CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

It has been observed that international conflict has many characteristics so far as its twin conflictual and cooperative tendencies are concerned. In the process of conflictual and cooperative behaviour international actors often tend to use incompatible means to achieve their objectives. Therefore, interaction of ends and means often initiate a process of conflictual tendencies, which in turn might lead them towards co-operative behaviour. Conversely, a cooperative process might through mutual competition lead to a conflictual process. Hence, conflictual and cooperative processes are interconnected with each other and a love-hate relationship is part of the game. Moreover, it is rare to identify the areas of total confrontation or total cooperation inter-se actors. But to keep the systems in interaction it is necessary that the conflictual tendencies should be kept at a manageable level.

While studying the India-Pakistan conflictual and cooperative behaviour it is essential to demarcate the areas of

1. J.W. Burton, Conflict of Interest: Subjective or Objective, (New York, 1965)
Forest L. Girieves, Conflict and Order: An Introduction to International Relations (New York, 1972)
Elton, B. Mc Neil, (Ed), The Nature of Human Conflict (Ann Arbor, 1965)
R. Fisher, (Ed), International Conflict and Behavioural Science (New York: 1964); and
Wehru Paul, Conflict Regulation (Boulder, Colorado, 1979)
conflict and cooperation. It has been observed that the origin of Indo-Pakistani conflict lies in the real clash of interests and ideologies, revolving around incompatible goals, objectives and structural realities. Conflict inter-se systems may be desirable so long as it is constructive or evocative and has a touch of creativity. But the moment it turns out to be destructive or catastrophic it calls for resolution. In the India-Pakistan case it has been found in the historical perspective that their conflict has been largely of a destructive or negative rather than of a constructive or positive nature. Hence, their conflict has to be resolved in the larger interest of harmony, peace and progress.

The conflictual tendencies between India and Pakistan cannot be properly examined or evaluated unless the processes and factors which have traditionally escalated conflict are identified. These processes/factors may be summed up as follows:

The very principle of partition of British India into Bharat and Pakistan; misperception over the party theory; controversy over the concept of two-nation theory; secularism vs. pan-Islamism; non-alignment vs. alliance system; military competition; controversy over identity crisis; security apprehensions; lack of proper communication and information channels; zero-sum pattern of relationship; lack of adequate avenues of peace diplomacy; the desire to maintain "mirror images"; lack of trust and confidence; malign propagandistic approach against each other with the intention to distort mutual image; lack of positive response on the part of intellectuals, decision-makers, diplomats, political elites and academicians; lack of desire for psycho-
logical learning process;\(^2\) repression/neglect of minorities in both countries;\(^3\) assets and liability problems; canal waters distribution controversy; the Kashmir dispute; etc., etc. Thus the Indo-Pakistani Conflict ranges from religious and ethnic to economic, political and psychological dimensions. Therefore, the thrust towards conflict in the Indian subcontinent is multidimensional in nature and problem solving is made more difficult by the persistence of outmoded ideas and approaches, even among specialists on international relations.\(^4\)

2. Anthony De, Reuck and Julie Knight, (Eds), Conflict in Society (London, 1966);

India and Pakistan have an illustrative model of conflict resolution in the form of the "Indus-Waters Agreement". This model could be made use for the resolution of their other disputes. Possibly this model could help in identifying the syndrome and symptoms of their conflicts and promote the psychological learning process. Realistically speaking Indo-Pakistani conflict is more of a psychological rather than political nature. Their conflicts and disputes seem to resemble the symptoms or pathology of a disease, as they, since their inception are dominated by bias and prejudice approaches. Further an effort has not been made for the reexamination of the existing assumptions and contours. M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly, (Eds), Sisir Gupta : India and the International System (New Delhi, 1981), p. 276.

3. The phenomenon of repression of minorities had been observed both in India and Pakistan in the initial phases of their separate existence. But with the passing of time, it came to be largely controlled. However, now and then if communal riots occur in Pakistan or in India, the Govt of the cross-country should not give over emphasis to such "incidental developments? As it is the domestic matter and the country concerned is solely responsible for the protection of its minorities (their social, cultural, economic and political activities). Further, it has been observed that whenever communal incidents took place, in India, Pakistan had shown greater enthusiasm/over reaction, in the name of protection of Muslim brothers in India. Indian Muslims are on priority basis Indian first, and Muslims later and they are the part of Indian society.

