CHAPTER V
COMPARISON - SOME ASPECTS

SANNIKARŞA

According to the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika perception depends upon the intercourse (San Nikarṣa) of the sense-organs with their objects. San Nikarṣa is the function of the sense-organs by means of which they enter into a particular relation with their appropriate objects and bring about the perception of the objects. This intercourse between the sense-organs and their object is of six kinds so far as our ordinary perception is concerned viz.,

(1) Union (Samyoga)

(2) United inheritance (Samyukta Samavāya)

(3) United inherent inheritance (Samyukta Samaveta Samavāya)

(4) Inherence (Samavāya)

(5) Inherent inheritance (Samaveta Samavāya)
The relation of qualification and qualified (Viśeṣaṇaṭa)²

In addition to the above six kinds of intercourse, which are called ordinary intercourse (Laukikasannikṣa), the Neo-Naiyāyikas recognize three other kinds of extra - ordinary intercourse (Alaukika sannikṣa) between the sense-organs and their objects. Ordinary sensuous perception depends upon one of the six kinds of ordinary intercourse between an external or internal sense-organ and its object. But super-sensuous perception is not produced by any of these six kinds of ordinary intercourse. It is produced by an extra-ordinary intercourse. The extra ordinary intercourse is of three kinds. (1) the intercourse (with all individual objects of a particular class) through generic character-Samānyā lakṣaṇa Sannikṣa ³ (2) the intercourse with an object not present to a sense-organ, through its idea revived in memory - Jñānalakṣaṇa Sannikṣa ⁴ (3) the intercourse with remote, subtle, past and future objects produced by meditation - yogaja Sannikṣa ⁵
ACQUIRED PERCEPTION

According to the Neo-Naiyāyikas the visual perception of fragrant sandal is explained as due to an extraordinary contact (*Jñānalakṣāna pratyāsakti*) through the knowledge of fragrance, though it is not the proper object of the visual organ. In western Psychology such a perception is generally regarded as acquired perception. According to the Jaina, the acquired perception is a complex psychosis made up of representative and representative processes mechanically associated with each other and involving judgement and inference. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of a psychic compound of distinct psychic entities.

The Jaina regards the visual perception of fragrant sandal as a cause of acquired perception. The visual organ alone cannot produce the perception of fragrant sandal, since fragrance cannot be apprehended by the visual organ. Nor can the visual organ produce this perception, even in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance, for in that case, odour will be apprehended by the visual organ. So the perception of fragrant sandal can neither be perceived by the visual organ...
singly, nor in co-operation with the recollection of odour. There is an apprehension of fragrant sandal after the operation of the visual organ in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance. But from this it does not follow that it is a simple psychosis of the nature of visual perception produced by the visual organ. In fact it is a complex psychosis of presentative and representative processes mixed up together. It is a mixed mode of consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements mechanically associated with each other. There is an integrative association of two co-ordinate and co-existent elements in the visual perception of the sandal and the idea of fragrance is freely reproduced in memory. The apprehension of fragrant sandal is simply a sum of two distinct psychic entities, the present optic sensation of the sandal plus an image of its fragrance reproduced from past experience by association and integrated together into a complex psychosis. Though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, and the fragrance is reproduced in memory by the law of association, the apprehension of the sandal as qualified by fragrance or fragrant sandal, involves a process of judgement and
an inference. Thus according to the Jaina, in the acquired perception of fragrant sandal there is a free association of ideas, judgement and inference. An acquired perception is rather an act of inference than perception, though it depends on both perception and recollection. This account of an acquired perception is similar to the account of the associationist psychology of the west.

But the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of a mixed mode of consciousness. Every psychosis is simple. There cannot be a psychic compound because of the atomic nature of the Manas, without which there can be no psychosis at all. According to this view, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is a simple psychosis, though it is preceded by the visual perception of the sandal and the recollection of its fragrance.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika regards cognition as it apprehends both the past condition of its object and its present condition by a synthetic act of apperception. Sense-organs can produce only perception and subconscious impression can produce only recollection, yet when they co-operate with each other
they can produce recognition which is a kind of qualified perception.

What is the object of recognition, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika? The object of recognition is something existing at present but also qualified by the past time. Thus recognition apprehends both the past and the present character of its object.

So according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, recognition is perceptual in character, though it is produced by the sense-organs - with the help of subconscious impressions.

