CHAPTER IV
NATURALISM AND ITS KINS

4.1. The Game Plan for Normative Naturalism:

Stich’s panglossian project succeeds if and only if future science can succeed to eliminate folk psychological states. For Stich, this would not happen if scientific theory is gradually being revised from time to time. That would only support what he calls ‘pan-eliminativism’. We need both a theory of mental representation as well as content, where the content is defined by

\[ R \text{ represents (means) } S \text{ is true iff } C. \]

where \( C \) stands for necessary and sufficient conditions.

There are a multitude of ways in which the right hand can be filled up but none would be satisfactory. It is no good arguing that meaning is a semantic property of a sentence (or proposition) in the way physical properties are (M. Devitt\(^1\)). Neither reductionism nor physicalism would be the options. Fodor chooses the option to fill up the right hand side with some variant of ‘conceptual analysis’ before taking them to be ‘innate’. Fodor is responsible for causing disbelief while claiming that it would be satisfied with sufficient conditions, “for one bit of the world to be about (to express,
represent, or be true of) another bit” even if they are not necessary. But this is what he cannot hope to achieve in the face of intuitive counterexamples (where sufficient condition can be turned out to be one of the necessary conditions and reduces the whole argument to absurd consequences.

It appears at some point we have to theorize that content of natural kind terms would be available but that is also met with counterexamples (Putnam’s Twin Earth examples illustrate this). But what is clear is that we have to meet necessary conditions somehow given as:

\[(x) \text{ (x is water iff x is } H_2O)\]

which science (a posteriori) can discover Naturalism is not the default option. Naturalizing content of propositional attitude (I believe that p) or naturalizing semantics seems to the last choice in these circumstances Stich’s game plan here to have recourse to a naturalistic content as defined by supervenience (strong or weak) so as to satisfy the two important constraints on naturalism, to be given below:

Constraint 1 : If intentional notions can’t be naturalized, then we will be led into intentional irrealism.

Constraint 2 : If naturalism is unpacked in the way it is proposed, then intentional can’t be naturalized.
Initially, Stich’s way of overcoming is to change the argument into one in which

Premise: intentional notions cannot be naturalized.

Conclusion: no dire consequence would follow (as against something dreadful will follow)

or,

Conclusion: no catastrophic consequence follows.\(^3\)

because,

intentional irrealism would be a preposterous doctrine

or,

it would be quite absurd that non-supervenience entails irrealism.

But it can be shown that,

Irrealism does not even begin to follow\(^5\).

Similarly, from

meaning-based sufficient conditions cannot be given for intentional terms, then

it will not follow that,

meaning is a myth.
Stich concludes:

If “there are good reasons to worry about intentional realism, then the fact that ‘R represents C’ can’t be defined surely is not one of them”.

Stich is not ready to accept:

a) naïve version: descriptive theories of meaning or reference (or truth)

b) sophisticated version: causal-historical theories of meaning and reference (or truth).

With regard to the above, Stich holds that they tend to ‘trivialize’ eliminativism. More precisely,

a) on the description theory, eliminativism is trivially true

and

b) on the causal-historical theory, eliminativism is trivially false.

What corresponds to the former is the proposal such as the one given by Cummins saying⁶ that

a) beliefs cannot be specified in a way that is independent of environment (anti-individualistic claim)

and Lycan’s claim⁷ saying that
b) beliefs can be eliminated from mature psychology (doxasta-phobe claim).

Stich wants to hold that given any intentional property, it is easy to find a ‘narrow’ surrogate (of that property which does supervene on the current, internal, physical state of the organism). That is, we can take,

the property of believing that (p)

to be the narrow surrogate of

_____ believing that p

The extension of the property

_____ believe that (p)

is just the class of all possible individuals who believe that p along with all of their current internal property doppelgangers. This is advanced as part of the scientific theory of other minds which is worked out as consisting of two coordinating mechanisms (called TT+TOM along with TMP) where TT → Theory, Theory, TOM → Theory of Mental Mechanism and TMP → Theory of Mental Precepts).

Stich proposes the following amendment in the footnote:
“But it will not entail that there are no pigs. Similarly, if it turns out that meaning-based sufficient conditions cannot be given for intentional locutions, it will not follow that meaning is a myth.\textsuperscript{9}

Stich may be in broad agreement with Tye who follows a variant of methodological naturalism but it is too hazardous to guess that there is an agreement between them. Tye acknowledges in a footnote that Stich comes closer to him\textsuperscript{10}. Tye’s attempt to naturalize the mental consider the following the four options before dismissing them out of court\textsuperscript{11}.

1. analytical naturalism (a priori- reductive)

2. conceptually regulated science (new science awaits us) → (Panglossian project approximates to this).


4. conceptually sufficient (Fodor: nomologically sufficient) which we have seen that Stich is likely to reject.

Tye argues that the thesis which holds that mental states (including belief states) are natural phenomena must be approached as going through the following motives.

183
1) mental states are part of the natural world (just as much as chemical, biological, geological states (e.g. glacier, fossils etc.).

2) mental states participate in causal interactions which fall under scientific laws and theories\(^\text{12}\).

3) mental states types may reasonably be taken as physical states (psychology is also physical science)\(^\text{13}\).

4) mental state tokens are generally constructed by neural processes just as neural processes are constructed by molecular processes (such tokens may vary in its constitution in different possible worlds).

5) That is, higher-level types may be realized by more than one lower-level type within the actual world (higher-level tokens may be constituted by different lower-level tokens but only in different possible worlds).

6) Mental states participate in causal interactions which fall under scientific laws and are either ultimately constituted by or ultimately realized by micro-physical phenomena.

7) We can derive from (1) - (6) (even if they are partially or fully wrong) what is called world involving character of intentional content: mental states enter into constitutive relations with the world.
Then Tye claims to sponsor a project very similar to Stich but differing in essential respects (Tye adds more with which we are not concerned).

