Kañāda (300 B.C) the author of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, is the founder of the Vaiśeṣika System. Kañāda brings all objects under Six categories. They are substance (Dravya), quality (Guna) action or motion (Karman) generality (Sāmānyya), particularity (Viśeṣa) and inherence (Samavāya).

Kañāda did not mention negation in the categories. The late Vaiśeṣikas added the seventh category of negation.

Padārtha means, the meaning of a word. It is an object of valid knowledge and capable of being named. It is knowable and nameable. The first six categories have existence, nameability and knowability. They are objects of the positive notion of being.

The three categories of substance, quality and action are related to beinghood (Sattā) which subsists in them. The three categories of generality, particularity and inherence are
related to themselves and devoid of relation to sattā. They are neither causes nor effects. They are eternal and incapable of being expressed by the word object. They are non-spatial and timeless ontological entities. Substance, quality and action are causes capable of producing effects. They exist in time and space\(^1\). The categories are briefly narrated below.

**SUBSTANCE (DRAVYA)**

Kaṇḍāda defines a substance as a thing which has qualities and action and which is the inherent cause of an effect \((Kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇamitī dravyalakṣaṇam)\(^4\). It differs from its qualities and actions because it is their substrate.

A substance has genus of substance which inheres in it. Substances are eternal and non-eternal. Non-eternal substances consist of parts, and are produced by their combination and destroyed by their separation. But the simple and partless substances like the atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal. They are neither produced nor destroyed. They are self existent, independent and endowed with particulari-
ties. Space, time, ether, and souls are incorporeal and ubiquitous (Vibhu) or eternal. Mind is atomic and eternal. It is neither produced nor destroyed.

EARTH

Earth has the genus of earth. Of the substances earth is that which has odour (as its inherent quality). Even though its special quality is odour, it has colour, taste, touch, number, magnitude, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, acquired fluidity and velocity. It has many kinds of colour. It has six kinds of taste: sweet, sour, salt, bitter etc. It has two kinds of smell, fragrant and foul. Its touch is neither hot, nor cold, but luke-warm. It is of two varieties, eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is atomic and non-eternal is product. Again it is three fold: body, organ and object. Body is that as of human beings. Organ is that which grasp odour, i.e., the olfactory organ. And it abides at the tip of the nose. The earthly objects are like clay, stone and such other things.

WATER

The genus of water inheres in water. Its special quality
is cold touch. It has colour, taste, natural fluidity, viscosity, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight and velocity. It has white colour, sweet taste and cold touch. Viscidity is the quality of the water only.

Water is eternal and non-eternal. The atoms of water are eternal and non-eternal are of the nature of products. It is again of three varieties, body, organ and object. Its body is in the region of Varuṇa, organ is that of taste organ. Objects are rivers, lakes and the like.

FIRE

The genus of fire inheres in fire which has hot touch, as its special quality. The fire has colour, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, acquired fluidity and velocity. Fire is eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is of the nature of atoms and non-eternal is of the nature of product. It is again of three kinds - body organ and object. The body is well-known in the solar region. The visual organ is composed of light and perceives colour. The
object is of four kinds, earthly, heavenly, gastric and mineral.

The light of the visual organ has unmanifested colour and touch which are not perceptible.

AIR

The genus of air inhere in air which, possesses touch without colour. It is two fold, eternal and non-eternal. The eternal is of the nature of atoms and non-eternal is of the nature of product. Again it is three-fold, owing to its classification into body, organ and object. Body is found in the world of wind God. The tactual organ which pervades the body is composed of air and perceives touch. Object is the cause of tremor of trees. The air that circulates within the body is the vital breath. Though one, it is denoted variously as prāṇa, apāṇa etc. Owing to different places, air has touch, number, magnitude, distinctness conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity and velocity. Its touch is neither hot nor cold.

There are atoms of earth, water, fire and air which are eternal. They are neither created nor destroyed. They are combined into composite substances which are produced and
destroyed. The qualities of atoms are eternal, but those of composite products are non-eternal.

ETHER

Ākāśa is one, ubiquitous, eternal, imperceptible substance which is characterised by the distinctive quality of sound. Ether is one individual and has no genus. It has a particularity which distinguishes it from other eternal substances. It is one, since sound has no difference in land. It has different degrees of loudness only. There are no different kinds of sound, which proves that there are no difference in ether.

