CHAPTER - III

PRAJÑĀKARA GUPTA AND ANALYSIS OF
PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKĀLAṆKĀRA

Prajñākara Gupta (PG) is the author of Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra. This is a sub-commentary of the Pramāṇavārttika of DK, the commentary on Pramāṇaśamuccaya of Dīnāga. Pramāṇaśamuccaya is marked as the magnumopus of Dīnāga in Buddhist logic. PG is remarked as a veteran scholar who belongs to the post Dharmakīrti period in the long history of Buddhist logic. The details about PG’s life is available only in the scattered form. Lama Tārānath mentions this scholar in as a native of Bengal and he lead his life was as a householder in his pūrvaśrama. Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana records that the time of PG may be fixed at the first half of the 10th century AD. He quotes that PG is called as Prajñākaramati, a monk and a keeper of Southern gate of the Vikramāśila University during the period of Canaka dynasty. Another work, viz., Sahāvalambhananiścaya is also ascribed to this writer by him. But later scholars did not admit this remark. According to them Prajñākaramati is different from PG. L. M. Joshi remarks that PG is the teacher of Viniṭadeva who probably flourished in the later half of the 8th century AD.
So Joshi states that PG might have been lived in C.800 AD. Moreover Yamāri, the author of Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkaṇāratīka, wrote a commentary on PG’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkaṇāra, who lived in the period between AD 800-900. The Japanese writer H.Nakamure\(^5\) says that the time of PG might have been fixed as later half of the 7\(^{th}\) century AD. Dr. Radhesyāmdhar Dwivedi\(^6\) gives some remarks about the life of PG. According to him PG belongs to as the period between 700 - 750 AD. Th. Stcherbatsky\(^7\) states that PG is designated as the great exponent in the third stage of Buddhist logic. This stage mainly tries to disclose the deep philosophical content of the system of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti regarding it as a critical system of logic and epistemology. This school aims at development, improvement and perfection of the system. These attempts must have been happened round about the year 800 AD. PG is also regarded as one of the founder of the school of commentators. Th. Stcherbatsky follows the opinion of Tāranāth about his native place and he remembers that the Udayanacarya of 10\(^{th}\) century AD. has criticised PG frequently in his work. Th. Stcherbatsky says that the followers of PG can be divided in three sub-schools of which the exponents were Jina, Ravigupta, Yamāri in respectively.\(^8\) Among them Jina was the most dedicated and spiritual follower of PG and the developer of his ideas.
Ravigupta was the direct pupil of PG. He was popular as the exponent of more moderate approach to his teacher PG than other followers. Yamāri also tries to develop the unexplored field of the content in the work of PG. The great scholar Rahul Sāmkṛtyayana is of opinion that the date of PG can be fixed as the second half of the 7th century AD. From these references mentioned about the time of PG can be fixed as the later half of the 7th century AD.

Another Independent logical work namely Sahālambanirṇayasiddhi is ascribed to PG by L.M. Joshi. Original of this work in Sanskrit is seemed to be lost. Its Tibetan translation exist in Tanjur.

Pramāṇavārttikālaṇkāra - An Analysis

Pramāṇavārttikālaṇkāra is a sub-commentary of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika based on Pramāṇasamuccaya. Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana observes that the Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exist a Tibetan translation and it is divided into two parts. In Tibetan language it is known as Tshad-ma-ṛnam-hgrel-gyi-rgyan. This translation was prepared by the great Kāsmīrian paṇḍita Bhavyaraja and the Tibetan interpreter Blo-idan-scs-rab. This work was prepared under the supervision of numerous sages of great monastery of Vikramśila and the great Paṇḍitas named Srisunaya-srīmitra, Kumārasri of Kaśmire etc. This
work Pramāṇa-vārttikabhāsyā or Vārttikālaṅkāra of PG is a commentary of the chapters from II\textsuperscript{nd} to IV\textsuperscript{th} in Pramāṇavārttika.\textsuperscript{11} He leaves the first chapter accepting the traditional order, i.e., the first chapter is commented by the author himself. This work is preserved as Tanjur collection in two large volumes. PG. did not gave it usual title, like a comment. His work is named as a 'Alaṅkāra'. So this author PG. became popular by this title as 'Alaṅkārakāra' or 'master of ornament'.

Th. Stcherbatsky states that the author wish to intimate the attitude towards the real content which require much more space. It requires the attitude from the students with extra ordinary power of comprehension. Therefore author composes a short ornamentation in order to elicit its ideas. The salient points of these doctrines are meant for the community with less gifted intelligent.

The text Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra (PVA)\textsuperscript{12} was discovered by the great scholar named Rahul Sāmkṛtyayana and published from K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna in 1953. Another publication with Hindi commentary is done by Swami Yogindrānanda namely Vārttikā-laṅkārabhāṣyavākyākhyā from Śaddarśana Prakāśan at Varanasi in 1991.\textsuperscript{13} Swāmi Yogindrānanda is considered as a great living savant of Varanasi. In this work he puts forward not only the translation based on
word to word but he gives its purport with timely explanation through references.

The text in PVA is divided into three chapters, viz. Pramāṇasiddhi paricheda, Pratyakṣaparicheda and Pararthānumānaparicheda. PG starts to comment the second chapter viz. Pramāṇasiddhiparicheda deals with the attainment of the validity of knowledge. In this chapter he defines the need of philosophical basis to develop Buddhism as a religion.

The 'Pramāṇavarttika' begins with the commemorate 'Buddha', "the redeemer and chief who worked for the universal welfare. He is also the consultant of a darśana". The chapter named Pramāṇasiddhi commences with glorifying Buddha who is the source of valid knowledge and the consult of all science related to knowledge.

The third śloka tells us that infinite knowledge is permanent non-polemical and the means for fulfillment. Heat or fire is the basis of cooking, and the basis of a fulfillment is called non-contrary or non polemical.

Buddhists admitted that perception and inference become valid knowledge and verbal cognition has nothing to do with the validity of knowledge. We may doubt that verbal cognition is a knowledge since sound is the medium of communication. We may also doubt that this is a
the sign of pramāṇa such as we mistake the colour of the couch as yellow. The process of cooking is still there, while we dream of it, but actually there is no such process. Therefore the above said sign of valid knowledge has the defect, viz. Ativyāpti. If we add 'faultless' as a sign of it, there is nothing wrong with it. It is also wrong because verbal cognition is based on sound and it is a cognition by sound. The relevance of sound is only when there is communication. Because sound, smell, feelings etc are represented through sense organs. We make use of sound to put across something inferential or seen. Therefore verbal cognition cannot be termed as an independent source of valid knowledge.

Then he discusses about the advantages of verbal cognition. The Vedas are transmitted through sound. They are not divine, because it developed as the result of man's attempt. If Veda has only one meaning can many interpretations by the masters? Vedas are also not valid knowledge since their mantrā's can be interpreted in many ways in accordance with one's vision. Thus vedas are not self explanatory but contradictory. Now we come to know that sound is used for communication as to get verbal and it is not regarded as valid knowledge.

The answer to the question 'whether vedas are eternal or they were composed by any God? If so they were written by whom? Or entrusted
with it? And PG, asks them what 'niyoga' is? Here the author does not accept that 'Niyogin's are the persons appointed by brāhmīns to perform the rituals. Mīmāṃsakas says that Niyogīns are the persons to perform sacrifices and they belong to the brahmin caste. Then some question may arise, who is a brahmin? Are they belongs to a race or a caste? Here some arguments about the karmas belonging to four varṇās namely the brāhmīns, the kṣatriyās, the vaiśyās and the śūdrās are discussed.

Eleven types of Niyogavādins are described here. They are:

1. Śuddha kārya niyogavādins.
2. Śuddha prēraṇa niyogavādins
3. Prēraṇa saṅgata kārya niyogavādins.
4. Kārya saṅgata niyogavādins
5. Oupacārika pravarttakatva vādins
6. Ubhaya sambandha vādins
7. Ubhaya samudaya niyoga vādins.
8. Ubhaya svabhāva nīrmukta vadins
10. Bhōgyarūpa niyogavādins and
11. Puruṣa niyogavādins

Here PG, refutes all these arguments defining the term 'niyoga'. It means when man voluntarily involves in his duties he is called as 'niyogi'.

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Bhavāna nirāsma (Negation of imagination): Mimāmsakas says imaginations are of two types. One is śābdhī bhāvāna and the other one is ārthībhāvāna. śābdhībhāvāna is the action done by a man either by compulsion or prompting of another. It is a verbal duty. This verbal imagination is not niyoga at all. Niyoga is karma or duty and it is not merely verbal. Ārthībhāvāna involves an action (Kriya). Exertion of one's duty results in sacrifices and it is Ārthībhāvāna. But imagination itself is futile since the mantrā's in vedas do not bear any fruit. Action should have a result. PG states that there is no visible result in the Yāgādikriya and it is not believable and here occurs the negation of imagination.

The cooking process results in a preparation but yāgādikriya have no such result at all. Therefore, it is futile and the author gives special emphasis to deny it.

Vyāvahārika pramāṇata (Utility gets authenticity): Sense organs are invalid while wisdom is valid. Jñāna (knowledge) helps one to reject what that is to be rejected and to accept what to be accepted. For example, I see a pot and I touch it. Here perception takes place in the form of knowledge. According to Buddhism the real knowledge is pure perception. The identification of 'pot' as an object other than a pot is the
real one and this first perception leads to real knowledge. According to them the name 'pot' is actually attributed to that object.\textsuperscript{18}

The form of the pot and the ability of the senses constitute that perception, 'a pot'. A knowledge different from this stream of thought is not real knowledge. The perception of this structure of the pot leads to the summation of knowledge. This knowledge is from the information of the senses and not by practice of any.

\textit{Pramāṇabhalabhedāt pramāṇata} (Knowledge identified by further knowledge):- We identify an object by its form and shape or form brings us knowledge. It is not spontaneous. If it is spontaneous, we would get the valid knowledge. So perceptual knowledge is also authentic and real.\textsuperscript{19}

Utility brings validity, but we feel action in dream but they are not valid. Dreams cannot make any utility by themselves, for there is no action. Dreams do not satisfy perceptory inference. More mental pictures or visions in dreams cannot be valid and that is why we depend on inferential knowledge. The knowledge about 'fire' become valid only when there is burning or cooking. The concept of liberation is clarified by the \textit{edification of the śāstras}. Knowledge becomes valid only when the unknown is given known shape, form and perception. At first we get
structural knowledge or sensual knowledge and then it leads to inferential knowledge and thereby to the generalisation. The word 'fire' is acknowledged by the sight of fire and there we get the generalised knowledge that 'fire' is a burning thing which is the real knowledge. Later the word 'fire' itself brings us the perception of its structure and shape.²⁰

We make use of inferential knowledge for those, which are incomprehensible. For example when we say sound is finite, we infer the finiteness of sound. For example "sound is a created one and all creations are subject to decay".²¹ Therefore we infer that sound also will decay. Thus inferential knowledge, which has logical sequence can be considered as valid knowledge.