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Further, India-Pakistan relations based exclusively on the concept of security narrow the range of scrutiny. It is possible to avoid extreme positions between India and Pakistan if the analytical emphasis is not exclusively on ideology, but on the recognition of inter-system relations and structures and processes (i.e., interdependence and high level of interaction) which could generate functional equivalents of offensive strategic concept. However, conflict resolution, confidence-building and peace-building approaches pose the problems in terms of the total need to create equitable, symmetrical and horizontal interdependence inter-se conflicting parties. Therefore, these approaches are more relevant for

Hence, the responsibility for the social, cultural and political and economic protection lies with the Indian government and not with Pakistan government. Any action on the part of Pakistani administration under such situation would be equivalent to interference in the domestic affairs of India. Moreover, such behaviour possibly exacerbate political climate of both the countries. Therefore, precautionary steps should be taken to avoid warlike situations. And, see: R.J. Vincent, Non-intervention and International Order (Princeton, 1974)

6 Johan Galtung, "Institutionalised Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm", Journal of Peace Research, vol.2, 1965, pp.348-83; Anthony De-Reuck & Julie Knight,(Eds), Op Cit; Christoph Wulf, (Ed), Handbook on Peace Education (Frankfurt/Main, 1974); Henry A.Kissinger, (ed), Problems of National Strategy (New York, 1965) and Richard N. Gardner, Blueprint for Peace (New York, 1966). Interdependence in areas of agreement, such as, collaboration in the fields of sports, fine arts, music, cinematography, pilgrimage, revival of cultural contacts, academics, transfer of technology, free exchange of nationals, could be achieved without much controversy. During this researcher's discussions with front-ranking Pakistani authorities and policy-makers it was noted that they are all for such cooperation or collaboration.
the resolution of India-Pakistan conflict. And the rationales for the achievement of peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan are related to an intrinsic logic for overcoming conflicts which are obsolete politically, economically and technologically.

We have seen that the Indo-Pakistani conflict tends to resemble the so-called a "prisoner's dilemma", "chicken game" or "the two scorpion's locked in a bottle" situation - so it is not very deep-rooted or intractable. But the principal feature of genuine desire to shift their conflict-oriented structure into peace-oriented structure is at an embryonic stage. Therefore, there is no reason why perpetual tension should prevail in Indo-Pakistani relations, especially as the postulates of tolerance and mutual good-will prevail in the wide cross-section of societies of both countries, in spite of the scars left by partition. Hence, the possibility for the attainment of the objectives of mutual understanding and confidence-building seem to be brighter.

7. Such types of Conflicts frequently are not deep-rooted. In fact a slightest opportunity if it comes in its way, they could be resolved, like, the dilemma between two prisoners or the struggle between chickens for their share. Similarly, within India-Pakistan conflict, there is dormant element working for its resolution and it has been observed the form of demonstrated will from both sides, from time to time.

8. During a study-trip to Pakistan this scholar met individuals from a wide cross-section of Pakistan society, such as political elites, statesmen, military personnel, policy-makers, diplomats, academics, students, businessmen, industrialists, journalists and laymen with the desire to evaluate their views on the possibilities of peaceful coexistence between India and Pakistan. The impression gathered is that Pakistani public realises their short-comings in the past in the attainment of friendly relations with India. They exhibited a strong will to cultivate friendly environment in the subcontinent in the light of developments in Afghanistan after pro-Soviet Babarack Karmal regime's installation in Kabul and the security problems created by it. In....../continued....../
However, Indo-Pakistani problems and the larger problems of the subcontinent will only be aggravated if the perceptions of the decision-makers are shaped by a cynical faith in Clausewitz's ideas which are tenaciously held by military and bureaucratic circles throughout the world. A war between India and Pakistan, even of a short duration cannot serve as a continuation of politics by other means. It is a pity

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fact the Pakistani administration expects strong support in their critical phase of security problems from India. Similarly in India a substantial section of society realises the geostrategic importance Pakistan had acquired after this move as a buffer state. And a feeling has emerged that a strong and united Pakistan is in the security interest of India and they favour the required closeness between the two countries.

