CHAPTER II

MAIN PRINCIPLES OF NYAYA PHILOSOPHY

The Nyāya Philosophy is mainly concerned with Logic and secondarily with Ontology. Gautama mentions sixteen categories in Nyāya Sūtra, Viz, Pramāṇaprameyasyasam-śayaprayojanadṛṣṭāntasiddhāntavayavatarkanirṇayavāda- jalpavitandaḥetvābhāsachalajātinigrasthānānām tattvajñānāt nisreyasādhigamaḥ.\(^1\)

It is the knowledge of the real essence (or true character) of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of the highest Good: The means of right cognition, the objects of right cognition, doubt, motive, example, theory, factors of inference, hypothetical reasoning, demonstrated truth, discussion, disputation, wrangling, fallacious reason, perversion, casuistry and clinchers\(^2\).

It deals with sources of knowledge, viz, perception, inference, comparison and testimony and conditions of their
validity and the nature of world, soul and God.

PRAMĀṆAS

Pramāṇa is the valid knowledge of an object. Pramāṇa is the instrument by means of which the self knows an object. Prameya is the object that is known. According to Nyāya Philosophy, there are four Pramānas viz, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

PERCEPTION

Gautama defines perception as the knowledge which is produced by the contact of an object with a sense-organ, undefinable, determinate in harmony with its object (indriyā rthasannikarṣotpamam jñānamavapadesyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam).

According to Naiyāyikas, there are three contacts needed for an external perception. Those are (1) of the soul with the mind, (2) of the mind with the sense-organ and (3) of the sense-organ with an object. (atmā manasā, manah indriyena, indriyam arthena).
The sense-organs are directed by the manas which is directed by the self. Conjunction of the sense-organs with the manas and conjunction of the manas with the self are the general causes of Perception. The contact of sense-organs with an object is a special cause of perception. Perception is the immediate knowledge of a present object. This perception is different from other pramanas which are not produced by the contact of sense-object.

There are two kinds of perception (i) Indeterminate perception and (ii) Determinate perception. The ancient Nyāya regards the indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an object as qualified by a substance, quality, action and genus, but devoid of a name. The determinate perception is the apprehension of it not just as qualified by these but associated with name. But the Navya-Nyāya regards the former as immediate, simple, non-relational apprehension of an object and its generic nature as unrelated to each other and the latter as mediate, relational synthetic apprehension of an object and its generic nature as related to each other.
Gautama’s definition of perception is not applicable to Yogic perception. So Paññita Govardhana, in his Nyāyabodhini - a commentary on Tarkasaṅgara - and Viśvanātha, in his Siddhāntamuktāvalī, defined perception as immediate knowledge which is not derived through the medium of any other knowledge (jñānakāraṇakam jñānampratyakṣam). This definition is applicable to all kinds of perception and excludes other pramāṇas.

Gaṅgeśa accepts three kinds of extra-ordinary contact, viz, sāmānya laksāṇa, jñāna laksāṇa and Yogaja laksāṇa. Perception of smoke happens through ordinary contact. But the perception of generic character (dhūmatvam) is due to Sāmānya laksāṇa pratyāsakti, because all individuals (smokes) are not perceived through the sense-organs at a time. But they are indirectly perceived through the knowledge of their generic character. Jñānalaksāṇa Pratyāsakti is the extra-ordinary contact through the knowledge of an object revived from a past perception of it. Visual perception of a fragrant sandal is due to the contact of the visual organ with the sandal and the recollection of its fragrants perceived in the past.
through the olfactory organ owing to association.

Yogic perception is produced by an extra-ordinary contact brought about by meditation. There are two kinds of Yogic perception - Yukta and Yuñjāna. The former is the intuition without effort of a Yogin, who perceives all categories ever. The latter is the intuition of a Yogin who puts forth effort of will to perceive all objects.

The Nyāya advocates, the Anyathākhyāti (theory of error) which is also called Viparītakhyāti. When one perceives the qualities of silver in a nacre it is an illusionary perception.

INFERENCE

Inference is the mediate knowledge of an object derived through the medium of the knowledge of invariable concomitance between two objects. First there is a perception of mark (Liṅga) or probans (Sādhana) in a subject (Parvate dhūmah drstāḥ). Secondly there is the recollection of invariable concomitance of the mark with the predicate, probandum (Sādhya) (Yatra yatra dhūmah tatra agnih). Thirdly,
there is the inference of the existence of an unperceived object in the subject (Parvataḥ vahnimān). This is inference for oneself (Śvārtha).