Recognition is not a mixed mode consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements, for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the simultaneity of two or more cognitions owing to the atomic nature of the Manas. According to this view, recognition is a single presentative cognition or perception, but qualified by the past time or by the past cognition of the object. Recognition, therefore is a kind of qualified perception.

The Jaina regards recognition as a single unitary psychosis produced by perception and recollection both, which
apprehends identity of an object in the past and the present. It is neither of the nature of perception nor of the nature of recollection, nor a mechanical association of perception and recollection both nor a composite psychosis containing the two fold element of perception and recollection. It is a unique psychosis; it is 'sui generis' a single unitary psychosis. Perception apprehends the present condition of an object. Recollection apprehends the past condition of an object. Recognition which is quite a new psychosis apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present. So recognition is different from perception and recollection and its object also is different from that of perception and recollection. Thus the Jaina differs from the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas, who regard recognition as a kind of perception. For instance, wherever peripheral stimulation is present, perception is present, and wherever peripheral stimulation is absent, perception is absent. Recognition does not directly follow upon peripheral stimulation.

In fact recognition is neither perception nor recollection, but 'Sui Generis' psychosis produced by both. It is not a
THEORIES OF PERCEPTION.

The Jaina recognizes only two kinds of valid knowledge: direct knowledge (Aparokṣa) and indirect knowledge (Parokṣa). Knowledge is direct when it is immediate or distinct. Knowledge is indirect when it is mediate. Perception is direct or immediate knowledge because it is directly derived from the sense and the mind, while mediate knowledge (e.g., inferential knowledge, verbal knowledge etc.) is derived through the medium of some other knowledge.

Perception is of two kinds Samvyavahārika pratyakṣa and Mukhya pratyakṣa. The former is the ordinary perception of every day life. The latter is super-normal perception. Samvyavahārika pratyakṣa again is of two kinds. Perception produced by the senses (Indriyanibandhana). The Jaina regards the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the skin only as sense-organs. He does not regard the mind (Manas) as a sense-organ. The mind is called no-sense organ (Anindriya).
Hence the two varieties of ordinary perception are sense-perception and mental perception. *Mukhya pratyakṣa* is of three kinds; *Avadhi* or clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance of time and space, *Manaḥ Paryāya* or telepathic knowledge of thoughts in other minds, and *Kevala* or infinite knowledge unlimited by time and space or omniscience. All of them are perceptual in nature.

The Jaina distinguishes between *Darśana* and *Jñāna*. *Darśana* is simple apprehension of an object. Just after peripheral stimulation there is the bare cognition of an object in a general way. It apprehends only its general features (*Sattāmātra*) and not its particular features. *Jnana* is the apprehension of the special features of an object. *Darśana* is the knowledge of acquaintance, while *jnana* is the knowledge about an object. *Darśana* is called indeterminate perception (*Nirvikalpaka jñāna*) in other systems of philosophy. But the Jaina recognizes it as *jñāna* or knowledge. *Jñāna* is always determinate, it must have a definite form (*Sākāra*), it must apprehend the special features (*Viśeṣa*) of its object. So the Jaina does not regard *Darśana* as indeterminate per-
ception, because perception is always definite and determinate.

In our ordinary perception (Samvyavahārika pratyakṣa) there are four stages; (i) Avagraha (ii) Ṭhā (iii) Avāya (iv) Dhāraṇa.\(^1\)

Gautama defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, not associated with any name, and well defined. In this definition, the different kinds of perception, the condition of valid perception, and the genesis of perception have been described. Perception is of two kinds, viz. indeterminate (Avyapadeśa) and determinate (Vyavasāyatmakā). We have already discussed the nature of indeterminate (Nirvikalpa) and determinate (Savikalpa) perception in detail. Perception is that cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. In this definition only the specific condition of perception has been stated. In perception there is not only the contact of the sense-organs with the Manas, but also the contact of the Manas with the self.
The contact of *Manas* with the sense organs and the contact of the *Manas* with the self are common to inference and other forms of cognition also\(^2\). But it may be contended that the contact of *Manas* with the sense-organs also is a specific condition of perception, which is not present in other forms of cognition also. So this condition should be distinctly mentioned. Vātsyāyana rightly points out that the contact of the sense-organ with the object is as good a distinctive feature of perception, as the contact of *Manas* with the sense-organs. So when one distinctive feature has been mentioned, there is no need of mentioning the other similar features, since the definition is not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all conditions of perception\(^3\).