18-9
11. Ravi Rikhye, Indo-Pakistani War: A Fourth Round (New Delhi, 1981). In this book Rikhye hypothetically concluded the possibilities of Indo-Pak war in 1980s. The crux of his study is that even the fourth round would be undecisive for both India and Pakistan. On the Pakistani side its strategists and policy-makers recognised their limited capabilities in the light of the 1971 experiences and had realised that any mis-calculated attempt in such a direction would mean suicide for Pakistan. Neither it seems beneficial for India to go to war with Pakistan, unless, India's security interest were in danger from Pakistan. Further, India's emergence as the decisive regional power in South Asia after 1971 war is another negative point for Pakistan in that direction. Thus the present political, economic and geostrategic environment is not consonant with the war-psychoisis. But this environment is more favourable for the attainment of peace and cooperation, provided both India and Pakistan could make use of proper opportunities for a confidence-building and peace-building ethos within the parameters of conflict resolution and peace research approaches. Nazir, A Kamal, "strategy in the Contemporary World", Strategic Studies (Islamabad), vol 2, July-Sept. 1971; and Gen Zia's interview to an Indian Journalist, in Sunday (Calcutta), vol 9, No.52, 13-19 June 1982, pp. 14-22.

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that most of the studies on Indo-Pakistani hostilities have been written against a background which utterly ignores the broader view of peace and conflict issues developed by peace research and conflict resolution studies.

An objective attempt to evaluate and examine the prospects for cooperative and accommodative relationship between India and Pakistan requires neither the optimistic approach nor the pessimistic approach but the realistic approach, which Kenneth, E. Boulding termed as the "reality testing", i.e., there should not be over emphasis and exaggeration on arms-race and the communication pattern should be based on its accuracy, veracity or genuineness. A well defined and impartial communication pattern such as, Pavel Apostol's "Comprehensive communication",12 Anatol Rapoport's "advance communication",13 Thomas C. Shelling's "effective communication",14 Lewis Richardson's "elite communication" for conflict resolution as one of the

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Even in a meeting with this Scholar, during the latter's visit to Pakistan, the Pakistan's President, Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, highlighted and emphasised on these points. His main thrust during the discussion was that Pakistan realises its limitations as a weak nation and the only option left to it is to develop a peaceful framework through consultation with India. He declared that his government was busy in working to evolve such a framework and he hoped that the Indian response to it would be positive.

techniques seems to be relevant in this case. Further, the negative aspect of propagandistic approach with the desire to distort each other's image, both in the national and international arena, the concept of maintaining "mirror images", zero-sum pattern of relationship and the prevailing phenomenon of "cognitive dissonance" should be avoided. Thus in order to characterise a realistic accommodative and cooperative policy subjective perceptions of reality should be controlled. And the warning given by Kenneth Boulding about "reality testing" should be followed to avoid extreme position, such as those formed when national feelings were exacerbated. The post-Simla phase is highly suitable for the implementation of such manifestations.

16. However, the phase covered in this study indicates that from both sides the negative aspect of propagandistic approach to a larger extent controlled and a balanced approach seems to be adopted in this field by either of them. But this phenomena is at its embryonic stages. Therefore, proper efforts are required on the part of both countries to make it permanent feature in their policies.

17. Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Michigan, 1960)


", "Conflict Management as a Learning Process", in Anthony DeReuck and Julie Knight, (Eds), Op Cit; and

", "The Meaning of Twentieth Century (London, 1964)
Moreover, there is now a trend that even the external powers are not openly taking sides either with New Delhi or Islamabad in their conflict. China of course continued to express in very general terms support for Islamabad but for a long time this has not been anything more than propagandistic noise. If this trend continues it would enable both New Delhi and Islamabad to maintain relaxed postures and cope with new problems in a genuine spirit of mutual confidence and trust-building and give-and-take, within the framework of the Simla Agreement.

