A substance (dravya) has the characteristic of existence. It possesses generation, destruction, and permanence. Some new qualities are generated, some old qualities are destroyed and some qualities remain permanent in it. Permanence means indestructibility and continuity of the essence of the substances. Recognition apprehends permanence of a substance in the form 'this is that'. When prominence is given to the indestructible essence of a thing and its changing qualities are subordinated to its essence, it is called a substance. It is permanent in regard to its essential qualities, and impermanent in regard to its changing qualities. A substance is possessed of attributes (guna) and modes (Paryāya). Attributes coexist with one another in the substance. Modes
succeed one another in it. Modes are changes in the attributes of a substance. They are partly different from their substance, for their substance persists even when they are destroyed. They are partly identical with their substance because they cannot exist apart from their substance, and because they are nothing but its modifications\textsuperscript{2}.

A substance is both permanent and changing. It is permanent as a substance, and change is as modes.

The relation of a substance to its mode is that of matter to its form. There can be neither matter without form nor form without matter.

A substance cannot exist without attributes, which also cannot exist without it. They are partly different from, and partly non-different from each other in their nature.

If a substance is entirely distinct from its attributes, then it may be transformed into infinite other substances. If the attributes are entirely distinct from a substance and can exist apart from it, there is no necessity for a substance. Both the alternatives are untenable. Hence a substance and attributes are not entirely distinct from each other \textsuperscript{3}. 
The Jaina Philosophy brings the whole universe under two everlasting categories. The two classes of things are respectively described as Ātma and Ajīva, the consciousness and unconsciousness, the latter, Ajīva, including not merely matter but also time and space. Therefore, the Jaina recognizes six substances as (1) soul (Jīva) (2) the principle of motion (Dharma) (3) the principle of rest (Adharma) (4) space (Ākāśa) (5) matter (Pudgala) and (6) time (Kāla). The last five substances are called non-soul (Ajīva). The first five substances are extensive like body (Kāya), and occupy more than one unit of space: So they are called astikāyas. Soul, matter, dharma, adharma and space are extensive substances. Time is unextended and composed of innumerable moments which are not coextensive with one another. So time is a substance devoid of extension.

**JīVA**

The notion of Jīva in general corresponds to that of Ātman or Puruṣa of the other schools of Indian thought. But as implied by the etymology of its name - “what lives of by animate”- the concept seems to have been arrived at first ob-
serving the characteristic of life and not through the search after a metaphysical principle underlying individual existence⁴.

The number of Ātman is infinite all being alike and eternal. In their empirical form they are classified in various ways such as those that have one sense, two senses and so forth. The Ātman is an eternal, spiritual substance. It is uncorporeal, immaterial, and different from the body or the sense organs. But it is co-extensive with the body it occupies, as the light of a lamp coextensive with the room in which it exists⁵. The Jainas believe not only that the Ātman exists, but also that it acts and is acted upon. It is the knower (Jñātṛ), enjoyer (Bhoktṛ) and active agent (Kartr)⁶.

Its intrinsic nature is one of perfection and it is characterized by infinite intelligence, infinite peace, infinite faith and infinite power⁷.

Cognition, feeling and conation are its qualities. Consciousnes is not its accidental quality, but it constitutes its essence. It is active and free. It can freely do right actions or wrong actions, and acquire merit or demerit. It is the mas-
ter of its own destiny. It freely enters into bondage, and is separated from karman-matter in the state of liberation. The liberated soul moves upward to the summit of mundane space. From the practical standpoint that is called the soul which is possessed of the five sense-organs and vital forces, strength, duration of life and inspiration and expiration. But from the ontological standpoint that is called the soul which has consciousness. The soul is absolutely different from the non-soul. The five sense-organs and the body are its accidental adjuncts which are not conscious.

The Jainas accept that Jīva is active because of its association with karman matter. In the perfect state it is absolutely free from karmans, and becomes inactive. In the state of bondage it is the agent of its own actions, and the enjoyer of their fruits. It is blinded by ignorance on account of its bondage to karman-matter created by itself and roams about in the world of birth and death. The faithful soul liberates itself from bondage by adopting the path of Right faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct. But the unfaithful soul roams about in the world of samsāra for ever. The destiny of each Jīva is entirely self-determined.
The soul is a spiritual substance, and consequently unextended. But it is considered to be an extensive substance because it illuminates the whole body with its consciousness. The souls are of two kinds, bound and liberated. The former are limited by adjuncts and have either gross body or subtle body. The latter are free from bodily adjuncts.

The former are impure, while the latter are pure. The former have false knowledge and perception, emotion and passions, while the latter have omniscience, infinite bliss and infinite power. The omniscient soul pervades the whole universe by its consciousness. Even the bound soul occupies innumerable space-points. Though it occupies innumerable space points, it can occupy the space of a small body or a large body by the contraction and expansion of the space points like a lamp. The perfect souls are absolutely unconditioned. They have no casual relation to the cycle of samsāra. They are entirely free from karman-matter. But the imperfect souls are united with karman-matter.  

The Jīvas are either embodied or disembodied. The former attain liberation, but the latter never attain liberation.
but roam in the world for ever. The embodied souls are of five kinds. Among these human souls are rational; animal souls, plant souls, and elemental souls are irrational.

**Dharma**

*Dharma* used in the Jaina metaphysics is not the same concept of other philosophies. *Dharma* is the imperceptible medium of motion. It is supersensible and devoid of sensible qualities, taste, colour, smell, sound, touch, lightness, and heaviness. It is perceptible to the omniscient soul only. It is incorporeal, inactive, and eternal. It is co-extensive with mundane space. It is continuous because its units of space are inseparable. It is without any gaps and motionless. It cannot impel matter and souls to move. When they begin to move, it assists their movement. *Dharma* is the neutral, external, auxiliary cause of motion of matter and living beings which move on account of their own material causes. It pervades mundane space. So it is called *dharmāstikāya*. It is a real substance which persists in the midst of changing modes.
*ADHARMA*

*Adharma* is the principle of rest. *Adharma* is one, eternal, formless, inactive substance which is co-extensive with worldly space. So it is called *adharma*stäkäya. It is an extensive substance. It is non-atomic and non-discrete in structure. It is simple, incorporeal and formless. Its structure is not constituted by space points. It is devoid of sensible qualities of material things. It is imperceptible to us but perceptible to the omniscient soul. It is an eternal, neutral, auxiliary cause of rest of moving and stationary living beings and material things. It is not the principal cause of rest of living beings and non-living things. It does not generate their rest, nor does it impel them to rest. *Adharma* merely helps the rest of stationary and moving things without which they would not be able to rest. It is the support of rest.\(^{14}\)