Uddyotakara offers other explanations too. Firstly, the sense-object contact, is the distinctive feature of every individual perception. In every individual perception which is produced by the sense-object contact, what differentiates it from every other perception is either the sense-organ concerned, or the object perceived, and each individual perception is called either after the sense-organ or after the object.
example, the perception of colour is called either visual perception or colour perception. No perception is ever called after the mind sense-contact, the perception of colour for instance, is never called mental perception. Secondly, the mind-sense contact is the common factor among all kinds of perception, which are otherwise different. In otherwords, the contact of the mind, with the sense-organs does not differ in different kinds of perception, it remains the same in different kinds of perception. Thirdly, the mind-sense contact is not mentioned as the distinctive feature of perception. Since with regard to perception, the mind sense-contact, stands on the same footing as the mind soul-contact. Individual perceptions are never called either after the mind or after the soul. Both these contacts subsist in a substratum which is imperceptible by the senses. Neither of these two contacts belong to the perceived object, and both of these contacts subsist in the mind. These are the reasons why the mind sense-contact has not been mentioned in the definition of perception.

Praśastapāda maintains that, just after the contact of an object with a sense-organ there is immediate apprehension
of the mere form of an object (*Svarūpamātra*). This is indeterminate perception. It apprehends an object with its generic and specific characters, but does not distinguish them from each other. It is the primal stage of perception. It is not the result of any other prior cognition.

Vātsyāyana recognizes a nameless perception which may be called indeterminate perception. An object may be perceived even without an apprehension of its name. When an object is perceived along with its name and their (of name and object) relation to each other, it is said to be apprehended by determinate perception. Determinate perception has the same object as indeterminate perception, but it differs from the latter in apprehending an additional factor, viz., the name of its object revived in memory by association. The former is mixed up with the verbal image of the name of its object, while the latter is free from verbal images.

Bhasarvajña defines indeterminate perception as apprehension of the bare nature of an object immediately after peripheral stimulation.

He defines determinate perception as the apprehen-
sion of an object qualified by its qualifications, such as name, substance, quality, action, genus and non-existence. The concept of name (Samjñā) enters into such a determinate perception as ‘This is Devadatta’. The concept of substance enters into such a determinate perception as ‘The man is with a stick’. The concept of quality (Guṇa) enters into such determinate perception as ‘The cloth is white’. The concept of action (Karman) enters into such a determinate perception as ‘the man is going’. The concept of genus (Sāmānya) enters into such a determinate perception as ‘This is a cow’. The concept of non-existence (Abhāva) enters into such a determinate perception as ‘The ground is without a jar’.

Gaṅgeśa defines indeterminate perception as the non-relational apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, genus, and the like.

Visvanātha elaborates the view of Gaṅgeśa. He defines indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an object and its generic character as unrelated to each other immediately after the intercourse of a sense-organ with the object.

Annambhatta defines indeterminate perception as the
immediate apprehension of an object with its properties without apprehending the relation between them \((\text{Viśeṣaṇa} \text{viśeṣya sambandha' navagāhi jñānam})\). He defines determinate perception as the apprehension of the relation between the qualified object \((\text{Viśeṣya})\) and its qualifications \((\text{Viśeṣaṇa})\) viz., name, genus and the like \((\text{Nāmajātyādiviśeṣana viśeṣya-sambandhāva gāhijñānam})\). Nīlakanṭha holds a slightly different view. He holds that indeterminate perception is the mere apprehension of an object \((\text{Viśeṣya})\), its qualifications \((\text{Viśeṣaṇa})\) and the relation of inherence \((\text{Samavāya})\) without their mutual connection. He does not recognize its object as a qualified thing \((\text{Viśeṣya})\), its qualifications as qualifications \((\text{Viśeṣaṇa})\), and the relation of inherence as subsisting between the two. The mutual connection among these elements is apprehended by determinate perception. Thus unlike Viśvanātha and Annambhaṭṭa, Nīlakanṭha makes the relation of inherence also an object of indeterminate perception, though not the connection of the relation with the qualified object and the qualifications. But he agrees with them in regarding indeterminate perception as an immediate sensory
presentation of an object. These are the views of the Naïyayikas.

According to Jaina there are two kinds in perception-empirical and transcendental. Empirical perception is sensuous or non-sensuous. Sensuous perception is due to the external sense-organs. Non-sensuous perception is Mental perception.

