CHAPTER- III

KASHMIR ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE (WITH REFERENCE TO
ABHINAVAGUPTA)
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Principle of vāk is central to the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. The school explicates every principle metaphysics, ontology, epistemology through the synthesis of language. Although, the nature of language is not necessarily explained in a single form, it is presented as vimarṣa (awareness), as parā vāk (pure non-linguistic thought) and as śakti (power) mainly. Every nomenclature is related to the particular state of language. Parā vāk and vimarṣa are the most fundamental principles in the context of philosophy of language. On the basis of vimarṣa and parā vāk principles, the school prepares the ground for the interface among the language, thought and reality. The relation among the language, thought and reality will be examined through the principle of vāk of Kashmir Śaiva school in this chapter. Regarding this, preference is being given to such issues, which are chief constituents to develop the substructure of vāk. These issues explain epistemology of vāk as well as prepare the foreground to explain the nature of śabda, artha, their relationship and so on. The chapter is devoted to the most fundamental problems- nature of vāk and epistemology of vāk. Epistemology of vāk may be understood by two ways, the first one is the cognitive aspect of parā vāk, which starts with the nirvikalpaka avasthā and the other one is āgama śāstra as the most authentic pramāṇa in the form of the determinate knowledge. The constructive principle parā vāk is the source of the indeterminate and determinate knowledge, while as the pramāṇa she mainly concerns with the determinate knowledge. For this purpose, works of Abhinavagupta is being taken up by preference.

The question is that how does Abhinavagupta develop the theory of vāk? Where does he get the idea from? Or does he borrow the concept of vāk from other schools or
does he get by the teaching of his predecessors? This problem is in itself an open-ended question for the further research. Here, the problem is tried to attain in this way-

1. **THE SOURCES OF VĀK FOR ABHINAVAGUPTA**

The concept of vāk reaches at the height of excellence with the logical arguments throughout the magnificent works of Abhinavagupta. The concept does not only give a recount of philosophy of language, even it opens the door for many research areas, because it is multidimensional concept. The principles, including arguments and methodology of the vāk, are relevant to the aesthetics as well as the concept of sakti is also the source for aesthetic, philosophy of language and philosophy of religion. Getting these entire dimensions, one query comes in mind that what is the source of this multidimensional vāk principle? Is it an original principle which has been developed by Abhinavagupta by himself? Or Abhinavagupta borrows this principle from somewhere else? Or he develops the principle through understanding of the principles which have been flourished in other tradition as well as in his tradition. Thus, inquiry about the sources of vāk, is the essential step for understanding its nature. One thing is undisputable that the principle is not borrowed or taken from outside other than tantric thought. The essence of vāk principle has been rooted already in the earlier texts of Tantra and is fully flourished in the works of Abhinavagupta. The logical explanation comes from his mind, because such logical presentation is not seen in the works of his predecessors. Although, the nomenclatures have similarity with the other Indian Philosophical schools, but the content of these principles are quite unique in the theory of Abhinavagupta. For instance, the theory of sāmanya lakṣaṇa, svalakṣaṇa, kṣaṇa are the same terms which are used in the Buddhist philosophy also, but both systems examine them in a different manner. But, more or less, Abhinavagupta is influenced from other tradition too. At one hand, he gets idea of vāk from the benefactors of his tradition, simultaneously, he is influenced by the other tradition also for the development of vāk principle. These sources within tantric tradition and outside tradition would be-
1. Saiva Upaniṣad and Saivāgama

2. Vedic texts

3. Vākyapadiya

4. Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana.

(a) Āgama (Saiva Upaniṣad and Saivāgama)

The first primary source is itself Saiva Upaniṣads and āgama. Being a Śaivit, he must have inspired by the texts of his own Śaiva tradition which would be his first school. K.C. Pandey gives detailed description about these sources in the first part (Historical) of his book Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study. Accordingly, Dvaita, Dvaitādvaita, Advaita system of Tantras and other schools of Śaiva like Siddhānta Śaiva, Lakulīsa Pāśupata etc. influenced the thought-process of Abhinavagupta. There is the broader and the deeper part of Tantras and their schools give historical and philosophical background to Abhinavagupta. In conjunction with, he intensifies theories of his own school of Kashmir Śaiva. In this manner, all the texts enjoined him in deepening the vision for the enlargement of his thought. It requires a consideration through systematic research.

(b) Veda

Vedas is accepted as the eternal source of knowledge. It is called nigama also. Āgamas and nigamas have same purpose i.e. liberation as both are the eternal source of knowledge. Both are accepted as parallel streams. Both streams have same gradation and authority on subjects. They have same ultimate goals but with different means. However, Vedas also prepare the foreground for Abhinavagupta in the development of his ideas. The vāk sūkta of Ṛgveda influences the thought of Abhinavagupta, because in

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1 See V chapter in 'Historical Background of His Thought' of Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study.

2 Dr. Rajnish Mishra analyzes āgama and nigama in his Ph.D. Thesis: Śaiva Philosophy and Literary theory: An Examination of Abhinavagupta’s Poetics With Special Reference to Tantrāloka.
this sūkta, vāk is also a creative principle. His concept vāk must have found elementary key hypothesis from the concept of female counterpart of the Vedas, like śaci, sarsvati, vāk. The concept of effeminate develops in various manners in the whole Vedic tradition. It takes the form of helpmate that is wife, simply mother of powerful devatā and as individual existent, like vāc. Generally, her maternal feature presents powerful and creative characteristics. When she performs as spouse, she is the helper of her husband. These female mates as the spouse of male devatās, are symbolically would be power of them. All the Vedic gods such as Indra, Agni, Tvāṣṭṛ etc. have certain cosmic powers or functions (III.57.3, III. 31.14, IV.22.8, V.31.6, and X.88.10). Originally, these powers are simply part of the deva’s nature, but in some contexts one begins to connect this power or function to the notion of female consorts of the devatās (I.82, 5, 6) (III.53.4f), (I.22.12) (II.32.8). The notion of śakti or śaci appears to have a close affinity in the function as to the Gnās, the wives or the divine females who accompany devatā, for example- sarsvati, indrāni, varuṇāni, hotrā, āgnāyī etc. (II.32.8, I.33.10, II.31.4, V.46.2). As the power of male devās, these powers function under the supervision of their monogamists. The meaning of śaci is adding the aspect of competence, which is supporting other aspects of female principle as Śakti. Through their etymology, these female counterparts are closely related to each other, both are derived from the root /sak, which means-

1. To be able

2. To have a certain capacity or power to do anything.

Usually in the later Vedic hymns and Brāhmaṇās, these female consorts start playing role in the Vedic mantrās, like in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, VI. 5.4.7. Same way, feminine aspects are presenting the aspect of energy, function or power independently. As a mother, these fertile aspects are free, the most powerful and pervasive. These creative forces that are unifying concepts are named as vāk, just as the masculine creative forces are represented into the form of Puruṣa or Prajāpati. Vāk is the personified creative female and powerful principle of energy according to Rgveda (X.125). In the Brāhmaṇa, vāk is the consort of prajāpati and they created things in a combined way.
She is the mother of all mantras, she is the uttered speech as well as inner thought process of Brahman. On the basis of these female powers, Abhinavagupta would have prepared the concept of vāk where vāk is the sakti of Śiva and the creative principle. Both aspects have been already dealt with in the Nigama tradition.

(c) Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiya

The Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari, entirely devoted to the philosophical domain of language, is the other significant text, which influences Abhinavagupta to the larger extent. Abhinavagupta respects only Bhartṛhari so much, while other grammarians are not welcomed by him. The development of the theory of Bhartṛhari is found in the works of Abhinavagupta and the other Śaiva texts, along with other grammarian successors. Bhartṛhari deals with the chief issues like nature of language, relationship between word and object, theory of semantic through the sphota theory etc. All these issues have been dealt in the treatise of Abhinavagupta more deeply, although Abhinavagupta does not take sphota theory. Without any dispute, most of the experts of this school accept the influence of philosophy of Bhartṛhari on Abhinavagupta. Navajivan Rastogi casts light into the pratyavamarśa which is one of the theories of Kashmir Śaiva. The theory show the influence of Bhartṛhari on Abhinavagupta. Navajivan Rastogi indicates concisely these things in the following way—

The vision, to a great extent, AG inherits from BH. The ideas of word as the creative principle, unity of thought and speech, world of experience constituted by the powers of word as the ultimate principle, speech as the basis and constitutive of the empirical world of purposeful activities, vimarśa and anusandhāna (unification) not only participating in apprehending and communicating but also in ordering and coordinating our universe of discourse (vyavasthā), language in its transcendental aspect transfiguring into religious language par excellence, soteriology of language leading to self-realization and language being the root of our literary, cultural and aesthetic pursuits, all have been taken from BH. Even the major tools and metaphors

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of crystal, of liquid in a peahen’s yolk, vāgyoga, notion of superimposition of the word on meaning (adhyāsa), illustration of rapid reading, rapid movement, stillness, all these are drawn by UTP and AG from BH. Here AG’s contribution is threefold. First, he continues the basic thrust of BH by meeting criticism from Buddhist logicians specially Dignāga, Dharmakirti and Dharmottara viś-a-viś their notion of śabdāna as abhilāpa and apoha in particular, by defending BH against the attack from the realists and also against the dualistic linguistic formulation of Siddhānta Śaivism, second he clarifies vague and doubtful areas as for instance the relationship between word and meaning articulated in the word —penetration doctrine (and the use of expression such as ‘as if’-iva-as in anuviddhamāva), treating meaning as vivarta of word (without being sure as to what it stands for: whether transformation or appearance), freedom of the ultimate principle being coloured by nescience, meaning and the process of pratyavimāra, the ontological status of meaning, and the existence of the transcendent level of language as para-these are, inter alia several areas that demanded a precise formulation. Third, he develops hints and insight which were in incipient stage in BH or were only suggested therein. Here we have a creation of full bodied religious language, depicting reality as constituted by the sacred language (mantraśarīra or śabdārāśi) and its essence as mantra or śabdana, building up a thoroughly structured aesthetics, integrating speech with resonance within the framework of the basic aesthetical formulations, evolving the notion of enjoier (bhoktā) into that of aesthete at the level of both metaphysics as well as art-experience rooted in BH’s formulation of grammatical notion of subject as bhoktā and modulating some of foundational linguistic insights, viz., pronouncing the coeval status of word and meaning and yet synthesizing them into an identity (śabdārtha­sāmarasya) instead of treating meaning as having word as its nature (śabdānātmaka) and not thought as if pierced by or shot with the word, taking word as attribute and meaning as substantive, going in fact to the extent of making either of them give up their designation as attribute or substantive within the process of adhyāsa, visualizing the word and meaning in harmony instead of the Word-principle alone as the supreme reality and finally construing the notion of pratyavamarśa as aham- pratyavamarśa (self-referring affirmation)4.

In this way, Abhinavagupta is greatly influenced by Bhartrhari. He takes many principles from the Vākyapadīya and develops deeply according to his tradition and thought.

(d) Dhvani Theory of Sanskrit Poetics

Another important source, which influences Abhinavagupta, is the theory of rasa and dhvani. According to the Indian tradition of poetics, the excellence or beauty in the work of art has to do with the intensity of certain emotional states aroused in the reader or

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4 Rastogi, Navjivan, “Vāk as Pratyavamarśa: Bhartrhari from Abhinavan Perspective” in ‘Bhartrhari: Language,

Thought and Reality’, P. 325-6.
spectator as a result of his experience of the work of art. Each of us has certain permanent or fundamental feelings which manifest themselves in various combinations in ordinary life. When we are aroused aesthetically, a certain state of consciousness manifests itself and this aesthetics state of consciousness is called rasa. The developed form of rasa is seen as dhvani in Ānandavardhana⁵, which means resonance or suggestibility. The basis of the rasa is dhvani that is suggestiveness, a resonant sensibility which occurs as a result of all great poetry. It is something beyond the conventional meaning of words, although it is revealed or released as a result of conventional expression. In ordinary experience, man speaks from an instrumental, with discursive perspective, in art, one’s consciousness is expanded. Thus, experience goes beyond the discursive and instrumental elements. One resonates and opens oneself to a universal joy through the sādhāraṇikarana. However, the capacity to create such an aesthetic experience by the artist or writer and capacity to enjoy such an experience by the appreciative or responsive reader is discussed usually by the terms pratibhā, bhāvanā, sahṛdaya etc. Pratibhā⁶ is the creative intuition of the poet as well as the intuitive receptivity of the responsive reader. Bhāvanā is the power of producing and refers to the capacity of the poet to create a work of art. Sahṛdaya refers to the imaginative or sensitive reader. All these notions are used synonymously with the term ṣakti. In this context, ṣakti is the creative imagination of the spectator or reader. Ṣakti in this context is still vāk, but not literal word. She is the capacity to create and experience rasa or dhvani, the capacity to evoke or receive a resonating suggestiveness achieved by the word yet transcending the word and the leading to an experience of universal joy or wonder. So, these aesthetic principles throw great impact on the complete realm of Tantra and its philosophy. Accordingly, thought of Abhinavagupta is greatly influenced by the theory of dhvani, pratibhā, sahṛdaya and so on.

⁵ Artho gūṇikṛtāmā gūṇikṛtābhidheyaḥ śabdo vā yatārthāṁtaramabhivyayanakti sa dhvaniriti. teṣu katham tasyāntarbhāvah. Vyāṣya-prādhānāye hi dhvaniḥ. DL.L, com. on 1.13
⁶ Apiṛvavastumāṇakṣamā praṇā. Tasyāḥ viśeṣo
Rasāveśavāsaiṣadyasaundaryakāvīyanāmaṇakṣamatvam. Ibid, com. on 1.6
In this manner, these principles prepare the ground to speculate the vāk with more dimensions and help to developing the theory of vāk.

2. SVARŪPA (ESSENTIAL NATURE) OF PARĀ VĀK

Language as a concept is not restricted with the semantics or semiotics only. It goes beyond this and is extended to the ultimate reality in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. Kashmir Śaiva philosophy may be called linguistic philosophy. Its philosophy of language supports pre-potentiality of language by establishing it as the ontological category. World is nothing but the outcome of its creativity. The creativity is the cause to give birth to the ontological as well as epistemological process. Language and its creativity are defined by the nomenclature vāk or parā vāk in this school. However, for the deeper understanding of vāk principle; one has to pay attention on other appendage concepts also, like śakti, vimarśa, pratyavamarśa, avamarśa and so on, all these principles explain the different dimensions of vāk. Śakti and vimarśa are the most basic concepts which compose different concepts of the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. The term śakti is found in other six philosophical schools with varied meaning, but the deeper aspect of śakti as a metaphysical component, is nowhere rather than in the tantric tradition only. Predecessors of Abhinavagupta like Utpaladeva, Vasugupta and Somānanda have done sufficient annotations in the form of vimarśa, spandana, parā vāk, tattva and others. The crux of these principles helps to develop a theory of vāk in the philosophy of Abhinavagupta with a deeper perspicacity. Particularly the vimarśa śakti, which is the essential nature of the metaphysical tattva Parama Śiva, is the most significant. During the process of ontology and epistemology, the principle is presented as parā vāk. These technical terms and their acts cannot be delineated separately because all of them are related identically. Along with, every principle is overlapping each other. But a particular technical term is more significant in relation to particular function. Following this aspect i.e. particular term in relation to particular act, this is the methodology which has been followed to shape the discussions of this research work so that principles could be examined comprehensively as well as concisely.

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The heart of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy of language lies in vāk principle. Even, the principle is intersecting point for so many theories. It is the quintessence not only for cosmology, but also for liberation. In the form of kāraṇa and kārya, it is the substratum as well as substance for the sṛṣṭi prakriyā. Here, Parama Śiva is also explained in same manner as kāraṇa and kārya by Abhinavagupta, in the context of ābhāsana kriyā. Thus, at these places confusion arises due to the lack of understanding of these theories. The fundamental fact of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is that it is the advaitic by nature. Everything is identical with the metaphysical tattva. Parama Śiva and parā vāk are also identical in essence. Abhinavagupta defines parā vāk as the svarūpa of śiva. So, both can be elaborated in the same manner in accordance with the context. Parama Śiva is the kāraṇa and kārya in ābhāsavāda, which looks in closely the substance and supports mainly externality, while parā vāk is prominently related to the internality through the vimarśa principle.

The striking features of vāk, which is relevant to the philosophy of language of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy, are-

1. Parā vāk is an essential nature of metaphysical Parama Śiva in the form of vimarśa śakti.
2. Parā vāk is an epistemological principle.
3. Parā vāk is an ontological principle, tattva.
4. Mantric nature of Parā vāk (examines issues like, relation between mantra and mantras, nature of śabda, śabda and artha, śabda śakti, svara and vyāṃjana).
5. Parā vāk as āgama or prasiddhi.

All these aspects of parā vāk may be summarized in this way- relation of parā vāk with metaphysical principle, her epistemological and ontological aspects. These aspects may be interpreted by twofold interpretations of parā vāk, which explain the nature of vāk. The twofold definition of vāk is being examined here:

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7 Tasya śivasya, svarūpaṃ parāvāksvabhāvam ātmarūpaṃ----. T.A., com. on 1.90.
1. The definition, which elaborates directly the nature of vāk, such as vakti viśvam abhilapati prayavamarśena iti ca vāk.

2. The elements, which are pretty independent principles, still, are identical with the vāk, like vimarśa as vimarśamayī vāk, śakti as vāk śakti, tattva as parā vāk tattva. Here, identical relationship of these principles is the cause of the various dimensions in parā vāk spontaneously.

(a) Definition of Vāk

Moniar Williams enlists meanings of vāk-speech, voice, talk, language (also of animals), sound (also of inanimate objects as of the stones used for pressing, of a drum etc.), a word, saying, and sentence⁸ etc. All of these meanings are somehow presenting the grosser nature of vāk rather than the nature which is examined in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. The most fundamental features of vāk is defined in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy as vakti viśvam abhilapati prayavamarśena iti ca vāk, means the inner speech is vāk, because of her speaking of (referring to) the universe by means of inner sound in the determinate apprehension⁹. This characteristic becomes more perceptible when aham-principle comes in light. Pratyavamarśa is related to the reflection during the process of srṣṭi prakṛtyā. But, reflection of what? Answer is- reflection of aham, svam̐̑samvedanā, which expands itself into the form of vikalpas. Fundamentally, prakāśa, of which core function is bhāsana, is by nature svarūpamaruṣātmaka (Reflective of Self). The reflecting subject continuously aware for its existence as aham, so it is the self-consciousness. That, which is svarūpa-parāmaruṣana (self-consciousness/awareness), is itself the parā vāk¹⁰. Vāk is so called, because she speaks of the object by superimposing...

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⁸ Moniar Williams, p. 936.
⁹ Ibid, 5
¹⁰ Evam bhāsā svabhāvena svarūpamaruṣātmikā.

Svarūpamaruṣanam yacca tadeva paravāgvupūḥ. PTV., com. on 5-8.
herself on the object through the unification, namely ‘this is this’\(^\text{11}\). The \textit{aham-vimarśa} is embodied with this \textit{vāk}, but this is not determinate. Being creative spontaneously, it is her very nature to appear in the diverse forms of existence, therefore she shines as the cosmos of variegated existence\(^\text{12}\). She never undergoes to the state of dependence. She is not dependent on anything outside itself, then, how, possibility of any impediment can be in it? Therefore, \textit{parāmarśamayī vāk} is devoid of convention, she transcends from all space, time, \textit{kāla}, \textit{māyā}, limitation of space or activity. Her state of being independent is the cause for her perfection. She is the all and yet different from all forms and figures. So, \textit{parā vāk} is characterized by excellent refinement of the pure form of \textit{suddhavidyā}. She is \textit{aham}\(^\text{13}\) in both ways, as \textit{siva} and \textit{sakti}, both as consciousness and her expression as energy. That \textit{aham} itself as \textit{mātrkā}, is the very essential nature of earth etc. in the highest sense, its fluid form is said to be vowel (\textit{bīja}) and solid form of consonant (\textit{yoni}), the very nature of \textit{siva} and \textit{sakti}.

The \textit{vāk} is called \textit{parā vāk} at her highest stage or form or in real nature. The entitlement as \textit{parā vāk} reflects her independency and completeness since the first word \textit{parā} refers to the completeness. It means \textit{vāk} is complete in herself; even she has no dependency on others. \textit{Pratyabhīṣṇāhṛdayam}, the introductory text of \textit{Pratyabhijñā darśana} of Kashmir, elaborates \textit{parā vāk} precisely, accordingly-

\begin{quote}
Now then the \textit{vāk} \textit{sakti} (power of speech) (known as) \textit{parā} (supreme) who is identical with the light of consciousness (i.e. Śiva), who is of the form of great mantra that is eternally sounded, who consists of the consciousness of the perfect ‘I’, who contains within herself (lit. who is pregnant with) the whole assemblage of \textit{saktis} formed by the sounds beginning with ‘a’ and ending with ‘kṣa’, brings into manifestation the sphere of the limited subject or experient
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Vaśyarūpāt śrotagrahyāt sabādānya eva antaravabhāsāmānah saṁvidrūpāvēśaśabdanāṁabhilāpovāgiyanoktah- vakti arham svādhyāśena so yamītyabhisambandhena---. Ibid., com. on 1.6.1}
\item \textit{Tadvicitrasvabhāvatvādvicitraprathāmayam,}
\textit{Prathate pārantrayam hi na jātu bhajate kvacit. Ibid., com. on 5-8.}
\item \textit{Svābhāvikamahāsaṁvītsatsāṁskāraikalakṣaṇam.}
\textit{Suddhavidyātmakam rūpamahamityabhayātmakam. Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
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through the successive phases of paśyantī, madhyamā etc. In this state (of the limited experient) she conceals her real form as parā and produces in the empirical subject (māyā-pramāṇa) ever-new vikalpa-activity every moment which activity brings into view objects that are obscure and particular, and also she presents the stage of avikalpa as veiled by that (vikalpa-activity), though in itself it (the avikalpa stage) is quite pure. In these circumstances, and deluded by the peculiar saktis in the form of ‘ka’ and other consonants which are presided over by Brāhma and other deities, the deluded man helplessly considers the body, praṇās etc. themselves which are limited as the Self.

(In the translation of Jaideva Singh.)

In this prakāraṇa text, nature of parā vāk is defined precisely. All essential characteristics have been examined here. Accordingly, vāk is the sakti and identical with the Parama Śiva. She is avikalpa rūpa.

Kṣemarāja accepts that the non-empirical parā vāk is placed with the parameśvara as identified, although the same fact is supported earlier also like in the Tantrāloka, where she is identified with Parama Śiva as she is the svabhāva of Parama Śiva. The parama pramātā exists in every experients with the same integral nature, but degree of this integrity varies at different stages, in accordance with the amount or measure of the malās and purṇa and apurṇa jñāna. A person is the knower and doer simultaneously. Para samvid is pramātā, who creates differences through its svātantra sakti. The relation between cause and effect is said as the relation between kartā and karma. Caitanya, united state of purṇa jñāna and purṇa kriyā, is supported by the purṇa


\[15\] Parameśvaraḥ paścavidhakṛtyamayaḥ, satatom anugrahāmayyā parārūpayā sāktyā ākrānto vastuto'nugraḥākāta-{ma}va, nahi saktīḥ śivāt bhedamāmarṣayet. PTV., com. on 1 verse.

\[16\] Tasya-śivasya, svarūpaṃ parāvāksvabhāvam ātmārūpaya TTA., com. on 1.90.

\[17\] Saiva ca sakalapramārśamvidadvayamaśyāt satatom eva vartamārūpaya. PTV., com. on verse 1.

\[18\] —parasamvidātma pramātā tāvat bhedendhanadāhakatvādagnih TTA., com. on 4.124.
svātantrya. Only pūrṇa svatantra is the ultimate jñātā and kartā, because only svatnatra kartā as well as jñātā is capable to manifests anything in any form. Parā vāk is not away from these elements since she is the svabhāva of Śiva. Even, svātantra sakti is also none other than parā vāk. The essence of pramāṇa is the cause of creativity of parā vāk. The ontological principle parā vāk is beyond time, space and causality. Human being or empirical world is just an abode for expressing herself through the articulated language. The whole empirical world is nothing but an expression i.e. abhilāpana of parā vāk. However, the articulated language is the closest effect of Parā vāk. Abhinavagupta defines her characteristics thoroughly. These characteristics are- lokānugrahi, vimārṣamayi, paramarśayamayi (at the level of pāśyantī), adesa-kālakalita, amāyiya, śabda śakti, paramārtha svabhāva, asāmketika, akṛtaka, svasaṃvit, paramahāmantra, vīryasṛṣṭirupā. All these characteristics will be examined according to the context.