The Jainas recognize the reality of nine varieties, viz. (1) soul (*Jīva*), (2) non-soul (*Ajīva*), (3) merit (*Puṇya*), (4) demerit (*Pāpa*), (5) inflow (*Āsrava*), (6) bondage (*Bandha*), (7) stoppage (*Samvara*), (8) shedding of *karman* (*Nirjara*) and (9) liberation (*Mokṣa*). *Jīva* is a living
being or soul. Matter, *dharma, adharma*, space, and time constitute non-soul (*Ajīva*). *Punya* is virtue or merit, *pāpa* is vice or demerit. *Āsrava* is the inflow of *karman* matter into the soul. *Bandha* is bondage or investment of the soul by *karman*-matter. *Samvara* is the arrest of the *karman*-matter into the soul. *Nirjara* is partial destruction of the accumulated *karman*-matter. *Mokṣa* is complete destruction of the accumulated *karman*-matter and liberation of the soul from bondage. Of these nine categories, *Jīva* and *ajīva* are the primary. Existence merit, demerit, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *samvara*, *nirjara* and *mokṣa* are the conditions of the soul which arise from its different relations to *karman*-matter.\(^{15}\)

**MOKṢA**

Liberation is the absolute separation of the soul from all karmic-matter which has entered into the soul. The destruction of all accumulated karmic matter leads to the self’s realization of its intrinsic purity. Right faith, right knowledge and right conduct (*3gems*) constitute the path to liberation. When karmic matter is burnt by these three gems of the
Jaina philosophy, it does not cause birth and death, even as scorched seeds do not germinate\textsuperscript{16}. First deluding \textit{karmans}, which are the causes of \textit{sams}\text{\text"{a}}\text{\text"{ra}}, are entirely destroyed by right faith, right knowledge and right conduct, when the influx of a new \textit{karman}-matter is stopped, and the accumulated \textit{karman}-matter is worn out. Then obstructive knowledge obscuring and faith obscuring \textit{karmans} are simultaneously destroyed. Lord-ship appears in the soul separated from the four kinds of \textit{karman}-matter. The person is called the supreme Lord. He becomes pure, enlightened, free from bodily and mental diseases, and omniscient. He is called the victor (\textit{Jina}). He attains \textit{nirv}\text{\text"{a}}\text{\text"{na}} when the other four kinds of \textit{karmans}, feeling-obscuring, age-determining, character-determining and family-determining are completely destroyed. The liberated soul moves upward to the summit of mundane space\textsuperscript{17}. It realizes infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power.
JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE (ĀKĀŚA) AND TIME (KĀLA)

Regarding primary material elements (Mahābhūtas) there are two old views. One view recognized five mahābhūtas and the other recognized four mahābhūtas.

The five mahābhūtas recognized by the first view were ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, ap and Prthvī. They possessed the five special qualities- ākāśa-sābda, vāyu-sparśa, tejas-rūpa, aprasa and prthvī-gandha. Those who followed this view counted ākāśa as a mahābhūta with a special quality sābda. The sāṅkhya-yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prabhakara Mīmāṃsā accepted this view. The four mahābhūtas recognized by the other old view were vāyu, tejas, ap and prthvī. Those who followed this view maintained either that ākāśa is a form of matter produced from the four mahābhūtas or that ākāśa is non-material, non-spiritual substance. The Therāvādi Buddhists accepted the first alternative. For them ākāśa is sāṃskṛta, it is produced from the four mahābhūtas, thus it is a derived matter (Upādāya rupa). But the Vaibhāṣika Buddhists, who too recognized the above-mentioned four
mahābhūtas only raised ākāśa to the status of asaṁskṛta (eternal) dharma (element), thus putting at state its bhautikatva (materiality). So for them ākāśa is a non-material, non-spiritual (rather non-physical) element. Jainas too follow this old tradition of four mahābhūtas and maintain that ākāśa is not pudgala (matter) but is an independent substance.

**JAINA DESCRIPTION OF ĀKĀŚA**

Jainas do not regard ākāśa as a mode or an effect of mahābhūtas. For them it is an independent fundamental substance. It is devoid of colour, odour, taste and touch. According to Jainas śabda is a mode of mahābhūtas or matter (Pudgala). Aggregates (Skandhas) of atoms strike against one another and śabda is produced from them. Hence śabda is not the nature of ākāśa, nor is it its quality. If śabda were its quality the quality of ākāśa being formless or non-physical it would not have been heard through the organ of hearing, say the Jainas. Ākāśa is infinite in extent, it is present every-
where, it stretches not only over the universe, but also far beyond over the non-universe. All other substances are confined to the universe only. Thus no substance is so extensive as ākāśa is. The pervasiveness of ākāśa is infinite. Ākāśa is one in number. It is a one membered class, so to say. There is no possibility of increase or decrease in its number. It is one and will remain one for ever. It is eternal in the sense that it never gives up its nature. As it is present everywhere in the universe, the possibility of movement from one place to another is rejected in its case.

The function of ākāśa is to afford room to other substances. Other substances exist by their own nature. There is no doubt about it. But they require something to exist in. They do exist by themselves. But where in do they exist? They exist in ākāśa. Their existence is not the same as ākāśa. Nor is ākāśa an aspect of them. It is a fundamental substance different from them. Thus ākāśa is a universal container in which all other substances are contained.

Can ākāśa function as a condition of motion? The Jaina answer to this question is an emphatic ‘no’. They con-
tend that if it be also the condition of motion, then wherever there is ākāśa, there would be a chance of motion, but neither a single īśva, nor a single body nor a single atom could step beyond the limit of universe (Loka) though there is ākāśa beyond the universe. If ākāśa were credited with the function of assisting motion then it being present in aloka (non-universe) also the division of loka and aloka would disappear, the loka (universe) would dissipate, the atoms would disperse in the infinite space, they would be very far from one another and they would hardly come in contact with one another to form material bodies.

UNITS OF SPACE (ĀKĀŚA PRADEŚAS)

A primary indivisible atom of matter is the ultimate unit of matter. And the space occupied by a material atom is the ultimate unit of space. It is called Pradeśa (Spacepoint).

Though ākāśa does never accommodate two material bodies in the same spacepoint at a time, it, under certain conditions, can accommodate up to ananta material atoms in one
and the same space point at a time. This phenomenon becomes possible because material atoms in their subtle stages are conceived as mutually non-obstructive. Again, this phenomenon definitely proves the fact that a material atom is subtler than a spacepoint.

Ākāśa has ananta spacepoints. But this number ananta is fixed in the sense that there is no possibility of increase or decrease of even a single spacepoint.

The spacepoints are conceived as inseparable parts or avayavas of ākāśa. Thus ākāśa is an avayavi-astikāya. Avayavas or parts (pradeśas) of ākāśa are as much objectively existent as ākāśa of which they are parts. They maintain that the partless ākāśa can never be a favourable receptacle for the objects having parts. Thus they contend that ākāśa too must have parts, for when the table exists in space as in that case, other things cannot exist at all anywhere. The table exists not in all space but in that part of space where it does actually exist, leaving room for the other objects to exist elsewhere. All this clearly implies that space too has parts, space is an avayavin. To be an avayavin does not necessarily mean
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that it should be produced from its *avayava* put together at some point of time.