*Bhagavataḥ pramāṇyaṁ (Buddha, the valid knowledge)*²²:- Perception and inference are valid. How Buddha can be valid? Buddha is a perceptory form and therefore there is valid knowledge and thereby he is the "infinite". He is the dozen of the four noble truths and therefore he is the valid knowledge. This validity is not self sprung, but by the testimony of others. Validity is the accreditation of other people. It is true that Buddha who has the knowledge of non-dualism had valid knowledge.²³

Since substances are mortal, the knowledge about them is also mortal. For if they are to be valid, we have to prove its validity. The
knowledge that God is eternal is wrong for knowledge is acquired and any acquisition is a subject to decay. The knowledge of God has also the same destiny. God is beyond perception and if we acknowledge the eternity of God, we acknowledge the invalidity of it. By perception, we know, fire burns but the power of God is imperceptible and we are helpless to say whether God is eternal or not. Therefore we must acknowledge Buddha as the God who is perceptible.\textsuperscript{24}

\textit{Īśvaradērāprāmāṇyam (Absence of the sufficient means of knowledge to realize God)}\textsuperscript{25}:- Naiyāyikās realise God by retrieval to the old, the shape of the pot and their utility. Atoms end in atoms themselves. Each object has different structures and quality. Each one is placed in its perfect position such as river, the ocean etc. Therefore, they need a creator and thus God gets validity. But these inferences are insufficient to establish the entity of God. It is not right to say that God is behind each action. If so God instead of the potter may mould the pot. But we don’t perceive the intervention of God in any action. It is wrong to believe that the potter is prompted by God. If so who prompts God to make so, is it another God? Then it is a continuous absurdity.\textsuperscript{26}

God is eternal and expects universal welfare. If so, God is responsible for the mistakes and he cannot establish welfare. Thus it is
clear that there is no God. God does not give shape to anything. The clay has no shape at all. The pot is shaped by the imagination of potter. If it is God, the clay itself will have the real shape of a pot.\textsuperscript{27}

Pradhāna nirāsam (The rejection of pradhāna):\textsuperscript{28} According to the sāṅkhya, God is not the cause of the universe. Earth, water and everything is a mixture of well ness, sorrow and desire and therefore they are not real. The created things have shape and colour and so they are not real. Therefore the cause and causation of pradhāna is not God. If so we have an unending series of cause and causation. So we cannot admit pradhāna as the cause of universe.\textsuperscript{29}

Karma kāraṇanirāsam (The negation of action as the cause):\textsuperscript{30} Action is the basis and cause of the universe, action has three dimensions mental, verbal and physical. Mental work is the vital force. Verbal and physical actions are from mental process and they are not visible. Therefore we cannot feel their presence or absence. The virtue and sin from action are also invisible and action cannot claim the cause.\textsuperscript{31}

Paramāṇu kāraṇata nirāsam (Negation of atom as the cause):\textsuperscript{32} Atom or paramāṇu cannot be termed as the cause of everything. If atom is the cause of a pot, the atom itself should have the shape of a pot. Atom is keen and limbless, and a limber object cannot reproduce and without it, it
is invisible. Buddhists do not admit that atoms have a shape at all and the reformed atom is not the cause of the universe.\textsuperscript{33}

Like the pot, earth has a shape therefore if the potter is the creator of the pot, there we can infer that God is the creator of the earth. As a reply to this, it is said that pot has a definite shape where as mountains and earth have no definite shape. It is only a nominal shape. We have measure for one cloth but oceans and mountains have no definite shape.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{Bhagavad pramāṇata-jñānavatvāt} (Buddha is the valid knowledge because of omniscience)\textsuperscript{35}:- Buddha is valid since he has omniscience. Buddha finds out reasons for man's misery and he suggests measures to overcome it. Only the omniscience can lead and guide in such a manner,. Only one enlightened can provide us with the knowledge of salvation, pradhāna and prakṛti. Therefore it is not wrong to consider such a person as the valid one.\textsuperscript{36}

Buddha suggests measures to root out misery and he is the advisor of 'four noble truths'. Desire is the root of all miseries and we can avoid miseries by non-attachment. Misery and its reasons to misery, its eradication and the means of eradication comes under the four noble truths', which Buddha suggested. The knowledge to this truths are
unique one and thereby itself. Buddha can be termed as 'pramāṇa'. He gets pramāṇata through the micro-minute findings of these truths and their means.\(^{37}\)

Buddha is the valid knowledge since he is compassionate and only a compassionate man can feel the misery of others and suggest means to avoid it. This compassion is not acquired by this birth. This is an acquisition from the cycle of rebirths. It is based on a continual process. It is acquired by practice. The mercy which has been transferred from the cycle of rebirths gets fulfillment and then one gets the ability to renovate and reconstruct the whole universe. Buddha is the redeemer and reformer in the sense that he has mercy and sympathy which can save the world from all its miseries.\(^{38}\) Therefore Buddha is termed as valid knowledge.

_ Bhūtacaitanya nirāsam (The negation of the vitality or validity of the five elements)\(^{39}\):-_ Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Sky are the five elements. No one can admit its permanent vital force. Fifty is a number, which comes under the numerical of one hundred, likewise each element is not perfect by itself. The sky has sound as its quality, air has touch, fire has touch and structure and water has touch, structure and taste while earth has all these along with smell. Buddhists rejects this, since all these are absolute
nothingness where as Buddhists accept life as unreal. Each substance is the product of a 'cause'. The senses and intelligence are sources from a particular 'cause'. Body is not the source of its origin. If its origin is from the great elements, then everything should have 'life'. This doesn't occur and the life of animals is not eternal. This will resume till the end of this world. Whether intelligence is not a source from the elements? If we admit elements as the source of prāṇa senses and intelligence, there is the defect, viz, 'Atiprasāṅga'. Sense functions are accordance with the knowledge of the mind. Senses do not function or obey the elements.

DK clarifies it through the forty-first śloka that says mental cognition is not intervened even if any of the sense organs gets lost. If mental balance is lost through fear or sadness, sense organs take no difference of feeling. Therefore sense organs are in working condition based on mental ability. Intelligence is incomparable and there is nothing a kin to it, even the sense based body is not a part of intelligence. It has separate entity and sense organs depend on it and intelligence does not depend on anything.

**Vijñāna siddhi (Attainment of wisdom):** Jñāna (knowledge) is the cause of everything. Senses and intelligence are complimentary. This complimentary basis constitute the universe. Intelligence is related to
whole of births and rebirths like a seed generates the next tree. Matter is based on a cause and the cause of this birth is the cause of the last birth as experiences are based on the previous birth. Forty sixth śloka clarifies the possibilities of the cycles of births and rebirth. The cause of the constituents like cognition, senses of body are from the cycle of births and rebirths. The former is the cause of the latter. In short, desire of the previous birth is the cause of this birth. A birth that has got fulfillment has no rebirth at all. Fulfillment or liberation is getting knowledge and we get knowledge when we erase attachment and desire for the knowledge can take us to 'liberation'. When one erases desire and attachment, he overcomes the senses and acquires state of being liberated.

Matter is depended on 'upadānakāraṇa' i.e.- body decays through death and Citta which is full of knowledge remains. The śloka fifty-one clarifies, it with the help of 'Saptamī Vibhakti', while interpreting these state. The Interpretation of 'asminsatidam' Buddha states the sign of 'cause' as "this from that". The infinite cause becomes finite cause. Without the Infinite there is no finite. Here occurs the abstract and the concrete infiniteness.

Kāraṇa padārtha ('Cause as a substance')- The pot is the product of the joint venture of the potter, wheel, clay etc. They are the causes of a
pot. Here which is the real cause? The answer is that the last event before the substance is regarded as real the cause of the pot.\textsuperscript{50}

Cārvākas find vitality (caitanya) in the body. Therefore caitanya decays along with the body. Their liberation is inaccessible. The Paralokavādins do not accept this. According to them body does not have caitanya. Therefore fulfillment of body does not result in mental or spiritual fulfillment (cittanivṛtti). In effect we get the transcendalism of births and rebirths. When there is citta (mind) there is life and its external actions (praṇāpāna). Praṇāpānas are not the cause of citta. 'Citta in action' is called as 'cetana'. In that form cetana is also the cause of prāṇa, apāna (inhale and exhale etc.).\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{Vasanābalādutpatti (Mind as the result of the mindset culture)}\textsuperscript{52}:- An erotic dreams is co-active or partially active therefore it has truth. The existence of such dreams depends on the culture or mindset of the person. Transcendalism is the process like the childish mind turning into the mind of the adult. For example, there is a knowledge in dream and it is not conscious and the conscious mind does not create a dream. In other words we cannot be both conscious and non-conscious simultaneously. When the body decays, the citta transcends, to another even into a far off one.\textsuperscript{53}
Perceptual knowledge cannot acquire this mystery of transcendent meditation. We depend on inferential knowledge for the knowledge of this transcending life of citta. Degeneration is not out of cause. If destruction is by destructive forces, what shall be the basis of 'existence'. Existence becomes valid until there is destruction. Destruction of any substance is a natural process. Citta has existence as far as the forces of destruction are absent. If body is the abode of the citta, body becomes only an instrument for the manifestation of the citta. Citta is the cause of all knowledge. It is not an active substance like the body. So it is dependent of the body. The citta gets into caitta by the absorption of the consciousness of the cycle of births. Then there may arise a question, whether these will be a universal citta on the basis of all these numberless cittas such as threads in a single cloth. PG follows the opinion of DK that we make use of instruments like pot to restrain the flux of water. Likewise knowledge, action etc. are inactive in substance and action, and it is futile to ascertain any basis on them. Therefore body is not dependent on citta. Body and citta are a co-habitual experience. Citta migrates from one body to another. Knowledge and other cittavyāpāra exist through practice. It is not by the exercise of the body. Knowledge does not occur in the body. Knowledge takes place in the citta and its basis is on the
previous citta of previous body. Therefore the only reliable thing is not the body but the citta which has a transcending nature. Lamp is the source of light, and it is wrong to say that body is the source of citta, for the things based on knowledge like the 'rasāyana' are not of the body but of the citta.  

If any one posses the experience in all śāstras in his previous births, surely he has the excellence of it in this birth. Life, memory and intelligence are the dimensions of knowledge. Happiness produces desire and sadness makes anger and thereby we assess that body is not responsible for desire and anger. Such as the increase of humor, phlegm, choler makes fever and dementia. This is caused by the spontaneity of citta. Son may represent the nature and character of his parents. Therefore parents are the cause of the son and not the previous birth. They are like the parent trees. It is not compulsory that the son should possess all nature of his parents. Some natures also come from the issue of self exercise.

**Punarjanma parigraha (Acceptance of rebirth)**: Birth takes place by conception. Life has self love and therefore it has the quest to renounce misery and enjoy happiness. The servant works according to the will and pleasure of his master. Similarly citta transcends to another by the will of
God. This concept is wrong since the work of all is not by the compulsion of others. Citta transcends in accordance with its own desire.\(^5^9\)

**Antharābhava dēha (Transmigration of the citta)**\(^6^0\):- Why don't we experience life getting into another? Because our senses are not competent to experience it. Senses are helpless to lead this transmigration. This transition from one body to another is mystic and invisible. But it happens and this transmigration may take place to distant places. This knowledge is available to yogīs. They practise it to eliminate desire and other things from their life and so they have no transition at all.\(^6^1\)

**Avayavanirāsa (The negation of organs)**\(^6^2\):- Knowledge is not away from the body. Body is the amalgam of molecules and whether each molecule has this knowledge in acquisition to be answered. The whole of the molecules constitute a single body and it has only one organ and that organ is the basis of physical function.