For Fodor, the “deepest motivation for intentional irrealism” is the suspicion “that the intentional can’t be naturalized.”14 In recent years, philosophers are interested to give a very high priority to a “naturalistic” account of intentional categories. “Naturalizing the intentional isn’t just an interesting project, it is vitally, important. Something dreadful will follow if it doesn’t succeed.”15 Why would irrealism follow if “the intentional can’t be naturalized?”16 To get an answer we have to satisfy a pair of constraints. Let us discuss the two constraints first.

The First Constraint: Non-naturalizability entails irrealism:

Intentional notions can’t be naturalized to the conclusion that intentional irrealism or some other deeply troubling doctrine is true.

The Second Constraint: Intentional properties are not physical properties:

Fred Dretske suggests that if intentional states are causally impotent, then we should not include them in our ontology at all. “If naturalization fails, then there could be no serious science of intentional psychology because there could be no laws that invoke intentional terms or intentional properties.”17
There is an established tradition in the conceptual analysis which assumes that the concept or mental structure underlying the use of most predicates is actually a mentally represented definition - a set of necessary and sufficient conditions.

The “classical view” holds that we are either consciously or unconsciously determining whether the case at hand satisfies the conditions of the definition.

Fodor offers very different alternative to the classical account of concepts. He views that the concepts which underlie most of our one-word predicates have no structure at all - or at least none that is relevant to the semantic properties of the concept. Fodor thinks that they are all innate. Fodor maintains that the meaning of intentional predicates or intentional concepts can’t be set out as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which do not themselves invoke intentional terms. And he is more adament than any one to pursue the argument that our intentional concepts can’t be analyzed in non-intentional terms.

Fodor views that the attempts at conceptual analysis practically always fail. And he gives an example of the failure of the reductionist program within the study of language and he calls it the Definition Hypothesis which shares two versions:

(a) The weak version: many lexical concepts are definable.
The strong version: These concepts are definable in a vocabulary of sensory-terms-plus-logical syntax.

Contemporary philosophers reject the classical account and offer many alternatives. Following are two best known accounts.

(1) **Prototype and Exemplar Account:**

These both accounts are developed by Eleanor Rosch. Inspired by later Wittgenstein, Eleanor Rosch maintains that in the prototype account, concepts are weighted lists of features that are characteristic of the most typical members of the category, that the concept picks out. The list will generally include lots of features that are not necessary for category membership. The exemplar account assumes that concepts are detailed mental descriptions of particular members of the category.

(2) **Natural Kinds and Essential Properties**

The second account starts with some doctrines in the philosophy of language. Natural kind predicates like ‘water’ or ‘gold’ and what is it that determines which parts of the world are in the extension of such predicates are discussed here. According to the causal-historical account of reference, the answer must invoke the notion of “essential properties” of natural kinds - properties that everything in the extension of a natural kind term must have. The doctrine of essential properties is that individual items are grouped into natural kinds in virtue of the possession of certain essential properties, and it
is the job of science to discover what these properties are. In the form ‘R represents S’ is true iff C’ the vocabulary in which the condition C is couched contains neither intentional nor semantic expressions. It is a demand for a conceptual analysis. The property in virtue of which the predicate ‘R represents S’ applies to all and only those pairs of things in the universe such that the first represents the second.

Putnam formulates the constraint on necessity for natural kind terms\textsuperscript{20} as,

\[(x) x \text{ is water iff } x \text{ is } H_2O.\]

It is a necessary scientific truth, but its necessity doesn’t depend upon the structure of the concepts, that speakers invoke when they use the terms involved. It is not a matter of intuitions and psycholinguistics. For Stich and Laurence, the intentional irrealism is not plausible that the intentional predicates cannot be naturalized and the intentional predicates are not natural-kind terms. Therefore, the intentional properties are not essential properties.

If intentional irrealism doesn’t follow from the fact that intentional predicates aren’t natural-kind terms, we have a pair of possibilities.

**Possibility No.1:** It focusses on the causal efficacy of intentional states. If intentional predicates aren’t natural-kind terms, they are not literally true causal claims. It is a singularly implausible suggestion\textsuperscript{21}.
Possibility No.2: If intentional predicates aren’t natural kind terms, then there is no science of intentional psychology. The science of intentional psychology has to include intentional laws, and laws can only be stated with natural kind terms. No kind terms, no laws; no laws, no science. There is a link between kind terms and laws. And it is simply a stipulative definition: natural-kind terms just are the sorts of terms that can occur in law-like statements.

What other options left to sustain naturalism? At least two options come to my mind. The first option is epiphenomenalism (that requires upward or one-way causation). Non-reductionists like Searle uses this to obtain a framework for biological naturalism which holds that lower-order properties causes the higher-order properties to emerge. The second options is to tighten the causal relation in both ways to sustain some form of ontological naturalism (J.Kim). Kim uses supervenience to locate mind in the physical world.

Stich uses a third option called supervenience which was originally used by Moore to talk about the emergent moral property. Supervenience is generally defined as the relation between two properties Stich distinguishes between strong, weak and global supervenience.

4.2. Does Supervenience Support Normative Naturalism?

To avoid irrealism, there are two proposals:
1. Intentional properties must be identical with or supervene upon non-intentional properties.

2. The naturalization should be explained in terms of property identity or supervenience.

Property identity entails supervenience, and thus non-supervenience entails non-identity. The intentional which supervenes on the non-intentional differs on a pair of dimensions.

1. The notion of one class of properties supervening on another can be expressed in two different ways namely strong supervenience and weak supervenience. Of these, one (strong) entails the other (weak).

2. There are various options that might be proposed as the “supervenience base” for intentional properties - the class of properties on which intentional properties are expected to supervene.

Since strong supervenience entails weak supervenience, the failure of weak supervenience, entails the failure of strong. In both strong and weak supervenience the first constraint is not satisfied. Neither irrealism nor the other unwelcome consequence follow if supervenience fails. There is another notion of supervenience, called global supervenience and in this case, the second constraint isn’t satisfied. For in this case, it is wildly implausible that supervenience fails.
As we have seen, supervenience is defined as a relation between two classes of properties. Consider following conventions:

“Let B and S be two classes of properties (think of them as the base class and the supervenient class) whose members are $b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_i, \ldots$ and $s_1, s_2 \ldots s_i \ldots$ respectively. Now, the basic idea is that one class of properties $s$, supervenes on a second, $B$, if the presence or absence of properties in the first class is completely determined by the presence or absence of properties in the second class.