**DIVISION OF ĀKĀŚA**

Ākāśa is *ananta* (infinite) in extension. That portion of it which contains all substances is called *lokākāśa* (universe space) and that portion of Ākāśa which has no substance to accommodate in itself is called *alokākāśa* (space beyond the universe). Ākāśa is one only. Lokākāśa and alokākāśa are not two individual ākāśas. Thus this division is not in ākāśa itself but it is due to its relation with other substances\(^25\).

**TIME SUBSTANCE ACCORDING TO DIGAMBARAS**

According to the Digambara thinkers, time is atomic. There are innumerable time atoms. Each time atom occupies one spacepoint of the cosmic space. Thus time atoms are confined to cosmic space only. They are not present in the space beyond cosmos\(^26\). They do not combine to form molecules as the material atoms do. Nor they constitute one single
whole as the spacepoints do. Thus they have no spatial extension (\textit{tiryak pracaya}). Only those substances that have spatial extension are termed "\textit{astikāya}". Hence time is not counted among \textit{astikāyas}. Time atoms go on assuming different modes all the while. All these modes are not measurable. The smallest measurable mode of a time-atom is termed \textit{samaya} (instant) which is defined as the time taken by a material atom to traverse a unit of space by slow movement\textsuperscript{27}. Each time has infinite such modes. Though these modes are not simultaneous, a time atom being a substance pervades all of them, \textit{i.e.} these modes are not discrete without any permanent substance underlying them. This is the reason why time atoms are said to have temporal extension. Time atoms are motionless and hence each of them for ever occupies one particular spacepoint in cosmic space. They are immobile entities arranged in close proximity to one another. They are eternal as they are atomic and do not form aggregates. Origination, persistence and decay in their case are explained through the origination, persistence and decay of other things (\textit{Parapratyayotpāda vināśasadbhāvādanityāḥ})\textsuperscript{28}. It is also
said that they are eternal in the sense that they never give up their own nature and that the origination and decay in their case is due to the rhythmic rise and fall of their untranslatable term. literally means neither heavy nor light quality. Acārya Kundakunda maintains that a time atom undergoes origination, persistence and decay at one and the same movement.

Time atoms are devoid of physical qualities like colour etc., and in this sense only they are called amūrta.

**PUDGALA (MATTER)**

*Pudgala* (Matter) is a non-soul substance which has touch, taste, smell, and colour. Material substances have form. Matter exists in the form of an atom or an aggregate. Atoms are indivisible units of matter. Aggregates are composed of atoms. Atoms arise from the division of aggregates. They are the furthest limit of division. They cannot arise from combination. An atom is one indivisible, indestructible and corporeal unit of matter. It is the maker and breaker of aggregates. It is spatial, yet non-spatial. It occupies only one unit of space. It is the determinant of time and number. It is with-
out beginning, middle and end. It is capable of modifications.

Atoms are combined into aggregates. The aggregates are minute or large, and have touch, taste, smell, colour and sound. Each atom has one taste, one smell, one colour and two tactile qualities. They are the causes of sounds, but devoid of sounds.

There are five kinds of colour blue, yellow, white, black, and red. There are eight kinds of touch - softness, hardness, lightness, heaviness, coldness, heat, smoothness and roughness.

Atoms have imperceptible qualities. They become perceptible in the aggregates. Of the eight kinds of tactile qualities an atom has temperature. It has neither heaviness nor lightness. An atom occupies only one space point. So atom cannot have sound. Sound is not the quality of ether. It would be heard in a vacuum in which ether is present.

Atoms are homogeneous and devoid of qualitative differences. Atoms are subtle and imperceptible to us, but they can be perceived by the Omniscient only. The homogeneous atoms produce the four elements of earth, water, fire and air.
One moment is the time taken by an atom to move from one space - point is the next space point. The change of position of an atom is the measure of time. One atom of matter and one particle of time exist in one unit of space. Matter, time and space are three inseparable units of the physical world. They cannot be separated from one another, though they are different in their nature. Matter, space, time units are the elementary substances of the dynamic world. Karman particles are infra-atomic matter. They are finer than atoms\(^3\).

Aggregates have manifest qualities of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound. They have atomic linking, dimension, figure, divisibility, opacity and radiant heat (light).

**PRAMĀṆAS**

In any school of Indian Philosophy pramāṇas have crucial role to acquire knowledge. In the Jaina Philosophy also there is a vast inquiry about pramanas. Pramāṇa is the definitive cognition of the self and others (Svaparavyavasāyijñānam pramāṇam). In Jaina view the pramāṇa can also be defined as "a valid knowledge about the self and the not self".
By defining the *pramāṇa* as valid knowledge, the Jaina means to show also that it is to be distinguished from doubt, illusion and inattention.

The Jaina definition of *pramāṇa* can stand the test of valid syllogism. It is in this way. "The *pramāṇa* is valid knowledge, regarding the self and the not self" because *pramāṇa*-hood cannot be met with otherwise (i.e. because *pramāṇa*-hood and valid knowledge regarding the self and the not self are invariably found together). Vādi Devasūri defines valid knowledge as determinate cognition which apprehends itself and an object, and which is capable of prompting activity which attains a desirable object or rejects an undesirable object". Siddhasena defines valid knowledge as cognition, which apprehends itself and an object, and which is not contradicted.

These definitions do not exclude recollection from valid knowledge. The result of valid knowledge is cessation of ignorance, avoidance of evil, selection of good, and indifference. It is partly distinct and partly non-distinct from valid knowledge. The person who has valid knowledge removes his ignorance,
avoids evil, selects good and becomes indifferent on account of the knowledge of truth.

A cognition in itself is valid since it cannot contradict itself. It is valid or invalid in relation to its object. If it is not in harmony with its object, it is invalid. The validity (Prāmāṇya) of knowledge consists in its agreement with its object and the invalidity (Aprāmāṇya) of knowledge consists in its disagreement with its object. Both validity and invalidity of knowledge arise from extraneous circumstances, viz., the proficiency or deficiency respectively in their causes. But they are known from extraneous circumstances, viz, the knowledge of harmony and disharmony and the presence or absence of contradictory experience in unhabitual cognitions. Valid knowledge is of two kinds, immediate knowledge or perception (Pratyakṣa) and mediate or indirect knowledge (Parokṣa).

