INTRODUCTION
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The Śaiva School, flourished in the geographical area of Kashmir, is known as Kashmir Śaiva, has a wider connotation that encompasses all the philosophical branches non-dualistic and dualistic. These branches maintain harmonious relationship with each other like the school of Śākta and Advaitic Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. The term Kashmir Śaiva suggests the schools which are developed in the Kashmir since the beginning of their existence and also the schools that came from other places and got nurtured here from the 8th to 11th century. The schools must be the devotees of Śiva and Śakti. Navjivan Rastogi says-

The Kashmir Śaivism is generally believed to be temper and idealistic in ideology. We have, however to be very clear that the word Kashmir Śaivism has extremely wide connotation and includes within its range all the branches of Śaiva speculation monistic, monistic-cum-dualistic and dualistic associated with Kashmir. If Abhinavagupta’s Tantrāloka is any guide, the Trika of Kashmir Śaivism stands for the total Tantric lore of Kashmir.1

Kashmir Śaiva philosophy incorporates the wider range of thought-systems. In spite of this, the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is known for the Advaitic thought system, which get perfected between the 8th to 13th century, particularly in the work of Ācārya Abhinavagupta. According to the historical evident, the first available text of Advaitic Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is Śivadṛṣṭi of Somānanda in 9th century. Further, Abhinavagupta develops the thought tradition of his predecessors and teachers. He writes commentary on the texts of earlier scholars, like the Iśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī and Iśvarapratyabhijñāvṛttivimarśinī on Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva. His original texts like Tantrāloka, Parātriśikāvivaraṇa, Tantrasāra, Paramārthasāra provide the background for the further development of the thought system. Thus, the central figure of this school is Abhinavagupta, who is the sādhaka as well as dārśanika. He deals

1 Rastogi, Navjivan, “Introducing Kashmir Śaivism” in Mālinī, P. 17.
with twofold divergent thoughts—Tantraprakriyā and Kulapratikriyā in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. Kula, Krama, Pratyabhijñā and Trika are incorporated in these prakriyās. The Kula school is identified with Kulapratikriyā while the Trika, Krama and Pratyabhijñā are included in the Tantraprakriyā. The Spanda school is not placed under any category because the school does not influenced by the tantric thought as well as the school is much closer to the Śākta tradition rather then Śaiva tradition. Anyway, the reciprocal relationship of Kula, Krama, Pratyabhijñā, Spanda give rise to great school of Advaitic Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. These branches have harmonious relationship. Although, their areas of concern are same on most of the philosophical problems as well as on the tantric problems, but they have differences on some fundamental issues, such as the nature of ultimate reality. Abhinavagupta accepts this conflict in the commentary of sūtra eight in the Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam. In accordance with, Tantra accepts ātman principle as transcendent only². Kula system accepts that ātman principle is steeped in the universe; it means that the universe is only a form of the ātman³. Trika philosophy which is Pratyabhijñā branch recognizes both aspects transcendental and immanent of ātman principle⁴. In this manner, the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is wider in range, so including a entire corpus of Shaivite scholars in this present thesis would be lifetime task. Thus, only the corpus of Abhinavagupta (10th) has been included in this study which is directly related to the issues of language.

Language is the central issue since the very beginning of the Indian knowledge tradition. The very first text Rgveda elaborates competency of vāk to create the universe in vāk sūkta. Since then, language has been continuously remaining a central issue by the 21st century. The West in late 19th and 20th century has been occupied with the problems of language and subsequently the new branch of philosophy as philosophy of language

² Viśvottirṇamātmatavam-iti tāntrikāḥ. PH. com. on sūtra 8
³ Viśvamayam iti-kulādyāmnāyanīvīś āḥ. Ibid.
⁴ Viśvottirṇa viśvamayam ca-iti trikādi darśanavidaḥ. Ibid.
arises. Contrary to Western scholars of 19th - 20th century, Indian philosophers have been taken this problem seriously and have done work on the divergent aspects of language. Bhartrhari (7th cen.), Kumārilabhaṭṭa (7th cen.), Maṇḍana Miśra (8th-9th cen.), Abhinavagupta (10th cen.), Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa (17th cen.) and some other philosophers have culminated it with different approaches in their schools. But, the common factor among them is that these schools, always, have been relating language to the reality, thought and cognition. Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is quite significant school since it ties every principle with the foreground of language i.e. vāk. The vāk principle is the essence of language, thought and reality. It binds these three elements into identical relationship. The vāk is not a pure philosophical principle rather than it is the philosophical as well as tantric principle. Due to this fact, vāk is propounded with many approaches. Abhinavagupta examines vāk, extends from mysticism and comprises the school of grammar, linguistic speculation, psychological interpretation and philosophical reasoning. All the issues of Śaiva philosophy of language revolve around the vāk. So, the issues like- relation among language, thought and reality, nature of language, the nature of śabda and artha, epistemology of śabda, does language construct the world or represent?' are discussed deeply. Rajnish Mishra couches all the problems and possible issues in his work-

The questions which have been constantly addressed to all the major Indian philosophical systems are: what is language (śabda)? What is the nature of linguistic denotation? What is the relationship which holds between the śabda and the artha, i.e. word and meaning? Do the words refer to a universal or particular, class or individual, form or substance? How far language is valid as an epistemology? What is the relationship between language and thought on the one hand, and language and reality on the other? Does language represent reality or fashion it out? To what extent is verbal cognition reliable? Since all our intellectual discourse is constituted in language (vānimaya), do the issues of language also pertain to it? If it is so, is there any methodology to approach these texts with a deeper linguistic insight?

We will try to discuss these issues thoroughly, comparatively and critically in our research work from the Kashmir Śaiva perspective.

1Buddhist Theory of Meaning and Literary Analysis, p.8.
Theory of language has the significant status in the school. It is the most active element in the form of vimarśa and parā vāk. The language as the vāk is the creative energy of Parama Śiva. She manifests the universe as well as liberates it. Thus, she has role in ontology and epistemology as well. From the ontological point of view, she permeates the universe in two form, vācyā (substance) and vācaka (speech). J. F. Stall writes about these vācyā-vācaka forms that 'both aspects coincide in Śiva, vācyā corresponds to the objective substance of the world whereas vācaka corresponds to conscious being.' The ontology of the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy starts with the Parama Śiva, the metaphysical principle, which has two aspects- viśvottirṇa and viśvamaya. In the state of viśvottirṇa avasthā, the transcendental principle Parama Śiva is the pure consciousness and eternal, nothing can effects its purity and limpidity, but in this form, Parama Śiva does not manifest the universe, whether manifestation is the essential nature of Parama Śiva. It manifests the world in the stage of viśvamayatā. At the viśvamaya avasthā, Parama Śiva as prakāśavimarśamaya, is inseparable from its energy or śakti. The very śakti is the source and cause of the srṣṭi. This śakti is vimarśa śakti (self awareness), which corresponds to the word (language) aspect. The supreme divine energy, parā śakti or vimarśa, is the preceding state of parāvāk, she expresses herself as parā vāk at the time of srṣṭi. Vimarśa is merely thought, whether vāk is the sphaṭa (distinct) form of this thought. The Parama Śiva, when contracts itself, is called pramātā, who exits only at the two levels, first level is jñānātmaka and second level is śabdātmaka. The basis of these levels are, prakāśa and vimarśa, respectively. The vimarśa is merely thought form and thought cannot stay without language i.e. śabdātmaka, thus vāk is the indispensable necessity of vimarśa. Thus, the thought and language or the vimarśa and vāk are interrelated concepts. They are synonyms. It proves that thought and language is identical. The vāk is not as a mere physical phenomenon, it is immaterial part of the Parama Śiva. She is completely different from the gross sounds

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6 Sanskrit Philosophy of language, p. 523.
7 B.S, 2, p.187.
or words and objects. The concept of language as the parā vāk is the essence of the highest reality which is ever-present and all pervasive. Parā vāk contains in herself not only the stages of words, but also all the phenomenal actions and objects, which will be produced in the form of universe. Parāvāk, at the time of ābhāsa or manifestation, presents in the paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī, which are the respective stages of manifestation. The vāk evolves from an unconditioned supreme state and down to the gross sound vibration and thereby evolutes successively the gradual emergence of the cosmos into existence as the thirty-six ontological level on the descending levels of paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī. The reality is the condensation of vāk śakti, it means that language, thought and reality are the one underlying principle in reality, they appears in different forms according to their mode of expression. Thus, in the Śaiva philosophy, there is no space for the duality. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta also clearly states that the parāvāk does not attach with dualistic thought construction, vikalpa.

The principle of vāk is the central to the Śaiva Philosophy. Abhinavagupta discusses it in his texts, like Mālinīvijayavārttika, Iśvarapratyabhijñāvīrtivimarsini, Tantrāloka, Tantrasāra and Iśvarapratyabhijñāvīrtivimarsini. Thus, the theories and arguments of Abhinavagupta make the Kashmir Śaiva and its philosophy of vāk as significant among the other Indian philosophical schools.

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8 Viṣayarūpāt śrotagrāhyāt śabdād anya eva antaravabhāsamānaḥ saṁvidrūpāvesā śabdānātmābhilāpo. IPY, 1.6.1.

9 Taduttaraṇ paśyantyādidaśasvapi vastuto vyavasthitā tayā vina paśyantyādiṣu aprakāśatāpattyā jaśatāprasārīgati. PTV, p.5.

10 Ahampratyavamarśo yoḥ prakāśātmāpi vāgvapuḥ nāsau vikalpoh sa hy ukto dvayokṣepī vinścayah. IPK, 1.6.1.
1. SIGNIFICANCE OF ABHINAVAGUPTA

The versatile philosopher and poetician Abhinavagupta presents the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy in unique way. His subtle vision and reasoned inquiry enriches the principles of poetics and philosophy. His methodology and arguments, which he uses for establishing the principles, are mixed nature of philosophy and aesthetics. The works of Abhinavagupta took the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy into a new light, which gave him significant position among others. K.C. Pandey comments on his expertise—

He was perseverant, industrious and exceptionally intelligent and so his study over various subjects was great. He tried innumerable experiments personally to ascertain the truth of what he had read or heard about spiritual matters, and unchallengeable is, therefore the correctness and precision of his conclusions. Great was his spiritual power and his contemporaries had occasions to see its greatness in deeds. Clear was his head, powerful his memory marvelous his intellectual capacity, wonderful his command over the language, shrewd his eye to see the real nature of a thing from different angles of vision and beautiful and convincing the way of putting his ideas and every page of his available books is an unmistakable proof of it. ——thus noble was his life, loving and gentle his temper, honest and rigorous his life, strong and admirable his character, brilliant and highly useful his career, memorable and lasting his contribution to both poetics and philosophy—-.

In this way, K.C. Pandey evaluates the position of Abhinavagupta and proves him as the most significant philosopher of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. Abhinavagupta is the most significant figure throughout the tradition of Tantra, poetry, philosophy. Even, one cannot refrain from noticing or recognizing his mattering much presence in development of socio-cultural domain of Kashmir. S.S. Toshkhani K. Warikoo presents concisely the history of intellectuals of Kashmir Śaiva and establishes that Abhinavagupta has the quality to be the most significant scholar in Indian knowledge tradition—

At the societal level, Kashmir Shaivism rejects all differences of caste, creed and gender and allows everyone to be initiated into its fold. From Vasugupta, to whom the philosophy was revealed in the 9th century in the form of Shiva Sutras-its seminal texts, to Somananda, Bhatta Kalatta, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, a line of great masters expounded, interpreted and

propagated the doctrines of Kashmir Shaivism down to Swami Lakshmanjoo in our own times. Abhinavagupta, the greatest of them all, gave it a firm epistemological and philosophical foundation and integrated its different schools-Krama, Kula, Spanda and Pratyabhijna into one monistic vision, bringing them all under the rubric of Trika.12

The significance of Abhinavagupta is recognized by the scholars from all the disciplines of social sciences and humanities, because he was the versatile philosopher, who was the master exponent of the aesthetics, poetry and drama. That’s why B.N. Pandit says on the significance of Abhinavagupta-

Abhinavagupta wrote on subjects like dramaturgy, literary criticism, logic etc. in addition to Śaivism on which he is final authority in both, the theory and practice. He interpreted correctly and clearly the philosophic principles and theological doctrines of Kashmir Śaivism through his commentaries and independent works. It is in fact he who popularized Kashmir Śaivism by writing detailed elucidative commentaries on the works of Somānanda and Utpaladeva. As a commentator and interpreter, he did not leave any stone unturned in the field of philosophy of Śaiva monism. Besides, he is the only author who arranged, systematized and interpreted the highly esoteric and mystic doctrines of Śaiva theology lying scattered in the vast scriptural literature of Śaiva Āgamas. In addition to these two difficult and colossal tasks, he made the Śaiva philosophy easy to be understood even by beginners through some small and big but easy works that can even now serve as text-books at the M.A. (Samsk.) level. In addition to it, he composed several easy religio-philosophic lyrics dedicated to Śiva and Šakti. Such lyrics throw a wonderful light on some highly mysterious points of spiritual philosophy13.

In this way, the versatile Abhinavagupta establishes himself through his diversified works as the most significant personage not only in the history of Kashmir Śaiva, but also he is the extraordinary scholar in the entire Indian knowledge tradition. His contribution to the Indian tradition is remarkable. But he has been recognized as the excellent scholar in the past recent decades. Although his presence in the aesthetics is accepted through his works of Dhvanyālokalalokana and Abhinavabhārati, but his philosophical works have not found their worth place in the Indian tradition by now. This thesis is an attempt to throw light into his contribution in the realm of philosophy.

12 Cultural Heritage of Kashmiri Pandits, preface xiii.

2. STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY OF KASHMIR ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY

Understanding the structure and methodology of a discipline makes someone equipped to understand the depth of the subject. The structure of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is very complicated since it is the branch of Tantra, which does not keep restricted itself with the area of philosophy only. The structure and methods of examining the principles of texts decides the stipulated requirements of the adhikārī (eligibility of reader). The eligibility is informed at the outset of texts through the anubandha-catuṣṭaya. The concept of anubandha catuṣṭaya is one of the most fundamental methodologies of the entire Indian knowledge tradition. Annabhāța, in Tarkasamghra, alludes to eligibility of the student in the very first verse. The Pratyabhijnāhṛdayam, the very basic text of Pratyabhijnā branch of the school, indicates the required characteristics of a student. Such texts fall under the category of prakāraṇa texts, which are designed to explain the particular foreground principles in the simplest language and expression. But, there are some texts which are complicated and highly technical such as Parātrīṣikāvivarana, Tantraloka, Isvarapratyabhijnāvivṛttivimarśini. Only the experts of this tradition are able to understand them. In spite of the availability of translated and edited volumes, confrontation with the complex principles and terms happen quite frequently. The principles of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy are packed with the numbers of nomenclatures, of which the source of etymology i.e. the root word is same, like the vimarśa, pratyavamarśa, avamarśa is derived by the same dhātu mṛṣa. their technical meanings are not same, although in general language they signify almost same meaning. They are the fundamental terms. All principles, either ontological or epistemological or theories of yoga and sādhana are explained by the same nomenclatures. There are

\[14\] Namāḥ śivāya sata tām pāṇcakṛtyavidhāyīnena.

Cidānandaghaṇasvātmāparamārthāvabhāṣīnena.

Śāṅkarapaniyatsāra-pratyabhijnāmahodadheḥ.

Kṣemendoghriyate sārāḥ sansāraviṣāsāntaye. PH., 1.
different explanations of each term at specific level since the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy explicates the theories at different levels. Thus, usage of most of the terms, like parā vāk, paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikhari, keep the particular explanation according to particular approach. Parā vāk and her levels are the part of ontology at the one side, on other side, they are the part of the process of revealing of knowledge. The parāmarśa, āmarśa are used as synonyms as well as they are presented with different aspects also. The reason of these problems are that principles overlap each other. So there is much more scope of hermeneutical studies of these texts. Over and above, at some places, theories are said not to be elaborated openly, as these are the subjects of sādhanā. Only the sādhaka is capable to know the principles in their true essence. Abhinavagupta repeats this condition many times, claims as highly mysterious principles, so that only indications are enough. The eligible participant will understand by his own effort. The strictness is followed at many places in the important texts like in Tantrāloka and Parātriśikāvivaraṇa. At these places, it is tough to understand the principles by the person who is unskilled in sādhanā and yogic practices. Many symbolic terms are used at regular interval throughout the texts. The main reason of following this type of interpretation is the sādhanā paddhati of Kashmir Śaiva. Everything of sādhanā cannot be explained and revealed before anyone due to the possibility of misusing and misinterpretation. The reader should develop the expertise to understand the sense of symbolic elements. Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is a tantric school and sarvasarvātmakavāda is one of the most fundamental principles that influences every terms and principles. Likewise, all theories are quite mixed up with each other with a lot of common nomenclatures. Reader has to be aware with the particular problem which he is trying to solve out. So, philosophy of language of vāk principle is discussed in the complicated manner, because of the mixture of the methodologies of aesthetics, philosophy and tantric. Abhinavagupta is not ready to leave the aesthetical and philosophical approach anywhere. So, the methodology where philosophy and aesthetics

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15 Gopyam updeśasāra sadyo bhairavapadāvaham satatam.

Abhinavaguptena mayā vyākhyātam prāśinasarvasvam. PTV, com. on 1

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are intertwined is the basic equipment for understanding the philosophy of vāk. Meanings are multilayered, such as, the Parātrīṣikāvivaraṇa, one of the most important works of Abhinavagupta, is based mostly on the philosophy of vāk and interpreted at many levels. This fact is accepted by scholars of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy & Tantra. Bettina Baumer says16:

The Parātrīṣikāvivaraṇa is one of the most important works by Abhinavagupta on philosophy of language and hence he justifies every interpretation of word, a root, a syllable, in the light of his insight into the many layers of meaning and the four dimensions of the word (vāc).

The Parātrīṣikāvivaraṇa is explained at many levels. It is based on triad relationship of elements, such as parā- aparā- parāparā, sīva- sakti- narā and so on. Thus, the text is quite tough to understand. Bettina Baumer explains the methodology of Abhinavagupta concisely in her hermeneutical interpretation of Parātrīṣikāvivaraṇa in this way17 -

Whatever text or subject matter he deals with, Abhinavagupta does it with intense awareness of the methodology, and using all tools at his disposal: from grammar to etymology to logic, to all the principles of scriptural hermeneutics, literary criticism, poetics etc. he used not only traditional methods of interpretation, but he was also a keen observer of the phenomenological and psychological states and applies appropriate methods to bridge the gap between theology and everyday experience. In the present Vivaraṇa we find such an employment of a phenomenological method, for example, in the fields of language in a child, for instance, and relates it to the levels of the Word (vāc). We shall find many such examples of subtle psychological observations.

In this way, Abhinavagupta follows different types of methodology in his texts. He uses sarva- sarvātmaka theory which is the most fundamental principle. It is the source of internal coherence and consistence. No theory goes unaffected by the skeleton

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16 Abhinavagupta’s Hermeneutics of the Absolute Anuttaraprakriyā: An Interpretation of his Parātrīṣikā Vivaraṇa, p. 16.

17 Ibid, p.15.
of *sarvasarvātmaka* theory. All theories are developed horizontally so they can go parallel.

With the help of these significant theories, Abhinavagupta contributes so much in the development of the whole Kashmir Śāiva philosophy and *Tantra*. Even his predecessors also, like Vasugupta, Somānanda etc. have done very important contribution. Śīvadṛṣṭi of Somānanda, Śivasūtra of Vasugupta, Śpadakārikā and so on are some of them. Nonetheless, the tantric school has not been received sufficient attention by the recent decades. The area has been become quite ignored. The reasons for the ignorance of this school are considerable here.

3. **REASON OF IGNORANCE OF THE ĀGAMA (TANTRA)**

An overall assessment of the position of Abhinavagupta on the śabda in Indian tradition has not yet been attempted. Certainly understanding his theories is not an easy task due to his eclectic teaching. The tantric school of Abhinavagupta is the source of many research areas, which did not get proper attention till some years before. In the 19th century, study of Tantras and their philosophy have started. There are the set of facts which is the hurdle for studying the tantras, is to be analyzed. Anyway, the most basic query is on the rationality for choosing this topic regarding this thesis, which should be rational and filled with valid points. Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is packed with the innovative ideas for the research in some fields, which have been mentioned already. Likely, it is a valuable source for the philosophy of language also since the metaphysical constituents prakāśa and vimarśa opens the door for such type of research. There is no research work either in the form of scholarly monograph or thesis or dissertation or edited volume, which presents the philosophy of language of Kashmir Śaiva. Only references are mentioned for the further study in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy of language, like the T.V.R. Murti gives a glimpse on this important problem in his paper of *The Philosophy of Language in the Indian Context* in this way- The Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, the
Saṅkhya-Yoga and the school of Grammar and Kashmir Śaiviam, among others, are loyal to this tradition\textsuperscript{18}. In the whole article, he mentions only one time the Kashmir Śaiva. Other scholars have done the same job by merely pointing out to it. Some works are available which deal closely to the principles of language (vāk) of Śaiva philosophy. In this context, Andre Podoux’s Vāc, is the one of best researched document, which deals with all the aspects of language, but from the tantric perspective. The other appreciable observation has been delivered in the published work Mantra aura Mātrikāyon kā Rahasya of Shiv Shankar Avasthi, which examines the concept of mantra. There is another work, although not devoted to the vāc principle only, titled Kashmir Shivadvayavada ki Mula Avadharanayen, by Navajivan Rastogi, helps to understand the complex structure of the whole philosophy of Kashmir Śaiva. By now, scholars have studied on this area, but none of these studies is exceptionally selective on the problem of vāk. So, this is the obvious question on the part of any academician that why scholars have not given enough attention to the Kashmir Śaiva Philosophy of language, at a time when language is attracting many scholars as an important issue of research.

There are reasons, some general and some particular, for disregarding of this school in the context of this problem-

1. The very first reason is the problem of language, which is the most common problem in Indic tradition. The entire corpus of Kashmir Śaiva is available in the Sanskrit language only, which is the biggest obstruction for the scholars, who are not conversant with this language very well. Theories are still concealed in the original texts, which are to be revealed before the competent scholars. To uproot this problem, there is need of translation of the whole corpus of the school. Initiatives have been already taken by the some scholars, like the edited volumes of Kashmir Series of Text and Studies have been

\textsuperscript{18} Murti, T.V.R., "The Philosophy of Language in the Indian Context" in 'Studies in Indian Thought', p. 362
published in above fifty volumes, much of them is awaited for translation. The next big problem is correct translation which is the bigger one. For the correct translation, the proper understanding of Sanskrit language is required. Bettina Baumer indicates towards this problem:

What terminology are we going to adopt when translating some of the central and esoteric terms of the text and the commentary? Every translator had to face the same question, and there is no universal solution to it. We have got used to translating certain concepts of Indian philosophy in a particular way, with some variations, but to these translations really convey the various levels of meaning? In the eyes of non-Sanskrit knowing reader, are they not sometimes more misleading than helpful?¹⁹

In addition to this, background of the Indic tradition means Vedic as well as tantric, must be known to the translator. Otherwise, the problem of misinterpretation arises. At times, these texts are translated not properly and misinterpreted in the shed of individual intentions. So, translation is not a permanent solution. It is only a temporary solution because the characteristic of one language cannot be replaced by another one. Always the study of primary text in the original language should be encouraged.

Nonetheless, some texts like Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa, Tantrāloka,Īśvarapratyabhijñāvīrtīvimārśini have been shaped with quite complex structure. These primary sources need to interpret also in different languages. In this direction, many scholars have been moving; Andre Padoux and Raffelle Torella have been doing this work in French, German languages, Italian. Like to these scholars, others also have been provided a good translated work in various languages. Thus, the biggest problem is the hurdle in the form of language, which is faced by the scholar, who does not know the language.

2. Indian philosophy is bound with the knowledge of āgama and nigama, the main two streams of Indic tradition. For enriching understanding of these texts, one needs to

¹⁹ Abhinavagupta’s Hermeneutics of the Absolute Anuttara-prakriyā, p. 28.
work rigorously in continuation for years. Thereafter one may be able to understand the Śaiva philosophy and its theories.

3. There is a presumption about the Indic tradition among the Western scholars that Indian philosophy is related to theology only. Indian philosophy is all about the metaphysics, thus argumentative aspects of this tradition is neither rigorous nor realistic. But the truth is quite different from this assumption, that's why the new trend has been started that is the methodology of reinterpretation.

Supplementary to these specific problems, there are some conventional problems also. The economical, political and ideological factors are determining factors for the noticing any theory. Same way, the theories get attention when the value of other theory is evaluated and come in the center of attraction. Like the Paul Kiparsky (1941) has established already that generative grammar was first developed in India by the Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini in the 5th B.C.E. But the fact was not noticed that time. It got recognition after the Chomskiyan (1928) linguistics in late 1950’s and 1960’s and then the Pāṇinian grammar has been accepted as the superior to the linguistics science of the West.