Ether is ubiquitous because it has contact with all corporeal substances of limited magnitude (Sarvamūrtadravya samyogitvam vibhutvam)\(^1\). It is pervasive since it is impenetrable and unresisting. Ether is eternal because it is ubiquitous. It is neither produced nor destroyed.

SPACE

Space is one ubiquitous, eternal, partless substance.

It is an individual which has no genus of space. It has a par-
ticularity which distinguishes it from ether, time, souls and minds and atoms of earth, water, fire and air. All material things exist in space and maintain their relative positions in it. It has no special quality, but it has number, magnitude, distinctnes, conjunction and disjunction\textsuperscript{12}. If there is no space the existence of things also not possible. They interpenetrate one another.

Space is inferred from the cognitions of different directions. Space is the efficient cause (cognitions) of directions. If space were non-eternal their spatial relations would not be possible\textsuperscript{13}. It is one and therefore distinct. It is ubiquitous and therefore eternal. It is imperceptible\textsuperscript{14}.

Space is different from Ether. Ether has a specific quality. Ether is the inherent cause of sound, but space is the general cause of all effects, but not the inherent cause of sound.

**TIME (KĀLA)**

Time is one, ubiquitous, eternal substance. It is an individual and has no genus. It has a particularity which distinguishes it from ether, space, souls, minds (Manas) and atoms.
of earth, water, fire and air. It is a real and objective sub-
stance.

Time is inferred from temporal remoteness and tem-
poral proximity which subsist in new by created substances.
Temporal remoteness is produced in an old substance after
the lapse of this sun from its production\[^{15}\]. Time is inferred
from the cognitions of some simultaneity--succession, slow-
ness, quickness, oldness and youth which are its marks\[^{16}\]. Time
is inferred as the efficient cause of production, persistence
and destruction of all effects\[^{17}\]. Time is three-fold, past,
present and future. Time is the cause of moments, hours, days,
months years and the like. These are all artificial divisions of
time. Time is one since the marks of priority, posteriority,
succession, etc., are the same. Time is ubiquitous because it
has conjunctions with all corporeal substance of limited mag-
nitude which depends on its ubiquity\[^{18}\]. It is partless. It is
eternal since it cannot be destroyed by the division of parts\[^{19}\].
SOUL (ĀTMAN)

Ātman cannot be perceived through the external sense-organ. It is an object of inference. Different sensible qualities are perceived through the different sense-organs, which are the instruments of knowledge. Knowledge as an effect must have a material cause. The self is its material cause in which it inheres. The activity of the sense organs requires an agent, who uses them. The body, the sense-organs and the manas cannot be the agent, since they are conscious. They require the individual self as the agent, who uses them as organs of experience.

Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are qualities of the self. They are not perceived by the external sense-organs. They are experiences as ‘I feel pleasure’ (Aham sukhi), I feel pain (Aham duḥkhi), etc. This ego consciousness refers to self. The pleasure and pain are felt in connection with different parts of the body, I feel pleasure in the foot, I feel pain in the head. So these pleasure and pain are not special qualities of body and sense-organs, but are special qualities of a substance which pervades the entire body of it. The spe-
cial qualities of soul are perceived through the *manas*. Recollection and recognition prove the existence of the self. The self is the substratum of these qualities. Recollection proves the unity and identity of an individual self. Recognition also proves the permanence and identity of the self.

The vital acts of inspiration and expiration, the opening and closing of the eyes, the growth of the body, self recuperation of wounds, the movement of the *manas* and the impression of the sense-organs prove the existence of the self.

Finally, apperception proves the existence of the self. Special qualities are perceived their sense-organs. Some of its qualities are remembered. They combine into a single experience and are referred to as an external object by the self, by its synthetic acts of apperception. All these said above are the arguments for the existence of one's own self.

The voluntary actions of the body which realize good and avoid evil prove the existence of another self, which directs the body like the movements of a chariot are guided by a charioteer. The voluntary movements are the outward expressions of the volitions of a self. Thus we infer the existence of
other individual souls after the analogy of our own souls.\textsuperscript{25}.