(a) **Weak Supervenience (S weakly supervenes on B)**

Take the notion of a B- or S-doppelganger. A B-doppelganger of an object is an object that has exactly the same B properties as the original. An S-doppelganger is one which has exactly the same S properties. Using the picturesque language of possible worlds, we can express the idea that B properties determine S properties. If in all possible worlds, every pair of B-doppelgangers that exist in that world are also S-doppelgangers, then we will say that S weakly supervenes on B.

(b) **Strong Supervenience (S strongly supervenes on B)**

So, if S weakly supervenes on B, then in any possible world we select, if we know that a pair of objects in that world share the same B properties, we know they share the same S properties as well. And if a pair of objects in that
world do not share the same S properties, we know that there must be at least one B property that one has and the other doesn’t. Now we can build a stronger notion of supervenience if we relax the restriction that is doppelgangers are in the same world. We will say that S strongly supervenes on B if all B-doppelgangers of an object, no matter what possible world they inhabit, are also S-doppelgangers.

The game-plan is stated in a pair of claims: since strong supervenience entails weak supervenience, the failure of weak supervenience entails the failure of strong\textsuperscript{25}. Thus, if we can show that no untoward consequences follow when weak supervenience does not obtain, the same conclusion will follow if strong supervenience fails.

c) Global Supervenience

In global supervenience, the central notion is that of worlds that are doppelgangers of one another. Global supervenience can be defined as follows: A class of properties, S, globally supervenes on a class of properties, B, if and only if all possible worlds that are B-doppelgangers are also S-doppelgangers. So if S globally supervenes on B, then if a pair of worlds are indistinguishable with respect to the properties in B, they will also be indistinguishable with respect to the properties in S\textsuperscript{26}.

In each of these three cases, we will argue that the constraints set out in section 1 are not met. In the first two cases, it is the first constraint that
isn’t satisfied: Neither irrealism nor the other unwelcome consequences follow if supervenience fails. In the third case, it is the second constraint that isn’t satisfied. For in this case, it is wildly implausible that supervenience fails. We will follow all of this with a brief discussion of another notion of supervenience, so-called global supervenience, whose precise relation to the other two notions is a matter of some dispute\textsuperscript{27}. Here again, we will argue, nothing catastrophic follows if intentional properties fail to supervene on the various bases that have been proposed. It is the end of the game plan.

Throwing the gauntlet, Stich concludes: Until some account of naturalizing is given that satisfies both constraints, the most plausible view is that the motivation that Fodor recounts is simply confused. There may be good reasons to take the prospect of intentional irrealism seriously, but the worry that the intentional can’t be naturalized is not one of them\textsuperscript{28}.

Is there a defensible naturalism of the mental? It depends on the way we have a defensible criterion of empirical meaningfulness (legatee of positivism) or else, intentional properties stand in some sort of relation to the properties of physics (not necessarily ‘special relation’ which looks like a “singularly implausible proposal). So, Stich is forced to distinguish between

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node (n1) at (0,0) {Naturalism (2 types)};
\node (n2) at (0,-1.5) {Puritanical naturalism};
\node (n3) at (0,-3) {Open-ended naturalism};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}
The first choice is the legatee of positivism. This is what is ultimately a base for Quine who denies that there is any mandatory between science (a class of a posteriori truth) and philosophy (a class of a priori truth) and its consequent denial of ‘first’ philosophy. The later asserts that knowledge does not rest on any foundation one can confidently assert that

1. epistemology is a branch of psychology
2. psychology is the branch of physiology
3. physiology is part of cognitive science
4. cognitive science becomes a niche subject

Puritanical naturalism becomes open-ended with the naturalization of epistemology which does not necessarily refute the Sceptic. But philosophy of science is philosophy enough (Quine’s dictum)

The first choice is the legatee of positivism. Here Stich comments that this “puritanical naturalism will also suffer the same fate as positivism did: It will die the death of a thousand failures.”

With regard to the second choice, he calls attention to the fact how relations are cheap; everything is related to everything else in endlessly many
ways. Rather, what I am claiming is that there is no *single, special relation* that all and only the properties invoked in respectable sciences bear to physical properties. There are, no doubt, lots of interesting relations between physical properties and properties like being a buckminsterfullerene; some but not all of these also obtain between physical properties and the property of being a cheating gene; and some but not all of these obtain between physical properties and the property of being a strange attractor.”

Perhaps there is no *single* relation in which all naturalistically *kosher* properties must stand to the physical. So he feigns a definition.

A property is naturalistically acceptable if and only if it is related to physical properties by relation $R_1$, or by relation $R_2$, . . . or by relation $R_n$.

S comments: “It is not only the case that different sciences invoke properties that are related to physical properties in different ways, it is also the case that as science progresses, *new* properties are found to be useful, and some of these are related to physical properties in important *new* ways.” “There is no way of specifying the relations in advance, nor is there any reason to suppose that the list might not grow indefinitely.”

Panglossian project is saved. Stich concludes, “since naturalists are making a very strong and (by my lights) very implausible claim, I am inclined to think that the burden of argument is on them.”
There is no more reason to suppose that there must be some fixed relation in which all scientifically legitimate properties stand to the physical than there is to suppose that there must be a fixed relation in which all empirically meaningful sentences stand to physical-object sentences or sense-data reports. The problem is that they play no role in any successful scientific theory. I don’t claim to have an account of what it takes to be a successful scientific theory. Indeed, I suspect that too, is a pluralistic, open-ended, and evolving notion. But on the picture I am urging, being invoked in a successful science is all that it takes to render a property scientifically legitimate.