The Jaina does not recognize the existence and validity of intermediate perception, because it cannot determine the nature of its object with its specific qualities, and because it cannot lead to attainment of good and avoidance of evil. Valid knowledge is determinate cognition which apprehends itself and an object. Indeterminate perception neither apprehends itself nor apprehends an object definitely. So it is not valid. It is not distinct cognition. So it is not perception.

CONDITIONS OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas divide Perception mainly into two kinds viz. external perception and internal perception. The older Vaiśeṣikas hold that external perception depends upon
the following conditions.

The object of external perception must have extensity (*Mahattva*) or appreciable magnitude, it must be a composite of many parts (*Anekadravyavat*) and must have appreciable odour (*Udbhūtarūpa*).

The later Vaiśeṣikas agree with the older Vaiśeṣikas in holding that extensive magnitude (*Mahattva*) is the general condition of perception.

**PERCEPTION OF COGNITION**

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a cognition is an object of perception, but it is not perceived by itself but by another cognition through the internal organ or mind.

According to the Jaina, since cognition has self illumination, it is perceived by itself in apprehending its object, it is not perceived by any cognition.

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika holds that a cognition is perceived by another cognition, which is called *anuvyavasāya*. A cognition is directly apprehended by internal perception. A cognition can never turn upon itself to make itself the object of cognition. Though a cognition manifests another object
(Paraprakāśaka) it can never manifest itself (Svaprakāśaka).
It is other-manifesting but never self manifesting. But though
a cognition is not manifested by itself, it can be manifested
by another cognition (Jñānam jñānāntara vedyam)21. A
cognition is perceived by another cognition through the mind.

THE SELF AND ITS PERCEPTION

According to the Naiyāyikas, the self is a permanent
substance in which, cognition, pleasure, pain, aversion and
volition inhere. It is not a series of cognitions, but a perma-
nent principle in which they exist. It is not a stream of con-
sciousness, but an abiding substance which becomes conscious
at times. All Naiyāyikas admit that the self is an object of
perception as well, while others deny it. Gautama makes the
self an object of inference. It is inferred from its qualities
such as pleasure, pain, cognition, desire, aversion and voli-
tion22. Gautama nowhere mentions in the Sūtras whether the
self is an object of perception or not. The self is perceived by
the yogin through a particular kind of conjunction between
the self and the Manas owing to the ecstasy of meditation.
The self is an object of yogic perception23. So the self is not
an object of normal perception. It cannot be perceived by ordinary persons through the internal organ. But it can be perceived only by the yogin in the state of ecstasy. So the self is not an object of normal internal perception, but of supernormal perception. Here, by the self, Vātsyāyana means the pure self free from its connection with the organism.

Kaṇāda holds that the self is not an object of normal perception, but of supernormal perception. It cannot be perceived through the internal organ (Manas), owing to its ordinary conjunction with the self. My own self is as imperceptible as any other self⁴⁴. But Kaṇāda admits that the self can be perceived by the yogins through a particular kind of conjunction between the self and the Manas. This conjunction is due to a peculiar power (Dharma) born of meditation. Thus, the self is an object of higher intuition.

The Jaina holds that the self is an object of internal perception. When I feel that ‘I am happy’ or ‘I am unhappy’ I have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an object of internal perception. But how can it be an object of direct and immediate apprehension or perception, though it
has no form at all! The Jaina replies that just as pleasure can be perceived though it is without any form, so the self also can be perceived though it is without any form. When pleasure is perceived, it is not perceived apart from the self. It is perceived always as belonging to the self. Pleasure is never perceived as 'this is pleasure', as a jar is perceived as 'this is a jar'. Pleasure is always perceived as 'I am pleased' or 'I have pleasure'. Hence the perception of pleasure in the form of 'I am pleased' not only reveals pleasure but also the self. Thus the self is an object of internal perception.

The Jaina holds that the self is manifested both by external perception and by internal perception.

SUPER NORMAL PERCEPTION

Bhāsarvajña divides perception into two kinds. Yogic perception (Yogipratyakṣa) and non-Yogic perception (Aveyogipratyakṣa). He defines ordinary or non-yogic perception as direct and immediate apprehension of gross objects produced by a particular relation between sense-organs and their objects with the help of light, time (now) space (here)
merit or demerit of the person. And he defines Yogic perception as direct and immediate apprehension of distant, past, future and subtle objects.