4. Some scholars ignore the originality of the Tantra. They accept Tantra as a branch is flourished by the Nigama. Accordingly, it is not an independent tradition. George Feuerstein remarks-

Tantrism’s contribution to philosophy is negligible. Its unicity lies wholly within the practical sphere, the sādhanā. From philosophy point of view, there is no hiatus between Tantrism and previous traditions. Buddhist Tantrism rests substantially on the foundations of the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna, and its Hindu counterpart on those of the cognate Advaita-Vedānta.20

5. In the primary texts of Tantra, philosophers have been using the symbolic language. Abhinavagupta also uses this language. It is mentioned in those context that particular theory is secret, only the adhikārī sādhaka can understand. This is also one of

20 The Essence of Yoga: A Contribution to the psychohistory of Indian civilization, pp.-176-77.
the biggest hurdles for comprehending the texts. Thus, there are many reasons to ignore the Tantra. Torella also surveys the reason behind the ignorance the school. He says-

We can find, scattered in Abhinavagupta's works, a number of penetrating remarks on the nature of language. An overall assessment of his position in the Indian speculation on śabda has not yet been attempted, and certainly this is not an easy task due to the many components and the various sources of his eclectic teaching. Another reason for his absence from the general survey of Indian linguistic studies may have been the implicit assumption that owing to his being a tantric master, and therefore above all a 'mystic', his philosophy is not to be taken seriously, an exception being made only for his well-known contribution to aesthetics. Be this as it may, the available studies on Abhinava as a philosopher of language end up by being either a chapter attached to specific tantric studies or just a paragraph when dealing with the doctrine of Bhartṛhari, to which Abhinavagupta's doctrine is considered an esoteric appendix. Now that it is becoming more and more apparent that Abhinavagupta is one of the great philosophers of traditional India, time has come for us to make an attempt to reconsider his ideas in broader perspective. Another reason for his absence from the general surveys of Indian linguistics studies may have been the implicit assumption that owing to his being a tantric master and therefore above all a 'mystic', his philosophy is not to be taken seriously, an exception being made only for his well-known contribution to aesthetics. Be this as it may, the available studies on Abhinavagupta as philosopher of language end up by being either a chapter attached to specific tantric studies or just a paragraph when dealing with the doctrine of Bhartṛhari, to which Abhinavagupta's doctrine is considered an esoteric appendix. Now that is becoming more and more apparent that Abhinavagupta is one of the great philosophers of traditional India, time has come for us to make an attempt to reconsider his ideas in broader perspective.

All these reasons kept away scholars from Kashmir Śaiva philosophy in general and from philosophy of language particularly. Anyway, the school comes into the light at the earlier decades of the 20th century, when J.C. Chatterji introduces his monologue, titled Kashmir Shaivism. The book is accomplished successfully its task to present a short description of principles of Kashmir Śaiva. Afterward, in the fourth decade of the same century, the tremendous work, *Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical studies* and *Comparative Poetics* of K.C. Pandey attract attention of the intellectuals around the world. Navjivan Rastogi counts the reason which bounds the interests of

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22 *Kashmira Shivadvayavada ki Mula Avadharanayen, prakkathan*, ix.
scholars in Kashmir Śaiva. Accordingly, parallel stream of tantrism with Vedic stream, tradition of sādhanā, new explanation of the yoga in the form of ānandayoga, affirmative principles towards human life, new theories in the field of philosophy of language, developed principles with aesthetic approach etc. are the leading causes which make interest create in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy

The school opens the door for so many research areas. Some of them has been tried to highlight in the next section.

4. RESEARCH AREAS IN KASHMIR ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY AND TANTRA

The structure of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is developed in such a way that it opens the door for many relevant research areas. Even, Abhinavagupta itself hold command on many disciplines. Influence of these disciplines is seen easily in his works, like dhvani siddhānta which is related to the aesthetics or sāhitya śāstra. He put the essence of this theory in his philosophical and tantric arguments. Kashmir Śaiva is philosophical as well as tantric school, so, it keeps so many divergent ideas together. It reveals open-ended questions on śadāṅga yoga, aesthetics, cognitive science, feminism, psychology, philosophy of language, poetics and so on. Particularly, the texts of Abhinavagupta throw light into these issues in a deeper way. His texts Abhinavabhārati, Dhvanyālakalocana are related to the domain of aesthetics and poetics. Dhvanyālakalocana is explained under the shadow of parā vāk, paśvantī, madhyamā, vaikharī. In the last of each chapter, the essence of these elements is exclusively elaborated. The Vijñānabhairava examines the yoga and opens the door for the study of mind as well as Abhinavabhārati dwells with the cognitive science. In the tantric and philosophical texts, vimarsana, ābhāsana, hṛdaya, svarasodita parā vāk, camatkāra, dhvani- all of these nomenclatures reveal the aesthetics aspect of this school. Even, the

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23 Kashmira Shivadvayavada ki Mula Avadharanayen, prakkathan, ix
structure is explained under the frame of aesthetic methodology. The text Śivasūtra is abound with the aesthetic description, like- nartaka ātmā (III.9), rango 'ntarātmā (III.10).

The rituals, sociological and cultural studies are common. The concept of mantra has been taken in different manner. Anyway, mantra as the main problem in terms of religious and philosophical studies is pursued with three perspectives- social, cultural and historical. The investigation of mantra is confined to the limits of lingual parameter, like its phonetic structure, semantic problem and so on. From the semantic point of view, some questions like, ‘are mantras meaningful?’ ‘If yes, what sort of meaning they have?’ Answer of the former question is somehow knowable on the basis of background of that mantra either vedic or tantric, but the complex aspect is defining the latter question sort of meaning, which applies equally well to all possible cases. One can apply the same reasoning, on one hand, to a mantra that appears, when one reads or hears it, to have some more or less obvious meaning, and, on other hand, to a series of vedic stobhas or to a tantric mantra made up of a syllable or a group of syllables, forming neither a sentence nor a word? Moreover, sometimes, meaning of tantric mantras can be somehow understood by the interpreted meaning in text, like the aham mantra, while the essence of some mantras can be known only by practice of yoga. Thus, there is a problem of getting the proper meaning of mantras. Another open-ended problem is the layers of meaning of mantras. Harvey P. Alpher points out toward the problem of the linguistic utterance of mantra. He raises this problem-

I believe that one could frame an argument to demonstrate the linguistic nature of mantra, but I do no attempt to do so here. Another possibility might be to argue that ostensibly non-linguistic mantras must be understood analogically with those that are linguistics, rather than vice versa. Or one might argue that the utterance of mantra is a linguistic act in that it functions linguistically.24

In the same article, he throws light into some new perceptive of tantric mantras comparing with the Game theory of Wittgenstein. In his words-

I draw upon the Wittgensteinian tradition because I believe that it provides a useful point of departure for the description of the mantra. Wittgenstein’s late works- posthumously published ‘Philosophic Investigations (1953)’, On Certainty (1972) and Zettel (1967b)-may be read as sketching out the grounds for a typology of linguistic uses. They suggest a strategy for discriminating among the different ways in which words are used that can help establish whether a peculiar sort of utterance, such as a mantra, makes sense or is merely gobbledygook. In other words, Wittgensteinian categories may provide a philosophical vocabulary in whose terms one can establish whether a linguistic, whether it has a meaning, reference, and point, and, if so, what are the meaning, reference and point?

In the same direction of linguistic domain, one of the relevant issues concerning mantra is its intentionality (vivakṣā), since Mīmāṃsā school stands with the intentionality of language. It often means ‘more than what is actually said’. So, does mantric utterance possess any intentionality? Staal brings out comments on vedic rituals regarding the intentionality of mantra and denies its participation. Unlike to this, Padoux does support intention of tantric ritual, but eye catching factor is intention of user of mantra is accepted rather than mantra’s intention. Accordingly ‘How a mantra can be used without some reason? It is not uttered as an involuntary noise but for a purpose: an intention is surely is always there. More specifically, tantric texts on mantraśāstra always assign a use (viniyoga), and thus a purpose to mantra. Clearly such an intention is not that of the mantra but of its user. It can be attributed only metaphorically to the mantra itself. An ambiguity as to where the intentionality lies, however, is kept up in such systems as the Śaiva non-dualist ones, which treats consciousness and mantras as identical at their highest levels.’ According to Oberhammer-

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By means of wish to contemplate or experience—-effects in the meditating subject—-an intentionality that opens him radically for encountering the reality of Śiva.27

The mantra appears as strengthening this intentionality. According to Oberhamer, it is a means for the contemplation of the godhead. Sandhya bhāṣā is an another problem which is related to the intentional language or hidden language. These above-mentioned open-ended issues of mantra are included by the entire indological schools of vedic and tantric. Anyhow, the edited volume Understanding Mantras the collection of different research articles on Indian philosophical schools, throws light into various issues, concerning mantra. On the other side, Gonda’s pioneer study The Indian Mantras makes interesting and useful readings. It contains a number of definitions and explanations of the term at one place.

The characteristics, mantras possess, differ from ordinary language as they do not abide entirely by its rules, sometimes as to their forms, always as to their use. Mantra can be understood as a tool of action and thought-producing or thought sustaining devices. The inner organization of mantras and especially, their phonetic structure are more important than their obvious meaning. They are part of ritual performances outside of which they cannot really be understood. There are cases where mantras are the deity’s vācaka in Vedic performances. All these peculiarities inspire to call it as magical formula by and large. But the term magical formula misrepresents the concept since the magic word signifies the art of producing illusion. Although, magic indicates into the art of producing a desired effect or result through the use of incantation or various other techniques that presumably assure human control of supernatural agencies or the forces of nature. The term like supernatural or natural is an ambiguous term as these Western terminologies are not able to connote the South Asian concepts fully. Andre Padoux strictly refuses using this inappropriate translation since mantra is not related to such a limited area of magic, but how? The answer is found in the statement of Padoux-

One might be tempted simply to consider mantras as examples of the magical use of language. But, the explanation by magic alone, though useful, seems inadequate. First, because the uses of mantras are not restricted to what may legitimately be called magic, which, even in Tantrism, is only a limited part of a vast amount of practice and speculation on the holy or sacred, of which magic is but a profane or profanatory handling. Second, and even more important, because, the distinction between magic and religion, always a difficult one, is practically impossible in the case of Tantrism, where one can seldom know where the domain of the holy ends or what exactly is profane.28

The word magical always restricts the power of mantra. It is basically misinterpretation of the term mantra. Same way, the term linguistic formula restricts it with so much limited sense.

In addition, the historical development is itself a relevant area. In this context, first part of late K.C. Pandey's work, Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Studies and recently published Kashmir Ki Shaiva Sanskriti main Kula and Krama Mat of the contemporary scholar Navjivan Rastogi and Sandersons's works are helpful to understand the foreground for the research study. The works of Gopinath Kaviraj is also significant from the point of view of historical, sociological and theoretical. The perspective of the interrelation of Kashmir Śaiva with the Buddhist school, Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, Mimāṃsā in respect of the development of thought and place of origination is another problem. Interpretation of theories from ritual approach of Kashmir Śaiva, interrelation between Pāñcarātra āgama and Kashmir Śaivāgama, ontological study in terms of comparing the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya yoga, Bhartrhari's impact on Trika system, study of vyākaraṇa in relation to the Abhinavagupta, ontological status of upāyas, relationship of Pratyabhijñā with the Nyāya school, ontic status of padārtha, study of vṛtya in terms of aesthetics, importance of pratibhā in aesthetic and philosophy are problems which are still untouched.

Kashmir Śaiva philosophy & Tantra is the rich source for many areas regarding the humanities and social sciences. However, the prime concern of this thesis is the

28 Ibid, p. 303
philosophy of language. Philosophy of language deals with the triad relation among language, thought and reality in general. Kashmir Śaiva Philosophy of language is related to the vāk mainly. Vāk principle is dealt with the three points- vāk as a supreme, subordinate creative deity and its stages of manifestation, it’s relation to the mind and cognitive activity throughout the Indic tradition. Here, vāk is the creative and essential nature of supreme.

Abhinavagupta enriches this School through his depth vision. Theory of vāk is one of his most pervasive and deeper theories. So, the reason of the significance of this principle is to be examined.

5. IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE IN KASHMIR ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY

One may ask for the reason for giving such a great importance to the vāk principle in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy by Abhinavagupta. Some of his works are absolutely devoted to the same principle like, Mālinivijayottra, Parātrīśikāvivarana, Parāpraveśikā. The other texts are also occupied with the profound revelation about vāk, like Spandakārikā. Navjivan Rastogi enumerates a number of causes behind importance of vāk principle. Accordingly, Tantras, the parents of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy, often address the ultimate reality Parama Tattva as ṣabdārāsi. Abhinavagupta keeps an eye on these established principles Abhinavagupta keeps an eye on these established principles. Advaitic Kashmir Śaiva accepts the one and only element. Unity in multiplicity is its one of the basic principles. To maintain these values, he explores the concept of sakti which is the dynamic aspect of static metaphysical element, otherwise how would have been created the world? Since at the principle level, metaphysical element Parama Śiva is the consciousness only, which would be static in itself, in this case how is any activity possible? For attaining the dynamism, the concept of vimarśa is added as the essential nature. Parā vāk is the other form of vimarśa to enriching Parama Śiva with

29 Kashmira Shivadvayavada ki Mula Avadharanayen’, p. 66.
dynamism. In that way, vāk principle is assigned since the beginning with Parama Šiva. Dynamism is related to the wishing, knowing and doing, because an activity is a process of these combined activities. At the one side, these combined activities are related with the dynamic principle, other side, it is evident in itself that awareness exits since the commencement. The concept of awareness is different from the mere consciousness, in spite of having same substance. In this way, all principles are supported by the foreground principles of vimarsa as well as vāk. So, epistemology, ontology and metaphysical problems are dealt by the principle of language, which establishes deep relation among language, thought and reality in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. Kashmir Śaiva is the tantric school, where mantra is one of the most essential elements. For relating mantra directly and significantly to the matter at hand, it is needed to establish the parā vāk as the most competent element at the most essential place. Torella indicates the reason of the importance of vāk in this way:

The speculations on the nature of the word are indeed one of the threads that unite the diverse aspects of Abhinavagupta’s vast work-aspects so diverse from each other that they have made some scholars think of a temporal division of phases (aesthetics, religious, philosophical), which seems to me hardy to correspond to the facts. All these trends coexists at the same time and nourish each other. One may only think that Abhinavagupta sees a hierarchy in them, but it is always a hierarchy projected into an all-encompassing totality, such as that of the paramādvaita, which makes any single highest level provisional.

Besides being one of the possible centres of Abhinavagupta’s doctrine, the speculations on vāc also is one of the main intersection points of the religious and philosophical traditions that nourish his teaching.

So, the importance of language in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy inspires to the independent study of vāk. It is very necessary to take a glimpse of all the research works either article or thesis or edited volumes, which are devoted to this area.

6. REVIEWS

The area of *Tantra* in general is ignored till the recent decades of 20th century, so a very few research works have been done thereupon. Still, the works of contemporary scholars like K.C.Pandey, R.C.Dwivedi, Braj Ballabha Dwivedi, Laksaman Joo, Gopinath Kaviraj, Navjivan Rastogi, Sandersons, Ander Padoux, Raffela Torella are appreciable and the significant attempt to contribute. Nonetheless, there would be no research work on Kashmir Śaiva philosophy of language. Only, Ander Padoux’s *Vāc: The Concept of the Word in Selected Hindu Tantras*’s is research work in English. As the title itself reflects, the work is based on tantric aspect of vāk rather than philosophical or philosophical cum tantric study. There are seven chapters, along with introduction, conclusion and bibliography in the book. He starts examining the vāk from Vedic period and comes on *Tantra* from second chapter. In this regard, he discusses manifestation of sound, levels of word, phonematic emanation, the sixfold course (Śadadhvan), the *mantra*. He throws light into all the aspect of vāk from the pure tantric and ritualistic point of view.

Another scholar is Raffela Torella, who has been working on some issues on vāk through the research articles. One of his articles is *The Word in Abhinavagupta’s Bṛhad-Vimarśini*. In this article, Torella examines the vāk principle with the comparative study of the great opponents of Kashmir Śaiva. These opponents are Buddhist, Śaiva-Siddhānta. Bhartṛhari is also examined. The author takes the *ṭikā* on *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśini* of Utpaladeva for examining the vāk. Accordingly, ideas of Abhinavagupta on the word turn out to be the elaboration of two distinct components: the esoteric one, deriving from the Śaiva scriptures and the linguistic-philosophical one, deriving from teaching of Bhartṛhari. This paper proposes to examine relevant points in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivrtivimarśini*. Overall, the articles are quite significant in terms of comparative studies of Kashmir Śaiva, Siddhānta Śaiva and Buddhist. The article is highly technical which helps for the advance study.
His next article is *Devī Uvāca or The Theology of The Perfect Tense*. As the Śaiva Tantras are structured by the dialogue, which is occurred between Śakti and Śiva. In this conversation, generally Śakti asks and Śiva replies. Sometimes, Śiva asks and Śakti replies. But the problem is that Bhairava or Śakti speaks in perfect tense. How could it be possible to make the goddess or Bhairava speak in perfect tense? In reality, devī or Bhairava abides in the heart in any reality? Then why dialogue is in past perfect tense? So, here, the structure of perfect tense from the philosophical point of view is examined. Although, the article does not keep concern with the philosophy of vāk, but this is great example to understand the importance of grammar in terms of philosophy.

His article titled- *How Is Verbal Significance Possible: Understanding Abhinavagupta's Reply* is quite relevant to the philosophy of language of Kashmir Śaiva since Torella examines the meaning-bearer unit according to the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. Abhinavagupta accepts varṇa as the meaning-bearer unit rather than accepting the sphoṭa. He indicates towards the Śaiva-Siddhānta, which also does not support to the sphoṭa. To elaborate the concept, he refers the works of Abhinavagupta. These texts are- *Tantrāloka, Parātrisikāvivaraṇa, Ishvarapratyabhijñāvimarśini* and *Mālinīvijayavārttika*.

Another scholar Navjivan Rastogi examines the principle of vāk in his edited volume of *Kashmir Shivādvayavāda ki Mula Avadharanayen* in Hindi. The work provides the explanation of the most basic principles of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy for the apprentice. The concept of vāk is also examined with the same purpose. The chapter is pretty significant to the structural study of vāk. The author tries to present the essence of all the aspects, either philosophical or tantric or poetic of vāk.

It has been distinct by the available research works that there is no doctoral thesis which is devoted to the study of philosophy of language according to the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. The present thesis is an attempt to examine the principle of vāk. And the thesis is structured is knowable through the structure of the chapters.
7. STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY

This research work intends to analysis of relation among language, thought and reality. In nutshell, the whole institution of knowledge system, including Western and Indian, commences speculation on the co-relationship among the aforesaid relative elements on the basis of three presuppositions-

1. Either language is identified with reality, or
2. Language can represent the world with adequacy,
3. Otherwise language cannot represent world with adequacy.

In order to understand the problem, the thesis has been divided into four chapters, along with introduction, conclusion and bibliography. The order of chapters is organized such way that one would get the essence of philosophy of language in general and then enter into the Śaiva philosophy of language. The first two respective chapters give general idea about the philosophy of language. The second one is the extension of the first one. The next chapters’ i.e. ‘third and fourth’ are precisely focused on Kashmir Śaiva philosophy of language. Here also, the fourth chapter is the extension of the third chapter, likewise the first and second chapters are.

The first chapter, titled-Language, Thought and Reality: Issues & Assumptions, reflects that this chapter is precisely related to the issues of philosophy of language. The chapter has been started with the vāk sūkta of Rgveda and its development in Upaniṣads has been discussed. The purpose of examining them is to show that the Indian tradition has been speculating on the vāk since the earliest time. And the philosophical schools of Mīmāṃsā, Jaina, Buddha, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Baudhā along with Bharṭṛhari find the source from the Vedas and Upaniṣads. Most of the Indian Schools must discuss language since authenticity of knowledge-texts is the problematic in every School, by and large. Anyway, demarcation of language depends on the nature of particular philosophical school, like the Vedānta relates language to the empirical-limited world.
only. The hermeneutical Mimāmsā is very much devoted to examine the word-principle since it accepts *Vedas* as *nitya* and *apauruṣeya*. It reveals two theories of meaning, *abhihitāvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhaṇavāda*. It accepts the *vāṇa* as meaning-bearing unit. The dualistic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy upholds the distinction between language and its object-referents. Being the realistic school, it supports the objectivity of meaning. *Pramāṇa* is the central notion in Nyāya epistemology. Accordingly, any well-formed sentence is the *pramāṇa*. Language is the source of factual knowledge i.e. *śabda pramāṇa*. It is mode of the representation of the world. Jaina darsana deliberates the issues like origin of language, nature and structure, semantic theory, relation between word-meaning, meaning as universal vs. particular or *sāmānya* vs. *viśeṣa*, limitation of meaning, relation between language and truth, types of sentences with the foreground of *saptabhanginaya*. *Saptabhanginaya* is the theory of *anekāntavāda*, accordingly, each *vastu* has so many *dharmas*, which can be percept relatively. Thus, so called *dharma* is truth with relation to. The school embraces all mutually contrastive aspects of language, relating to other Indian schools, on the basis of *saptabhanginaya*. Anyway, Jaina school stands for atomic language i.e. *pudgala*, generated by physical endeavor. Bhartṛhari, the founder of philosophy of language as independent *darsana* in Indian tradition, adds to the Indian philosophy of language *sphoṭa* principle. *Sphoṭa* is the unifying principle that connects the Word, the grammatical form of the word, and the meaning. It is indivisible-whole-united-sentential form of *śabda* and *artha*. Bhartṛhari brings up the nature of language in such way that includes the philosophical, linguistics and metaphysical traits. He considers *Śabdabrahman*, the foremost rudimentary cause of reality. It is *anādi nidhanam* i.e. without beginning and end. That is not the subject of temporal sequence, neither externally or internally in the form of succession of mental events that form cognitions. It functions as the inherent, primordial ground of all cognitions. Thus language is not something which is created. The *Śabdabrahman* is called *aṣṭara* also. The phenomenal-idealism of Buddhist philosophy is developed as counterclaim to the Hindu realist position which acclaims the existence of external reality. The idealistic Buddhist claims that the world of experience or phenomena is the product of the human imaginative faculty since our cognitive experiences construct our
reality. These are the modes of consciousness containing cognitive contents and in the final analysis, do not yield any knowledge about reality as it may be outside of themselves. Consciousness posits the (apparent) externality of objects, not the objects themselves. Pioneer principle *apoha* offers the essence of meaning as negative in character. Words do not refer to objective realities. Words deal with i.e. conceptual image which are purely subjective constructions of mind.

After the Oriental tradition, the Western tradition has been taken. The reason behind the choosing of this tradition is that Western tradition discovers the new branch as ‘philosophy of language’ of philosophy. The term ‘Philosophy of Language’ is named by the scholars of Western Tradition. The Greek tradition which is flourished by Plato, Aristotle and so on, consider the importance of language and try to relate it with the world. The Continental and Analytical are the contemporary bifurcated branches of Western Knowledge tradition. They have been deeply indulged in the quest of language. According to fundamentals, they approach language with different perspectives. The Analytical Scholars accept the representative aspect of language. That’s why Bertrand Russell seeks artificial language to represent the world and his student Wittgenstein in his later period believes completely on natural language. Their thrust to explore the perfect or ideal language against the world let them not go beyond the natural vs. artificial language. The Continental philosophers prefer to the study of the relationship of Language, thought and reality, keeping the Language in center. Structuralist Saussure firmly accepts the language which is unified aspect of signifier and signified. His fundamental principles of structuralism like-the structure determines the position of each element of a whole, every system has a structure and structural laws deal with coexistence rather than changes. He denies the connection between the material object and the word. He sets it aside in order to study the very structure of language. Language precedes us. It is the medium of thought and human expression. Saussure reveals the structure of Language rather than the use of language i.e. speech or parole in his own technical vocabulary. In the same order of Continental Philosophy, Derrida stands against the structuralism; he views the signifier and signified as inseparable but not
united. Still meaning inheres to the play of difference, but in different way. Poststructuralist theory denies distinction between signifier and signified. Accordingly, concepts are just mere words. Thus, signifiers are the words that refer to other words and never reach out to material objects and their interrelations.

The second Chapter, titled, Philosophy of Language and Śaiva and Śākta philosophy deals with the Siddhānta Śaiva and Śākta Schools of Tantras has been examined. Siddhānta Śaiva is the concurrent philosophical School. Its conceptual elements are taken within the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy with its own interpretation, like caitanyātmaka nature of sat, satyatā of empirical world have been taken with modification in Kashmir Śaiva. The Śākta School is developed in the same structure of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. Even, the geographical region Kashmir is same for this non-dualistic School. That’s why it is also undertaken in the Kashmir Śaiva school. These schools are pretty closer to the Kashmir Śaiva Tantra and Philosophy, one is concurrent and other is coherent. Nonetheless both Schools have their own peculiarities. The Śaiva Siddhānta accepts duality at metaphysical level. The Śākta philosophy disagrees with Kashmir Śaiva only on the metaphysical element, since the Śākta is related to the śakti, while śakti is the essential nature of Parama Śiva in Kashmir Śaiva Tantra and Philosophy. Thus, in this chapter, tantric schools have been defined with two purposes-to get the background for the philosophy of language of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy in its own tantric domain as well as to perceive the eccentric characters of school of Siddhānta Śaiva and Śākta.