This non-observational and non-experimental principle cannot be defined within any pragmatic relation. There is no word which is to be signified parā vāk with her essential nature. Putting it another way, parā vāk is out of reach from time, space and causality since she is pārmarthika, amāyiya, akṛtaka and adesa-kālakalita. She is svasaṃvit and paramahāmantra also. She is called paramahāmantra since the concept of mantra is not only limited with the formulas means linguistic and non-linguistic mantras. Principle of mantra is related with the principle of I-Consciousness i.e. aham vīmaṣṭā.

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19 Iha na kīcchidapacetātām bhavati, citikriyā sarvasāmānyarūpā iti. Cetayati iti cetanāḥ pūrṇajñānakriyādvattvam, tadeva ca paramaisvaryaśvabhāvam svātantryamucyate. Ibid, com. on 1.28-9.


22......svasaṃvitiśiddhaḥyaṁ yaiva parāvāgghūmih, saivaṃśyāya-
Sabdaśaktiparamārthasvabhāvasaṃkēṭikākṛtakapāramārthikasanskārasārā, vaktṣyamāṇapanyena
mantra-vīryabhūtānāsacoditā...... PTV., com. on verse 1.
(Detail of this point will be described in the 4th chapter). \( \textit{Vāk} \) possesses multiplicity. The \( \textit{śabdas} \) are the cause of \( \textit{bheda} \). But it is not the real nature because it is also \( \textit{prakāśarūpa} \) like the \( \textit{sukha}, \textit{dukha}, \textit{bandha}, \textit{mokṣa} \) are \( \textit{prakāśa rūpa} \). Abhinavagupta explains it through the example of \( \textit{ghaṭa} \) (pot) and \( \textit{kumbha} \) (pot), which are synonyms, because they refer to the same meaning or object. So they are one in reality\(^{23}\). The externalized elements, which support the multiplicity, is identical (\( \textit{ekārtha} \)) with the \( \textit{parama advayadaśā} \), since all are \( \textit{prakāśa} \) ultimately. \( \textit{Śabda} \) is also \( \textit{eka}^{24} \) (identical with \( \textit{prakāśa} \)), because all \( \textit{śabdas} \) are \( \textit{saṁvedanarūpa} \) in reality. So, all \( \textit{śabdas} \) are \( \textit{saṁvedana rūpa} \) at the \( \textit{parama advayadaśā} \). These \( \textit{śabdas} \) also cannot be accepted as the cause of duality.

All of these constituents enrich her capacity of \( \textit{anugraha} \) (grace) which is pertaining to the most rudimentary nature of the \( \textit{vāk} \), consequently she is \( \textit{anugrahamayi} \). \( \textit{Parā śakti} \) never abandons the nature\(^{25}\) of \( \textit{anugraha} \). Being constant on the nature of \( \textit{anugraha} \), she does other four acts. In this way, \( \textit{parā vāk} \) is entitled to do five type of tasks i.e. \( \textit{pañca-kṛtya- sṛṣṭi}, \textit{sthiti}, \textit{saṁhāra}, \textit{pidhāna} \) and \( \textit{anugraha} \). Fundamentally, these tasks are the most basic division of the most primal actions. But in the context of philosophy of language, \( \textit{sṛṣṭi} \) is the more significant rather than \( \textit{anugraha} \). Other three acts, \( \textit{sthiti}, \textit{saṁhāra} \) and \( \textit{pidhāna} \) are also the part of \( \textit{sṛṣṭi prakriyā} \). She is essence of the phenomenal reality. The text \( \textit{Parāśrīkāvivarana} \), which is completely devoted to the principle of \( \textit{vāk} \), indicates in \( \textit{mangalācharana} \) towards the creativity of \( \textit{parā vāk}^{26} \). Accordingly, she has the capacity to create new

\( \text{Ghaṭa-kumbhavadekārthāḥ śabdāste'peyakevam ca. TA., 2.19.} \)

\( \text{Ityāha 'śabdāste'peyakevam ca' jñātam, ekamiti -saṁvedyamānātvasaṁvedanaevyarthāḥ.} \)

\( \text{Ibid, com. on 2.19.} \)

\( \text{PTV., p.4, com. on 1.} \)

\( \text{Vimalakalīśrayābhivinavāṛṣṭimahā janani,} \)

\( \text{Bharitatanuśca pañcamukhaguptarucirjanakah.} \)

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world through her svātantrya. Following that, the next verse is the attestation of this claim that the existence of the universe is manifested and is shined by the svātmāsamvittim parā vāk^{27}.

Parā vāk is the state of pure awareness as aham-vimarśa that follows absolute unity. Parā vāk is such a place which does not provide optional elements in the form of this (a particular activity), thus (particular form), here (particular space) and now (particular time). It means concept of multiplicity, in her real nature, does not arise. This parā vāk is full of wondrous light, continues pulsation i.e. sphurāṇa. This sphurāṇa (existence with vibration) is the continuous, uninterrupted pulsation of aham, that’s why parā vāk is avicchinnā^{28} (without break). She has so many peculiarities and that can be followed by a special designation of parā vāk as devī. The word devī reveals colorful nature of parā vāk, through the various denotation of div dhātu. Some of them which are relevant to the philosophy of language are below-

1. One meaning of div is- to sports, accordingly, in the succeeding order of creation from paśyantī down to external manifestation like blue etc. Parā vāk sports with the creative delight of her consciousness, so she is called devī^{29}.

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{Tadubhayāmalasphuritabhāvavisargamayam,}

Hṛdayam anuttarāṁtakulam mama samsphuratāt. Ibid, 1.

^{27} Yasyām antarviśvam etai vibhāti
Bāhyābhāsam bhāsamānam visṛṣṭau
Kṣobhe kṣīne' nattarāyām sthitau tām
Vande devim svātmāsamvittim ekām. Ibid, 2.

^{28} Tatra ca, idam, evam, atra, idānim' ityādibhedakalanā na kācit. Tata eva ca, parā vāk-mahāmantrāvīra-visṛṣṭirūpāyā ārambhya vaikhariprasṛtā-bhāvabheda-parāyantam yad iyam svacamākṣatiṃmayā svātmanyeva prakāśanamaye viśramya sphurāti, tad eva sphuritam avichinnatāparamārtham 'aham' iti. Ibid, com. on 1.

^{29} Paśyantyādisṛṣṭikramena bhāhyanīlādiparyantena svāvimarśa- anandātmanā kridanena. Ibid.
2. Other important meaning of div is to carry on the activities of life. The activities of para vāk support her designation as devī since she carries on the activities of life in many innumerable ways of knowledge, memory, doubt, ascertainment etc.30.

3. Shine or irradiate is another meaning of div. Parā vāk shines in the forms of blue etc. which appears everywhere31.

4. Parā vāk has access to all things at any space and time according to her will. This is another reason for addressing her as devī because div dhātu signifies- to go, to have access to32.

5. The fact of question and answer is an ever present reality which is in the first instance i.e. at the level of parā vāk without division. Therefore it is all what is meant to be said. The self is that who is natural state of all existents, who is self-luminous, amusing himself with question-answer, which is not different form himself and in which both the questioner and the answerer are only himself33.

The parā devī is recognized by other names also, triśikā, parā śakti, parābhāṭṭārikā and bhaṭṭārikā parā. The one who controls icchā śakti, jñāna śakti and kriyā śakti is called bhaṭṭārikā parā or parā-bhaṭṭārikā or parā śakti34. The same is called triśikā35 since only


31 Sarvatra ca bhāsamānena nilādura tattādyātmabhāsāsanarupena dyotanena. Ibid.

32 Yathecacham ca deśa-kāla-avacchedena sarvātmakā-gamanena, mukhyato 'bhairavanātahasya' eva devatam īṣyate, tachaktereva bhagavtyā devirupatā. Ibid.

33 Vastu ca prasnaaduttaduttarupam satatoditameva prathamam avibhāgamayam. Tena etāvad eva atra tātparyam- svātmā sarva-bhāva-svabhāvah, svayam prakāśamānah svātmānam eva svāmāvibhinnena prasnaprativacanena praṣṭprativaktvāsvātmamayena ahantayā camatkurvan vimrṣati. Ibid.

34 Abhidheyam 'Triśikā' iti, tīṣṇām śaktānām icchā-jñāna-kriyānām srstādyūdyogādināmāntaranirvācyānāṁ tīśikā tīṣvari, tīśanā ca tīṭvāvāyātirekenaiva bhāvīnti-iti etacchaktibhedatattayottirnā tacchaktyāvibhāgamayā śamvidbhagvati bhaṭṭārikā parā abhidheyam, taddyogādeva ca idamabhidhānam triśikākhyam. Ibid.

35 Tistrah śaktīḥ kāyatī-iti triśikā. Ibid.
she is able to make icchā, jñāna and kriyā sakti as spandanātmaka vimarśarupa. She is called amā, with two explanations. One explanation is based on complete word amā, accordingly, amā is the one who knows (amātiiti)36. In second explanation, amā is broken into two a+mā, wherein a has negative meaning, means avidyamāna and mā means ‘māna’ i.e. both knowledge or jñāna and its absence i.e. ajñāna i.e. who is the ever-present substratum of both. In this manner, she is amā37. Anyway, parā vāk is highly celebrated absolute sakti since all saktis are her different forms. Everything either real or unreal is controlled by parā vāk for their existence. In such wise, this ultimate controller has lots of forms according to heterogeneous and odd acts, accordingly lots of designation she has.

She is dhvani rūpa also. Dhvani is satata-udita because it is the parāmarśa svarūpa of sānvid. The dhvani is called parama hṛdaya38. The svarasodita parama hṛdaya rūpa dhavani is parā vāk. Thus, ultimately parā vāk is the ahamparāmarśatmaka nāda. Aham-parāmarśa is the svabhāva of parā vāk.39 Jayaratha explains svayam as ananyāpekṣa, it means independent, that’s why she is sadodita. So she is udita without any interruption or break-nityāviratena rūpeṇa uditaḥ. Parama means sārabhūta, (essence), mahat means avyabhicarita-svarūpatvād-vyāpakam which is pervasive and stays always (sarvadā) and everywhere (sarvatra), so omnipresent. The hṛdaya means tathārūpa, ukta in sarvasāstra.

(b) Parā Vāk as Tattva

36 Sobhanena āvaitakalankāṅkānakālusaśāśtuṣyena amena paramārthopadesādvyātmanā jñānena, mānām avabhodho yasya svapradāśakarūpataḥ. Amaitiiti amā. Ibid.

37 Amā iti avidyamānam mā mānam niṣedhaśca nityoditavāt sāmkhāraśca yatra nāsti, sā bhagavatām amā iti uccayate. Ibid.

38 Parāmarśasvabhāvatvādetyā yāḥ svayama dhvaniḥ.
Sadoditaḥ sa evoktaḥ paramam hṛdayaḥ mahat. Ta., 4.181.

Saivit Abhinavagupta explains in his texts all the aspects of parā vāk, sometime directly and sometime through the other identical principles. These principles are the evidence of the extended nature of parā vāk. These principles cast light into the different characteristics of vāk, because all are essentials and significant for the integral development of the same principle. All characteristics are the svarūpa of vāk. Abhinavagupta defines svarūpa as, Yacca yena vinā na bhavati tat tāvat svarūpam yathā śīṅśapātvam vyākṣatvasvarūpam. Accordingly, which is related eternally to the particular one, is svarūpa. One of her svarūpa (facets) is tattva rupa. It establishes vāk as ontological principle. The tattva is not an independent category, as are śiva, śakti, vimarsa etc. Nonetheless it is being discussed exclusively because the same stands with the fundamental principles like Parama Śiva, 36 tattvas. That’s why Abhinavagupta defines tattva at many places in his texts. Its extent of scope in this school could be evaluated by establishment of Parama Śiva as parama tattva. Abhinavagupta writes explanatory notes on tattva. The different explanations, which are available in his texts, are as follows:

1. Nanu tanyate sarvam tanu ādi yatra tat tattvam - means the place, wherein the being are getting extension respectively without any interruption, is called tattva.

2. Tananāt vā tat apralayam - The one whose process of expansion has been running until the pralaya (dissolution), is called tattva.

3. Tasya bhāvaḥ iti vā tattvam - the one, is knowable through the senses, is tattva.

4. Tattvam yadvasturūpam syātśvadharmapraṇaṭtaṇam,

   Tattvam vastupadām vyaktam sphaṭamāṁnāyadarśanāt.

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40 P.V, com. on verse 5-8, p. 47.
41 P.S., p. 42
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
Yadacyutam svakād vyṛttāttram cātmavaśam jagat,

Tatamanyena vā na syāttattavam tattvasamtatau.⁴⁴

Essence of these lines are that the one who makes extend all is tat and its para rūpa bhāva is called tattva

5 Tattvam yadvasturūpam syātsvadhamaprakaṭātmakam,

Tattvam vastupadam vyaktam sphaṭamāmnāyadarsanāt.

Yadacyutam svakād vyṛttāttram cātmavaśam jagat,

Tatamanyena vā na syāttattavam tattvasamtatau.⁴⁵

The vastu, who can manifest its dharma or nature, is tattva. The one, who does not abandon its real nature, is tattva. It is the pervading element and resides in itself. It is expanded only by itself.

By virtue of all the interpretations of tattvas, it comes into light that tattvas are real, pervasive elements, which can expand to some extent, although the degree of expansion are not same. It depends on the nature of tattva. The tattva mainly stands for these elements-

1. For Parama Śiva as mūla tattva.
2. For śakti like parā vāk
3. For the 36 tattvas.

⁴⁴ TA., com. on 9.6.

⁴⁵ Tattvam yadvasturūpam syātsvadhamaprakaṭātmakam,

Tattvam vastupadam vyaktam sphaṭamāmnāyadarsanāt.

Yadacyutam svakād vyṛttāttram cātmavaśam jagat,

Tatamanyena vā na syāttattavam tattvasamtatau. Ibid.
Parama Śiva is the mūla tattvā. Ahamātmaka-parāmarśātmaka-nāda is its nature. It experiences its existence into the form of aham which is unconventional eternal sound. This nature of Parama Śiva i.e. nitya udita parāmarśa is called vimarṣa. This very ahamātmaka vimarṣa is called parā vāk tattvā. Parā vāk is aiśvaryarūpa aham parāmarśa that is svaśantra, ananyāpekṣa, most pervasive, present as nitya uccarita in every element. She is called sphurattā and mahā sattā also which is beyond the limit of time and space. Further, thirty-six tattvas like prthivi etc. is called tattva; these types of tattvas have capacity of expanding in many forms, but in limited way. Among all these three categories of tattvas, the first two Parama Śiva and parā vāk, are the rudimentary tattvas. They are the most pervasive tattvas in respect to all, while the groups of 36 tattvas are pervasive in the respect to the empirical world only. Thus, vāk is the pervasive and real element with the capacity of expansion. She extends herself into the form of objective world also. That’s why she is the essence of the entire universe.

(c) Parā Vāk as Śakti

Fundamentally, Tantras have always acute relationship with the concept of śakti. No Tantra can be systematized without this element ever. It is established as required or customary characteristic in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy and Tantra. So, parā vāk also could not be stayed away from this idea. How is it possible that both essential concepts

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46 Yānyuktāni purāṇyamūni vividhairbhedaityadēsvanvītam,
Rūpam bhāti parama prakāśanīvidam devaḥ sa ekaḥ śivaḥ. Ibid, com. on 9.1.

47 Citiḥ prayavamarsātmā parāvāk svarasoditāṁ,
Svaśantryamanukhyam tadaśvaryam paramātmānaḥ.
Sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālavidēsintī,
Saisā sāratayā proktā hṛdayam paramēśthinaḥ. Ibid, com. on 4.181.

48 Tatsvāntaryamāsātpūnāḥ śivapadādābhede vibhāte parama,
would be live separate? They have to be bound within some relation and the relation is that the parā vāk is śakti tattva inwardly. Although, etymologically śakti is derived from śak dhātu which means power, but to become śakti tattva (power), the following essentials are needed:

1. mala-rahita,
2. paravimarsamātra svabhāva
3. Śuddhsvātantra śakti rupa

Śuddhatā and malarahita, the duo marks out to the common element i.e. nirmala, since nirmala is related alike with both. This nairmalyatā is the nature of prakāśa, because of this nairmalyatā, prakāśa is able to ābhāsita through the bimba-pratibimbavāda. It is related to the śakti also. Nairmalyatā has three essential qualities-

1. Never abandoning svaprakāśa i.e. means real nature.
2. It should be nature of abheda always, without division.
3. Have innate capacity to reflect something else like external

If something or someone has these qualities, is acknowledged as nairmalya. But gradation of nairmalyatā does not follow uniformity. That’s why nairmalya is measured on the basis of purest, purer and pure categories. Their most basic classifications are twofold-

1. Mukhya
2. Amukhya

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49 Vīgata 'malaḥ' avacchedakā yasyāstādāśi yā kalā paravimarsaikasvabhāvakartātālakṣā, sā āśryaḥ ālambanam svarūpam yasyāḥ sā śuddhavātantryasaktirūpā. Ibid, com. on 1.1.

50 Śvasminnabhedādbhinnasya darśanakṣamataiva yā, atyaktasvaprakāśasya nairmalyam tadguruditam. Ibid, 3.8.

51 Tadetannaśmalyam mukhyamukhyatayā dviprakāramiti darśayitumāha. Ibid, com. on 3.9.
In the category of mukhya nairmalyatā, only saṁvid falls, it is the svacchattam tattva. Svētantrya is the cause of the nairmalatā which is in tie with saṁvit. Parā vāk also comes in this category. And others are fallen into the category of amukhya since they are nairmalya partially i.e. anśānśika rūpa. Śuddhatā and malinatā cognates are the cause of bimba and pratimbara (the detail discussion of bimba-pratimbara is in chapter IV). Malinatā is the cause of bheda. Bimba has sahiśnutā for the pratimbara-grahaṇa and pratimbara what is pratimbarātmaka. Thus, bimba is competent to get the reflection because it is śuddha (pure) rather than pratimbara. Bimba-pratimbaravāda is the universal relationship. It is the essential theory of ontology, because world and word are divided into bifurcated relationship of bimba and pratimbara. Parā vāk, paśyantī, madhyamā have relation of bimba and pratimbara respectively, but vaikharī is alone pratimbara. So, parā vāk is the bimba for paśyantī pratimbara, paśyantī is bimba in the respect of madhyamā pratimbara and so on. In this manner, bimba-pratimbara is examined deeply in the first chapter of the Tantrāloka in the context of saṁvid while it is discussed in relation to the parā vāk, paśyantī and madhyamā is in the Parātriśkāvivaraṇa.

Other characteristics of śakti are also essentially nature of parā vāk. Śakti is the whole universe and which comes out from śiva. Śiva and śakti are unified (tādātmya), because they cannot stay separate. Thus, parā vāk always abides with abheda nature, without disunity of aham. For disunited elements, like vācyavācaka, viśva, vikalpa, apūrṇa jñāna, none of them stays in distinct form at this place. Same way, this element is absolutely independent as she is sva-prakāśita. She reveals herself, even, has capacity to reveal universe also. No one is either cause of her existence or an agent of her

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52 Tannairmalye ca tatśvētantrameva nimittam-ityāha-vimalam tattadicchayā iti. Ibid, com. on 3.9.
53 Nairmalyam mukhyamakasya saṁvinnāthasya sarvataḥ, anśānśikāḥ kvāpyanyadvimalam tattadicchayā. Ibid, 3.9.
54 Śaktisca śaktimadrāpā vyatirekaṁ na vāhchefati. Tādātmyanayornityam vahnidāhakahayorai. Bpd, 2.
origination. Fundamentally, nature of prakāśana either svā-prakāśana or para-prakāśana is directly related to the nirmalatā, since nirmalatā is the cause of prakāśana. Mukhya nairmalyatā provides the capacity of prakāśana.

(d) **Parā Vāk as Vimarśa**

After  śakti as characteristic, the next one is paravimarśamātrasvabhāva, wherein the term vimarśa is entitled to more than ordinary consideration, since this concept is understood as parent of parā vāk. Fundamentally, vimarśa is vāk. It is the most significant principle to develop the principle of vāk, since vimarśa is śabdarāśisvarūpa (congregation of words) 55. The principle of vāk could have not been actualized in extended form with the omission of vimarśa. Parā vāk is the sphuṭa (distinct) form of vimarśa. Vimarśa is not only the simple characteristic of  śakti but also it boosts up the dynamicistic approach in all respect in every part of Kashmir Śaiva because vimarśa is the kalanātmikā śakti (effectuating power) or kalanā of akula 56. Definition of vimarśa is atra tu parasanvidi yathiva bhāsaḥ tathaiva vyavahāramayo’pi vimarśa 57. Accordingly, things are completely identical with consciousness that is real nature. thus, resting in its real nature is the state of vimarśa, like water in water, flame is in flame. Reflected images are completely excluded from vimarśa. So, if the svarūpa of bhāsa (appearing) would be same in vyavahāra also, in this case it will be vimarśa in parasanvid. Vimarśa is the sva-bhāva’of avabhāsa i.e. prakāśa also as it is said-

_Svabhāvamavabhāsasya vimarśam viduranyathā._

_Prakāśo ’rthoparokto ’pi sphaṭikādijadopamaḥ._

---iti śabdarāśisvarūpa eva ayam akrtaḥ vimarśah. PH., com. on 20th sūtra.  

56 _Kalanātmikā hi vimarśaśaktīḥ._ PTV, com. on verse 5-8, p.n. 58  

57 _Ibid._, com. on verse 5-8, p. 45.
It is akṣṛtrima aham and does srṣṭi, sthiti and sanmhāra. It is the cause of viśvākāra,
viśvaprakāśana and viśvasamhāra\footnote{Vimarśa nāma viśvākāreṇa, viśvaprakāśena viśvasamharaṇena cākṣṛtrīmam-iti visphurāṇam. Pp}.

In this way, vimarśa has so many aspects. That’s why, explanation of the term in
English has been done quite vividly by the contemporary Kashmir Saivit Experts. So,
one has to be careful for all different meanings or interpretations of the same term.
Raffaele Torella indicates into this problem-

Vimarśa has been translated in various ways and there are good reasons for each of them:
‘cogitazione, pensiero’ (Gnoli), ‘prise de conscience’, (Silburn), ‘self-consciousness, freedom,
determinate consciousness’ (Pandey), raiissaisissement infini (Hulin), ‘Betrachtung, Urteil’
(Frauwallner), ‘self-representation’ (Sanderson), ‘prise de conscience active, libre activite de la
Conscience’ (Padoux) etc.. The translation ‘reflective awareness’ that I have generally adopted-
drawn from Matilal 1968a, who however use it to translate anuvyavasāya (also Dyczkowski
uses it frequently)-seemed to me broad enough to be adapted to the different contexts and
meanings in which the term is used. Being neither too precise nor too vague, it permits me not
to disseminate the text of different expressions for the same term\footnote{The Īsvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vytti, Introduction, XXIV.}.