20 In an interview, Deng Xiaoping, Chinese Vice-Premier and the man at Chinese political scene observed contrary to China's usual pro-Pakistan stance - that Kashmir is a problem between India and Pakistan (not an international problem), which should be settled amicably and bilaterally. S.C. Gangal, "India-China Talks: Pointers and Portends" The Hitavada (Nagpur), 8 December 1981

21 In a seminar conducted by the Centre for International Politics and Organisation of the School of International Studies, in 1970, on "Crisis Management in International Politics", experts on Conflict and Crisis Management studies, like, Lewis F. Richardson; Kenneth E Boulding and many others had concluded that to manage future crisis it is inevitable by proper judgement and compromise the decision-makers in the Third World countries should safeguard themselves against intervention strategies which sought to manufature crisis, and had suggested that developing and underdeveloped Third World countries should utilise the institutional nexus of UN and its various agencies plus the nonaligned group and at the same time retain the initiatives for quick and effective negotiation to restrain and eliminate conflicts in developing world through bilateral process. This suggestion seems to have equal relevance in the process of de-escalation, management and resolution of Indo-Pakistani conflict and avoidance of great power intervention. See, M.L. Sondhi, "Crisis Management in International Politics"; Report of a Seminar, International Studies (New Delhi), vol.1, 1975 and R.J. Vincent, Op Cit.
While pacifism in India and Pakistan may not be practical politics, yet the best way to limit the range of destructiveness of their mutual conflict is to increase the openness of political debate between the two countries. By speculating on scenarios for the use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, it is hardly possible to promote non-provocative alternatives. It is only by eliminating the danger of war that India and Pakistan could link themselves to the wider perceptions of regional interests which could really provide a check on exploitation of outside forces, and could play constructive functional role for the rest of the Third World countries, as both of them carry substantial influence among these countries.

Thus the peace prospects between India and Pakistan could only be ensured if the decision-makers in both countries understood and examined the need for an organized framework in which historical and ideological incompatibilities could be related to goal changing as a process. Hence, India and Pakistan should restructure their conflict-oriented model of relationship into peace-oriented system, even if some sacrifices are required from each side.

22. Anatol Rapoport, Op Cit, n.17; Frequent seminars, conferences and debates should be held in both countries and opportunities should be provided to academicians, researchers, journalists, students, policy-makers and other interested individuals, to exchange their views on various subjects of mutual interest. One step ahead of this proposal would be the sponsorship of University Professors and researchers to the Universities and research institutions in the cross-country.


Further, the element of negotiation and compromise would promote cooperation while socio-cultural harmony within the two societies will help in a "reciprocal learning process" which will ultimately eliminate confrontationist propaganda and promote peaceful coexistence.  

In order to develop a framework for the settlement of bilateral issues, it is also essential to think of creative global roles both for India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan can work out roles as participants in global and regional politics without being continuously and conspicuously in conflict with each other on account of foreign policy decisions made in Washington, Moscow, Beijing or in the capitals of some Muslim West Asian countries. The opportunities for consensus and compromise can only be worked out after a certain measure of confidence and trust has built-up. India and Pakistan can step up a new diplomatic tradition by respecting their particular roles in a pluralistic world. There are political, strategic problems between India and China, Pakistan and USSR, but there is no reason to think that a onesided military partnership between Pakistan and China or Pakistan and USA or India and USSR can endure. The politics of the "containment era" can not be the basis of new diplomatic manoeuvres in the contemporary world.  

25. Anthony De-Reuck and Julie Knight, (Eds), Op Cit.  
26. L.K. Jha, North-South Debate (New Delhi, 1982)  
27. W.J. Barnds, India-Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York, 1972)
The solution of most of Pakistan's problems are contingent upon regional politics and here the scenario for the future, can be peaceful and optimistic if local disputes with India are not complicated by acquiescences to operating norms of Third parties. It is by priority to bilateral long-term interests that India and Pakistan can avail of the opportunities that may arise in future.

Further, India and Pakistan should not narrow the scope of their political actions at international forums like, UN and its various agencies, non-aligned group, North-South forum, South-South forum, the Group of 77. A reorientation of policies can only come about if both countries scrupulously respect each other's sovereign rights. It is fruitless to follow the policies which culminate in mutual frustration. If political realism is the basis of their political manoeuvrability in the future then the practice of vitriolic attacks on each other must be given up and the level of interchange of political views and opinions must be raised. These bilateral actions may possibly create homogeneous postures.