In other words, according to Jaina Philosophy, Pramāṇa (cognition) is of two kinds:— (1) Perception and (2) non-perception.
(1) PERCEPTION

Perception is that which is an effect depends on the sense which is called 'akṣa' \((\text{Akṣam indriyam pratigatam kāryatvenāsritam pratyakṣam})\). Perception is distinct knowledge. Distinctness consists in the apprehension of an object with its specific qualities without the mediation of any other knowledge. It is independent of other pramāṇas. It is stronger than indirect knowledge as a kind of valid knowledge.

(2) NON-PERCEPTION

It is clear in itself. Which is hidden from sense \((\text{Akṣebhyo akṣādvā parato vartate iti parokṣam})\) is non-perceptual.

There are two kinds of perception empirical and transcendental.

(1) Empirical

\((\text{Samīcīno bādhārahito vyavahāraḥ pratinivṛttiḥ lokābhilāpalakṣaṇaḥ samvyavahāraḥ, saṁvyavahāraḥ tatprayojanam samvyavahārikam})\). Our ordinary perception
is empirical. It is based on unhindered transaction (Samvyavahāra), characterised by corresponding talk of engagements and withdrawals, e.g., perceptual cognition of ourselves. It depends on the sense-organs and other conditions.

Transcendental perception depends upon proximity to the self, and not upon the sense organs and other conditions. It is revelation of knowledge of all objects due to the extirpation of the karman matter that enters into the soul.

Again empirical perceptual cognition is of two kinds (a) Sensuous and (b) Quasisensuous.

The sensuous is effected by eyes etc. (cakṣurādi-janitam) and the Quasi sensuous is born in mind. Though mind functions even in the sensuous cognition, it is the extra-ordinary cause. Non-sensuous perception apprehends pleasure, pain, cognition and volition through manas which is not a sense-organ.

Both of these again are of two kinds (i) Sensuous cognition and (ii) Scriptural knowledge.
SENSUOUS COGNITION

Sensuous cognition is conditioned by a sense and the mind, and is not based on word, whereas that which is based on word, is scriptural knowledge (pitcher is pitcher). Sensuous cognition has four stages

(i) Avagraha (grasp)

(ii) Thā (speculation)

(iii) Avāya (perceptual, determination)

(iv) Dhāraṇa (retention).

(i) AVAGRAHA

Avagraha is of two kinds (a) contact awareness and (b) object awareness. Contact awareness is of four kinds in accordance with the difference of senses except sight and mind, which being of non-contactory nature cannot have any contact awareness. Otherwise, there should have been wetness and burning at the sight and the thought of water and fire.

(b) Object awareness:- It is the general feature, without any distinction of form, name genus, activity, quality and substances (Svarūpa-nāma-jāti- kriyā guṇa-dravyakalpanā
rahitum sāmānya grahaṇam arthāvagrahah) It is the first impression of an object endowed with inferior generic characters arising from the formless cognition of mere beinghood just after the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object.

(ii) ṢHĀ (SPECULATION-ATTENTION)

It is the soul which is able to appreciate the qualities of the visible object. For example, on hearing noise, one does not in the beginning know whose noise it is. This is the stage of evagītā. Speculation comes when one feels the curiosity of knowing the source from which the noise is coming forth.

(iii) AVĀYA (PERCEPTUAL JUDGEMENT, DETERMINATION)

In it one comes to know about the object definitely. To pursue the above mentioned, example, one enters the stage of avāya when one is able to locate the source of the noise definitely.
(iv) **DHĀRAṆĀ (RETENTION)**

This stage comes when the full knowledge about the object leaves an impression (Samāskāra) upon the heart (Antahkarana) of the man. This is the final stage of direct knowledge. Recollection, perception and inference are all included in this stage.

**SCRIPTURAL KNOWLEDGE**

Śrūta knowledge is derived through words. It is produced by the word which is heard. It is to be gained from authoritative books and words of great sages. Perusal of authoritative books and listening to the sermons of saints are essential for this kind of knowledge. Knowledge through the sense-organ is, thus, a prerequisite for śrūta knowledge. Matī knowledge precedes śrūta knowledge. The preaching of the Tirthankaras fall in the latter category.

Śrūta knowledge is divided into two categories, viz, (i) Āṅgapraviṣṭa and (ii) Āṅgabāhyā. The former is mentioned in Jaina scriptures, while the śrūta knowledge outside
the pale of religious books of the Jaina falls in the latter category. *Aṅgapraviṣṭa* is regarded superior to *Aṅgabāhyā*.

**TRANSCENDENTAL PERCEPTION**

Tranascendental (*Pāramārthika*) is direct knowledge for its genesis depends only on the activity of the soul. It can be divided into two subdivisions, viz, (i) *Vikalajñāna* and (ii) *Kevalajñāna*.

**KEVALAJÑĀNA**

That which has a direct cognition of all substances with modes is called Pure knowledge (*Nikhiladravyaparyāya sākṣātkāri kevalajñānam*). Therefore it is called perfect perception.

**VIKALAJÑĀNA**

It has been divided into two heads namely (1) *Avadhi* (clairvoyance) and (2) *Manah paryāya* (telepathy)
AVADHI (CLAIRVOYANCE)

Having all these objects which have forms as its subjects and depending only on self is the clairvoyance type of knowledge. (Sakalarūpīdravya viṣayaka jātiyam ātmātrāpekṣam jñānamavadhijñānam)

MANAH PARYĀYAJÑĀNA (TELEPATHY)

It is telepathic knowledge of the processes of other minds. It is direct or immediate knowledge caused by the destruction of a particular kind of karman-matter obscuring the knowledge, which is due to the purity of restraint or Right conduct.

NON-PERCEPTUAL (MEDIATE KNOWLEDGE)

The indirect is not clear (Aspaṣṭam parokṣam). It is wanting in ‘clearness’. It is of five kinds, viz., Recollection, Recognition, Reasoning, Inference and Verbal Testimony. Following is the short description of each one of them.
RECOLLECTION

Recollection is the cognition generated only by experience (Anubhavamātra janyam jñānam smaraṇam) as that is the image of the Tirthankara (Lord) (Tattārthakara-bimbamitiyathā). This is not organ of knowledge. Recollection determines the real nature of an object perceived in the past. So it is valid knowledge.

RECOGNITION

It is the synthetic knowledge, caused by experience and recollection and cognising the similarity between the two and the identity of one person at different ages etc. e.g., This body of the cow is the same.

REASONING

Reasoning (Tarka) which is knowledge of the invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) of the middle term with the major term in the past, the present, and the future, arises from the observation of their co-presence and co-absence. Vyāpti is of two kinds: Anvayavyāpti and vyatireka vyāpti. For
example, 'where there is a smoke, there is a fire'. This is anvayavyāpti. 'Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke'. This is vyatirekavyāpti.