The term is translated quite vividly. All these translated terms are the attempt to define
its various aspects. So, one should be careful with the interpretation and translation of
the term. However, vimarśa is rooted basically in Bhartṛhari’s thought and
Bhartṛhari’s influence on Abhinavagupta has been discussed also in the earlier section
of this chapter. Raffaele Torella’s statement is being given here to support the claim-

Apart from isolated and uncertain cases in the Śaiva scriptural tradition (cf. Dyczkowski
1987:233 n. 10; cf. also ŚD II.83d, 84c) vimarśa, in the pregnant sense Utp. Attributes to it,
cannot but derive from Bhartṛhari’s teaching, especially if we consider its link with light on the
one hand, and the word on the other. Of course, I am referring here to the two very famous and
most quoted stanzas I.131-32 of the VP, whose influence, though extending over the whole

\footnote{TA., com. on 2.32.}

\footnote{Vimarśa nāma viśvākāreṇa, viśvaprakāśena viśvasamharaṇenā cākṣṛtrīmham-iti visphurāṇam. Pp}

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structure of the Pratyabhijñā, we find concentrated in particular on two closely connected aspects. One (IPK 1.5.19) concerns the only way deemed possible to account for a common fact in everyday experience, such as the immediate and seemingly thoughtless action that still achieves its purpose—namely that of affirming the presence of a subtle reflective awareness even within the sensation or movement captured at its most direct and undifferentiated moment. The other aspect regards the two solemn general formulations (1.5.11 and 13) that defines vimarṣa (pratyavamarṣa in the vṛtti) as the essential nature of light (avabhāsa, prakāśa in the vṛtti) and indissolubly link consciousness (citi etc.), reflective awareness (pratyavamarṣa) and the supreme word (parā vāc). 61

Thus, the similarity between the terms and principles are found in both schools. Vimarṣa is also one of those principles. It does not mean that the principle is defined in the same manner as it is defined in the Vākyapadiya. Abhinavagupta defines the principle in his own way.

In Kashmir Śaiva philosophy, Utpaladeva very first mentions this concept in the jñānādhihikāra, fifth āhnikā of Iśvarapratyabhijñāvimarṣiṇī. Thereafter, Abhinavagupta develops the principle of vimarṣa. Vimarṣa can be discussed in two ways, at one side it is the svabhāva of prakāśa, other side it is the parā vāk. Both aspects are interrelated. Fundamentally prakāśa and vimarṣa is the single unit. Twosome is the inseparable facets of single entity, wherein prakāśa is the substance or existents or consciousness or subject and vimarṣa is the consciousness of this substance or existents or consciousness. Prakāśa is identified with satya, which is the jīvāna (life) of viśva. Jīvāna is nothing but sphurāta 62 (existence with vibration). So is prakāśa defined- Viśvasya jīvitam satyam prakāśaikātmakaścā saḥ 63. Paramesvara is the prakāśātmā and vimarṣa is the svabhāva of prakāśa 64. Even, it is the mukhya svabhāva of prakāśa 65. Here, svabhāva term indicates towards ananyāpekṣitā, avyabhicāraṇīyatā and svātma-mātraviśrānti. So,

61 Ibid.

62 Pārmārthikam jīvitam-sphurattātmakatvena anuprāṇakam, nahi tena vinā kiñciddaśam prakāśate, ityuktam, 'prakāśaikātmakaścā' iti— TA., com. on 2.32.

63 Ibid, 2.30.

64 Iha khalu paramesvaram prakāśātmā, prakāśaśca vimarṣasvabhāvaḥ. Pp.

65 Svātantryam hi vimarṣa ityucyate, sa cāsyas mukhyāḥ svabhāvaḥ—. TA., com. on 3.65.
prakāśa is independent in each context, either for its existence, its self-experience or its prakāśa, ābhāśa and so on, because vimarśa is the sāmartya of prakāśa. It infuses kartrṛtā in prakāśa. Four types of kartrṛtā are possible in prakāśa svātma-camatkāra, svātma-parāmarśana, svātma-prakāśana and aparicchinnatayā bhāsana. All of these related to ānanda, svarūpa-bodha, jñāna-kriyā svātantrya and avicchinnamon bhāsamānatā respectively. Every type of experience is occurred in the form of ahamvimarśa. The aham-vimarśa signifies mātra-svarūpa vimarśa. It means, I- the universal experience is its nature, which does not bear conventionality. It is samkettottṛṇa āntarābhilāpāna. It is presenting the sattā in relation to the bhavana-kriyā kartrṛtā. Bhavana-kriyā kartrṛtā is the samvedanarūpatā as the nature of reality as well as it is presenting the kartrṛtā rūpa of aham-vimarśa. The kartā is responsible for the manifestation of idam. The ahambhāva of vimarśa is presented into vākrūpatā or śabdana.

Anyhow, united principle prakāśa and vimarśa is the most basic characteristic of any living being, because the conscious and its consciousness cannot live separately. Apart to vimarśa, consciousness would be just like one who does exist but not aware for his existence, it means inertness dominates. The effect, brought about by this inertness, is that no capability of functioning would be stay anymore. So, denying dynamism would be like refuting the universe. In terms of philosophy of language, symbolically both of them are explained in this way that prakāśa is the śabda and vimarśa is the artha. Since the śabda and artha has eternal relationship, likewise, prakāśa-vimarśa has eternal relation. Put it in reverse order, śabda and artha are unified principle so are the prakāśa and vimarśa. In spite of the eternal unity of both principles, the prakāśa is placed as the more significant in the view of the metaphysical element, which is supposed to be a subject, parama pramātā. At this point, prakāśa is also acknowledged as prakāśaka of pramātā. In this manner, with the purpose of explanation, one can say that prakāśa is

66...........tathābhūto 'pyasau prakāśo vimarśarupatāṁ vinā nārthasya ātmano vā prakāśarūpatāyāṁ pratiśṭhāpdatam syāt, nahi prakāśah ityevāsau svaparātmanoh pratiśṭhāpako bhavet, evam hi nīlamapi ityeva kṛtvā tathā syāt. Tasmāsve paraprakāśakatāśidhau tasyāpi aham parāmarśātmā jīvītabhūtaḥ prakāśo 'bhupagamanīyoyena sarvam Siddhyet. Yaduktam- 'Prakāśasyātmaviśrāntirahambhāvo hi kṛtiṣṭaḥ' iti. TA., com on 1.55.
closer to the pramātā, although denotatively prakāśa and vimarśa cannot be measured in any degree of comparative or superlative. Sabda is the governing element in comparison to the artha. Nāda or dhvani (detail is in 4th chapter) always exists without any interruption, while artha is not necessarily in appearing stage as sometime it appears, sometimes stays in the hidden form. The murmuring sound has meaning, but it is not distinct, because it is hidden in that sound.

Now, the next problem is that how is vimarśa accepted as the consciousness of subject prakāśa? And in what way, its particular aspect reveals the door for the issues of philosophy of language? What are the issues, with which it deals? To enquiring all these questions, the nature of sanvedanā or awareness of the vimarśa has to consider. The sanvedanā is the most basic awareness or experience, since it is ‘having conscious’ for own existence without interruption or without help of the others. If something or someone exists, then this fundamental consciousness must have to be there. This sanvedanā is necessary to be having actual being, that’s why it is the source of everything. So, the most basic ingredient for the existence is experiencing own existence in the form of aham. The aham sanvedanā is identical with vimarśa, so that technically, it is said aham vimarśa as well as aham parāmarśa. Fundamentally, vimarśa is sanvedana and sanvedana is experienced by the sabdana. The term aham vimarśa defines the state of pure awareness only, while aham parāmarśa or ahamparāmarśātmā is the svabhāvabhūta dharma or jīvanabhūta ātmā of prakāśa, it is related to ontological process. So, parāmarśa has nothing to do with the association of words, but constitutes the intrinsic nature of knowledge, jñāna. Actually, prakāśa casts light into the mere existence or substance exclusively, which cannot be the subject

67 Sa eva ca ‘prakāśa eva prakāśah pramātā’ iti nityā parapramātṛprāh paraśvaraḥ śiva iti yukta muktam jñeyasya ca param tattvam yaḥ prakāśātmakaḥ sivah iti. Ibid, com. on 1.54.

68 Tatra yāvat kīcīt sanvedyete, tasya sanvedana eva svarūpam, tasyāpi antarmukhavimarśaṁayāḥ pramātāraḥ tattvam. PH., com. on 20 sūtra.

69 Āryadharmakīrttevampriyāḥ prthakpratiprakāśaparigamati ca iti utkam prak—the ṭathā hī na atra samayāyaśayojanaṁ ukktā yato vikalpatā āpataḥ, apita vimarśarūpataḥ bodhasya naisargikī—ityāśayena āha sūtram. IPV. II, 174.
without vimarśa. For example, colors like blue and yellow cannot replace each other in the sense of their višeṣa or peculiarities, which are blueness and yellowness. But if their peculiarities supposed to be excluded from their own form, in this case, only one thing would be remain and that is mere existence or prakāśarūpata. So, in the absence of peculiarities, mere existent is supposed to be non-exist, because in this state, they cannot be called colors anymore. Thus, these peculiarities are related to the vimarśa.

Even though, svātma prakāśarūpa is the svātantrya-paraprakāśaka so it is independent for its own existence as well as it is the cause of manifestation of 36 tattvas. Still, the prakāśa needs vimarśa since it cannot establish its own existence because it is not pratiṣṭhāpaka (establisher). It means being a prakāśamātra cannot supply the power of pratiṣṭhāpaka. Without pratiṣṭhā, ‘blue is blue’- it cannot be known. That’s why it needs ahamparāmarśātma rūpa jīvana for abhyupagamana. Thus, vimarśa supports the sva-samvedanā, the most basic experience. This experience is certification in itself that language is preceded by the thought. Thought paves the way for the development of language. It does not mean that language is separate from thought, unlike to that, language and thought have eternal relationship. They are one in essence, but thought must proceed to shape the language.

However, prakāśa is the cause of the ābhāsana (manifesting, illuminating), likewise, vimarśa is the cause of vimarśana kriyā. The vimarśa involves into the number of transformations. Navjivan Rastogi elaborates these transformations of vimarśa, which paves the way for further diligent and systematic enquiry in vimarśa-

In the realm of language vimarśana emerges as śabdana, in analyzing art-experience vimarśana is transformed into camatkaraṇa and pratibhā both as the underlying process and the end-result, in aesthetics and metaphysics vimarśana figures as kalana to explain the creativity of the artist and by implication that of the supreme artist i.e. Śiva-the actor, the dancer Param Śiva excellence, in ritualistic and cosmogonic contexts vimarśana serves as visarjana, in epistemological analysis it

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70 Prakāśasya ca svaparaprakāśakatvāt. Tā., com. on 1.55.

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continues to remain as vimarșãna, and in ritualistic, religious as well as soteriological context is reckoned as mantra.\textsuperscript{71}

In this manner, concept of vimarșã has multidimensional approach, because of its different characteristics. These characteristics are interrelated. Thus, all is significant to the philosophy of language.

This vimarșã is related to the āmarșãna/bodha of sarva (all). It is said that viśvātmărūpa caitanțya is the mirror for all. Everything reflects in its surface. Bodha is capable to reflect (parāmarșã) at its surface through the vimarșã śakti\textsuperscript{72}. This vimarșã (āmarșã) is not sāmketika (conventional), she is svarasodita-parā vāk\textsuperscript{73}.

Vimarșã is the thought form. It is inevitable for the indeterminate and determinate knowledge. How does thought proceed to shape the knowledge or language? To get the answer, parāmarșã and pratyavamarșã is considerable, which are the different forms of vimarșã. The core act of pure saṁvedita rūpa vimarșã is avabhāsa, which is intended for doing universal acts like avabhāsa of cid, jñāna and srṣṭi. On this wise, principles like parāmarșã, pratyavamarșã, āmarșã are close to the avabhāsa. Vimarșã, pratyavamarșã, āmarșã, avamarșã are quite inter-related since these connatural elements share same dhātu mṛṣa at derivational level. So, is mṛṣ dhātu belongs equally to entire group of the concept of vimarșã. It means to touch, handle\textsuperscript{74}.


\textsuperscript{72} Antarvibhāti sakalam jagadātmanītha,
yadvadvitiraracanā makurāntarālē.

\textit{Bodhaḥ punarnijavimarṣanāsāravṛtyā,}
\textit{viśvam parāmrśati no makurastathā tu. TA., 3.65.}

\textsuperscript{73} Sa cāyamārśio na sāmketikāḥ, apitū citsvabhāvatātmātrāntarīyakāḥ svarasoditaḥ parāvāgrūpāḥ. \textit{Ibid.}, com. on 3.65.

\textsuperscript{74} Dhātupāṭha, mṛṣa āmarṣane. Āmarṣanam sparṣah.
The same *dhatu* is described by *Vrsabha* in *Vrtti* in this way that touch that rendering the form of word as an object of grasping which is not possible in the absence of the word. To understand the contextual meaning of touch, we can take the help of vision of Bhartrhari in the words of Navjivan Rastogi, accordingly—

When a user wants to utter a word he has to know its form clearly and for this his mind concentrates on it by isolating it from the existing mass of other words. He tries to touch all of them, though he cannot. Similarly, listener too grasps the form of word because of his habitual concentration of the understanding of meaning.\(^7^5\) This description of *mṛś dhatu* always does make sure one fact that *vimarśa*, *parāmarśa* must support awareness either pure awareness or awareness with determinacy. Raffaele Torella examines the term *vimarśa*, ‘vimarśa is accompanied by a series of terms deriving from the same root with different preverbs (parā, pratyaya, ava, ā). A differentiation between them might be attempted by identifying a more intimate and analytic element in *vimarśa*, a more instantaneous and indefinite element in *parāmarśa*, one more characterized by introjection and return to the subject in *pratyavmarśa*. However the close reading of the texts of this school indicates that, even if these different nuances are in principle are unfounded, they are largely used as interchangeable terms. Another important notion, closely connected with *vimarśa* and probably first introduced by Utp.-is that of *camatkāra* ‘astonished, wondrous, savouring. It could be defined as a *vimarśa* enriched with a strong aesthetic connotation.\(^7^6\)

In this way, meaning of *mṛś dhatu* is significant to understand the functional aspect of *vimarśa*. Other terms, which are different forms of *vimarśa* like *parāmarśa*, *pratyavamarśa* is also derived from the same *dhatu*.

*Pratyavamarśa* is the essence of knowledge. The knowledge made of the relation of words and thought. Thought is dependent on the word to express. The knowledge, made of word and thought, is dependent on subject’s reflectivity and thereby eliminates passivity of language which is now enlivened by the agential participation. Knowledge illumines itself and others. It has capacity to assume the form of reflected image. It receives reflection as well as it knows that it is receiving reflection. Now this capacity of being aware, of consciously apperceiving, responding

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76 The *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* of Utpaladeva with the Author’s *Vrtti*, *Introduction*, XXIV.
and reacting is known as pratyavamarsa. According to Utpaladeva, light is secondary nature consists in its purity or translucence (nairmalya or svacchātā) but has nothing to do with non-insentience (jādya). The primary essence consists in reflection or in being reflective aware. This is what the term pratyavamarsa stands for. It means, not only is reflection important, but reflection with judgment is important. Pratyavamarsa constitutes the primary nature of knowledge. Since such a conscious apperception is not possible without being grounded in the conscious subject, it is identified with the subjective reflectivity transfiguring consciousness into I-consciousness, distinguishing the sentient from the insentient, who is incapable of conscious apperception.

The Ahampratyavamarsa is the svātāntrya śakti of Parama Śiva. It contains subordinate factors like nityatā, vibhutva, viśvākṛtī dharma in itself. Pratyavantrasātmā is the parā samvit. This very pratyavantrasātmā parā samvit appears as pramate, prameya and pramāṇa. Pratyavamarsa is related to the prakāśa aspect also. In the commentary of 1.66 of Tantraloka, it is said as the svabhāvabhūta dharma of prakāśa. Pratyavamarsa of prakāśa is the self-dependency i.e. nāpeksā for svapraKaśana and parapraKaśana because it does not desire or need of any second element or agent for prakāśa. The parāmarśa is added into the same notion as parāmarśaraupiniś samvid, appears as antar-bhāhya. So, the parāmarśa is ahamātaka nāda as well as sphuritva

77 Prakāśasya asaṅgaśasya tata eva akārdiprakāśaṇilakaṇasasya parasārūpyam pratibimbāyamānapararatādāmyakṣamataṃ svabhāvāntaram yatastena vapaṣā ghaṭāderbodho viśisyate, tathāpi na tat mukhyam jade̐pi manimukuraṇaprabhaṭau tasya sambhavāt, vimarṣastu jade na sambhavati iti ananyavisayatvāt sa mukhya āmeti uktam. IPVVII, p. 177.

78 Ata evāya svātāntryarūpaṃ tattadvaśakāldyavabhāvāsahasrātāssanāmartham svātāntaryānā eva svabhiivabhūta dharmaṃ svabhāvantāyaṃ tattāddeva kāraṇam prajñāpāyaṃ pratiṣñānaṃ iti. Ibid.

79 Eṣā-pratyavantrasātmā parā samvit, svamāhātmyādayanturbhāyobhayātmanā pramātrprameyādirūpātya svāmānabhavabhāṣya sthitāpi. Ibid, com. on 4.147.

80 Aṣṭa khalu eka evāyaḥ ahampratyavantrasākhyo hi svabhāvabhitā dharmaḥ sti, yoḥ sarvam vibhuvādīdharmajñāyamāṣcīpya. Aṭrāyamārthaḥ-ayam hi nāma prakāśasya ahampratyavantrasa ucyate yadayam svisyā pariṣṇam vā prakāśane paraṃ nāpeksate iti. TA., com. on 1.66.


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rupa i.e. viśva. Viśva, a number of times, signifies the empirical wavering world which possesses knowable, knower and known as separate entities. Viśva is defined- viśvasya-cetanācetanātmanāḥ sarvasya. Sphuṣṭa in the form of viśva is called ‘parāmarṣa’ of Parama Śiva. Śabdārāśimaya-pūrṇāhantā-parāmarṣa-sāra viṃśarṣātmā Parama Śiva is manifested in the form of 36 tattvas. The term aham, either way, staying with pratyavamarṣa or parāmarṣa, stands for the viṃśarṣa aspect.

Viṃśarṣa is called pratibhā also. It is related to the saṁvit who is pramātā also and becomes pratibhā. Pratibhā covers everything either kramatā or akramatā in herself. Objectivity is secondary in pratibhā. Pratibhā is pramātrpradhāna vyāpāra. She signifies sarvabhāva-sāmarthya, that's why she is said navaṇavaṃsaśālini' prajna. In Kāvyasastra, the concept of pratibhā is significant. Pratibhā is the intuition, through which the meaning of words and sentences is grasped. It is due to the capacity which is innate in all human beings. It is the power which is related to the parā vāk, the very substance of everything. Parā vāk is also said pratibhā, who is defined by these characteristics also- ananyāpeksitā, parā, devi, anuttarā. According to Abhinavgupta, she is the cause of the viśva. In the commentary, Jayaratha explains anuttara as-niratiṣayavātantryaśvaryacakamkāramayāmīyantarhaḥ. It means anuttara is niratiṣayi, svātantryamayi, aśvaryamayi, camatkāramayi. This anuttara is ananta-sakti-
vrātollekhaśālīnī. All parāmarśa is done by her. Svātmatrya is called vimarśa. All-inclusive vimarśa is capable to perform all actions with these principles because she is akṛtrima and malarahita. She is akṛtrima due to the fact that her existence is spontaneous i.e. udita. She is mala rahita on the ground of freeness from idam i.e. duality. She is addressed by these names also-cit, caitanyam, svarasoditaparāvāk, svātantryam, paramātmāna mukhya aiśvarya, kartṛtvam, sphurattā, sāra, hṛdaya, spanda etc.

Vimarśa śakti is related to other two principles which are also involved in the manifestation of universe. The duo accelerates vimarśa śakti with a view to obtaining creativity. These two principles are:

1. Group of śaktis.
2. Svātantrya śakti or icchā śakti.

(e) **Group of Śaktis**

There are different groups of śaktis-

1. Group of icchā, jñāna and kriyā
2. Group of cit, ānanda, icchā, jñāna and kriyā.
3. Group of jñāna and kriyā.

The trinity of the icchā, jñāna and kriyā śakti is the inherent nature of vimarśa śakti. Any action is accomplished, passing through mechanism of this trinity, because the very first one wishes or intends, at the second step, the same person comes to know and at last, executes and find its object, whatever is desirable for him. Jñāna and kriyā are
two facets of one element because jñāna is also mode of action. Each activity is kriyā, that’s why kriyā śakti is accepted as primary śakti of Parama Śiva. Ultimately, kriyā is extremity or parākāśṭhā of jñāna\(^92\). On account of this, kriyā śakti is called essential śakti of Parama Śiva. Even, ultimate reality is parama pramātā i.e. the ultimate knower. The principles of entire Kashmir Śaiva system is cohered naturally with the identical relation of knowability and doer-ship, wherein vāk comes spontaneously. The course of icchā, jñāna and kriyā śakti collectively constitutes the structure on logical ground for the process of any type of action either manifesting the world or revealing the knowledge at any level\(^93\).

These śaktis can be explained by the subtler division as the group of five śaktis—cit, ānanda, icchā, jñāna and kriyā. Accordingly, at the time of the knowledge of an object, such as jar etc. icchā, jñāna, kriyā, ānanda, cit are present. One knows the jar—this indicates kriyā śakti. Knowing—this fact indicates jñāna śakti and but for the jñāna, icchā must be there, because without icchā, no act is possible. As soon as a thing has been known, the interest towards that thing is diminished, which is called nivṛtti (abstention) from that thing. But this is not possible without the experience of ānanda (nivṛtti). Ultimately, knowledge is not possible without cit\(^94\). Thus, the group of five śaktis

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\(^92\) Yato nānyā kriyā nāma jñānameva hi tattathā, Rūdheryogatātām prāptamiti śrīgamaśāsane. TA., 1.150.


\(^94\) Ghaṭādigrahakale’pi ghaṭam jānāti sā kriyā. Jānāti jñānamatraiva nirucchāvedanakṣatiḥ. Aunmukhyābhāvastasya nirvṛttnirvṛtā vinā.

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are interlinked, which follow systematic continuance. The root is cit and the ultimate destination is kriyā.

There is other group of two sakti, jñāna and kriyā, which is supposed to be same act. The sakti of jñāna and kriyā constitute the very life of the sentient beings and the being of the insentient depends entirely on the sentient. Through the sense of speech and the language, one gets access to one’s sentiency. In the absence of this, one is supposed to be dead or senseless, because speech urges and engages us in our pragmatic pursuits and constitutes our practical life. These faculties of jñāna and kriyā are the practical or the more concrete manifestations of consciousness. Thus, Abhinavagupta enlarges the ambit of kārikā of Bhartrhari because the life of the sentient is not self-confined, it touches and enlivens the life of even the insentient objects with which one deals and interacts making life an ordered whole. Jñāna-kriyā is the jīvāna of bhūta. Kriyā sakti and icchā sakti is called cause of this world in different contexts. These saktis are the different forms of parā vāk

(f) Svātantrya Śakti

The principle of all-encompassing svātantrya sakti, is another mattering much source for accelerating the creativity. The sakti is the most pervasive sakti because it is the integrated form of all saktis. The all-inclusive svātantrya sakti contains the unified aspect of prakāśa and vimarśa. She is translated in English as free will which brings about the objectification of its ideation. Svatantrya is the main characteristic of svātantrya sakti. Ananyanirapekṣatā (absolute independency), ātmaviśrānti (resting in itself completely), sarvakartrśāmarthya (omnipotent) and aiśvarya (bliss) are the

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Dveṣye pravartate naiva na ca vetti vinā citim. PTV., com. on 5-8, p.n. 62.

95 Bahirapitu yat viśeṣavṛttiirupaṃ vacanādānādi----tena vāgādiāvāreṇa tādāmyāpannaṁāntaramāpi jīvanam pratyakṣatvenaiva abhimanyate. IPVV, p.n. 100.

