CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

The developed form of Buddhist logic can be seen in the logical treatise of DK. Among these works $PV$ is the most important one. Svārthānumānaparichēda is considered as the first chapter among the four chapters of this work. In the chapters of $PV$, DK himself has written an interpretation by the name ‘$Sopajñavṛti$’. Many have interpreted this text which has initiated the beginning of combinatorial literature.

School located at Nalanda.

This school has interpreted the text strictly adhering to its meaning and without losing its essence. The leader of this school is recorded as an ācārya called Devendrabodhi. Stcherbatsky has opined that he was the direct disciple of DK and he lived in the 7th century AD.

School located at Kashmir.

This school sought to find out the visions in books of DK. This school known as Kaśmīrean school, had its working area in Kashmir. Their leader was Dharmottara. What they have done is that revealing the deep visionary ideas in the writings of Diśnāga and DK. Dharmottara was
not a direct disciple of DK. Stcherbatsky stated that since Dharmottara was not a direct disciple of DK, he had formed a free and personal view in his interpretations. Even though Dharmottara was a native of Bengal he selected Kashmir as his field of work. Though Dharmottara has not worked out an interpretation of PV the first and foremost work of DK, he has done excellent interpretations of works such as Pramāṇaviniścaya and NB. Other commentators on DK's PV named Jñānari and Sankarānantha were famous logicians belonging to this very kaśmīrean school.

**School located at Bengal.**

This school interpreted the work giving more importance to its religious and ritual aspects. They attempted not for giving mere interpretation of the right hand, but they gave emphasis to assimilate the importance of Mahāyāna principles. They tried to establish the validity and omniscience of Buddha. In the second chapter of PV namely Pramāṇa siddhi, there can be seen the explanation of Buddhism, its problems and laws. The leader of this school was a Bengal native named PG. Th. Stcherbatsky has remarked about him that, "He was a Buddhist and having led the life of a householder in his former āśrama under the reign of 'Pala' dynasty". Thus his time might be in the 8th century AD.
He interpreted the text fixed from 2\textsuperscript{nd} chapter to fourth. The language of this book is mixed style of prose and verse and it is a remarkable one. Such mixed works were very rare in that period. Even common men also should easily follow this book. Another remarkable quality is that the writer has tried to attract the attention of common men by using a metaphorical and illustrative language. For example, while discussing the signs of pramāṇa, a fallacy named 'Bādha' interrupts the validity of knowledge and it is also discussed here by him. He says 'The duty of knowledge is to reveal the subject'. Knowledge never interrupts the object of the topic or the subject. PG compares these types of interruption to the deeds of a king. The duty of a real king is to protect his subject. Unfortunately some kings have such a special habit to take away things from his subjects. Similarly the kings takes away good things which belong to others also because he thinks that he is the king and he should be the owner of all good things and if he fails to posses it, he should attack, conquer and try to make them under control. But in the case of knowledge here is some difference. One who meditates on something to acquire the absolute knowledge with intense desire and complete surrendering on it, he could possess it through its exposition. These objects convey its ideas with whole heartedness.
When he criticises the concept of Niyoga of Mīmāṃsakas he reveals the futility of sacrifice. He puts forward some question to defend against Mīmāṃsakas. “Who is entrusted to practice sacrifices? Is it a Brahmin? Raising such type of questions PG establishes the futility of sacrifices. He strongly states that no one can perceive the brahminhood with naked eyes and it is not perceivable like gold. If any one says a box contains gold, one can ask to show the same. If anyone points out any doubts of it, he can open the box and show it. The glittering of gold is visible to the eye. But brahminhood cannot be perceivable. The caste Brahminism has no shape or form of its own, so it cannot be visible.

Let us look at the example why infallibility is given to the concepts like 'God'. He negates it. If one undergoes Sukha, Dukha etc., he is worthy of advising the nature of these experiences. Here given example is very relevant. If one has not suffered or undergone any type of misery, he has no experience or right to advise others about it.

The writer says about the rejection of divine lights by the five elements to establish validity on Buddha. Here the illustration is noteworthy. When the whole universe is a unitary whole, how can there be divisions like 'five' likewise the digit 50 is among the digits to hundred.
likewise if sūnya is valid, then how can feel the totality of emptiness be right. Similar examples are illustrated.