Third chapter, titled ‘Kashmir Śaiva philosophy of language (with reference to Abhinavagupta)’ is completely devoted to the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy of language. The chapter commences with the sources of vāk for Abhinavagupta. Thereafter, the main section starts with the elaboration of the nature of vāk. Accordingly, vāk as creative element is tattva rūpa. Vimarśātmakatā, śaktirūpa, svātantrya rūpatā and so on are her nature. All these elements strengthen her connectively. These constituents prepare the ground for the epistemology of vāk. Epistemology is completely related to the internal
development which is the cognitive process. It also has two dimensions. The first one is structural development of knowledge, wherein the pūrṇa-apūrṇa jñāna, nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka jñāna, kṣaṇikatā of jñāna, levels of parā vāk- paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī are discussed. Another aspect is parā vāk as āgama the most authentic determinative pramāṇa. The reason behind the examining of epistemology of parā vāk is that Kashmir Śaiva philosophy takes internal reality as fact. This fact is cognitive fact. It is the foreground for the ontology of 36th tattvas as well as for the ontology of mātrkā cakra.

Fourth chapter is 'Mantra and Prapāṇca'. The fourth chapter may be divided into three sections- the mantra, ontology of tattvas and ontology of varṇas. Although these sections are not complete separate because the methodology and structure of theories of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is designed such way that theories are overlapping to each other. Along that case, their independent study is not possible. That's why the foreground theories- sarvasarvātmakavāda and bimbapratibimbavāsa have been examined. Thereafter, in the first section mantra is taken, because it is also related to ontology. Thus, the nature of mantra, its relation with the ahamrūpa-vimarśa and parā vāk is there. These characteristics relate mantra with the metaphysical element. The mantra has not same nature as the linguistic mantras have. It is the source of these mantras, so in this form it is mantravīrya. Thus, the ontological status of mantra and its relation with the mantras are the main problems in the first section of the chapter. The second section is related to the ontological status of varṇas and as meaning bearing unit. So, the theory of meaning has been discussed. In this context, the ābhāsas and their relation with the determinate knowledge is elaborated. The centrality of aham as subject and as pūrṇa jñāna has been highlighted. Thereafter, the last but not least, the ontology of tattvas in relation with the mālinī and mātrkā and mātrkā cakra have been evaluated.

In this way, through the whole chapters, the philosophy of language of Kashmir Śaiva has been tried to examine.
8. METHODOLOGY

The principles of philosophy of language of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy are examined in a conceptual format here. For that, texts of Abhinavagupta have been preferred. Along with his teacher Utpaladeva’s Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā and commentary vṛtti and vivṛtti has been taken. Exegesis of Utpaladeva on the Pratyabhijñā branch of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy becomes foreground for the Abhinavagupta in terms of further development of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy. In the same direction, Kṣemarāja, the student of Abhinavagupta has been chosen as by his texts, the further development of principles is seen. To understand the position of Abhinavagupta, these scholars pay significant roles. That’s why, according to the context, other Kashmir Shaivaits, who contribute as the cause to do deeper the vision of Abhinavagupta, have been also discussed. The principles of this school have been delved into hierarchical levels and these theories overlap each other, so analytic and synthetic, both methodologies have been followed.
CHAPTER I

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY:
ISSUES AND ASSUMPTION
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LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY: ISSUES AND ASSUMPTION

Philosophy of language is a reasoned inquiry into ontology and epistemology of language. The ontological and epistemological enquiry of language is in central in Indian thought system since the beginning of the tradition. Basically, language as a unitary activity of speaking and writing is examined at two levels, i.e. form and meaning. Language marks the difference between human beings and other species. An understanding of language requires the apprehension of the formal composition of utterances and their relations with the rest of the world outside language. Experts of different disciplines like psychologists, anthropologists, logician, philosophers, linguistics, and theo-logicians have been tending to explore language with contradistinctive approaches. All sciences and organized knowledge depend on language for their preservation and dissemination. This is one of the reasons for ascribing a central place to language among the disciplines. However, philosophy concerns itself with the very general question about human knowledge, perception, argumentation and obligations. All these matters are dependent on language for their public communication and discussion. On the other side, many philosophers have turned their attention to more detail examination of the language since structure and formation of sentence, used in the philosophical discourse, are the determining factors, thereupon the nature of solution depends on language. Many times the outcome is unsubstantial due to incapacity of erratic language. In the view of incapacity of spoken language, some contemporary scientists, mathematicians and philosophers like G.E. Moore, L. Wittgenstein and the logical positivists seek perfect language. They look on many of the traditional problems of philosophy as the after-effect of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of semantic aspect of language. Philosophers like Plotinus and Bergson (philosopher of mystical
intuition) regard language as unsuitable for the formulation of fundamental truth. In order to remove the inadequacy of language, Ludwig Wittgenstein supports the ordinary language (language of everyday discourse). Extending equally, some philosophers like Bertrand Russell stand for the artificial language to reveal the truth in philosophical and scientific inquiry. By and large, deeper investigation of language commences with the ‘linguistic turn’ of 20th century in the Occidental schools. Since then, philosophers mostly indulge in the seeking of ideal language, although the understructure of the study of language has been laid down since the Greek tradition of Grammar. In Europe, the earliest systematic grammatical analysis of Greek has apparent impact of philosophical and linguistics thinking. Plato, Aristotle and other philosophers examine different aspect of language time to time. Nevertheless, language captures the dominancy in the age of 20th century.

Unlike to Occidental school of thought, language has been preoccupying a central position essentiality from the beginning of Oriental tradition. Oriental tradition of India acknowledges language as a constructive entity dominates world through its creativity. It is described as metaphysical element or ontological elements in Āgamās and Nigama. The explicit-manufactured-psycho psychical language is just a small glimpse of ‘metaphysical language’. The caliber of the psycho-physical language is delimitated by the determinate knowledge only, according to Buddhist school. The psycho-physical language is incapable to describe the reality in its completeness. That’s why Navya Nyāya School creates a new artificial-language. Thus, there are two most central reasons to examination of language, which are not limited to one tradition only-

1. Centrality of language in society and
2. Deficiencies regarding meaning and others, which inspires philosophers for probing language exhaustively.

Being a nearly recognized area since the last four decades of 19th century, there is so much scope for dealing different problems of language. The statement of Alston clarifies the necessity of the research in this new area in the introduction of his work-
The Philosophy of language is even less well-defined and less in possession of a clear principle of unity than most other branches of philosophy. The problems concerning language that are typically dealt by philosophers constitute a loosely knit collection, for which it is difficult to find any clear criterion separating it from problems concerning language dealt with by grammarians, Psychologists and anthropologists.¹

But this 'so called' new area exists in Indian tradition since the time of Rgveda. Indian philosophical Schools recognize the importance of language since always. Āgama is the rich source for examining the language in Indian tradition. Thus, this thesis is related to one of the schools of Āgama i.e. Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. This School has vast material concerning the same problems. Arguments and theories of vāk principle open the door for the philosophy of language. This tradition has not been dealt yet properly in spite of its rich research material regarding the philosophy of language due to some inauspicious negligence. The causes of its ignorance have been already discussed in introductory notes. So, the study of language is not a new study, rather than it is an attempt to do an afresh study.

Linguistics and philosophy of language have significant similarity as both sciences study language. So, the dispute is followed regarding the necessity of uncovering new individual discipline i.e. philosophy of language. Disregarding the dispute, both disciplines are quite different in nature, although the difference between the philosophy of language and linguistics is subtle. Searle makes out the difference between them, linguistics philosophy is the name of method and philosophy of language is the name of subject². In general, philosophy typically concerns with the most intractable and conceptual difficult parts of various disciplines. It embraces systematic study of basic concepts of epistemology, science and ethics, by which world and society is tried to systemize. However, the distinguishable point is that philosophy of language deeply concerns with the one branch of linguistics i.e. semantics and some other concern with syntax, by and large.

¹ Philosophy of language, p. 1.
² Ibid, p. 2.
1. AREAS OF STUDY CONCERNING TO LANGUAGE

Philosophy of language explains the relation of language, thought and reality, particularly the problem of meaning. Meaning is the key component for imparting relation between the utterances and the world at large. It is an attribute not only of language but of all sign and symbol systems, so that semantics embraces the wider range than language alone. Besides this, metaphysics, epistemology and logic are the prime concerned philosophical area, where language is speculated. According to Aristotle, it is the science of 'first principles'. Its main task is to investigate the first principles of whatever exists. Alston describes:

An attempt to formulate the most general and pervasive facts about the world, including an enumeration of the most basic categories to which entities belong and some depiction of their interrelations.

Thus, the ontological question regarding language is dealt in philosophy of language. Some of the problems of metaphysics are considered through the fundamental features of language. The 20th century logical atomism is a quite explicit philosophical movement of metaphysics. Logic is the science of reasoning. Its basic concern is the validity of any argument rather than truth.

Logic is the study of inference, more precisely the attempt to devise criteria for separating valid from invalid inferences, since reasoning is carried on the language, the analysis of inferences depends on an analysis of the statements that figure as premises and conclusions.

The logic reveals the validity or the invalidity of an inference, which depends on the forms of the statements that make up the premises and the conclusion. Epistemology is concerned with language at a number of points, the most prominent of which is the problem of priori knowledge.

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3 Philosophy of language, p. 8

4 Ibid.
2. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IN INDIAN TRADITION

Deliberation on language in Oriental tradition is confirmed quite earlier in compare to the Occidental tradition through the attestation of the earliest text ‘Rgveda’. The text laid down the foundation for the further development of different thoughts in every field of Indian intellectual tradition. Its tenth chapter i.e. vāksūkta is the foreground for unearthing various branches to the study of language only. In that sūkta, is established as the creative divinity. She is said daughter of Ambhrṇa rṣi. She is the most potential and omnipresent. She is iśvarī of the entire universe. She is the knower of Brahma. Brahmā, who creates the sṛṣṭi, is uttered by her. She is capable to make known to anyone. In this manner, Rgvedic analysis of vāk presents her constructive aspect. She is established as Brahma. This analysis prepares the foreground for the further structural development of vāk in the Upaniṣadas. In upaniṣadic thought, it is examined by three ways- bhautika, daivika and ādhyātmika, although the vyuṣṭpatti of vāk is same as in Veda by and large. Accordingly- vāk kasmād, vacē. The one which is speakable, is vāk. In Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the concept is explained- yaḥ kaśca śabdo vāgeva sā. So a śābda is called vāk. Tattiriya Upaniṣad says that vāk sandhīḥ, jihvā sandhānam. The definition supports the articulation of speech by the sense-organs. Jihvā sandhānam is closely related to the prāṇa śakti and mānasika śakti, which is found in a developed form in latter upaniṣadic thought and in Tantras in the form of nāda, bindu, bija etc. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad accepts that vāk is the adhiṣṭhāna (foundation) of every jñāna. Jñāna of Rgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda and Atharvaveda occurs through the vāk only. Itihāsa, Purāṇa and

5 Aham rudrebhivasaubhiścarāmyahamādiyairvita viśvadenvai, Rgveda, 10.125.1
Aham mitrāvaruṇobhā bhībharmyahamindrāṇī ahamaśvinobhā.

6 Aham rāṣṭrī saṅgamanī vasiṃnām cikātūṣṭ prathamā yajñīyānām.
Tām mā devā vyadadhūḥ purutrā bhūristhārām bhuryāveśayantām. Ibid, 10.125.3

7 Aham eva svayamidam vadhāṁ jatam devebhiruta mānuṣeḥbhā.
Yam kāmaye tam tanugram kr̥ṇomi tam brahmāṇam tamṛṣim tam sumedhām. Ibid, 10.125.5

8 Nirukta: 2.22.2

9 Sarveśām vedānām vāgevāyatanam. Br., 2.4.11
other *vidyās* are knowable by the *vāk*. So, everything is the *viṣaya* of *vāk*. Thus, the *Upaniṣads* are profound in displaying the multi dimensions of *vāk*. In respect of philosophy of language, *Upaniṣads* deal with the relevant issues such as relation between language and thought as well as limitation of language. Both problems evaluated from different point of view. Accordingly, in *Kathopaniṣad*, it is said that ultimate reality cannot be known by *mana* or *vāni*¹⁰, because *vāk* is not able to reach at the deepest level. She is *parimita*¹¹. But, the other side, the relation of *vāk* and *mana* (thought) has been accepted as it is said that *vāk* is the *dhenu* (cow), *praṇa* is her *ṛṣabha* and *mana* is *vatsa*¹². *Aitareya Upaniṣad* accepts that *vāk* and *mana* are establishing each other¹³. Phenomenon of language has been examined by and large in other individual disciplines also. In order to that, four *vedāṅgās* are devoted to the different aspects of language, *ṣikṣā* is on phonetics, *nirukta* on etymology, *channda* on prosody or metrics and *vyākaraṇa* on the grammar. Among *vedāṅgas*, *vyākaraṇa* is considered ‘primary’¹⁴. Bhartrhari accepts *vyākaraṇa* as the grand ladder, *siddhi sopāṇa*. Accordingly, it is the pure form of language which alone can ensure *apavarga* (liberation). In the same manner, *Patañjali* says that the language reveals itself to a sincere student of *Vyākaraṇa*, just as, a beloved wife reveals herself to her beloved husband. Pāṇini’s grammar is ‘one of greatest monuments of human intelligence’ according to the Leonard Bloomfield¹⁵. Fundamentally, language occupies the central place in the Indian disciplines of *sāhitya-sāstra*, *vyākaraṇa* and schools of *darśana*. *Sāhitya-sāstra* and schools of *darśana* are quite closer to each other as both of them acknowledge ‘problem of meaning’. Theories of

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¹⁰ *Naiva vācā na manasā*. Kt., 6.13

¹¹ *Vāgyai manaso hrasfyasf. Aparimitataramiva hi manaḥ. Parimitatareva vāk*. Śb., 1.3.6

¹² *Br.,* 5.8.1.

¹³ *Vāṁ me manasi pratiśṭhitā, mano me vāci pratiśṭhitam. Ait., antima anīśa

¹⁴ *Mb.,* 1.1.

¹⁵ Leonard Bloomfield (April 1, 1887 – April 18, 1949) was an American linguist who led the development of structural linguistics in the United States during the 1930s and the 1940s. Bloomfield’s approach to key linguistic ideas in his textbook *Language* reflect the influence of Pāṇini in his treatment of basic concepts such as *linguistic form, free form*, and others. Similarly, Pāṇini is the source for Bloomfield’s use of the terms *exocentric* and *endocentric* used to describe compound words.
language of each darśana provide the chief framework to the sāhitya śāstra in general. Thus, different theories are structured and developed through borrowing or influencing the perspective of schools of darśana. The theory of dhvani in Dhvanyālokalocana and theory of rasa in Abhinavabhārati is supported by the doctrine of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. On account to that, these philosophical schools have been devoting to understand the intrinsic structure of language and its relation to the reality. J. F. Stall asserts-

At times almost excessive preoccupation with language on the one hand, and with philosophy on the other, may indeed be regarded as a characteristic of Indian civilization.\(^{16}\)

Accepting the central position of language in Indian philosophical schools, he adds up-

Though almost all Indian philosophers whether Hindu, Buddhist or Jain devoted some attention to language, and most of the commentators evince familiarity with at least some rules of Panini, language was more or less basic topic only for the Hindu systems of Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya, and important, though not pivotal, for the Hindu Vedanta and for similar developments in Buddhism.\(^{17}\)

The Mīmāṁsā, Bhartṛhari school, Buddhist school, Nyāya school, Jaina school, some schools of Tantra i.e. Āgama like Śākta school, Śaiva Siddhānta and Kashmir Śaiva school discuss broadly about the different aspects of language. These Philosophical schools are enough rich sources to the speculation on language. Most of the schools must discuss language since authenticity of scriptures is a central problem in every school. Particularly, theories of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy is fully developed through the ahamātmaka vimarsa principle, that is one of the main sources of philosophy of language in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. Anyway, demarcation of language depends on the nature of individual philosophical school, like the Vedānta relates language to the empirical-limited world only. The hermeneutical Mīmāṁsā is very much devoted to examine the word-principle since it accepts Vedas as nitya and apauruṣeya. Furthermore, to interpret Vedas, two different schools of Mīmāṁsā has given two different theories of meaning,

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\(^{17}\) Stall J.F., Sanskrit philosophy of language, p. 500.
abhihitānvayavāda and anvītābhidhānnavāda. Buddhist philosophy emphasizes on the
determinate language since it accepts world is nothing but the determinative expression.
It explores theory of meaning of apoha. On the contrary, Bhartṛhari and Kashmir Śaiva
consecrate on the language inclusively, because for them language is metaphysical and
ontological entity respectively. All these issues are summarized in the statement of
T.V.R. Murti-

Every system of philosophy had to consider language at some stage or other; and each one had to
ponder over ultimate questions concerning the relation of word to Reality, of modes of meaning
and the validity of verbal knowledge.¹⁸

The essence of T.V.R. Murti indicates the necessity of studying language in terms of
philosophical problems, which are related to the ontology, metaphysics and semantics
also. All mentioned schools are categorized under the bifurcated Śrauta Śāstrās (that
which is heard) or revealed Āgama and Nigama. All the six orthodox systems of Indian
philosophical schools are flourished under the influence of Nigama by and large. Śaiva
schools, Vaiṣṇava school, Śākta are flourished by the Āgama tradition. Over and above,
Buddhist philosophy, Bhartṛhari philosophy and Kashmir Śaiva philosophy are closer to
each other since all of them establish Language as creative element. Likewise, to
understand the philosophy of Kashmir Śaiva, one has to entertain with the principles of
Mimāṁsā, Buddhist and Bhartṛhari. Although views regarding the nature of language are
quite distinct in all schools, like the determining factor, metaphysical element and
ontological category is the distinct characteristics of language in Buddhist, Bhartṛhari and
Kashmir Śaiva philosophy respectively. Nonetheless non-disputable factor is its
constructiveness in all the three philosophical school. The apologist Somānanda,
Abhinavagupta, Kṣemarāja and other philosophers of Kashmir Śaiva are seen very often
countering the theories of adversary Buddhist and Mimāṁsā. Iśvarapratyabhijñā and its
commentaries are well known text for the same purpose. Whereas giving respect to
Bhartṛhari, other grammarians are criticized by Abhinavagupta. He is influenced by the


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Bhartrhari's principle so much that he develops some fundamentals of Bhartrhari within the structure of his system.

Language is examined in relation to the most fundamental issues of metaphysics, ontology and epistemology in philosophy. The competency of language is one of the most important questions for the philosophers. This problem is directly related to the metaphysics and ontology. There are common terms, which are used usually for language in Indian philosophical schools. These nomenclatures are- **bhāṣā, vāk, sabda** and **vāni**.

1. **Bhāṣā** is from the verb root bhās, which means 'to make sound/noise'
2. **Vāk** is from the root vac, which means 'to say something'
3. **Vāni** is form the root vañj which means 'to articulate musically'.
4. **Śabda**.

Although all nomenclatures are used to refer language, but the nature of language is diversified. So, different terms are used in Indian philosophical schools for language. **Bhāṣā** is used on the wider level to signify spoken languages, like Hindi, Urdu and English. The term **śabda** is related to the sound and includes **varṇa, pada** and **vākya**. **Śabda** of Bhartrhari is the sentence and **Śabdabrahman** at transcendental level. **Śabda** in Kashmir Śaiva refers sound mostly. **Śabdana** is also used to signify the **vyāpārarūpa**. Usually, **vāk** is used in terms of creative language, the cause of world in Kashmir Śaiva philosophy. **Vāni** is also used in prose and poetry to refer spoken language, particularly in the sense of bitter and polite language. Namely, **śabda** and **vāk** is more common terminologies in philosophical speculations. The common notion springs from these etymological terms is that language is directly related to speech sounds means verbal facet, not with the writing, unlike the West where writing is accepted primary rather than speaking by some scholars, such as Derrida. Without any altercation, in the whole Indian tradition, speech is established as the foremost principle. The **Vedas** is the great evidence of the oral tradition which confirms that speech is prior to the writing. Their written forms are only an attempt of preservation of the oral **Vedas**. Thus, debates of Indic
schools move around the speech principle, like the metaphysic and epistemic value of speech, its role in epistemology in the form of Knowledge text in general, but of *Vedas* particular and indeterminate language vs. determinate language. With the exception of Cārvāka, other schools take language as an independent and ultimate source of knowledge. Commonly, following issues are discussed by the entire Indian philosophical tradition-

1. Class vs. individual
2. Universal vs. particular
3. Form vs. substance
4. Identity vs. difference
5. Positive vs. negative
6. Present vs. absence
7. Semantic properties are natural vs. conventional,
8. words vs. sentences,
9. meaning particulars vs. universals,
10. epistemology of testimony, and
11. Contextually determined individuals vs. context free generalities.

To understand these debates, one needs to apprehend clearly the structure of schools. It will help to know the problems of particular school as well as to build the foundation for the further chapters, related to the main concern of this thesis- *Kashmir Śaiva philosophy of language.*
(i) NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

The ontologically pluralistic and materialistic Nyāya philosophy of language postulates language with magnitudes of ontology and epistemology. The dualistic philosophy upholds the distinction between language and its object-referents. Being a realistic school, it supports the objectivity of meaning. Pramāṇa is the central notion in Nyāya epistemology. Accordingly, any well-formed sentence is the pramāṇa. Language is the source of factual knowledge i.e. ūśabda pramāṇa. The other feature is its form of guṇa (quality), which is not as significant as the other mentioned marks are, for philosophy of language. It relates the world to the language directly through the ontological principle. Language is the mode of representation of the world. It represents the world as words have meaning because they refer to external objects. Realistic schools follow the direct referential approach to meaning. The Logicians hold that the perceptual apprehension of the object could be distinguished from naming the object. Words refer to distinct generic properties and relations between objects. Anyway, theories of Nyāya philosophy of language would similar to the Analytical philosophy of language. P.K. Mukhopadhyay points out towards the allegations against the realistic theory of Nyāya philosophy of language, which are denial of objectivity of meaning. According to these opponents, Nyāya theory of meaning supports denotative theory, subjective theory as well as theological theory of meaning. This manifesto is supported by some recent scholars, who are well conversant with the contemporary Euro-American analytic philosophy of language according to the claim of P.K. Mukhopadhyay. He explains the allegation in this way-

However, some recent scholars, who are well conversant with the contemporary Euro-American analytic philosophy of language (CAPL), have alleged that Nyāya fails to preserve realism in their philosophy of language in that NP or NTL (Nyāya theory of language) fails to preserve objectivity of meaning. They have also alleged that so far as linguistic communication is

19 Āptavākyam ūśabdaḥ. N.S., 1.1.7
concerned NPL cannot avoid solipsism\textsuperscript{21} or in other words, it makes linguistic communication impossible.\textsuperscript{22}

Further, in this same article he has given subtle arguments to de-establish the so-called allegations. Nyāya philosophy of language has been dealt in the text of Gangeśa’s \textit{Tattvacintāmaṇi} of Navya-Nyāya and Jagadīśa’s \textit{Śabdaśaktipraṇāśikā}, mainly.

\textit{Pratyakṣa} is the two-step process involving the initial apprehension of the object and the subsequent apperception/awareness that results in mental and syntactic/linguistic representations of the first moment of awareness. Here, linguistic categories originate in different substances and attributes that exist in the world. Being a possessor of empirical principles, Nyāya philosophy analyzes language only at the level of speech-sound. Word denotes the ontological entity only. \textit{Pada}\textsuperscript{23} is accepted as ‘minimal bearing unit’. Linguistic meaning and word-meaning is ‘one and the same thing’. Words are only the primary unit of meaning. Same way, they are the sole bearer of meaning. Sentence\textsuperscript{24} does not possess meaning. Grammar, lexicon, statement of authoritative persons, usage and linguistic contexts are the sources of learning meanings. Relationship between the word and meaning is real, positive and direct. Meaning is explained as, ‘that which forms the object of remembrance, caused by the knowledge of the relationship between a morpheme and its reference\textsuperscript{25}. Naiyāyika accepts two types of meaning, denotative meaning that is \textit{abhidhā} and the second one is implication that is \textit{lakṣaṇā}, an extended or intended meaning. The system does not establish any third variety of meaning unlike to

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\textsuperscript{21} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism: Solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. Solipsism is an epistemological or ontological position that knowledge of anything outside one's own specific mind is unjustified. The external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist. In the history of philosophy, solipsism has served as a skeptical hypothesis. Indeed, one might even say, solipsism is \textit{necessarily incoherent}, a self-refuting idea, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing in which he or she purportedly refuses to believe: the 'reality' of intersubjectively valid criteria, and/or of a public, extra-mental world.