96 Jñānam kriyā ca bhūtanām jīvatām jīvanam matam. PTV., com. on verse 1, p. 9.

97 Vastutaḥ sarvabhāvanāḥ kartesānaḥ paraḥ śivaḥ——. TA., 9.8.
constituents of svātantrya śakti. She subsumes all śaktis, so she is the most essential śakti of Parama Śiva.

The certain way, ever present reality Parama Śiva performs its activity of appearance i.e. ābhāsana kriyā through the svātantrya śakti. Although these appeared realities are not separated from the reality in essence, but the appearance of objective is possible only because of svātantrya śakti. With regard to this ultimate task, svātantrya śakti is the most obligatory śakti and is the cause of multiplicity (vicitratā) of the world. Svātantrya śakti is not influenced or controlled by others in matter of sustaining, conducting or acting. She exists and functions as an absolutely independent organism. She is the cause of prakāśana of sva and parā vāk as well as potency to bring about anything without any effort. The transcendental śakti is outside the limit of time, space and causality. Fundamentally, svātantrya is the svabhāva of Parama Śiva, called as citi also. This is the exposition of svātantryavāda. The same is addressed as parā vāk in Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā.

Thus, all śaktis show colorful traits of one śakti, which can be addressed by any name among these-icchā, jñāna, kriyā, vīmārśa, svātantrya, citi. These colorful śaktis open the door for the possibility of further research in different areas, like in aesthetics, study of mind in cognitive science. In essence, parā vāk is one of the facets of these śaktis. The proficient parā vāk principle is duly self-equipped for ābhāsana and

98 Ṣā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣaṁi, Saśśā sārataye proktā hṛdayam paramēṣṭhināḥ. IPV., 207-8.
99 Sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣaṁi, Iḥāḍvayanaye hi bhagavāneva svavśātantryamāhātmyāt abhāṣamātrasārataye svāvyatiriktaṁapi vyatiriktatveneva jagat ābhāṣayaṁ ity anvāpekṣṣiṁah svātantryasyaiva jagadvicītyanīmmattatvamuktam---Ibid, cōm. on 1.1.
100 Tasmādātanopahāvanīyāḥ prakāśavimarśātma svavśātantryāḥ paramāśīvō bhagavān svātantryādeva rudrādiṣṭavārāntapramāntṛupatayā nīlāśūkhipramyārūpatayā ca anatiriktyāpi atiriktyāy eva svarūpānācchādikayā svamirūpāpanāntariyākasvātantryāmachīṁna prakāśata iti avam svātantryavādāh pramūlitaṁ. IPV, pt. 1, p.9.
vimarsana of the ontological categories. In this manner, para vāk, who includes conglomerated features, is the foreground for the ontological and epistemological process through releasing capabilities in the form of vimāraṇa, svātīnātrya, icchā, jñāna and so on.

In this manner, the described elements are sufficient to establish the efficiency of para vāk. The actions of para vāk can be bifurcated into twofold-

1. Process of knowledge

Along with, the liberation which comes under the anugraha is also quite paramount act. But, in the context of this thesis, the aforesaid theories are more relevant. The process of knowledge builds the foundation for the ontological function. The internal becomes external when it comes outward. The very first internal reality is sub-structured by the vimarsana kriyā, thereafter, the external reality is manifested. The external reflection or manifestation is related to the ontology. That is the reason that this chapter is going to start with the epistemology of vāk. Thereafter, the ontology of vāk will be discussed in the next chapter.

3. PARA VĀK: EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES

By and large, the epistemology deals with issues of knowledge under the triad relationship between pramāṇa, prameya and pramātā. Kashmir Śaiva philosophy also accepts this triad relationship at the level of linguistic world, but it is so much prone to the pramātā, the Knower. The philosophy accepts only pramatā as real. The school keeps engaging itself into the structuring of pramātā. The theoretical reason behind the supremacy of pramātā would be the establishment of ultimate consciousness as ultimate knower, the parama pramātā. Anyway, Abhinavagupta has been recognizing the interior elements more valid. Like prakāśa, vimarsa, para vāk, Caitanya, saktis, jñāna, every principle is fundamentally internal. Whatever is external are the appearances of these
internal ones. The interior world is independent rather than the outer world. Still, every world either interior or outer is appearance of parā vāk. In the view of interiority of pramātā, pramāṇa and prameya, only pramātā is internal and real. The pramātā is made of prakāśa and vimarśa. It experiences its existence in the form of ‘aham’. This aham is the pūrṇa jñāna. It gets life mainly from the vimarśana, because jñāna is saṁvedana rūpa in real form and unified form of existence and experience of existence. The chain of knowledge, which is made of pūrṇa and apūrṇa jñāna, is driven by the parā vāk. In this manner, theory of knowledge of parā vāk keeps concern with the pramātā and pūrṇa and apūrṇa jñāna. Pūrṇa and apūrṇa jñāna is called by another names as nirvikalpa or avikalpa and savikalpa respectively. All these elements support to the building the linguistic knowledge to shape the outer world according to capacity of the knower. In the same manner, world is established with the relation of signifier and signified. Signifier is the internal element while signified is the external one. Parā vāk’s epistemology is absolutely dependent on internal cognition through vimarśana and parāmarśana. Here internal reality establishes its relation with external world by abhāsana kriya.

Epistemology of Kashmir Śaiva depends on the vāk. It is completely structured by internal elements, deals with issues like nature of knowledge, appearance of complete knowledge as incomplete, relation of knowledge with world, relation of thought and language with knowledge. Parā, paśyanti, madhyamā, vaikhari are stages of the emerging of the knowledge.

Before setting out the theory of knowledge, there is necessity to casting light into those issues, which help to prepare the foreground for the theory of knowledge of vāk. These issues are-

(a) **Rejection of the Independent Status of Pramāṇa-Mimāṃsā**

Epistemology of vāk is not dealt with the common constituents of pramāṇa-mimāṃsā i.e. pramāṇa, prameya and pramātā, like empiricist Nyāya does. It does not mean that Kashmir Śaiva does not accept the relation of pramātā, pramāṇa and prameya. The school itself accepts three pramāṇas-pratyakṣa, anumāṇa and āgama. Abhinavagupta
examines deeply these pramāṇas in his text Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśini. So, there is no intention of denying the significance of pramāṇas. But these pramāṇas are limited to the vikalpakatā (determinacy) only, while epistemology of parā vāk starts with the nirvikalpakatā (indeterminacy). The nirvikalpakatā is beyond to the triad relation of knower, knowable and means of knowledge. It is related to the pramāṭā only because pramāṭā is eternal and the most fundamental reality. Thus, pramāṭā and nirvikalpakatā are not separate principles. Nirvikalpakatā is pūrṇa jñāna i.e. aham vināśa, which is beyond to the triadic relationship. That is the reason that alike to Advaita Vedānta, entire Kashmir Šaiva tradition accepts inaccessibility of jñāna of reality through the pramāṇas. Abhinavagupta presents a celebrated kārika through the discussion in his texts to show the inaccessibility of reality by pramāṇas. Thus, Šaivite does not talk over on the pramāṇas in their epistemological considerations in the terms of pūrṇa jñāna or avikalpa jñāna. Fundamentally, the school accepts the validity of internal reality. The outer world is valid but only as an appearance of ultimate reality. Accordingly, prakāśa is the only tattva i.e. the real nature of any vastu, either bhāvātmaka or abhāvātmaka. It is anapahvanīya since real nature cannot be demolished ever. So no pramāṇa is able to reveal the real nature, which is already prakāśita (revealed). It is well accepted that pramāṇa is meant to reveal the unrevealed truth that is apūrvārtha viśaya, anadhigata viśaya, while the one and only reality conscious knower is already known. Since the beginning of the srṣṭi, para pramāṭā exists, so it is ādyasiddha. In this case, which pramāṇa may be able to become its ‘means’? Thus, the pramāṇas is not as useful for the

102 Svapadā svaśīrāścāyām yadvallanghatumīhate.

Pādoddeśe śīro na syāttatheyam baindavi kalā. PH., com. on sūtra 1.

103 Jñeyasya hi param tattvam yāḥ prakāśātmakah śivah.

Nahyapra-parśarāpasya prakāśyam vastutāpi vā. TA., 1.52.

104 Apūrvārthaviśayam khalu pramāṇam. Yadāhuḥ

‘Anadhigataviśayam pramāṇamajñātārthapraṇās vā’ iti. Ibid, com. on 1.54.

105 Vastūnām jñāttajñānaṁjñeyyāmanām ‘ādyam’ ādyasiddhatvāt----. Ibid, com. on 1.57.
internal reality of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy as it is useful to external world\(^{106}\). The level of complete knowledge and reality Kashmir Śaiva philosophy discusses, prepares the foreground of the *pramāṇas* of next level. This is the reason that the number of *pramāṇas* has not been included in epistemology of *parā vāk*. Epistemology of *parā vāk* includes the *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* *jñāna* while the the *pramāṇas* (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*) deal with the *savikalpaka* or determinate knowledge only. This aspect will be dealt in last section of this chapter.

(b) Validity of Internality

The Advaitic approach insists Abhinavagupta to acknowledge the validity of internal reality. Although the significance of internality has been discussed already, but there some other characteristics are to be revealed. However, the striking factor is that in the context of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy, validity of knowledge does matter only in terms of *pūrṇa* and *apūrṇa*. So the truth can be complete truth or incomplete truth only, but not be untruth' or invalid truth. That is the reason that barron’s son is also accepted as imagined truth. Thus, the valid and invalid which is quite significant in the philosophy of language, logic and in other disciplines is not placed in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy otherwise. The reason behind the negation of this methodology is that Kashmir Śaiva philosophy always insists on internal reality. Very frequently, it is repeated that the more internal one goes, the more valid reality he finds. The internal end is *parā vāk*. Nonetheless, these levels help to shape the empirical knowledge. External is only an appearance of internal. It is rooted in internal. The most internal reality is *nirvikalpaka*. So, we have to consider closely, in further sections, the levels from subtlest to grossest, means *parā* to *vaikharī* to understand the process of shaping determinate knowledge in terms of philosophy of *vāk*. *Parā vāk*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* support only internality.

\(^{106}\) *Ataścāsya vastunah sāḍhakamidam būḍhakamidam pramāṇam-

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(c) Externality as the Manifestation of the Internal

Externality is the grosser appearance. Vācyā and vācaka, jñāna, śabda-artha, all are about inward elements, even if, the vaikharī who deals with extraneous principle, is centralized with the internal elements of human body. It means jñāna stands with validity of internal. As the ābhāsas are essentially of the nature of consciousness, so they always exist internally. Internality is the shining in the subject as ‘I’. Antar means near. And nearness requires something, in relation to which it may be asserted. And in the absence of other requisites of internality, the subject alone is the unexceptionally requisite in all cases. Therefore, it follows that nearness to the subject is oneness with it. That which is different from it (the subject) is external. But when they are manifested externally by the māyā, they exist externally also. That is pictured up in the imagination, is also external. It shines separate from the subject as ‘this’ and not as ‘I’. Internality consists in oneness with the subject. Externality is not the essential nature of either the positive or negative manifestations, example, I have pleasure or I have no pain. In both examples, the real nature of pleasure or pain does not shine as externality, but only as pleasure or pain internally. Externality is another manifestation. When Parama Śiva, by virtue of its sakti of svātantrya, manifests externality as united with pleasure, then externality becomes its attribute. Therefore as absence of manifestation of blue does not affect the real nature of the manifestation lotus, so even when manifestation externality is absent, manifestation pleasure, pain is not affected in any way, because they exist internally. The manifestation such as blue etc. when reflected on the internal organ i.e. the mirror of buddhi, are internal, inasmuch as they are within internal organ. They become external, because they shine as separate from the subject as objects of knowledge. Pure

107 Tat āntaratvam, antariti nikātam, tacca kīñcit apeksya, apekṣaṇīyaśca sarvatra pramātaiva apekṣaṇīyāntarābhāve, tataśca pramātari nikātam tādāmyam prāptameva iti——. IPV., com on 1.8.8.

108 Cinmayatve 'vabhiisiinimantareva,
Māyayā bhāsamānānām bhāhyatvādvariirapyasau. Ibid, 1.8.7.

109 Iha antahkarāṇe buddhidarpanātmanī nīlādināmavabhāsānām āntaratvamapayasti-antahkarāṇamadhye bhavatvāt grāhyatāṛūpaṃ——. Ibid, com. on 1.8.5.
externality is simply external perceptibility. In both the conditions of internal as well as external, these manifestations blue etc. exercise their functional power inasmuch as they give rise to knowledge, referring to themselves. These manifestations do not exercise their functional capacity (artha kriyākarī) in the state of internality, the chief characteristic of which is oneness with the subject. For the functioning, they depend upon their separateness. The manifestation blue is separate from the manifestation yellow and separate from the subject also; therefore it can exercise its functional capacity in relation to that subject.

There are two types of externality-

1. The one, which is perceived externally.

2. The one, which shines as separate from the subject as ‘this’. So, imagination is also external, because it shines separate from the subject\textsuperscript{10}.

(d) \textit{Jñāna as a Polyvalent Term}

\textit{Jñāna} is the most essential elements of knowledge process. Although, its translated English term ‘knowledge’ is very ambiguous term, used by the Westerner scholars with different explanation and keeps so many variation in meanings also, so one should be careful with this ambiguous term and try to avoid translated terms, although some scholars have welcoming attitude towards these European terms. This claim is supported by Paul Hacker in his one of the articles \textit{Dharma in Hinduism}. He says in some context:

The encounter with this inscription encourages us to make a leap of 2200 years forward in time to the moment when Europe and India again came into contact-this time, however, in an incomparably more intensive manner then in the Hellenistic period—in order to ask which Western term is today juxtaposed to the Indic. Today it is, to be sure, not a matter of translating from an Indic to European language, but [95,498] the reverse. Thanks to the Anglicized school system, educated Indians have since the 19\textsuperscript{th} century learned to think in European terms, and now use,

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Vikalpe yo'jamullekhah so'pi bāhyah prthakprathah},

\textit{Pramātraikāmyāntaryam tato bheda hi bāhyatā. Ibid, 1.8.8.}

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when writing in Indic languages, Indic words to express European concepts. It is therefore now a question of transposition from European to Indic, not the opposite.\textsuperscript{111}

Although the problem of translation is not directly related with this thesis, nonetheless it has been pointed out since it is the serious problem in the context of Indological studies particularly. Anyway, attention is to give on the term \textit{jñāna} of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. The specific problem regarding Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is that the principles are so intricate as to be hard to deal with at times. All concepts are pretty mixed with each other so one has to be careful toward certain problem and approach. The term \textit{jñāna} is so complicated as this very term is used, sometimes, with exact nomenclature \textit{jñāna} and at times ‘signified meaning’ of \textit{jñāna} is showed by replacing the real term \textit{jñāna} with some other terms like \textit{saṁvedana}, \textit{anubhava}, \textit{parāmarśana}. Likewise, the same term \textit{jñāna} signifies different meaning contextually. The term \textit{jñāna} is used at these places with distinct expressions by and large:

1. \textit{Prakāśa} (coupled with \textit{vimarśa}) indicates \textit{jñāna} meaning.
2. \textit{Vimarśa} (coupled with \textit{prakāśa}) is \textit{jñāna} of \textit{jñāna}.
3. \textit{Cid} (coupled with \textit{ānanda}) indicates ‘\textit{jñāna}’ meaning.
4. \textit{Jñāna} (coupled with \textit{kriyā}) as nature of Parama Śiva.
5. The triad \textit{saktis icchā}, \textit{jñāna} and \textit{kriyā}.
6. \textit{Cit}, \textit{ānanda}, \textit{icchā}, \textit{jñāna} and \textit{kriyā} \textit{sakti}, Parama Śiva’s five main \textit{saktis}.
7. \textit{Pūrṇa} and \textit{apūrṇa \textit{jñāna}.
8. \textit{Baudhha} and \textit{pauruṣa \textit{jñāna}.

So, these are the contexts where \textit{jñāna} is used in different meaning, although all of them are quite interrelated. Epistemology of \textit{vāk} principle is supported by the second, seventh

\textsuperscript{111} Hacker, Paul, "\textit{Dharma in Hinduism}" in Dharma Studies in its Semantic, Cultural and Religious History, p. 477.
and eight constituents prominently, while the first, second, third and fourth are the constituents of metaphysical one and fifth and sixth are the different categories of sakti. The source of first, second, third and fourth feature of jñāna is related precisely to the Parama Śiva that is called by different nomenclatures as cit, caitanya, ātmā, svabhāva or parama pramātā. The first principle prakāśa and vimarśa is elaborated in initial section of this same chapter in the context of essential nature of parā vāk. Accordingly prakāśa refers sattā and vimarśa is the vimarśana (awareness) of this sattā. Adding to this characteristic, prakāśa signifies jñāna also, by substance it is jñāna svarūpa and vimarśa points out toward the jñāna of jñāna. Concerning jñāna, signified by prakāśa, is tied in with cid or cidprakāśa. Cit is svaccha (luminous) and svatantra. This cit, alone, is the cause of the siddhi i.e. manifestation of the universe which consist of pramātṛ, pramāna and prameya. The text Pratyabhiṃjñāḥdayam identifies Śiva with Ātmā. This ātmā is essentially cidānandaghana i.e. (cit+ānanda) ghan. Cit is the common source for many principles like cidātmā, cidprakāśa, cit, cetanā and caitanya. Abhinavagupta defines cit as cidātmā and cit has intricate relation with prakāśa. Accordingly, prakāśa, which is fundamentally a Subject, cannot be divided by space and time because it is ultimate non-dual reality. Cit is only the pramātā and kartā (subject) since the merely inert i.e. jada cannot be the subject, it is devoid of svātantrya. Jada can only be an object of experience, not the subject of experience. Vāk sakti is identical with citprakāśa. Parā vāk is of the form of eternally sounded great mantra consists of the consciousness of the perfect ahām who contains within herself the whole assemblage of saktis formed by the sounds beginning with a and ending with kṣa. This parā vāk brings into manifestation the sphere of the limited subject or experient through the successive phases of paśyanto, madhyamā etc. In the state of the limited experient she conceals her real form as parā and produces in the empirical subject (māyā pramātṛ) through ever-new-vikalpa-activity at every moment. This activity brings into objects that are obscure and

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112 Nirūḍhṛśā citātmā śivabhāṣṭāraka eva eka ātma, na tu anyāḥ kaścit, prakāśasya deśakālādhibhiḥ bheda-yogāt, jadasya tu grāhakatvānupapatteḥ. PH., com. on sūtra 7.

113 Tathā hi-citprakāśāt avyātirikṭā nityoditaṃ mahāmantrarūpā pūrṇāhārvimarśa arśamayī yā iyon parā vāksaktiḥ ādi-kṣaṅta-rūpāśeṣaśaktikalagarbhāni. Ibid, com. on sūtra 12.
particular. Here, she presents the stage of *avikalpa* as veiled by that *vikalpa* activity, though in itself it (*avikalpa* stage) is quite pure\(^{114}\). Further Abhinavagupta reveals some other features of *cit* as *ātmā*. In accordance with, it is all-pervading. All roles are displayed by its absolute will and differences in the roles are due to various gradations in which that absolute free will either chooses to reveal or to conceal itself. Therefore, there is one *ātmā* only, pervading all these characteristics\(^{115}\). *Cidātmā* has essential nature of *aśvarya sakti* which is *ekaiva* (unique), *anapāyinī* (unfailing) and whose essential nature consists in doer-ship (*kartr*) which is essentially a *sphurattā* or flashing forth of divine light\(^{116}\).

The next group of *cit*, *ānanda*, *icchā*, *jñāna*, *kriyā*\(^{117}\) is the group of five *saktis*. They are described in the context of cosmology in *Spandakārikā*. Accordingly, the first aspect (*spanda*) of *anuttara sakti* is the supreme *aham vimarśa* which assumes the form of *akula* i.e. that of which the body (*kula*) is *a*. This *a* is expression of *cit sakti* of *śiva*. As there is further expansion of the world manifesting power of *ahāṁ*, *ānanda sakti* comes into play which assumes the form of *varṇa ā*; then bringing forward *icchā sakti*, that consciousness displays *i* in the *aksūbdha* state of *icchā* and *i* in its *kṣūbdha* state which is an expression of *tśāṇa* or *iśītri* state, she displays *unmeṣa* (*jñāna*) which is represented by the letter *u* and in the *kṣūbdha* state of *jñāna sakti* displays *unati* (deficiency in *jñāna* as mere *jñāna*) which becomes the cause of objective appearance. This is represented by the letter *ā*.

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\(^{114}\) Sā tāvat paśyantīmadhyamādikramena grāhakabhūmikāṁ bhāsayati. Tatra ca parārūpaṇeva svarūpam aprathayantī māyāpramātuḥ aṣṭaḥsādhrānājārthāvahārsarūpaṁ pratikṣāṇa navanāvāṁ vikalpakriyāmullāsayaṁ, śuddhāmapi ca vikalpabhūmīṁ tadācchādītāmeva dārśayaṁ. Ibid.

\(^{115}\) Evam ekasyaiva cidātmānuḥ bhagavataḥ svātantryāvabhaṣītāh sarvā imā bhūmikāḥ svātantryapračchādanānoṁlanaśrātyabhāvitaḥ. Atra eka eva etāvadyāptīka ātmā. Ibid, com.on sūtra 8.

\(^{116}\) Api ca cidātmānuḥ paramesvarasya svā anapāyinī ekaivala sphurattāsārakartṛtātmā aśvaryaśaktāṁ. Ibid, com. on sūtra 12:

\(^{117}\) ......cidānandecchā-jñāna-kriyāsaktirūpatve'pi...... Ibid, com. on sūtra 7.
Other group of śakti is triad of icchā, jñāna and kriyā. These have been already examined.

Jñāna and kriyā is also a pair like prakāśa-vimarśa. This couple is also presented as essential nature of Paraṃ Śiva. Thus, jñāna is not inert or inactive or not gained by an external agent. It is spandanātmaka, sphurita, ābhāsita and prakāśita in itself. Its dynamic nature itself relates it with the agent or doer. Jñāna is the essential nature of the ātmā or svarūpa of pramāṇa, which is called as aham sattā. But jñāna of this aham sattā is known as vimarśana kriyā of vimarśa. Thus, aham vimarśa that is ‘awareness of own existence’ gives completeness to reality. Thereupon, examine of jñāna is to be needed in different manner, as pūrṇa and apūrṇa jñāna.

(e) Validity of Pramātā

Pramātā is the ultimately significant element because the world, which is bound to twofold relation of signifier and signified, resides in the mind of knower. Mind of the knower is such place, prameyas and pramāṇas reside inside. Ultimate consciousness or reality is the knower, the para pramātā, pramāṇa and prameya lie in this pramātā only, because the innumerable prameyas reside under this para pramātā ‘prakāśa’. All of them are prakāśamāna (appeared) by this prakāśa\(^{118}\). So, in any case, para pramātā cannot be prameya (knowable) through pramāṇas. Prameyas are knowable in the form of idamātmaka vimarśa\(^{119}\), while para pramātā is ahamātmaka\(^{120}\). The pramātā (knower) ultimately does exist and ‘the others’, which are appearances either inwardly or outwardly is nothing but the grosser form of pramātā\(^{121}\). Pramātā is addressed by different names according to different characteristics, like śiva, parāśamśīd, prameya.

\(^{118}\) Na caivarūpatvam pramātyeyena pramāṇaparicchedaḥ syāt, sa hi arthaparicchedādau pravṛtā svapraṇāśarūpatvānna prakāśādhibhino,----. TĀ., com. on 1.57.

\(^{119}\) Prameyam ca vibhinnavakrāśādīdhāsiddhikamidantiivimrsyam ca bhavati. Ibid, com. on 1.57.