Hence it should be possible to evolve a problem-solving approach to Indo-Pakistani conflictual relations, if the antagonistic ties and goals of Indian and Pakistani national interests, are minimized. It is clear that neither India nor Pakistan could gain from the prevalence of high level of tension. The desired state of affairs would be the reduction of tension to a very low and tolerable level.
If the two sides can develop some effective way of communication pattern\(^ {28} \) and thereby achieve some coordination of choices, then the prisoner's dilemma or chicken game can be overcome.\(^ {29} \) There is a need that both sides should not rely on onesided interpretations of the otherside's conflict-oriented information but these information should be tested for their veracity and a bilateral interpretation based on consensus and compromise should be followed and thus a meaningful communication pattern should be introduced. These precautionary steps may possibly lay the foundation of at least a token cooperative behaviour which in due course of time may lead into permanent features.\(^ {30} \)

Thus we can find a solution to Indo-Pakistani conflictual or confrontational relations within the parameters, premises and contours of the games theory, psychological and pathological learning processes, crisis management and simulation studies.\(^ {31} \)

However, both India and Pakistan could gain control of the conflict dynamics by understanding peace-building measures, and by stimulating perceptions of common interest\(^ {32} \) in the following areas:

31. The relevance of these theories for the resolution of Indo-Pakistan conflict has been discussed in-depth in Chapter I, Introduction, in this monograph.
32. Richard, N. Gardner, Blue Print for Peace (New York, 1966)
(A) Common Communication Media;
(B) Common Broadcasting System;
(C) Common Press and Coordinated Newspapers;
(D) Common Family Welfare Institutions;
(E) Common Administrative Training Institutions, as both countries face more or less identical problems in these areas;
(F) Common Research Institutions for the eradication of inflation, corruption and to resolve linguistic problems;
(G) Common Engineering and Technical Know-how Institutions (i.e., collaboration in the transfer of technology);
(H) Common Textile Industry with Intermediate Technology (i.e., joint industrial ventures);
(I) Common Pilot Projects, Industrial Complexes;
(J) Common Research Institutions to utilize irrigation and power potentialities in the subcontinent (i.e., Regional power grid);
(K) Joint River System for agricultural purposes, (i.e., common agricultural planning institutions);
(L) Common Transport Institutions;
(M) Common Flood Controlling Agencies;
(N) Common Universities to promote interchange of scholars in science, humanities, medicine and other faculties;
(O) Frequent Conferences for inter-regional dialogue and mutual understanding in the areas of mutual interest.

Functional cooperation in the above-mentioned areas could conceivably cover an entire new range of relationship and

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The suggestion given in this book about various joint committees as the technique to develop coordinated efforts among conflicting parties would be applicable in Indo-Pakistani case; And, F.C. Northorp, *Op.Cit.*
these institutions could assist in laying the basis of enduring bilateral cooperation. 33

For a long-term and enduring solution of Indo-Pakistani conflict following comprehensive schemata suggested by a group of experts on conflict resolution studies seems to be applicable.

(1) Kenneth E. Boulding's proposal for building up of 'Peace Defending Organizational Institutions' as a counter-part to the "threat system" is applicable in this case. Possible Peace Defending Organizational Institutions in Indo-Pakistani relations could be institutions for voluntary participation in the areas of mutual interest, like, revival of cultural ties, institutions to create an atmosphere for greater interaction among nationals of either countries in the fields of literature, fine arts, music, poetry, (Urdu-Hindi), sports, cinematography, pilgrimage, and others, conclusion of a no-war pact, establishment of joint commissions with the intention to demarcate the areas of mutual interests, like, defence, nuclear energy, scientific and technological know-how, medical sciences, agricultural

33. David Mitrany emphasises regional integration as a first step towards regional cooperation. His emphasis is on building of a transnational body of socio-economic organization as a step forward to international integration. Developing the concept of "ramification", he hypothesised that collaboration in one technical field would lead to collaboration in another technical field. In short he concludes integration as a form of cooperative activity, it is because of this emphasis on cooperation across artificially created national boundaries that it is plausible to agree that Mitrany's functionalism is a variety of integration theory. See, David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London, 1975); and A Working Peace System (London, 1946)

sciences, veterinary sciences, and possibly a treaty of peace cooperation and friendship could be concluded.