\textsuperscript{22} Mukhopadhyay, P.K., \textit{A Transparency Theory of Language}, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Padam ca varṇāsamāhath}. N.M, Bhaga 1, p.336

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Padasmāho viśyam}. Ibid, p. 336

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Buddhist Theory of Meaning and Literally Analysis}, p. 42.
\end{flushright}
other Indian schools, which keep the wider range of meaning. Particularly in literature third category of meanings i.e. suggested, vyanajña is accepted. The significatory function is either denotative function (sakti) or implication (lakṣanā). Denotative function i.e. sakti is the relation of a word with its meaning. Nyāya liberally posits that the meaning of the word is individual, class and the generic form (akṛti) all together. However, in explaining the nature of this relation, the ancient and Navya Nyāya differs from each other. According to the former, denotative function of the words is in the form of will of isvara that ‘from this word this meaning is to be understood’. The Navya Naiyāyikās assert denotative function is in the form of will only, not necessarily the ‘will’ of isvara, while in Tarkasamgraha, isvara-sanākta is the sakti. Denotative function arises in the individual. Naiyāyikās establish that the denotative function of words is in the individual as qualified by the universal. They do not admit separate denotative function in each individual class. There is only one denotative function in the form of the will of isvara in all the individuals. Consecutive characteristic of cowness abides in all individual cows and such a characteristic does not exist anywhere else except in individual cows. There are eight means of knowing denotative function, they are: grammar (Vyākaraṇa), comparison (upamāna), dictionary (kośa), sentence uttered by authoritative person (āptavākyā), action brought about by usage (vyavahāra), remain of the sentence (vākyaseṣa), explanation (vivaraṇa), proximity of a well known word (prasiddha pada sānīdhya). Words are divided into four categories, classified on the basis of usage of meanings: yaugika (derivative), ruḍa (Conventional), yogāruḍa (Derivatively conventional) and yogikaruḍa (Derivative-conventional). Meaning is got through the derivation of any word is yaugika. The meaning is cognized by the denotative function of the word as a whole without depending upon the denotative functions of the parts of the word, is ruḍa. In yogāruḍa, the meaning is got through the combined effort of yaugika and ruḍa respectively. Yaugikaruḍa is the reverse action of yogāruḍa, where

26 Evam ca ganṭha vājayañayoh prtho va gyātivayuktam tayor lakṣaṅgayāmantarbhāvasambhavāt. Ś. V., p. 1
27 Asmiitpadādayamatho bodhivya itiśvarasaṅketaḥ saktiḥ. T. Ś, Sabdapariccheda, p.173
28 Śakigraham vyākaranapamānakāśptavākyād vyavahāraśca. Vākyasya sēṣaḥ vivyātvaradanti sānīdhyaṣaḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ. N.Ś., Śabda Khanda, p. 266
meaning is understood through the derivation and convention respectively. Implication is used in the case of either the incompatibility of semantic connection or the incompatibility of the intention of the speaker, says old Naiyāyikās. A very famous example of this kind is gangāyām ghoṣaḥ (there is a village on the ganges), wherein denotative meaning gangā does not suit to the meaning of other word ghoṣa i.e. village. Such an incompatibility of semantic connection is the cause of postulating implicating of the word gangā in bank. The Navya Naiyāyikās holds that everywhere only the incompatibility of the intention of the speaker is the cause of postulating implication. Such implication includes two categories i.e. jahatsvārtha and ajahatsvārtha.

On the problem of creation, Annambhaṭṭa emphasizes that iśvara, creator of universe, is also the creator of all languages. Iśvara creates both the world of objects and also the language with which to talk about it. But ‘talking’ about the world of objects is impossible unless there is a relation of meaning between language and reality. Iśvara does not merely create the objects and the sounds, but also institutes a relation of meaning between them. Because of this relation, sounds become expressions of the language. Iśvara is āpitapuruṣa and jnāni. Thus whatever he says is infallibly true. So if iśvara says that the word ‘jar’ should mean the ‘thing jar’, then he does so because the word and the thing are objectively related. If they were not related, then iśvara would not be āpitapuruṣa and jnāni29. The spoken words as physical realities are merely kinds of sound. They become language only when they are endowed with meaning. No basic words can be empty, i.e. devoid of meaning (reference). Further, Nyāya develops a new language that is Navya-Nyāya language to represent the fact. The Navya-Nyāya language is developed through the natural language. Natural language is a spontaneous development of the power in man, by which he is distinguished from other animals. In such languages, the relation of meaning between expressions of such languages and elements in the ontology is purely conventional i.e. creations of the will of those languages. Later Navya-Nyāya philosophers take note of this phenomenon of creating technical terms and hold that the relation of meaning is conventional because it is created

29 Jñānādhiphikaraṇamātmā. Sa dvividhaḥ. Jivātmā paramātmā ceti. Tatreśvareḥ sarvacānāḥ paramātmā eka eva. Ts., p. 10

44
by the will of the persons concerned. The school does not support eternity of language. The school is quite related to the articulated language. The subtler and the higher levels of speech have not been recognized. They posit three reasons for non-eternity of words:

1. Because it is produced, so it has beginning and end.
2. Because it is bound in sense-organs.
3. Because it is postulated and used metaphorically.

In Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, the physical world is independent and real without the interference of mind or mental activity. An experience of the pragmatic world which is made of five bhūtas is also real. Validity of the reality is examined through the knowing and naming. Whatever is knowable and nameable is real because whatever is knowable, have existence and whatever exists is real. The world is known and referred by the name, so, to a certain extent, language is important in the Nyāya philosophy. Thus, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of thought world is called padārtha (meaning or referent of a linguistic form: padasya arthaḥ = an entity).

Major concern of Naiyāyika concern is with the problems of epistemology. Vākya is the major source of knowledge30. A person acquires the knowledge or experience of the world through four ways of knowing- pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, upamāna and śabda31. Perceiver transfers his experience into language and expresses it orally or in the written form. Here, language indicates towards vākya. Although words are only ‘meaning bearing unit’, vākya is the only source of knowledge in the context of pramāṇa.

Words, though, meaningful, but cannot perform the epistemic function of producing in the hearer some definite and determinate belief or knowledge of fact. In These two aspects of a sentence are related. A sentence succeeds in producing factual knowledge because it has no meaning. Sentence have no meaning but or because of that, they are the vehicle of linguistic

30 Āptavākyam śabdaḥ. Ibid, p.62
31 Tatkaranamapi caturvidham-pratyakṣanumāṇopamāṇasabdabhedāt. Ibid, p. 25
communication, where linguistic communication consists primarily in producing in the hearer, though the use of language, certain knowledge of fact.  

A vākyā is the accredited source of knowledge of the fact, which is not previously known. It focuses on the combined causes in the process of emerging a meaning. Four causes of verbal knowledge are enumerated by the logicians: āsakti (Contiguity), yogayatā (Semantic competency), ākāṅkṣā (Syntactic expectancy) and tātparya (Intention of the speaker). Enumerating the process of getting sentential meaning, Nyāya says that hearer/reader splits the received sentences into the word or the morphemes. He remembers referents from each phoneme and infers the intention (tātparya) of the speaker and decides the meaning of a word accordingly. He relates meanings, thus remembers and understands the sentential meaning. The whole process is called sabda bodha or a verbal understanding. Compared to the other theories of meaning, Nyāya theory of meaning may not appear well-defined; even after that its position is crucial in the discussion of theories of meaning. Still, the Naiyāyikās have proved themselves the powerful and balanced critics and commentators.

Navya-Nyāya theory states that spoken language is language in the primary sense, whereas gestures and written language are language only in derived sense. Gestures and written signs remind one of the spoken words which would have been used to convey the same sense. It is only by ‘suggesting’ spoken words that these become a ‘language’. In the theory of meaning, spoken language alone is the primary significant element. Written language is taken as derivatively significant in so far as it suggests the spoken words. It is only through spoken words, is suggested by the written words so that they become instruments of communication. Language is used as the means of communication to be successful. One must ensure that the hearer understands what the speaker intends to convey. This aspect of language is treated in Indian philosophy in general and Navya-Nyāya in particular as a source of second-hand information. To be the source of knowledge, second hand information is to be the instrumental cause which produces the

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33 Ākāṅkṣā yogayatā sannidhipā ca vākyarthaṁ āniṁ venu. Padasya padāntaratrayatirekaprayuktānvayūnaubhāvavakatvatvamākāṅkṣā. Ts., p. 64
cognition of the sentential meaning. The concept of meaning, therefore, is defined purely from the hearer’s point of view. Language as a ‘means of communication’ is conceived as the instrumental cause which produces certain cognition in the hearer. The concept of meaning is formulated only from the hearer’s point of view. The speaker already has the knowledge which intends to communicate to the hearer. Thus, in the case of inference for oneself, the person completes the process of inference without using any word at all. When he wants to communicate his inference, he uses a sentence with five membered syllogism. Hearer has to understand the meaning of a sentence. Meaning is defined as the divine will which produces certain cognition in the hearer on hearing the relevant word. There is the ignorance of the intention of the speaker which becomes important only in understanding the sentential meaning. Nyāya does not percept the deeper features of language. Even, language is not included under the categorization of seven ontological categories. P.K. Mukhopadhyay comments on the Nyāya philosophy of language—

Nyāya gives us a philosophical theory of language but its orientation, etc. does not allow us to say that it gives us a philosophy of language in its standard primary sense.\(^{34}\)

It is only the simple medium to represent the facts in the world of simple human-beings and intellectuals. It has no capacity to relate itself to the world. The relation between world and word is made by will of individual.

(ii) **JAINA PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE**

Jaina dārśana deliberates issues like origin of language, nature and structure, semantic theory, relation between word-meaning, meaning as universal vs. particular or sāmānya vs. viśeṣa, limitation of meaning, relation between language and truth, types of sentences with the foreground theory of saptabhanginaya. Saptabhanginaya is the theory of anekāntavāda, accordingly, each vastu has so many dharmas, which can be percept relatively. Thus, so called dharma is truth with relation to. The School embraces all mutually contrastive aspects of language, relating to other Indian Schools, on the basis of

Anyway, Jaina school stands for the atomic language i.e. *pudgala*, generated by physical endeavor. In the terminology of *Vyākaraṇa darśana*, it suits to the *vaikharī* level only. It does not recognize the subtle level of language. However, the relationship between thought and language is discussed but that ‘thought’ i.e. *mati jñāna* cannot be compared with the *madhyamā* level of Śaiva and *Vyākaraṇa*.

Jaina *darśana* is also aware to the problem of language. Discussions on language have been occurred time to time. A noticeable evidence is the first *saṃgha-bhedā*, where *Mahāvīra* and his son-in-law dispute over the nature of ‘present continuous’. The significance of ‘relation of social human to language through the communication’ is fully elaborated in the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* of *Umasvāti*. The text elaborates role of language for social human being with the help of *parasparopaghraho jīvānām sūtra*.

Primarily, *śabda* is *pudgala*. Marrying with consciousness *pudgala* takes the form of *dhvani* and becomes language. Thus, language is the combination of consciousness and *pudgala*, where *pudgala* is the governing element. Giving importance to the scripts, *Jaina* philosophy includes the category of written form also in *śabda* at secondary level. The *śabda* can be presented into two forms-

1. Verbal form- through the hearing organs.

2. Written form-through the sense organs of eyes.

Along with, language can be read through the organs of touch, like brail script helps to read. In this way, the all-inclusive language incorporates all forms of language either the most subtle unit of language as *pudgala* or speaking language or the script which are excluding part from both of them. Language is not constructive element for the Jainas. It is just the unit which is used for the imparting and communicating. Thus language, including word and meaning, can be known by three ways-

1. *Sparśendriya*

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35 *Vastutas tu parokṣam eva, matijñāṇatvāt. Kuto nu khalv etan matijñānam parokṣam eva, matijñāṇatvāt. N.D., 2.3*

36 *T.A.S., 5.21, p. 2.*
2. Cakṣu indriya


Besides these, mana/buddhi is inevitable element with these sense organs.

The verification of every theory of this darśana is come across to the principle of syādvāda. Its great impact goes to the eternality of language also. ‘Prajñāpanā sūtra’ points out towards the origin of language. Accordingly, the origin of language is parallel to the origin of sentient being. The exact point of time of origination of language cannot be traced like the origin of human being cannot be delineated. Language is eternal but its eternality exists in the sense of pariṇāmi nityatā. Pariṇāmi nityatā establishes language as beginning-less and eternal. At the other side, its commencement can be traced at particular time by individual. Language is sādi by individuality. At the same time it is anādi also on the basis of bhāṣā paramparā or bhāṣāpravāha. Again, language is non eternal, because it is originated in the form of pudgala. Prajñāpanāsūtra accepts the origin of language by physical endeavor. Both the contrasting aspects i.e. non-eternity and eternity of language come under the relative terms ‘sādi śruta’ and anādi śruta. The system marks the wider range of the gross language as it includes every type of sounds under the different class of languages. It incorporates vague sound of animals and different types of noises which is generated through the contact of things. Two most basic types of sound is included into Language-

1. Akṣarātmaka

2. Ankṣarātmaka.

Akṣarātmaka- the language which is uttered by the help of speech sounds by the human beings, is said akṣarātmaka. There are other two sub divisions of this category i.e. śravya and drśya. Almost all languages of the world come under this category37. Akṣara śruta, lipi jñāna and saṃketa are classified into this section. The language is used for the communication and imparting knowledge.

Anksarātmaka- excluding speech-sounds, remaining sounds i.e. conglomeration of sounds are anksarātmaka, like, animal's language, child's language, and language of dumb. It includes the sign and symbols which is indicated by the physical endeavor and others. Tirthankar's language is also named anksarātmaka language, probably this would be the reason that such types of sounds are including in this class. Viṣeṣāsvaṣyaṭakabhāṣya says that sneezing, clapping, deep exhaling, crying silently come under the anksarātmakabhāṣā. In this case, knowledge is not imparted to others, only knower knows it but does not express it before anyone. These categories come under the śruta jñāna, 'when on the basis of one knowledge (indriyabodha), another knowledge (artha-bodha) come on the light, is called śruta jñāna' 38. The śruta jñāna has two divisions, one is aksara śruta and the other is anksara śruta. Śruta jñāna (indriya bodha) is the cause of artha bodha39.

Every system accepts the relation of thought and language to the some extent, although the nature of relation is different in each individual school. Here, thought and language are not very distinct from each other as the silence form of language is named as thought and the articulated form is named language. Thought is called 'mati jñāna' and language is 'śruta jñāna'. Mati jñāna is none other than indriya bodha and śruta jñāna is bhāṣā jñāna. Language cannot express itself without the pre existence of thought. Śruta jñāna is posterior to mati jñāna40. Actually indriya- samvedanā is the precondition of language. Without the resort of language, thought would subsist, but language endurance must not be possible without the thought41. The pure mental process is counted under the mati jñāna, like indriya-samvedanā, mānasika-samvedanā, cintana, vicāra, tarka. There are four sub-divisions of mati jñāna -

1. Avagraha

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38 P.S., 1.122. p.17.
39 Ibid.
40 Śrutam matipūrvam----- T.A.S. 1.20
41 V.A.B., 105
2. Īnā

3. Apāya

4. Dhāraṇā.

Language falls into the last three elements. The avagraha does not come under the realm of language. Language must be used in other three concepts. Viśesāvaśyaka bhāṣya and Jain Tarka Bhāṣā raises a question on the categorization of the mati jñāna. Accordingly, only avagraha should count under the mati jñāna, because that is the only pure thought process, while the other categories are compound with language. In reply, author affirms the fact of conglomeration of language and thought in the three categories. Nevertheless, language is not dominant factor there, only thought is the governing element. The basic unit of the language is alphabets, which is classified into svara and vyāñjana. These fundamental elements take part for the conveying meaning, it is aksara. Conventionally, vowels and consonants are named aksara, but Jaina darsana defines aksara as 'knowledge or consciousness which has capacity of knowing meaning. Svara is the independent category. It gives base for the pronunciation of consonants without vowels, consonants cannot be uttered. There are 46 letters (mātrkā aksara) in alphabets which are originated by the physical endeavor. Jaina darsana sketches the structure of alphabets-

1. Ākṛti rupa

2. Dhvani rupa

3. Jñāna rupa

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42 V.A.B, 461.

43 Ibid, 461.

44 Ibid, 462.

45 P.B., 11.15. p. 28.
On the basis of these states, three branches are developed\(^{46}\) –

1. Samjiñā akṣara
2. Vyañjana akṣara
3. Labdhyākṣara

The meaning of labdhyā akṣara is got through the samjiñā akṣara and vyañjana akṣara. This is related to the semantic aspect of sentence. The labdhyā akṣara has two aspects-

1. It is arjita guṇa.
2. It is anarjita guṇa.

Language is learnt by getting the meaning of words and sentences. In this sense it is arjita guṇa. But the learning capacity is inherent which abides in each person. Deficiency of this inherent capacity leads to human beings towards the incomprehension of language. This inherence capacity is anārjita guṇa, which does not come from effort. It lives naturally from the time of birth. The inherent capacity shows some similarity with idealism which says the language exists inherently. It is inside, not outside. Thus, labdhyā akṣara is the inherent capacity of learning language. Samjiñā akṣara and vyañjana akṣara is an outside material. The categorization of alphabets authenticates aspect of writing also. Jaina darśana accepts writing as one of the medium for expressing the language. Nevertheless, like other Indian philosophical schools, Jaina darśana also establishes priority of speech.

Categorization of sounds is defined very broadly in this particular school. But in the context of communication, Jaina darśana emphasizes on śabda that should be sequentially organized sound speech, perceived by sense organ ear\(^ {47} \). This śabda must have ‘meaning aspect’ which is essential element of every language\(^ {48} \). Pada is the

\(^ {46}\) \textit{V.A.B.}, 464.
\(^ {47}\) \textit{Śrotendriyagrāhānyiyatakrama}——. \textit{A.R.B} 7, p. 338
\(^ {48}\) \textit{Sabdatepratipādyate vastvaneneti śabdaḥ. Ibid}, 7, p. 338
meaning-bearer unit. It is made of group of letters. Vākya is the group of words where all words are dependent upon each other for expressing their meaning. A sentence in itself is an independent linguistic construct. Word and meaning are not identical. They are two independent entities. The relationship of vācyā and vācaka (signified and signifier) is said aviyojya.

The relationship between śabda and artha is also non-eternal, but signifier conveys signified, how? The ‘similarity’ (sādrṣyatā) relates signifier and signified. Thus, the word expresses meaning not because of the eternal relationship between them, but it expresses meaning on the basis of similarity. Like the word gau expresses meaning ‘cow’, because the reason is similarity. Gau which has been spoken in past is different to present word gau but still both have some similarity. On the basis of these similarities, ‘cow’ is apprehended. There are two views regarding how do words express meaning? Is it natural capacity or is it developed capacity?

1. Word has natural relationship with its meaning. It expresses meaning spontaneously, without any effort. Every word is connected with its meaning since the beginning.

2. Śabda has no natural capacity of expressing meaning. Meaning is applied on the word through the conventional relation and other external elements.

Jaina darsana admits both views from different point of view. Meanings can be got through the root verb (dhātvārtha). On the other side, many words can be known by the ruḍi. Thus, there are some words are vyutpattiparaka and some words are ruḍārtha. Jaina accepts three theories for the determination of meaning-

1. Sahaja yogyatā (svābhāviṣka śakti).

2. Saṁketa

3. Samaya (paramparā/ prayoga)50.

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49 Padānām tu tadapeksānām nirpeksah samudāyo vākyamiti. P.K.M., p. 458

50 Svaḥbhāvikasāmarthyasamayābhyyāmarthabodhanibandhanam śabda iti. P.N.T.L., 4.11

53
When a statement possesses more than one meaning of the one word, in that case meaning is determined according to the context and intention of speaker. The famous example of saindhava refers salt for the eating man. Jaina darsana includes paradox elements, sāmānyā or viśeṣa in meaning. Accordingly, sāmānyā and viśeṣa are the inevitable part of each other. The word does not denote only sāmānyā or viśeṣa, it denotes both. Theoretically, both seem different entities but at pragmatic level they are not separate from each other. ‘Particular’ or ‘universal’ cannot exist alone without each other. No man can be lived without the manness and manness cannot be lived without man. Besides this, some words have only universal meaning or some words have particular meaning only, like man has universal meaning and individual has particular meaning.

At the time of speaking, the very first man, the mental organ and then vāc the sense-organ of speaking becomes active. Now, organs of articulation come in movement, and through the svara yantra, pudgala/parmānu of sounds are transformed into the speech sounds. At the most outer level, speaker exhales these speech sounds into the form of sequential language. Coming out, these pudgala starts moving (prasāraṇa) throughout the ākāśa. These speech sounds (dhwani taranga) spread by the lokānta51 as the language is pervasive in Jaina darsana. Actually dhwani is paudgalika and prasaraṇaśila. In this continuation, paudgalika dhvani reaches till the sense organ of hearing and listener apprehends meaning. Mana is inevitable element in the process of getting meaning. It creates bimba through the different information of sense organs. Tattvārthasūtra discusses naya and nikṣepa theory which have semantic aspect. Nikṣepa determines the meaning of words52. Naya determines the meaning of sentences53. Naya theory gives foundation to the listener to understand the context with the intention of speaker. There

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51 P.B., 15.
52 Prakarāṇādādīnāṃ pratipattyādi vyavacchedakayathāsthāna vinīyogāyāḥ sabdārtha racana viśesā nikṣepāḥ. J.T., Nikṣepa pariccheda, p. 63
53 Vakturabhprāyayāḥ = nayayā = Laghiyastrayī, sloka 55, nayoijnāturbhprāyayāḥ =. S.V.M, p. 243
are seven nayas: naigamanaya, sangrahanaya, vyavahāra, rūṣutra, śabdānaya, samabhirūḍanaya, evambhūtanaya. The first four nayas are related with the meaning and the last three nayas are related with the word i.e. śabda. There are four types of nikṣepa also: nāma, sthāpanā, dravya, bhāva.

In this way, Jaina darśana examines many aspects of language under the influence of saptabhangi naya and syādavāda. Notwithstanding, it tries to explain the gross language with a wider connotation. But it does not throw light much on the subtle level of language. Language is just the mode of representation of the world. It is limited to the mode of thinking and talking. It is totally dependent on speaker for its origination. It is nothing but only a more advanced and essential equipment of communication in Jaina darśana.

(iii) MIMĀMSĀ PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

Mimāṁsā darśana is established to prove the authorization of the Veda. Its philosophy of language involves throughout its discussions in the establishment of Veda as eternal indisputable authority and apauruṣeya. Primitively, Mimāṁsā as vākya śāstra is distinguished for its traditionally recognized narrow confines of ritualistic interpretation of Vedic sentences. This study is mainly based on the problem of word-meaning and sentential meaning. The concept of ākāṅkṣā (mutual expectancy), yogyatā (consistency) and samnidhi (contiguity), which fix the role of word’s meaning in unity of sentence, is uncovered by the Mimāṁsā school for the very first. These three factors are accepted by others schools also with a little modification. Adding to these, tātparya is taken as understanding from the contextual factors. The theory of abhitānvyayavāda that is held by Kumārila and anvitābhidhānāvāda54 which is held by Prabhākara, are important contributions to the field of semantics. According to the Purushottama Bilimoria, the

54 Jātiśaktyaktyabhedaparyantavat padaśakteranvayaparyantatte ca lādhavena anvitābhidhānāvādaḥ. M.M., Saptamam Kusumam, p. 192

55
autpattika (relation of word with the meaning form the very beginning) thesis offers semio-logical insights from De Saussure's work and their extension in the writing of the contemporary French philosopher Jacques Derrida. V.N Jha points out the commencement of language studies in Vedic tradition in nutshell-

The history tells us that there was a time when the people of Vedic society at some period of time wanted to have justification for the continuity of the ritual culture. Naturally, the people of the then society must have been divided into two groups, one group trying to defend the continuity. For the defenders what was required was to establish the authorativeness of the Vedic text on which the ritual culture depended. The defenders might have adopted various philosophical systems in ancient India. Once they could achieve the logical defense for the continuity of the ritual culture, the next problem which the defenders must have faced was of preserving and interpreting the sacred texts. To preserve the texts, particularly the samhitās, they discover various methods known as pathas and vikrtis. This process necessitated the knowledge of the system of sound production and realization which slowly gave birth to the science of phonetics in the form of the Prātiṣākhya and Sikṣās. The continuity of the ritual culture further demanded the thorough understanding of the Vedic texts, because without that the performances could not have been possible. This, in turn, needed the thorough knowledge of grammar of Vedic language which slowly developed into full scientific knowledge of analysis of language in the form of Pāṇini' Astādhyāyī. To acquire the understanding of the Vedic texts for translating them into action required a system of interpretation of sentences. This attempt gave birth to the ancient Indian science of sentence interpretation known as the system of Pūrva Mimāṁsā.55

In this way, Mimāṁsā school took the birth and developed the theory of sentence-interpretation, which is its contribution to philosophy of language. Raffaela Torella indicates the issues of language in terms of Mimāṁsā56.

The central questions, posed by Mimāṁsā, together with the whole of India's philosophic and linguistic tradition, are as follows: what is it makes a sound word; what is indicated by the word; what is its relationship with its meaning; what is sentence; what are its relations with its components words, and more, generally, can language be a vehicle of knowledge, i.e. how reliable is its 'reproduction' of the real? Thus, Mimāṁsā is devoted to the semantic theory, because it has to interpret the knowledge-texts. That's why it deals with the question of externality of language, its epistemological process and so on.