According to Naiyāyikas, different organs constitute the body, they have no isolated function. Organs are dependents of body. Every thread in cloth does not reflects colour, likewise every organ in the body is not valid by themselves. A 'pot' is the amalgam of molecules, have not the
shape of a pot. In short atoms lack shape from and size in its widest extent.

Then he arises a counter opinion about the body. If it composite of paramāṇu or dvaṇuka etc knowledge can be produced or acquired by a single organ etc. In other words the organs of the body have no isolated existence. If each organ can acquire some knowledge at a time, then there are much knowledge acquired at a time. His replay is that ‘this is inadmissible’? Atoms without an organ has no union and therefore atoms themselves have no validity.63

Vijñāna kārapam (Wisdom as the cause)64:- Body is a product of the great elements. Even if an organ is mutilated knowledge takes place ceaselessly. According to Buddhist, vijñāna comes out from jñāna and an experience of it may produce a single one. In other words experience are divergent.65

Karmasiddhi (Attainment of action)66:- It is wrong to assume that body is the source of Vijñāna. Valid knowledge comes from jñāna and jñāna begets vijñāna. Body which is devoid of jñāna cannot get vijñāna. If body is the source of vijñāna then where does Buddhijñāna comes from? It is a transitional knowledge from karma. The knowledge about cloth does not bring in the knowledge of a “pot”. The collective consciousness of Vijñāna
is termed as "karma". Some philosophers think that the doctrine of karma has more importance than dharma. According to them karma designs the body as the abode of desire of a person. PG replies to this that the coexistence of the karma and Vijñāna is mystical and invisible. Body is not the source of Vijñāna. Transmigration takes place even without a physical body and the cause of this transmigration is the mind which is evolved from the karma.⁶⁷

*Karuṇābhyāsa (The practice of compassion)*⁶⁸:- Omniscience gets through practice. Compassion will get solutions to everything. Practice brings up our logical reasoning and thereby we get the ability to solve problems. Compassion is acquired by practice. When we feel 'to be compassionate' we become competent enough to give relief to others and their problems. Hatred is to be eliminated through practice. Compassion is the practice of mercy. We get non-attachment by practising, mercy and this compassion helps one to relieve the living beings from their miseries.

Buddha is valid since he is the redeemer. He is non-attached and capable of eliminating misery and he is valid one. Only the non-attached one can deprive others from their misery. One becomes worthy of exploration only when he can solve the problems of man and thus lead
mankind to mōkṣa. The eradication of misery should be achieved through practice and thereby one can get liberation. Misery disappears when one renounces the self, desire and ambition.⁶⁹

Transmigratory knowledge is an indirect acquisition. Knowledge relates action and its results revealing the cause and causation. Inferential knowledge works as in direct and they are also useful for self realisation. Realisation is the work of the senses. The knowledge of the future takes place through inferential knowledge.

Yogi get prophetic powers through the zenith of their mental cognition.⁷⁰ The knowledge is the result of abstinence from desire and ambition. For example hunger can be eliminated by constant practice. The good and evil comes from practice. Buddha renounced desire and ambition and thereby he eliminated the misery of others. He showed others, the means to escape from misery.

Sugata means one who has attained his 'self'. Buddha is valid since he had attained himself. So he could empty his self through self realisation. Anātmavāda or no soul theory is the result occurs from the absence of self. Self realization through self-denial results the eradication of misery. The craze for praśastata, (being recognized) janmābhāvata (to be free from rebirth) and niśāsesata. Niśāsesata means the absence of
weakness of the body. The use of evil words and re-foundation are causes for the weakness of the body. Buddha has nothing of these and he could lead others to the right path so he is valid.

Buddha is valid owing to his paripālana karma. He was compassionate and renounced the world and spent his life in extreme 'yoga' (tapa). Buddha followed the four noble truths and illuminated others with his compassion and thus he is valid. Therefore noble truths are the capacity to know the nature of misery, the cause of misery, its prevention and the means to its prevention.

According to him misery, desire and ambitions are the causes of misery. Ego and egoism leads to misery. Its absence is the state of wellness. Desire makes one well or happy. The desire is a permanent one and wellness comes out of it. For example the misery of 'hunger' can be satisfied by food and thereby wellness is created. Thus wellness or happiness is acquired while misery is even pervading. It cannot be acquired since it is already present.

Desire is the cause of misery which is not of phlegm, choler and melancholy which are known as "Tridōṣa" it is wrong to ambition comes from phlegm and choler begets hatred, and water creates desire (rāga). Desire and ambition are inherent.
Bhūtacaitanya nirāsam (Negation of desire as a product of the elements): Here PG negates the tridosa theory of sāńkhya or their followers. Desire is not the result of 'phlegm' the elements have their inherent nature. The emphasis on earth and water result in 'desire' and the emphasis on fire and air results in 'anger' and the emphasis on water and air results in ambition. This is a false statement. The element has no structure. The hardness of earth, the coolness of water, the heat of fire are their eternal basis. Wellness is a process of interior experiences. Wellness and knowledge do not occur from the elements. Wellness has no shape, it is an experience. Vījñāna is from the cycle of births and rebirths desire and ambition are the reason for this rebirth. Wellness is a form of eternal ignorance (avidyā) and it is peripheral and not real. This universe itself is a place of misery.

The salient features of misery, are Anityata, Dukhata, Śūnyata and Anātmata. The experience of misery is occasional and therefore it is not permanent. Everything is not available simultaneously.

Samudaya satya (Cause of misery): The causes are of four types viz. Hetuta, Samudayata, Prabhavata and Pratyayata. Misery and the cause of misery are occasional and therefore it has no permanence. Desire is
the root of all misery. The desire has three dimensions namely the desire
to be well, the desire to have rebirth, the desire to get rid of misery.

Every substance has a natural quality, but it need not be of a eternal nature. For example the sharpness of a needle may not last long. Misery is with a reason, but God is not its reason, if we infer an eternal substance as the cause of misery it will be altogether a countless misery. Desire is the root of misery. In the absence of desire, rebirth ends. Self-love is the source of desire. Love is inherent in the self and this self works for happiness out of self love which is related to ignorance, desire and karma of worldly things. But karma doesn’t inspire one without desire.

Nirōdha satya (Knowledge of the features of one who overcome the whole miseries)⁷⁸:- Nirodhata, śāntata, uttamata, nirmuktata are the features of nirōdhasatya. Those who are in the bondage of the world can never set themselves free. Those who are non-attached will get mokṣa (liberation). Those who like to eliminate other’s misery, must not be miserable. To eliminate misery, one should avoid desire and get into work without any thought of return. He will not have rebirths. Only those who are compassionate may feel empathy. The spirit of karma never declines a man who is compassionate.⁷⁹
**Satkāyadṛṣṭerigama (Negation of satkāyadrṣṭi)**: The eight path of right resources is the means for the prevention of misery. Rebirth does not take in the absence of self-love, one who has craze for, wellness and desire not to have sorrow gets into self love. His motivation is only for wellness. Rebirth does not occur to one who has selflessness.

**Bandhamokṣa (Release from bondage)**: The stage after mokṣa is happiness. The moment of liberation and moment of parituṣṭi are different. Deliverance is from the release of bondage. Eternal happiness occurs only after the attainment of liberation and it is ever lasting.

A substance cannot be valid and invalid simultaneously. Presence and absence cannot go together, either presence or absence is the only material fact.

**Mārgasatya (The four structures of the means to the prevention)**: The means to the prevention of misery have four spheres. Māṛgārūpa, Śāntarūpa, Uttamatva and nissaraṇa. The key to the prevention of misery is selflessness. Selflessness can be acquired only by practice. A self-motivated person can never avoid the ‘Doṣa’ (defect) in him. He has only self-love and is not able to realize the ‘Doṣa’ or defect of him. Yogins have the power to get devoid of their self-love. They also suggest the means to avoid the misery of the whole universe.
**Mārgabhāvāna (The means of imagination)**: The vision of selflessness is the right one. One has to eliminate the desires in order to access it. The thought of the 'self' leads one to desire and 'doṣa' leads to hatred. The sukhāsadhana of the self is merit and its dukhāsadhana creates demerit. Self sacrifice is the means of selflessness. Citta is the dependant on intelligence, wellness and sorrow. When one rejects all these and gets into wellness and he reaches liberation. PG. quotes the theory of Vaiśeṣika to refute it "the existence of the soul is related to substance and this is the valid according the Vaiśeṣikas. Soul is a state of consciousness with wellness and this is related to body and it is joint consensus. Soul is absent where there is no consensus between body and soul.

**Anātmavāda (No soul theory)**: Soul is sinful by itself. Man is with a stick only when he uses it. Likewise the knowledge of desire comes only when one comprehends 'desire'. Caittajñāna is related with yogi jñāna. It has micro dimensions. It is invisible to common man. Ignorance is the reason for anger and it leads to the knowledge of the consumer and consumption makes the world complicated and thereby the consuming self also creates doṣa.

According to sāṅkhya, the feeling of the union between prakṛti and puruṣa does not helps one to get deliverance from misery. But the
knowledge about the prudence of prakṛti and puruṣa results liberation. Puruṣa is pure by itself. Prudential knowledge delivers liberation to the self. This is remark is refuted by PG here (See Vs No. 251). He says that prakṛti and puruṣa are variant. The degradation of body and rebirth are different from the self. Self-centered motivation in puruṣa makes 'anurāga' with his soul with senses and the misery formulated by it. Self motivated puruṣa will not be non attached. The attachment to self creates desire and elimination of desire is the deliverance from misery.88

Similarly he states that Verbal authority of the Vedas do not lead to liberation. We can acquire knowledge about the self through Vedas and Mantrās. Material pleasures are the subject to decay and its pleasure has no permanent effect. The misery can eradicate through acquiring the intention from the teaching of great men. These teachings get validity. But all verbal cognition from Vedas can’t be accepted as valid knowledge.

He exemplifies 'The fried seed do not germinate, they become impotent because of heat'. Likewise, if desire is fried in the fire of non-attachment, rebirth will be stopped for ever. It means if we have the attitude to erase our desire and get to the stage of non-attachment. Ignorance begets desire. And thus practice of no soul theory brings us knowledge.89
Sins are immaterial, since soul is formless. Soul has no form. But matter has a form. It is wrong to say that virtue has a form and sin is its deformation. Sin and virtue are not substances. The solution to sin is the attainment of liberation, rituals based on hymns incantations or praise of Gods do not bring us liberation. Through the karma of the previous birth we get desire and false knowledge. The new birth is the result of previous one. Those who have attained liberation has no emotion in worldly affairs. If soul is eternal, there is no question of rebirths.\(^9\)

The self has always posses rāgādīdoṣa. Through the two hundred and seventieth śloka he rejects the argument of the Vaiśeṣikas who give much importance to soul. If soul is to be pure, it should free itself from rāgādīdoṣa, Vaiśeṣikas argues that soul is the lord and the consumer. Neither one can do something be a consumer nor he is a producer. Nothing can be good and bad simultaneously. So the realization of the soul is rejected by the author.