However, in this respect Werner Levi's concept of establishment of non-violent institutions for common sharing inter-see conflicting parties is more or less similar to Boulding's 'peace-defending organizational institutions'.

(2) Lewis F. Richardson's concept of substitution of peace-race to that of arms-race, with a well organized communication system as its major component.

(3) Johan Galtung's concept of associative activities with high level of interaction and increase dissociative interaction inter-se parties to the conflict (i.e., structural design with three major components (a) high level of inter-dependence (b) symmetrical relationship; (c) common institution-building).

(4) Herman Schmid's concept of 'greater trade interaction'.

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38. Juergen Dedring, Op. Cit; During my study trip to Pakistan it was observed that there was a genuine desire on the part of Pakistani community for the resumption of trade relations with India. See, A.R Kemal, "Import-Export Structure and Trade Expansion in South Asia", A Study for the Committee on South Asia (unpublished papers; Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad) April 1982
(5) Lue Reychler's concept of 'pacifist strategy'.

(6) Ernst-Otto-Czempiel's concept of perpetual practical exercise for cooperative interaction at least on the part of one party to the conflict, to make realise the other party the inevitability and necessity of cooperative relationship (i.e. in Nazir A. Kamal's terminology, theory of graduated or flexible responses).

(7) J.W. Burton's Concept of perceptual changes in the structure of conflicting parties.

(8) Robert Jervis's concept of avoidance of cognitive dissonance inter-se conflicting parties.

(9) David Lelienthal's concept of "community relationship" and control of old illusions and fear-psychosis.

(10) Z.A. Bhutto's concept of clean and consistent bilateral relations inter-se conflicting parties.

(11) The study of conflict analysis and peace research can make a lasting contribution in the construction of peace at national, trans-national, regional and inter-national levels and


42. Robert Jervis, Op. Cit., n. 18

43. Colliers, 4 August 1951

44. Z.A Bhutto, Bilateralism: New Directions (Karachi, 1976)
this should therefore become a major area of interest among Indians and Pakistani scholars, policy-makers, diplomats and statesmen. 45

(12) The factor of surveillance should be reorganised and restructured within the parameters of conflict resolution and peace building ethos. 46 And an advance surveillance system should be introduced between India and Pakistan.

(13) The element of malign propagandistic approach should be avoided.

(14) Opportunities should not be given to external powers to exploit the Indo-Pakistani relations in their interest and external interventionist policies should be checked thoroughly. 47

(15) Elements of political rationality should be introduced in their day-to-day interactions.

(16) Symbolic actions of generosity and good-will should be a part of their mutual behaviour, i.e., at least the -


47. R.J. Vincent, Op.Cit, n. 3
Concept of a token cooperation; or
Experimental Cooperation should be introduced. 48

(17) The element of demilitarization should be introduced in their relations, because a major military confrontation between India and Pakistan would only result in increasing internal strains and constraints in both countries. The range of options of both countries are limited during escalation of conflict. Whatever strategic measures India and Pakistan take against each other, they cannot lower the cost of military conflict. This realisation should lead the decision-makers to overrule their strategic experts whenever it is required through compromise, bargaining and mutual accommodation to reduce their over-extended commitments suitably modifying their political aims, objectives and above all strengthening the internal cohesions of the Indian and Pakistani political system.

(18) Emma Rothschild's concept of beating of Swords into Plowshares is imperative in Indo-Pakistani relations, i.e., the conversion of military economy for the use of civil society with the intention to raise the living standard of the masses. 50

49 E.P. Thompson and others, (Eds), *Op.Cit*
(19) Judgement of professional strategists without examining the specific nature of interaction between two neighbours should be avoided.\(^{51}\)

(20) Economic cooperation even at an experimental level would assist both countries in evolving a viable future cooperative system.\(^{52}\)

(21) Prevention of internationalisation of their conflicts.

(22) Leadership responsibilities in India and Pakistan should be peace-oriented.

(23) Thomas C. Schelling's concept of in-between situation should be applied, (i.e., a medium approach).