\(^{120}\) Nāpiśāntavimrśyaḥ ahampratyavamarśāyataḥ,----. Ibid.

paramaśīva, anytāra. That Parama Śiva never vanishes like the light of candles. It stays in all external light and darkness also. Basically, all the external lights and external darkness resides in it. It is the essence of everything. It is the svabhāva of universe. Thus, pramātā is not limited in the sense of knower only; it is doer also because ‘functioning’ is nature of para pramātā. Any action, either knowing or doing is the kind of function or activation. Kśemarāja marks out the nature of ātmā in Śivasūtravimārśinī as knower and doer. When Parama Śiva manifests itself through the vimārśana in the form of 36 tattvas, then this activity is called kartrtvā. However, the twofold aspect of cit as caitanya or ātmā is considerable. Ātmā is the kartā and jñātā means ‘an active agent’. This claim is strengthened by the derivation of ‘caitanya’ term; accordingly term caitanya is derived by the caitana word, so ‘cetayate iti cetanāḥ sarvajñānakriyāsvatantrāḥ. Bhāva of caitana is caitanya who is characterized as sarvajñānakriyāsambandhamaya-paripūrṇa-svātantryam. This characteristic of ātmā is quite unique in compare to the ātmā of other Indian philosophical schools. A conscious being is the one who consciences (i.e. thinks) and is absolutely free in all knowledge and activity. The word svātantrya indicates three elements:

1. Absolute freedom to create i.e. aiśvarya.

2. Vimarśa, a self which is all-inclusive (knower, known and means of knowing).

3. Jñāna and kriyā.

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122 Anastamitabhārūpa stejasāṁ tamasāmapi.

Ya eko 'ntaryadantaśca tejāṇi ca tamāṇi ca. Bpd, kārikā 1.

123 Ithamicchākalājñāna-śaktisulombujāṁritah.

Bhairavaḥ sarvabhāvānāṁ svabhāvāḥ pariśilyate. Ibid, kārikā 15.


125 Cetayate iti cetanāḥ sarvajñānakriyāsvatantrāḥ, tasya bhāvaḥ caitanyam sarvajñānakriyāsambandhamaya paripūrṇam svātantryam ucyate. Śsv, com. on 1.1.
Caitanya is the ātmā or svabhāva of the entire universe consisting of both existent objects or non-existent objects i.e. imagined objects\textsuperscript{126}, since ‘acetyamāna’ cannot be svabhāva. Kṣemarāja answers in the Vimarśinī commentary of Śivasūtra that why only caitanya can be ātmā, he says cetyamānastu svaprakāśavivekābhūtatvāt caitanyātmaiva\textsuperscript{127}. So the existent objects or imagined objects, everything is cid by nature\textsuperscript{128}. Every appearance owes its existence from the cid-prakāśa. In this manner, everything is the subject or knower in real. So the supreme ātmā is jñātā and kartā. The same idea has been expressed in Ucchusmabhairava in the following way:

‘Oh dear one, so long as there are no knowers, how can there be anything known. The knower and the known are really the same principle; therefore, there is nothing which is inherently impure.'\textsuperscript{129}

Hence, whether in the world or object or mental apprehension of it, there is no state\textsuperscript{130} which is not Śiva. So, whatever exists is the expansion (appearance) of Śiva or caitanya. Thus, every existent has ultimately essence of parama pramātā. It is the knower who assimilates in herself or himself knowledge and knowable. Even, the cause and effect theory is explained by the kartṛ-karma bhāva. The Śaiva School accepts kartṛ-karmabhāva rather than satkāryavāda or asatkāryavāda or vivartavāda. According to the kartṛkarmabhāva, kartā is kāraṇa and kārya is karma. Kartā is samvalita with the kriyā-svātantrya sāmarthya. So, kāraṇa rests into the kartā. The cit-rūpa paramēśvara manifests the world by his icchā i.e svecchā\textsuperscript{131}. Reality is bifurcated into two categories,

\textsuperscript{126} Kīna ca yadat caitanyam uktam sa eva ātmā, svabhāvah, viśeṣācodaṇāt bhāvābhāvarūpasya viśvasya jagataḥ. Nahi acetyamōnah ko’pi kasyāpi kadācidapi svabhāvo bhavati. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128} Kīna ca yadat caitanyam uktam sa eva ātmā, svabhāvah, viśeṣācodaṇāt bhāvābhāvasya viśvasya jagataḥ. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{129} Yāvanna vedakā ete tāvadvedyāk katham priye, Vedakam vedyamekam tu tattvam nāsytaśucistataḥ. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{130} Yasmāt sarvamayo jīvah---------. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{131} -tasmāt cidrūpa eva paramēśvaraḥ svecchāvaśāt iyadvīśvāmaṁavabhāsāyati. TA., com. on 9.8.
\( jñāpya \) and \( jñāpakatā \) form the epistemological point of view. There is another bifurcated category that is \( kāraṇa \) and \( kārya \) also on the basis of substance\(^{132}\). There is no space for third category, like \( pramāṇa \) as another category. From the knowledge point of view, only knower and knowable or known exits, while the \( pramāṇa \) arises from the knower. So, \( pramāṇa \) cannot be independent in the terms of separate existence at empirical level also.

\( Jñāna \) term is used as substitute of \( jñātā \). This \( jñāna \) does not signify passive knowledge or mere knowledge, \( jñātā \) is presented as \( jñāna \). \( Jñāna \) is the subjective term. For instance, in \( Śivasūtra-vimarsini, \) Kṣemarāja replaces \( jñātā \) with \( jñāna \) nomenclature in this sūtra, \( Svaśaktippraca yasya viśvam\)\(^{133}\). Introducing this new sūtra, he comments on \( jñātā \) by addressing it as \( saṁvid \), later on he replaces \( saṁvid \) with \( jñāna \). Even experienced object or knowable element is nothing but an experient one in essence. He elaborates that whatever shines in various external and internal forms, is \( jñāna \). It is \( jñāna \) that assumes the forms of objects. It is through the \( jñāna \) that objects are ascertained. By the application of \( vīdhi \) (affirmation) and \( niśedha \) (negation), there is division of existents either as \( asti \) (positive) or \( nāsti \) (negative). As \( jñāna \) and the \( jñeya \) i.e. its objects are apprehended together, therefore they are (knowledge and its objects) one and the same\(^{134}\).

\(^{132}\) Tacca dvividhameva paramārthato \( jñāpyajñāpakatā \) \( kāryakāraṇatā \) ca-. IPV., com. on 2.3.1.

\(^{133}\) Śev, 3.30.

\(^{134}\) Tattadrūpatayā \( jñānam \) bahirantaḥ prakāśate,

\( Jñānadhṛte nārthasattā \) \( jñānarūpam \) tato jagat.

\( Na hi \) \( jñānadhṛte \) bhavāḥ kenacidivyākṛtāḥ,

\( Jñānam \) tadāmatāṁ yatametasmādavastāya

\( Astināstivibhāgena \) niśedhavidhiyogataḥ.

\( jñānātmatā \) \( jñeyaniṣṭhā \) bhāvānām bhāvanābalāt.

\( Yugaspadveda \) bhūjjñānajñeyayorekarūpataḥ. Ibid, com. on 3.30.
In, the subject, wherein the entire world consisting of subject or knower (mātr), means of knowledge (māna) this world and object or the known (meya)\textsuperscript{135} resides.

So parama pramātā is capable to create differences through its svatantrya sakti\textsuperscript{136}. All padārthas abide (svātmasāt) in para pramātā, otherwise for the conveying of all padārthās externally, smṛti would have not been lived there. In spite of the maintenance and dissolution of the world occurring one after another, there can be no break in the awareness of the yogi, because of his being the knower or subject\textsuperscript{137}. With the disappearance of phenomena brought about by avidyā, the nature of consciousness does not disappear. As consciousness or awareness is free from appearance or disappearance, there cannot be a real disappearance of knowership\textsuperscript{138}. The highest reality, known as ātmā also, has two aspects called kartā and kārya. The kārya (object) is perishable, the kāraṇa (subject) is imperishable\textsuperscript{139}. But at the empirical level, there is innumerable pramātās, who perceives the limited knowledge. The jñāna is gained through the pramāṇa, stays in the pramātā, because it is the dharma of pramātā or vettā, not of vastu.

Kashmir Śaiva philosophy explains everything in the terms of jñāta or kartā. The concept of kartā (agent) is the most essential principle. Everything lies in this kartā. All acts of kartā are done by the jñāna-kriyā svātantrya rūpa vimarsa. Basically, kriyāmakatā is

\textsuperscript{135} Yatra yasminścidośipe svātmanī idam mātrmānayeśmatmakam sarvam jagatkāryam sthitam yatprakāśena prakāśamānam satsthītim labhate----. Spn, com. on 1.2.

\textsuperscript{136} ---parasamvidātmā pramātā tāvat bhedendhanadāhakatvādagnī----. TA., com. on 4.124.

\textsuperscript{137} Tatpravṛttāvaparyināsah saṁvetbhavāti. Śsv, 3.32.

\textsuperscript{138} Nāśe 'vidyāpapācasya svabhāvo na vinaśyati,
Ut pattidhvan savirahāttasmānāśo na vāstavaḥ,
Yato 'vidyā samutpanthvānabhāyāmupacaryate.
Yatsvabhāvena naśtan na tannāṣam kathamucayate. Ibid, com. on 3.32.

\textsuperscript{139} Avasthāyugalam cāra kāryakārttvāsaśabditam,
Kāryatā kṣāyinī tatra kārttvam punarakṣayam. Ibid.
possible in the following forms only-saśīlesaṇa, vislesaṇa, anusandhāna and uttirṇa from the saṃsālaṇa-vislesaṇa. Abheda-buddhi, bheda-buddhi, bhedābheda buddhi and beyond to the bhedābhededabuddhi are the respective nature of all these kriyā. The nature of any activity must be come in any of them.

(f) Pramāṇa and Prameya

During the establishment of parama pramātā, Jayaratha defines pramāṇa. Accordingly, aprūvārthaprakāṣatvameva hi nāma pramāṇatvam and anadhigataviśayam pramāṇam, ajñātārthaprakāśo va. So, the knowable, which is unknown to everyone (apūrvārtha, anadhigataviśaya) and is being known first time by which means is called pramāṇa, so it is ajñātārthaprakāśaka. Further, at empirical level, the ahampratitirupa parā vāk saṃvid pramātā manifests itself through the svātāntraya sākthi in 12 forms- buddhi, mana, five jñānendriyas, five karmendriyas, these twelve are called pramāṇa. They are the medium of the perceiving objects. They are called prakāśaka also because they do arthālocana, reveals the objects. For the possessing prakāśaka guṇa, they are addressed as sūrya also. In fact, pramāṇas are external form of parama pramātā. The para pramātā stays in essence form (antarbhāva) into the pramāṇa, as the whole external elements are the grosser form of Parama Śiva. Thus, the sense-organs get the capacity of perceiving. The pramāṇās are not svaatāntra, while pramātās are svaatāntra. In the

141 TA., com. on 4.83.
142 Ibid.
143 Karmabuddhyakṣavargo hi buddhayanto dvādaśātmakaḥ, Prakāśakatvātsūryātma bhinne vastuni jṛmbhate. Ibid, 4.160.
144 Sa eva ca ahampratitīmāprasvarūpāḥ svasvātāntrayāt buddhāndriyādyātmanā dvādaśadhā prasphuratanā pramāṇādasmādādhiśayānah sūryāḥ ityucyate. Ibid, com. on 4.124.
145 Pramāṇam ca pramātiureva bahirmukham rūpam, tatra pramātā tāvadantarbhāvāmiyāt. Ibid.
146 Itthameva mitau vācyam karaṇasya svakam vapuḥ, Na svaatāntram svato mānam kuryādadhigama haṭṭāt. Ibid, 4.81.
relation with *indriyas, buddhi* is called *pramātā*, since she is able to receive the reflection of objects, like a mirror.\(^{147}\) The chief characteristic of *pramāna* is its power to produce the determinate knowledge. It is the cause of the effect in the shape of determinate knowledge, the continuity of which is not broken till the accomplishment of the fixed purpose. It is essentially the light of consciousness. It is related to an object and springs from the essential nature of the subject.

Same way, *prameya* or *jñeya* or *vedya* is also not *svatantra*, as it has *viśrānti* in *prakāśa*. Its *viśrānti* in *prakāśa* is called *vedyatā\(^{148}\)*. It is always dependent on the knower.\(^{149}\) If knower recognizes or knows the object, then it is designated. Even, the knower is capable to recognize the absence of the object also. *Anyādhiṇapraṇāśatā* is the *prameyatā* or *meyatā\(^{150}\)*. The *prakāśana* of *bhāva padārtha* occurs with the *jñāna purva*. *Pramāṇa* is the *jñāna* which cannot live without any substance or support (*aśraya\(^{151}\)*). So, *pramāṇa* resides in *prameya* as *antarbhuta* entity. The world is *prameya*. *Pratyakṣa* or *parokṣatva* is the dharma of *viṣaya* on the basis of *deśa* and *kāla\(^{152}\)*.

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\(^{147}\) *Sakalakaranāṇapañnaprasavanimitattvād buddhiḥ, saiva cicchāyāśamkrāntisahīnutvād darpaṇah,…*  

\(^{148}\) *Aprakāśā svaprakāśāddharmādeti prakāśatām,*  
*Prakāśe khalu viśrāntim visvam śrayati cettataḥ.*  
*Nānyā kācidapekyā’sya kṛṭakṛtyasya sarvataḥ.*

*Yathā ca śivanāthena svātāntreyād bhāsayate bhidā. Ibid, ibis on 10.76-7.*

\(^{149}\) *Ataśca asya prakāśate, mama prakāśate, mama prakāśate iti prakāśāmapramāṭraśamlagnaiśvā sā yuyate iti nāsa svātāntreyāṇa paryavasitasvarūpi nilādi, śiva eva prakāśātmakah pramāṇamakah pramātā, tadatiriktyasya anayasya bhedābhedavikalpahatattvāt, ataśca nīlārdjerjñeyasya prakāśamāṇatvāt sa eva paramārthāh ityuktaṃ ‘prakāśātmakah śivaḥ param tattvam’ iti.*  
*Ibid, com. on 1.52.*

\(^{150}\) *Paraprakāśatvam nāma meyatvam ———. Ibid, com. on 10.113.*

\(^{151}\) *Pramāṇam nāma ca jñānam, taccopāśrayasyaṃ na kvacidapi sambhavati. Ibid, com. on 4.124.*

\(^{152}\) *Pratyakṣatām parokṣo’pi pratyakṣo’pi parokṣatām,*  
*196*
This pramātā, prameya and pramāṇa as well as jñātā, jñāna and jñeya is called pramiti when all of these stays united. At the grosser stage, all of them stay separate and at the subtle level, they maintain their unity as essential nature in the form of pramiti. Intrinsically, knowers, knowledges and knowables are temporarily appeared as segments’ of pramiti. Concerning conventional knowledge, pramātā, pramāṇa and prameya are crucial principles, since jñāna always requires two things i.e. grāhya (prameya) and grāhaka (pramātā)\textsuperscript{153}.

(g) Jñāna and Jñeya

The jñātā and jñeya is occurred by the āśleṣa of ātmā and indriya. In this process, ātmā is kartā and its mana is kriyā. Jñeyatva is the dharma of jñāna\textsuperscript{154}, rest in jñātā. So, jñeya, the external element, cannot affect jñāna because jñāna is independent to the jñeya. So, I know this subject/object- here subject is not so important. Contrary to that, jñāna of jñāna is the cause of getting knowledge of subject. Cid is jñāna. No one is able to cover the svabhāvabhūta dharma of cid, so ‘jñeyatva’ is the jñāna dharma of cid, cannot be covered\textsuperscript{155}. Jñāna is kriyā in essence. Jñāna is the only kriyā. Actually through the ruḍi, jñāna itself becomes kriyā in the parākṣāṭhā of yoga.\textsuperscript{156} For example, if someone wishes, I should go, as soon as the person thinks, his physical moment starts and finally he sets out walking.

Jñeya is twofold-

1. Cinmātra

\textsuperscript{Deśakālādibhedena viṣayah pratipadyate. Ibid, com. on ‘10.18.}

\textsuperscript{153} Buddhiṃdriyādyātmakaraṇagalakṣaṇe pramāṇe ca sabdanam- vikalpastadrūpiṇī bhedāmarśamayāṭyarthaḥ. Ibid, com. on 4.126.}

\textsuperscript{154} Jñeyabhāvo hi ciddharmastacchāyeccchādayenānānam. Ibid, 1.136.}

\textsuperscript{155} Jñeyatvam hi jñānadharmah,---. Ibid, com. on 1.136, p.n. 190.}

\textsuperscript{156} Yato nānyā kriyā nāma jñānameva hi tatattathā.}

\textsuperscript{Rūḍeryogāntatām prāptamiti śrīgamaśāsane. Ibid, 1.150.}
2. Jada

Kalpita Vedya- The first cinmātra is kalpita when Parama Śiva, who is staying in its own nature i.e. vedaka, appears in the form of vedya through svātantra. The one which is related to the cinmātra is tādātmya rūpa. It is vastuśūnya.

Jada Vedya- Jada is satya, is praticchandātmaka. It is like reflection in mirror. The jada is able to reflect in buddhi, because it is not related with the tādātmya relation. If the tādātmya relation would have been come, in that case, blue, yellow objects will become jñāna rūpa. In that case, pratichandakatā will finish. So, it has pratibimba which reflects in mirror.

(h) Kṣaṇikatā of Jñāna

Kṣaṇikatā, kāla and jñāna are interrelated terms. Kṣaṇa of jñāna is said kāla, so kāla is kṣaṇa rūpa. Jñāniya sattā is the kālāvadhika sattā. Pariṇāma of kṣaṇikatā of kāla and jñāna are same. Differ to Buddhist kṣaṇa, kṣaṇa of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy has ādi, madhya and anta. So, what is the definition of kṣaṇa? Before the ābhāva of jñāna/jñānābhāva, by when jñāna exists is called kṣaṇa of jñāna. But ābhāva of jñāna cannot occur until and unless pramātā and his sense-organs get connected.

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157 Yat svam svarūpam vedakameva sat vedyatvena avabhāsayati. Ibid, 1.176-7.
158 Ata eva kalpitam vastuśūnym ityuktam. Ibid, com. on 177.
159 Tatra niśajñānam ityādau cito niśādinā darpaṇamukhanyayena pratibimbamātrameva samāvesārtho na tu tādātmyam, tathārve hi niśāderjñānātīmihūtatvād jñānameva avāśīṣyate iti praticchandavyavasthāvai na syāt. Ibid.
160 Kālastu bhedakastasya sa tu sūkṣma kṣaṇo mataḥ.
161 Sātvam satvārtha jñānādyavanti sa kṣaṇa. Ibid, 7.25.
162 Yathānto 'sti kṣaṇasyaivamādirdhāyam ca cintayatām.
Ātmakatvātksaṇasyaiva na lokasya kṣaṇe sthitiḥ. Ibid, com. on 7.25.
(samyoga) and get disconnected (vibhāga). In the process, the very first pramātā comes in contact with object and he percepts the object in particular form like this is nīla, this is pīta. The relation between pramātā and object is samyoga, which is temporary. Through the samyoga, vastu-bheda arises. After percept one object, pramātā percepts another object, like seeing nīla vastu, he sees pīta vastu. In that stage, the first jñāna of nīla vastu gets accomplished. This is vibhāga. Through the process of samyoga and vibhāga, jñānābhāva and jñāna-bhāva occurs.

But in experiences, jñāna stays in continuous form dhārāvāhi, then where is kṣaṇikatā? In reply it is truth that jñāna is kṣaṇika, which arises from the samyoga and diminishes with the vibhāga. So abhāva is the key principle in this context. But the nature of abhāva is not related to the permanent diminishing of jñāna. Smaranaṭṭmakā jñāna still works here. Here, samyoga and vibhāga stand with the logical arguments i.e. spanda. Samyoga and vibhāga are the appearance of the activity of spanda. Spanda is the movement, so are samyoga and vibhāga. One comes in position to connect with someone or something after the disconnecting with the prior element.

(i) Descending levels of Parā Vāk and Aham

The characteristics, of parā vāk principle establish the voluminous nature of parā vāk. Among these primitives, aham-vimarsa is the remarkable notion to the ‘main problem’ of philosophy of language of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. In short, it is the self-awareness, which is unified, unconventional, beyond to the time, space and causality. It is called unified because no duality exists in its nature, which arises in the

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163 Tadabhāvasca no tāvadyāvattatrākṣavartmani. Arthe vātmapradeśe vā na samyogavibhāgitā. Ibid, 7.27.

164 Jñānasya ca tāvadabhāvo na jāyate yāvadindriyānāmarthasaya pramātturna samyogavibhāgau na syātām, tadaviratendriyānāmarthasaya pramātturnālādīviṣaye jñāne jāyamāne yadā nīlādīnā vibhāgau utpadyate, pīrādīnā vā samyogastadā tadabhāvo iti. Ibid, com. on 7.27.

165 Desāddevaḥtvam hi calādvastu vastvantareṇa samyujyate viṣyujyate vetyabhāpūryaḥ. Ibid, com. on 7.28.

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further extension and then *aham* appears into the splitting form of *aham* and *idam*, I and you, this and that, here and there and so on. But it never abandons the real nature and stays always in nirvikalpaka form. In this manner, whatever, is in universe, are her splitting forms. So, the important thing is the process of splitting. Splitting or appearing is not a lying flat process; it needs much involvement of various stages and elements. *Paśyantī*, *madhayamā* and *vaikharī* are the essentials for each manifestation. They may be dealt from different aspects. Fundamentally they are the levels of manifestation, which are established hierarchically. They are the grosser appearance of *parā vāk*. Each level is related to the particular stage of manifestation like at the *madhyamā* level, appearance of *idam* becomes distinct. In this way, these are the levels as well as they provide ground also, where manifestation occurs. Each level has specific structure. Although these hierarchical levels follow specified function, but they are not separate. They are united by the *parā vāk* who is the foreground as well as she is present in all the stages in essence. So, presenting at all stages in essence, she unites all of them together. They act unitedly. These are common for the epistemology and ontology, because epistemology and ontology are not separate from each other. Cognitive process is the internal function and ontological process is the external function. Both are related to the name and form. These levels show the development of the grosser appearance of name and form. In this way, levels of *parā vāk* are quite significant in the process of epistemology and ontology.

In that way, *parā vāk* is present in these trichotomous elements with integral nature of doer-ship and knower-ship. It means *aham-vimarsa* abides at all these stages in its real form, so that 'recognizing own nature' is possible at any level but definitely, with, different equipments and methods. Keeping real nature unaffected at all levels, *parā vāk* keeps executing the process of manifestation continuously. The whole manifestation process opens the door for revealing the knowledge and process of creation or appearance of the world. Both of them are simultaneous, even at the theory level, both processes are same, since knowing and doing are two aspects of single one. Along with, *ābhāsās* or *prakāśa* is the *jñāna svarupa*. Anyway, either process sets out from *parā*
vāk and passing through paśyantī, madhayamā and vaikhari. Each level must be fixed with definite sets of functions. Paśyantī level is the parāmarśamayi and always cognizant of the essential nature of the consciousness. She is related to such nirvikalpaka avasthā which is desired to be known if it is awakened by the causal conditions\(^{166}\). Definitely, this nirvikalpaka avasthā is not in the same form as nirvikalpaka avasthā of parā vāk. Paśyantī is moving ahead to madhyamā. At this stage, the epistemic value of vācyā and vācaka is not stayed with distinction. Still, both are unified. The stage is called prathamajñānakāla\(^{167}\) because it is the very first initial stage of appearance, wherein only enrooting of appearing comes into existence so does it call bhedānāsasyāṣṭūrṇam\(^{168}\). In further stage, madhyamā is the place wherein difference between vācyā and vācaka is appeared at the same location, samānādhikaraṇa i.e. antaḥ-karaṇa\(^{169}\). So there is an appearance of difference inwardly. The last stage of the grossest knowledge and world is vaikhari, which possesses clear difference between vācyā and vācaka\(^ {170}\). Thus, paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikhari, all are dependent on parā vāk since it is such place wherein everything lies in ‘concealed’ form. In that way, essence of parā vāk is found in each and every existent. She contains in primordial state all the stages of the word or speech, all the phonemes, all the words, actions and objects. Language either subtle or gross and thought is one of the extensions of parā vāk so the whole system of language is also structured by parā vāk. In that way, the non-conventional parā vāk is the foundation of conventional world, for relativity cannot produce relativity. An absolute starting point or basis is the necessity and that is parā vāk. The parā vāk is the basis of the differentiation not only

\(^{166}\) tatastu paśyantī yadyat abhīṣitam tattadeva samucitakaranaṇiyamaprabodhitam bodhasūtraṇamātṛena vimṛṣati. PTV., com. on I.