Inference is mediate knowledge while perception is immediate knowledge. Perception apprehends present and mere objects while inference apprehends past, future and remote objects as well as present and near objects.

Inference is of two kinds

(1) Inference for oneself (Śvārthānumāna)

(2) Inference for others (Parārthānumāna)⁹

Of them, inference for oneself is the cause of one's own inferential knowledge as already mentioned above.

But when one having inferred for oneself employs the five membered syllogism to make others understand the same, it is known as inference for others. The five members of the syllogism are pratijña, hetu, udaharana, upanaya and nigamana.

(1) The hill is fiery (Pratijñā)

(2) Because it is smoky (Hetu)

(3) Whatever is smoky is fiery

for example, a kitchen (Udāharaṇa)
(4) The hill has smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire (Upanaya)

(5) So the hill is fiery (Nigamana)

Gautama mentions three kinds of inference—Pūrvavat, Āsava, Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. Vātsyāyana gives two meanings of each of them. A pūrvavat inference is the inference of an unperceived effect from a perceived cause. A future rainfall is inferred from clouds. Āsava inference is the inference of an unperceived cause from a perceived effect. A past rainfall which is source of a river is inferred from its fullness and muddiness of water which are perceived. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is the inference of an imperceptible object from a perceived reason which is known to be uniformed, related to it. The movement of the sun is inferred from its different positions in the sky which are perceived. Vātsyāyana gives other meanings also of this kind of inference. A pūrvavat inference is based on previous experience of invariable concomitance of two objects. The fire is inferred from a perceived smoke and the hill
The *sēṣavat* inference is inference by elimination.

Sound is not substance because it *inheres in one substance*\(^1\). It is not an action, since it is a cause of another sound. It is not a community, a particularity or inherence. So it is a quality.

*Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is the inference of an unperceived object from a mark which is perceived though the relation between them is not perceived\(^1\). The existence of soul is inferred by the qualities of cognition, pleasure, desire, aversion and volition\(^1\).

**COMPARISON**

Comparison is the means of knowing an unknown object through its resemblance with another well-known object.

A person who is familiar with a cow, who is ignorant of the object denoted by the word *gavaya*, learns from a certain forester that the *gavaya* is similar to cow. He goes to a forest and perceives a strange animal similar to a cow and remembers the declaration. Then arises in him the knowledge: This is the animal denoted by the word *gavaya*\(^1\).
TESTIMONY

Gautama defines Testimony as instruction of a trustworthy person, who speaks of things as the existing reality. Verbal Testimony is an instruction which is expressed in a sentence. Testimony is due to the knowledge of a sentence or words. Testimony is of two kinds, Testimony about perceptible objects and Testimony about imperceptible objects. The modern Naiyāyikas divided Testimony into two kinds, Secular Testimony and Scriptural Testimony. The secular Testimony of trustworthy persons is valid. The Vedas are not impersonal, but personal compositions of God, and are therefore valid. Testimony is expressed in a sentence which is a combination of words, conveying a meaning. Its comprehensibility depends upon certain conditions: (1) The Verbal expectancy (अकाङ्क्षा), (2) Compatibility or mutual fitness of words (योग्यता) and juxta position or proximity (सन्निधि) are the cause of the knowledge. Of the meaning of a sentence, Verbal expectancy consists in the inability of a word to convey...
the meaning of a sentence due to the absence of some other word. A sentence devoid of verbal expectancy is unauthoritative. e.g., the words a cow, a horse, a man, an elephant, etc., are not authoritative as they are devoid of verbal expectancy.

Compatibility is non-contradiction of the sense. The sentence, sprinkle with fire is not authoritative owing to the absence of compatibility.

Juxta position is the utterance of words in quick succession. Words like bring ----a---cow etc. pronounced at long intervals are not authoritative owing to want of juxta position.

LIBERATION

Liberation is absolute cessation of pain and rebirth. The body, the sense-organs, and the Manas are the causes of pain. At the time of dissolution, the soul becomes free from pain. The Nyāya view of Liberation, is the same as the Vaiśeṣikas view. Liberation is the complete extinction of the special qualities of the soul, viz., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and impression. The
soul is free from congnition in the state of liberation. In Liberation the soul is devoid of merits and demerits and consequently free from pleasure and pain. True knowledge of the self ultimately leads to liberation through the destruction of merits and demerits and the consequent cessation of birth. Gautama defines Liberation as “\textit{tadatyantavimokṣo apavargaḥ}”. Absolute freedom from the aforesaid is final release. 