The vaisesikas recognize the plurality of the individual souls, which is inferred from the variety of experiences and conditions of different souls. Some are happy, while others are miserable, some are bound while others are liberated. These differences in the status of individuals prove the existence of many souls.

According to Vaiśeṣika, the plurality of individual souls is confirmed by the scriptures also. The Upaniṣads speak of two beautiful birds residing in the same tree, one enjoying the sweet fruit and other merely looking on. They speak of the individual soul and the supreme soul residing in the same body, the individual self being subject to happiness and misery, and the supreme soul, the inner controller being a mere spectator without experiencing happiness and misery.

Even in the state of liberation the finite soul retains its integrity and is not merged in God. Each soul has its particularity by virtue of which it is distinguished from the other souls and God. Each soul is eternal and its particularity is eternal.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition,
merit, demerit and disposition are the special qualities of individual self. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction are its generic qualities. It is ubiquitous.

**MANAS (MIND)**

Manas is the internal organ in the view of Vaiśeṣikas. It is one in each body. It is an immaterial, corporeal, partless, atomic, unconscious eternal substance, which is capable of action. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are perceived by an organ. The external senses are not their organs. So the *manas* is their organ.

Another argument by the Vaiśeṣika is that through the self the sense-organs and the objects are present though the self-perception of external organ is not present. Therefore the existence of manas is inferred from non-production and production of perceptions at particular times. Here, when the *manas* is present there is perception. When it is not there is no perception. The conjunction of the self with the *manas*, of the *manas* with the sense-organ, of the sense-organ with the object are necessary conditions of perception.
Recollection of the sense-objects also prove the existence of mind.

Cognitions, volitions and other qualities of the self are always successive but not simultaneous. Their non-simultaneity proves the existence of one manas in each body. If there were many internal organs they would be the cause of different kinds of perception simultaneously.

The internal organ is atomic. If it were of large magnitude, it would come into conjunction with all sense-organs at the same time and produce perception of all senses simultaneously, but they are not perceived simultaneously at our experience. They are perceived in succession. This non-simultaneity of perceptions proves the atomic size of manas. It is ubiquitous, it cannot come into contact with the self. If there is no conjunction of the self with the manas, self cannot produce its qualities. Also the manas is not of intermediate magnitude. If it is so it would be composed of parts and be non-eternal. So mind is an atomic internal organ which is capable of conjunction with the self. One self has one manas, with which it transmigrates from one body to another.
Mind is corporeal (Mūrta) because it is capable of movement. Though it is corporeal, it is eternal, because it has no parts. It is devoid of any specific quality. It has the generic qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction disjunction, remoteness, proximity and velocity. It is intangible. Each manas has a particularity which distinguishes it from eternal substances. The genus of manas resides in it.

QUALITY (GUṆA)

Kaṇāda defines a quality as an existing thing inhering in a substance and devoid of quality, which is not an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction (dravyāśraya-guṇavān samyogavibhāgeśvanapeekṣa iti guṇalakṣanam)\(^{31}\). Praśastapāda adds one more characteristic of a quality. According to him this is an entity related to the genus of a quality, abiding in a substance and devoid of quality and action\(^{32}\). A quality inheres in a substance which is its substrate. But it is not identical with a substance. The quality is devoid of qualities. The quality is devoid of action. Quality and action exist in substance only. A quality has a community. (Guṇatva jātiman)
DIFFERENT KINDS OF QUALITIES

Kanāda mentions seventeen qualities, viz., colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition. But the commentator, Praśastapāda adds seven more qualities by the word of ‘ca’ used by the aphorist, viz, heaviness, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit and sound. Thus there are twenty four qualities.

Qualities are divided into general and special. General qualities are those which abide generally in two or more substances. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, derived fluidity, gravity and velocity are general qualities.

Special qualities are those which abide in one substance only at the same time and not in two or more substances. Colour, taste, smell, touch, viscidity, natural fluidity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, faculty and sound are special qualities. Qualities are further divided into three kinds,
those which are perceptible by one external sense organ. e.g., sound, touch, colour, taste and odour.

(ii) qualities those which are perceptible through two external sense-organs, e.g., number magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, fluidity, viscosity and velocity.