**INFERENCE (ANUMĀNA)**

Inference is the knowledge of probandum from probans. It is based on Vyāpti derived from reasoning. There are two kinds of inference, inference for oneself (Svārtha) and inference for others (Parārtha). The inference of oneself is the probandum caused by the recollection of the relationship and the knowledge of the probans e.g., the knowledge that 'the mountain contains fire' arising in a person who has perceived the smoke and has also recollected the concomitance. The knowledge of the probans and recollection of the relationship should be jointly accepted as the cause, otherwise there would be an occasion for occurrence of inference with reference to a person who has forgotten or not grasped the relationship and has not perceived the probans. Parārthānumāna is used for convincing others. So it must be more systematized and vivid. It is five-fold. In five fold
parārthānumāna an inference is drawn in five sentences.

These are called the propositions of inference: e.g.,

1. Pratijña - the hill is fiery.
2. Hetu - because it is smoking
3. Drṣṭānta - wherever there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen
4. Upanaya - The smoke, which does not exist without fire is in the hill.
5. Nigamana - Therefore the hill is fiery

AGAMA (TESTIMONY)

It is the knowledge of a thing through the words of reliable people. A person, who knows things in their true form and expresses his views correctly is reliable or āpta. He is free from prejudice. His words carry the truth which they are seeking to express. Agama is of two kinds, viz., mundane (Laukika) and supra mundane (Alaukika). The words of Janaka, etc., are laukika. The words of the Tīrthaṅkara are alaukika.

The Jaina do not believe in the Vedas. They have faith only in
the Tirthankaras, who have attained perfection and realized all knowledge. Just as a lamp illuminates a thing, so word also manifests a thing by its inherent power. But its meaning also depends upon customs and traditions. Its truth or falsehood is determined by the virtue of voice of the speaker.  

THREE KINDS OF THE FALSE KNOWLEDGE

Some Jaina Philosophers believe in eight kinds of knowledge which can be classified as authentic and fallacious. Mati, Sruta, Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala are regarded as true authentic knowledge. On the other hand, fallacious knowledge (Mithyājñāna) includes samśaya, viparyaya and Anadhyavasāya. The first five of these have already been discussed. Samśaya is that knowledge which admits doubt, suspicion and misgiving. It has its effects upon Mati and Sruta knowledge. Knowledge which is contrary to truth is dubbed as Viparyaya. It is found in Avadhi. False knowledge due to negligence or indifference, is known as Anadhyavasāya. According to the Jaina, perfect knowledge suffers from no loopholes what so ever. It is singularly free from samśaya, vimoha
and vibhrama. Delusion, deception or suspicion cannot assail it.

**JAINA THEORY OF SOUND (ŚABDA)**

The Indian Philosophical schools which have invented, developed and adopted the theory of sound by their speculations may be placed in five groups. The first group is represented by the Sāṅkhya-yoga, the second one by the Vaibhāsika school of Buddhists, the third one by the Nyāya. Vaiśeṣika, the fourth one by the Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school and the fifth one by the Jainas.

According to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Śabda (sound) is *tanmātra* (infra atomic and potential energy) which generates ākāśa (ether or space) because of being a radicle or centre encircled by masses (*Bhūtādi*), while the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhism maintains that śabda (sound) as an object of hearing is one of the fifteen kinds of Rūpa (matter). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceives śabda as quality of ākāśa (space).
The Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school accept śabda as a substance on the basis of the fact that it is perceived independently and directly, it exists as a self-subsistent real and it does not have the criterion of quality of being perceived invariably as dependent upon a substance-substratum.

JAINA THEORY OF SOUND

According to Jaina metaphysics, sound is conceived as the manifestation of matter. This view is identical with that of the physical sciences on the theory of sound, as it is conceived by them as energy of matter, i.e., manifestation of it. It usually originates in vibrating bodies through the surrounding elastic medium, usually air, as wave motion of the longitudinal type. When the compressional sound waves are passing through air the amplitude of the vibratory motion of the layers or particles is surprisingly small, being only about 10-8cm for a sound that is barely audible.

KINDS OF SOUND:-

According to Jaina Philosophy, there are stated to be
mainly two kinds of sound, viz., *bhāṣātmaka* (sound incorporated in speech or language). The former is subdivided into two groups, viz., *akṣarātmaka* (articulate utterance or speech) and *anakṣarātmaka* (sound made by creatures, etc. While the latter is also of two groups, viz., *prāyogika* (sound produced by human beings through the play of musical instruments i.e., musical sound) and *vaiśraśika* (natural sounds such as roaring of thunder, the rippling of water, noises in general etc.)

*Prāyogika śabda* (artificial or produced sound) is further subdivided into four kinds, viz., *tata* (musical sound of tabla etc., i.e., a stretched membrane) *Vitata* (musical sound produced by stringed instruments), *ghana* (musical sound produced by solid instruments, such as, bell) and *suśira* (sound produced by wind instruments, organ pipes or conch)

The outlines of the Jaina sound theory clearly reveal its scientific approach to the problem from the points of view of substantiality and modality in the light of the sound theories of other Indian Philosophies even in the absence of critical data of modern experimental science.
THE DOCTRINE OF NAYA

This doctrine is a peculiar feature of Jaina Epistemology. Pramāṇa and Naya are the different ways of the knowing of the reality. Pramāṇa is the valid knowledge of multiform object endowed with many qualities. Naya is valid knowledge of one part, aspect, quality or mode of a multiform object. Naya is a part of a pramāṇa. It is a partial valid knowledge. A Naya apprehends a part of a real thing comprehended by valid knowledge, and ignores its other parts. It is the standpoint of the knowing person embodying a particular purpose to understand a particular part of a thing to the exclusion of the other parts. He becomes indifferent to the other aspects of the thing for the time being. Nayas are the points of view from which things are considered.

Since Naya deals with a part of the object it yields certain knowledge about part of an object and as such it is neither, pramāṇa (which is knowledge of an object in its entirety) nor a mode of a false knowledge. Nayas are mainly of two kinds, Dravya Naya and Paryāya Naya. In another classification there are two kinds of Nayas.
The expounded (Vyāsa) and

(ii) The compounded (Samāsa)

EXPOUNDED NAYA

In its expounded form it is of many sorts. A thing has infinite aspects and each observer fixes his attention on any one of these aspects in accordance with his purpose or inclination. Nāya which is concerned with the particular aspect of a thing corresponding to the particular standpoint of the observer is accordingly of many sorts in its expounded form.

COMPOUNDED NAYA:-

In its compounded form it is of two kinds:-

(i) Dravyārthika and

(ii) Paryāyarthika

DRAVYĀRTHIKA NAYA

Dravyārthika Nāya considers a thing as a substance in which qualities and modes are unified. It emphasizes the substantial aspect of a thing and ignores its qualitative and model aspect.
Dravya Nayas are of three kinds, Naigama Naya, Sañgraha Naya and Vyavahāra Naya. They are also called Artha Nayas.