Gautama gives a sequential order to attainment of Liberation, i.e., “\textit{duḥkhajanmapravṛttiidoṣamidhyājñānānām uttarottarāpāyeyadanantarāpāyādapavargaḥ}.”

There is a cessation of each member of the following series - Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and wrong Notion - the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it, and this ultimately leads to Final Release.

According to Naiyāyikas the liberation is the real knowledge of categories, that is mentioned in the aphorism of Nyaya Sūtra, Viz, \textit{Pramānāprameyasamsāya prayojana - drṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkanirṇayaavādajalpavitan}.
It is the knowledge of the real essence of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of highest good.

The means of right cognition, the object of right cognition, doubt, motive, example, theory, factors of inference, hypothetical reasoning, demonstrated truth, discussion, disputation, wrangling, fallacious reason, perversion, casuistry and clinchers. The practice of Yoga, austerities, the performance of duties and abstention from sins are subsidiary to the acquisition. Release can be achieved by intuition of the self. It destroys false knowledge with its potencies and stops rebirth.

CAUSALITY

Nyāya gives an empirical definition of a cause. Udayana defines it as an invariable antecedent of an effect. Gaṅgeśa also defines a cause as an unconditional invariable antecedent of an effect. This definition applies to the inherent cause, the
non-inherent cause, and the efficient cause. A cause co-exists with the prior - non - existence of its effect and so it must be its antecedent (Karyam prāgabhāvapratiyogy) 26. Though a cause is an immediate antecedent of its effect, it is also synchronous with it. A conditional (Anyathāsiddha) antecedent depends upon other conditions in order to be followed by an effect, which is not necessary for its production. The Nyāya admits three kinds of cause, viz., the material cause, the non-inherent cause and the efficient cause.

**SELF (ĀTMAN) AND TRANSMIGRATION**

Nyāya arguments for the existence of the finite soul are similar to the Vaiśešikas' view. The Nyāya admits the perception of the self while the vaiśešika denies it. According to Nyāya, the self is an object of internal perception, inferred from marks, and known from the Testimony of the Vedas. The self is an object of “I Cognition” or mental perception. It is perceived by intuition owing to a particular kind of conjunction of it with manas due to meditative trance 27.
The self is inferred from desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. The self is inferred from the synthesis of the sensations of colour, taste, smell and touch of an object into a unity of perception.

There is recognition of an object perceived by the right eye, which was perceived by the left eye in the past. If the sense-organs were conscious, one sense-organ could not recognise an object perceived by another sense-organ. 'I touch the same jar through the tactual organ which I perceived through the visual organ'. Here the jar is perceived by one sense-organ and touched by another sense-organ. These two perceptions are recognized as belonging to the same self. By the above said reasons the self is beyond the body and the sense organs.

The Nyāya concept of the self is the same as that of the Vaiśeṣikas'. It is a substance which has cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit. The first six qualities are transitory and the last three qualities are permanent.
The self is eternal and devoid of origin and end. The self is a substance because it is the inherent cause of cognitions. It is ubiquitous because it is an eternal and incorporeal substance. It is incorporeal because it is motionless. It has pre-existence and undergoes transmigration until it achieves Liberation. It leaves a body and assumes another body. An organism is born and perishes, but a soul is unborn and immortal. The self has relative freedom of the will. Its freedom is limited by the divine will. It earns merits by free righteous actions, and demerits by free unrighteous actions. But its freedom is limited by the merits and demerits, acquired by free actions in the past births, though it can counteract them by free actions in future. Hence the freedom of the individual self is subject to divine will and the law of karman.

WORLD

The conception of the world is the same as the Vaiśeṣika view of it with slight variations. The world is composed of five physical elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether. They are the atoms of the first four elements. Atoms are the
material cause of the world, while God is its efficient cause. Causation is real and object causation is teleological and subservient to the Moral Law of Karman. Atoms are combined with one another by God into gross material objects, living organs and the multiform world and adapted to the enjoyments and sufferings of individual souls in accordance with their merits and demerits.