He replies that it is the difficult for the self to recollect the previous experiences. It also does not get the effects from the actions of previous birth. For the person remembered and the person experiencing are different. Karmaphala cannot be transferred. Mind is numberless, so karma is also numberless. Self is only one, then where the individual
difference will occur? Self cannot be identified by inferential knowledge. It is impossible to know about the self through the Vedas. Then why self is absent from the universe? In answering to this question, Buddha proposes the four noble truths. Sthīrakārata, Sukhākārata, atmīyākārata and ātmākārata these are the devices to eliminate trṣṇa (desire) and its roots from the world.

The true vision of selflessness, and thereby the destruction of desire and acquisition of liberation, through Bandhamokṣa. Ignorance can be eliminated and desires are to be eliminated. Liberation is through tearing of karma, the destruction of karma occurs when desire is eliminated. If karma is destroyed, the body disappears. Then desire is to be eliminated and thereby we can avoid karmaphala and rebirth.

Liberation attains through the destruction of karma. Body and karma do not disappear unless desire is eliminated. The personal mind takes a universal attitude i.e., the misery of the world becomes one with the person. The person who get liberation has no pleasure or sorrow. Wellness is through Śubhakarma. Then we should work for wellness. In this context there is no state as wellness. Everything is misery wellness is an illusion. It can be an important experience except in liberation.
Sugatatva is through providence when we infer the sign of fire through, smoke. Likewise the four noble truths helps to infer the sign of providence in Buddha. The word sugata means, the one who attained the true knowledge, eternal knowledge and permanent objects is never reborn. So Buddha is valid. Since Buddha is capable of interpreting the four noble truths and quenching the misery of the universe. Sugatatva is one who has exhorted and exemplified the four noble truths.  

Buddha, the teacher attains validity through absolute knowledge. The compassionate Buddha tried to quench the miseries of others. He is the valid knowledge, since he is compassionate and non-attached. Buddha is the valid one and our inferential knowledge becomes valid. We realise him as the absolute knowledge. Thus Buddha becomes valid through the means of valid knowledge. So he becomes the object of valid knowledge and means of valid knowledge. 

Pratyakṣa Paricheda

After discussing the general features of the two valid knowledge, viz. perception and inference. PG starts to discuss its specified meaning or terminal identification. Both these valid knowledge have infallibility and given validity. When substances have perceptible connection, they have svalaksāṇajñāna and when they are inferential they have general
knowledge. There is no other valid knowledge without these two distinctions. We get the complete or the perfect knowledge of a substance owing to our first knowledge about an object.

Knowledge of association gets from the perceptual knowledge to the inferential one. Knowledge of association is impossible without the visual knowledge of an object. The water in the desert is a meaningless one since water is not available or seen in the desert. Similarity and dissimilarity or semblance and resemblance are the different state of knowing based on perception. Perception makes true knowledge possible as memory makes inferential knowledge. Possible memory of perceptibility in knowledge leads to inferential ability. Perception brings us knowledge about something and it is through the senses. Perception of knowledge is self-sprung or spontaneous.

*Paramārthasat and samvṛtisat* - Fire gets suitability through burning. Likewise, according to Buddha, paramārthasat are not so as called samvṛtisat. Paramārthasat is the original sign and samvṛtisat reflects general sign. Everything in this world is based on this type of both knowledge and those object based not on this knowledge is devoid of error. This infallibility is not acquired by perception or inference.
Buddhists do not accept the concept of the soul theory of Naiyāyikas. Buddhist accepts only two types of valid knowledge as valid, and they believe that the soul has no eternity. An eternal object cannot make the cognition of an object. According to Naiyāyikas soul is eternal and knowledge is the quality of soul. Soul is the abode of knowledge dharma, adharma etc.\(^{98}\)

Inferential knowledge doesn’t bring the knowledge of causation before ‘cause’. It means that there is no inference of something having not proceeded by perceptual knowledge. In other words without perception inference is not possible. The subject of inference does not involve perceptual knowledge, if so inference does not work there. If cognition and cognisant are different and we infer infallibility on both, it is equal to a saying that burning is there without fire. For example we feel the process of burning, in a dreaming stage but actually there is no such process at all.

If we visualise an object, we get perceptual and sensory knowledge of it. Inferential knowledge is an indirect means and inference also comes out from perceptive memory. The inferential knowledge is possible only through the knowledge of association with sense organs and object.\(^{99}\)
Sāmānyanirāsam (The rejection of samānya kalpaṇa)\textsuperscript{100} :- If there is no relation between cause and causation, everything become weak. We know that the germination of the plant is from its seed. The knowledge of causation attained from the cause is the samvṛti knowledge. Inference leads to perception or perception leads to inference, both there is, it has a cause and without cause there is no matter. The matter is visible in world through mental construction (world). It is wrong to say that every visible object has its own validity. Validity or futility is based on 'samvṛtijñāna'. Thus Buddhist rejects common things through samvṛti.\textsuperscript{101}

Sāmānyacinta ( Thought of generalization)\textsuperscript{102}:- It is wrong to say that infallibility is both in svalaṅkaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa; infallibility is not possible in sāmānyalakṣaṇa. For example eyes help us to get the knowledge of shape from the association or contact of object based on our intellect. Here svalaṅkaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa has nothing to do with vision other than the eyes. Intelligence is depended on the impression, which is acquired in the former birth and it is not depended on common knowledge. It is wrong to say that, we get perception of an object only if it exists. Knowledge which is contrary to perception also can create consciousness of the matter. No substance is different from its form. Each substance has a common reliable factor. When clay is
moulded, we get a pot and the wholes. *Someness* of the pot makes its possible to contain water. If the pot is piece by piece, it cannot contain water.

Generalisation is an inferential topic. Verbal knowledge is also a general cognition, therefore we cannot say the sound is valid; one lacks the other. Buddhist opines that generalisation of the state of being generality (*Samānānām bhāva*) \(^{103}\) The pleasure from the sound is a mere feeling. It is an illusionary knowledge. Therefore Buddhists do not accept verbal cognition as valid. The word 'pot' does not give us any knowledge. When we see 'pot' we get the knowledge of its shape. It cannot be considered as a verbal cognition. The things we see in dreams such as black elephant, white clothe etc. give the feeling of real knowledge but the knowledge from dream can not accepted as true knowledge. The elephant that we see in our dreams is as same as the elephant we see in real. In its shape and form elephant is the same but it lacks presence and that is why we lacks its material apprehension. So we can't see the elephant when we awake from the dream at the next moment. Thus we rejects the opinion of others related with sāmānya. \(^{104}\) We cognize mere general conditions through sound and not in person. It is wrong to say that to understand the person, senses are essential, because when the
person is absent the knowledge of 'mere essential' does not possible. The awareness of common sensory knowledge gets only from the presence of individual object. According to Buddhist the knowledge of shape is from the sensory connection with objects and senses. But the knowledge about the qualities like black, white etc., get from inferential knowledge.

The awareness of matter is of two kinds, Inferential and sensory, Pratyaksa is through the sense organs. The shape of one man is different from another. This term man is individually different and it has no shape. Cow has the common features of a cow and it can be called as cowness (gotva) similarly man can be designated as a person being possessed with manness (manuṣyatva). Here the general term 'manness' is applicable to all men even though the shape of each man is different from each other.¹⁰⁵

The 'yellow colour' of a couch is a material acquirement. Samanyajati cannot be defined by the shape of a person or by its different dimensions. 'There is a pot', 'there will be a pot' etc. represent samanyajñāna and they are also representative based on the term of 'potness'. But we cannot say that cloth is a pot as it entirely different from the later.
"Hare has no horn", we cannot make such assumptions. This is a non-existing thing and 'hare-horn' is an example of non-existing thing. There are two valid knowledge since there are two valid objects. This states that there are two valid knowledge and they materialise the Buddhist theory. Sāmānyalakṣaṇa is inferable with differences and it cannot be termed as 'paramārthasaṅ'. Inferential can be acquired by conventional (vyavahara). So it cannot be accepted as 'paramārthasaṅ'.

The valid knowledge on perception is based on the knowledge of self nature and inference is based on its general feature. Inferential knowledge is also valid since it is inferable. Fulfillment and infallibility can ascertain its validity. Perceptible knowledge identifies the object with its specific signs. But inferential knowledge identifies the object with its general signs. Perceptual knowledge receives only what is sensible. Perception and inference are complementary. Without one, the other is impossible. It is meaningless to say perception occurs after inference or inference comes after perception. The knowledge of fire on the mountain cannot be identified without sensory perception.¹⁰⁷

Knowledge is of two types and these topics also gets two dimension of matter, which may not get due dimension of knowledge. Because knowledge is an experience of the thing what is to be acquired.
The object of knowledge can lead some one to the means of knowledge. Inferential knowledge does not get access in the absence of the object. According to Naiyāyika absence can be acquired, through verbal knowledge. But according to Buddhists, inference for sake of others can acquires absence.\(^{108}\) Infallible knowledge is valid and the symptom of valid knowledge in inference and therefore inference is also valid.

The Śimśapa tree and it distinctive features and are one and the same as a tree.\(^{109}\) We get the sense of other world through verbal communication, likewise we get the knowledge of inference also. Senses work according to these worthy eyes. Without eye, sight is futile. Sight brings worth to the eyes. Likewise all senses become self accomplished only when they have their own power as valid. Because it helps to remember only those that have been experienced. The visualised object is valid when it remember them and they are present in memory. Memory helps to recognize an identified object.

*Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension)*\(^{110}\):- Non-apprehension helps to get the knowledge of the absence of an apprehended object. We cannot get the awareness from any saying like ‘Fire is Cold’, because of the contradicted state of fire and cold. And it is pratisedha. Non-apprehension is the absence of something. It is the continuation of
another object other than this such as fire brings heat and thus there is
the absence of cold.

The common features of a cow resemble in all other cows. Śimśapa is a tree
and it has the common features of treeness and Śimśapatva. So the memory
of the association as a tree is related with the Śimśapa which is experienced
by us. This association between this object with that object relies on the
experiences based on other similar objects.

**Pratyakṣacinta (Perception)**⁴¹⁴:- According to Buddhist, perception is a
knowledge which is devoid of error and imagination. Then it becomes
valid knowledge, when we are free from all external thought and mind is
fully concentrated on that object. The knowledge what comes through the
eyes it is called visual perception. But this perception through senses
cannot be perceptive when it comes through memory.

Memory is only a knowledge, which acquired in the past and it is a
continuation of the acquired former impression. We get cognition through
many ways. But only one knowledge takes place at a moment. There is
only one knowledge occurs at a moment. Pot has a common dimension
and this common feature makes the knowledge of its shape and form.
'Pot' has no specific meaning when we hear this term for the first time and
it does not represent the intention specified. It is the work by which we are able to express a meaning that we have gone through the senses. But it does not apply visibility there. It is mere 'imagination'. The wrong and rightness of the same topic in our mind creates different world based on mental worlds. But we feel the two mental worlds are the same and the compatibility of knowledge about the same thing is only repetition and it is not a variant of the first five sense organs make five experiences and theory do not create five types of Knowledge. It is wrong to say like Śankaraswāmin that true knowledge is experienced through the senses as the children may do.\textsuperscript{112} Because children may go wrong in their perception. Therefore the knowledge through senses may not lead to the right perception.