\(^{167}\) nahi prathamajñānakale bhedotrā āṣṭupātra, yatra vācyavācakaviśeṣayoh abhedaḥ. Ibid.

\(^{168}\) Tanmadhya eva tu paśyantyāṃ yatra bhedānāsasyāṣṭūrṇam. Ibid.

\(^{169}\) Madhyamā punah tayoreva vācyavācakayoḥ bhedamāmarṣyav samānādhikaraṇyena vimarṣasyāyopārā. Ibid.

\(^{170}\) vaikhari tu tadubhayabhedasphutatāmāyeyya. Ibid.

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between phonemes, but also between the various cognitive concepts, the moments of
time and so forth. In this direction, parā vāk as the foreground and her three descending
stages paśyanti, madhyamā and vaikhari are the way to show the subjugation of
nirvikalpakatā and vikalpakatā. Nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka terms are mutually
dependent. Although at the theory level, nirvikapakatā is absolutely independent
element, while vikalpakatā is subordinated by the former. Nirvikalpātmakatā is
connected to the transcendental elements like Parama Śiva, vimarśa, parā vāk. It is the
highest stage of vikalpatā, wherein no conventionality stays. Vikalpātmakatā is about
particular condition, character or mode in which something appears. In this manner, all
the terms of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy, particularly in the context of philosophy of
language, can be bifurcated into nirvikalpa and vikalpa. The nirvikalpaka refers to the
pure form as well as savikalpaka refers to the determinate form of jñāna and tattvas.
Particularly, vikalpātmaka aspect keeps concern with manifestation levels of limited
knowledge, mini-macro universe, conventional language, conventional thought, speech-
sounds, segments, partialness and imperfectness. Limitedness of appearing elements is
come from the influence of time, space and causality. So vikalpa provides space, time
and causality for taking place. Nirvikalpātmaka and vikalpātmaka is the stage or place
wherein everything gets development, from the subtlest to the grosser or the grossest.
The essence of each and everything is aham-vimarśa so it is the very aham-vimarśa
who passes from these stages. It appears in multiple forms. These stages open the door
for consideration of two principles, epistemology and ontology. Although, both
principles are mixed up with each other in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy, but these are
about to be dealt as distinct principles in different sections in the view of preference to
the deal with the philosophy of language.

(j) Process of Knowledge and Purṇa-Apurṇa Jñāna

The cognate of pūrṇa and apūrṇa jñāna is the essential part of the epistemology of vāk.
Pūrṇa and apūrṇa measure degree of the awareness of reality. Degree of awareness of
reality is the key principle for the process of knowledge. It decides purity and impurity,
completeness and incompleteness of knowledge. Degree of awareness is the
measurement for the limited, less limited, less complete, more complete and the most complete knowledge. On this basis, jñāna is measured through a couple of criteria:\footnote{171}{Jñānajñānasvarūpam yaduktam pratyekamapayadhi..... TA., 1.36.}

1. Pūrṇa jñāna

2. Apūrṇa jñāna, which is called ajñāna and mala also\footnote{172}{Malamajñānamicchanti sarśārāṅkurakāraṇam,
Iī proktain tatāḥ ca śrīmālinivijayottare. Ibid, 1.23.}.

Pūrṇa jñāna is the highest knowledge which presents itself into the form of aham vimarśā. It is the complete awareness of self-existence. It is called pūrṇa, because aham is the unified form of prakāśa and vimarśa. The notion of idam does not exist in aham. Idam is always related to the disunity that’s why it supports multiplicity of pramāṇa and prameya or jñātā, jñāna and jñeya, sabda and artha. The pūrṇatā of jñāna always stands with the pramāṇa. So, the unified aham always signifies integrated pramāṇa. Pramāṇa and prameya and jñāna and jñeya rest in pramāṇa. Pramāṇa, unified form of prakāśa and vimarśa, has capacity to burst into parts. However, this state is beyond to the time, space, causality and conventionality so it is the nirvikalpaka avasthā, where the whole world exists by the relation of tādātmya bhāva with the pramāṇa. Further, the aham-vimarśa appears into the triangle relative forms of jñātā-jñāna-jñeya.

The aham vimarśa is embodied in the parā vāk and it is not vikalpaka, because vikalpakatā signifies certainty, which implies two\footnote{173}{Ahām pratyavamarśo yaḥ prakāśātmāpi vāgyapuḥ,
Nāsau vikalpah sa hyutto dvayapēkṣā viniścayah. IPV., 1.6.1.}

The aham vimarśa rūpa pūrṇa jñāna is called nirvikalpaka or avikalpaka jñāna. Nirvikapaka is called bodha also. As giving up all mental activities, one is united to Śiva only, so the awareness without any thought-construct (avikalpa) is bodha.\footnote{174}{Vyāpāram mānasam tyaktvā bodharūpega yojayet. Śrv, com. on 3.19.} It is the stage of svātantrya-saṁvedanā.
Nirvikalpaka jñāna does not come into the range of utterance\textsuperscript{175}, that’s why it is uccārarahita vastu. The nirvikalpaka avasthā of parā vāk is everlasting. Even, the term vāk itself stands with such sound which shines in perpetum. It means that parā vāk is not the means of vikalpa i.e. determinacy. She is the only cause.

This nirvikalpa avasthā of pūrṇa jñāna is pursued by the vikalpa avasthā of apūrṇa jñāna\textsuperscript{176}. Before getting the form of multiple determinate knowledge from the indeterminate knowledge, there is a stage wherein the pramāṭā, pramāṇa and prameya have no divided status, they are one entity and called pramiti\textsuperscript{177}. Thereafter, the nirvikalpaka knowledge starts to burst into limited knowledge. Nirvikalpaka jñāna stays in nirvikalpaka saṁvid.

Nirvikalpaka jñāna and nirvikalpaka saṁvid belong to the same stage. The nirvikalpaka jñāna denotes the indeterminate knowledge while nirvikalpaka saṁvid signifies the indeterminate knower. Nirvikalpaka saṁvid is called unmeṣa, pratibhā etc. Nirvikalpaka saṁvid is the agent to relate the indeterminate and determinate knowledge. Indeterminate knowledge is not different from the determinate knowledge. Indeterminacy is the subtlest form of determinacy. But, indeterminate or nirvikalpaka is the more competent rather than determinate or vikalpaka, because it is not limited i.e. apūrṇa. That’s why nirvikalpaka saṁvid and nirvikalpaka jñāna are identical denotatively. The efficacy of nirvikalpaka saṁvid brings something within comprehension (determination) in unified form, because determinacy is about the segments, incompleteness, partiality, conventionality. Thus, it must be not so competent for integrity or unity which is one of the most essentials for the pragmatic world also. For, apprehension is based on integral understanding. Any apprehension or action is related to the unity. Thus, nirvikalpaka

\textsuperscript{175} Uccārarahitam vastu cetasaiva vicintayan—. Ibid, com. on 1.6.

\textsuperscript{176} Āśām hi prathamavikalpakamānasapratyakṣasviṣayavatamapyasti, anyathā
Tatprṣṭhabhāvino bubhukṣeyam iti vikalpasyodayo na syāt. Tā., com. on 1.75.

\textsuperscript{177} Naumi citpratibhām devīm parāma bhairavayoginīm.
Mātramānaprameyānśaśīlāmbujakṛtāspādām. Ibid, 1.2.
saññīvīḍ becomes cause for its subsequent suitability for the particular purpose (arthakriyāyogyatādīvaśa) and finally acquires confirmation as a state of the self and receives firm concurrence which precedes all successive determinate perceptions like blue etc. which are considered to be mutually incompatible. So, nirvikalpaka saññīvīḍ brings together these incompatible-partial-determinate elements blue, yellow determinate elements etc. and it makes them appear undivided and integrated comprehension, like the picture is percept integrally in which the difference of various parts is not marked or integral perception of a peacock’s tail. Nirvikalpaka consciousness has capacity of bringing about such a determinate consciousness. The avikalpaka is the cause of that kind of consciousness, even if any other cause would be supposed to be its origin; it will ultimately end only in that kind of undivided universal consciousness. The capacity of the nirvikalpaka aham-vimarśa brings about endless variety in manifestation. In the being of this nirvikalpaka consciousness, its svātantra of creativity never ceases. In vaikharī stage or in madhyamā, there is dominancy of subtle māyiya objectivity. This kind of bheda-vimarśa (apprehension) would have not been possible if it would be completely excluded from the nirvikalpaka saññīvīḍ. Determinate perception does not arise without the indeterminate consciousness because they lack the freedom for emerging by themselves. This freedom belongs only to the nirvikalpaka saññīvīḍ. Nirvikalpaka saññīvīḍ serves as means for the recollection of the conventional signs etc. also. Otherwise how could the recollection of conventionality etc. be possible without the experience of nirvikalpaka saññīvīḍ? Because the determinate knower is impermanent, jñāna is also

---tatra tu tathāvidhatve karaṇāntarasānvedanātākāryamāne’pi ca karaṇe punarapi tathāvidhabodhāvinirbhāgāmātraparyavasānāt tasayaiva avikalpasānvidādanaḥ tathā sāmartyam. Ibid.

"Evameṣa svapraṅkāsātikarūpo’pi artho yuktyā pradarśyate-yat yat svasāmartyordhūḍottarākārikārthakriyāyogyatādīvaśansāngasyāmāsatsatāvśāvāptāvicalasānādām virodhāvabhāṣaṃaṅkātaramitakavalkyamānānādiniṃgavikalpakapūrvaḥvāvī nirvikalpakasānvidāpam tattadvikalpanīyaviruddhābhimatanilāpīnyābhāsāvibhiḥ bhavati, yathā citrajñānasikharasthasaṃvīvamācacakabodhādi, "

"Asyām ca saṭṭāyamaśvāyamānapetam yato vaikhāryātman evam māyīye vedye’pi va madhyamāmaye dhāmī bhāsanātirekṣa na saṃbhāvyaḥ evam vimarśaḥ. Ibid.

"Vikalpānām ca avikalpam vinā nodyaḥ, svātantryāt. Ibid."
Kṣaṇika, so in the absence of permanent knower, who will be abode for the smṛti, saṃskāra etc.? The nirvikalpaka saṃvid is the permanent knower and smṛti, saṃskāra etc. stay here. In such consciousness, there is absence of limitation of time etc. thus the pratibhā (indeterminate consciousness) or nirvikalpaka saṃvid stays not only in the beginning and the end but in the intervening state also she stays. She is the origin of the emergence of the other present, past and future determinate apprehensions.

It always stays in the interval between two different nirvikalpaka jñānas, which are kṣaṇika by nature. One savikalpaka jñāna terminates and the other that is about to rise. There is interval between the two savikalpaka jñānas. In this gap, who does stay to link up the savikalpaka jñānas? In reply- nirvikalpaka saṃvid stays. It abides undivided among the endless determinate perceptions. That interval consists of consciousness only, otherwise (if consciousness is not present in the interval), on account of extirpation of the residual traces of consciousness caused by that interval or gap, memory, congruous link, etc. between the consciousness preceding the gap and the consciousness succeeding it would become impossible. So the determinate apprehension takes place immediately after the indeterminate one and the indeterminate consciousness remains uniformly the same in pure indeterminate form.

But the problem is that how nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka jñāna will be connected, because both are absolutely different from each other in nature? In reply- it has been said already that nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka are not different in essence. Nirvikalpaka is the subtest form of the savikalpaka jñāna. So they are not heterogeneous. There is no complete exclusion of the savikalpaka jñāna from the nirvikalpaka jñāna. Nirvikalpaka is the essence of savikalpaka. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the indeterminate consciousness and any other apprehension. The thought-constructs are not entirely detached from the indeterminate state of consciousness, which is only another kind of vikalpa. Nirvikalpaka saṃvid is able to

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182 Bhavati ca idamastamitodyadubhayavikalpaśnānāntarālavārti unnesapratibhādi sabdāgamagūnam nirvikalpakam saṣaṇvādvairūddhābhimanilādvikalpārvabhāvi. Ibid.
differentiates the various entities (bhāvās) from itself by its svātantrya sakti. All the processes of nirvikalpaka to savikalpaka are related to the parā vāk.

The vāk in the form of aham-pratyavamarśa is also the stage of nirvikalpa. Ahampratyavamarśa cannot be represented to be the nature of vikalpa. Therefore, in the case of nirvikalpaka samvid (I-consciousness) is the pratayavamarśa (self-consciousness) only and not determinate cognition (vikalpa). Nature of pratayavamarśa is said as prakāśasya viśuddhasaṁvidrupa, jīvitabhūta, sārasvabhāva, vicchedaśūnya, akalpita, ananyamukha, svātantryaviśruntirūpa183, while vikalpa is defined, vividhā kalpanā vividhatvena ca śaṅkitasya kalpo ‘nyavyavacchedanam vikalpaḥ, accordingly vikalpa is the act of constructing many images in consequence of contact with one object and then differentiating the object of cognition from all else, which is at first doubted to be. Fundamentally, there is no difference between nirvikalpa and vikalpa jñāna184, because each and every jñāna stays in form of nirvikalpa jñāna. On the next step, this very nirvikapā jñāna becomes vikalpaka jñāna receiving varieties of bhāva. Thus, nirvikalpaka jñāna is the cause of the arisen of vikalpaka jñāna.

(k) Apūrṇa Jñāna

Apūrṇa jñāna is the partial knowledge which is the cause of vikalpas. Vikalpa is to be promoted duality. It determines jñāna so that determined world comes in existence. This determination is occurred through the parāmarśmayī vāk, who is vimarśamayi at the level of pūrṇa jñāna. Thus, parā vāk is the cause and paśyanti, madhyamā and vaikharī are the places where pūrṇa jñāna rūpa aham vimarśa gets shrink and shrink and at last appears in the form of vikalpas. At the grossest level of vaikharī, knowledge and world is manifested as ‘this is this’ by the superimposition185. In this manner, vikalpa is the key

183 Prakāśasya viśuddhasaṁvidrupasya dehādiśaṁsparsaṁśaṁbhiṁśaṁ yañ āum ā jīvitabhūtaḥ sārasvabhāva vicchedaśūnya ‘ntarabhāsyapagamakalpo ‘nanyamukhapreśīsvatantryaviśruntirūpāḥ ahamiitī pratayavamarśaḥ asau vikalpo na bhvati. IPV., com. on 1.6.1.
185 Antḥ saṁvidī satsarvam vadyapavaparathā dhiyī.

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principle for the *apūrṇa jñāna* as both are identical. After getting āśyānatayā, *vimarśa* is ready to manifest into the forms of multiple elements, now this very *vimarśa* turns to *vikalpa*. That *vikalpa* is very limited to one ābhāsa only, since it is not able to reach by the other ābhāsa. These *vikalpaka jñānas* are associated identically with the *śabdas* which are made of *varṇas*.

*Savikalpa jñāna* is expressed through the language, which gives name and form. The process is dependent on object i.e. *vastu*. *Vastu* is constructed in determinate form during the process of *savikalpa*, thus without *vastu*, there is no use of *savikalpa jñāna*, whereas the *nirvikalpa jñāna* is self-governed *jñāna*. The one and only indetermined *sāṇīvid* manifests itself in many forms relatively to the different *padārthha* through the *vimarśa*. Thus, there are two stages of *vikalpa*. At the first stage, *aham-aham* and *idam-idam* is experienced. At the second stage, experience occurs like *idam aham eva*.

*Vikalpa* deals with the fragmented reality, because *māyā* veils the caliber of perfection in each context through its five associated. There may be *bodha* or *jñāna* without the sense of doer-ship or I consciousness (which is the loss of *kārttva-*)

Prāne dehe'thavā kasmīsasamkrāmetkena vā katham.

Tathāpi nirvikalpe'sminvikalpo nāsti tam vinā,

Drṣṭe 'pyadṛṣṭakalpatvam vikalpena tu niścayaḥ. TA., 5.14-5.

186 *Vimarśa* eva hi āśyānatayā bhedaprāṇatvādaviṣuddhādhiṣṭrayāno vikalpa iti ucyate. Ibid, com. on 15.350.

187 —*vikalpo 'pi udayamāno varṇarāśi-samārābdha-tattadvicātāsabdārūṣitaiveti 'pi na tādṛṣṭena varṇapūjijātmanā sakticakreṣa nyujyate. PTV, com. on karikā 1.

188 *Savikalpakaṁnasapratyakṣaviśayatve 'pyāsāṁ na kaściddeśalḥ, tasya vastvāśrayatvēna pramāṇatvābhupagamāḥ. TA., com. on 1.75.

189 Vastuto hyata eveyam kālam samvinna samsṭrēṣat,

Ata ekaiva samvitirnāraupe tathā tathā.

Vindānā nirvikalpāpi vikalpo bhāvagocare------. Ibid, 7.30-1.

190 *Vikalpaṁca sarvātmanā artham jñātum na śaknoti- niyatānābhiniveśtvāt tasya.... Ibid, com. on 1.76.
svātantrya) or there may be the sense of doer-ship without bodha or jñāna, which is the loss of jñāna-svatanrya, this is the ānava mala in two ways both of which are due to one’s loss of the grip of one’s essential nature. Thus, seeing partial reality is essentially vikalpa, because its fundamental act is to ensure bheda, which is ensued by akhyātirupa ajñāna. The whole process of savikalpa is executed by bhedita pramāṇa who determines the pervasive element in narrow form through the apiṇḍa ajñāna. In this manner, the unlimited entity is perceived in the limited form. The additional reason for calling it vikalpa is that the process of getting limited is related to the śabda. At the level of psycho-physical body, vikalpa is originated by the mana, because the mana is the nature of samkalpātmaka that’s why it is vikalpa. It means relation with speech does not indicate ‘determinacy’, because it is different from the sound, which is of the nature of an object and such can be perceived through the sense of hearing. Vikalpa is the continuous flow of the idea of that object.

Thus, connecting to the determinate present stage with the previous one, which is due to the revival of impressions (in the case of limited subject, which has definite temporal, spatial and formal limitations), is also a determinacy, because it is related to shining separately as limited. Smṛti (memory), sanāskāra are different forms of

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191 Taduktam śrīpratyabhijñāyām:

Svātantryakāṇ̄irbodhahāya svātantryasyāpyabodhathā.

Dvīdhāyavam malamidam svasvarūpāpaḥānītaḥ. Šev, com. on 1.2.

192 TA., com on 1: Vikalpo hi bheda-prathātmakah, sa catva akhyātirūpaḥ adajñānam iti bahūktaṃ.

193 Avikalpanamitī-svātmābhedena parāmarśah bhedītasaiva pramāṇaprameyāderarthaḥsa


194 Śabdārūṣaṛaṇā jñānam vikalpaḥ kila kathyate----. Ibid, 7.33.

195 Iti nityā samkalpaṁatavat vikalpaḥ----. Ibid, 1.73.

196 Tatāḥ tatpratayapravāharūpā vikalpaḥ----. Šev, com. on 1.10.

197 Kādācitaṁabhāse yā pūrvābhāsādīvyānā,

Sanskārātikalpanā proka sāpi bhinnāvabhāsini. IPV, com. on: 1.6.6.

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vikalpa. Vikalpa contains the sāṃskāras through the repetition of śravaṇa and cintana. The development of sāṃskāras in the vikalpa passes through 4 stages of subtle to gross. These four levels are asphuṭa, sphuṭatam yogya, sphuṭanomukha and pūrṇa sphuṭa. Vikalpa is the incomplete knowledge, which manifests through the descend stages of parā vak. These stages are parā, paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī. Thus the limited knowledge is manifested by the sabdas. Basically knowledge is appeared by the sabdas.

Fundamentally, only siddha vastu is known by vikalpa. So, where subject is already siddha, in that case, there is no need of pramāṇa. Vikalpa is the cause to separate a vastu which is grhīta (already known) by nirvikalpa. So, vikalpa is the grāhaka of grhīta (knower of already known). Grāhakatva is nowhere in vikalpa, then how one will say that ‘I know this’. Here, nirvikalpa vimarśa works and vikalpa vimarśa gets ability to say that I know this. One may ask that jñāna is jñāpaka, not kāraka, so it is able to do jñāpī rather than siddhi. Then why it is said that siddha vastu is able to adhigata by vikalpa? Answer is- sphurattā is the siddhi of vastu. Vikalpa is nirvikalpa in its real nature, so it has also sphurattā. Still it is not able to create siddhi, because vikalpa is smṛti which does not need vastu.

Abhinavagupta explains baudha and pauruṣa jñāna under the section of baudha and pauruṣa ajñāna in the context of mokṣa in the first chapter of Tantraloka and Tantrasāra. Baudha jñāna and ajñāna both have relation with the vikalpa, either sūdhā vikalpa or asūdhā vikalpa. Now the question is that where does both ajñāna come from? How do they get existence? And what is the relation between caitanya or consciousness and both ajñāna? To get answer, some facts must be known, so-

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198 Sarvā vikalpah smṛtih-----. TA., ṭom. on 1.89.

199 Caturṣrveva vikalpeṣu yah samskārah kramādassau,
Asphuṭah sphuṭatābhāvi prasphuṭansphuṭitāmakaḥ. Ibid, 4.4.

200 ---sphurattāvā vaṣṭunāḥ siddhīḥ. Ibid, ṭom. on 1.182.

201 Iha jñānam mokṣakārānam, bandhanimittasya ajñānasya virodhakatvāt. Dvividham ca ajñānam, buddhiṣgataṁ pauruṣam ca. TS., Prathama āhnika, p. 6.
1. Nothing is unconsciousness, everything is caitana or caitanya, so citikriya is sarvasamanyarupa\(^2\).

2. Ajñāna is not the absence of jñāna\(^3\), contrary to this, dvaitaprathātmaka apūrṇa jñāna is ajñāna\(^4\).

3. Ajñāna is mala\(^5\), which is the cause of ‘samsārāṅkuraṇa’. It is of three forms āṇava, māyīya and kārma\(^6\).

So, the nirvikalpaka jñāna rupa samvid is veiled by malas and kaṅcukas and brings about the consciousness of difference and plurality. The pūrṇa jñāna is manifested in the form of apūrṇa jñāna. For the most part, apūrṇa jñāna and ajñāna is meant to refer baudha jñāna and ajñāna rather than pauruṣa jñāna. To reveal the motive of this preference, Jayarath’s remarks is pretty important as he says that ‘pauruṣa jñāna and its related action dikṣā’ is not so competent, until and unless the baudha jñāna proceeds. So, baudha jñāna is greatly significant\(^7\). When Abhinavagupta talks about apūrṇa jñāna and ajñāna, it means he is referring baudha jñāna mostly.

Determinate knowledge is the internal process, which is totally depends on vimarsana, but it is deeply associated with the outer world, which is made of innumerable ābhāsas. There is no use of determinate knowledge in the absence of ābhāsas. Same way, there is no significance of ābhāsas also without the determinate knowledge. Their relation is nothing but the process of getting connection of name and form. One

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\(^2\) Iha na kiñcidadpya bhavati iti citikriyā sarvasamanyarūpā iti. TA., com. on 1.28-30.