4.3. Ontological Eliminativism as a Paradigmatically Deconstructionist Programme:

From the foregoing, we can surmise that doppelganger account warrants a scientific theory of mind in which we can treat ‘believe that - p’ is a syntactic type (without semantics as suggested by his earlier theory of mental representation) and naturalism is to be foisted on this. The domain of reasoning is not that of pure reason where Stich can argue folk psychology is still a science at its a earlier stages and it can mature into cognitive science. So this project looks more plausible in the realm of practical reasoning. So, what we need in the domain of practical reasoning in which TOM + TOMM are incorporated. This is what is defended by Stich in his hybrid account of
theory-theory and simulationism which has been decisively rejected in the light of many criticisms altered by Carruthers and others. This is what that issues in normative naturalism which is presented in terms of a multiple lines of argument. We unfold the nuances of the argument with our own comments with a large scale reconstruction and this is adequate enough to preempt critics like Tim Crane who charges Stich as retreating from eliminativism. We do not agree.

Premise 1: FP is a Tacit Theory of Theory-Theory (mental states are posits of the commonsense psychological theory).

2: FP is a Defective Theory (some of the crucial presuppositions it makes are false or incoherent).

3: FP is to be eliminated.

(3a): Science will not explain FP (Science is only heuristics)

(3b): FP will not enter into Science (It can enter into heuristics)

Stich finds out that some additional premises are necessary, to make it valid.

Additional Pr. 3* (deconstructive step) : Referential Opacity/Referential Plurality/Referential indeterminacy: a belief ‘refers to x’ is neither true nor false. Therefore it is indeterminate (that we get here is:
eliminativism itself is neither true nor false). This line of thinking is closed.

(it is derived from: (2) descriptive theory of reference or causal-historical theory of reference.

3* may entail: a wide account of content-identity: a pair of belief tokens are type-identical if they have the same content (sameness of content).

**Lewis’s Strategy: Theoretical Terms:**

For Lewis, a theory offers an “implicit functional definition” of the terms of it. And these terms are definable functionally, by reference to causal roles. Theoretical terms are “defined as the occupants of the causal roles specified by the theory... as the entities, whatever those may be, that bear certain causal relations to one another and to the referents of the O (observation) -terms.”³⁴ Lewis maintains that we have specified the sense of a term when we have specified its denotation in all possible worlds.

Lewis’s account shares two notable features. The first feature is the strategy Lewis instigates to deal with terms of mistaken theories. According to him, theoretical terms are implicitly defined by the causal patterns specified in the theory that introduces the terms. This will lead to blurry of the distinction between realized theory and ‘newly realized’ theory making eliminativism itself indeterminate.
The second feature holds that if we “think of commonsense psychology as a term-introducing scientific theory, though one invented before there was any such institution as professional science,” then everything he has claimed about theoretical terms can be applied to theoretical terms in folk psychology.

Lewis points out that if folk psychology turns out to be seriously mistaken, we have to give up not just beliefs and desires but pains, pleasures, and other conscious states from our ontology. Lewis identifies commonsense psychology with the psychological “platitudes which are common knowledge among us - everyone knows them, and so on.” And most these platitudes will turn out to be correct (platitude view of FP). So FP is mistaken.

Lycan’s Deconstructive Step (this is to be deconstructed further):

Both theories of semantics are defective; but causal-historical theory survives because of ‘error’ theory.

. They refer but erroneously. Thus it moves reference to centre stage.

1) Now we have 4 options:-

Ist Option: The sameness of content is met with supervenience as follows: if two organism believe, they are psychologically identical.

IIt Option: Lewis is met with holism: Same doxastic surround. Folk Psychology takes the content of a propositional attitude to be
dependent in part on the network of other propositional attitudes that a person has. Thus, if the doxastic networks surrounding a pair of belief tokens are sufficiently different, the tokens will differ in content. Although the change in the doxastic surround has altered, perhaps even destroyed, the content of the belief that remains.

The stronger version of holism holds that a pair of belief tokens are identical in content only if they are embedded in identical doxastic surrounds. If that is right, then no two people will have beliefs that are identical in content. The heavy-duty assumption entails that Two beliefs an identical in content only if they are embedded in the same doxastic surround.

**IIIrd Option : Heterogenous (clear/damaged distinction is warranted):**

Now, the analogy between folk grammar and folk physics bring to the open what is called the ‘performance error,’ (competence is the same but performatively different). This ‘hits a snag’ because we have same content and different content that could be attributed to different individuals or even, to one and the same individual. That is, heterogeneous properties are attributable.

In suitable conditions, folk psychology attributes a belief with the same content/different content to the clever, the retarded, and the brain damaged. So this requires that our theory of mind is split in the middle to accommodate
the basal ‘conflict’ (e.g., autism). But folk grammar has a definite way of explaining this problem (epistemic problem).
4th Option: Naturalize content in the normative way:

It begins with the claim that content (and related intentional notions) can’t be “naturalized” - there is “no place for intentional categories in the physicalistic view of the world.”

This should answer at least three clusters of questions.

a) What exactly would be required to “naturalize” content?

b) This set of questions focuses on the relation between naturalizing and being real. It makes questions such that is everything real reducible to the physical?

c) What reason do we have to think that content can’t be naturalized? Is it simply that no one has figured out how to do it?

Twin Proposals:

1. Reference as an account of folk semantics

   [gives error theory (1)].

2. Reference as an account of proto-science

   [gives error theory (2)].

   (1) entails that the analogy between the theory of reference and theory of grammar has to pulled apart.
entails that these analogy between folk physics and theory of reference may be correct.

So, (1) and (2) introduces what is called the **folk semantics**.

Correspondingly, we have:

1. If two people have different internalized folk semantics then the notions of reference they are using are different.
2. We have a way of accounting for the difference by taking that there is no real disagreement. That is, they are both right (one’s man’s *modus ponens* is another man’s *modus tollens*).

We thus move to holding that reference is culturally determined, just as everything else.

**Explanation**: Linguists like Chomsky hold that a sequence of phonemes is grammatical in a dialect if and only if it is classified as grammatical by the grammar inside the heads of the speakers. Unlike the folk physics, the grammatical principles inside a speaker’s head can’t be wrong. A phoneme sequence is grammatical by the rules or principles inside the speaker’s head.