Mercy illumines only through constant practice. He exemplifies the nature of mercy to the heat of water. Water is cool by its nature. But water will get heated with the help of fire and it becomes cool again when the fire is removed. It becomes hot only when it is heated again. Water does not change its nature. So constant firing helps water to be hot. This illustration can be equated with the practice of the mind. The mercy in the mind can be raised only through constant practice. Then only merciful thought is natural and will fill the mind. The person with merciful mind is the one only eligible to wipe out the tears of other beings.

‘Misery’ one among the four noble truths has been explained as important and we can destroy the causes of ‘misery’. Elimination of desire is the means to it. Here he describes it as ‘better not to get into mind than to wash it. He discloses the meaningless state of this world. PG advises his followers that it is better to avoid the touching of muddy water instead of washing our body with clear water after taking bath in the muddy pond. Women, son, wealth are bring sensory pleasures but those pleasures are material and non-eternal. Separation from these pleasures also makes pain. To get rid of this pain one has to avoid such pleasures.
Let us look the illustration when he confutes the claim of the evolution by the Sāṅkhyas. According to Sāṅkhyas the curd is already in the milk and even though we are unable to see it. This claim is unacceptable and states through the illustration. "It is equal to the claim of hundred elephants standing on the tip of a grass leaf". If an impossible thing with similar claim stands as non-existent such as curd is there in the milk.

While rejecting the claim of bhūtadharma on forming body he says that it is also not acceptable. According to us Phelgm, humour are inherent and where there is the importance of earth and water in a body there is 'raga' and where there is the importance of water and air there is 'Moha' etc.. Here PG rejects these by showing the defect viz., 'anaikāntika'. He says that heat and raga are not similar in nature, the nature of heat is not different from the Mahābhuta. Raga is variant from body. If there is no heat there is no fire because heat is the result from fire. Mahabhūta has no role in making 'raga' moha etc.. Through these verses, he states the facts of meaninglessness of inter dependence of things in the world.

While discussing the applicability of four noble truth, Dukhasatya is explained in four ways. Anityata, Dukhata, Sūnyata, and Anātmakata of these sub-division. Dukha takes place only as conditional. So it is
impermanent. A permanent thing cannot be absent always. Similarly the permanent thing is not to be occasional or situational. They are contradictory to each other, therefore one is present while the other is absent. Dukha is related with raga. Dukha should be with a cause and therefore (सबं परवर्त दुःखं) this celebrated proverb becomes relevant. Dukha is anatmarūpa. It has no basis and therefore irrelevant. Sukha and Dukha which occurs at different times are not out of a single reason.

The 2nd Samudayasatya also has four types. They are: hetuta, samudāyata, prabhavatā and pratyayatā. Since Dukha is situational. Situations are also impermanent. Whatever is independent and it does not act for the benefit of ātma. It should be permanent and real. The object like sky etc.. are explained with the examples of rabbit and its horns. While discussing the causes of misery they are three in number. Desire is the root of misery. They are desire for pleasure, desire for rebirth and desire not to have misery. Here we can see the development of the philosophical vision of PG in its highest position. These desires have four concepts which are mind, mental, form and nirvāṇa. In Dukha its cause, its rejection and in its means Dukha nirodha is infinite truth and others are partial truths. Here comes the terms like sūnyata which familiarise the philosophy connected with Buddhism in Mahāyāna.
Though Dukha is with a reason there is no permanent cause to it. If pradhāna is considered as the cause, there many 'Dukha' comes together. The causes like pradhāna have more permanence. The causes of misery like 'God' is out of desire. The causes like 'God' occurs from 'desire' and the desire for rebirth is also the same. Self love is said to be another reason for misery. Here the term 'Ātma' is related to mental or consciousness activities such as self love etc., and are related with the self.