The hearer/reader remembers the meaning only if he/she knows the relationship (vṛtti) which holds between a pada and its meaning (padārtha). The relationship is real, direct


56 The Philosophical Traditions of India: An Appraisal, p. 189.
and positive. For them meaning is vastavártha. It denotes or signifies the entity which exists ontologically. Thus, meaning is defined as, 'that which forms the object of remembrance caused by the knowledge of the relationship between a morpheme and its reference'. The relationship by the Nyāya logicians can be extended to the account for the intended meaning. The extended relation is called lakṣaṇā. Thus, we have the primary relation and extended relation. The system does not posit any third variety of relationship as vyañjanā or suggested meaning.

The purpose of establishment of Veda as the absolute authority reflects in the structure of every theory of Mīmāṃsā. Nature of śabda is also structured to complete the principle aim. Accordingly, the minimal bearing unit pada is eternal. The constituents of word are syllables. The school does not accept any distinction between the word and its syllables. Fundamentally, they have abheda relation. Śabara puts it 'aṅkṣaṇānya eva padam'. There syllables are not produced by the vocal efforts, they are revealed. They are nitya (eternal). Jaimini and Śabara say that the main purpose of the words is to yield sense. But their main concern is not śabda. They have interest in the task of interpreting the sentences in the Vedas, which are concerned under the vākya śāstra. Jaimini defines a vākya in Mīmāṃsāśūtra as: so long as a single purpose is served by a number of words which on being separated are found to be wanting i.e. incapable of affecting their purpose, they form one sentence. According to Jaimini, the group of words will be called a vākya if:

1. The constituent words keep expectancy for one another
2. Words are uttered or placed together.
3. They serve one purpose or yield one signification.

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57 Buddhist Theory of Meaning and Literally Analysis, p. 42.

58 Parantu mīmāṃsādārśane śabdo varṇātmakāḥ atiriktam dravyam, varṇā nityāḥ vyāpakāḥ dhvanivyanāgyā iti svākritaye. M.M., Prathamam Kusumam, p18
He defines three syntactic elements to make the valid sentence. These principles are ākāṅkṣā (mutual expectancy), yogyatā (logical compatibility) and sannidhi (spatio-temporal contiguity). Further, Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsāka and Naiyāyika like Jayanta add the forth element, tātparya (the knowledge of speaker’s intention). These elements make statement valid and meaningful.

Mīmāṁsā interprets meaning in two ways, which are based on laukika and Vedic sentence. Vedic vāyya is apaauruṣeya. There is no chance of interference of speaker, only this śabda is pramāṇa. In the context of laukika vāyya, vākyārtha is obtained from the padārthas only. Vākyārtha is the sum total of the arthas of the constituents’ padās. Here, meaning appears according to the intention of the speaker. However, the laukika vāyya cannot be accepted valid each and every time, because of determining meaning. Intention is the more important than the śabdas. From the epistemological point of view, Vedic word is an unquestionable pramāṇa, since it is not contaminated by language of day to day life. On the other hand, the laukika śabda is found sometimes to be apramāṇa because it is so contaminated. In fact, the śabda is used there only as a means of conveying the artha or the abhiprāya. Increasing the range of meaning, Mīmāṁsā accepts lakṣaṇika artha also. In some cases, primary meaning does not suit in the laukika vāyya due to incapability for signify the intention of speaker. In this situation, putting aside the primary meaning, secondary meaning i.e. lakṣaṇā, is applied on the sentence. Sometimes the secondary meaning is more capable to express the intention of speaker. Pragmatic world gives the more significance to the meaning rather than sentence. But this indefinite meaning opens the door for some possibility of error in the pragmatic sentences as there is intervention of human agency which is not perfect in itself.

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61 Tattadvākyasthāni padāni yadā śvīyamartham upasthāpya viratāni bhavanti tadā padairabhhihitāh padārthāh ākāṅkṣā sannidhi-yogyatārūpaḥ kāraṇaiḥ parasparānvyayuktāḥ vākyārthabodhakāḥ bhavanti iti abhihitānvyayavāda. Ibid., Saptamam Kusumam, p. 191
Śabda and artha are accepted as eternal as well as their relationship is also eternal\(^{65}\). This eternal relationship is addressed 'autpattika'\(^{66}\). Their relationship is explained by different nomenclatures also, like śabda is pratyāyaka and artha is pratyāyaka. So there is relation of pratyāya-pratyāyya bhāva or the samjñā samjñilaksana sambandha. Meaning is known by the common usage, thus loka is the only authority so far as śabdārtha is concerned. Thus, word- meaning and their relation with the Vedas, all three are conceived to be nitya and therefore apauruṣeya. So, the validity of the śabda or the Veda remains unchallenged.

Mimāṃsāka Jaimini and Śabara accept that ākṛti is denoted by the śabda. Ākṛti signifies jāti i.e. universal. The ākṛti of Mimāṃsaka’s is none other than sāmānya which is acknowledged as the ‘cause of the perception of oneness’. Whether, vyakti signifies an individual i.e. something which it possesses in common with none else. First, denoting the word, the idea of generality is got, after that matters come to action. Meaning is connected with the generality of the individual. Thus, actual usage would seem to show that a word expresses both ākṛti as well as vyakti (in succession). But, still ākṛti is primary. Kumārila has different view since he does not deny the importance of ākṛti, but at the same time, he supports significance of vyakti also. Accordingly, there is relation between the universal and the individual. The individual is comprehended by means of arthāpatti (postulation) and anumāna (inference). Kumārila adds other two essentials also for cognition. One is anuvṛtti ‘(similarity)’ and the second one is vyavṛtti (difference). These two elements prove the existence of individual and universal or class. ‘Similar notions’ help for cognize the elements of class (as cow). ‘Differential notions’ distinguish one class from the other classes (like horse, ox, etc.) and help to identify an individual within the class. So, the meaning of word involves both universal and particular which is determined by anuvṛtti and vyavṛtti. However, grammarians refute

\(^{65}\) Tatra mīmāṃsakāḥ autpattikastu śabdasārthena sambandha iti vadantaḥ śabdārthayossambandha iti vadantaḥ śabdārthayossambandham nityamapauruṣeyanca vadanti. Ibid, Prathamam Kusumam, p., 14

\(^{66}\) Śabdārthayoh sambandhasvabhāvikah (nityah) (autpattikah)——tatra mīmāṃsakāḥ autpattikastu śabdasārthena sambandha iti vadantaḥ śabdārthayossambandham nityamapauruṣeyanca vadanti. Ibid, p., 14
this view and accept the view of Jaimini and Śabara. Jayantabhaṭṭa has different view on the issues of denotation of Kumārila. Accordingly, Kumārila’s theory postulates self-contradictory elements together.

There are only two śabda-vṛttis or saktis namely abhidhā and lakṣanā. In fact, abhidhā signifies primitive śabda sakti, another vṛtti is gaṇavṛtti or lakṣanā. In the case of incompatibility of meaning of abhidhā sakti, the gaṇavṛtti or lakṣanā is used. The former one is taken as mukhyārtha while lakṣanā is conveyed on the basis of śādrśya or other relations. Along with, synonyms of one meaning are also primary meanings. In that case, context helps to determine the exact significance. Though, such a word seems to be one, but in actually this is not one word, these are two words. Mīmāṃsā gives preference to abhidhā, which is stronger than lakṣanā. Jaimini and his commentator accept four different classes of words, nāma, sarvanāma, viśeṣaṇa and ākhyāta or karma-śabda.

The constituent syllables are uttered one after the other by the speaker. Impressions of some syllables remain left by those syllables that pass away on listener’s mind. After getting the impression of all syllables, outcome presents in the form of śabda, the primary unit of language. All these impressions get combine with the last syllable. Consequence of the combination of these syllables is the artha-jñāna. The process is the outcome of purely mechanical conduct. There is no space for the theories like sphoṭa which accepts the existence of something beyond, an absolute word. There is ‘cause and effect’ relationship between śabda and artha jñāna. One cannot be presented without the presence of other element, which is shown by anvaya and vyatireka by the
fact the latter can arise only in the presence of the former but never in the absence thereof. There is no problem with the meaning of words, but the problems arise when one tries to get the meaning of sentence. The semantic process in the context of sentence is the problem of Mimāṃsā darśana. Kumārila bhāṭṭa's and Prabhākara are indulged in the semantic problem.

*Abhīhitānayavāda* is based on the concept of Vājaṇayana of grammarian, who holds that sentential meaning is the fruition of mutual association of word-meaning. First, words signify their own individual meanings. Thereafter, these individual word-meanings relate themselves together in conformity with the triple syntactic requirements—expectancy, competence and contiguity. So the sentence is nothing but the aggregate or conglomeration of word meanings. Kumārila accepts the role of speaker’s intention in the verbal comprehension. Prabhākara and his disciple Śālikanāth expound the theory of *anvītābhidhānavāda* which states that words possess their meaning by the mutual relationship in the sentence. Though, they regard words as real and actual components of language. In adding to that, they clearly hold that sentence is a pre requisite to convey the word meanings. Words are used in a sentence; yield complete meanings. The meanings which are contextualized in a given syntactic relationship cease to exist if they are taken out of the sentence. So the mutually associated meaning (anvita) is communicated by the word. The sentential meaning is the actual imports of words. There is no need to posit the speaker’s intention in the communication of the word meaning. The vākyārtha mārkā vṛtti states that there are many words, and therefore many meanings, the unity of the sentence meaning is achieved through the unity of purpose.

The fundamental thought of Mimāṃsā is obliged to give importance to philosophy of language, simultaneously, its other obligation is to establish each unit of

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71 *Tatra jñānasya na svayam pratyakṣatvam, apiḥ jñānadharmaviśeṣasya jñātatālaśaṇasyaiva pratyakṣatvam.*
*Ibid, Saptaka Kusunam, p., 187*

72 *Idatra bodhyam- pratyakṣe hi tāvat padārthajñānam, tato jñānasvarūpajñānam, anantaro 'bhivyaktiriti.* *Ibid, p., 187*
language as valid, otherwise validity of Veda would be fall in dilemma. Thus, its consolidation of efforts involve throughout in the examining the theories of word-meaning and sentential-meaning.

(iv) **BHARTṛHARI’S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE**

Bhartṛhari is the founder of philosophy of language as an independent *darśana* in Indian tradition. His philosophical inquiry is conditioned by the cultural and knowledge texts values, in which the learned pursuits the purpose of realization of absolute knowledge and liberation. His significant contribution to the Indian philosophy of language is *sphoṭa*: principle which bear the meaning. It may be characterized as the inter-subjective, universal store-house of the meaning, the ground of all linguistic activity and communication. *Sphoṭa* is the unifying principle that connects the word, the grammatical form of the word and the meaning. It is indivisible-whole-united-sentential form of *śabda* and *artha*. The parent principle of the *sphoṭa* theory is derived in the 'Mahābhāṣya' of the Patañjali. The principle is appeared in the Mahābhāṣya in the sense of permanent element in the word i.e. *sphoṭa* signifies spoken language, with the audible sound (*dhvani*) as its special quality. Tradition ascribes the authorship of *sphoṭa* term to Sphoṭāyana. *Sphoṭa* theory of Bhartṛhari is completely against to Mimāṃsā’s interpretation of *śabda* and *artha*. Since Mimāṃsakas accept eternity of Vedas and the words, of which Vedas are composed, also have to be eternal. On the contrary, Bhartṛhari holds eternity of meaning rather than the word.

Bhartṛhari brings up the nature of language in such a way that includes the philosophical, linguistics and metaphysical traits. He considers Śabdabrahman, the foremost rudimentary cause of reality. It is *anādi nidhanam* i.e. without beginning and end. That is not a subject of temporal sequence, neither externally or internally in the form of succession of mental events that form cognitions. It functions as the inherent,

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73 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjectivity](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjectivity): Intersubjectivity is a term used in philosophy, psychology and sociology to describe a condition somewhere between subjectivity and objectivity, one in which a phenomenon is personally experienced (subjectively) but by more than one subject.
primordial ground of all cognitions. Thus language is not something which is created. The Śabdabrahman is called akṣara also, but there is debate regarding the meaning of akṣara in the context of Śabdabrahman. Some interprets this as a nature of eternity of Śabdabrahman. Other accepts it as ‘phonemes, the minimal units of meaningful sound’ which is the appearance of Śabdabrahman.

Deferring to others schools and establishing language as a metaphysical element; he starts the scope of inquiry of grammar. The cause behind the importance of grammar is not only the correction of formal language, but it is the path of correct knowledge and, path of salvation also. The spoken i.e. appeared language, is the closest appearance of the Śabdabrahman. So the correct understanding of speech increases conventional and spiritual capacities. The language must operate at the following levels: sentence and words, meanings corresponding to sentences and words, the fitness or compatibility between sound and sense and the spiritual merit obtained by the correct language. The analytical or formal language emerges from an abstract analysis of communicative language. For the sake of that, the prominent aspect of Bhartṛhari’s speculation is not the spoken language, but the ‘abstract cause’ of this spoken language.

Bhartṛhari’s theory occupies an important place in the ongoing Hindu-Buddhist debates about meaning and reference. For the Buddhists, meaning is a function of social and linguistic convention and reference is ultimately a projection of imaginative consciousness. Bhartṛhari puts forth a theory of language which starts from the question of how meaning happens, how it emerges from the acts of both speaker and audience. He constructs the theory which is appropriate to metaphysical, epistemological and stereological implications. He does not emphasis on the physical utterances and perception of sounds. The audible noise may vary, since it depends on the speaker’s

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74 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_language: A formal language is a set of words, i.e. finite strings of letters, symbols, or tokens. The set from which these letters are taken is called the alphabet over which the language is defined. A formal language is often defined by means of a formal grammar (also called its formation rules); accordingly, words that belong to a formal language are sometimes called well-formed words (or well-formed formulas). Formal languages are studied in computer science and linguistics; the field of formal language theory studies the purely syntactical aspects of such languages (that is, their internal structural patterns).
mode of utterance. *Sphota* is not the subject of such variations. Thus, meaning is conveyed by the sentence. Thus, he puts forth the *sphota* theory, as *sphut*, meaning to burst forth as in the idea that spews forth (in an internal mental state) when a meaningful sound, the sentence as a whole, is uttered.

Bhartṛhari formally engages in debate with the *Mimāṃsā*, concerning the minimal basic unit of meaning i.e. sentence vs. word. He excludes alphabets, words, suffixes, prefixes and all others elements from the sentence, which are supposed to be components of sentence at the linguistic level. A sentence is the unit of utterance and an indivisible entity with a meaning that is grasped as a unity in a flash of insight *pratibhā*. A sentence is neither a unified collection nor an ordered series of words, nor is it sufficient to add the standard requirements of contiguity, expectancy and appropriateness. A letter or word has no reality by itself apart from that of a sentence. The sentence employs analyzable units to express its meaning, but that meaning emerges out of the particular concatenation of those units, not because those units are meaningful in themselves. ‘Whole is always prior to parts’, this principle applies on the sentential unit. So these parts are unreal and have existence only at the pragmatic level. Any single word or alphabet is called sentence if it achieves the completeness of meaning, like a substantive noun tree. Here, the verb to be is always understood hidden so that what is indicated is really a complete thought that it is tree\textsuperscript{75}. A sentence which requires some other words or word for the completion of its meaning is incomplete. *Varṇa* and *pada* which are components of a sentence are unreal elements. It is seen as existing in the middle of a sentence, is due to the incapacity of the perceiver. These are only means to the cognition of the real word\textsuperscript{76} and the understanding the sentence\textsuperscript{77}. Due to illusion, temporal sequence in the form of *varṇa* and *pada* are

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\textsuperscript{75} *Apoddhārapadārthā* ye ye cārthā sthitālakṣapāh,
 *Anvākhyeyāśca* ye śabdā ye cāpi pratipādakāh.
 Kāryakāraṇabḥāvena yogyabhāvena ca sthitāh,
 *Dharma* ye prataye cāngam sambandhāḥ sādhvasadhuṣu.
 Te lingaisca svaśadaśca śastre'sminnapavarṇitāh,
 *Smṛtyarthamanugamyante kecideva yathāgamam.*

VP., 1. 24-26

\textsuperscript{76} *Bhedānukcāro jñānasya vācaścopapalavo dhruvah,*
 *Kramopśtaripā vāg jñānam jñeyavyapāśrayam.*
 *Ibid.,* 1. 85

\textsuperscript{77} *Pratyekam vyañjalakā bhinnā varṇavākyeṣu ye,*
noticed first, afterward sentence is understood. The ‘one and only sphota’ appears many in numbers\textsuperscript{78} through every individual, like the same phoneme in different words are not different and the same word in different sentences is not different by nature and by form. Bhartṛhari presents the sphota doctrine as a solution to the traditional problem of meaning. Hence in view of Bhartṛhari, a word consisting of letters and syllables cannot directly convey its significance. According to him, sphota is an eternal entity, corresponding to each word which underlies the constituent letters and has no component parts. The unitary unchanging sphota, latent in the word, is evoked as the letters and syllables. They are successively uttered or heard and produce the cognition of its meaning. The term sphota is derived from the root sphuṭ which means to burst. It is defined in two ways.

1. ‘That from which the meaning burst forth’ i.e. shines forth, in other words the word as expressing a meaning.
2. It is defined as an entity which is manifested by letters\textsuperscript{79}.

Sphota is therefore the cause of manifested language, which is meant to convey meaning. Sphota is more specifically identified as the underlying totality of linguistic capability, or “potency” and secondarily as the cause of two differentiated aspects of manifested meaning: applied meaning is expressed as dhvani, the audible sound patterns of speech and artha-language as meaning-bearing. The grammatical/syntactical parts of the underlying sphota can only be heard and understood through its phonetic elements.

Bhartṛhari advocates that a word has two aspects: the word-meaning (arthā) and word sound (dhvani). At first, they may appear to be essentially different but they signify

\textsuperscript{78} Na varṇavattyāreka padamanyāśca vidyate, Vākyam varṇapadābhyām ca vyatirikta na khiścana. Ibid, 1.71

\textsuperscript{79} Ātmabheda-stayoh kecidastityākup purāṇagāh, Buddhībhedābhinnasya bhedameke pracaśate. Samānîṁ vyākhyāmicchanti śūre grāhyāmāthāpare, Jātipratyāyita vyaktih pradeśeṣūpatiṣṭhate. Ibid, 1.44, 68
meaning identically. Both elements are complementary to each other as if the articulated word did not signify anything, the word would be nothing but mere a jumble of sounds. The same meaning is also useless in the absence of speech-sounds. Thus, their significance occurs only at the condition of their natural relationship. Although, the speaker has to be cognized sabda the very first, otherwise he would ask ‘what did you say?’ Language has to be object of knowledge in the form of revealed to convey the meaning. Only meaning inspires to one to do action. Meaning lies in the form of thought in mind, at the time of speaking it bursts through the word. These united word-meaning refers referent. ‘Referring’ is not direct process as realistic Nyāya accepts.

Ontological categories are characterized by jāti, i.e. nature of Śabda. Namely, Śabda denotes jāti. Every word first of all means the class of that word. Thus, cow means the universal of the words having the form cow, it is the universal of the ‘form meant’. Later, it is superimposed on the universal of the thing-meant. The word first gives the idea of its form and then that of its referent. Word signifies meaning on the basis of form of phenomenal entities. These are jāti (universal) and vyakti (particular). Jāti is the reality and vyakti is unreal element, which has only pragmatic value. Śabda, the signifier makes the relation with artha signified ‘universal’ and reach till the particular. There is straight connect between language and universal, which is absolutely ideal, mental. It is the real meaning of word. Signifier śabda and signified artha (meaning) has eternal relationship. They are inseparable, so that they have a natural relationship. At the level of speaking, the united word-meaning connects to the referent through the conventional relation. Only meaningful word, sentence or statement presents the fact. Naming process is the consequence of the integrated relationship of word and meaning. The relation between word and meaning is that of natural relationship. Since, words come into use; they are related with their meanings. This relationship is the yogyatā (natural fitness) of

80 Ato‘nirṇātarāpatvāt kimābhetyabhidhiyate, Nendriyayāpy prakāśyeyihe svarāpam grhyate tathā. Ibid, 1.56
81 Sāmānyamāśritam yad yaduṣmānōpameyayoh, Tasya tasyopamāneṣu dharmo‘nyo vyatiricyate. Ibid, 1.62

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the words\textsuperscript{84}. The word is never devoid of its \textit{yogyatā} which is a given relation between word and meaning.

\textit{Sabda} and \textit{artha} are different aspect of the one and the same thing. When \textit{sphoṭa} is manifested, its two aspects, the word aspect and the meaning aspect, appear to be differentiated. \textit{Sabda} conveys an idea of the form of an expression as well as its content. Words have the power to reveal their objects, meaning and to them, like light which reveals itself and at the same time reveals other thing\textsuperscript{85}. Bharṭṛhari denies pure convention. Nobody would be able to create a relation between words and meanings in case of absence of relationship between them. A relation between \textit{sabda} and \textit{artha} is a relation that is \textit{nitya} i.e. given. Relationship between \textit{sphoṭa} is \textit{vyaṅgya} i.e. manifested and sound is \textit{vyaṅjaka} i.e. manifestor\textsuperscript{86} and illuminator (\textit{prakāśa}) and the illuminated (\textit{prakāśyatvam}). At the same time, they are said to be cause (\textit{karaṇa}) and effect (\textit{kārya}).

The speech-sounds are innumerable in number and uttered by the speaker in the temporal sequence. The uttering sounds exist with meaning in the mind of hearer since always. Uttering the word, speaker produces a sequence of different sounds in order to make a sense out. But, only manifesting sounds do not convey meaning; per contra the indivisible sequence-less word i.e. \textit{sphoṭa} is the cause. In order to that, hearing the series of sounds, listener perceives the utterance as a unity ultimately. At the same time, the \textit{sphoṭa} appears to be many due to speech-sounds. Thus in the process of manifestation each sound uttered by the speaker reveals \textit{sphoṭa}, the first one vaguely, the second one clearly and so until the last one helped by the impressions left by the previous cognitions reveals it in all its clarity and distinctness. Each one of them is helpful in the rising of the final clear perception of \textit{sphoṭa}\textsuperscript{87}. Though it is indivisible and timeless but can be

\textsuperscript{84} Viṣayatvamanāpannaih śabdairnārthah prakāśyate, 
Na sattayaiva te’rthānāmagghitāh prakāśakāh. Ibid, 1.55

\textsuperscript{85} Sadṛṣagrahaṇānām ca gandhādīnām prakāśakam, 
Nimitta niyata loke pratidravyamavasthitam. Ibid, 1.97

\textsuperscript{86} Nādairāhitabājāyāmanteṇa dhwaniḥ saha, 
Āvṛttaparipākāyām buddhau śabdo’vadhāryate. Ibid, 1.83

67
revealed only by means of the sound in the time series pattern. The word has no sequence; it is neither prior nor posterior, when it is articulated or manifested by the nāda, is manifested as having sequence and parts, like the reflection of moon in water seems to have movement because of the movement of water. Just as various sentences might sound different in the mouths of different speakers and yet convey the same meanings, various Vedas may seem different in form and style, but there is a unity carried by the underlying sphoṭa, which ensures that it is the same truth or dharma that is expressed throughout the texts. Bearing in mind that Brahman is the ultimate referent of all speech forms, this higher reality is manifested in the sacred texts—whose efficacy (ritual, stereological, epistemological) depends upon our ability to correctly apprehend its meaning. The sphoṭa concept makes such interpretation possible. Again, the sphoṭa expresses a meaning-whole behind individual letters and words. The implication for the truth of Vedic discourse is clear, for that truth is already present in the speaker (the Veda) and is potentially present in the consciousness of the hearers (the practitioners).

The concept of pratibhā describes Bhartrhari’s insight into the nature of the relationship between word and thing. Pratibhā helps one to overcome the dualistic mode of separation between the word and thing. Though, the words have different meanings when they are individually apprehended, but the moment they are united together in the form of a sentence, there is a single sense which is distinct from the meanings of isolated words. This kind of sense derived from the sentence as a whole is called pratibhā. The word pratibhā is derived from the root ‘bhā’ which means, ‘to shine upon, to come in sight, flash upon the thought’ etc. pratibhā comes closer to the term intuition. Bhartrhari calls it as an instantaneous flash of insight. He compares it with the light of consciousness which is verbal in nature. It follows that the flash of understanding is directly manifested by the use of words. Bhartrhari speaks of six different kinds of pratibhā as obtained by nature, by action, by practice, by meditation, by indivisible causes and as handed down by the wise. Bhartrhari claims that this intuitive knowledge is far more reliable than any other kind of knowledge because it comes from within. It can arise in all sentient
beings, it is the word principle which is an integral part of the sentient and hence present (potentially) in all such beings. When a single word is uttered, it brings without the interference of any other word or words, but with the help of the context or the speaker’s intention, any other meaning which is required to complete it. The completeness of the sentence meaning is experienced, not through inference, but in the special kind of perception called pratibhā. It is ‘perceiving of the meaning-whole of the sentence’ in a flash of intuition. It is not logical in nature, not is it capable of being directly described to others. Pratibhā therefore is of the nature of one’s inner-self, but normally requires uttered word or words for its manifestation.