Following Chomsky, Stich says that this would not count as an error on the part of the non-conforming speaker or his grammar, and the non-conforming speaker or his grammar. And the non-conforming speaker spoke
a different dialect. Because, he may be the only one who spoke the dialect, in which case, it is known as idiolect.

5. **Pluralistic Step: Consider now:**

So, reference is culturally transmitted and acquired by individuals from the surrounding society. Eliminativism claims that beliefs and other intentional states do not exist. But that claim is true if and only if predicates like ‘---- is a belief’ refer to nothing. Well, suppose that ‘------ is a belief’ doesn’t refer to anything. Eliminativism is true if and only if ‘------ is a belief’ refers to nothing.

6. **‘New’ theory: (Strategy of semantic ascent) from deflationary standpoint:**

   (1) (x) Px iff ‘p ----’ refers to (or is satisfied by) x.

   (2) (x) x is a blackhole iff ‘blackhole’ refers to x (There is no blackhole)

   (3) (x) x is a belief iff ‘belief’ refers to x. (There is no belief)

   (4) ~ (∃x) ‘black hole’ refers to x

   (5) ~ (∃x) x is a black hole.

   (6) ~ (∃x) ‘belief’ refers to x

   (7) ~ (∃x) x is a belief.

   Equally, 6 gives non-deflationary account of reference.
Harty Field suggests that the semantic ascent is a constraint.

1) It must be a relation that does a good job at capturing our intuitions about a wide range of cases.

2) It must satisfy the semantic-ascent principle, Field notes that the strategy of semantic ascent just hides the problem, it doesn’t solve it.

7. Dialethic Step ('Dialethic' means contradictory statements; that is \( p \land \neg p \))

Theorist [A]: “The predicate ‘------ is a belief’ stands in the R relation to certain neurophysiological status (or functional states). Field argues, “we can conclude that beliefs do exists, since ‘belief’ stands in the R relation to these neurophysiological states, and R is the reference relation, and the reference relation satisfies the principle of semantic ascent Q.E.D.”

Theorist [B]: No reference

therefore no belief exists Q.E.D.
This is a patent contradiction.

Stich finds out that the alternative strategy is the notion of constitutive or conceptually necessary properties. A certain property is conceptually necessary for having beliefs. Stich views that this strategy is even less promising than descriptive theories of reference. This poses a much deeper problem about the distinction between analytic synthetic statement. But according to Quine, there is no distinction between analytic and synthetic, so this adds to the difficulty.

8. Normative Naturalism (turns the tables against Churchland)

Stich suggests that we have to proceed with some normative principles - principles of rational ontological inference or decision making based on reflective equilibrium.

Robert McCauley explains the theories at “levels of analysis” lead to theoretical and ontological elimination McCauley provides an interesting and provocative conclusion that holds, “the superior theory eliminates its competitor (and its ontology)\textsuperscript{39}.” Both common sense psychology and cognitive psychology operate at different levels of analysis from neuroscience. Agreeing with Churchland, McCauley maintains that the neuroscience and commonsense psychology are “incommensurable” and it would be incorrect to “conclude . . . that such incommensurability requires the elimination of one or the other.”\textsuperscript{40}
9. **Two Skeptical Counters:**

(1) There is not one normative-naturalist strategy but many whose relation to one another is based on the family resemblance.

(2) The normative credentials of normative naturalist procedures have a relativist flavor.

10. **Social/Political argument (Social Constructivist view)**

Personalities and the micropolitics of scientific communities often play an important role in situations like this.

The skeptical conjecture Stich proffers is that the normative naturalist strategy will not uncover principles of rational ontological influence that are rich enough to tell us what ontological conclusions we will draw from this.

The descriptive claim is that in which the ontological questions have been resolved. At the most, it is only belief revision in science.

11. **Corollary: Papineau’s Argument:** (Theoretical terms are unsettled and hence eliminated)

Papineau argues that the theoretical terms are eliminable: “any claims formulated using such terms are simply a shorthand for claims that can be formulated without such terms.” Thus, “we can *eliminate* theoretically
defined terms from any claims in which they appeal.” Unlike Quine he thinks that there are some “cove assumptions” of the theory. He also thinks that there are so theoretical assumptions whose definitional status is indeterminate.

**Corollary 2:** We can change the above into Quinean counter, leaving the only clause that it is sociologically determined which of not Quinean in any respect. This is what is called the Quinean version of pragmatism.

The question is: Does the eliminativist conclusion follow? It appears that it does; but also, it does not. It does because the ‘dialethic’ step (p.~p) warrants that the contradiction is overcome only at the expense of reducing the whole argument about similarity of content for absurdity.

It does not because the normative naturalism is poised to accommodate the disagreement, and we get a Quinean conclusion. What this warrants is the construction of a theory of mind plus a theory of mental mechanism by which we attribute similarity of content by identifying the type. The whole argument began with what is called the folk psychological capacities which include a cluster of abilities (common folk physics and folk psychology even while keeping out folk semantics). All of which seek agreement between people: Beliefs are identical iff they have the same content (Two belief tokens have the same content).
The above argument is completely reformulated but not without much consternation. It is too complex but once it is formulated it sustains our original hypothesis. This is very difficult in structure from the one which Tim Crane formulates in simplistic terms, in which he charges Stich as proposing a retreat from eliminativism. What we have proved thus far shows that the contrary is true. The actual argument:

Premise 1: Intentional states are postulates of a proto-scientific theory, folk psychology.

Premise 2: Folk psychology is largely false.

Conclusion : Intentional states do not exists.

His comments are enumerated below:

1) The above argument is invalid (it is not invalid but it contains gaps to be filled up).

2) It leads to social constructionist view but there is no reason to believe that there is a” possible source of harmony between eliminativism and social constructivism”

(1) and (2) warrants a “clear departure” from eliminativism

Stich’s argument according to his reading lacks consistency because it is an assemblage of many authors. This is not true since all the others share a
similar conclusions, as their recent writings attest. Stich’s use of Lycan for “waking up from his dogmatic slumbers”\textsuperscript{44} will not pay off as there are ‘hidden’ sources of agreement about facts. Moreover, the right conclusion to draw here is that the theory of reference is “not the heart of the issue.” We may need a positive theory which will escape the distinction between deflationary and non-deflationist theories.