The truths implied in the prevention of misery are also from four kinds. They are 'nirodhata', 'śāntata', 'praṇītata' and 'nissāraṇata'. Rebirths do not take place in persons having no desire. The person, who has no desire, can live in the world with his karma and mercy. Free from the bondage of attachment is the stage 'non-attachment'. This cycle of rebirths can be stopped only by stopping the instincts of previous births. I am happy or I am sad and such feeling in a man, which is caused igo, has been the basis of sadness or misery can be eradicated only with the removal of 'ātmavāda'. One who is bound by misery cannot attain salvation. If one wants to end the cycle of births, he should free himself from attachments.
There are four types of mārgasatya, i.e. the means to attain nirvana viz. 'mārgarūpata', 'śāntarūpata', 'praṇītata' and 'nissaraṇata'. These are the means to dukhanivṛttī which gives a vision beyond or without soul (nairātmyadarśana). Only the learned can be conscious of this vision which is being attained through the non-existence of the soul. Yogis have this consciousness. This vision which is against the non-existence of soul, is caused from 'avidyā'. Every misery is the result out of it. Ignorance is to be removed with the consciousness of knowledge, i.e. 'nairatmyadarśana'. Thereby misery of all kinds can be removed. In the annexture 'pramāṇa siddhi' he describes the invalidity of 'sound'. Pramāṇa is to know about something without intervention. Non-erroneous is the position of validity or meaning of that (something) object. Śabda is the knowledge related to sound. Is the knowledge of the word having mere relation with a sound. As an answer to this doubt, Ācārya says that if sound is to be considered as valid then it should come out from an omniscient. If a man is to be omniscient, he should have scientific vision about all subjects. And if science, has the 'truth' then how the differences of opinion among scientific ideas, has developed. How can it be the infinite truth. Thus there is controversial and differentiated views in scientific interpretation of matters like this. Where there is flexibility it
cannot be accredited as valid. Thus sacrifices for salvation are indefinite and there results also are doubtful. The doubts in vedas lead to questioning or infallibility about its validity. These thoughts are described in the Parīkṣa prakaraṇa of NS. But PG states that the treatment of the vedas are unable to find out the truths and the sound used for communication in vedas are invalid.

**Recognition of the validity in Knowledge:**- Validity related to knowledge are of two types. Perceptual and inferential. Perception helps to find out the self nature of an object. Form is beyond inference but its name and quality are realised with the help of inference. A matter has svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa (self form and common form). Generally, self form or svalakṣana is perceptual and in common form caused from self form is inferential and it is based on attribution. Thus the subjects are of two and the validities are of two types. Here the views of Mīmāṃsaka, Śāṅkhya, and Cārvāka are rejected in many matters. Along with their rejection, Ācārya has tried to establish his opinion.

**The rejection of Mīmāṃsakas**

In the outset of the text, Ācārya denies the explanation of the niyogas and its eleven subdivision. He has the minute details of each and everything. Here his expression is very clear. He declares that, it is wrong
to use niyoga as a means to denote 'one who is entrusted with the duty of sacrifice'. They state that the actual meaning of 'niyoga' is a comprehensive power in reasoning'. One who is entrusted with the fulfillment of a duty. Who is entrusted? Are they the Śiṣṭācāras; Are they brāhmins? What is meant by a brāhmana? Is it one who is virtuous among the virtuous? And who is sinful? Is it not that niyoga are activity by man. If so, doesn't it become a unified sensibility? Niyoga, can not be accepted as valid. Thus Ācārya denies niyoga explaining these situation.

Śābdībhāvana is the action through the prompting of sound. According to sacrifice it represents its intensive mood (arthībhāvana). Those who administers the sacrifice with an order, should listens to the sound. And when he says 'I am entrusted to it', it can be a niyoga of sonal imagination. 'Niyoga' is not mere an utterance, but it is an intention of the word of a doers. But when niyoga is done, they gets more relevance. They claim that vedas are not created by man. Here Ācārya denies the validity of the Vedas as well as the sonal validity of it. Since there is no perceptual or inferential knowledge, the concept of salvation through yāga is to be denied. Thus the imagination of sacrifices through verbal receptivity is also denied by PG.
Ācārya replies that śāstra should work for the satiation of 'Moha'. Teachers from various śāstras have difference in their opinions and only the learned can get rid of the ignorance of others. Is the omniscient 'Bhagavan' having the knowledge of salvation and heaven. As an answer to these doubts of the opponents, Ācārya says that through meditation and hearing the learned speeches a man can attain 'nirvāna'. And valid knowledge is the basis of 'nirvāna'. With this interpretation he draws the picture how 'Bhagavan' Buddha gets validity through the definitions and interpretation of the noble truths scientifically.

Buddha is devoid of 'rāgādidvēsa' since he is an advisor, 'Sandigda' is the word with rational fallacy. As an answer to the question from Ācārya opponent says, whether ignorance, raga and the other 'fallacies' can be considered as permanent? Is there no solution to get rid of these fallacies? Raga and the other like are occasional and therefore they are temporary. Self is the root cause of all defects. Egolessness is the only solution to this problem. Buddha doesn't believe in soul and he is a believer of no soul theory (nairātmyavāda). His teachings are capable of depriving these defects. Light and darkness cannot stand together, likewise Ātmavāda and Nairātmyavāda are contradictory, they can not exist together.
The denial of the views of the sāṅkhya.