\textit{Sāmānyanirasa (Rejection of commonness or generality)}\textsuperscript{113}: The man with a stick shows that the man is having a stick with him. And if they are to come in our memory, we should have the previous knowledge of a man and a stick. We should know that a stick is like this. But the qualities or features of a man is not decided by these commonness or generality. So the knowledge from senses may not be the true knowledge. When we say a 'cow' we get the memory of its shape but we don't have its
qualities. In such case we perceive it through the knowledge of its structure.

Avayavinirāsa (The negation of the self through limbs or organs)\textsuperscript{114}:-

Clothes are made of threads and threads unite together to make a cloth. But cloth without threads is a meaning perception. The waving of a single thread does not produce air, but when we wave a piece of cloth, we can feel the presence of air. So the connection of threads makes a cloth and like wise we identify an object with its different features.

Nanumānāt sāmānyasiddhi (Inference does not lead one to identify quality)\textsuperscript{115}:- Quality does not include in the shape of an object but it is something adjacent to it. It is impossible to distinct persons and quality. Man has manness and cow has the cowness. But it is impossible to sort out as quality of an object. Man is with manly qualities and it is not to be guessed out. When we see a man we can recognize manness through gestures.

Anyāpoha cinta (Each object has its own specified identity)\textsuperscript{116}:- The name itself indicates its specified identity. Cow, the word itself denies all other signification like cloth, pot etc.. The word is self explanatory, pot has a shape and the things other than pot having other shapes are do not belong to potness. This is 'anyāpoha'. A woman have different roles like
mother, sister and daughter. These are different from Kevalajñāna. Every woman has the resemblance of womaness. The word 'cow' brings us knowledge based on its shape, then comes the verbal consciousness. The true knowledge takes place at the first and then it follows the other qualities. Thus every object represent its own objectivity other than it. It is called 'anyāpoha'.

Śabdakalpana nirasa (The negation of validity of verbal knowledge which happen through sensory experience)^117:- The true knowledge based on sensory perception has no verbal knowledge. Like wise verbal memory is also absent there. We see only the 'mere objects' through the eyes, here there is no memory or adjectives, verbal memory cannot come from vision. After the vision, the sound or verbal recognition makes it possible to identify it. In other words verbal cognition comes after sensory participation. Eyesight brings only visual perception of the object, not memory. Can we cognize an object at first sight without any adjectives or qualification? Then verbal cognition follows and identifies an object with name, genus etc. At the final stage also the absolute knowledge only exist without the qualifications. Thus Buddhists accept that we get the perceptual knowledge only at the first moment. In the second moment we
get the knowledge of its extended level. Thus we get different layers of knowledge of an object.

Two experiences are always different. When we feel or know the heat of the fire, we have no experience of cold. The knowledge through the sense can’t be experienced as verbal knowledge. We identify objects through senses and in it knowledge memory also has role. The expression 'cow' brings us the knowledge about the shape of a cow. Sensory perception means the perception with the help of the senses. Here senses are more important than the objects based on senses. 'Pot' is an amalgam of different atoms and we can see the pot, but we cannot see the atoms independently, which contained in the pot as a composite. We can’t perceive so many objects at a time. But we can perceive an object where it is an amalgam of many objects in a particular form.

We can see a peacock of multi-colours. Here the knowledge which we get through the perception and there multi-formed knowledge help to get the idea of a single object in our intellect. In our intellect or cognition we get the idea of many constituent like multi colour shape and the structure of that creature, its sound its, posture, its expression etc. which occurs simultaneously in our knowledge. Here multi coloured peacock and the perceiver have some roles in the process of attaining
knowledge. Through this attainment the process of seeing will be accomplished through its fulfillment. Intellect is only helpful to perceive some things. When we perceive an object, we may not cognize to all its features, but concentrate mainly on that object other than on its salient features. Later we understand the uniqueness and features of that object and there by we get the true knowledge about that object.

*Arthakriya (Attaining fulfillment)*\(^{119}\):- Substances are different owing to their nature. When we see something there are the minute parts of it, but eyes are not capable to see these particles. Then how does eyesight works without seeing the atoms? We can see the pot while accumulating the union of atoms, but then why the eyes do not see the atoms directly. DK tries to explain this through these verse.\(^{120}\) He says that the known objects, and the objects to be known are different. We identify those that comes under our knowledge and those beyond cannot be identified, because, our senses are powerless in identifying the remote object. To identify them, we have to practice in enriching our experience. Then PG tries to analyse how the absolute knowledge can be accumulated through practice.\(^{121}\) For attaining this he initially explain the nature of true knowledge.
The primary and secondary steps of perceptions are not attained by vision and they are not memory also. Memory comes from inference. Knowledge through the senses is valid since they bring us fulfillment. Sensory knowledge becomes clear with self nature and verbal knowledge is not clear in that sense. Verbal expression is attributed by someone to an object and validity depend on the person who instructs about that object. So we include it in inference. But sensory knowledge is different and it depend upon the sense organs. The knowledge through touch are different from smell because of the variety of organs.

*Mānasapratyakṣam (Mental perception)*\(^\text{122}\) :- Visibility are of three types mental, self-realised and intuition or Yogipratyakṣa. Mental vision occurs in the mind. Realization comes through the senses. Yogipratyakṣa is intutional. Desire and knowledge in the mind is also a kind of *self-erected one*. Mental cognition may be comprehended that what cannot be comprehended by the senses.

The first sensory perception gets into the mind and then gets contemplation. The knowledge of an object occurs through senses in the first moment and mental cognition follows as the second one. There are many causes for a single object and object of comprehension is the knowledge of that cause.
Svasamvedanapratyakṣa (Perception of self realization): It is the perception of desire, anger, happiness and sorrow, these are mental impression such as the feelings like desire etc that takes place in one’s own self and not in others.

If one believes that the knowledge about happiness or pain have occurred as a result of the action in his former birth that knowledge becomes its basis. If one believes that the knowledge about desire and other things from his inherent base, that knowledge is a wrong one. Karma is the reason of this. Happiness is also connected with cognition and it is related to mind. Senses do not enjoy happiness when they are centred on mind. If happiness is the product of exercise like the learning of a child to walk, it is not a conscious effort. Happiness and other things are consciously made. We get cognition through imagination, likewise happiness also comes out of this imagination. This happiness from imagination is experienced through cognition.

Citta is eternal and free and it does not depend on anything. But happiness and other feelings are the qualities of it and these qualities are short living. Then how can this eternal happiness can exist externally without soul? Buddhists do not accept the concept of soul, they call it Cittasambandha or Caitta. A non-existing thing does not depend on
anything, therefore soul does not exist. It is said that eye enjoys sight and this is wrong. Happiness is enjoyed not by eye, it is by the mind. Through sense organ we only identify external objects and happiness is decided by the mind. Knowledge brings happiness and ignorance brings sadness. Happiness is through the pure knowledge because of its relation with knowledge.\textsuperscript{124}

Sāṅkhya believes that happiness, sadness, desire structure are external things and these experiences can be acquired through the union of nature. It is perceived through the union of prakṛti with puruṣa. To them it is wrong to mingle happiness and sadness without knowledge. Therefore they think that it is essential to consider happiness as structure of knowledge. The sāṅkhya give dominance to nature and they think that happiness is through nature and they reckon external happiness as the real happiness. If intelligence is one which gives happiness then happiness cannot be seen as external thing. If so the Caitanya puruṣa which they accept is unhappiness. Without object and perception how can happiness be felt? Soul is permanent and happiness is temporary, so they are different. It is wrong to say that soul enjoys happiness in effect. Because it is an experienced one. According to sāṅkhya cause and causation are of the same category and this is not so.\textsuperscript{125}
Yogajapratyakṣa (Yogic perception)\textsuperscript{126}:- The knowledge of Yogins are real. Their imagination and perception are visible knowledge and it is clear and comprehensive. Buddha was a sage and his knowledge is considered as Yogaja. He found reasons for everything and interpreted four noble truths through his yogic perception. It is accepted by the Buddhists. Buddha is one who realized (interpreted) the four noble truths and his words are infallible and leading to fulfillment. Therefore he is valid. Yogins can eliminate things regarding knowledge and acquire the true and exact knowledge.

Pratyakṣābhāsacinta (Thoughts on fallacious perception)\textsuperscript{127}:- In the absence of absolute knowledge imaginary perception does not become valid. Self-form is with structure and matter is subject to change. Imaginative cognition are of three types. Fallacious perception e.g. there is water in the desert of doubtful knowledge such as knowledge based on the first vision with shape form and other qualities make a 'pot' cognizable. Likewise water in the desert may seems to be true, but here it is a mirage or fallacious perception. A person who has glucoma may see hairs in the sky and this is fallacious perception. According to the Ācārya like Kaṇḍāda says that the knowledge of two moon in the sky (dvicandrajñāna) is an illusion of the mind. This knowledge is similar to the
knowledge that there is water in the desert may create from a mirage. We feel it and when we reach there, there is no water. It is like assuming a rope to be a serpent. There are all contrary to the visual knowledge. Perception means realizing knowledge and knowledge which is not illusionary or hallucinatory. So DK states that the knowledge should be non-erroneous.

Pramāṇaphalacintā (The result of valid knowledge): We cannot acquire everything out from one karma. The knowledge should occur based on a subject and is out knowledge related to that subject. We are ignorant about a thing until we come to know of it. The visual knowledge brings us knowledge about the visual object. Knowledge is the ultimate result of everything and we see the Vijñānavāda of the Buddhists here. By sensory intervention we get logical and attributory knowledge of an object. The core of the thing is the generation of knowledge and the reason for it is the senses.

Karma and its related cause have no topical difference. The action of cutting gives two results (the cut tree has two parts). Every karma has a result.

Svasamvedanaphala (The result of self realization): ‘Black’ is an identification by vision. Black object or black cow and thus we get
cognition of it with a shape. When we say a 'pot' we get the knowledge of 'pot'. Then we don't think that this is a pot, because many molecules and atoms have formed it. We cannot see 'pot' in its atomic forms. 'Black' is identified with other colour in memory of association.

Pratyabhijñā (Recognition of the colour blackness)\textsuperscript{131}:- The colour 'black' brings us the experience of 'blackness' we see a pot because of light and not by itself. In answer to this doubt it is said, eyes have light and light in the eyes makes us see things. Darkness is the original thing and when light comes there, it disappear. But light is relevant in the presence of darkness. Knowledge is likewise, it comes where there is knowledge. Ignorance is the original thing and removing this ignorance, comes the beams of light in the form of knowledge. Ignorance is the effect of biotic forces. Salvation is realised only when the ignorance is removed and knowledge is permitted to set in. There is no difference of object and senses according to the vijñānavadins Absolute knowledge is the sum total of previous experience. Fulfillment can be attained only through acquiring true knowledge there by avoiding illusionary knowledge.

Bahyārthanirāsa (Negation of external reality)\textsuperscript{132}:- External meaning is illusionary or hallucinatory and it does not bring the different connotations. In effect there is self-communication only. Knowledge depends on the
object and if one is unable to identify the object in its external and internal sense, one cannot understand things like 'black'. When we see blue colour we understand not mere the sense of that colour but there takes place a disassociation of black from other colours. When we see 'black' as an object black colour is seen in our mind. When we memorise the object 'pot', it is from real knowledge of it or the identification of it. The cognizable object is pramēya, the shape of the object is valid and its result is communication to the mind or brain.