Moreover, Crane comments further that Stich and Lawrence fail to dissolve the question of naturalism. This is not true. What they try to achieve is turn it in the direction of normative naturalism and then by making it compatible with Quinean pragmatism, they persevere in their outlook on eliminativism. The positive outcome of course lies in the defence of a hybrid-theory of theory-theory and simulationism. This two theories are purported to explain clearly what is called the sameness of content in as much as technical a way as it would be possible. Stich may be wrong but he is not wrong on account of the reason that he is an eliminativist. Thus we make a natural transition to his overall theoretical account, where we have more scope to consider a blurry of objections.

4.4. **Hybridizing Theory Theory and Simulationism**

Sellars’s myth can be viewed as having three stages:

1. **Inscrutability Premise** : “A stage in pre-history in which humans are limited to what I shall call a Rylean language, of which the
fundamental descriptive vocabulary speaks of public properties of
public objects located in Space and enduring through Time.” For our
purposes, Sellars’s myth can be viewed as having three stages. The
first of these is “a stage in pre-history in which humans are limited to
what I shall call a Rylean language, a language of which the the
fundamental descriptive vocabulary speaks of public properties of
public objects located in Space and enduring through Time.” At this
stage in the myth, our “Rylean ancestors” have no terms in their
language for beliefs, thoughts, or other “inner mental episodes.”

2. **Other-Ascription Premise:** The second stage in the myth begins with
the appearance in this “Neo-Rylean culture” of “a genius - let us call
him Jones.”: Jones develops a theory according to which overt
utterances are but the culmination of a process which begins with
certain inner episodes. And let us suppose that his model for these
episodes which initiate the events which culminate in overt verbal
behaviour is that of overt verbal behaviour itself. In other words,
using the language of the model, the theory is to the effect that overt
verbal behaviour is the culmination of a process which begins with
“inner speech.” In this stage, the theory is only applied to other
people (we can call this as Stich-Stage 1).
3. **Self-Ascription premise:** The third stage shows that Jones and his compatriots learn to apply the theory to **themselves**. They apply it to themselves in much the same way they apply it to others inferring various theoretical claims by attending to their own behavior. And, they discover a new way of applying the language of the theory to themselves (we can call this Stich-Stage 2).

Sellars tells:

> Once our fictitious ancestor, Jones has developed the theory that overt verbal behaviour is the expression of thoughts, and taught his compatriots to make use of the theory in interpreting each other’s behaviour, it is but a short step to the use of this language in self-description. Thus, when Tom, watching Dick, has behavioral evidence which warrants the use of the sentence (in the language of the theory) “Dick is thinking ‘p’” . . . Dick, using the same behavioral evidence, can say, in the language of the theory, “I am thinking ‘p’” . . . And it now turns out-need it have? - the Dick can be trained to give reasonably reliable self-descriptions, using the language of the theory, without having to observe his overt behavior. Jones brings this about, roughly, by applauding utterances by Dick of “I am thinking that p” when the behavioral evidence strongly supports the theoretical
statement “Dick is thinking that p”; and by frowning on utterances of “I am thinking that p,” when the evidence does not support this theoretical statement. Our ancestors begins to speak of the privileged access each of us has to his own thoughts. What began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role.

So, in Sellar’s myth, expressions of the form “I am thinking that P” are theoretical expressions which have acquired a “reporting use in which one is not dreaming inferences from behavioral evidence.”

1) As the myth indicates, one can use the overt verbal behaviour (which expresses ones own thought) is a short-step. The use of self-ascription.

2) This warrants that we can pass from other ascription: Dick is thinking of p for self-ascription : I am thinking of p.

3) Now, Dick is trained to use self-ascriptions without using his behaviour as evidence. The behavioral evidence supports only the other-ascriptions.

4) Obviously, the evidence does not support self-ascriptions. But this can be arrived at from the other ascriptions.

5) So, the self ascription is a reporting use in which one is not drawing inferences from behavioural evidence.
(1) to (4) give us a rule for reporting without inner episode requirement.

Now, Stich turns this to his advantage. He argues that:

1) One can use the above myth to connect self-ascriptions with one’s own behaviour.

2) Such self ascriptions may at times be mistaken causing ‘discrepant’ beliefs.

He says: ‘occassionally, an anomalous event may cause the observed behaviour in the absence of the hypothesized internal state.’ Likewise, reasonably reliable self-ascription without observable behaviour may misfire and that we describe ourselves as thinking that P, in the absence of the hypothesized internal state. Stich’s comment that says that though Sellars himself did not stress the point, there is a more pervasive way in which our self-descriptions might turn out to be wrong, is beside the point.

This is just to muster evidence for cases of Autism or Down’s Syndrome. In fact, the psycho-pathological evidences Stich seeks may not materialize from the above conceptual analysis. The evidences from psycho-pathology on the otherhand might illuminate conceptual analysis.

From this, Stich has recourse to a pair of problems:
1) The myth is actually a myth for the very reason that it embodies, infallible knowledge that is available twin self ascription.

2) It is not consistent with the practice of self and other ascriptions because ascription in one ordinary day-to-day world are not based on such theory (or narrative).

Thus, Stich is not happy with the myth and passes on to neo-Sellarsian myth (of his own) overlooking the Stich-states we have termed as Stich (1) and Stich (2). This actually lends a different colouration to his approach, which is briefly captured below form his latest reflections.

Mind-reading skills in both the first person and the third person cases, can be divided into two categories - detecting and reasoning.

1. **Detecting:** It is the capacity to *attribute* current mental states to someone.

2. **Reasoning:** This capacity is to use information about a person’s mental states (typically along with other information) to make predictions about the person’s past and future mental states, her behaviour, and her environment.