The sāṅkhya concept about pradhāna as the root cause of the universe was denied by the Ācārya. They use Pradhāna instead of 'god'. Nature is responsible for this universe and it also is a wrong concept. To prove this, he says pradhāna has no shape or colour, then how can such statements be proved as real? Such as a 'pot with gold'. And it is wrong to conceive that pradhāna is responsible for giving colour and power to objects. Because, if so, pradhāna is the omnipotent. Invisible and unreal causes may be inferred as transmitted defects of traditions, i.e. if pradhāna is the cause of all then what is the cause of pradhāna? and so on the question continues. It may create some disorder. A matter is evolved out of another and matter gives rise to the thought of other matters. It is inferential in the case of concept of cause and causation there is no continuity and there is 'anavastha' so Ācārya denies it. If pradhāna is the admitted as the cause, then the horn of the hare also is to be admitted. We are not able to establish whether an invisible object is eternal or ephemeral.

The reason for Dukha is the unanimism of man and nature. Man becomes free himself from nature by mere prudence. The claim of the sāṅkhya is denied by stating the 'vivekadarśana'. It helps to identify the
difference and it is fulfilled by ‘Anvayavyatireka’. Soul is everywhere but pleasure is not omnipresent. Flowers are bound in a garland though they have separate identity. Garland is real only with the unanimity of the flowers. Likewise soul and misery stand separate but we feel its union. The destruction of soul is not sought in a person who seeks pleasure. It is wrong to say that salvation is not possible through the unity of puruṣa and pradhāna. If there is no relation between pradhāna and puruṣa, there is no question of their uniting together. Man considers that Prakrti creates its objection of study and then how can there be resemblance. Sāṅkhya vision does not account for reason in layman. Then how can it resemble? Desire and memory are the duty of instincts. How can this desire takes place in man with questions like this. Ācārya clears the doubts. According to the Sāṅkhya, pain, mind and such mental experiences are complemented. The doubts about wisdom, its reflection and its variance were clarified by him. Citta, caitta bheda of the Sāṅkhya is, for cetas is not away from citta- “चित्तेऽऽऽ: चैतसा नान्या”. According to this Citta and cetas cannot be isolated from each other. For example the stars at night glow by receiving light from the sun, likewise the objects of caitasa cannot be separated from citta. Wisdom and reflux feel to be two variants. Cetas is not manifested in matter. The opinion of the sāṅkhya and the vijñāna
does not come out of vijnāna is refuted by him. For the sāṅkhya seed comes out from the evolution of another seed and it is not the case of vijnāna. Here Ācārya refutes this. Vijnāna is originated in the embryonic stage itself. The vijnāna of the pre-natal existence takes birth in a new body also. Power is always related to vijnāna, and by this vijnāna is acquired through birth and rebirth.

Then Ācārya began to reject some views of Vaiśeṣikas. Vaiśeṣika’s opinion is that atoms are permanent. They say that atoms forms as a pot. Pot is the amalgam of many atoms. Similarly atom has no shape, but a pot has its shape. Each object gets shape by the will of God. This concept of Vaiśeṣikas is cleared out by Ācārya saying that the pot is formed of different atoms. If God is the moulder of these atoms, then it is a hallucinatory. Like as the silver in the gem, we get the concept of a pot through the amalgam of its parts. Since the earth do not have the shape of human perception, there is no creator for it. If everything has a creator the moth bound also is created by the potter. What is the use of conferring to God that he is the creator of every action. If conferred so, each one has to be interpreted with a creator. It creates the state of the fallacy viz. Anavastha. PG also denies the Ātmavāda of Vaiśeṣika. They believe that soul is pleasant unanimous and copulative with body and
jointly unanimous to the physical parts. Thus all things has found unified only with the self (avayavī). Soul has no existence without body according to the basis of matter of interpretation. If there is no relation like samavāya the profit of soul is to be with its instinct lore. Then how can detachment take place? If sky is permanent why didn’t it become God who is said to be permanent. Since they are one, how can there be difference? If God is the basis of the desire for karma which creates the desire for man to act. This is a very relevant question. It acts like a idiom that ‘kākatālīya’ which means that occurred at that same moment. The crow came and palm fruit fell down at that moment such things happen occasionally and rarely and it is unfit to say the cause and effect occurs simultaneously. Here what occurs naturally is entrusted with the function of God. PG states that pot is the constituted form. Buddhists do not believe in avayavī. They consider that all objects represent its own shape. Similarly Buddhist are not concerned with God as a creator. They believe that this world is the result of the effort of living beings because of its variety in nature, shape etc.. If the omniscient and omnipotent God is the creator of this world, the whole universe including the animate and the inanimate objects will become the place of happiness. So ācārya did not accept this view. He clearly states that this universe is the effect of human effort.
To refute the view of Naiyāyikas related to the fallacies, he points out that the definition of Kāryasama as defective. The definition of kāryasama given by Nyāyasūtrakāra is irrational. Sound is permanent and since it does have an everlasting use, it is illustrated as equally to that of a pot. Kāryasama is the fallacy, which occurs with things of temporary forms. The act of kāryasama is said to be of two kinds. The result of getting water from digging a well and the cloth that we make out of weaving are similarised. This matter has difference both in the example of sound and pot. But 'kāryata' in objects like the pot is not definite. This kind of kāryasama can divide both in the literal and original sense. Thereby sound is something after the 'karma' and it is not abhivyakta in this instance.