The issue of interrogation on the birth of language is directly related to the problem of eternality and non-eternality in the realm of darśana. The metaphysical entity Śabda Brahman i.e. ‘the first cause’ cannot be traced as it is beyond to the grip of human caliber. Language is anādi i.e. beginning less, nobody knows the time of the emergence of language. Language is eternal in the sense of vyavasthā nityatā (continuity). In spite of its manifestation, it is not transitory, because it is form. Whatever is manifested, is the effect of this ‘eternal cause’ Śabda Brahman. Dhvani, the Manifested form of eternal Language, is transitory by nature. Likewise, meaning which abides in the mind is not transitory by nature, while referent is non-eternal. The eternality of word and meaning has been supported by the texts of Pāṇini, Kātyāyaṇa and Patañjali also. Suggestive expressions i.e. the uttered expression or the manifesting sounds produced by the articulatory organs are called dhvani. Dhvani is the external aspect of internal sphoṭa. It has temporal distinction, they can be short, long or prolated, depending on the speaker. The relation between dhvani and śabda is not as same as the relation between cognition

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90 Nityātve kṣatakav eva teṣāmādirna vidyate,
Prāṇīnāmiva sā caiva vyavasthānītyatocayate. Ibid, 1.28

91 Desādibhiṣca sambandho dṛṣṭah kāyavatāmapi,
Desabhedaṅkalpe ‘pi na bhedo dhvanīśabdoby. Ibid, 1.95

92 Nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhāstātrāṁnātā mahārṣibhih,
Śātrāṇām sāmutantrāṇām bhāvyāṇām ca prāpetṛbhiḥ. Ibid, 1.23

93 Nāḍyasā kramajanmatvānna pūrva na paraśca saḥ,
Akrāmaḥ kramarūpeṇa bhedavāniva jāyate. Ibid, 1.47

69
and its object. Bhartrhari says that it is the spoken words that suggest the inner meaning and eventually evoke the unified sphone. Dhvanis have two forms, namely the prakṛta dhvani and the vaikṛta dhvani.

Bhartrhari accepts different levels of reality, which are three in numbers. These levels have two dimensions, epistemological and ontological. Knowledge of the objects is cognized respectively, through the stage of the subtlest to the grossest. The same way ontological categories get their designation through the gradual emergence of naming process. These stages vaikharī, madhyāmā and paśyanti are not defined anywhere in the kārikās of Vākyapadiya. Vṛtti gives some information about them94. Paśyanti is ascribed as supreme reality i.e. Śabda Brahman. This principle accounts for creation on the number of levels. It is the origin of consciousness, of cognition, sensation, language use, cognitive and experiential aspects of the world. Objects and thought, their relations between them are word-determined, regardless of whether they are objects of perception, inference or any other kind of knowledge. One perceptually apprehends external reality in the terms of names. Since without names, objects are neither identifiable nor knowable.

Jñāna and śabda have no distinction in essence95, only forms distinct. No knowledge is possible without the operation of the sphone96. Words are spoken, come out as an embodiment of thought, is called language. In the process of mutual transformation, the internal knowledge assumes an audible form and all ideas are communicated to others97. Bhartrhari posits knowledge as a matter of specifically linguistic construction. The structure of language shapes how one categorizes the objects of our experience and our descriptions of reality as a whole. At the level of pure sensation, the sensory core is

94 Evam sādhau prayoktave yo’pabhramśah prayuṣyate,
Tena sādhvyavahitaḥ kaścidartho ’bhidhiyate. Ibid, 1.143

95 Na jāivakarīkam kaścidāgām pratipadyate,
Bījam sarvāgamāpāye trayyēvīto vyavasthitā. Ibid, 1.123

97 Itikaryatyā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśryā,
Yām pūrvāḥitasamsēkāro bālo’pi pratipadyate.
Ādyah karapāvinyāsah prapāsyordiwa samāraṇam,
Sthānānāmahighātaścā na vinā śabdabhāvanām. Ibid, 1.112-113

70
already saturated, as it were, with the "deep structure" of language. Bhartrhari does not distinguish between a pure perception and a constructed perception because perception is inherently verbal. Linguistic units are expressive of the unitary principle of Brahman which is differentiated into the plurality

The power which creates and regulates this universe rests on the words. It is through that eye that all this diversity of understanding is perceived. All kinds of meanings depend upon the powers of word. What is cognized can enter into worldly usages only if it can be expressed in words. The distinctive features of something in this world are easy to see and they have their words to express them. But the distinctive features of some things are not easy to grasp, which is not expressed by word. All knowledge of what is to be done in these worlds depends upon the word. Even the child, with its residual traces from the previous birth, has such knowledge. Even, absolutely non-existent things like a hare's horn or something which appears and disappears in the sky like a celestial town seems to be having existence because brought to the mind by words. Germs of the word exist in children, because of the existing residual traces of words, used in their former births. The consciousness of all beings going through transmigration is in the nature of the word. It exists within and without. The consciousness of all types of beings does not go beyond this essence. Just as in the wakeful state it is through the word that the agents act on the objects of all the actions. Same way, in dream, the word itself becomes the object of all actions. Whether everything is of the nature of the self or of the supreme, as the word present it, so it is understood. It is through the word that the object is established. In case of a thing like 'a circle of fire' (ālātacakra) where the circumstance is totally different, merely by the force of word, its form clearly figures in the mind.

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98 Svamātṛā paramātṛā vā śrutiḥ prakramyate yatā, 
Tūhārāvā ṛudatāmeti tayā hyartho vidhiyate. Ibid, 1.119

99 Api prayokturāmānāṃ sādamanantaravasthitam, 
Prāhuramahāntamśabham yena sāyujamśisyate. Ibid, 1.121

100 Sato 'vivakṣā pārārthīyam vyaktirarhasya laingkā, 
Iti nyāyo bahuvidakartakeṣa pravibhajyate. Ibid, 1.127
Bhartṛhari’s explorations into the relations between language, thought and reality reflect contemporary philosophical concerns with meaning, use of language and communication, particularly in the work of Chomsky, Wittgenstein, Grice, and Austin. His theory of language recognizes that meaning is conveyed in formalist terms where meaning is organized along syntactical rules. It leads to paramount metaphysical knowledge, a knowledge carrying with it a palpable salvific value.

(v) **BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE**

The phenomenal-idealism of Buddhist philosophy is developed as a counterclaim to the Hindu realist position which acclaims the existence of external reality. The idealistic Buddhist claims that the world of experience or phenomena is a product of the human imaginative faculty since our cognitive experiences construct our reality. These are the modes of consciousness containing cognitive contents. In the final analysis, they do not yield any knowledge about reality as it may be outside of themselves. Consciousness posits the (apparent) externality of objects, not the objects themselves. Interestingly enough, Bhartrihari’s *sphoṭa* theory of language and cognition is sometimes understood as an extension of the Buddhist position. According to the grammarian, cognition is entirely language-dependent in that the structure of our cognitive states is determined by grammar.

The Buddhist logicians Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti delve with various linguistic problems from their own metaphysical standpoint of taking the world as a universal flux. They point out the fundamental problem of the interrelation of speech, thought and facts. Their theory *apoha* i.e. negation is absolutely different from the other schools of Indian tradition. *Apoha*, the Pioneer principle offers the essence of meaning as ‘negative’ in character. Words do not refer to objective realities. Words deal with i.e. conceptual image which are purely subjective constructions of mind.

Buddhist philosophy measures reality on dual levels:

1. Reality in ultimate sense
2. Reality at pragmatic level.

Particular at a time-point, the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa)’ is the ultimately real. The so-called objective world is made up of a succession of such momentary particulars, like the still pictures of cinema. The unique particular is a transcendental reality which is shorn of all qualities, convention, sankalana, duration in terms of time and extension, in the terms of space\textsuperscript{101}. It is distinguished from everything else in the world. It is therefore discrete, disconnected and absolutely isolated. The Sanskrit word for the unique particular is svalakṣaṇa, means ‘its own kind or unique which has no similar of it in the whole universe\textsuperscript{102}. It exists only for one moment; because no sooner is it originates, it is destroyed and replaced by another unique particular. Lasting only for a moment, it is called momentary (kṣanika)\textsuperscript{103}. Svalakṣaṇa is efficient i.e. the capable of producing purposive action (arthakriyā-kṣama). Unique-particulars i.e. the external real are grasped pure passive sense-reflex. There is no admixture of thought or intellection. It is never grasped by thought or śabda which comprehends only a generalized form\textsuperscript{104}. There is only a sort of awareness in the sense of something. Inasmuch as it is without any image (kalpanā)\textsuperscript{105} or without any mode or determination (vikalpa), it is called nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (indeterminate perception). Thus the ultimate reality is beyond to the word i.e. linguistic sign. It is not the object of the language. The conceptual image or meaning has no real stuff in it. It is negative in content. They accept the reality only of the simple, non-conceptual cognition which is absolutely free from all verbal associations. This kind of indeterminate knowledge may be experienced, but cannot be directly communicated by words, since it is beyond the reach of words or concepts.

\textsuperscript{101} Saṅketasmanopāyam drśatasankalanātmakam. Pūrvaparaparāmarṣaśāne taccākṣuse katham. P.V., Pratyakṣaparicchedah, Kārikā 174

\textsuperscript{102} Ekatra drṣto bheda hi kvacinnayatra drṣyate. Na tasmād bhinnamstyanyat sāṁyene buddhayabhedaḥ. Ibid Kārikā 126

\textsuperscript{103} Kṣanikamiti utpattikṣaṇa eva sattvāt. B.T., p. 56

\textsuperscript{104} Tasmād viśeṣavijayā sarvaivendriyajā matiḥ. Na viśeṣeṣu śabdānām pravṛttāvasti sambhavaḥ. P.V., Pratyakṣaparicchedah, Kārikā 127

\textsuperscript{105} Pūrvāparamanusandhāya śabda sāṅkīrṇākārā pratītirantarjalpākārā vā kalpanā. B.T., p. 19

73
A pure sensation is immediately and necessarily tracked by the thought-process which provides an image, a mode, a prediction or determination to the sensation and is therefore called a *savikalpa* i.e. determinate perception. *Savikalpaka* is not *nirvikalpa*. *Kṣaṇika* is *nirvikalpaka*\(^\text{106}\). The Buddhist holds that the generalized form and other attributes ascribed to the object belong to thought and not to the external particular. These generalized forms are only ideal and have no correspondence in the external world of reality, which are alone real. Thus, the pragmatic reality is named and cognized by the language i.e. linguistic sign. A word can not signify a momentary ‘unique particular’, which does not continue up to the time when conventional relation is apprehended. Word can signify only the universal, which is only an intellectual fiction without any reality. The word cannot denote a real positive thing, because only the momentary particulars, the thing-in-itself (*svalaksanā*)\(^\text{107}\) is the ultimately real. Thus, the meaning of the word is primarily and naturally a conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) and not an objective fact\(^\text{108}\). The relation between the word and the conceptual image is one of the cause and effect. The word produces the purely subjective concept, which is negative in nature, consisting as it does in the exclusion of other concepts to make it distinct. Hence the meaning of the word has to be considered as the negation of concept’s counter-correlate (*anyāpoha*)\(^\text{109}\), as the exclusion of everything other than itself. Word signifies the *vikalpa* i.e. mental image. Whatever speaker and listener see and hear, are their mental concepts. There is no relation of *śabda* with the outer world\(^\text{110}\). Having similar illusions, both think that they are referring to the objective reality. Hence language is a convenient means of communication.

\(^{106}\) Na ca *vikalpa eva nirvikalpaḥ, kim tum vikalpakāṁ nirvikalpakasyodayaḥ.* *Ibid,* p. 32

*Svalaksanāpatimāyāsaikāraṇāśam vastusvarūpam desākālākāraṇiyyataṃ.* Etenaśādaṅkum bhavati
ghatādirudakādyāḥ pūrṇasyaḥ prakāśamāno nītyatvādyenevadāntarodāsīnaḥ pravṛtti-viṣayajasajātyajñātātivyāvyatyātataḥ svalaksanāmyārthāḥ. *Ibid,* p. 34-5

\(^{108}\) Pratyākṣam kalpanāpoḍa pratyakṣenaiva sidhiyati.

*Pratyākṣam kalpanāpado pratyakṣenaiva sidhiyati. Pratyākṣam kalpanāpado pratyakṣenaiva sidhiyati.* *Pratyaỹapariccheda,* *Kārikā* 123

\(^{109}\) Bāhyāsaaktivāvacechandaniṣṭāhābhāve ‘pi tacchruṭiḥ.

*Vikalpapratītibimśu taniṣṭēṣu nibadiyate.*

*Tato nyāpohaniṣṭatvāduktānyāpohakṛt śrutīḥ.* *Ibid,* *Pratyaksapariccheda,* *Kārikā* 163-4

\(^{110}\) Na ca śabdānāṁ bāhyāṣṭhena saha kaścitsambandho ‘sti.

*B.T.*, p. 11

74
Apoha means, ‘to exclude by means of logic or reasoning’. It excludes that which is not compatible or consistent to the context in discussion. The various particular objects of a class have nothing common in them to giving rise to the notion of commonness by their very nature. Thus, this notion is not caused by the positive commonness residing in all the individual objects of a class, but by the negative commonness which belongs to all individual objects of a particular class. All cows have a negative commonness in that they are all different from the non-cows, horses etc. The universal commonness is not an external reality, but only a negation in the form of exclusion of non-cows. It is called atad-vyāvṛtti which means the exclusion of what a thing is not. In that way, meaning of a word is conceptual image (vikalpa) whose essence is the negation of its counter-correlate (anyāpoha). The word cow does not actually mean the animal with dewlap, horns etc. It means only the exclusion of all things that are not the cow. Vācaspatiṁśtra points out: ‘this illusory external image is the object of determinate perception as well as that of words’. The same idea is expressed by Śridhara: ‘a determinate perception of a cow projects or imposes its image externally. Jayanta also in his exposition of apoha says that ‘the externally reflected image in the determinate perception (vikalpa) which is designated as apoha is the meaning of a word (class-name). It appears that all these authors hold that an illusory external form or externally projected image of the thought or its external reflex or externally reflected image (all these terms signifying the same thing, i.e. apoha) is the object of determinate perception and that it is the significance of a class name.

Apoha theory is promulgated by the Dignāga very first. He establishes the negative essence of meaning in the fifth chapter of his Pramanāsamucaya. He seems to have explained it in terms of pure negation without any positive reference. Śāntarākṣita explains Diṅgāga’s purely negative essence of meaning on the logical ground that words do not have any reference to the positive reality. Later Buddhist scholars found it necessary to modify their conception of apoha. Thus in the Tattvasamgraha, Śāntarākṣita presents slightly different approach to the problem. He admits that mere negation is not what is apprehended from a word, in fact there is no affirmation without negation. The affirmation of something is always concomitant with the exclusion of everything else.
There is nothing incongruous in a single word bringing about two notions, one positive and the other negative. The two notions are not brought about simultaneously. The positive meaning is known directly and the negative or the exclusion of everything else is known through implication. From a negative statement like, ‘the fat boy does not eat by day’, positive idea is understood about his eating during night. Both the meanings are known from the word. Śāntārakṣita is laying stress on the fact that the word of our speech, although direct meaning is only a subjective construct without any objective reality, indirectly refer to the particular thing also. This particular thing is also called the negation since it is something in unique in itself. Again, a slightly different interpretation of the *apoha*\(^{111}\) theory is found in *Apohasiddhi* of Ratnakīrti. He says that a word has both a positive and negative signification\(^{112}\). He rejects Śāntārakṣita view that the word conveys the positive meaning first and a negative meaning later by logical implication. He also rejects that the negation is the direct meaning and the positive notion comes later. According to him, the essence of meaning consists in the affirmation qualified by the negation of all other things. This simultaneous cognition of positive and negative elements of the meaning is matter of experience. Just as in the term ‘*indivara*’ (blue lotus) the element of blue and the element of lotus are cognized simultaneously, so also in every word the two element of the meaning are grasped simultaneously. Śāntārikṣita proceeds that the first meaning of the special negation, i.e. thought-form or the externally reflected image of thought is the principal meaning of the word (the class-name). When the word is spoken, it is thought image of an object that is directly evoked in our mind therefore that is the principal meaning of a word. But the second kind of negation is also implied in it. The essence of the thought-image i.e. of a cow consists in this that, ‘its essence is not the essence of another image, like a horse. The exclusion of non-cows is only a subordinate meaning. So, the thought image is the direct meaning of a word and negation

\(^{111}\) *Na hyanantarbhāvitaviśeṣanapraṇāśīrśavishapratītih tato yathā sāmānyamaham pratyemūti vikalpābhāve‘pi sādhāraṇākāraśpariparasaṃścād vikalpabuddhāḥ paresām, tathā nivṛtti pratyayāśśiṣṭā nivṛttilbhādhirahapraṇāśīritīvyavahāramātanaścit. A.S. 3, p. 67*

\(^{112}\) *Nāśmābhārpohasabdēna vikāre śatyaḥ bhupṛtataḥ. Nāpyanvavyāvṛttimātāram. Kintvānābhārpohaviśiṣto vidiḥ śabdānāmarthaḥ. Tataśca na pratyekapraśpanipātiddosāvakāsāḥ. Ibid, 7, p. 68*
in the form of exclusion of non-cows is only an implied and secondary meaning. Although, thought-image is also not positive, it is only the kind of special negation.

The Buddhist scholars argue that name does not relate to the ontological entity, but only to a mental picture of that which is variant and subjective. There are various functions of mind involved in construction of an entity when it is denoted by the linguistic sign. Without the šabda, indriyas cannot be related with the buddhi. Each feeling, conceptions, attachment, the prior knowledge and impression all actively participate in the constitution of the content of the linguistic sign. Words deal with the concepts which are purely subjective constructions. Universals are intellectual fiction and their pragmatic value is due to their remote extraction form objective facts. Words certainly have got the meaning and the objective external reference too. What is signified by the word is neither a subjective idea nor an objective reality, but something fictitious and unreal, which is neither here nor there. The speaker and the hearer apprehend subjective content and not any objective fact. So the connotation of words is the subjective idea, a mental image, which however is hypostatized as an objective reality existing in its own right independently of the thinking mind. The connotation of the word is the subjective notion, a mental image in the first instances, which is positive idea no doubt. But as it has an exclusive reference by implication and as this negative implication gives the verbal import its distinguishing character, its real significance and force. The connotation of the word is rightly looked upon and designated as a fundamental negation.

1. The mental content, the ideal representation is occasioned by the word and has a distinctive individuality and this individuality will have no meaning if it does not negate and excludes other such ideal contents. So, negation constitutes its fundamental individuality.

113 Šabdenāvyāptātāsya buddhāvapratibhāsanāt. Arthasastra drṣṭāviva iti. B.T., p. 86

2. The verbal idea leads to the attainment of the real individual entity, which has self-identity peculiarity its own. The real is something which is detached and severed from all other individuals, similar or dissimilar. So the reality from which word and its meaning derive their significance and utility being something essentially negative in character. The word meaning should be looked upon as essentially negative in function.

3. Because some people regard the ideal concept, the verbal import, is identical with the self-contained reality, which possesses an exclusive identity. So the negative character of a verbal import has twofold meaning and justification, essential and incidental. It is grounded in its essential individuality.

This negation has a twofold aspect- relative and absolute. An absolute negation is an unqualified pure negation and has no positive reference, remote or direct. Example- the cow is not not-cow, is a negative judgment, pure and simple. A relative negation has primarily a positive reference and its negative value is only indirect and implied inasmuch as it comes into relief only in reference to any other. For instance, the concept 'cow' is in and by itself a positive fact, but in relation to a horse, it is a negative concept. This negative concept may be twofold-

1. Concept

2. Fact

The import of words is the relatively negative concept and is neither the fact nor an absolute negation. It is not the absolute negation inasmuch as it is a conceptual consciousness construction positive in character. But it is not regarded as a true measure of reality, because it carries a factual objective reference, though it does not possess any objectivity in itself. As a concept it is a purely subjective phenomenon, but it has an objective external reference that constitutes its falsity. But false and unreal concept that is generated by the word is regarded as the meaning of that word. There is no absolute relation between the denotative and the denoted. This relation has to admitted by all the
users of language in the mental construction level\textsuperscript{115}. So the denotative relation of word and meaning is at bottom the relation of causality between the fact (word) and a concept. Buddhist holds that the word denotes the negative idea first. The word has the meaning in the positive concept and the negative import is the resultant cognition. The Vaiśeṣika system identifies seventy two originated and three unoriginated dharma. Nāma and rūpa are two of the 72 originated dharmas. Nāma refers to the mind and mental activities and rūpa refers to all the object of the world or elements of matter. These are potential to explain our cognition of the world and especially the nature of verbal cognition. They constitute the logical ground for the ideational approach to reality.

The Buddhist philosophers do not accept universal\textsuperscript{116} and class as real categories like the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika system. They hold that the whole is not different from its parts which constitute it in the absolute sense. But certainly the whole is more than its part, because of all individual components contributes to fame out the whole. In this way, the whole performs more significant acts. The object of inference is universal. In Buddhist system of thought, universal has been defined as that which is differential in nature, knowable through verbal or inferential sign, conceptual form of the object, non-existent in the external world, dependent on space and time, associated with quality, generic configuration or form, name and class. It is also important to note that word as linguistic sign is not different from the inferential sign in Buddhist epistemology. Both linguistic as well as inferential signs (linga=hetu=smoke for the cognition of fire) capture only the general properties of the object. This is the reason that Buddhist logicians include verbal testimony and analogy in inference. Another key concept is conceptual image vikalpa. Vikalpa is derived from root kṛp which means doubt, certainly but more appropriately it means option or optionality. In this sense it comes very close to the sign or symbol. It is an option or alternative or sign/symbol that may be a pictorial representation, specific code of any culture-community or a linguistic/inferential sign. Buddhist scholars hold

\textsuperscript{115} Tathā hi śabānāmadhyavasitavijñātyāyārntavastumātraviṣayatvamānicchadbhiḥ paraiḥ paramārthato- Vācyam svalokānāmupādhirupādhiyogah. Sopādhirastu yadi vā kṛitrastu buddhāḥ. A.S. 3, p. 77

\textsuperscript{116} Prathamapakṣe pakṣasya pratyakṣabādhāsādhanāvadhānamānavakāśayat. Vastugrāhinoḥ pratyakṣasyobhayapratibhāsvābhyāvāt. Viśiṣṭabuddhīvam ca sāmānyaheturanākāntikah. Ibid, 50, p. 76
that sign is the mental postulate only and comes in the domain of inference. They also maintain that this linguistic sign (*vikalpa*) is given (*siddha*) but certainly it is constructed conventionally in any historical or physical time. The Buddhist accepts the demarcation of the language by the mental realm. It is not able to relate itself with the ultimate reality. Even, the ultimate reality cannot bear its interferences.

In this way, the Indic philosophical schools provide different status to language. In this term, the nature of metaphysical element is the determining factor.

3. **PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IN WESTERN TRADITION**

In Western tradition, the intact Western domain of philosophy of language can be categorized into three philosophical traditions for the convenience of study-

1. The Greek tradition
2. Analytical philosophic tradition
3. Continental philosophic tradition

(i) **THE GREEK TRADITION**

The above mentioned classification is based on the nature of speculation of language, as Greek tradition asks three general questions about language—whether language is natural or conventional, whether or not language is based on a fundamental principle of regularity. How many parts of speech are there? Same way, other two Analytical and Continental schools take language with different approaches. The most basic task of Analytical school is to search a perfect language. In order to that they entangle with the natural vs. artificial language. Contrarily, Continental School tends to reveal the form of language. They concern on the real nature of language, rather than the structure of spoken language. Although, pioneer study of language is approached by the ancient Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in the 5th century B.C., but the attention towards problems of language has been attracted by the first Greek thinkers ‘Sophist’ (5th and 4th centuries B.C.). They focus their entire program on linguistic
questions. Thereafter, the Greek philosophers involve into these questions in the classical period. It may be supported by this paragraph also. The first Greek thinkers to focus their entire programme of teaching on language were the so-called Sophists (i.e. wise men) of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, who lectured on the techniques of oratory and disputation. Their reputation for being unscrupulously clever with words has bequeathed to the term sophistry its modern pejorative sense; but they nevertheless fulfilled an important educational function in their day, and brought linguistic questions to the forefront of Greek consciousness is the Classical period. Socrates debates with the Sophists, as recorded by Plato, constitute the earliest detailed evidence from which we can reconstruct a coherent picture of the Greek view of language.

(a) PLATO

It was Plato's contribution by whom scanning of language is set out in the stream of scholarly discussion. His perception related to the theory of universal and Form or ideas, is the substratum for the apprehension of the characteristics of language. Language represents reality as well as divides reality into innumerable names. Thus, it represents the material world only, which is the copy of Reality i.e. Forms or Universals. Thus,

117 Landmarks in Linguistic Thought, Introduction, p. XII.

118 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals: The problem of universals is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist. Universals are general or abstract qualities, characteristics, properties, kinds or relations. How can one thing in general be many things in particular - was solved by presuming that Form was a distinct singular thing but caused plural representations of itself in particular objects. Plato accepts there to be a sharp distinction between the world of perceivable objects and the world of universals or Forms: one can only have mere opinions about the former, but one can have knowledge about the latter. For Plato it was not possible to have knowledge of anything that could change or was particular, since knowledge had to be forever unfailing and general. For that reason, the world of the forms is the real world, like sunlight, the sensible world is only imperfectly or partially real, like shadows. This Platonic realism, however, in denying full reality to the material world, differs sharply with modern forms of idealism, which generally assert the reality of the external, physical world and which in some versions deny the reality of ideals.