For example, “one might *detect* that another person wants ice cream and that the person thinks the closest place to get ice cream is at the corner shop. Then one might *reason* from this information that, since the person
wants ice cream and thinks that she can get it at the corner shop, she will go to the shop.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Explanation (1)} “the obvious facts about self-attribution (e.g. that normal adults do it easily and often, that they are generally accurate, and that they have no clear idea of how they do it.)”\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{Explanation (2):} “the often rather un-obvious facts about self-attribution that have been uncovered by cognitive and developmental psychologists.” \textsuperscript{52}

Two basic assumptions about the mind are given as below:

\textbf{a) The Basic Architecture Assumption:}

It claims that a well known commonsense account of the architecture of the cognitive mind is largely correct, though obviously incomplete. The basic architecture assumption maintains that in normal humans, and probably in other organisms as well, the mind contains two quite different kinds of representational states, beliefs and desires. The beliefs and desires differ “functionally” because they are caused in different ways and have different patterns of interaction with other components of the mind.

\textbf{b) The Representational account of Cognition}

It maintains that beliefs and desires and other propositional attitudes are relational states. To have a belief or a desire with a particular content is to
have a representation token with that content stored in the functionally appropriate way in the mind.

So, for instance, to believe that Socrates was an Athenian is to have a representation tokens whose content is *Socrates was an Athenian* stored in one’s Belief Box, and to desire that it will be sunny tomorrow is to have a representation whose content is *It will be sunny tomorrow* in one’s Desire Box.

The representational account of cognition assumes that the representation tokens subserving propositional attitudes are linguistic or quasi-linguistics in form.

Stich discusses the three models of the TT account as follows:

The central of the TT account of self-awareness is that the process of reading one’s own mind is largely or entirely parallel to the process of reading someone else’s mind. Those who defend the TT account of self-awareness maintain that “knowledge of one’s own mind, like knowledge of other minds comes from a theory-mediated inference, and the theory that mediates the inferences is the same for self and other - it’s the Theory of Mind,” according to the TT:

1) Detecting one’s own mental states is a theory-mediated inferential process. The theory, here as in the third person case, is ToM (either a
modular version or a just-like-other (scientific)-theories version or something in between).

ii) As in the 3rd person case, the capacity to detect one’s own mental states relies on a theory-mediated inference which draws on perceptually available information about one’s own behaviour and environment. The inference also draws on information stored in memory about oneself and one’s environment.

1. The Crazy Version:

   It proposes to maintain the parallel between detecting one’s own mental states and detecting another person’s mental states quite strictly.

   The crazy version denies the widely held view that an individual has some kind of special or privileged access to his own mental states. This version of TT is sketched in figure.
2. **The Under-described Version:**

The theory-theory version 2 allows that in using ToM to infer to conclusions about one’s own mind there is information available in addition to the information provided by perception and one’s background beliefs. This additional information is available only in the 1st person case, not in the 3rd person case. A sketch of the under-described version is given in Figure.

3. **ToM version**

On the TT version 3, the ToM has access to information provided by perception, information provided by background beliefs, and information about the representations contained in the Belief Box, the Desire Box, etc. This version of the TT is sketched in Figure.
The Monitoring Mechanism Theory:

It is a mechanism that serves the function of monitoring one’s own mental states. Eg., when normal adults believe that p, they can quickly and accurately form the belief I believe that p; when normal adults desire that p, they can quickly and accurately form the belief I desire that p; and so on for the rest of the propositional attitudes. In order to implement this ability we have to require a Monitoring Mechanism (MM) that, when activated, takes representation p in the Belief Box as input and produces the representation I believe that p as output. This account of the process of self-awareness is sketched in Figure
Developmental evidence and the Theory Theory

Stich cites Autism as a support for a Theory Theory account of self-awareness.

Stich and Nichols assume that the empirical evidence produced by developmental psychologists does not support the TT over our Monitoring Mechanism Theory. Rather, they argue that in some cases both theories can explain the data about equally well, while in other cases the Monitoring Mechanism theory has a clear advantage over the TT. They show some problems of the TT versions,
1. Version 1 looks to be hopelessly implausible; it cannot handle some of the most obvious facts about self-awareness.

2. Version 2 is a mystery theory; it maintains that there is a special source of information exploited in reading one’s own mind, but it leaves the source of this additional information unexplained.

3. Version 3 faces the embarrassment that if information about the representations in the Belief Box and Desire Box is available, then no theory is needed to explain self-awareness; ToM has nothing to do.

Stich rejects all the three versions on account of the criticism about ‘extensive parallelism’ which is next described.

The extensive parallelism:

It shows that “our knowledge of ourselves, like our knowledge of others, is the result of a theory.” The argument establishes a broad based empirical case for the TT of self-awareness.

If Gopnik and Meltzoff are right that there is an “extensive parallelism,” that would support the TT since the TT predicts that there will be a parallel performance on parallel theory of mind tasks for self and other. For TT, in order to determine one’s own mental states, one must exploit the same Theory of Mind that one uses to determine another’s mental states. So, if a child’s Theory of Mind is not yet equipped to solve certain third person
tasks, then the child should also be unable to solve the parallel first person task.

In recent years, Stich’s eclectic model draws fire from critics especially from those who are defending a new paradigm of mind-reading as involving self-monitoring mechanism. Carruthers, for example, presents his case for self-model theory of mental activity as part of introspectionism or a revisionary introspectionism. Carruthers distinguishes three accounts of the relationship between third-person mind-reading and first person metacognition. While two of these accounts (Stich and Goldman) endorse the existence of introspection of propositional attitudes, and the third (Carruthers’s) depends on mind-reading upon ourselves. What is conveyed in this review is that mind-reading is neutral between self-ascription and other-ascriptions.

This is just to make it convenient to endorse a claim that our knowledge of our attitudes results from turning our mind-reading capacities upon ourselves however ‘partial’ it might be. Carruthers cites two major observations (experimentally supported) in support of this,

1) We have no subjectively accessible reasons for believing in introspection.