If yogins can perceive all objects of the world, past, present, future, hidden, subtle and remote and supersensible objects like dharma, etc., how do they differ from omniscient God? How does the Yogic perception differ from divine perception? Jayanta Bhatta replies that the difference lies in that the omniscience of yogin is produced by the constant meditation, while divine omniscience is eternal. Moreover, the divine perception of dharma (Moral Law) is natural to God, dharma constitutes the essential nature of God, which is the cause of the Vedic injunctions of dharma. But yogins at first learn the real nature of dharma from the Vedic injunctions and then by unceasing practice in meditation they come to perceive it and when they acquire an intuition of it, the conception that the Vedic injunction is the ultimate standard of duty or moral obligation loses its hold upon their minds.

Praśastapāda divides Yogic perception into two kinds, viz., (1) Yukta pratyakṣa or the perception of those who are in
ecstasy, and (ii) Viyuktapratyakṣa or the perception of those who have fallen off from ecstasy. Those who are in a state of ecstasy can perceive their own selves, the selves of others, ākāśa, space, time, atoms, air, manas and the qualities, actions, generalities and particularities inhering in those, and inference itself through the manas aided by the peculiar powers (Dharma) produced by meditation. And those who have fallen off from ecstasy perceive, subtle, hidded, and remote things owing to the fourfold contact of the self, manas, sense-organs and objects, and virtue of the peculiar powers produced by meditations.

Similarly the Neo-Naiyāyikas divide yogic perception into two kinds:

(1) the perception of a yogin who has attained union with the Supreme Being (Yukta)

(2) the perception of a yogin, who is endeavouring to attain such a union (Yuñjāna).

The first yogin enjoys a constant perception of all the objects of the world, ether, atoms etc, his mind aided by a certain dharma born of meditation, while the second yogin
can acquire perception of all the objects with a little effort of
attention or meditation.

The Jain divides perception into two kinds;

(1) *empirical perception*

(2) *transcendental perception*

Empirical perception is what we have in every day life. It is of two kinds.

(1) Sensuous perception (*Indriyanibandhana*) or perception derived from the sense-organs (i.e. external sense-organs)

(2) Non-sensuous perception (*Anindriyanibandhana*) or perception derived from the mind which is not a sense organ according to Jaina.

Transcendental perception owes its origin to the self alone, it is neither derived from sense-organs nor from the mind. It is directly derived from the self owing to the destruction of the impediments to perfect knowledge. It is of two kinds viz., imperfect or deficient (*Vikala*) and perfect or complete (*Sakala*). The former again is of two kinds, viz., clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance of time and space
(Avadhi) and direct perception of the thoughts of others, as in telepathic knowledge of the thoughts of other minds (Manahparāya). The latter is omniscience (Kevalajñānam) or the perfect knowledge of all the objects of the universe due to the complete destruction of the karman-matter which is an obstacle to knowledge. Thus the highest stage of transcendental perception, according to the Jaina, is omniscience (Kevalajñāna). The Jaina does not believe in the existence of God and consequently in divine omniscience. But he holds that the Jīva or the individual self can attain perception and omniscience by completely destroying the karman matter which is an obstacle to perfect knowledge. The knowledge of all objects exists in the self. But it is veiled by karman-matter. When the veil of karman matter encrusting the self is completely destroyed, the self realizes its omniscience. This perfect intuition of the whole universe is not produced by the external sense-organs or by the internal organ of mind as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say.