Ācārya mentions some objections about the ātmavāda of Naiyāyikas. The soul is the abode of 'Pleasure misery' etc.. They say that through brings unhappiness through death. Thus objects like atma has both Sukha and Dukha and Sukha is a predecessor of Dukha. If Sukha is preceded by Dukha, how can we consider it as Sukha. Ācārya replies to this argument, as when Dukha is destroyed the cause of the destruction of Dukha also results. While districting these cause the soul attains the renounced stated and get salvation. Wherever there is attachment, there
is no liberation. One should get rid of the love of the soul in this world.

The intense love to the soul is ‘raga’. Nairātmyavāda is the result of renouncing raga and all its elements.

He admits the claims of Nyāyasūtrakāra in some places. Desire is the root of birth and ignorance is the root of desire and this claim is accredited by the Ācārya. Likewise when he replies to the Svabhāvavādins, adds that sharpness of a thorn is without cause and misery is also without a cause. Nyāyasūtrakāra refutes it 'अनिमितानिमित्तव्यानिमित्ततः' also has the same response. If the sharpness of a thorn has a cause, the cause also has a cause. If there is a thorn, there is sharpness and if there is no thorn, there will be its absence. This reply is with anvayavyatirēka. Misery is not natural, it has also a cause. There is nothing without a cause.

While rejecting the Cārvāka’s claims of the cause of the element is breath, sense, intelligence are not originated from body, because they have frailties. These are not from the bodies of the parents but are from the instincts and are common to homosapiens. The scientific findings of these have co-related with the cycle of births. Spaceless experiences bring their own results. Cause and causation are closely related. It is a meaning of interpretation, when Ācārya responses to the claim about
rebirths by the Cārvākas. How can there be male calf from the womb of a female-mother? This doubt is cleared by saying that bullock or buffalo is not from the mother, but bought from the market. Matter is from the invisible cause. Each birth takes place by experience or exercise. A new birth from an old one get through experience. This experience beyond the space is gained by the prenatal experience. Previous birth is responsible for the present life. Senses do their duty in accordance with the acquired knowledge. Senses are not related to the elements. The rejection of karma is done in this way.

According to the topic related rebirth, he says 'consciousness' is occupied with raga and other faculties. The moment one gets free himself from these, he gets liberation. If soul is permanent, rebirth do not take place. If, so, soul has both purity and impurity, it is contradictory and there comes fallacy. When there is no contradictory situation, there is either liberation or subjection. Liberation is through the renouncing of the ragas. As far as there is desire, the Citta gets births and rebirths based on its instincts till the end of desiring.

In the case of death it is the absence of a visual object. According to the Jainas, if a tree is dried up it is dead. The expression of 'death' in their view is not admissible. For Buddhists they do not realize the death of
the tree. Buddhists realize that death is the end of knowledge and Sāṅkhya do not admit this. The objects like trees which may not have knowledge and this doubt of the absence of knowledge cannot be admitted. That is to say, if there is no span of life there is no destruction to the life span. According to Vaibhāṣika, duration of life is the presence of life in the body and it is based on knowledge. In effect, the objects like trees have no life and thereby no death, such as मृत्यु: तर्कः।

While discussing the nature of 'Mokṣa'. Karma doesn't end without annihilating 'desire'. When 'karma is totally degenerated, Mokṣa comes to be in validated. For example destiny cannot be there without desire with desire, people acquire kingdoms. But the results of karma need not satisfy the desire. Rāgādīdvēṣa can be easily produced in persons who are involved in karma, desire, action etc.. Here only the destruction of desire will be enough to attain mokṣa.