(1) THE NAIGAMA NAYA

This Naya is the first kind of Dravyārthika Naya. This is interpreted in two ways. It signifies in an undistinguished way two ideas, one of which is the chief and the other, an ad-

The Jaina holds that a thing is an organic unity of both generic and specific qualities, which are equally real. This is the concrete view of Jaina. The Naigama Naya is the stand-

point of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems according to the Jaina. They hold that a thing is the complex of the universal and the particular, which are equally real and primary and different from each other. So far they agree with the Jaina. But they consider the distinction between the universal and the particular to be absolute, while the Jaina considers it to be relative. They consider them to be absolutely different from each other, while the Jaina considers them to be particularly
different from each other. The Naigama Naya becomes Naigamābhāsa at the hands of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas.

It is of three kinds inasmuch as the ideas may be:

(i) Ideas of characteristic features or attributes.

(ii) Ideas of a substance and of an attribute characteristic or feature (Vastuparyāyavat dravyamitidharmiṇoh).

(iii) Ideas of substance (Kṣanekam sukhi viṣayāsakta jīvetitu dharmādharminiṇoh).

(2) SANGRAHA NAYA (SĀMĀNYAMĀTRAGRAHĪ PARĀMARŚĀH SAMGRAHĀH)

Literally Sangraha means the viewpoint which considers the infinite particularities as one identical aggregated whole, i.e., in a homogeneous lump as it were. This Naya refers to mere generality devoid of all specific qualities. This Naya consists in reconciling the particular aspects of individual things to their underlying common features, and treating the former as a unity. When we have the sangraha, we fix
upon the generalities, e.g., Existence, Substantiality, etc., the
genel.alities as devoid of the infinite particularities
characterising the things.

_Saṅgraha Naya_ has been divided into two:—

(i) Ultimate Naya or _Parasaṅgraha_

(ii) Non-ultimate _Naya or Aparasaṅgraha_.

(i) **ULTIMATE NAYA**

The Ultimate or the _Parasaṅgraha_ consists in assuming _an attitude of indifference to the infinite particularities_ (of a thing) and fixing solely upon (its) barest substratum which is equal to pure existence. The following is the example of ultimate _Naya_: _Viśvamekam sadaviśeśāditi_.

The Universe is one: for here is no difference in the being (of all things). Everything is cognized to be existent in this respect, i.e., from the consideration of the fact of existence, the infinite number of objects may be said to be but one.

The fallacy in regard to this (i.e., the _saṅgraha naya_) consists in maintaining the absolute identity of all beings and
denying all the particularities. As for instance, pure existence is the only reality: for particularities apart from that are not apprehended.

(ii) NON ULTIMATE

The non-ultimate saṁgraha consists in taking into consideration such non-ultimate generalities as substantiality etc, and assuming an attitude of indifference to their various modes. For instance, Principles of motion and Rest (Dharma and Adharma), Space, Matter, Soul all these substances are one because all of them have substantiality which is identical and so on.

(3) VYAVAHARA NAYA

The Vyavahāra Naya is the practical point of view based on sense-perception. This considers the particular individuals alone, without taking cognizance of their generic qualities and specific qualities.

The fallacy with regard to this practical naya consists of a tendency to divide the substances and the modes into un-
real sub-classes. The Cārvāka philosophy is an instance for it. The Ĉārvākas recognize the reality of the elements of earth, water, fire and air which are objects of practical use and reject the reality of the soul. Their Materialism is Vyavahāranavāyābhāsā.

II. PARYĀYĀRTHIKA NAYA

Paryāya Naya considers a thing as a conglomeration of qualities and modes and ignores its substantial aspect. Paryāyārthika Naya keeps in view the modifications and conditions of the object concerned. This Naya is of four kinds.

(a) Rjusūtranaya (straightly expressed)
(b) Verbal or sābda naya
(c) The subtle or samabhirūḍha naya
(d) Evambhūta or the such like.

(a) RJUSŪTRA NAYA (STRAIGHTLY EXPRESSED)

This Naya consists in a tendency to fix on or emphasise only the mode which is straight, i.e., existent for the present. Rju means straight, i.e., clearly manifest. The aspect of a thing as it is observed at the present moment is always clear. The
aspect of the thing as it was in the past or as it will be in the future cannot appear to be so clear. Although the subject matter of the straight expressed is still a Dravya it holds the impermanent modes and aspect as matters of principal interest. For instance, now there is pleasure.

(b) VERBAL OR SABDA NAYA

Śabda Naya refers to words and their meanings. This Naya attributes different meaning to a word in accordance with the difference in tense etc. This Naya shows how the meanings of the words vary in accordance with the difference in tense, cases, genders, numbers, persons, prefixes etc. For example Dā rāh (plural), Kalatra (Singular) mean the same object—wife.

(c) THE SUBTLE OR SAMABHIRUDHA NAYA

It consists in attributing different meanings to synonyms according to their derivations. For instance Indra is one who rains, 'Sakra is one who is potent, Purandara means destroyer of the enemies. This Naya emphasizes the literal meanings of the words, and ignores their identical derivative
meaning. This is a special application of ‘śabda naya’.

(d) EVAMBHŪTA OR THE SUCH LIKE

Evambhūta Naya is a special application of Samabhirūḍha naya. It restricts a word to one particular meaning which emphasizes one particular aspect of an effect suggested by its root. The word ‘gauḥ’ literally means a moving animal. A moving cow is a gauḥ. When it is at rest, it should not be called a gauḥ. It should be designated by a different word. This is the standpoint of Evambhūtanaya.

To sum up, a Naya a statement also in its application to its object, follows the law of sevenfold predication, through affirmation and negation. The Naya considers an object in its particular aspects and part, where as the pramāṇa considers an object in its entirety. This is the difference between Pramāṇa and Naya. Nayas are relative truths and not absolute truths. All affirmations and negations are relative to time, place and circumstances. They are not unconditional and absolute. So the doctrine of Nayas is related to ‘Anekāntavāda’ and ‘syādvāda’.
SYĀDVĀDA

It is the conception of reality as extremely indeterminate in its nature that is the basis of what is known as syādvāda - the most conspicuous doctrine of Jainism.

The word 'syāt' is derived from the sanskrit root "as" "to be", being its form in the potential mood. It means 'may be'. So Syādvāda may be rendered in English as the doctrine of 'may be'.

Syādvāda signifies that the universe can be looked at from many points of view, and that each viewpoint yields a different approach. The nature of reality is expressed completely by none of them, it admits all predicates. Every proposition is therefore, in strictness, only conditional. Following is the short description of the seven fold theory or the sapta bhaṅgi

SAPTABHAṅGI

According to the principle of the Jaina Philosophy, a thing is not confined to one aspect only, but has many aspects (Anekānta). Thus in some sense, it is existent, in some sense,
again, it is non-existent. Similarly, viewed from one stand-
point, a thing is eternal but viewed from another, it is imper-
manent. As a matter of fact, seven such aspects may be found 
out in a thing from seven view points (Saptabhi-prakāraḥ).
Now word is but a counter-part of the thing and like those in 
the thing, a word also has seven aspects, so far as its manners 
of expressing it are concerned.