The two classification of knowledge are Bodharūpa and Ajñānarūpa (conscious and unconscious). If an object can make some impact through experience it can exist in memory. Knowledge is such one. Whether we consider structure of knowledge and external meaning which are different their conscious takes place in numerous form. Therefore external or peripheral meaning is also self-communicating. For example happiness and sadness are the result of karma. External and internal causes are based on knowledge. When we accept the peripheral existence of an object, we get 'svasamvedana'. Though we have the appearance or visibility of an object, its comprehension is based on intelligence. Sautrāntikas accept reality in external meaning in association.
**Arthasamvedanaphalam (The result of meaning for communication)**

External sensing is an outcome of identifying the object by self. Knowing 'the object' is also a reflection of self made knowledge. We could feel the presence of water even if there is no water in the deserts. The knowledge of water comes through experiencing when we see the oasis. Sāṅkhyas consider this as the theory of naturalism in the process of creation and Naiyāyikas gives respect to the creator. All these are the outcome of the inherent nature. Thereby we acknowledge its futility. All external objects are being perceived by the inheritance of the previous nature.

**Vijñaptimātratāyāṃ pramāṇaphalavyavastha (The result of validity of knowledge in accordance with the theory of knowledge)**

The expressions of knowledge and object are not different in themselves. Object and knowledge seems to be different is the result of inherent nature of the ignorance. The lessons of mantras are cited as the examples. As an answer to these doubts, quotes mantras by the author do what the golden pieces attributes in store can be inferred as hidden in the earth. The attainment of absolute knowledge is the search for the differences in the object and knowledge. It is owing to the eye that one cannot differentiate the earthen and the golden which inside it. We feel the presence of 'gavaya' in cow because of the illusion of knowledge and
This is meaningless. This illusionary knowledge would eradicate when the valid knowledge occurs in our intellect. Internal disposition is responsible for making such type of differences. Actually there is no difference at all. The inherent feelings never make illusion. To an idealist what is understood is valid and identification of it by self-nature is the result of it.

According to Naiyāyikas four types of pramāṇas are necessary to get valid knowledge. And four conditions are also occurring in a knowing process. They are the knower, the object of knowledge, means of valid knowledge and valid knowledge. But Buddhist are of opine that only two valid knowledge, viz. perception and inference are necessary to fulfill the process of knowledge of an object. So they didn’t accept comparison as a separate means. They state that comparison includes in inference through these examples of gavaya and cow. Here Buddhist says that these reflections are born in mind only, these are only mental reflections. Similarly knowledge of an object occurs through the contact of eye and sense organs with object. Knowledge is the result of the association of different components and its last stage of subject only exist in the form of knowledge. For example, to bring forth a child may like parents, food, climate are responsible. But the resemblance of one of the parent would be visible and other causes becomes marginalised. Thus the object of
this manifold is reflected as a multi-faced nature. Only the nature of absolute knowledge of an object should exist its own form. Similarly object reflect only its nature and not even the relation of sense organs with it. Knowledge is self illuminator and its perceiver is not another cause. It means that one who enlightens with knowledge he attains the form of knowledge. Infact knowledge is self realising. Mental knowledge is based not on the subject but one’s desire.

Memory is not valid in nature. Memory causes out from experience. But the knowledge from an object becomes meaningful with clear objective evidence. Memory does not included in valid knowledge. Because the explanation of memory is the process between the speaker and listener. If the speaker and listener is a single man then only the memory gets a clear shape. Otherwise the memory did not create any new knowledge. Then how can we believe that the experience of a person is valid in the form of memory. Then the reliability of the speaker is the only measuring scale. So we have to conclude the reliability of a speaker is based on reasoning and this also comes under the heading inference for the sake of others.

_Smrçi (Memory):-_ The cognitive object makes a definite shape with the experience from the memory of an object. If so, whether the same
cognition from memory makes a valid meaning is an important question. If an external object makes a valid knowledge, naturally every person should have the same cognition based on this experience. If the material knowledge based on memory makes a perpetual one then why is it not a kin to other? If we say memory based knowledge is related with self then what can be the relevance of it? Then the question arises whether the soul is along with knowledge or knowledge comprises of the self. If the external object reflected the same thought in every person, then it can be termed as valid knowledge. But here the generality of shape does not take place as it is, in every person. If the self is knowledge based surely the communication or knowledge of the object will be same in every person. Here the perceived knowledge differs from the speaker and the listener. The unity based on analogy it cannot make any resemblance.

The answer to this question is that the knowledge of analogy is different from person to person. To one it may seem to be direct and to other it may be indirect. When the acquired knowledge is transmitted, our personal judgement influences it. It is impossible to compare use of smṛti in two persons because it differs from person to person. Without external help no knowledge of an object does make sense to another. If so Jñāna becomes meaningless. Even the knowledge will be capable in making
extending knowledge by annexing the acquired knowledge. When we say how the knowledge make experiences, this can be exemplified. Smṛti-jñāna is different from experience and experience is different from Smṛti-jñāna. They have similar qualities which are complementary to each other. Thus this knowledge can attain perfectness in through inferential knowledge. The 'Ākāra' of the jñāna whichever deals with 'blue' and I have that jñāna of blueness. The exposition of this jñāna becomes definite by other objects or by its meaning. This jñāna of the real 'blue' colour does not occur other than blue. Every one gets jñāna out of his past experience of jñāna. Some people concern only the external meaning of an object. The intentional knowledge in the world cannot be termed as the omniscience. 'That objects which is the object of my present knowledge takes place in me', he replies to this question. It is wrong to say that such an impression like omniscience is that type. The nature of knowledge does not satiate from its intention. Jñānasvarūpa, when displays has its partial mystery. Jñānanirūpaṇa is incomplete based on intention and is without the phenomenal knowledge shape and the like. The Knowledge of an object is the comprehension of both the knowledge and the object. For example difference can change the meaning but it is wrong to say that this case makes the change in meaning. The difference
of an object makes different knowledge through several means and it has no difference in object.

Even interpretation can change according to its situation. In effect, we cannot interpret the colour 'blue' without a visual object with blue colour. But this blue colour cannot define the names of different objects in blue colour. The knowledge of the blue coloured object is the result of the intellect related to blue colour and the shape of the object. How can we experience a blue cloth without the consciousness of this blue colour? Thus the previous knowledge of blue colour and the shape of the object summate together and create the nature of self. Thus an object different from the colour 'blue' is also perceptible. So the colour 'blue' has certain common features and the difference of this colour from others make 'bheda-jñāna'. The colour blue helps to identify the colour because of its reasons namely blueness which exist behind this object. The shape of a pot gives us knowledge since it has a definite shape but when we think of its existence, we don't have the thought about the potter who made it. If there is jñāna of an object from its different dimensions it must have been thought simultaneously. The memory of a pot is not related to its potter. Even then it is not necessary for having any personal partiality. The general knowledge of an object should insist not only its matter but also
its absence and presence of it in our memory, which is essential. Therefore the identity and meaning of an object rest with the difference of it from other objects. Even if an object has some similarity to some other objects, there should be a little difference. Identical twins have also certain dissimilar features. But vijñāna never includes meaning and shape. Thus the perception of an object has also no meaning and shape. Thus the perception of an object has also no meaning when it makes vijñāna. This can concern the implied meaning of an object and this knowledge leads to condition of perception. Thus we get the objective knowledge. When we perceive an object, we get its knowledge of shape along with its memory and it can be recollected. As we perceive the identity of twins, we can also separate the difference and later we can recollect the difference and similarity, simultaneously. When we perceive a Śimśapa tree, we perceive both the shape of its genus and the shape of the tree. At first sight the object can perceive without any adjectives and its implied and dimensional possibilities are apprehended later. The first experience brings the knowledge of an object (cētas) of self nature that comes under wisdom and then we get its manifold nature (jñāna of bhinna-abhinna). Therefore the knowledge become viṣayākāra (objection). In the first moment the object is perceived and then all other meaning comes out
from it. This perception is called ("arthasamkalanāśleṣābuddhi"). It means covering of the combination of different dimensions of an object.

Is kevalajñāna a combination of meaning, shape and other related things of an object? Or is kevalajñāna a wholesome perception of an object? As an answer to this doubt, doubt leads the state of unbecoming. Because the remains of doubts about the perceived idea, makes clear that the object has not realised by the perceive properly. The object of perception to preceptor also is doubtful. Doubt comes from the sāmānyajñāna, somebody is seen this statement testifies that the speaker is uncertain. The general law is that if, the perceiver himself is doubtful about an object, then the jñāna of the meaning of the object is not in him. Then how can he perceive the object? The secondary thought of the object brings out an acquired knowledge and make a comparative study of the similar objects that he has come across. The third and fourth thought would imprint a meaning of the object in his inner mind. This knowledge in the self leads him to svātmasamvedana. Then he becomes capable of recollecting this acquired knowledge. Therefore kevalajñāna do not take place in the second thought. It takes up to levels of meaning and creates a meaning related to those levels. There by it gives a memory related to the similarity and dissimilarity of the object and there is the
memory of this even in its absence and thus we can interpret it later. On the contrary, the combination of acquired knowledge and mysterious one may lead to senselessness. As an answer to this question, it is said that the knowledge of an object is 'Arthākāra'. The memory of the acquired knowledge is a combination of both. An intelligent man perceives that the memory of knowledge is same as the memory of that object. But memory of knowledge is attained through the light and silence of mind. Whenever there is object based combination of meaning and word, there comes the necessity of the combination of this light. Because it is impossible to perceive an object without light. That is the knowledge of an object combined with the matter the self-realization is absent. Mental knowledge is thus related to light.

Thus perception of an object occurs through cause and causation. For example 'pot' cannot be isolated with the potter. Therefore it does not mean that appearance of shape can attain through light alone. If the object of lamp do not luminate the objects and the object of lamp itself then how can we perceive an object? Thus lamp which gives light formulate shape with meaning. Then we have the knowledge of that object through the presence of light. Lamp lights up the shape of the flame likewise knowledge also lights up the shape. We cannot see the
lamp without its form. Likewise we perceive an object with its shape essential. How one can claim vijñāna, without this light of shape and form. Therefore shape helps one to get the knowledge about the structure of an object, i.e., the Vijnāna. That vijñāna should be attainable by dharma called 'causality'. Every jñāna is the experience about the shape depending on meaning. Therefore jñāna and the subject have no difference.