119 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Forms: The theory of Forms of idea is related to non-material objects, but its substantial. It possesses the highest and fundamental kind of Reality. This Form is distinct to the 'form' i.e. appearance of something, object was essentially or "really" the Form and that the phenomena were mere shadows mimicking the Form.
Where beyond does language reach to? The answer to this is not given in Cratylus. It is supplied by Plato's quasi-mystical doctrine of 'forms' or 'ideas' (Cornford 1935). The things and properties, we perceive, or believe we perceive, in this world are merely imperfect 'copies' of their corresponding 'forms' or 'ideas'. These latter are the sempiternal realities whose existence supplies the ultimate foundation for all human knowledge.  

Plato talks over on the issues of language in his work *Cratylus* dialogue. He deals basically with the nature of language and action of language concerning communication and representing the world. In this term, *Cratylus* is the earliest philosophical monograph of the Classical Greek period wherein Plato deals with aforesaid matters as well as concept of etymology and linguistics. Plato defines two action of language-

1. It represents material reality

2. It is the mode of communication.

Language has capability to represents the reality, but not absolute reality, only the image of reality i.e. the material world can be represented. Thus, it is limited to the material reality only since it is the instrument of speech. It is incapable in the context of Reality, but in macro world, it would be the most powerful than any other element. Here, communication through the names is the only mode for represent the reality. Line of demarcation of language cannot extend over the sphere of particulars which are innumerable. Each and every particular has name. Innumerable and multiples names are quite success in communication to represent a total flux. If the names are used properly, they will complete its function in right direction. The function of language is to divide reality, to distinguish one thing from another. Thus, name is an instrument of teaching and separating reality as a shuttle is an instrument of separating the web. In order to perform this task, a name must be designed in the right way. It must have the right form, otherwise it will not work.

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120 *Landmarks in Linguistic Thought*, p. 19.

121 *Ibid*, p. 7

Representation is not the part of mimicry of anything, particularly in material world. It is not onomatopoeic impersonation of sounds of birds, animals. Poles apart, it is the representation of the essential nature of each thing by means of combination of appropriate sounds. The whole process is explained through the example of painter. As a painter uses colour to express the essence of his subject in a painting, the same way, creator of words uses letters containing certain sounds to express the essence of a word’s subject. Thus, primary names are built up by a mimetic process through combination of sounds which copy the essential nature of the thing ‘named’. This mimetic process is based upon the physiological articulations of the individual sounds. Ones, these primary names are established, the repertory is extended by combining them into meaningful compounds according to their primary senses. So, essence of the language of Plato lies in ‘name theory’. Name term covers wider meaning in Plato’s discussion.

In reading Plato’s dialogue, it is important to bear in mind that the term usually translated into English as ‘name’ (onoma) covers not only proper names such as Hermogenes and Socrates but also what would nowadays be classified as common nouns (manifestation, horse, etc.). Furthermore onoma was also sometimes used in Greek as the general term for word.

Plato’s question is- what is meant by names? The concept of name mainly deals with the worldly affairs. The plural noun onomata (singular onoma), translated names, in fact varies between being, as names are used in these sense-

(a) A general term for words,

(b) More narrowly, nouns or perhaps nouns and adjectives and

(c) In certain contexts, proper names alone.

In the most generic use, it comes to designate as language (words) as such. Ultimately, for this reason, Plato’s dialogue Cratylus is about the language, even if mainly nouns, like common noun, proper noun is discussed. Proper names are included among these nouns.

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124 Ibid, p.3.
There is no systematic distinction between proper names and common nouns at that time. Furthermore onama was also sometimes used in the Greek as the general term for word. Plato himself appears to recognize only two parts of speech. One is ‘names’ and other is ‘rhemata’ (usually translated as verbs or predicate).

Raising question regarding the relation between language and reality, he debates whether language is conventional or arbitrary? Is language is a system of arbitrary\textsuperscript{125} signs or it has intrinsic relation to things? He criticizes conventionalism because it led to the bizarre consequence that anything can be conventionally denominated by any name. Hence, it cannot account for the correct or incorrect application of a name. He claims that there was a natural correctness to names. He points out that compound words and phrases have a range of correctness. He also argues that primitive names (or morphemes) had a natural correctness, because each phoneme represents basic ideas or sentiments. For example, for Plato the letter / and its sound represent the idea of softness. However, by the end of the *Cratylus*, he admits that some social conventions are also involved. There are faults in the idea that phonemes had individual meanings. He strictly criticizes the ‘volitional theory’ of names of Hermogenes which conflict with common sense. It validates the recognition of many private languages in the proportion of individuals. This makes nonsense of normal understanding of difference between truth and falsehood.

The relation between person Hermogenes and the name Hermogenes and a horse and the word horse is not established. Same time, it is not depend on volitional act of any individual. So, what factor does work for establishing relationship? For this enquiry, the correctness of name and purpose of name should be inquired respectively. Actions are not determined by human volition; rather human volition must conform to the action if one wishes to accomplish it successfully. Speaking is also an action and names are the instrument of speech. To speak correctly means to use the instruments of speech in the proper way. The connection thread in all these ideas is that functionality which in turn is assumed to presuppose rationality. Functionality implies that form is not fortuitous, but is designed to serve a purpose. What would make the form of one name more apt for a

\textsuperscript{125}http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrariness: Arbitrariness is a term given to choices and actions subject to individual will, judgment or preference, based solely upon an individual's opinion or discretion.
given purpose than the form of another name? This takes to next step in Socrates’ argument. It introduces that speech represents or depicts reality. Thus, the name will be designed to the extent that it correctly represents what it designates. Socrates again begins by arguing form the necessity of recognizing the distinction between truth and falsehood. He pursues the question by elaborating the analogy between language and painting. Just one can wrongly assign a portrait to an individual because it is actually a likeness of someone else, likewise, one can make a mistake in assigning a name. The correct assignment in both cases is that which contributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it. Like to the most other scholars of different era, Plato also makes distinction between speech and writing in the dialogue of *Phaedrus*. Speech has ‘unquestioned legitimacy’. It is the source and origin of the concept of authenticity. He uses the expression like ‘the living speech’ and accords primacy to speech over writing ‘which may fairly be called a kind of image’\(^{126}\).

Regarding origination of language, Plato accepts invention of language, but he is silent on the question of inventor. He compares invention of language with the weaver. Accordingly, weaver does not know about the inventor of loom, the same problem is with the inventor of language. But one thing is definite i.e. in both cases the psychology of inventor’s mind can be understood by examining the design of the invention. To solve the problem of inventor, he introduces a mythical inventor of language, whom he calls simply the name maker. The name maker does not merely choose names at random, like the inventor of the loom assembles random collections of objects and make them into a machine of weaving. To know the correctness of names, one tries to discover how the name-maker originally designs them as he knows how to embody in the sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object. In this way, Plato organizes the philosophy of language very first in Western tradition. His theory of representation and name become the foreground to the further philosophers.

\(^{126}\) *Landmarks in Linguistic Thought*, p.10.
ARISTOTLE

After Plato, his disciple Aristotle (384 BC) makes a comment on the metaphor, which is the outcome of his poetic vision. The concept of metaphor is clearly based on Socrates' concept of names. A name is the word which belongs to the something or someone. The debate which Socrates refers in Plato's dialogue is about how do names belong to the objects, person, actions and qualities etc with which they are correlated? Aristotle's definition of metaphor bypasses this controversy and rest content with identifying metaphor as transference of a name to something it does not 'belong to'. But this definition would hardly make sense without the Socratic's assumption that names do belong to someone or other in the first place. Metaphor, thus, characterizes straight away as an exceptional case, involving in a transgression or setting aside of the normal correlations which govern the everyday use of words. It is significant that Aristotle discusses metaphor as a feature of poetry as if it were not part of ordinary language. The reason underlying Aristotle's treatment of metaphor is intimately connected with his philosophy of language, which differs in certain crucial respects from Plato's conception. Unlike the Plato, Aristotle supports conventional role of language, convention is the stability of name. Convention is understood as an arbitrary assessment to adopt one name rather than another. It is the part of an ongoing social process with its own momentum. Aristotle concerns with the issues of logic, categories and meaning creation. He separates all things into categories of species and genus. Accordingly, the meaning of a predicate is established through an abstraction of the similarities between various individual things. This theory later came to be called nominalism. However, since Aristotle takes these similarities to be constituted by a real commonality of form, he is more often considers a proponent of "moderate realism". With the Prior Analytics, Aristotle is credited with the earliest study of formal logic and his conception is the dominant form of Western logic until 19th century advances in mathematical logic. Kant states in the Critique of Pure Reason that Aristotle's theory of logic completely accounted for the core of deductive inference. Thus, since the 5-6th century, examining the language

\[127 \text{Ibid, p 20}\]
have come in existence. Aristotle and Plato’s theory becomes the landmark for the philosophy of language onwards. Their place is crucial in Western tradition.

(ii) ANALYTICAL AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

The Analytical\textsuperscript{128} and Continental mode of thinking is the result of turning point of philosophy, which refers to the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century when scientific and technological developments come in prominence. The metaphysical problems with which philosophers had been seriously engaged for many years appeared to be outdated in the age of scientific development. Most of the questions, answered by philosophers, are being answered by scientists in more satisfactory way. On the other side, due to the lack of the proper understanding of the meaning of the scientific terms, words are wrongly used by the Scientist. Thus, search of the logical meaning of scientific terms start. Philosophy of language gets the central position through the argumentation against the realism which is the metaphysical doctrine. Metaphysical doctrine points out two problems-

1. What exists?

2. Nature of existence.

According to realism, answer of the first problem is that matter or objective world or physical entity is real and answer of the second one is that these entities don’t depend for their existence on minds or on awareness or the perception or cognizance. Idealism does not reject answer of the first problem, but it holds different view regarding the second one. Accordingly matter or objective entities have no separate and independent existence. The argumentation against realism starts from the epistemology as epistemologists says that one could have knowledge provided that realism should be given up. For knowledge, the gap between the object known and knowing mind must be closed. The object must be made dependent on our way of knowing. The same argument enters in the philosophy of language against realism in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The gap between the object referred to and the referring mind must be closed. The object must be in some way, be made dependent

\textsuperscript{128} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy
on our way of referring, dependent on our language. In this way the metaphysical issues has tended to disappear and the attention has centered so heavily on the epistemological approach of language.

Thus, after Plato and Aristotle, language becomes centermost problem in the 19th century. At this same century Analytical and Continental philosophers scrutinize ‘the truth’ through the ideal and perfect language which is acknowledged as an agency of the right knowledge. In spite the sameness in intention, both philosophies have distinct modes of examine language.

In the narrower sense, Analytical philosophy is used to refer the works of Gotlob Fredicate, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and G.E. Moore in the span of 1900 to 1960. Disregarding idealism of Hegelianism, their speculation is based on the new developments of logic. They reject common sense that is pertaining under ordinary language. According to their perception, logical clarification of thoughts can only be achieved by the analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions. They disagree widely about the correct logical form of ordinary language. They concerns with the four central problems:

1. Nature of meaning
2. Language use
3. Language cognition
4. Relation between language and reality.

From about 1910 to 1930 Analytical philosophers like Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein focuses on creating an ideal language for philosophical analysis, which would be free from the ambiguity of ordinary language. This philosophical trend can be called ideal-language analyses or formalism. In this phrase, Russell and Wittgenstien try to understand language and philosophical problems, by making use of formal logic to formalize the way in which philosophical statements are made. Ludwig Wittgenstein develops a comprehensive system of logical atomism in his _Tractatus Logico Philosophicus_. He argues that the world is the totality of actual states of affairs. That
states of affairs can be expressed in the language of first-order predicate logic. So, a picture of the world can be built up by expressing atomic facts in atomic propositions and linking them, they use logical operators. In the late 1940s and 1950s, Analytical philosophy takes turn toward ordinary language analysis. The movement is followed by the later development of Wittgenstein philosophy, is totally contrasted to the earlier established theory of artificial language. According to later philosophy of Wittgenstein, ordinary language is pretty capable for representing the reality. Logical Positivism focuses on logical formation and expels the contingent factors such as culture, language and historical tradition. Ordinary language philosophy emphasizes on the use of language by the ordinary people. Wittgenstein, Austin and Ryle, the prominent ordinary philosophers often try to disperse philosophical problems by showing them to be the result of misunderstanding of ordinary language.

Alongside to Analytical philosophy, Continental philosophy has been discussing language since 19th and 20th century from mainland Europe. Accepting historicism and metaphilosophy, Continental philosophy has been often sought to redefine the method and nature of philosophy against the Analytical philosophy which tends to treat philosophy in terms of discrete problems, capable of being analyzed a part from their historical origins. Continental philosophy typically suggests that philosophical argument cannot be divorced from the textual and contextual conditions of its historical emergence. Rejecting scienticism, they accept natural sciences as the best way to understand all phenomena. Poles apart to Analytical philosophy, Continental philosophy do not study language as separate discipline. It is an inextricable part of many areas of thought, such as phenomenology, semiotics, hermeneutics, Heidegerian ontology, existentialism, deconstruction and critical theory. The field of hermeneutics and theory of interpretation in general, plays a significant role in 20th century Continental philosophy of language. Accordingly, everything has meaning. Each and every object, person, event and force also communicate or signify continuously. True communication, including the use of human language, requires someone (a sender) who sends a message or text in some

\[\text{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental_philosophy}\]
code to someone else (a receiver). Human language (both natural and artificial) is just one among many ways that humans are able to communicate. Thus, language is studied only insofar as it is one of these forms (the most sophisticated form) of communication. It allows them to take advantage and effectively manipulate the external world in order to creating meaning for themselves and transmit this meaning to others.

(a) **BERTRAND RUSSELL**

The scholars, who lead different views, fall in bifurcated intellectual tradition of Analytical and Continental philosophy in the era of 19th to 20th century, prominently. Britain mathematician-logical positivist-philosopher Bertrand Resell\(^{130}\) (18 may, 1872-2 February 1970) is one of the founders of Analytical philosophy along with Wittgenstein and Fredge. His co-authored works are *Principia Mathematica* with A.N. Whitehead and *‘On Denoting* are considered as paradigm of philosophy by *Frank P. Ramsey*. Both works have had a considerable influence on logic, mathematics, set theory, linguistics and Analytical philosophy. The significant contribution to the philosophy of language is Russell’s theory of description (commonly abbreviated as RTD) which is initially put forth in his essay *On Denoting*, published in the journal of philosophy *Mind*. His theory of description is crucial to logical atomism as Russell accepts that language mirrored reality. Russell focuses specifically, how we use language as a central part of his philosophy. Still, in the context of ‘language and metaphysics’ he categories relation of words to non-verbal facts in this way:

With regard to the relation of words to non-verbal facts, most philosophers can be divided into three broad types:

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\(^{130}\) [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism): Logical positivist typically saw philosophy as having a narrow role. For them, philosophy concerned the clarification of thoughts, rather than having a distinct subject matter of its own. The positivist adopted the ‘verificationism’, according to which every meaningful statement is either analytic or is capable of being verified by experience. This led the logical positivists to reject many traditional problems of philosophy, especially those of metaphysics and ontology as meaningless.
A. Those who infer properties of the world from properties of language. These are a very distinguished party; they include Parmenides, Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel and Bradley.

B. Those who maintain that knowledge is only of words. Among these are the Nominalists and some of the Logical Positivists.

C. Those who maintain that there is knowledge not expressible in words, and use words to tell us what this knowledge is. These include the mystics, Bergson, and Wittgenstein; also certain aspects of Hegel and Bradley.

Among these three parties, the third can be dismissed as self-contradictory. The second comes to grief on the empirical fact that we can know what words occur in a sentence, and that this is not a verbal fact, although it is indispensible to the verbalists. If, therefore, we are confined to the above three alternatives, we must make the best of the first. Russell’s language is an ideal and isomorphic language rather than an ordinary language. He comments on ordinary language.\(^{131}\)

Ordinary language contains a number of purely syntactical words, such as “is” and “than”, which must obviously be excluded from the primary language. Such words, unlike those that we have hitherto considered, are in fact wholly unnecessary and do not appear in symbolic logical languages.

The ideal language mirrors reality. Accordingly, the most important requirement for such an ideal language is that every meaningful proposition must consist of terms referring directly to the objects with which is acquainted. He gives the theory of ‘logical atomism’ wherein the whole world is composed of facts which are described by atomic proposition and atomic propositions or logical atoms are the simplest unit of language as far as the problem of knowledge is concerned. The world is consists of logically independent facts. A plurality of facts cannot be broken down any further. That knowledge depends on the sense-data of our direct experience is related to them. Sense-data is the thing of the world independent of us, i.e. the objects are just the logical construction of sense-data. Through the logical construction of atomic propositions, molecular propositions describe the world. Logical atomism is the form of radical

\(^{131}\) An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 64.
empiricism, whereby knowledge can be reduced to the terms of atomic propositions and their truth is functional compounds.

So, the logical atomism contains fact. The facts are complex structures of objects (particulars). He defines objects is the fact in the relations of atomic facts. In addition, there are judgments (beliefs), which are in a relation to the facts. This relationship is either true or false. Russell strives to eliminate what he sees meaningless and incoherent assertions in philosophy. He seeks clarity and precision in argument by the use of exact language and by breaking down philosophical propositions into their simplest grammatical components. He accepts main task of philosophers is 'to illumine the most general propositions about the world and to eliminate confusion'. He says-

The technical form of the principle of atomicity, as I said before, asserts that all propositions are either atomic, or molecular, or generalizations of molecular propositions, or at least, that a language of which is true, and into which any statement is translatable, can be constructed. This must be true if Wittgenstein's principle of atomicity is true. The converse does not hold. As I shall explain in a moment, a less sweeping and more defensible form of the principle leads equally to the technical form. It is in its technical form that the principle is important in logic. I think that Wittgenstein himself would now accept the modification in question, since I understand that he no longer believes in atomic forms, and the modified principle allows forms, and the modified principle allows them to be substituted for the original atomic propositions, in which it was considered necessary that each word should stand for something destitute of complexity. 132

Russell adopts133 William of Ockham’s principle against multiplying unnecessary entities; Occam’s razor is a central part of the method of analysis134. In short, Russell argues that the syntactic form of description is misleading, as it does not correlate their logical and semantic architecture. While description may seem fairly uncontroversial phrases, Russell provides a satisfactory analysis of the linguistics and logical properties of a description. It is vital to the clarity in important philosophical debates, particularly in

132 Ibid, p. 266.


134 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_of_Ockham: William of Ockham (c. 1288-1348) was an English Franciscan Friar and scholastic philosopher. His one important contribution is to modern science and modern intellectual culture through the principle of parsimony in explanation and theory building that came to be known as Occam’s Razor.
semantic arguments, epistemology and metaphysics. Russell's theory focuses on the logical form of expressions, involving denoting phrases. The grammatical form of the sentence disguises its underlying logical form. The theory of Definite Descriptions enables the sentence to be construed as meaningful but may be false.

Descriptions, frequently, appear in the form of standard subject-predicate. Russell puts forward the theory of descriptions in order to solve out two problems of philosophy of language. These two major problems are:

(1) Co-referring expressions and

(2) Non-referring expressions.

The first problem, originated primarily with Gottlob Frege, is the problem of informative identities. For example, if the morning star is the same planet in the sky (indeed they are), how is it that someone can think that the morning star rises in the morning but the evening star does not? This is apparently problematic because although the two expressions seem to denote the same thing. One cannot be the substitute for the other, which one ought to be able to do with identical or synonymous expressions. Further, this becomes complicated as both the morning star and evening star are also on the planet Venus. The problem of non-referring expressions is that expressions that are meaningful do not refer to anything. For example, any dog is annoying it is not meant that there is a particular individual dog, namely any dog, who has the property of being annoying (similar considerations dog for some dog, every dog, a dog and so on). Thus, Russell avoids admitting mysterious non-existent entities into his ontology. He explicates the pragmatic world through the logical language, which is the basic contribution to the philosophy of language. Ultimately Russell is concerned with establishing sound epistemological foundations. Russell's theory gets the place in his student Wittgenstein's principle in the beginning. But later, Wittgenstein rejects his theory of artificial language. But, the role of Russell cannot be denied for the thought development of his student as well as his place in the philosophy of language.
(b) LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

An Australian British Philosopher ‘Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein’ (26\textsuperscript{th} April 1889 to 29 April 1951) works primarily in logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Development of his speculation is divided in two phases, which are known early Wittgenstein and later Wittgenstein. The division is based on the absolutely different approaches towards the nature of language. The former phrase deals with the technical language in his monograph ‘Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus’. The latter phrase deals with the ordinary language philosophy in ‘Philosophical Investigations’. Both monographs are placed among the top five most important books in the twentieth century philosophy. The latter is standing out as the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations. In his earlier phase, he absolutely agrees with Russell’s view of the ability of logical language to represent the world. To support the logical language, he gives a new theory picture theory. McDonough says thereupon-

The sentences of everyday language do not, apparently, have the logical structure attributed to the propositional symbol in the argument of the Tractatus. They are not composed of proxies which are in the same contingent state in which their subject matter is represented, that is, they do not have pictorial form. Even if an occasional sentence approximates to the structure, this seems to be an accidental feature of the sentence and does not have anything essential to do with the fact that the sentence expresses the sense that it does\textsuperscript{135}.

He asserts that ordinary language is sufficient in itself for mirroring the world through the establishing some theories like ‘game theory’, ‘family resemblance theory’ and ‘showing theory’. He argues that meaning is determined by the usages, because it is related to social event. If something is language, it cannot be logical or private and if something is private, it is not a language. Thus, the private language theory is against to the logical atomism.

Picture theory, explained in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, is about the relationship between language and world. It shows how language succeeds in doing what it does and which would also demonstrate the limits of its competence. Languages are able to reshape the world and define it, because language is the picture of reality. The

\textsuperscript{135}The Argument of The Tractatus, p.120.
distinction between what can be said and what can be shown is the central and original view of Wittgenstein Tractates. The picture theory is based on ‘what can be said’. The ordinary language is not perfect in terms of reality.

In general, the sense or meaning of the everyday sentence does not stand in any simple relationship to its structure. In everyday language sentences with different structures can have the same meaning, and sentences with the same structure can have different meanings. These are nothing other than, respectively, sentence synonymy and ambiguity. Since, in the view of Tractatus, the sense of the proposition is determined purely by its structure, the contrast between the sentences of everyday language and Wittgenstein’s requirements for the genuine propositional symbol is great. Not only do the sentences of everyday language not have pictorial form, but they would seem, from the point of view of logic, to be in a state of structural disorder.  

Keeping different explanation about meaning, Wittgenstein says in Investigation that meaning is just use. Words are not defined by reference to the objects or things which they designate in the external world, nor by the thoughts, ideas or mental representation that one might associate with them, but rather by how they are used in effective, ordinary communication. This view is against the Platonic realism and Gottlob Frege’s notion of sense and reference. Wittgenstein argues that definitions emerge from what he terms forms of life, roughly the culture and society in which they are used. He stresses on the social aspects of cognition. To see how language works, one has to see how it functions in a specific social situation. He rejects the idea that ostensive definitions can provide meaning of a word. For him, the thing that the word stands for, does not give the meaning of the word.

Wittgenstein holds that the entire philosophical problems are due to the wrong use of language. Repetition of wrong use of words creates a mental blockage in the user so much so that he fixes their meaning and thinks that in all context of their use the meaning is the same. But the blockage can be removed only when the use of words should be shown in ordinary language level in ordinary contexts. For example, some words as ‘reality, truth, knowledge, self, name, proposition, subject, object’ have fixed meaning in the hands of philosophers. When their use in different contexts is shown, the mental blockage ends. ‘Different uses of these words’ in different contexts, is what Wittgenstein

\[136\text{Ibid, p.120}\]
calls the ‘language game’. Language-game is the outcome of later Wittgenstein thought, which shows new aspect of language. With this shift away from a ‘metalogical’ view of psychological concepts to his post-1930 ‘logical’ view of signs came a very fundamental shift in Wittgenstein’s orientation toward language, a shift which can with some justification be likened to a shift away from an absolutistic, static and perhaps in part mentalistic conception of language to a ‘logical’ (in his post-1930 sense), relativistic and dynamic conception. This shift was so basic that it might even be called (to borrow a Kuhnian turn of phrase) a paradigm shift’, a resulting in a host of new categories which were, if not wholly incommensurate with, at least novel in relation to and representation of a radical break from, his own earlier conceptions. The notion of a ‘language game’ is one such new category or conception.