**NATURE OF GOD**

According Naiyāyikas, God has a particular soul endowed with merit, knowledge, intuition and sovereignty. He is devoid of false knowledge. Uddyotakara tells God with eternal knowledge, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa recognizes five qualities of God, Viz., knowledge, happiness, desire, volition and merit which are eternal and regards him as free from pain, aversion, demerit, impression, false knowledge, attachment and delusion. God transcends the atoms, time, space and ether which are co-eternal with him. God creates the world of manifold objects in accordance with the merits and demerits of the fi-
nite souls for their enjoyment and sufferings. God’s freedom is limited by the Law of *Karman*, which emanates from his moral will. So this limitation is self limitation. Souls cannot escape from the law of karman. God is omniscient and omnipotent and morally perfect while the individual souls have limited knowledge, limited powers and moral imperfections. God is the moral guide of the individual souls and the dispenser of fruits of the action. He lays down moral injunction and prohibitions for the good of mankind and favours their free actions with their fruits. Without his favour free human actions are ineffective.

Uddyotakara gives some arguments for the existence of God.

God is the efficient cause of the world and directs the atoms which are its material cause, and brings about their conjunction which is its non-inherent cause. The movements of atoms are supervised by an intelligent agent or God, because they are unconscious like an axe. This is the cosmological argument.

Merits and demerits are supervised by an intelligent agent inorder to produce pleasures and sufferings of the indi-
vidual souls because they are instruments. They cannot be supervised by the individual souls because they are unconscious of them. So God, who is conscious of their moral deserts conjoins them. This is the moral argument.

Jayanta gives the teleological argument. The arrangement of mountains, rivers and other material objects are produced by an intelligent agent, like cloths produced by human agents. This arrangement of objects are not accidental but produced by God, who is Omniscient and Omnipotent.

Udayana gives some arguments. The unconscious and inactive atoms cannot move themselves. God is the creator of motions, which is the cause of conjunction of the atoms into diads. So the two atoms of the diad are material cause, their conjunction is the non-inherent cause and the agency of God is efficient cause. God who is omniscient and omnipotent can know atoms create motion in them.

The whole Universe including the diads is destroyed by the will of God because they are destructible. He creates motion by his destructive will and disjoins the atoms of diads and the like. He is the destroyer of the world. Destruction of
the universe is beyond the power of the individual souls\textsuperscript{36}.

The validity of the Vedas which are accepted as authoritative by great saints, is due to the reliability of God who is their speaker. It is not due to the authority of non-omniscient seers who are ignorant of the supersensible entities mentioned therein. It is guaranteed by God who is the Omniscient creator of the moral injunctions and prohibitions \textsuperscript{37}.

God is the creator of the moral Law, which is not an impersonal moral imperative. It is the property of a reliable person who imposes the moral Law upon persons.

It is a personal command of God which impels them to perform righteous actions and abstain from unrighteous actions. This is the moral argument for the existence of God. The sentences in Vedas are creations of a person because they are sentences, like sentences composed by men. Just as the \textit{kumārasambhava} was composed by Kālidasa, so the Vedas were composed by God.
NOTES

1. NS.I.1.1.
2. NSG.I.I.1.1.
3. NS.I.1.1.
4. NS. NBh.I.1.4
5. NBh. on NS.P.20
6. SM
7. TCM. P.556
8. H.I.L. P.380
9. TSG P.29
10. NS. NBh. I.1.5
11. NBh. P.24
12. NV. I.1.5
13. NBh. P.25
14. NBh. P.25
15. NBh.I.1.5
16. NS. NBh. I.1.6
17. NS. NBh I.1.7
18. NS. NBh. I.1.8
19. TSG. TSGD. P.24
20. TSG. TSGD. P.42
21. NS. NBh. I.1.22
22. NS. NBh. I.1.22
23. NS. NBh. I.1.2
24. NS. NBh. I.1.1
25. NS. NBh I.1.2 & 22.
26. TSG.P.18
27. NBh. I.1.3.
28. NS. NBh. I.1.10. III.2.36-40
29. NBh. III.1.1-3
30. NS. NBh. II.2.64-69, 3-36 & 45
31. NS. IV. 1.21.
32. NV. IV.1.21
33. NV. IV.1.21
34. NM. P.184-187
35. NM. P. 184-187
36. NKS. P.58-59
37. NKS. P.62.