Perception of completeness does not take place at the first sight or all on a sudden. It merely makes a sensory perception. The second thought brings the relation between meaning and shape and it makes a comparison with the acquired knowledge. In the second step of knowledge the identity of the object is created. Then the meaning of the object goes to the memory in the form of arthakāryata. Then arises the doubt, how can opposite action get united? As an answer, Buddha says, permanence and impermanence make this contradiction. For example, the thought of two moons in the sky does not make any contradiction. Because moon is the same and since there is no contradiction. For the knowledge of shape based on a single moon makes wholes knowledge of the moon. We know this with help of anvayavyatirekavyāpti. Hereby we come to know that there is really no anvayavyatirekābhāva, Such there is
no artha or samveda. When we identify the colour 'blue' the same things
will happen. One who identifies the differences between artha and jñāna
can identify them with the reason of their differences. Therefore one who
knows these differences, makes use of this to acquire the complete
knowledge about an object. If it be so, how can this difference of identity
can be expressed? Which is to be received and which is to be avoided?
Here the difference is not in the object, the perception or memory
recollects the form which requires special attentions in perceptual
knowledge. So what is dependent on or what is the basis? Here Ācārya
says that future knowledge is not the result of acquired knowledge. But
acquired knowledge helps one to acquire more. Otherwise it will be
'Viṣayabhāsa'. Present knowledge does not lead one to the acquired
knowledge. How can this object to be depended. Every knowledge is
based on subject which gives us experience meaning and these are inter
dependant in acquiring jñāna, there by it is clear that knowledge and the
topic are not different, how the knowledge becomes product and
knowledge is the identification of it. The subject is filled with knowledge
and the process of reasoning is the union of matter and understanding. It
is difficult to infer blue colour by rejecting the object other than that of blue
colour.
It is wrong to say that happiness should be based on svarūpajñāna. According to some darsanikas happiness is the state of knowledge. Blue colour is identified with an object, but the cognition of happiness should come from inside, even though it doesn't create the attainment of object. Really it is impossible to accept this state of cognition which is both internal and external. These two does not possess any object. Therefore happiness etc has no perceivable nature like the colour of blueness. Even then such phenomenon is here. In specified nature of cognition, where this blue colour is perceived, we get the shape of an object with blue colour. Therefore it is impossible to perceive blue colour without an object, and that illuminated blue colour without the object, the interpretation of blue colour i.e. Blue colour or without an object is impossible. If such separate identity is experienced, it is hallucinatory. This knowledge of difference like the knowledge of two moons is not based on laws of cognition. Now let us know how this knowledge is impressed in mind? If the object of perception can be differentiated based on its difference in perception. Here a doubt may arise. If there is difference of perception in the same object, because of the fact it causes the perception to be difficult. How can an object be identified in two ways? It is wrong to say that an object is different in its self-form and
external form. It is difficult to perceive external form without perceiving the self of an object. Structural knowledge cannot take place without an object. If an object has no identity, then how can it be exhibited before others? Likewise how a pictorial depiction can be made without the help of the identity of the object what is to be portrayed. Likewise, in the vision of two moon also, this identity cannot be experienced. It is because of the inability to interpret the phenomenon of the self and the universal. For the acquired knowledge of this two moon-vision, it does not leads one to any help for the accumulation future knowledge of it. Therefore the illusion of difference develops a hallucinatory feeling. Likewise how can this percept of blue and yellow comes to cognition with co-existing objects with colours of blue and yellow? For the artist the picture which to be portrayed by him is the one and from same perception. Bhinnayogakşhemata is the identify of and we negate it and we perceive what is perceived by all. The knowledge of an object is related with the time, place etc not of a perceived object. May a different opinion can takes place about the same object it should be settled with the cause and the theory of causation. The knowledge of blue colour comes from an object and that object becomes the cause of our perception because of the presence of blue colour. Indeed, in the case of Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, a
branch of inference, 'Vyātirēka' becomes the active element here. Even if there is the presence of eyes, light and mind, the concept of a pillar does not occur without the contact with a pillar. It means that in the absence of an object, perception is impossible whatever it may be 'an object of valid knowledge. Even if it is with an external existence, how can be it seen, even though it is beyond our visual perception. Therefore external objects cannot be termed as the object of valid knowledge even if there are other means to perceive an object except its visual presence? Is valid knowledge contains transitive power. As an answer to this strict rules are not coming under this. Because every object has its own rules. It defines that visual perception is impossible without the way of visibility. Ācārya gives impermanence in the case of invisible object. Only the visible objects have shape and the other qualities. Other perceptions are meaningless according to visual perception. Visual perception is based on visibility. Then arises a question, the structure of a tree does not take place its mental construction without the visibility of the tree, thus external visual object makes the shape of an object. When one can be heard about particular object initially and later he sees it. Then the person who has acquired the knowledge of the object first and now it comes to the person as visual. The knowledge that comes later is the experienced
knowledge. The meaning of an object comes in force only when it is experienced and the previous knowledge of the object before experience is only in direct or guesswork. It has no basis about the meaning in mind; whether the previous knowledge without meaning and its experience is instinct? How we can guess it? It is to be enforced by the knowledge occurs gradually (Samanyatharapratyaya). This cognition creates the knowledge of a term through its sensual appearance. But it is useless to say that knowledge should come following some way. Then it is be said that bāhyapramēyata is external perception that comes under the inference of different causes. Then how can be realized the nature of cause and causation through expressed method. If meaning cannot be explained by external appearance then how can this cause and causation to be indicated. Ācārya clarifies that doubt about with or without blue and other colours such 'yellow', 'black' etc can be identified. In this case 'yellow' without yellowness cannot exist or identified. Therefore the word 'yellow' is less important other than the colour yellow. Likewise blue colour is the cause of blue form. But we cannot assert such a law. They are irrational by means of mutual co-existence. While speaking the external being is the cause of a blue cloth as qualified with its blue colour. This phenomenon as far as blue colour is concerned is the knowledge
occurs gradually. It helps to create dimensional knowledge by indicating the analogy of co-existence. The knowledge occurs gradually, instead of creating different cognition, creates the knowledge arise in conscious. The cognition of a matter is the amalgam of a different series of objects, thus creates blue colour. Then the question arises how white couch be termed as yellow? How thus sense of much, little and too much is formed? The answer is that the absence of comprehensive vision leads to a series of illusionary knowledge. Then a white couch is attributed as yellow. This knowledge is invalid and it is wrong to consider it as harmful likewise the bud forms from the seed. But Vijñānavādins assert no insemination is necessary beyond the production of it through denying the Co-existence of seed and its bud. It is an impediment to transaction. Jñāpyajñāpaka is an expression of refusal. For example we presume the presence of fire by smoke. Fire and its related experience are indirect since it comes to the sphere of experience. It is wrong to say that future phenomenon is inference. The seed germinates and there is no external evidence from the seed’s vision. Likewise, smoke clarifies the presence of fire and smoke and fire are different, here is the fallacy of cause and causation. The benefit of this phenomenon is described here about not the privileged for the meaning. Then seed, bud, fire and smoke are
complementary with any multidimensional instincts. Therefore its cause causation, cognition, ajñāna, ignorance, beings are related. The knowledge of the seed and germ based knowledge involves the dharma of reproduction. Jñāpyajñāpaka is described in this way then contradictions are hardly as possible. According to Vijñānavādins, this kind of statement is not acceptable. Such being can be described in terms of cause and causation. Fire and such object are permanent, if so what is the relevance of their visual inference.

Svarūpajñāna is not by means of presumption. Then how can its essence be established? If so Vijñānavada is also in the same way. When the vikalpa and meaning are combined by the other visual experiences it becomes established. This visual and verbal perception leads to the similarity and dissimilarity of objects and thereby its difference is described. Thus all terms of knowledge becomes the medium of vijñāna and it helps to find out the cause of seed germination, leaf etc. Likewise smoke comes out from fire and its existential instant is to produce fire. Polemical efforts make analogues results and thus create definite knowledge. Thus smoke results in fire again there before we experienced it. Vijñānavādins claim for its existential insentient. Smoke has an instinct of being smoke. Instinct is the cause and not the external object. Later
smoke is the product of fire. Fire is irrelevant here, if smoke is given its predominance through this instinct. This instinct later creates fire and this knowledge becomes valid when one feel smoke, one is uncertain of the quality of fire consumed inside the smoke. Here the major term fire cannot be inter protected. Can smoke and fire be amalgamated into one being? The answer is no and it does not become valid knowledge. Here they depend on the force of instinct and thereby amalgam of the two. Instinct is not the single isolated cause of an object. Fire cannot be presumed in an object other than fire. The future phenomena also cannot be inferred. Fire is inferred when there is scope and presence of smoke. And this can be inferred with the help of the reason on effect (kāryahetu).

Knowledge is dependant on whole through the actions. This is called Ālayavijñāna. For this acquired knowledge never becomes the basis. Positive or negative concomitance (Anvayavyatīrīkajñāna) also do not come under Ālayavijñāna. Knowledge occurs gradually with the cause of manovijñāna. Here past knowledge becomes the cause of the present knowledge. Knowledge is based on pūrvasamskāra. After illustrating memory ācārya sums up the state of the two forms of knowledge, viz. the knowledge with a form and the knowledge without a form. The knowledge of object gives the shape, which is known as
arthakāra. It means consciousness of the object. Preceded by perceptual knowledge inference works out the result. Inter dependence occurs where the one which exists. If inferential knowledge is not workout perceptual knowledge is also impossible. The knowledge with understanding represents the form with two divisions, viz. Jñānam samvedyam and samvedakam. One is being the identified and the other is identifier. Form brings out the perceptual vision of the object. Inference acts when self transmission is done. The one which has a shape can be understood through intellect. Memory of association is also applied to the intellect, if works for self-transmission. It is to identify with similar form which brings the colour consciousness like blueness. The concept of shape is formed through the sense like eyes etc. Similarly pleasure, pain etc are related to consciousness. Anyone may doubt about the experience of pleasure etc in a yogi. Its answer is it originates from the senses and their concepts also have sexual experiences in living beings. They can control their senses and they get the purity of thought and knowledge. They develop their ability to maximise or minimise their vision through transcendental meditation or contemplation, ones own misery does not lead to another person to the miserable state. Thus he makes clear that wellness and sorrow are personal.
Sound clarifies its meaning not on the basis of the view of grammarian. To them the cause of meaning is the exposure of sound. But Ācārya says that meaning is presumed by the presence of the object. The idea becomes meaningful when words are conveyed through sound and the concept is transmitted to others. And thus if sound is to be valid, and to get validity the communication must be efficient and effective. Therefore sound gets meaning with connectivity of words. Here PG defends the perceptual meaning established by DK. The purpose of meaning is to convey the meaning. If we can unfailingly by transmit the exact meaning of the words with its technical aspects, our verbal efficiency become fruitful. The validity of communication becomes valid when majority of people succeed to convey these ideas to others. Thus PG follows the view of DK and stresses the necessity of fruitful communication among human kind. 141

This transmission of idea before society results the state based knowledge (prama). Here the statement by DK is very relevant. The knowledge through sound and its communicative transmission, here creates only 'prama'. Thus he rejects the argument of sound explosion and there by knowledge acquisition. 142
Pararthanumana Paricheda

Pararthanumāna is the transmission of one's own realized facts to others. If svārthānumāna contains a cause, in pararthānumāna this reason on effect does not occur as we realise fire through smoke. If inference comes from sound, the verbal knowledge can be assured by the sound. Later Ācārya establishes that āgama pramāṇyam does not merge out in inference. Inference depends on ones personal assumption since it is the subject to prama every where while attaining fulfillment of its intention, there is no need to say that inference requires words. Here we can raise the inference of the Sāṅkhyaśtras about their opinion that wellness is not sensory. Intelligence is always constant. Therefore inference is relevant. A view of being known is to be validated with pramāṇa and not with the mind.