According to some, the external sense-organs aided by the merit born of meditation can apprehend past, future,
Distant and subtle-objects. But the sense-organs can never be
free from their inherent imperfections. Prabhācandra argues
that even the sense-organ of yogin can never enter into direct
relation with super sensible objects (e.g. atoms) like ours be-
cause they are after all sense-organs. What is the nature of
the aid rendered by the peculiar power (Dharma) born of medi-
ation to the sense-organs? Does the dharma born of medi-
ation increase the capacity of the sense-organs when they
operate on regard to their objects (e.g. atoms)? Or does it
merely assist the sense-organs when they operate on their own
objects? The first alternative is untenable because the sense-
organs by themselves can never operate on atoms, etc. If they
operate on atoms, etc., they do not stand in need of the aid of
the dharma born of yoga, and if they operate on atoms etc,
only when they are aided by the dharma, then there is a cir-
cular reasoning. The dharma born of yoga increases the
capacity of the sense-organs operate on atoms, etc, when they
are aided by the dharma born of yoga cannot increase the
capacity of the sense-organs, it merely assist them in operat-
ing on supersensible objects like atoms, etc. The aid of dharma
rendered to the sense-organs in their apprehension of supersensible objects is needless.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the internal organ (Manas) with the aid of the dharma born of yoga can simultaneously produce a knowledge of all the objects of the world, past, future, remote and subtle. But Prabhācandra contends that the Manas which is regarded as atomic by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika can never enter into direct relation with all the objects of the world simultaneously and therefore, cannot produce a knowledge at the same time. Otherwise there would be a simultaneous perception of all the qualities of a cake, eg. its taste, colour, odour, etc. at the time of eating it. It is not admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In fact the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of simultaneous cognition owing to the atomic nature of the mind. So it cannot produce a knowledge of all the objects of the world at the same time, even when it is aided by the dharma born of yoga. The atomic mind cannot enter into relation with many objects at the same time by contradicting its very nature. It is more reasonable to maintain that it is the self which apprehends all the objects of
the world independently of the mind by virtue of the specific powers born of meditation. It is useless to suppose that the self knows an infinite number of objects through the atomic mind at the same time. If it be argued that the mind of a yogin enters into relation with all objects of the world not simultaneously, then there is no difference between the perception of yogin and that of an ordinary person. Hence Prabhācandra concludes that the atomic mind can never enter into direct relation with all the objects of the world at the same time. But it may be argued that the mind of a yogin enters into relation with all the objects of the world through its relation with God, who is ubiquitous and consequently related to everything in the world. Prabhācandra contends that the mind of the yogin can enter into relation with the present objects only through its union with God, but never with past and future objects, since they are non-existent at the time when the mind enters into union with him. Hence the Jaina concludes that omniscience can never be produced either by the external organs or by the so called internal organ or mind, though they are aided by the peculiar powers born of meditation.
According to the Jaina, there is no eternal omniscient God, but the finite self can attain omniscience when all the \textit{karman} matter is totally destroyed, which is an impediment to right knowledge. And this omniscience is not derived through the channel of the external sense-organs or the internal organ of mind. And further, the Jaina holds that constant meditation cannot produce omniscience until and unless the \textit{karman} matter, which is an impediment to right knowledge, is wholly destroyed. Here lies the difference between the \textit{Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika} and the Jaina views. Just as the \textit{Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika} proves the existence of omniscient by the ontological argument, just as heat is subject to varying grades and consequently reaches the highest limit so right knowledge which is subject to varying grades owing the various degrees of \textit{karman}-matter impeding. It reaches the highest limit of omniscience when the hindrance of the four kinds of \textit{karman}-matter is completely destroyed. Omniscience is not derived from authority or scripture because it can never give us a direct and distinct knowledge which characterizes omniscience. Nor can it be derived from inference for the same reason.
Nor can it be derived from peripheral organs or the central organ of mind, as we have found already. Hence it is neither verbal, nor inferential nor sensuous. It is a transcendental perception of the whole world, produced by the complete decay and destruction of the karman matter. It is a distinct perception of all supersensible objects of the world on the complete destruction of karman or infra-sensible particles of matter which encrust the self.

MEMORY AND IMAGINATION

Vātsyāyana defines recollection as recalling and recognizing an object perceived in the past by the same self. One and the same self perceived it in the past, remembers it at present, and recognize it as an object of the past experience. Recollection appears in the form of ‘I have known it before’. The definition implies the following characteristic of recollection

1. Recollection Pre-supposes a past apprehension of an object by the self.
2. It presupposes an impression (Saṁskāra) pro
duced by the past apprehension in the same self.

(3) It pre-supposes the awakening (Udbodha) of the impression by (Udbodhaka). eg., the perception of a similar object and the like.

(4) It implies recognition of the recalled object as perceived in the past by the same self.

(5) Recollection implies temporal localization in the past. The object recalled and recognized is referred to a particular time in the past.

(6) Recollection pre-supposes the identity of the self. The self that recalls an object is the same as perceived it in the past.

If there were no identity of the self, there would be no recollection. Udayana asserts that the past perfection, its impression, and its recollection must subsist in the same self, that otherwise one's impression would produce another's recollection. Hence recollection implies the identity of the self which is endowed with the essential nature of knowing the past, present and the future. It implies retention (Dhāraṇa) and recall (Smṛti). It presupposes original appre-
hension, retention of its impression (Saṁskāra), and recall and recognition of the object apprehended in the past by the same self. This is the Nyāya view of recollection.