2) The mind-reading system’s model of its own access to its own mind (self-modelling).
Put together, (1) and (2) implies that our introspection is ‘divided’. It is divided in the sense that our access to our own mind is not transparent. What is argued for in received interpretations that I have a mind, I introspect, and my knowledge about myself is infallible, are to be taken with a pinch of salt. Carruthers proves that my mind is transparent (to myself) is not so transparent. Such a conclusion is not very far from the position maintained in the thesis, and stands neutral to both Carruthers and even so, to Stich, or to Bermudez who lays stress on misrepresentation as one of the criteria.

4.5. **Folk Psychology: An Interim Review:**

**Circularity Problem:** It holds that if ordinary mental state terms like belief, desire and pain are to be meaningful, they argued, they can’t refer to unobservable events taking place inside a person (or, worse still not located in space at all). Rather, the meaning of sentences invoking these terms must be analysed in terms of conditional sentences specifying how someone would behave under various circumstances. So for example, a philosophical behaviorists might suggest that the meaning of

1. John believes that snow is white

   Could be captured by something like the following:

2. If you ask John, ‘Is snow white’ he will respond affirmatively
**Functionalist account**

According to the functionalism, the meaning of ordinary mental state terms is determined by the role they play in a commonsense psychological theory. Influenced by Sellar’s myth, Lewis holds, “we think of commonsense psychology as a term-introducing scientific theory, though one invented before there was any such institution as professional science.” Thus the “functional definition” account of the meaning of theoretical terms in science can be applied straightforwardly to the mental state terms used in commonsense psychology:

Imagine our ancestors first speaking only of external things, stimuli, and responses . . . until some genius invented the theory of mental states, with its newly introduced T(heoretical) terms, to explain the regularities among stimuli and responses. But that did not happen. Our commonsense psychology was never a newly invented term-introducing scientific theory—not even of prehistoric folk-science. The story that mental terms were introduced as theoretical terms, is a myth Stich holds,.

“It is, in fact, Sellars’s myth . . . And though it is a myth, it may be a good myth or a bad one. It is a good myth if our names of mental states do in-fact mean just what they would mean if the myth were true. I adopt the working hypothesis that it is a good myth”.
Functionalists maintain that the meanings of mental state terms are given by functional definitions. For this view, *folk psychology is the theory that gives ordinary mental state terms their meaning.*

Two possible answers:

1. **Platitude account:**

   Lewis expounds the idea of the “platitudes” of commonsense psychology. Accordingly, these are generalizations that are “common knowledge” among ordinary folk. These platitudes are the intuitively obvious generalizations. On Lewis view, these platitudes constitute an implicit definition of the terms of commonsense psychology and they are the consciously accessible consequence of a substantially richer set of mostly tacit or unconscious psychological rules and generalizations that people in our culture share. These tacit rules and generalizations also play a central role in explaining folk psychological capacities.

   Thus, on this approach, folk psychology is just a collection of platitudes. We’ll call this the *platitude account* of folk psychology.

2. **Mind-reading account:**

   The mind-reading account holds that people have a rich body of mentally represented information about the mind, and that this information plays a central role in guiding the mental mechanisms that generate our attributions, predictions and explanations. Some psychologists like Gopnik, Wellman and Meltzoff defend this view and use the term ‘theory-theory’ for
it. They maintain that the information exploited in mind-reading has much the same structure as a scientific theory, and that it is acquired, stored and used in much the same way that other commonsense and scientific theories are. But Scholl and Leslie argue that much of the information utilized in mind-reading is innate and is stored in mental “modules” where it can only interact in very limited ways with the information stored in other components of the mind. And, both the modularity theorists and theory-theorists agree that mind-reading depends on a rich body of information about how the mind works. Both these theories share the label information-rich theories. Thus, folk psychology is the rich body of information or theory that underlies people’s skill in attributing mental states and in predicting and explaining behavior.

3. Three accounts of mind reading: Information rich, simulation based and hybrid

Simulation theorists and theory-theorists (information-rich) offer competing empirical theories about the mental processes underlying mind reading. But, recently, an hybrid approach has been accepted by a number of philosophers.

According to this approach, mind reading is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, many facets of which are best explained by an information rich approach, while many other facets are best explained by simulation.
a) Argument from simplicity:

The argument from simplicity is the only reason to prefer a simulation based account of inference prediction over an information rich account. Harris points out that it plays an essential role to convince us that a comprehensive theory of mind reading would have to invoke many different sorts of processes, and that simulation processes would be among them.

b) Argument from accuracy:

The argument holds that the inference prediction is remarkably accurate over a wide range of cases, including cases that are quite different from anything that most mind readers are likely to have encountered before.

1. Desire Attribution:

It is an essential capacity of mind-reading to attribute desires to other people. The desire attribution capacity is necessary for knowing what other people want and to predict or explain their actions. Stich and Nichols maintain that the desire attribution skills do not depend on simulation but rather are subserved by information rich processes.

Stich and Nichols provide two quite different reasons for their claim:

a) desire attribution exhibits a pattern of systematic inaccuracy and that supports atleast an initial presumption that the process is not simulation based.

b) for thinking that the mental mechanisms subserving desire attribution use information-rich processes rather than simulation is that it is hard
to see how the work done by these mechanisms could be accomplished by simulation.

2) **Discrepant Belief Attribution:**

It is an important capacity of mind reading to attribute beliefs that we ourselves do not hold. The discrepant belief attribution includes some relying on beliefs about the target’s perceptual states, others exploiting information about the target’s verbal behavior, and still others relying on information about the target’s non-verbal behavior. All these processes are subserved by information-rich mechanisms, rather than by a simulation mechanism.

Stich and Nichols offer a pair of reasons for this:

a) there is abundant evidence that the discrepant belief attribution system exhibits systematic inaccuracies of the sort we would expect from an information rich system that is not quite rich enough and does not contain information about the process generating certain categories of discrepant beliefs.

b) there is no plausible way in which prototypical simulation mechanisms could do what the discrepant belief attribution system does.
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22. Ibid.


25. Ibid., p. 179  
26. Ibid., p. 186  
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34. See Lewis (1972)  
35. Ibid, Sec. 3  
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233


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