The predicate consists in using seven sorts of expres-
sions regarding one and the same thing with reference to its 
particular aspects, one by one without any inconsistency, by 
means of affirmation and negation, made either separately, or 
together, all these seven expressions being marked with in 
some respects’ (Syār)58.

(1) The first predication consists in such affirmative 
statement, e.g., “Perhaps is” (Syādastyeva vaktavyam). The 
word ‘in some respect’, thus gives a definite content and char-
acter to the thing under consideration and prevents it from 
having the content and character of other things and thereby 
losing its own definite and determinate self. The ‘Bhaṅga’ 
indicates the definite and determinate nature of the thing; with-
out this predication the definite nature of the thing would not be stated at all, without this it should be as good as no statement at all. The word in some respect indicates in what definite way and manner the pitcher exists, these words state that the pitcher exists with respect to its own substance and not with respect to the substance etc. of other things.

(2) The second is a negative judgement. “Perhaps is not.” In some respect, every thing is non-existent (Nāstyeva sarvam). This consists in such a negative statement.

A thing is never intended to be non-existent in respect of its own substance etc. But it cannot be said that the thing is not intended to be non-existent in respect of the substance of other things, for that would be depriving the thing of its own definite and determinate nature. Reasoning will show that a thing is non-existent in some respects. The existential and non-existential are different aspects in a thing, although they are so connected that one is impossible without the other (Syādnāsti).

(3) The third is an affirmative judgement and a negative judgement in succession. This predication consists in
making statements, viz., that everything, e.g., the pitcher does not exist and that everything, e.g., the pitcher does not exist, one after the other (Syādastī nāsti)

(4) In some respects, everything is indescribable (Syādavaktyāyameva)

The presence of its own nature and the absence of its contradictory nature both are in a thing together. But it cannot be expressed. But it cannot be absolutely indescribable.

(5) A thing is existent with reference to its own substance etc, and it is inexpressible when existence and non-existence are simultaneously attributed to it. The fifth mode or predication consists in stating that a thing is existent and that is inexpressible (Syādasti avaktavyam ca)

(6) A thing is non-existent (Niṣedhakalpanā) with reference to the substance etc. of other things, and it is inexpressible when existence and non-existence are simultaneously attributed to it. The sixth mode of predication consists in stating that a thing is non-existent and that it is inexpressible (Syādasti and inexpressible),
A thing is existent with reference to its own substance etc. and is non-existent with reference to the substance etc. of other things, it is inexpressible when existence and non-existence are attributed to it simultaneously. The seventh mode of predication consists in pointing these out.

Thus Jainas admit the sevenfold Judgements.

Anekāntavāda

Anekāntavāda is the heart of Jaina Metaphysics. The Jainas hold that a real thing is endowed with an infinite number of qualities and modes, which is comprehended by valid knowledge (Pramāṇa). All objects of knowledge are manifold or multiform (Anekānta). They have infinite qualities and relations which distinguish them from the other objects. (Ananta dharmakāraḥ vastutatvam) The claim that Anekāntavāda is the most consistent form of realism lies in the fact that Jainism has allowed the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus, the theory of manifoldness of reality and knowledge.
Reality according to Jainism, is not merely multiple, but each real, in its turn, is manifold of complex to its core. Reality is thus a complex of manyness (*Aneka*) and manifoldness (*Anekānta*). The central thesis of the Jaina is according to a modern critic “that there is not only diversity but each real is equally diversified. For example, a gold jar exists as a specific substance with its specific qualities in a particular place at a particular time. It does not exist as other substances in other places at other times. When it is considered as a substance, it exists as an aggregate of atoms, it does not exist as a substance in the sense of space, the principle of rest and the other substances. It exists as a collection of earth atoms, it does not exist as a collection of water atoms, fire atoms and air atoms. It exists as a collection of gold atoms and not of silver atoms or atoms of other kinds of metal. It exists as moulded into the shape of this jar, and not of any other jar. As a substance its own qualities are not many. But the qualities of the other substances are infinite. It is distinguished from them by their infinite qualities. It exists in its own place and not in other places. The qualities of the other
things in time are infinite. The gold jar is distinguished from them by infinite qualities. It exists as endowed with a particular degree of yellow colour, particular degree of taste, particular degree of smell with roughness or smoothness, heat or cold, lightness or heaviness. In size it exists either minute or large, short or long and the like in relation to other substances. It can be distinguished from other substances by infinite magnitudes. It exists as comprehended by perception or inference by an infinite number of souls. The comprehended object must differ according to its comprehending modes of knowledge. So the gold jar must be endowed with infinite natures according as it is comprehended by infinite cognitions by infinite souls. It exists in infinite relations to the other substances in infinite time. Thus all things possess infinite qualities and infinite relations. The world is a system of interrelated objects possessing infinite qualities and infinite relations. This is the Jaina doctrine of relative pluralism (Anekāntavāda).
ATOMIC THEORY:-

The term anu, the sanskrit equivalent of atom is found in the upanisads, but the atomic theory is foreign to the vedānta. Of the remaining schools of Indian though, it is as we shall see a characteristic feature of more than one, the Jaina form of it being probably the earliest. The atoms according to it, are all of the same kind but they can yet give rise to the infinite variety of things. So that matter as conceived here is of quite an indefinite nature. Pudgala has certain inalienable features, but within the limits imposed by them it can become anything through qualitative differentiation. The transmutation of the element is quite possible in this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist. Even the four-fold distinction of earth, water, fire and air is derived and secondary, not primary and eternal as believed by some Hindu thinkers like the followers of the vaiśeṣika. These so called elements also, according to Jainism, are divisible and have a structure. By developing the respective characteristics of odour, flavour etc, the atoms become differentiated though in themselves they are indistinguishable from one another, and it is from the
atoms diversified in this way that the rest of the material world is derived. Matter may thus have two forms one, simple or atomic and the other compound called skandha. All perceivable objects are of the latter kind. Jainism also, like the upanisads, does not stop in its analysis of the physical universe at the elements of prthivi etc. It pushes it further back where qualitative differentiation has not yet taken place. But while in the latter the ultimate stage is represented by the monistic principle of Brahman, here it is taken by an infinity of atoms. It is not qualitatively only that matter is indefinite. Quantitatively also it is regarded as undetermined. It may increase or decrease in volume without addition or loss a position which is taken to be possible by assuming that when matter is in the subtle state any number of its particles may occupy the space of one gross atom. It is matter in this subtle form that constitutes karman, which by its influx into the jīva brings on samsāra.