(24) Strategic theories, like the control of deterrence theory and application of the detente theory are relevant in this regard.\(^{53}\)

Thus the literature of conflict and cooperation between India and Pakistan makes it clear that consensus and compromises were not a conspicuous part of the pattern of policy making.

\(^{51}\) Henry A. Kissinger, Problems of National Strategy (New York, 1965)

Until the Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972, there was no re-examination of the existing assumptions which could result in modifying the policy priorities and diplomatic-strategic postures of India and Pakistan. However, the need of the hour is to re-examine the existing policy priorities and diplomatic-strategic constraints.

Practical implementation of the Simla Agreement was initiated with the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir, followed by the withdrawal of forces to their respective lines of control, return of 5,139 sq. miles of territory occupied by India in the Western Sector, repatriation of 90,000 Pakistani POWs held in India and the exchange of civilians, resumption of postal, telecommunication and travel facilities, resumption of trade relations, resumption of railway links, overflights, cultural exchanges and diplomatic relations. Thus both the countries followed all the provisions agreed at Simla within a short duration of four years. The success in the process of neutralization of conflict and normalization of relations was achieved due to flexible and cooperative approaches adopted by the leadership of both countries.

53 See, Chapter III - The Conflict and the Cooperation Syndrome: India-Pakistan, in this thesis for details about positive contribution of these factors.

54 Mohammad Ayoob, India-Pakistan-Bangladesh: Search for New Relationship, (New Delhi, 1976)
However, during the process of neutralization of conflict and normalization of relations there appeared certain hurdles and on some occasions relations remained at a low ebb. The issue of POWs created a stalemate and India dragged her feet over this issue which fouled the good atmosphere created by the delineation of actual line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus India frittered away the advantage it had acquired by adopting a reasonable stand towards Pakistan at Simla over the issue of occupied territory in the western sector and suffered both politically and economically over the question of the issue of POWs and Civilians. Pakistan made of course certain concessions by accepting India's proposal on the actual line of control.

After India's explosion of a nuclear device on 18th May 1974, relations reached once again at a low ebb. Pakistan held it out as a jolt to the normalization process and unilaterally cancelled talks scheduled for 10 June 1974 for the restoration of postal, telecommunication and travel facilities. But on Indian assurance that its nuclear explosion was purely for peaceful purposes and it had no intention to make use of this capability for nuclear weapons production, Pakistan gave the green signal for the resumption of talks to resolve the

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pending disputes. 56 Thus, the credit for the smooth handling of the entire process of normalization goes to the leadership of both the countries. Through their flexible and accommodative policy, they had recognized the genuineness of 'peace diplomacy' and thus acknowledged the inevitability of peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan.

The major shift observed in the post-Simla Phase was the shift in the diplomatic and geo-strategic map of the Indian-subcontinent. This is an irreversible change in the structure of the Indian subcontinent and a return to the status quo ante is out of question. 57

The comprehensive analysis of conflict and cooperation syndrome, discussed above, highlights that post-Simla Indo-Pakistani relations initiated a new phase in the history of the Indian Subcontinent. The fascinating feature which left a deep impact on their relations, is the realization on the part of both governments and the general public in Pakistan and India that conflictual postures in their practical dealings would not resolve their problems. Only mutual cooperation in major fields, based on the principles of symmetry, equality, coexistence, horizontal linkages and fraternity would help them to establish enduring and long-lasting peace and would provide opportunities

56. This point has been discussed and highlighted in Chapter V—"The Normalization Process: The Post Simla Phase", part V, of this thesis.

57. John W. Mellor, (Ed.), India: A Rising Middle Power (Boulder, 1979)
for their all-round development. Major domestic changes observed in the post-Simla phase in Pakistan was the success of a civilian and democratic system in its entire history—(though domestic instability started after 1977 general elections and on 5 July 1977, Pakistan once again went under the martial law regime). It was really a rare phenomenon in contemporary politics. Another major change candidly identified was that never before had a sizeable cross-section of population and the intelligentsia in both countries supported normalization or rapprochement process, as they did, after the Simla Agreement. And it was observed that policy-makers and political elites gave enough considerations to these responses during the course of policy planning and execution. In fact these factors are instrumental in moulding the thinking of political elites and decision-makers towards the relevance of peace-building ethos.