\(^3\) Ajñānamiti na jñānābhāvaścātiprasaṅgatāḥ. Ibid, 1.25.

\(^4\) Ato jñeyasya tattvasya sāmastyenāprathātmakam.

\(^5\) Malamajñānamicchanti sāṁśārāṅkurāṅkāraṇam. Ibid, 1.23.

\(^6\) Āṇava-māyīya-kārmamalāvärttavat. PH., com. on sūtra 7.

\(^7\) Pauruṣajñānābhāvyaḥjñāne dikṣā tāvannya prabhavedvādasya baudham jñānam pūrvabhāvi na syāt, yenāsya tato’pi prādhānāyamuktam. TA., com. on 1.46.
determinate knowledge is related to the one ābhāsa. Determinate knowledge is so called because, on account of its residual trace, it has continuous existence till it serves its well known desired purpose, it cannot be destroyed before that. But if it be destroyed in the middle, it is not determinate knowledge. The word is the very life of this determinate knowledge. Determinate cognition entirely depends on the use of words. Hence it refers to each ābhāsa separately. One word is used for one manifestation only, which is free from all associations of other ābhāsas, e.g. jar or red. Here, each word, stands for separate ābhāsa, so, the word appears the ābhāsa jar only, it does not convey the idea of time or place etc. of the thing. Hence the means of right knowledge operates only an isolated ābhāsa which is very much like a universal and admits of no specification, because it is not mixed up with the other ābhāsas of time and place etc. Even the word ‘this’ refers to the manifestation in front, merely as such and not to one that is mixed up with other ābhāsas. In spite of separate word for ābhāsa, determinate cognition occurs as whole because of nirvikalpaka jñāna. Even in nirvikalpaka jñāna i.e. in the consciousness of jar etc. universals etc. shine, yet they don’t clearly shine there. The universal, relation, action, substance space etc. shine clearly when the two related clearly figure in determinate consciousness. The chain of successive momentary existence starts, when we grasp together all the parts and hold together the limited and limiting, respectively. Therefore it is established that the universal etc. are grasped through the determinative function of mind.

*Anubhava and anusañkhāna are come in vikalpa jñāna. Anubhva is mānasa pratyakṣa*\(^\text{208}\), which is born by the vikalpa only\(^\text{209}\). Vikalpa is born by the mana. The vastu that is atīndriya, is not related to mānasa pratyakṣa. So, first, nirvikalpaka mānasa pratyakṣa occurs. Thereafter, savikalpaka mānasa pratyakṣa happens\(^\text{210}\). Savikalpaka mānasa pratyakṣa is occurred by the vastu, but this vastu is not like ghaṭa (pot). The

\(^{208}\) Anubhāvo mano’dhyakṣaḥ prasiddhāḥ kṣudvyathā ca tṛṣṭa. *Ibid*, com. on 1.75.

\(^{209}\) Anubhāvo vikalpottho vikalpo mānasāḥ sa ca. *Ibid*.

\(^{210}\) Āsāṁ hi prathamamavikalpakamānasapratyakṣaviśayatvamapyasti, anyathā tatprṣṭhakbḥāvino bhuhkṣeyam iti vikalposyodayo na syāt. *Ibid*, com. on 1.76.
savikalpaka mānasā²¹¹ pratyakṣa is occurred at mana. So, the first experience is called anubhava and on the basis of anubhava, anusaṅḍhāna occurs. Same division is applied on the consciousness²¹². Like I am śiva is anubhava and I am this at the stage of sadāśiva is anusaṅḍhāna (unification)²¹³. Limited knower also has same types of experiences²¹⁴, like I am fat and further I, who was fat, not am thin.

All the indeterminate and determinate knowledge exists in the mind of subject or knower. The subject determines even when he is still in the sphere of indeterminacy. But the internal sense makes the appearances, such as action and relation etc., manifest by means of its activity which follows close upon indeterminate experience and is outside the latter, is of nature of ascertainment and is called reaction (anuvyavasāya). These appearances rest on unity and multiplicity. But, how can determinate cognition (vikalpa) touch (have for its object) that which is illumined by sense-perception and is indeterminate? In reply, the subject is the same self-consciousness as was present in the former indeterminate experience. His impression of former experiences consists at the time of determinative activity. As the former indeterminate experience illumines its object, the characteristics of which are self-confined, so does vikalpa, which is merely an action of the subject, who is one with the former experience. The subject has same objects as that of former indeterminate experience. The subject is said to have the impression of the former indeterminate cognition in so far as that former indeterminate cognition persists in him even at the time of differentiation.

(I) Elements of Determination

²¹¹ Vikalpo mānasāḥ sūkṣmaḥ----. Ibid, com. on 1.76.

²¹² Dvividho 'pi cāyam 'aham-pratyayo' dvidhā-anubhavamātṛaraścānusaṅḍhānāmī ca----. IPV., com. on 1.6.4-5.

²¹³ ---śivātmani 'ahamiti' sadāśivātmani 'ahamidamiti' śuddho dvidhā. Ibid.

²¹⁴ Asuddho 'pi 'aham sthūla' iti, yo 'ham sthūlo 'bhavam, so 'ham kṛṣo, bālo yuvā sthavirah, sa eva 'aham' iti ca aśuddho dvividhāḥ. Ibid.
Determinacy is the act of constructing many images in consequence of contact with one object. But the accomplishment of the process of determination includes many components. These components are-

(i) **Adhyāsa and Samāropa**

Samāropa or adhyāsa is related to the superimposition. But super-imposition of what? Where is imposition possible? It is possible between two heterogeneous things or homogeneous things? In reply, there is nothing which stands against the prakāśavimarśamaya samvit. So, the prakāśa cannot be aprakāśa, because samāropa is always of something which belongs to the same category. The aprakāśa has never been found to have the causal efficiency of the prakāśa. Even if, ‘non-light’ be supposed to shine or exists, then it is no non-light rather that is also prakāśa.

The first step of adhyāsa is ‘differentiating the object of cognition from all else’, which is at first doubted to be. The variety involves in determinacy is due to the fact that through the sense-contact with the fire, there is arisen of the idea of possibility of non-fire also. It is superimposed on the fire at first and then rejected. Thus it implies both fire and not-fire. Therefore, in determinacy, there is always differentiation of what the object of cognition is what from what it is not. Therefore, the possibility of appearance of both jar and cloth at the one place occurs, where jar alone is present, this is samāropa. The ascertainment ‘this is jar’ has the distinctive feature of determinacy, which depends upon the operation of the power of differentiation.

But, how can be the determinate perception of jar, which arises on the basis of the indeterminate perception, negate non-jar? For, nobody has mentioned even its name. And how can the residual trace of not-jar arise on perception of jar? In reply, subject is different from means of cognition. He is perfectly free in the sphere of cognitions. He is a free agent, because he is responsible for samyojana (unification) and viyojana

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(differentiation) of cognitions\textsuperscript{217}. And all the objects shine within that subject. These objects have essentially of the nature of pure consciousness only and shine as one with the subject, exactly in the manner in which in a city shines in a mirror. Thus, both the images of ‘this’ i.e. ‘jar’ and ‘not-this’ i.e. not-jar are present within the subject. Therefore, in the state of indeterminacy, jar is one with pure-consciousness and like the latter, it is uniform and perfect. But, no worldly transaction can be possible without the unification of cognitions. They are unified because of oneness of the prakāśa\textsuperscript{218}.

(ii) **Apohana**

Since the samāropa is not possible without the apohana. The differentiation comes at the level of māyā only. Therefore the subject, while manifesting the activity of māyā, splits this perfect being i.e. manifests it as delimited. He differentiates jar from not-jar, self and cloth etc. The differentiation consists in negation. It is the chief characteristics of apohana. And we speak of certainty about the jar -this is the jar and nothing else on the basis of that very negation nature of apohana only. This is the essential part of savikalpatā. The determinacy cuts a thing off on all sides from everything else. Śiva creates variety of forms because of its free will, by separating the objects. By means of his power of apohana, which is the helper of knowledge and remembrance\textsuperscript{219}, he creates form.

(iii) **Saṁskāra**

\textsuperscript{217} Iha pramātā nāma pramāṇādattiriktaḥ pramāsa svatantrah samyojanaviyojanādyādhāravaśat kartā darśitaḥ, tasya ca pramāṇurutah savarṣṭhāvabhāṣaḥ, cinmātraśariro ’pi tatsāmānādhikaranyakavyāvṛttirapi darpāpanagaranyāyenāsti-ityapi uktam. Ibid, com. on 1.6.3.

\textsuperscript{218} Tadāisyena vinā na svātsamvidām lokapaddhatih.

Prakāśaikyāttadkatavam mātaikah sa iti sthitam. Ibid, 1.8.10.

\textsuperscript{219} svātmābhavadhanānābhāvāṇstantadapohanaśantakataḥ. Chindanyah svecchāyā citrārupakṛtam stumah śivam.

Ibid, 1.6.
How is this unification possible in the case of separate limited subject? Reply is, because of impression i.e. remembrance, due to the revival of impressions, caused by the former experiences. In the case of the subject as vital air, this unification of two stages is based on feelings of strength and weakness. In the case of buddhi as subject, it is based on varying degrees of knowledge and pleasure etc. Similarly, in the case of unification of two stages of a jar also happens, ‘this is that very jar’ determinacy has to be admitted. But as in all these unifications vidyā śakti (the power of knowledge) flashes predominantly, like lighting.

(iv) Smṛti

Smaraṇa is smṛti, which is different to anubhava and prayabhijñā. It is called śakti of parameśvara. This is the mantra svarupa. Smṛti is the pūrvavarti of all bhāvās. It is the vyavasthāpaka of the svarūpa of anubhavaniya padārtha220. Before the arising of vācya-vācaka, everything stays in the form of saṃskāra rūpa spandamayī sphūrtā. Without this, the empirical arising is not possible. She presents svarūpa of vastu.

There is difference in manifestation (ābhāsa) in perception and in remembrance. External manifestation of the object, which shines within, without intervention of another (the residual trace), is perfectly clear. Manifestation, with the intervention of residual traces, because of its not having taken place at that very time, is indistinct. In perception, in which the objects are externally manifested and the manifestation occurs due to the svātantra, but in remembrance etc. it occurs due to the residual traces of the former experiences221. In the direct perception, this is nila makes ‘what shining within’ manifest externally. The external shining of the objects, which are within the self, is due to the freedom and not due to the impressions. In remembrance, imaginations and determinate

220 Smṛtiśca smaraṇam pūrvam sarvabhāveśu vastutaḥ.
Mantrasvarupam tadbhāvyasvarūpāpatītyojakam. TA., 5.137.

221 Kintu naisargiko jīone bahirābhāsānātmani,
Pūrvānubhavarūpastu sthitah sa smaraṇādiṣu. IPV., 1.6.9.
cognitions, following on the back of direct perception, the objects blue etc. lie within the subject, are externally manifested. Residual trace is continued existence of the experience, in another time also.

(v) **Krama Mūrti vaicitrya and Kriyā Vaicitrya**

The *kriyā sakti* in the Parama Śiva has no succession, yet because of it is responsible for the manifestation of succession in action in the limited subjects. At the level of *parā vāk*, the underlying reality of all objects is one, because of its recognition as such. When it takes the variety of conflicting forms, they turn unable to shine simultaneously. They start to shine in succession and make it one substratum of action\(^{222}\). *Kāla* in reality is nothing else than the succession, observable in the movement of the sun etc., in birth of different flowers and in summer and winter\(^{223}\). Succession depends upon differences (*bheda*). Variety of existence of certain manifestation and non-existence of another are brought about by the Parama Śiva himself. There are two types of *krama-*

1. **Mūrti vaicitrya**

2. **Kriyā vaicitrya**

The word *mūrti* means the body of the objects and vaicitrya means variety. Thus, by means of manifestation of the variety of external bodies such as house, courtyard, market, temple, garden and forest, each of which is different from the rest. The spatial successions such as distant and near, wide and narrow etc. are made manifest by the *parameśvara*. When, the stronger recognition takes place, the experience, ‘this is essentially the same hand’ arises and though there is no essential change in the body, yet formal differences appear, then the variety of forms arises, which cannot coexist in the

\(^{222}\) *tasmat pratyabhijnānabalāt eko 'pi asau padārthātma svabhāvabhedaṁ viruddhān yāvat angikurute tāvat te virodhādeva kramarūpatāya nīrbhāsamānāh tamekam kriyāśryam sampādayanti, iti tataśca sambandhādīnāmapi upapattiriti. Ibid, com. on 1.9.1.

\(^{223}\) *Kālaṁ sūryādīnāṁcārastattatpsūḥdijanma vā, Śīloṣne vāthā tallaksiṇḥ karma eva sa tattvataḥ. Ibid*, 1.9.3.
same body, because the forms are contrary to one another, is spoken of as action. He makes the temporal succession manifest, through manifestation of variety of forms, involved in action, limited or unlimited in their nature as related to one, that is freely constructed.

The universal consciousness itself shines in this manner. Its omnipotence consists shining in that manner. No law of contradiction can be effective in the case of shining itself. Essential nature of contradiction is the shining of one as negation of another\(^{224}\). The temporal and spatial succession belongs to the sphere of the manifested. But the subject is not the manifested. He is manifested to none; rather all are manifested to him. How it is then that temporal and spatial succession are experienced to him as ‘was, am and shall be and I am sitting in the house, forest or temple. The answer is- variety of manifestations of forms, which is the basis of the idea of temporal succession in all things, shines to the limited subject only, such as śūnya. It does not shine to the universal subject, whose light is eternal\(^{225}\). To shine is not the essential nature of limited subject śūnya, because it is insentient like other objects blue etc. Its shining as subject consists in the slight stir in the light of consciousness. Therefore, when what is absent, as in the case of body, subject is absent, the state of senselessness, then the continuity of its shining is broken. Thus there is a temporal succession in the limited subject is due to being and not-being of manifestations as in I am no longer a child, now I am young. And because the empirical subject is identified with the limited I-consciousness, therefore the temporal succession is evident in it. It is such subject who is responsible for the appearance of temporal succession in external objects e.g. I was a boy and a jar also had simultaneous existence with me as such.

Spatial succession also shines only in the limited subject, body, vital air or śūnya, as here I am sitting. It shines to object also because of their relation to him e.g. ‘that

\(^{224}\) Bhāsanābhāva eva hi virodhatatvam----. Ibid, com. on 2.1.5.

\(^{225}\) Sarvatrabhāṣabhedo'pi bhavekālakramākaraḥ,

Vicchinnabhāsaḥ śūnyādermaturbhātasya no sakṛt. Ibid, 2.1.6.
which is in close proximity is near and that which is contrary to it is far. The spatial succession is also in things shines to the limited subject only. To the universal subject the object shine as identical with itself, therefore as beyond to the all limitations, like the self itself. But, in reality no succession exists. In the case of ordinary individuals, caitra and maitra etc. also, the act of cooking is nothing else than the inner desire -let me cook and because of this desire it is that even when he is connected with various other movements than those of cooking, such as putting the pot on oven, the consciousness I cook remains unbroken. It is the very desire, expressed as I cook, which manifests itself as the various movements. In that desire in reality there is no succession. Similarly in the case of the parama pramātā also the determinate consciousness in the form of will let me lord over, let me shine, let me move and let me be self-conscious is in reality nothing else than I consciousness in its essential nature and there is nothing like succession in it. But when the desire in the form let me cook- assuming the form of movements, associated with the body, shines as affected by succession. His kriyā śakti is represented in two ways:

1. It is the capacity to create action, characterized by succession (kramarūpakriyānirmāṇasāmartyam).

2. It is the capacity to be affected by the action, characterized by succession (kramarūpakriyoparāgayaogaśca).

(vi) Sambandha

The objects are unified in so far as they are mutually connected in one subject. They constitute the basis of the idea of sambandha. It is one in itself and consists in standing of two things. There are two considerable elements in terms of sambandha-

---paramēśvarasya tu sā asti iti ubhayathā asya kriyāśaktih kramarūpakriyānīmāṇasāmartyam kramarūpakriyoparāgayaogaśca. Ibid, com. on 2.1.8.

Swātmanīṣṭhā viviktabhā bhāvā ekapramātari,
Anyonyānāvayaraśāpyayujyaj sambandhadhipadam. Ibid, 2.2.4.

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1. Unity and

2. Diversity, which fall simultaneously, then they constitute the basis of the idea of relation ‘king’s man’.

Since the kriyā śakti is the source for sambandha, thus all kārakās, which are related to kriyā, are nothing but relations. The mutual relation of kārakās, where on the powers of agent (kariṣṭākā) etc. rest and of the things, which is perceived, such as subject, the object and means of knowledge, is due to internal right-consciousness of predicate of a particular type. Without internal right consciousness of predicate a thing is not directly perceived as related to another. The relation of the powers of kārakās with the things, whereon they rest, is also due to determinate consciousness of predicate. Things and the powers are directly related to predicate. Thus, it is the glorious universal power of action, which manifests relation of so many types. The form of two objects—which are determinately cognized as external to the subject and separate from each other e.g. this is before, behind or far away from that, if it be at first conceived as a unity in the mind, then be visualized as diversity and lastly be cognized to rest on unity—is dik. Only in some cases this relation admits of being called different name e.g. to indicate the particular type of relation of those who have dew-lap etc. which can be presented by one word as cows, the word relation is substituted by universals etc. for practical purpose. But when another word cannot be used, the word relation is retained. Accordingly, all measures of land, grain and gold etc. and all this is included in them, such as small and big etc. and number and separateness etc. are the forms of relation only. Even those, who hold the universal to be something different from the relation, admit the inference (samavāya) to be very life of it. As for the kārakās, it always depends upon/predicate (kriyā) and the letter entirely rests on time. And time, the essence of everything through action, itself depends upon

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228 Kriyāvīmārasvāsyaḥ kārakāṇāṃ samanvayāḥ,
AvadhyavadhīmahāvānvyāśAMBĀ digādhiḍhāḥ. Ibid. 2.2.6.

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relation. Therefore, the practical life in all its various aspects entirely depends upon relation\textsuperscript{229}.

It means in a sentence every word comes through relation, and relation is nothing but a form of action. So accordingly, action is most dominant factor to decide the relation of words and helps for coming out meaning. Time is also one form of action. The essential nature of relation is that its multiplicity is outside the subject but its unity is within the subject, because the forms of the terms of relation mutually embrace each other\textsuperscript{230}. The determinate cognitions grasp the manifestation as universal (jāti). These universal shines (not in unity, which is within the subject and multiplicity, which is outside, is just as a type of relation. When universal shines, their two characteristic are cognized\textsuperscript{231}.

1. They rest on multiplicity, characterized by diversity of individuals (subsumed under it) which is outside the subject and

2. The unity of the universal that penetrates into all individuals and as such is outside the subject.

For instance, when one perceives a number of cows and say cow, he has the consciousness of individual cows, separate from one another. This consciousness is responsible for the use of plural number. At the same time he is also conscious of the characteristic that shines in each individual cow. Because of this consciousness, he

\textsuperscript{229} Iti, yadapi ca kārakam tadapi kriyāmukhapreki, sāpi kālam prāgēśvaram āśrayati, so'pi kriyādvāreṇa sarvabhāvān, sāpi sambandham uddharyati iti sambandhandhādhīnaiva iyaṃ citra lokayātrā.

\textsuperscript{230} --sa ca eṣa rūpaśeṣa ekaeva ubhayoh cidātmani tathā avasthānārūpah pūrvapratilabhasamvitpratीṣṭhe tata eva adhikasamvinnamajjanāt anābhāsāmānaprakābhavanalakṣapāsāvāṇītra viśrāmyati, iti tattraiva samāskanditapuruṣaparamārtha'i, evam bahiranekatā, antastu paraspararūpāśeṣānai kyam, iti sambandhasya rūpam. Ibid, com. on 2.2.4.

\textsuperscript{231} Jātiḥdravyāvabhasānām bahirapye karūpān, Vyāktyekadesaśabhedam cāpyālambante vikalpanāḥ. Ibid, 2.2.5.
recognizes the meaning of one noun in all individuals. Both of them are outside the subject. The person points out them by means of figure, saying these. The only thing is to be kept in mind is that their externality also presupposes their being within the true light of consciousness. Therefore the admission of both unity and multiplicity in the case of universal etc. does not admit of any adverse criticism, just as in the case of consciousness of variegated color. The internal unity of the universal is due to the relation. Similarly, the determinate cognitions, grasping the whole such as jar that shines objectively, do not refer to internal unity and external multiplicity. It refers to the external unity due to joining of part without any gap and multiplicity, due to parts, taken separately. Jar shines as a unity because of its parts being closely joined together, and also as extended.

Thus, when an object, that shines, in such a manner as does not bring satisfaction to be percipient so long as it rests within itself and has its form fully determined only when it rests on the determinate cognition of another object, then we have a relation, which is nothing but a manifestation of the universal kriyā śakti. There may be a relation in reference to another object, just as some maintain that in the number etc. inherence (samavāya) is involved. In this case the infinite regress, though it may be there, is not fault, just as in the case of creation, connected with the future, the grasp of the creation, connected with the past is not adversely affected. Therefore, there is no fear of basic relation being disproved.

(vii) Universal

The determinate cognitions, which grasp the manifestation universal, shines not in unity. The unity is within the subject. Multiplicity is outside just as does the relation. Universals rest on multiplicity, characterizes by diversity of individuals (subsumed under) which is outside the subject and on unity of the universals which penetrates through all individuals
and as such is outside the subject\textsuperscript{232}. Like when we perceive the number of cows and says cow, we have the consciousness of individual cows, separate from one another. It is this consciousness which is responsible for the use of plural number. At the same time, we are also consciousness of a characteristic that shines in each individual cow. And it is because of this consciousness of the characteristic that we recognize the meaning of one noun in all individuals. Both of them shine outside the subject. The universals are grasped is through determinate function of mind. Samvṛti is the determinate cognition\textsuperscript{233}.

\textbf{(g) Pratyabhijñā}

Pratyabhijñā and savikalpakatā are the different aspects of one element. Pratyabhijñā is the state, after which the determinate accomplishes. Fundamentally, pratyabhijñā is to show the permanent self or knower. It may be explained at many levels. In essence it is the synthetic knowledge. Navjivan Rastogi explains its meaning in the context of Kashmir Śaiva\textsuperscript{234}:

'Recognition is the re-knowing or re-acquainting (prati+abhijñāna) of the same object. It is unitary knowledge. Recognition is a process of unification of an object that has appeared (bhāta) once with the object that is appearing (bhāsamāna) at that moment, as for example in this judgement—that is that John. This element of 'sameness' is an outcome of identity, not similarity, of the two experiences. The verbal components of the Sanskrit term Pratyabhijñā e.g., prati, abhi and jñā stand respectively for pratipa (opposite) or pratisarādhāna (redirecting), ābhimukhya (readiness to encounter) and jñāna (knowledge). Pratipa conveys the same meaning as does its English counterpart ‘opposite’ (e.g., ‘opposite my house’ which means ‘in front of my house’). That is to say the knowledge (jñāna) of an object, when it reverts (pratipa) and faces the knower (abhimukha), is styled as recognition, viz. which was apprehended in the past is being apprehended presently. Hence prati-saṁbandha by implication means uniting or joining together.

\textsuperscript{232} Jātyavabhāsasya avabhāsamānārūpāyāḥ jāteḥ grāhikāyāḥ kalpanāḥ, tā na kevalam sambandhavat antar ekārūpātām bahiśca anekārūpātām ālambante, yāvat bhārapi vyaktibhedalakṣaṇam anākyaṃ bahireva ca tadāroṣadātaḥreṇām ekatām ālambanatvam nayanti, gāva iti hi prati-bhāse prthak ca tā bahir vyaktayo bhānti, yena ca bahuvacanam,-----. \textit{Ibid}, com. on 2.2.5

\textsuperscript{233} Evam hi samvṛti vikalpabuddhiḥ-----. \textit{Ibid}, com. on 2.2.3

In simple words, the meaning would be that our touch with previously known object is lost through the passage of time and the same is restored at the time of subsequent apprehension by reviving the memory.