Māṇikyanandin, a Jaina Philosopher, defines recollection as a cognition in the form of 'that' which is produced by the revival of an impression. For example, Devadatta was perceived in the past and that Devadatta is remembered at present. Vidyānanda Svāmin asserts that recollection is a cognition that assumes the form of 'that', and that it cognizes an object which was perceived in the past. It is a representative cognition as distinguished from a presentative cognition. If the past perception of Devadatta, Bhaṭṭa-Akalanka observes, did not cognize itself, then the present recollection would be a novel knowledge and consequently cease to be recollection. But it is an already acquired knowledge devoid of novelty, and therefore a reproduction of a past perfection which cognized itself. This is the Jaina view of recollection.
NATURE OF THE SENSE-ORGANS

The Jaina recognizes five sense-organs - organs of touch, taste, smell, vision and audition. The tactual organ pervades the whole body. The Jaina does not regard the mind as a sense-organ. (Anindriyam manah).

Jaina conceives the soul as pervading the whole body. A particular kind of sense-perception is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with a particular sense-organ. In Jaina view of the physical sense-organs the visual organ is aprāpyakārin; it does not come into direct contact with its object. The Jaina holds that the visual organ apprehends objects at a distance with the help of light. But he does not explain the nature of the action of light upon the visual organ. All the other sense-organs are prāpyakārins, they come into direct contact with their objects. But the direct contact may be gross (Sthūla) or subtle (Sūkṣma). The organs of touch and taste come into contact with gross objects. But the organs of smell and hearing come into contact with subtle objects. The organ of smell has direct contact with minute particles of the object smelt. The organ of hear-
ing has direct contact with merely a kind of motion. Sound is due to the knocking of one physical object against another. It is the agitation set up by this knock. The auditory organ comes into contact with this motion.

Gautama establishes the existence of five sense-organs. The existence of five sense-organs is inferred from five distinct functions (Indriyārtha pāṇcatvāt)\(^3\). Vātsyāyana explains that there are five purposes (Prayojana) of the senses: touching, seeing, smelling, tasting, and hearing; these five purposes require five distinct sense-organs. The function of the sense-organ cannot be performed by another. So the existence of five sense-organs is inferred from five kinds of sense-activities\(^3\), and from the five-fold character of the sense-organs, (A) the shape of perception, (B) the sites (C) the processes, (D) the forms and (E) constituents \(^4\).

(A) There are five different kinds of perception-visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual, from which we infer the existence of five sense-organs \(^4\).

(B) There are five sense-organs corresponding to the five sites (Adhisthāna) or end organs. The tactual organ, which
is indicated by the perception touch, has its seat throughout the body. The visual organ issuing out to the object as indicated by the perception of colour has its site in the pupil of the eye, etc. The diversity of the sense-organs is proved by the diversity of their locations.

The sense-organs are different from their physical seats.

(C) The five sense-organs involve different processes (Gati). The visual organ, which is of the nature of light, issues out of the pupil and moves out to the objects endowed with colour. The tactual organ, the gustatory organ and the olfactory organ come into contact with their objects resting in their own sites. They do not move out to their objects like the visual organ. The auditory organ also does not move out to their objects. Sound travels from its place of origin to the auditory organ in a series of waves. This argument shows that all the sense-organs are prāpyakārins, they apprehend their objects by coming into direct contact with them.

(D) The five sense-organs have different magnitudes (Ākṛti). The olfactory organ, the gustatory organ and the tac-
tual organ have the magnitudes of their sites, they are co-extensive with their seats.

(E) The five sense-organs have their origin (Jāti) in five material elements. The olfactory organ is made up of earth and apprehends smell which is its characteristic quality. The gustatory organ is made up of water and apprehends taste, which is its characteristic quality. The visual organ is made up of light and apprehends colour which is its characteristic quality. And the auditory organ is nothing but ākāśa and apprehends sound which is its characteristic quality. There is a community of nature between the sense-organs and their objects. A sense-organ apprehends the distinctive quality of that substance which enters into its constitution. The Vaiśeṣika also agrees with this view.

Gautama does not distinctly mention anywhere that the mind (Manas) is a sense-organ. But Vātsyāyana points out that Gautama’s definition of perception, as a non-erroneous cognition produced by intercourse of the sense organs with their objects inexpressible by words and well-defined, implies that the mind is a sense-organ. If by the sense-organs
he means only the external senses, his definition will apply only to the perceptions of external objects. But Gautama does not give a separate definition of internal perception of pleasure and the like. This shows that his definition covers both external perception and internal perception, and the mind is a sense-organ.