(iii) Qualities those which are imperceptible through the external sense-organs. e.g., gravity, merit, demerit, faculty, cognition, pain, desire, aversion and volition.

These are perceptible through the internal organ (manas)\(^{33}\).

Qualities are divided into eternal and non-eternal. The qualities of eternal substances are eternal. The qualities of non-eternal substances are non-eternal.

Colour, taste, odour, touch, remoteness, nearness, gravity, fluidity, viscosity and velocity are qualities of corporeal substances. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition impression merit and demerit are qualities of incorporeal substances. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction are qualities of both corporeal and incorporeal substances.
ACTION (KARMA\N)

Kaṇḍa narrates action as an entity which is inherent in one substance, which is devoid of quality and which is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction (Ekadrayamagunam Samyogavibhāgeśvanapek ṣakāraṇamiti Karmalakṣaṇam)\textsuperscript{34}. This also resides in a substance to make a quality. But an action is its dynamic and temporary feature whereas a quality is its static and enduring feature. An action, like a quality, resides in the substance and is devoid of a quality. But it is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction, whereas a quality is not their cause. Action has the genus of motion which inheres in it (Karmatvājātimān). It is not eternal and resides in a non-eternal substance. An incorporeal ubiquitous substance like ether, time, space or a soul is incapable of action. Motion is produced by heaviness, fluidity, effort and conjunction.

Five kinds of action are recognised, upward action (Uṭṣeṇaṇa), downward action (Apakṣeṇaṇa), contraction (Ākuṇjaṇa) expansion (Prasāraṇa) and locomotion (Gamaṇa)\textsuperscript{35}. 
GENERALITY (SAMANYA)

The definition of a generality is that which is eternal and which resides in many things (Nityam eka manekānu-gatam sāmānyam). It resides in substance, quality and action.

Kaṇāda says community and particularity are not conceptual constructs but ontological entities. Community is the cause of assimilation. It is the notion of common characters among many individuals which are quite different from one another.

It is natural and not accidental, e.g., there is the genus of cow (Gorva) in many cows, which is one and not different in different individual cows. Generality inheres in all its proper individuals. The genus of cow exists in all individual cows. It does not exist in all individuals - cow, goats, sheep, and the like. There are two divisions in generality, more extensive (Paratvam) and less extensive (Aparatvam). Generality of earth (Prthivīvam) is inferior to the generality of substance (Dravyatvam). Being (Sattā) is the highest generality. Substances, qualities and actions exist through relation
to Being (Sattā). Being is common to them. But it is different from them. Substances, qualities and actions are different from one another. But Sattā is identical in them and inheres in them.

PARTICULARITY (Viśeṣa)

This is special category accepted by Kaṇḍāda, by which this philosophy is called 'Vaiṣeṣika Philosophy'. Particularities are the differentiating features residing in eternal substances. They reside in eternal substances only and help in distinguishing one from another. They are infinite in number (Viśeṣāstu anantā eva). Particularities are the final distinctive characters of eternal substances. They subsist in the eternal substances - the atoms of earth, water, fire and air, ether, time, space, self and manas.

Particularities do not require other particularities to distinguish them from one another because it would lead to infinite regress. They are devoid of community. They had a community that would distinguish their substrates from one another. Eternal substances are infinite in number and their particularities also are innumerable.
INHERENCE (SAMAṆAVĀYA)

Inherence is accepted as a sixth category in Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. Inherence is the eternal relation which exists in an inseparable pair (Ayutasiddhavṛtti). There is a very good definition in Tarkasangraha of inseparable pairs: (Yayordvay-ormadhye ekamavinaśyadaparāśritamevatiṣṭati tāvayuta siddhau). When between two things, one thing as long as it is not destroyed, exists in the other things only, they are known as inseparable pairs. E.g., part and whole, quality and the qualified etc. Kaṇāda defines inherence as the relation between a material cause and its effect which is the cause of the notion, this subsists in this abode¹⁹.

Praśastapāda defines samavāya (inherence) as the relation which subsists between two inseparable entities related to each other as the substance and content, and is the cause of the notion: This subsists in this abode⁴⁰.