The cause of all the miseries in the world is the thought about self and its relations. A person who is liberated has no misery or happiness. He should have the consciousness of the noble truths. He should try to get the loss of desire and get Nairātmya darśana. In short, one who has nairatmyadarśana, gets the real mokṣa.
To make clarification of these truths PG uses maṅgalaśloka in the beginning of the book. It is excellently interpreted and explained. The importance of Buddhism and the infallibility of Buddhists philosophy are clearly stated in this śloka. It is said that the composition of this book was due to the sympathy towards the ignorant polemicals. He has copied the same maṅgalaśloka of the Pramāṇasamuccaya by Diṁnāga. Even though the importance of sacrifice referred in Veda and the concept of god is not stated. The infallibility of Buddha is established here through supportive arguments. Ācārya DK establishes the validity of Buddha by composing seven celebrated works. PG illustrates the validity of Buddha with four materials, one who is the benefactor of mankind, since he has mercy one who is the teacher, since he has knowledge, one who is pure of heart one who has the knowledge of the four noble truths and is conferred validity. Thus we can see the infallibility and validity of Buddha all throughout this text.

When we compare the work of Manorathanandin, with the work of PG. The metaphorical style of PG in illustrations becomes more superior or Manorathanandin follows a moderate approach defining the verbal meaning and deliberation. When the inferential validity is explained, Manorathanandin defines ‘avisamvāda’ as vañcanāmuktam. But PG
gives a detailed meaning as to say the process of digestion and niśpatti towards maturity. Avisamvāda is arthakriyāsthitī. Though the sound the communication is done for the transmission of knowledge.

PG had defined niyoga and its eleven sub-divisions in a detailed manner and denies it. But Manorathanandin has given no such details about 'niyoga'. PG has defined the topic like 'Abhāva' and 'Bādhan' with some extent. For example he has given vinābhāva as an illustration to abhāva. Such details are not seen in Manorathahandin’s work.

Through the 56th śloka of DK, the bodily blaze of Cārvāka is seen having no quality after death owing to rheumatism or the like defects. Here DK used मृते समीकृते दोष and Manorathanandin has used समीकृते.

Based on the first annexture of Pramanāsiddhi, Bhagavan Buddha has been validated with seven reasons. But PG states it with four reasons viz. Jagathitaisitvam, Śāstṛtvam, Sugatatvam and Tāyitvam. Here Manorathanandin goes from Tāyatva to Sugatatva and there by Śāstṛtva and through of Jagathitaisitva. Thus Bhagavan Buddha gets infallibility. In the case of hetvabhasa namely, Asiddha, both PG and Manorathanandin have certain resemblance. As Vaiśeṣikas realize eternality to atoms and Buddhists realize it as inexplicable. Atoms are mortal since they are
perfect or inexplicable. Here inexplicability and mortality are different and there by clarifies the phenomena of 'asiddha'.

We can undoubtedly say that PG has succeeded in making Buddha valid, and explaining his philosophy in Metaphorical usage.

Thus PG gives clarification to the theories and views of DK throwing a fresh light upon them. His discussion gives light to his deep scholarship on these doctrines. Later he became famous as equal to DK. PG defends all position of Buddhist related to controversial points. He became victorious in rejecting to reject the existence of God, self, space, time etc. He tried to maintain pragmatism (arthakriyakārīta) as the touch stone in the applied level of topic which mentioned in the previous sentence. A.S Altekar, the famous scholar observes in the introduction of PVA edited by Rahul Sāmkrtyāyana that about more often one hundred pages have been devoted by PG to establish the authoritativeness and infallibility of Buddha and his teachings. PG Vehemently attacks the position of Naiyāyikas who tries to establish the existence of god.

We can see that PVA is a work of valuable merit. More than three forth of this work PG have devoted the topics of rational and intellectual point of view while discussing the two means of valid knowledge, the character of correct syllogism etc. Based on pure rational consideration,
he uses all these for the benefit of philosophical explosive of a human being, who believe himself as the true follower of Buddha.