Vātsyāyana includes the mind in the sense-organs and points out its distinction from the external senses. Viśvanātha regards the mind as a sense organ. He argues that the perception of pleasure must be produced through an instrument just as the visual perception of colour is produced through the instrument of the eyes, and this instrument is the mind (Manas) which is thus a sense-organ (Kāraṇa). Prasastapada describes the mind as the internal organ (Antahkarana). He argues that pleasure and pain are not perceived through external organs, but that they must be perceived by an instrument and that is the mind. Śaṅkara Miśra also gives the same argument. Gautama does not include the manas (Mind) in the list of sense-organs. He mentions it separately among the objects of valid knowledge (Prameya). Kaṇāda is silent
on the point. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers generally regard the manas as the internal organ through which we perceive pleasure and pain.

The Jaina does not regard the manas as a sense organ. It is called aninḍriya. It is not a sense organ. Vidyānandin argues that the mind is not a sense-organ because it has no specific objects. The sense organs apprehend specific objects. One sense-organ cannot apprehend the objects of another. But the mind can apprehend all objects. So it cannot be regarded as a sense-organ. It may be argued that the mind is an instrument (kāraṇa) of cognition, and so it must be regarded as a sense-organ. But in that case smoke also would be a sense-organ, since it is an instrument (kāraṇa) of cognition, being a mark (liṅga) of inference. Hence it is wrong to include the mind in the sense-organs.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that all the sense-organs are prāpyakārins; they apprehend their objects when they come in direct contact with them. This doctrine is called the doctrine of prāpyakāritā.

The Jaina holds that only the visual organ is...
**INDIAN NOMINALISM AND REALISM**

In the eastern thought there are mainly three theories of the Universal, viz., Nominalism, conceptualism and Realism.

According to Nominalism, there is no Universal at all either in nature or in the mind. According to conceptualism, the Universal exists only in the mind. According to realism, the universal exists both in nature and in the mind. Among the Indian thinkers, the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṁsakas represent different schools of realism. The Jaina is a nominalist tending towards realism.

The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that there is a real Universal or class-essence in the individual of nature, i.e., Universal, and the relation between them is that of inherence.

The Jaina holds that there can be no universal notion in the mind, unless there is a real Universal in nature. The Jaina
does not recognize its existence. There can be no one, eternal, ubiquitous class essence in the individuals belonging to the same class, as the realist supposes.

NOTES
1. TS.G.P.25
2. TS.G.P.25
3. SM P.277
4. SM P.279
5. SM P.282
6. PMS, P.2
7. PMS, III, 1-2, PMS, II 5
8. PMS, II, 5
10. DSV. 4
11. PNT, II, 6, UTS, I, 15
12. NBL, I, 1, 4
13. NBL, I, 1, 4
14. N.V, I, 1, 4
15. NBL, I, 1, 4
16. NSPP, P. 14
17. TSD. P.30
18. TSD.P.30 (Ibid P.30)
19. 'SN; P 42.
20. PNT, II, 4-5
21. PKM, P.34.
22. NS, I,1,10
23. NBL, I,1.9
24. VSU, VIII,1,2.
25. NSar, P.3 and NTD, P.82.
26. PBL, P.187, NP.PP 72-75
27. BLP 65, SM, PP 284-85, HIP, I,P.P. 472-73
28. PNT, ch ii,4,5,18-23, PMS. II,ii, HIP, II, PP.189-90
29. PKM P.65
30. Kir, P.149, KVP, PP.154,160
31. NVTT, P.403
32. PMS iii,3
33. PRP, P.69
34. TS, II,19
35. PMV. II,5
36. Tattvarthasara, II, 49. P.69 (Culcutta)
37. Tattwarthasara II, 49.

38. NS III, 1, 58

39. NBh, III, 1, 58

40. NS, III, 1, 62

41. NBh III, 1, 62

42. NBh, III, 1, 62, NM.P.477

43. NBh, I, 1, 4

44. NBh, I, 1, 4

45. SM - 85

46. PBh. PP 152-3 Kir P 153

47. VSU, III, 2, 2

48. N.S.I, 1, 12

49. NBh, NV, I, 1, 4, NM.P484, SM P.397, VSU, III 2, 2

50. D.S