Inherence is a relation between substance and quality, a substance and an action, a genus and an individual, an eternal substance and a particularity, a whole and its parts. Inherence is an intimate relation, but it is not an internal relation. It is an eternal relation.
Inherence is one because it has the same distinguishing feature. Inherence is eternal, though its relata are transient. It is not produced by any cause and does not pertain to relation in time. It is different from conjunction which is a temporary relation. Conjunction is a relation between two substances. Inherence is a relation between a substance and another substance or non-substance. Conjunction is a separable relation while inheritance is an inseparable relation.

Inherence is a separate category while conjunction is a quality. Inherence is one while conjunctions are many. Inherence is imperceptible while conjunction is perceptible. Conjunction is destroyed by disjunction of its relation, but inheritance is indestructible.

Inherence is different from substance, quality, action, community and particularity because it is a relation between a substance and other category. It is different from non-existence. So it is a distinct category.

**NON-EXISTENCE (ABHĀVA)**

Negation is not included in categories, but this nega-
tion is accepted as a category by Kanāda and his followers.

Udayana divides the categories into existence and non-existence. He divides existence into substance, quality, action, community and particularity and the non existence into, prior-negation (Prāgabhāva), posterior negation (Pradhvaṁsā-bhāva), absolute negation (Atyantabhāva) and mutual non-existence (Anyonyabhāva).

Prior negation is without a beginning but with an end (Anādiḥ Sāntah prāgabhāvah). It exists prior to the production of an effect, e.g., A jar is produced from clay. There is prior negation of the jar in clay. It is without a beginning, but has an end. It is destroyed by the production of the effect. When the jar is produced, its prior negation is destroyed. It is beginningless but not eternal.

Posterior negation has a beginning but is without an end. It occurs after the production of an effect (Śādiranantaḥ pradhvaṁsābhāvah). It has a beginning but no end. Posterior negation is produced by the destruction of an effect but it can never be destroyed. e.g., when a jar is destroyed it has posterior negation in its fragments, which is produced by an
efficient cause.

Absolute negation exists in all the three times, having that which ascertains or reflects counter correlative delimited by relation or connection (*Traikālika sanhsargā-vacchinna pratiyogitākotyantābhāvah*)⁴⁵. There is absolute negation of colour in air, there is absolute negation of genus of earth in water and of the genus of water in earth. Absolute negation does not refer to production or destruction. It does not refer to the past or the future. It is eternal in nature.

The mutual negation is that which ascertains or reflects counter correlative as delimited by the relation of identity (*Tādātmyasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitako 'nyonyā-bhāvah*)⁴⁶ e.g., the non-existence of a horse in a cow and the non existence of a cow in a horse are mutual relation. It is one and eternal, but it is related to different objects when they are produced. Mutual negation has for its counter entities identity between two things.
The Vaiśeṣika advocates the theory of atomism. Earth, Water, fire and air are eternal as atoms and non-eternal as composite products. They are the invisible units of physical substances. They cannot inter-penetrate one another, for there is no intra-atomic space. They are motionless in themselves. Their motion is due to an eternal agent. The later Vaiśeṣikas said that God produces motion in atoms--combines them into composite products--with the aid of merits and demerits of the individual souls and causes their enjoyments and sufferings.

The Vaiśeṣika maintains that a dvyaṇuka is produced by the conjunction of two atoms. The motion of the atom is produced by the God. The two atoms are its inherent cause, their conjunction is their non-inherent cause, the merits and demerits of individual souls are its efficient cause. When there is an activity among the diads (dvyaṇuka) they come into conjunction with one another and produce a triad (tryaṇuka). A caturaṇuka is produced by the conjunction of four triads which are active. The qualities of the compos-
ite products are produced by those of the component atoms which are their inherent causes\textsuperscript{48}.

An atom is eternal because it is a substance which is partless like ether. Atoms are not non-spatial, but they have the minutest magnitude. They are spherical and supersensible. But they can be perceived by yogins and God.

**THE MORAL ENDS (PURUSĀRTHAS)**

The attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the natural ends of voluntary actions. Of the four human values, Vaiśeṣikas give importance to \textit{dharma} and \textit{mokṣa}. There also \textit{dharma} is the instrumental cause of liberation. We can understand this from the definition of \textit{dharma} given by Kaṇḍa, \textit{dharma} is what accomplishes happiness and liberation - \textit{(Yato 'bhyudayaniśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah)\textsuperscript{49}}.