Thus PVA has got much popularity among the later works of almost all writers. These writers includes not only the writers of Buddhist circle but the Jainas, Naiyāyikas Mīmāṁsakas Vaiśeṣikas etc. The famous Naiyāyika named Jayanthabhatta frequently quotes this text and records that Vārttikālāṅkāra or PVA bears the position of the work with great merit.

There are some resemblance in the ideas of Vēdāntic visions while communicating some suitable principles.

1. It is sensual fantasy to see serpent in a coir, likewise, the reason for universe is felt in this form is because of avidyā. This can be discussed through the samvṛtisatta and paramārtha satta. This can be equated with vyāvahārikasatya or paramārthasatya. Jñāna is felt momentary when actual perception, i.e. coir is not a serpent is completed.

2. The person, who is non-attached (jeevanmukta) is not related to his destiny. Here the vision of Buddhism equals with it. This knowledge is same as we can be felt in nairātmyadarśana.
3. Atma, of Vēdāntins which is 'pudgalam' in Buddhist view cannot be established mortal or immortal. It is indefinable in the view of Anirvacanīyakhyāti of Vēdāntins.

4. Knowledge eliminates Rāgādi doṣa. Ignorance is cleared through jñāna. Here vidyā and avidyā followed. Such as Buddhist believes that. ‘ज्ञानित्तु ज्ञानेव भवति, ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मेव भवति’ There is a self ego behind every karma.

5. Desire is prompted by Dukha svarūpa as for as we know it? Buddhism finds that karma is the result of desire which brings misery and the desire should root out to become liberated. This can be attained through non-attachment in Buddhism and detachment from worldly or heavenly pleasure of Vēdāntins.

Later influence

The followers of PG were mainly three writers on various schools located at different places. They were Ravigupta, Yamāri and Jinabhadra.

Ravigupta. He was the direct disciple of PG. He is regarded as a contemporary of Jñānaśribhadra whose sphere of work was Kashmir. He followed Devendrabodhi in arranging the chapters of text based on the numerical arrangements in PV, S.C Vidyabhusan has noted his age was in
about 725 AD and he was a poet and the teacher of priests. It is supposed that he lived before Jayanthabhatta, the Nyāyamañjarīkāra. Vidyabhusan has also written that he lived in the first part of 8th century AD. Taranatha notes that there were twelve religious study centres during that period and this has been accepted by L.M. Joshi also. S.C. Vidyabhusan has recorded that these institutions were in Magadha and even though Ravigupta was the native of Kashmir.

Yamari. He was the direct disciple of the Kāśmīrian pandit Jnānasri bhadra. But it is also said that his field of work was in Bengal. To Taranath his age is 11th century. In the opinion of S.C.Vidyabhusana 11th century is itself is his period (1050. AD). He was also a grammarian and logician. But L.M Joshi records that his age can be fixed between 800 and 900 AD. Based on these different observations we may fix his period might be 900. AD. Yamari had prepared the interpretations of three chapters of PVA. Th. Stcherbatsky recorded that this book has been in available at Tanjur in Tibet in 4 volumes. He opined that these interpretations of the writer seems to be good and it reflects the priestly rituals of that period based on Mahāyānism.

Jinabhadra. He is an Ācārya who tried to propagate the exact teachings of PG. The chapters of PVA are categorised in the following way. First
chapter is intended for Pramāṇasiddhi and the propagation of Buddhist ideas. The second third and fourth chapters seek to deal with the search for sensual perceptions, inferences and avayavās. S.C Vidhyabhusana has accredited his era as 940 AD. He is said to be the 'Jinabhadra' who lived in Konkan region.

The Impact of PVA on later works

Through the composition of PVA, PG has introduced a new style adopting prose and verse methodology in philosophical works. Rahul Samkṛtyayana observes that he is the first writer who started the new methods in defining terms and doctrines decorating full of idioms (lokoktayah) for easily understanding of common people. V.S Altekar expresses his wonder towards the size of this work. He says that the big size of this work (about 16,200 verses) comes equivalent to one sixth size of Mahābhārata, the biggest epic ever seen in Indian literature. Thus this text bear as a model to the successive writers. This text has got much influence as an epic among the common people belonging to Mahāyāna Buddhism like the epics Rāmāyana, Mahābhārata for Hindus.