most observers. Similarly, in India, the ultra nationalist party, the Jana Sangha, had merged in the wider combination of the Janata Party (even after the failure of the Janata Party as a national alternative to the Congress (I) and its disintegration into different small groups, it has been observed that there is a

71 During this scholar's visit to Pakistan (while discussing with most of the policy makers) this point has specifically been noted. And the other observers, like Robert Jackson, Mohammad Ayoob, Satish Kumar, Lawrence Ziring, and A.G. Noorani too agreed on it.
major change in the Jana Sangha ideology and it has emerged as more a nationalistic party then what it was before its merger with the Janata Party (in 1977) and there is a significant change in the anti-Pakistan rhetoric of leaders like A.B. Vajpayee. The instruments of economic and social policy are becoming more important in both the countries, and this will encourage a critical approach to old structures of political and military conflict. Instead of politics based on a fratricidal struggles, the leadership in both countries can plan measures and initiatives which can transform even delicate and complicated questions through a new political basis for constructive, responsible and reciprocal relationship. Both Indian and Pakistani leaderships can take advantage of the rising self-confidence in the Third World by reinforcing their political responses in the North-South dialogue, and by disengaging from problems which lead to reinforcement of old prejudices. In short, the "new politics" of India and Pakistan should be related to the economic over view of international co-operation among developing countries to reduce their vulnerability to economic exploitation.

72 During Janata regime as India's Minister of External Affairs, he had followed ubias and balanced policy vis-a-vis Pakistan.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1979).
The history of conflict between India and Pakistan shows that while the ideological purposes of the two politics have differed significantly, their adaptive capability to conflict has varied on different occasions. Thus the negotiations for the Indus-Waters Treaty were long and tortuous but in the end showed how parochial trends could be overcome.

In other issues the stereotype idea of irreconcilable conflict between India and Pakistan prevailed and what was technically possible of solution was found to be politically lacking in common denominators. The Simla negotiations point to the mutual perception of behavioural norms which can promote political management not necessarily for achieving utopias but for preventive cumulative friction leading in the end to explosive violence. The choice of new behavioural orientations is relevant in three ways:

(a) Systemic Changes: The historical situations of conflict between India and Pakistan have been the outcome of the process of power and violence in a real social context. The systemic changes which underlie the rationality in the decisions taken at Simla call for new behavioural orientation which can play a cohesive role in limited areas of co-operative Consensus is not easy to achieve between New Delhi and Islamabad but the Simla spirit calls for reasonable decisions within a framework of bargaining. New techniques are needed
which can build on the shared information, images and concepts and which provide acceptable roles for both India and Pakistan but prevent internationalization of their conflicts.

(b) Stability Patterns: The Simla negotiations did not reveal a common world view between India and Pakistan, but their mutual resolve for peaceful co-existence showed that neither of the parties were in an unduly ambitious mood. In terms of action, both were seeking procedures which would provide fair chances for continued stability. Much theoretical and practical research would be needed to determine the essential relationships in political, economic, social and religious fields which would guarantee a spectrum of stability. What is relevant to our present enquiry is to concentrate on the concrete steps taken by decision-makers to jointly review outstanding problems and seek improvements in fields like communication which can create common interests extending for into the future.

(c) Measurement of Conflict Problems: An important role in the future development of peace-building measures can be played by research which can dispel deep-rooted prejudices and bias. We have both legalistic and statistical studies of Indo-Pakistan conflicts but these studies are full of ambiguities as to the concrete significance of these conflicts. To usefully apply the principle of symmetry to any system of conflict in the overall interaction of the two parties. On the Kashmir question alone there is a wide
divergence of possible answers to the question of how significant this conflict is in Indo-Pakistani relations as far as the future is concerned. Charting the course of foreign policy is not easy for Third World decision-makers and these tasks have been complicated (in the Indo-Pakistani context) by the emotional involvement in their disputes as a result of the common origin of the two developing countries. It would therefore seem advisable to call for greater efforts to avoid ideological generalisations and make as accurate a measurement as possible of the conflict patterns so that there should be a perceptible improvement in the quality of conflict-resolution in the post-Simla period.