Here happiness is both worldly happiness and happiness in heaven. Kaṇḍa regards happiness as the end of positive actions and the liberation as the end of negative actions.

Liberation is attained when merits due to the performance of duties are destroyed. Only true knowledge of real-
ity can lead to release, but it is aided by the purity of mind brought about by the performance of duties. Spiritual insight is the direct cause of liberation.

Liberation is absolute negation of pain. Sridhara maintains that both knowledge of reality (tattvajñānam) and the performance of duties are necessary for Liberation. Liberation is not due to knowledge alone, but to the combination of knowledge with duties. The compulsory daily occasional duties must be performed. The non-performance of them produces sins of omission. The performance of them purifies the mind. Repeated practice of knowledge and obligatory duties lead to release.

GOD

Kaṇāda did not mention the supreme soul in the Vaiśeṣika Sutra. The famous Aphorism which is repeated twice by him does not clearly refer to God. The Aphorism is “Tadvacanādānmāyasya prāmāṇyam”51. The authority of Vedas is due to the utterance of him or them. It may mean that the authority of the Vedas is due to the utterance of God or
the seers, who perceive supersensible objects like merit, demerit, heaven, hell and the like. He believes in supernormal perception of the sages born of merit due to austerities and meditation. According to him God is not the efficient cause of the world. This reveals that the early Vaiśeṣika system was atheistic. In the matter of Praśastapāda, he speaks of the sages as the authors of the Vedas, who have supernormal power. He faithfully represents Kaṭāda’s view in regard to the authority of the Vedas. But he is theist and accepts that creation and destruction of the world happen at the will of God. Praśastapāda regards God as the efficient cause of the world and atoms as its material cause.

The Vaiśeṣika gives another argument for the existence of God. He is the author of the Vedas. The validity of the scriptural testimony is due to the authority of God, who is free from error, inadvertence, deficiency of the sense-organs. He is eternal and omniscient. God is the promulgator of the Moral Law. Whatever is prohibited by him is wrong. The Divine Law is the moral standard.

The cosmological argument proves the existence of
one-God. If there were many Gods, they would be non-omni-
scient like us and so incapable of producing the world, out of
the atoms. If they were omniscient, one of them would be
competent to produce the world and the others would be-
come useless. If they were equal to one another, they would
have no unity of purpose. If they had the same purpose, one
of them would be the sovereign Lord and the others would
not be Lords. So God is one.

NOTES
1. VS.I.1.4 SP. P.9.
2. KKV. P.103
3. PBh. P.17,18.
4. VS.I.1.15.
5 VS.VSU.I.1.8.10 & 12.
6. TSG. P.9
7. PBh. P.35-36.
8. TSG. P.9.
9. PBh. P.38,39.
10. TSG. P.9
11. VS.II.1.38, PBh. P.58
12. TBh. P.186
14. VS. II. ii. 12.
15. TSP. P.135.
16. KV P. 116
17. KV. P. 118
18. PBh. P.63-64
19. VS. II. ii. 7
20. PBh. P. 63
21. VS. III. 1. 2.
22. PBh. P. 69
23. VSU. III. 1-18, PBh. P. 17
25. VS, VSU. III. 1. 19
27. VS. II. ii. 1, PBh. P. 89
28. PBh. P. 89
29. VSU. III. ii. 1-3, PBh. P. 89
30. VSU. III. ii. 1-3.
31. VS. I. 1. 16
32. PBh.P.94.
33. PBh. P.95-97
34. VS.I.1-17
35. TSG. P.2
36. VS & VSU
37. TSG.P.6
38. TSG.D.P.6, PBh.P.13.
39. TSG.P.6
40. PBh. P.14
41. TSG.P.6
42. NK.P.230
43. TSG P.50
44. TSG.P.50
45. TSG.P.51.
46. TSG.P.20
47. TBh. P.21
48. TSD.P.10.
49. VS.I.1.2.
50. NK.P.283-86
51. VS.I.1.3, X.ii.9
52. PBh. P.7,131.