Time is referred to as earlier, later, less time or excess time etc. He rejects the concept of time by stating that time as a substance unnecessary since its reference of this time or that time. The old one are referred to as later and the future time is referred to as later, but how can this be without a substance? The same is the case with the four sides. Time is a natural phenomena and verb is related to subjects like Devadatta. Verb is not acquired through perceptual knowledge. Like
wise singularity or plurality is a matter of personal assumption. Since these things cannot exist without dependence they are all negated. The shape is related to the object.¹⁴³

Here upamāṇa is also rejected. Along with the refusal of Upamāṇa pramāṇa, upanaya is also rejected which is one among the vakyas of pañcāvayava of Naiyāyikas.¹⁴⁴ PG says that the word gavaya refers to comparison with cow that comes under inferential knowledge and it is beyond the possibilities of verbal cognition and comparison. Here the cause is presumed. Moreover everything related to sound depends on inferential knowledge, since there are contradictory reference in inferences. It is impossible to consider them valid. He rejects the argument that sound is the quality of sky. Form, touch, taste and smell are respectively related to light, air water and the earth. The dependence of sky includes the earth and the other related objects. Then how can sound be related to such a sky?

On earth and in all shapes sky emerge in unique consensus. There it is impossible to prove that sound is related to sky as smell is related to the earth. Since air is ever pervading, sound can be attributed as the quality of air. The same air brings us the quality of touch. There is no rule that a substance has only a single quality since quality is native in it its
reliability is natural acquisition. Smell is experienced when it is pervaded through air which is a quality of the earth. In such matters we are obliged to confer a relation of mutual consensus. When these qualities work complementary to each other, sound also is a quality of the earth. Therefore space which is isolated from there has no relevance at all. Since the earth comprises of all these things the space is not to be considered as another element. The sky cannot be the eat of air since air is ever moving. If so sky also demands support and there the defect of anavastha take place. If sky is the supreme then why not the stones and other solids become their seats in the sky. It is also not sight to say that sky is the seat of the soul. If so the soul cannot be termed in its oneness. Likewise, since the four sides are pervaded everywhere it cannot be given authenticity. If we say sun shows the sides, it will also be wrong for there occurs the defect of interdependence. Then he interprets variants of the signs of pakṣa and the like.

Later he states Bādha in four ways.\textsuperscript{145} The fallacies related to inference are three and the bādha related to perception are four and their differences are derivated. Along with the negation of memory as valid, he explains the condition of sin and virtue among the common castes brāhmīns and so on. When it is said Brahmins should not be slain and
the word 'killing is not particularly related to Brahmins. But it is a general concept and is not related to mere one caste. Generality cannot be personalised or otherwise it becomes a custom i.e. to give superiority to some persons being the member of particular caste and that is not fair.

To negate the validity of substance he states that a substance without vivid colour or shape or the power of touch therefore it has no appearance. Colour and shape are related not to the matter but to its quality. Size cannot be attained as one, which is isolated from colour. Varna can be qualified by the shape (curve etc). We can identify objects like pot with the power of touch. But that which touches it may not be a substance. Establishing these facts he rejects identity which helps memory. As far as memory cannot be valid, memory is related to inference.

When abhāva is discussed, it is said that collective consciousness works when the form is invisible, there abhāva works. To negate ātmavāda of Naiyāyika he states that which has no form is inactive.

A permanent object is always visible since it has no limits which cannot be memorised. Though body is active the infant do not act in the prenatal stage. Since there is the absence of action, the cycle of the soul from birth and rebirth is impossible. Thus he rejects the concept of the eternity of the soul.
Anupalabdhi is difficult from positive knowledge. The past and the future can be available through inferential knowledge. Anupalabdhi is not necessary to state that transport may affect the absence of quality of cloth.\textsuperscript{146} Presence and absence can be termed as the special features of an object. Absence can be interpreted only when something is unreal. Then only presence and absence can be interpreted in terms of perception. If something can be perceived either in its presence or absence, there is no need for mentioned abhāva. Inferential knowledge occurs where presence can be grasped by its absence and vice versa. When abhāva is stated the emptied state of something is which is mentioned there.

Quality is not dependent on anything. Dharma depends on the substance. Here a controversy may happen on the quality of the sky. As a result, it is stated that sound is not the quality of the sky and the sky is not included in one of the element.

We can perceive that, though he was able to write an excellent and perfect text like this he had no ego consciousness or self predominance and this can be seen all through out even to the end of his magnificent work he was able to select the language of the common man.\textsuperscript{147} As we use cosmetics to bright the beauty of the body he makes use of this work as a decoration of vārttika.
Notes:


8. Ibid., p.43.


12. Ibid.


   Introduction. II.


15. Ibid., p. 29, *PVA*, 84-104.

16. Ibid., p. 33.

17. Ibid., p. 39.


20. Ibid., p. 61, *PVA*, 201.


22. Ibid., p. 73, *PVA*, 226.

23. Ibid.,

24. Ibid., p. 74.
25. Ibid.,

26. Ibid., p. 83.

अय प्रबल्लों सोपि कुलाल्यं: प्रवर्तितः।

अजलादीधरस्त्म्यो न सोप्येन प्रवर्तितः॥ (२५४)

27. Ibid., p. 87, PVA, 278.

28. Ibid., p. 89.

अन्वयवशेषू सुखादिनं वर्तुत्वाधिकारनन्तरतः:

पुरस्यानं ततस्तत्वं कारणं न किमिष्यते॥ २८६

29. Ibid., p. 90, PVA, 288.

30. Ibid., p. 91, PVA, 292.

कर्मणं परिणामोपयोगिति सिद्धामिदं कुतः॥

अन्वयव्यवहितस्य कर्मणोपयी न विख्यते॥

31. Ibid., p.92, PVA, 296.

32. Ibid., p.93.

33. Ibid.,

संस्थानं हि नामेदेव वर्तुत्तते न सिद्धिमत्।

प्रातिनिष्ठात्सः सदावात् परमाणवं एवते॥

34. Ibid., p.100.

35. Ibid., p.118.

36. Ibid., p.120, PVA, 368.

37. Ibid., p.122.
53. Ibid., p.173, PVA, 457.
54. Ibid., p.174, PVA, 462.
55. Ibid., p.202, PVA, 492.
56. Ibid., p.205.
57. Ibid., p.211, PVA, 508.
58. Ibid., p.215.
59. Ibid., p.217, PVA, 512.
60. Ibid.,
61. Ibid., p.222.
62. Ibid., p.223.
63. Ibid., p.245, PVA, 561.
64. Ibid., p.246.
65. Ibid., p.253.
66. Ibid., p.254.
67. Ibid., p.261.
68. Ibid., p.262.
69. Ibid., p.268, PVA.

अध्यासो हृदयन्यकर्मणा क्रियमाणः
कृपात्मकत्वं विद्वद्धाति॥

70. Ibid., p. 274, PVA, 594.
71. Ibid., p.291.
72. Ibid., p. 294, PVA.

कत्तमानि तान्यार्यसत्तानि।

द:खं समुदयो निरोधो मार्गं हेतु।

73. Ibid., p.295, PVA.

दु:खं संसारिणं सक्तं।

74. Ibid., p.306.

75. Ibid., p.326, PVA.

अनित्यतो दुःखत: शून्यतोग्नात्मतत्तत्त्वतं चतुरुकारं दुःखसत्त्वम्।

76. Ibid., p.328, PVA.

समुदयसत्त्वमेव चतुर्विधमेव हेतुत: समुदयत: प्रभवत: प्रत्ययश्च।

77. Ibid., p.337, PVA,738.

78. Ibid., p.338, PVA.

निरोधम: शान्तत: प्रणीतत: निर:सरणलत्ततं चत्वार आकारः निरोध एव।

79. Ibid., p.340.

80. Ibid., p.345.

81. Ibid., 347.

82. Ibid.,

83. Ibid., p.351, PVA,760.

84. Ibid., p.353.

85. Ibid., p.365.

86. Ibid., p.367.
89. Ibid., p.387.
90. Ibid., p.392.
91. Ibid., p.397.
92. Ibid., p.399.
93. Ibid., p.403.
94. Ibid., p.405, *PVA*, 880.
95. Ibid., p. 410, *PVA*.
98. Ibid., p.438.
100. Ibid.,
101. Ibid., p.440.
102. Ibid., p.447.
103. Ibid., p.461, *PVA*, 177.

104. Ibid., p.475.

105. Ibid., p.486.


पूर्ववर्तमान विना सक्के संख्या यदि।

अत्याचारितायेवस्मिन व्यवहारानुबंधिता॥

107. Ibid., p.523.

108. Ibid., p.525.

109. Ibid., p.535.

110. Ibid., p.554.

111. Ibid., p.593.

समान्तर प्रमाणवाणिक द्वितीयोऽभागः, २- प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदं

112. Ibid., p.610.

इन्द्रियवादनुभावार्गःप्रकृतित्वादमानस्यादित्वादेऽरुपकल्पङ्गम्मर्म्ममित्याहुरन्ये

बालेन्द्रियान्वतु॥

113. Ibid., p.614.

114. Ibid., p.620.

115. Ibid., p.624.

116. Ibid., p.637.


119. Ibid., p. 698, PVA, 377.

कस्यचिद्व्यतिरिक्तेऽकस्यचिद्व्यतिरिक्तेऽत्तदं पर्यः
स्वभाव एष भावानां विभागे व्यवस्थितः॥

120. Ibid., p.699.

तत्समान्यं न जाने स्थूलाभासरस्वतादः
एकत्र प्रतिसिद्धवात् बहुध्विषी न सम्भवः॥

121. Ibid., p.735.

122. Ibid., p.738.

मानसमप्ययार्गादिस्वरूपस्ववेदनमकल्यक्तवात्॥

123. Ibid., p.748.

124. Ibid., p. 785, PVA, 526.

125. Ibid., p.785.

126. Ibid., p.791.

127. Ibid., p. 803.

128. Ibid., p.815.

129. Ibid., p.825, PVA.

प्रमाणाधीनो इत्र प्रमेयाधिकमः॥

130. Ibid., p.844, PVA, 625.

131. Ibid., p.926, PVA, 963.
132. Ibid., p.934, PVA.

हिन्दुरुपमिति ८४ोधाकारं नीलाकारश्र ज्योतिरंक्ष्यावेदनायेकम्।

133. Ibid., p.941.

134. Ibid., p.946.

135. Ibid., p.950.

136. Ibid., p.955.

चतुष्पु मैत्रविधासु तत्र्यं परिसमायतोप्रमाता प्रमेयं प्रमाणं प्रभुम्पिरिति।

137. Ibid., p.962.

138. Ibid., p.971, PVA, 1031.

139. Ibid., p.975, PVA, 1042.

140. Ibid., p.977, PVA, 1044.


142. Rahul Saṅkṛtyāyana, Pramāṇa Vārttikabhaṣyam or Vārttikālaṅkāra of Prajñākaragupta. p.4, (प्र.प)

प्रमाणमविसंवादिनां अर्थसिद्धियाच्यातिः

अविसंवादानं शाब्देयभिमिश्रयनवेदनाद्।
143. Ibid., p. 515.
144. Ibid., p. 489.
145. Ibid., p. 524.
146. Ibid., p. 631.
147. Ibid., p. 648.

शरीरशोभाम रागाय ग्राम्या वाच्छल्लकृतिम्

वातिकस्यापलड़कारो मयाकारि न गर्वतः।। प.अ.प पृ 622.