Thus, *pratyabhijñā* occurs through the unification of experiences. It refers to an object directly. The result of *pratyabhijñā* is that the distinction between oneself and others is being absent in the agent. Indeed there is the potentiality of recognition because the self is ever shining. *Pratyabhijñā* is the determinate cognition because this is the same object—here—this is determinate and it is nothing more than determinate of identity of the objects of past and present cognitions. And this *pratyabhijñā* is the very life of indeterminate cognition. It makes the chief objective manifestation of the sameness shines. It is described *ubhayaja* (arising from two), that is one that arises from the determinate and indeterminate both. That connotes the determinate apprehension and this refers to the indeterminate. The existential apprehension is the indeterminate whereas the apprehension with all attributes is determinate. So, synthesizing of two cognitive objects is the determinate function. Indeterminate knowledge does not need means of knowledge because there is no diversity whereas the determinate knowledge needs means of knowledge and recognition is essential in this context.

Thus, the determinate knowledge, having the innate capacity, becomes perceptible. In that act, the intricacy of aforesaid-determining-tools becomes absolutely necessary. One thing is important is that language must present in every element and task. It makes realize its present in the form of *parā vāk, śabdana, abhilāpana, vimārsa, parāmarśa, nirvikalpaka, savikalpaka* and so on. All understanding is due to use of words. Even, *saṁśaya* or *viparyaya*, every type of *vimārsa* is due to vāg, i.e. *vāgvimārśana*²³⁵. That’s why Advaitic Kashmir Śaiva philosophy may be called linguistic philosophy also. Even if the creative principle is *parā vāk*, in that case, what will be away from her? How indispensible she is in the linguistic Kashmir Śaiva philosophy, is perceptible by her upcoming aspect that is *parā vāk* as *āgama pramāṇa*.

²³⁵ *Viparyayena, saṁśayen-api vāyavimārśati tāvat saṁvedayata eva, sa ca vāgvimārśakṛta eva.*

_P.T.V_, com. on 6-7-8-9.
4. ÁGAMA PRAMĀṆA

Parā vāk is the source of cognition. Either indeterminate or determinate knowledge, both is constructed by the parā vāk. Basically naming and shaping to the world occurs by the creativity of vāk. All these functions occur at internal level. That’s why the rudiment task of parā vāk is parāmarśana of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka jñāna. So, parā vāk is the principle of the epistemology. The one aspect of epistemology has been dealt in the chapter which is absolutely related to the emergence of jñāna. But this aspect will be incomplete if we do not talk about the succeeding process. The succeeding process is absolutely related to the determinate knowledge, which is about the pragmatic world. The pragmatic world is known by the parā vāk as pure determinate knowledge. Here, parā vāk becomes the one of means i.e. pramāṇas. From the traditional epistemological point of view also, she is the highest category of pramāṇa. she is the most authentic means of knowledge in the form of prasiddhi or āgama, one of the categories of pramāṇas. The other two pramāṇas are dependent for their trustworthy claim i.e. pramāṇikatā on the prasiddhi. Tantrāloka, 35th āhnika and 37th āhnika (earlier kārikās) and Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī are absolutely devoted to the āgama pramāṇa. Their content regarding the prasiddhi or āgama is slightly distinguished. The former one includes tantric aspect also in the discussion. The latter one approaches āgama in pure philosophical way. Tantrāloka’s content is started with the prasiddhi and āgama is said as grāhya of prasiddhi, while the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī is commenced directly with the āgama. According to Tantrāloka, āgama is the meaning of prasiddhi. Signifier and signified have eternal relationship, so āgama is the eternal meaning of prasiddhi.

Why does Abhinavagupta include the parā vāk also into the pramāṇa? Even she is not only simple pramāṇa, she is the most authentic pramāṇa. In reply, the definition of pramāṇa is itself answer of this question. Pramāṇa is one of the kinds of relationship. Abhinavagupta divides the whole reality into twofold relationship that exists
between the knower and the known and that between the cause and effect. The previous one is called *jñāpya-jñāpaka sanbandha*. This relationship opens the door for the *pramāṇas*, because *pramāṇas* are the means to connect the knower *pramātā* and the known *prameya* or *jñeya*. *Pramāṇas* are the means for the pure determinate knowledge. Because of the power of *pramāṇa*, the objects shines determinately ‘as ‘this’ and ‘of such and such nature’. *Parā vāk* herself determines the world, then who will be the most trustworthy means for knowing the world rather than *parā vāk*? Everything is the *abhilāpaṇa* (utterance) of *parā vāk*. *Parā vāk* herself appears in the form of śāstrās i.e. āgamas, the most authentic determinative thought, which must not be contradictory ever.

Question is that what is the need of *pramāṇas*? Actually the *vastu* is not independent for its *prakāśana*, because it is jada (insentient). It always depends on *pramātā* (subjects). The *pramātā* recognizes through the determinacy. Ultimately, *saṁvid* is the highest *pramātā*, who manifests the dependent *vastu*. The *saṁvid* is said mahāprakāśa, the source of *prakāśana* of objects. Nothing in the objective world can bear separation from the mahāprakāśa. So, either the subjects or the means of knowledge or objects manifest exist due to this mahāprakāśa. In fact, the mahāprakāśa has to be manifested as limited. The limited subjective and objective manifestations are cut off from one another. Thus, in reality manifestation of the subject, the means of knowledge and the object is due to only one power of creation. *Pramāṇa* is here to determining. The chief characteristic of *pramāṇa* is its power to produce the determinate knowledge. Along with, there is another reason also for the relation between ābhāsa or *vastu* and āgama. There is three ways to cognizing the different kinds of ābhāsas- according to the taste or the purpose or the intellectual capacity i.e. the traditional knowledge. Here, traditional knowledge is relevant in terms of āgama.

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236 *Taccā dvividhameva paramārthato-jñāpyajñāpakaśa kāryakāraṇatā ca, tatra pūrvasyām mānaṃyabhāvādicitās padabhūtāyām sarvam uktacaram vakṣyamāṇam ca āyatta.---* IPV., com. on 2.3.1-2.

237 *Yathāruci yathārthitvam yathāvyutpatti bhidyate.*

Ābhāsa’pyartha ekasminnausandhānasādhīte. Ibid, 2.3.3.
Now the next query is that ‘to whom pramātā determines’? Pramātā determines the pūrṇa jñāna into apūrṇa jñāna through viśleṣaṇa, saṁśleṣaṇa and anusandhāna. Thereafter he relates this apūrṇa jñāna i.e. savikalpaka jñāna with the ābhāsas through the yojana. In that way, the vyāpāra of loka commences. For this purpose, ābhāsa is the essential. Pramāṇa is related to the outward reality, which are nothing but manifestation of svalakṣana and sāmānyalakṣaṇa ābhāsas. In this context, ābhāsas are significant, without the existence of ābhāsas, there is no pramāṇas. (The nature of ābhāsas will be discussed in detail in the 4th chapter).

Ābhāsa is categorized into twofold-sāmānyalakṣaṇa and svalakṣaṇa. Ābhāsas rise afresh every moment, because it is conjoined with the limiting conditions of time, space and form. Therefore, pramāṇa has to be manifested afresh as different from that of preceding moment to be able to receive the affection of the new objects. This is abhinavodaya238. Thus, ābhāsa shines as related to the limited subject and appears every moment in a new form, because of its being facing object is called pramāṇa, because it operates to bring about cognition.

What is this so called pramā? The ābhāsa is called bodharūpa miti, the fruit of pramāṇa. although there is slight demarcation between pramāṇa and miti or pramiti, because the same ābhāsa is the pramāṇa inasmuch as it is extrovert light239. When the same ābhāsa stays at internal level, identical with pramātā, then is called miti. When pramāṇa as determinately cognizing within itself an object, for which a simple

238 Tena śūnyadhi-prañadehādyupādhyāśrayasyavikārātma-saṅkocalahasyagṛhasahānta-citāt māyā-pramātāḥ
   anantakālāniḥmukhasaṁvedanarūpāt sa pramāṇaḥbhima ca ābhāso yāvat parkomukhatāsvabhāvah
   tāvat prameyasāya desakalākārābhāsāsambhedavatvāt so'pi tathaiva kṣaṇe kṣaṇe anyābhāsasārūpāh
   sraṣṭavyah, taduktam abhinavodayaḥ iti. Ibid, com. on 2.3.1-2.

239 Bāhyomukhapataya prakāśarūpataya tatra tat pramāṇam, yā su tasyaiva antarmuhāma
   vimārṣarūpata prāk upapādītā tattvabhāvena kevalam viśayadaśaḥsāṅkucitena sa eva bodhāḥ
   phalām.----

Ibid, com. on 2.3.1-2.
expression stands and which is free from temporal and spatial limitations, is the miti (cognition), provided that it should be uncontradicted.

How do these abhāsas and determinate knowledge unify? This is the considerable problem, because one is internal and the other is external. For, the sabda is very life of this determinate knowledge. So, one word is used for one abhāsa only, which is free from all association with other abhāsas, such as abhāsa of place, time etc. In that case, each word convey only single abhāsa without conveying the idea of time or place etc. which are apt to impart their limitations. The pramāṇa operates only on an isolated abhāsa, devoid of specification and very close to the universal. Even the word ‘this’ which is related to the form, refers to the manifestation in front, it is mixed up with other abhāsas also, because this is relative term. It always refers to something or someone that is another abhāsa. Therefore, pramāṇa operates on an isolated abhāsa only. Abhāsa alone is real. And the svalaśa (particular) is a different kind of abhāsa which is characterized by shining of time and space etc. as united with one and the same manifestation. Determinate knowledge refers to each abhāsa separately. Therefore even those who hold that the determinate cognition of the whole also is valid, because it is based on determinate cognition of each part separately, have to admit the validity to rest on the cognition of each manifestation. Determinate knowledge has to serve its known desired purpose. If it would destroy without completing the purpose, then it will not be called determinate knowledge. That’s why it has continuous existence till it serves its purpose.

By now, the determinate characteristic of āgama have been established on the basis of Abhinavagupta’s Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśini. In this context determinacy of

\[\text{idam etad drityevam yad vaśādyavatīṣṭhate.} \]

\[\text{Vastu pramāṇam tato 'pi svābhāso bhinvadayaḥ.} \]

\[\text{So'ntastathāvimarṣātmā desakālādyahhēditī.} \]

\[\text{ekābhādhānāvisaye mītiirvastunyabhādhītī.} \text{Ibid, com. on 2.3.1-2.} \]

\[\text{Abhedabhā pramāṇapahalayoh, vimarśabalena ca yataḥ pramāṇaṁ vimarśaśca sabdajñīvitaḥ sabdaśca abhāśāntarauh desakālādirupairanāmṛṣe ekatraivā abhāsamātre pravartate---.} \text{Ibid, com. on 2.3.1-2.} \]
ābhāsa have been explained. The purpose of examining this aspect is that determinate knowledge is the vyavahāra of loka. Even in śāstra, whatever is said is related to the vyavahāra, but the purpose of the vyavahāra of śāstra is different from the vyavahāra of loka. That purpose is the ‘hāna of bheda’ and getting mokṣa in the śāstra. In Tantrāloka, āhnika 35, Abhinavagupta starts speculation on some other characteristics of āgama śāstra. Āgama śāstra is called prasiddhi242 here. Prasiddhi is the other name of āgama. Āgama or prasiddhi is the most authentic source of knowledge, because it is none other than parā vāk, who utters the whole world. Jayaratha casts light on the deeper level and reveals the source of origination of āgama is kopa. Kopa is one of the forms of Parama Śiva. The reference of the kopa comes in Mālinīvijayottara Tantra in 3.24. He elaborates āgama as mātrkāśāra. Vāk is the source of all śāstras, that’s why all śāstras have the essence of mātrkā śabdārāśī. In this manner, on the commentary on 35.1, Tantrāloka, Jayaratha indicates the essence of āgama. Vyavahāra, purātana and prasiddhi are the constituents of āgama. The whole empiral world is being run through the vyavāhara. Everything depends on the same. There are innumerable vyavahāra in the world, which has been running since long time. Some of the vyavahāra maintains unbroken chain of the continuity, which has been running since long time back that’s why it is purātana and will be running eternally. These types of vyavahāras are called prasiddhi. On the basis of the anusandhāna of vyavahāra, the whole world is organized243. Anusandhāna of vyavahāra is much significant for the prasiddhi.

To explain the authenticity of determinacy of prasiddhi and her overruling nature on the world and other pramāṇas pratyakṣa and anumāna, Abhinavagupta takes the components of anumāṇa pramāṇa. His intencion is to prove that how prasiddhi dominates


243 Iha tāvat purātānīṃ prasiddhyantarānunmūlitatvena cirataram prarūḍām prasiddhimanusandhāya samasto 'yam vyavahāraḥ sarve eva tathā vyavaharantīyatīrthaḥ. Ibid, com. on 35.1.
the other pramāṇas, since these pramāṇas have same purpose i.e. vyavahāra of loka. Components of anumāna are anvaya-vyatireka, which are used to make the relation between sādhyā and sādhaka. Without the anvaya-vyatireka, it is almost impossible to relate the sādhyā-sādhaka. These sādhyā and sādhaka are the one of essentials to the vyavahāra. Anvaya-vyatireka cannot perform independently. They are upajīvaka of prasiddhi, which is the upajīvya. Not only anumāna pramāṇa, but also pratyakṣa pramāṇa is also determined by the prasiddhi. In this manner, prasiddhi is the source for all type of vyavahāra, even wordly also. The anumāna, pratyakṣa are the means of vyavahāra. All vyavahāras are run by the anuṣāṅdhāna of prakāśa. That’s why Jayaratha addresses it as sarvyavahāraṇa-bandhanānibhīṣṭām prasiddhimapektṣate.

Further, Abhinavagupta elaborates the nature of prasiddhi through the example of new born baby, who is hungry but not able to conveying his hunger since he is unaware for the worldly conventions. But still he starts taking milk by the feeding process? How does he do all these activities as well as how does he feel his appetite for food? At this place no anumāna or prakāśa can take place. The answer is in the nature of prasiddhi and that is svāvamarśātmikā as prasiddhi is svāvamarśātmaka in the words of Jayaratha. The svāvamarśātmaka prasiddhi is the cause of hāna and upādāna vyavahāra i.e. what to do, what not to do, what to leave and what to take. Going on the deeper level, Abhinavagupta explains this svāvamarśātmaka prasiddhi through its next characteristic, prāgyāsanā. The prāgyāsanā is pretty significant as it is identical with the vīmarśa. Prāgyāsanā is basically saṃskāras, which stay since the birth. The same is pratibhā also. This pratibhā is not ākasmika pratibhā; it is prāgyāśopajīvi pratibhā, related to the

\[\text{Ibid, 35.2-3.}\]
\[\text{Ibid, com. on 35.3.}\]
\[\text{Ibid, 35.}\]

\[\text{Tadaharjāto hi bālah sarvato nāṅvidhārthaśārthasaṁvalitē sthāne kṣudhitah sākānko ‘pi ekāko aprāptaparopadesāḥ kim karotu vinā svāvamarśātmikam prasiddhim niyataviśayāhāṅādānvyavahāra bālasya na yūdītyarthaḥ. Ibid, com. on 35.5.}\]
sāṃskāras. So, vimāśvara-pūrṇa-prāgvasanā pratibhā starts to work since the birth, because it is prauvakāliki, prācyā and āgata. Jayaratha explains it as prāgvaśana, which is the cause of cētā-prasāda, prācyā vāsanā vimāra, and it is the tāttvika rūpa of āgata, prauvakālīki prasiddhi. This vimāra is āgama as well prasiddhi. It is said that sajātīya prasiddhi controls the whole vyavahāra krama. Although the vyavahāra-krama is running through the pūrva-parvāva-vṛddhajana, but ultimately sarvāja is there, who stays ananyānpekarūpena at the āpta, śaktimanta parārūpi prāthamika bhūmi. In that sarvāja, anunmiṣitarūpa sūkṣma paraparāmarśātmikā saktirūpa prasiddhi abides permanently. That sarvāja is pūrṇāhamparāmarśāmaya paramēśvara who is nībandhanabhūta of samastaprasiddhi. Abhinavagupta defines sarvāja as hetu of bhoga and apavarga and paramēśvara of śataprasiddhi, whose nature is vimāra.

Prasiddhi, coming out from paramēśvara, works by two ways:

1. Sāstra

2. Loka

In this context, she is said anśāṁtiyā yoga. In the loka, she works through the vyavahāra-vāda. Fundamentally she controls vyavahāra. The continuity of this vyavahāra

248 Na mṛdabhavyavahārecchā punso bālasya jāyate.

Prāgvasanopajiva ācčavimāraṣṭhā sa ca vāsanā.

Prācyā cētāgata seyam prasiddhiḥ paurvākālikiḥ. Ibid, 35.9-10.


250 Pūrva-pūrvapuvevasamargane'pi sā prasiddhiḥ kasminścidekasmin sarvajñē purā parārūpāyām prāthamikyām bhumaśvayamānypākeṣaṃvesaṃ niḥśaṃkam sauśmyādanaunmiṣita bhāṣate parāparāmarśatmanā prasphurātyarthaiḥ. Ibid, com. on 35.11-12.


252 Bhogapavargatadvetaprasiddhiśitāsobhitāḥ
is unbreakable means paramparā rūpa, because of prasiddhi. Her other aspect comes in śāstra, which is basically mukhapāramparyā253. It is also antaravibhāgabhāvā254. Both paramparā are come from pārameśvari vāk255. Prasiddhi is satatodita, avigāñena ullasitā. She is the svabhāva of pramātā as svāvamarśatmapratītirūpā. She has kartṛtva of parāmarśa kriyā256. By this parāmarśa kriyā, a sādhaka or pramātā gets tādṛṣṭya with śiva. The stage of tādṛṣṭyaaprāpti is the stage of svātmaparāmarśa. before getting the tādṛṣṭya with śiva, prasiddhi functions at the level of vyavahāra. In this manner, Abhinavagupta examines concept of āgama by the vīmasamayē vāk principle.

Further, in the discussion, he points out that all types of āgamas or śāstras, which are related to the different philosophical schools like Buddhist, Jaina, Nyāya, Ārhatā, Śākta etc. are come out by the pāṇca-brahma. As evident of this claim, he refers Svacchandatantra257. In the commentary, Jayaratha elaborates that the pāṇca-brahma is the source of the susukṣma, suṣuddha, suprabhāvi dhvanirūpa258. Fundamentally, the dhvani is avyakta nāda. All śāstras stay here in spandita way as avyaktarūpa nāda. Further, these manifest in the form of mātrkā.

In the 37 āhniika, Abhinavagupta again examines the new aspect of prasiddhi i.e. what is grāhya from this prasiddhi? It means what is the artha or meaning of prasiddhi?

253 Paramparāmiti mukhapāramparyānirūḍhirūpām. Ibid, com.on 35.15.
254 Vitateti antaravibhāgabhāvāt. Ibid, com.on 35.15.
255 Laukikādirahasyāntāsastrāmarśaparakīṇi.
257 Siddhāntantraśāṅkādai sarvam brahmodbhavam yataḥ.
Śrīvacchandādiṣu proktam sādyojitaśibhedataḥ. Ibid, 35.27.
258 Adṛṣṭavigrāhāyātam śīvāparamakāraṇāt.
dhvanirūpam susūkṣmam tu suṣuddham suprabhānvitam. Ibid, com.on 35.27.
Čagna is the avaśya-grāhīya of the prasiddhi. To elaborate the āgama avaśyaṃbhāvi grāhīya, there are twofold dṛṣṭi- laukika dṛṣṭi and samyak vyavahāramāyī alaukika dṛṣṭi. laukika dṛṣṭi is related to the khandita prasiddhi, while the samyak vyavahāramāyī alaukika dṛṣṭi is related to sarvamaya prasiddhi, who is the cause of śivatva and that is the grāhārūpa āgama from prasiddhi. Further, he explains the avaśya-grāhīya term as that which gives mahāphala that is śivatva. So, that śāstra which gives mahāphala is the āgama and āgama is only śāiviāgamas.

Čagna is the antaraṅga i.e. essential or natural-svabhāvatayā sthita (inner) vyāpāra (activity) of the paramesvāra, who is pure consciousness (cit). The pure consciousness expresses the parā when he descends to the empirical level. It is spontaneous thought of one who rises to the transcendental level of complete de-individualization. It springs from never changing pure ‘I’. It is the very life of other means of knowledge, such as direct perception. Therefore whatever is said in the āgama, that is undoubtedly so. It means the determinate knowledge of āgama cannot be contradicted at any case. Like the following mantra- this poison cannot kill me. I am myself Garuḍa. This mantra frees a person from the effect of snake-bite, but only if the person, using it rises above the empirical personality and exclusively contemplates its meaning. According to this system, a person becomes what he contemplates in the aforesaid manner. Thus, āgama in reality is nothing more than the strongest determinate thought of the completely de-individualised self. And the collection of such thoughts in language is secondarily called, so it is means of arousing such thoughts.
Arguments of Abhinavagupta on the authenticity of āgama pramāṇa is quite interesting. Important point is that he accepts the validity of Vedas and the Siddhānta Āgamas or the other Āgamas such as those of the Buddha and Jainas, because these sabdarāśi are also pramāṇa, because they are helpful in arising the determinate knowledge\(^{263}\). In certain circumstances, they are valid. Here he exemplifies this as- ‘does the perception of the nīla on the part of one man, make the object known to all, or does the perception of smoke similarly make all infer fire from it or is āgama in the form of the prediction of a siddha? For, all āgamas, whether of the nature of injunction or of prohibition, are productive of strong determinate thought (vimarsa) only within the limitation i.e. in certain persons only time and space as co-operating causes\(^{264}\). But these Jaināgama, Baudhāgama and so on āgama pramāṇas assimilate into Kashmir Śaiva’s āgama, because it is the most trustworthy utterance or determinate thought. In this manner, Abhinavagupta incorporates all śāstras into āgama rūpa parā vāk.

Now, summing up the points of this chapter we can conclude that parā vāk’s epistemology gives the base to develop the ontological theory of varṇa. The ontological theory is also issued from the parā vāk. Fundamentally, knowledge process and ontological process are intertwined since the levels are same and simultaneous. Without vikalpa jñāna and pratyayas, the determined world cannot be come into existence. Parā vāk plays another role also in the form of pramāṇa i.e. āgama or prasiddhi. This is pure epistemological principle of parā vāk. Thus, parā vāk deals through her epistemology with both the determinate and indeterminate realm.

Further, another aspect of parā vāk in the form of ontological process comes into light. The sṛṣṭi-prakriyā is one of the pañca-kṛtya, which is done by the parā vāk herself. Varṇas are the most essential for the sṛṣṭi prakriyā. Varṇas as amāyiya element are identical with parā vāk and as māyiya varṇas stay at vaikharī with multiplicity. In this

\(^{263}\) ---tatra tu tathāvidhe sabdanātmani vimarṣe ānukālyam yo bhajate sabdarāśiḥ so’pi pramāṇam,-----. IPV,, com. on 2.3.2.

\(^{264}\) ---sarva eva hi āgamo niyatādhikaridesakālasakhāryādiniyantritameva vimarṣam vidhatte.

Ibid, com. on 2.3.2

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manner, the concept of varṇa is crucial to the ontological process of parā vāk. Varṇas are related with the mantra theory. The mantra enriches varṇas by two ways- it is power to give liberation as well as power to give birth to world. At the same time, aham mantra is the nature of parā vāk. So, in the pursuing chapter IV, the very first concept of mantra is going to be discussed, because it is the source of transcendental varṇas also. Thereafter, the nature of varṇa will be understood, wherefrom the ontology of parā vāk comes forth.