**ATHEISM OF JAINAS**

The Naiyāyika accepts God as a creator and destroyer
of the world. The Jaina strongly criticizes the Nyāya argument by the following reasons. If God is the creator of the world, he creates it with a body or without a body. He cannot create it without a body because creation involves movement which is not possible without a body. If God creates the world with a body it is either perceptible or imperceptible. It is not perceptible, since grass, plants, rainbow, clouds, and the like are found to be spontaneously generated without its aid. If God’s body is imperceptible what is its cause. If a special greatness is its cause, there is no reason to prove it, and it involves mutual dependence. God’s imperceptible body depends upon His special greatness, and His special greatness depends upon His imperceptible body. Our body is caused by our merits and demerits but God’s body cannot be caused by His merits and demerits because He is devoid of merit and demerit. Our merits and demerits also cannot be the cause of His imperceptible body. Therefore God cannot have a perceptible or imperceptible body. He cannot create the world without a body.

Even if God exists, He cannot be eternal, ubiquitous
and omniscient. If God is eternal, He should be absolutely eternal. He can neither create the world nor destroy it, since creation and destruction imply change and God is admitted to be unchangeable and immutable. Creation and Destruction are two distinct acts. They cannot be made by an eternal, who is not liable to change.

If God is the creator of the world, what is the motive of His creation? intelligent being exerts himself owing to self-interest or compassion for others. So God being intelligent must create the world to serve His self-interest, or out of compassion for His creatures. But He is an eternally fulfilled being, and has no unfulfilled desires. He has no self-interest. So he cannot create the world to fulfil His selfish end, nor can He be moved by compassion for creatures. Compassion is desire to remove the sufferings of others. But before creation there is no suffering which is felt by the self through mind, body and the sense-organs in intercourse with objects, which are not yet created. If God feels compassion for sufferings of creatures before their creation, then creation will depend upon compassion and compassion will de-
pend upon creation and sufferings consequent on it. Hence
God has no motive for creation.65

The Jainas do not believe in the existence of God. They
are avowed atheists. According to them, the world is eternal
and self-existent. Particular things in the world are created
out of their material causes and dissolved into them. There is
no creation out of nothing. There is no destruction some-
thing. The Phenomena in the world are governed by the law of
casuality subservient to the moral Law of Karman.

But though the Jainas do not believe in God, they be-
lieve in the innate divinity of each soul. Every soul can real-
ize its intrinsic divinity by self-effort. It can realize its infi-
nite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite
power. In this sense Jainism is not atheism. The Jainas wor-
ship Arhats with devotion. They worship also the Siddhas,
Acāryas, Upādhyāyas and Śādhus. They are called five
Parameśṭhins. The Jainas are full of religious fervour in their
worship of the idols of the great souls. They believe in wor-
ship, faith and devotion and recite mantras. They lay stress on
meditation penances and right conduct for the realization of
Innate divinity. But their practical religion consists in tenderness for animal life. They have developed instinctive horror of killing animals and insects. They are scrupulous vegetarians. Jainism forbids killing life, causing life to be killed and approving of killing life. It is a religion of morality without God. It believes in the inexorable Law of Karman.

ETHICAL DISCIPLINE OF JAINAS

Liberation from bondage is the goal of life in the Jaina scheme of values. This process is the exactly the reverse of the process by which it gets into bondage. The process of life consists of two phases, the arrest of the influx of Karman particles (Samvara) and the eradication of the karman particles enveloping the Jīva (Nirjara).

‘Tri-ratna’ (three gems is the means for Liberation. It consists of Samyag Darśana (right faith), Samyag jñāna (right knowledge) samyak carita (right conduct). Of the three, knowledge is central. The Jainas attribute our passions and activity which attract karman to envelope the soul, to ignorance about the real nature of our own soul and the things of the world that generate passion and activity and cause even-
tual entanglement in bondage. Right knowledge (Samyag jñānam) alone can remove ignorance. Right knowledge can be obtained by a careful study of the teachings of Tīrthaṅkaras, who have already attained Liberation. Right knowledge consists in detailed knowledge of all truths.

But their teaching must be approached with the appropriate attitude. The attitude is characterised as Right faith. One must have faith in the teachings of the liberated souls, if one is to obtain Right knowledge, which in turn is to be the basis for Right conduct. Right faith does not mean blind faith. It is a rational and open attitude to truth. It is the minimum will to believe without which no effective study can be began. As one studies more reflects on and gains more knowledge, both faith and knowledge become perfect. They result in kevala jñāna or omniscience.

Right faith and Right knowledge constitute the foundation for Right conduct (Samyak charita). Right conduct is, what helps the soul to get rid of the karmans that lead to bondage. For the arrest of the influx of the new karmans and
the eradication of the existing ones, the following practices are prescribed.

(1) Take the five great vows (Pañca Mahāvrata)

(2) Practice extreme carefulness (Practice in every day speech and movements so as to avoid harming any living being.

(3) Practice restraint of thought, speech and bodily movements

(4) Practice Dharma of ten different kinds namely forgiveness, humility, straight forwardness, truthfulness, cleanliness, self-restraint, austerity (internal and external) Sacrifice, non-attachment and celibacy.

(5) Meditate on the cardinal truths taught regarding the self and the world.

(6) Conquer through fortitude all pains and discomforts that arise on account of the body and,

(7) Attain equanimity, purity, absolute needfulness and perfect conduct.
The five great vows are *ahimsa* (abstinence from all injury to life) *Satyam* (abstinence from falsehood which means not merely speaking what is true but speaking as well as good and pleasant), *asteyam* (abstinence from stealing), *brahmacharyam* (abstinence from self-indulgence and not merely sexual celibacy) and *aparigraha* (abstinence from all attachment).

While the values of these five vows have been recognized and upheld by the *upanisads* and in Buddhism also, the Jainas are the most rigorous in trying to practice them.

NOTES

1. TS.V.30 SS.V.31-32
2. TS, V, 38 & 42, SS, V, 41
3. P. 11-13, 50, TDTV, 11-12
4. TS.P.272, 132
5. TS P.272, 132
6. SDS, St.48.
7. SDS.P.74
8. DSG.P.3, 128-129, 132
9. TS.P.75.105
10. TS P.75-105
11. TS.V.8 15-67
12. TS. 11,11,14-15,24
13. TS. 33-34, TDTV. 90-92
14. DSV. 17-18, TS P 93, TDTV 95-96
15. P. TDTV, 116
16. T Sar - VIII,2,427
17. T Sar - VIII, 20-22, 24-25 & 27
18. TS.5.1-2
19. PS. 2,40
20. TS. 5-6
21. TS 5-18
22. PS.14
23. SS. 5-8
24. BS. 5-7
25. SS.5-12.
26. DS.22
27. SS 312, PSD 2-49
28. PSD. 2-49
29. TDTV, 85-86
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