The major conflictual avenues observed during the period covered in this study between India and Pakistan (1972-78) were:

1. Delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir;
2. Return of occupied territory (by India) in the Western sector;
3. Withdrawal of troops to international border;
4. The Indian nuclear explosion conducted at Pokhran on 18 May 1974.

During my field-trip to Pakistan it was noticed that a wide cross-section of Pakistani society, i.e., academicians, policy-makers, statesmen, businessmen, industrialists, journalists, military personnel, and even a lay man have the understanding that Pakistan could resolve its problems with India only through peaceful means and they expect from Indian side reciprocity for the achievement of this goal.
However, diplomatically and tactfully both neighbours succeeded in settling these problems, thus initiating a new "cooperative phase". And the major cooperative avenues observed during the same phase were:

i. Resumption of Trade and Commercial relations;

ii. Resumption of Air and Railway links;

iii. Resumption of Postal, Telecommunication and Transport Facilities; and

iv. Resumption of Diplomatic Relations.

It needs to be stressed that while various normalisation measures are in the interest of the people of this region, these by themselves cannot overcome the deep rooted prejudice, fear-psychosis and suspicion or ensure enduring or lasting peace and stability. For the achievement of this objective the essential requirement seems to be the conflictual or confrontational relationship to a cooperative, cordial or fraternal relationship based on bilateral consultation, negotiation, compromise or consensus. And to fulfill the positive aspiration of the nationals of India and Pakistan, it is imperative that both these nation-states should accept or acknowledge and execute strictly the universally recognised principles of coexistence, cooperation, equality, mutual desire for friendship, mutual respect for noninterference, territorial integrity, in their mutual dealing and settle all their outstanding disputes within the framework of justice and equality.

59. Continuation of "Cooperative Phase" lies in the foresightedness and proper evaluation of Indo-Pak Public Opinion by statesmen, policy-makers and diplomats.
However, it is not natural for a small nation (i.e., Pakistan) to be suspicious and apprehensive of the motives of its big neighbour - India. Hence, it is imperative for big state (India - since the subcontinental relations are based on the concept of Indo-centrism) to remove suspicions and fear-psychosis from its small neighbours and should create an impression of good neighbourliness through broad-based and flexible policies. It should avoid actions which could generate a feeling of uneasiness and insecurity among the smaller states and should resist the temptation which can create any sort of misunderstanding.

Generally speaking, Pakistan's relations with India have to be patterned afresh since confrontation has lost all its relevance in view of the changed geo-political, socio-economic, socio-cultural and power realities and because of the fact that Pakistan feels itself much more weaker and insecure. Another vital factor is the significance of the Khyber Pass and Pakistan's being acquiring geo-strategic vitality as a buffer state between India, Soviet Union, China and to a certain extent the West Asian Muslim countries. Therefore, a united and strong Pakistan is in the security interest of India.

60. For detailed study of the fresh techniques and patterns applicable in Indo-Pakistani relations, please see, Chapters I and II in this thesis.

61. Particularly after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan's status as a buffer state has enhanced

Under these conditions, Indo-Pakistani relations should evolve gradually in such a framework that the identity of Pakistan as a separate and sovereign entity and its basic interests should not be threatened. On the part of Pakistan (it being a small state), it has to give up its imaginary or unrealistic vision of maintaining parity with India—a power which is vastly greater than her (in all aspects). It has to live distinctly but in harmony and should resist all her activities and attempts which could generate misconceptions, apprehensions, misunderstandings with its big neighbour—India. Then and then only, enduring or Lasting peace, cooperative and a working relationship could be attained in this sensitive part of the world.

Thus the convergence of interests and political, socio-economic activities in the post-Simla phase have revealed fresh incentives and motives for maintaining peaceful settlement. Further, improvements can be achieved if there is no serious disturbance in the new military balance. Hence, it seems imperative for India and Pakistan to initiate a new pattern of relationship, and should give up the old policy of confrontation or conflictual behaviour. This approach could possibly lead them towards enduring bilateral confidence and trust-building, towards a peace-building ethos and towards the development of a subcontinental structure of peace which in turn may lead towards a lasting cooperative and harmonious relationship.