Thus, the meaning of language is determined by its use. In playing language game, no new information is given to those who are using these words in their fixed meanings because they know their uses in different contexts. The only purpose to play the game is to remind them of their uses in different contexts. The purpose of the language game is not to solve the problems of philosophy but when the language game is played, the problems automatically disappear. In one language-game, a word might stand for things to be manipulated, but at another place, the same word might be used for asking questions or giving orders. Water!, for example, can be an exclamation, an order, a request, or an answer to a question. But, its meaning depends on the language-game in which it is being used. Thus, the word water has no meaning apart from its use within a language-game. One general characteristic of games is, ‘the way in which they consist in following rules’. Rules constitute a family, rather than a class that can be explicitly defined. As consequences, it is not possible to provide a definitive account of what it is to follow a rule. Indeed, any course of action can be made out to accord with some particular rule. Therefore, a rule cannot be used to explain an action. Rather, that one is following a rule or not is to be decided by looking to see if the actions conform to the expectations in the particular form of life in which one is involved. Following a rule is a social activity. At first coming up with a definition of the word game may seem a simple task, but actually it is tougher task. Any definition of game which focuses on amusement leaves us unsatisfied since the feelings experienced by a world class chess player are very

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different from those of a circle of children playing Duck Goose. Wittgenstein's point is not that it is impossible to define game, but that one doesn’t have a definition, and we don't need one also, because even without the definition, word is used successfully. Everybody understands what speaker means when he talk about playing a game. He can even clearly identify and correct inaccurate uses of the word, all without reference to any definition that consists of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of a game. Stern evaluates Wittgenstein’s language game-

Wittgenstein conceives of both language and activities here in a broad sense, one that is includes not just the uttering of words and the movement of limbs, but also covers much of what we might ordinarily consider their surroundings: broader patterns of action, the equipment used (such as colour samples and blocks), and even he sites where the activities in question take place. ---

Wittgenstein’s intention to draw analogy between language use and playful activity, but the nature of the analogy has often not been appreciated. As we have already seen, one of its functions is to mark a contrast with the notion of language as a calculus, a system that is governed by a set of formally defined rules, by stressing the involvement of language use with practical activity, activity which may well involves rules, but is not wholly determined by them. However, language-games are not supposed to provide the basis for a new, practice oriented model of language, to supplant the logico-mathematical calculus model, but rather to serve as object of comparison.138

Another theory, which gives clarity about language, is ‘Family resemblance theory’. Wittgenstein gives an example of shooting i.e. target shooting in Olympic is a called a game while military sharp shooting is not. Same way, how does one recognize that two people, to whom one knows, are related to one another? Seeing the similar height, weight, eye colour, hair, nose, mouth etc. in the view of enough matches, family resemblance is noticed. It is not always a conscious process. Generally one does not catalogue various similarities until he reaches a certain threshold. One just intuitively sees the resemblances. He suggests that the same is true of language.

He ponders on the possibility of a language which talks about those things which are known only to the user and whose content is inherently private. The usual example is that of a language in which the meaning of the term is decided by the individual alone. For example, the individual names a particular sensation. On some occasion, $S$, and

intends to use that word to refer to that sensation. Such a language is called by Wittgenstein private language. Stern elaborates his argumentative points in this way-

The discussion of private language begins by distinguishing between the ordinary sense of privacy in which my hidden diary, my secret code, or my concealed pain are private matters, and the sublime conception of privacy that is the focus of the interlocutor’s interest. While a diary, a code, or pain may well be private—that is no one else knows about it—it is always possible, at least in principle that others find out about such matter. The interlocutor, on the other hand, asks us to imagine a language that is necessary private, one that no one else could possibly understand, because the words ‘refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.\(^{139}\)

Although Wittgenstein certainly argues that the notion of private language is incoherent, because of the way in which the text is presented the exact nature of the argument is disputed. A private language is not really a language at all. This point is intimately connected with a variety of other themes in his later works, especially his investigations of meaning. There is no single, coherent sample or object that we can call meaning. Rather, the supposition that such things are the source of much philosophical confusion. Meaning is the complicated phenomenon that is woven into the fabric of our lives. A good first approximation of Wittgenstein's point is that meaning is a social event; meaning happens between language users. As the consequences, it makes no sense to talk about a private language. The *Investigations* deals largely with the difficulties of language and meaning. Wittgenstein views the tools of language as being fundamentally simple and philosophers had obscured this simplicity by misusing language and by the asking of meaningless questions. He rejects the variety of ways of thinking about what the meaning of a word is or how meanings can be identified. He shows how, in each case, the meaning of the word presupposes our ability to use it. The task of philosophy is to clean up linguistic mistakes. So, he investigates the limits of the \(\text{world}\) and later on meaning.

One can compare later Wittgenstein with Prabhākara’s theory of Anvītābhidhānvāda. According to Prabhākara, meaning of a sentence does not merely the continuation of the meaning of the definite words. Word indicates the meaning according

to the contexts and thereby we find the meaning of sentence. The later Wittgenstein’s Language game theory also says that meaning of a sentence depends upon its use, not upon the mental process. On the other hand, early Wittgenstein’s view can be compared with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Abhihitānvayavāda. Kumārila’s view is that meaning of a sentence is the mere continuation of the meaning of the words. He takes the direct or fixed meaning of the words and makes the anvaya to get the sentential meaning. In early Wittgenstein’s Picture theory, he is in view that language is the picture of reality (worldly) and simple propositions reflects the picture of atomic facts, i.e. propositions have a fixed meaning, not on the basis of the use. But rejecting his own theory, he stands with the ordinary language parallel to the facts and world.

(c) FERDINAND SAUSSURE

After the analysis of two significant philosophers from the Analytical philosophy, let’s turn to towards the Continental philosophers whose approach to the philosophy of language is absolutely different. At the one place philosophers of Analytical school, are involved in searching an ideal language, which should be parallel to the world. In order to that, they engage in the debate of artificial language i.e. logical language vs. ordinary language. At the same time some philosophers dispose toward the concept of Language, wherein it has been debated that by what extent language presents/constructs or represents the reality. Ignoring studying languages; they concentrate on the action of Language. In nutshell, they prefer to study the relationship of language, thought and reality, keeping the Language in center, rather than for search an ideal language. This second category falls into the philosophy of Continental school. Among the Continental philosophy, one of the prominent philosophers is Ferdinand De Saussure (1857-1913), the founder of structuralism of 20th century. The main source of his structuralism is found in Course in General Linguistics, written by Saussure's colleagues after his death and based on student notes, delivered by him. Saussure marks the end of the Socrates tradition of linguistics thought. He is the first to reject the Socratic question of how words relate to the world as an irrelevant and misleading starting point for linguistic inquiry. His significant contribution to the philosophy of language can be understood in this way-
This striking metaphor from Saussure's posthumously published Course de linguistique generale ushers in what was subsequently described as a 'Copernican revolution' in western linguistic thought. The term 'Copernican' is apt for just as Copernicus had claimed that the Earth rotated about the Sun, instead of the Sun rotating about the Earth, Saussure claims something analogous in the case of language. His thesis was that language is the instruments which enable human beings to achieve a rational comprehension of the world in which they live. Instead of seeing words as mere adjuncts to our reality, Saussure saw our understanding of reality as depending essentially upon our social use of the verbal signs which constitute the language we use. Words are not peripheral but on the contrary, central to human life. Human existence is, by definition, a linguistically articulated existence.\(^\text{140}\)

Saussure explains language and its relation with the thought and reality through the structuralism, which he himself introduce in linguistics the very first. 'Structural Linguistics' is actually an early form of corpus linguistics\(^\text{141}\) (quantification). It is an approach to the human sciences that attempts to analyze a specific field (for instance, mythology) as a complex system of interrelated parts and human culture is to be understood as a system of signs. According to Alison Assister, there are four common values regarding structuralism that form an intellectual trend.

1. The structure determines the position of each element of a whole.

2. Every system has a structure.

3. Structural laws deal with coexistence rather than changes.

4. Structures are the 'real things' that lie beneath the surface or the appearance of meaning.

These aforesaid points are the substratum of the emergence of structural perception of language in Saussure's mind. His structuralism is the response to pre-structuralism theory, which stands with an intimate connection between the material objects in the world and the spoken languages that is used to talk about those objects and their

\(^{140}\) *Landmarks in Linguistic Thought*, p. 176.

\(^{141}\) [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corpus_linguistics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corpus_linguistics): Corpus linguistics is the study of language as expressed in samples (corpora) or "real world" text. This method represents a digestive approach to deriving a set of abstract rules by which a natural language is governed or else relates to another language.
interrelations. Thus, a crucial feature of Saussurean structuralism is the idea that the structure itself creates the units and their relations to one another. Thus, he denies the connection between the material object and the word. He sets it aside in order to study the very structure of language. Language precedes us. It is the medium of thought and human expression. It provides the structure to conceptualize individual experience. So, Saussure reveals the structure of language rather than the use of language i.e. speech or parole in his own technical vocabulary. This underlying system of language i.e. langue is subject to be concerned under the semiology (system of sign). Saussure defines semiology in his own words-

A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would be a part of social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it semiology (from Greek semeion 'sign'). Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be, but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology; the laws discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter will circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass of anthropological facts.

The undermost cause which shifts the problem of languages to the 'language' is the proclivity of synchronic method rather than diachronic in Saussure’s philosophy of language. Synchronic method examines 'how the elements of Language are related to each other in the present' and how language works in the present. The language is not a continuous process of evolution, but is stable, structured system. Saussure’s theory of langue emerges as being rather like a theory of architecture according to which individual bricks only come into existence once the whole building is in place.

142 Landmarks in Linguistic Thought, p. 179
143 Course in General Linguistics, p. 16.
144 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synchronic: Synchronic- having reference to the facts of a linguistic system as it exists at one point in time without reference to its history.
145 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diachronic: Diachronic- pertaining to the changes in a linguistic system between successive points in time or historical.
146 Landmarks in Linguistic Thought, p. 179.
Saussure studies language from a formal and theoretical point of view. In his vocabulary Language is addressed as *La langue*. As the system of signs (semiotic), it is a static set of relationships. It is independent of any changes that take place over time, rather a dynamic system which changes over time. He explains sign, signifier and signified in this way—

I propose to retain the word sign (signe) to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound image respectively by signified (signifié) and signifier (signifiant).147

Sign is a composed of a concept i.e. signified and a sound pattern or its graphic equivalent i.e. signifier. For example, a word pear composed of the letters p-e-a-r functions as a signifier by producing in the mind of English-speakers the concept (signified, the concept of meaning of the word) of a certain kind of fruit that grows on trees, viz., a pear. Thus the pear which includes the concept of pear and the speech sound p-e-a-r, is called sign. Thus sign is the central fact of language. Everything in the world comes under the relation of signifier word and signified concept. Even, noises count as language provided that they express or communicate ideas, otherwise they are just noise. And to communicate ideas, they must be part of a system of conventions, part of the system of signs.

Language is the form, not a substance. Peculiarity of the system of language is that all the elements fit together. The value of any element depends on the simultaneous coexistence of all the others. De Saussure proposes a scientific model of language as a closed system of elements and rules that could be described quite independently from the psychological subjectivity of any particular user of that language. The Language pre-exists us, it is not we who speak. Language speaks (through) us. There is no truth that is not constructed by language. Nothing is outside the Language. Saussure brackets out of his investigation with the real, material objects (referents) to which signs are presumably related. This bracketing of the referent is a movement that enables him to study the way, a thing (language and meaning) is experienced in the mind. In this sense, his motivation

147 *Course in General Linguistics*, p. 67.
is similar to Husserl's. Saussure never offers a method for examining that how language as a system hooks up to the world of objects that lie outside the language?

Saussure marks crucial opposition between * langue * and * parole *. *La langue* is the system of language i.e. a system of forms, whereas *parole* is the actual speech, the speech act which is made possible by language. *La langue* is what the individual assimilates when he learns a language. It is the social product whose existence permits the individual to exercise his linguistic faculty. The identity of any linguistic sign, on Saussure's account, is determinate by the sum total of syntagmatic and associative relations into which it enters with other linguistic signs in the same langue. In discourse, on the one hand, words acquire relation based on the linear nature of language because they are chained together. This rules out the possibility of pronouncing two elements simultaneously. The elements are arranged in sequence on the chain of speaking. Combinations supported by linearity are syntagms. The syntagm is always composed of two or more consecutive units.

In discourse, the parole, on the other hand, is the executive side of language. Through the combination of both, speaker uses the code of the linguistic system in order to express his thoughts. The psycho-physical mechanism permits him to externalize these combinations. In the act of parole, the speaker selects and combines elements of the linguistic system and gives these forms concrete phonic and psychological manifestation, as sounds and meanings. The *la langue* must be primary concern. It is coherent, analyzable object. It is the system of signs in which only essential thing is the union of meanings and acoustic images.

According to Saussure's structuralism, a meaning is made possible by patterns rather than by some correspondence between a name and a thing. Meaning comes from understanding what a thing is not rather than from knowing in any kind of ontological sense what a thing is. However, meaning comes through the relationship between signs, which are the union of signified and signifier. So the word tree means by custom only and not by any intrinsic relationship between the sound and the thing. That's why "arbol"

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149 *Course in General Linguistics*, p. 123.
and tree both can signify the same signified. The meaning is constructed through
difference, particularly through binary pairs (man/woman, good/evil). Meaning arises
from the functional differences between the elements (signs) within the system of langue.
The signs of a linguistic system are like the coins of a monetary system or currency.
Thus, a system of signs (words of a language) is analogous to a system of values. A
quarter has a certain monetary value determined by its exchange value. Quarters can be
exchanged for other things, have a designated (but flexible) value. Quarters can be used
to buy goods or commodities. But they also have a fixed value in relation to the other
coins. Linguistic signs also have values in relation to the other signs. For example, the
word bachelor can be exchanged for the term unmarried man. This is, in many ways, an
equal exchange. That's what it means for words to be synonymous and they have the
same meaning or linguistic value. They can be substituted or exchanged from one
another. Meaning is not a private experience, as Husserl thought. But it is the product of a
shared system of signification. A text is to be understood as a construct to be analyzed
and explained scientifically in terms of the deep structure of the system itself. The
meaning of a term does not begin and end with the speaker's experience or intention as it
does in Husserl's theory. The act of speaking and intending presupposes a language
already in place and upon which the speaker must rely in order to say anything at all. In
this way, the subject i.e. individual or author is effectively replaced by language itself as
an autonomous system of rules. Thus, structuralism has been characterized as anti
humanistic in its claim that meaning is not identical with the inner psychological
experience of the speaker. It removes the human subject from its central position in the
production of meaning much as Copernicus de-centered the earth from its position at the
center of the solar system. Thus, according to Saussure's structural linguistics, each sign
in the system of signs makes up a language. "The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a
name, but a concept and a sound-image." Language gets its meaning only because of
its difference from every other sign. The word *pear* has no meaning in itself or in the
intention of the speaker, but only due to the fact that it differs from other possible graphic
images such as *p-e-e-r, p-e-a-k, f-e-a-r, b-e-a-r*, etc. In other words, it doesn't matter how

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150 *Course in General Linguistics*, p. 66.
the form of the signifier varies, as long as it is different from all the other signifiers in the system (langue).

Signifier and signified are purely relational or differential entities, because they are arbitrary and relational. It is said- 'the clue is to the identify of a linguistic sign is the fact that the relation between its significant and its signifie is arbitrary'. The relation between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary in at least two ways. First, there is no absolute reason why these particular graphic marks \( p-e-a-r \) should signify the concept pear. There is no natural connection or resemblance between the signifier and the signified as in symbol, i.e. an iconic representation such as a descriptive drawing of a pear. After all, it's not as if the word pear looks or sounds anything like a pear. In fact, the connection between the signifier and the signified is due to the contingent historical convention. But the word pear has come to signify the concept pear in English. No one has the power to simply change it. Thus, the relationship between a word and a concept is arbitrary in one sense in terms of its origin, but not in another sense of its use. Language is arbitrary; there is no natural bond between words and things. In the words of Saussure, 'the bond between the signifier and signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole result from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary'. So, there can be no privileged connection between language and reality. In this sense, reality is also produced by language. Thus, structuralism can be understood as the form of idealism. Principally, structuralism undermines the claim of empiricism that what is real is what is experienced. Saussure makes a second point about the arbitrariness of the sign. The relation between the sign itself (signifier/signified pair) and what it refers to what is called the referent, i.e. the actual piece of fruit is also arbitrary. This claim is less plausible than the former. For example, one might object that the concept in the mind of the speaker is formed, either directly or indirectly, by the actual pears. Ideally then we would expect it to be the case that the properties of actual pears would be causally related to our concept of a pear. The characteristics of pear produces in one's mind either directly through the experience of

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151 Landmarks in Linguistic Thought, p. 185.
152 Course in General Linguistics, p.67.
pears or indirectly through the pictures of pears, descriptions or some such things. Thus, the concept pear might be thought of as some basic information and set of beliefs about actual pears, e.g. what they look like, how they feel and taste, what they're good for, etc. Saussure's language is about to the union of signifier and signified. There is no direct relation of external world to the Language.

His structuralism has great impact on the later linguists between World War I and World War II, some linguistics like Leonard Bloomfield, Louis Hjelmslev and Alf Sommerfelt develops their own version of structural linguistics. Roman Jacobson, member of Prague school concentrates at the same as well as. In the Prague school, structuralism lies in phonemics. They examine how the sounds are related rather than simply compiling the list of sounds which occur in a language is examined. Inventory of sounds in language could be analyzed in terms of a series of contrast. Thus, theory of Saussure explores the new dimension of the language. Language constructs the world. Everything comes under the domain of signifier and signified relationship.

(d) JACQUES DERRIDA

In direct contrast to the structuralism claim of a unified relation of signifier and signified, post-structuralism of Jacques Derrida views the signifier and signified as inseparable but not united. Still meaning inheres to the play of difference, but in different way. Derrida's post structuralism represents the complex response to the variety of theoretical and philosophical movements of the 20th century, most notably Husserlian phenomenology, Saussurean and French structuralism and Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Derrida's three books make him distinguished among the scholars: Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, Speech and Phenomena. Posterior, he brings out three more controversial works: Marges de la philosophie, La Dissémination, Positions, which continued his attack on 'logo-centrism', what Derrida calls the Western preconception with truth as a presence (essence, existence, substance and subject). Journey of the development of the theory of Derrida can be summarized in this manner-

Derrida's principal philosophical formation was in the tradition of phenomenology, a central question for which is whether and how it is possible to get an understanding of reality that is independent of the language in which the understanding is cast. Is there, in other words, a
consciousness of things in themselves, which transcends language? Ever since Kant, those committed to belief in such a transcendental consciousness and reality has struggled to lay down a path towards reaching it. What Saussure's theory appeared to suggest was that linguistics does not suffer from the phenomenological 'disease' of not being able to separate is object of study-language itself-from the language in which the understanding of that object is cast. Saussure, after all, could speak straightforwardly of a 'signified' that was unproblematically distinct form its 'signifier' and only arbitrarily connected to it.153

He emphasizes on the historical study of every structure or synchronic phenomenon. The structure cannot be understood without understanding of its genesis. Same way, any origin cannot be pure unity or simplicity, but must be already articulated as complex. Poststructuralist theory denies distinction between the signifier and the signified. Accordingly, concepts are just mere words. Thus, signifiers are words that refer to other words and never reach out to material objects and their interrelations. Post-structuralism rejects the theory that one could map the structure of a language or culture.

Responded against the Saussure's structuralism, Derrida seeks to understand how the concepts are understood by readers in the present, while the structuralism efforts principally for understanding how the concepts are understood by the author in his or her own time. Post structuralism undermines the centrality of subject which is supported by metaphysics of Descartes, Husserl and so on. It reinforces the notion of de-centered self' who is author himself. This key concept helps to develop the theory of meaning. Without the central fixation on the author, post-structuralism examine other sources for meaning e.g., readers, cultural norms, other literature, etc. These alternative sources are never authoritative and are inconsistent.

Language works like a dictionary wherein, one looks up a word and get other words that provide meaning. Keep looking up those words; the one will ultimately come back to the word he started with. Thus, it has complex structure with its own world. The word is the most intrinsic parts of language. It is self governing, is accepted as unquestionable element by the majority of scholars. But the meaning is controversial component of language, which derivation with the author, is apprehended by the precedent philosophers. Language is the closed system of signs, without a centre. That

153 Landmarks in Linguistic Thought II, p. 189.
logic, perception or social behavior cannot provide the grounds for language, which is the primary reality. It can be addressed as autonomous organization. Once, one uses language (speech or writing) to refer to the reality, that reality is linguistically formulated, therefore indeterminate. Derrida's words rest on nothing, not on speech of Austin or 'intention' of Grice or naming of Frege or deep grammar of Chomsky or meta-languages of Davidson or social usage of Wittgenstein. The word can be defined in relation to the other words and these in turn call on other words, and so on. Derrida's mission is to show that texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs and practices do not have definable meanings and will always exceed the boundaries they currently occupy. Derrida's terminology shifts over the years. New words are coined and old words give new meanings. Concepts don't have settled definitions, indeed can't have, but assume new shapes depending on what deconstruction is 'reading' at the time.

Post-structuralism rejects the notion of the essential quality of the dominant relation in the hierarchy, which proposed certain theoretical and conceptual opposites i.e. actually binary opposition of structuralism. It chooses to expose these relations and the dependency of the dominant term on its apparently subservient counterpart. The binary pairs make meaning. He accepts 'polar opposition' and shows how in all binaries, one of the terms is always subordinated to the other (man/woman, good/evil). Particularly, on the binary speech / writing, speech has been seen to provide a guarantee of subjectivity and presence in the history of philosophy and linguistics. The author's intended meaning, such as it is secondary to the meaning that the reader perceives. Derrida does not only invert the binary opposition, but also displaces it and undo the concept of opposition. For Derrida, writing becomes an all-inclusive term that entails far more than mere graphic inscription. This view, of writing is said grammatology. Speech-writing has in fact encompassed language, indeed it is there in the very possibility of language. Thus, 'the language system in which linguistic signs are 'deferred' into a virtual social-mental realm of existence. Since langue precedes speech and determines what it can be, speech itself is always already writing'.

The only way to properly understand these meanings is to deconstruct the assumptions and knowledge systems which produce the illusion of singular meaning. The act of deconstruction illuminates how male can become female, how speech can become writing, and how rational can become emotional. To describe how meaning is produced, Derrida develops the term *differance*, meaning is to differ and to defer. Meaning is the ever-moving play of difference from signifier to signifier; a slipping from word to word in which each word retains relations to the words that differ from it. Meaning is constantly slipping from one sign to the next. Thus, the specification of meaning is an infinite and endless process. Meaning, to some extent, always escapes from one's grasp. It is always just out of the reach, ungrounded, with no origin in the intention of the speaker. Meaning is never fully present in any one signifier, but is infinitely deferred or suspended. It is contextual, i.e. affected by related words. Meaning is also not dependent upon the external subject i.e. author. There is no perpendicular concordance of language with the world. Meaning is not something preexisting in the mind that is expressed, like the main analytical schools of language philosophy from Hume onwards and contrary to Saussure. Derrida does not regard words as the expression of ideas. Meaning itself is indeterminate. Keeping different view on intentionality to the prior philosophers; he says that intention does not determine the meaning of what are said. Instead, the meaning of the words, what is used in speaking, determines intention. It does not mean that speaker has no meaning or that no one has intentions in communicating. Language is the social structure that is developed long before and exists prior to usage of it as individuals. One has to learn to use it and tap into its web of meanings in order to communicate with others. The basis of this new concept is that Derrida gives priority to writing. He tries to broaden the province of meaning. Intentionality plays significant role in the establishing writing as prior to speaking. Language is the structured system of signs and that the meanings of individual signs are produced by the *differance* between that sign and other signs. His description of meaning makes him distinguished from other scholars. As it is said-

The other elements of Derrida's system to have promoted widespread near-hysteria are those having to do with the free play of the signifier, including his use of deviant spellings, neologisms,
shifting senses and puns. He is sometimes blamed for having provoked a crisis of meaning in the late twentieth century by having disconnected the signifier from the signified.  

Words are not self-sufficiently meaningful but only meaningful as part of the larger structure that makes meaning possible. The meaning of language is dependent on the larger structures of language. It cannot originate in the unity of conscious experience. Linguistic meaning does not originate in the intentional meaning of the speaking subject. Post-structuralism rejects the idea of the literary text having a single purpose, a single meaning or one singular existence. Instead, every individual reader creates a new and individual purpose, meaning and existence for a given text. Meaning is constructed by an individual form the signifier. This is why the signified is said to 'slide' under the signifier and explains the talk about the primacy of the signifier.

Derrida attacks on logo-centrism, according to this view, ideas exist outside the language, one uses to express them in language. In the other words, idea lives in the mind which our writing and speaking attempt to express. Words refer only to other words, not to things or thoughts or feelings. No one possesses the full significance of their words. The texts in some sense write themselves: i.e. are independent of an author or his intentions. Jacques Derrida uses Saussure's insights to develop Deconstruction that focuses on the lack of a truth out there or at the center to provide meaning. He defines deconstruction—

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155 Ibid, p. 197.
For strictly speaking, deconstruction is not something an analyst does to texts, but something texts do, and that the analyst uncovers.157

He shows that how all Western philosophical systems are dependent on a center ‘God, the self’. The concept of ‘self’ as a separate, singular and coherent entity is a fictional construct. Deconstruction denotes the particular kind of practice in reading and thereby, a method of criticism and mode of analytical inquiry. Deconstruction generally operates by conducting textual readings. The text is not a discrete whole. It contains several irreconcilable, contradictory meanings. This process ostensibly shows that any text has more than one interpretation. The text itself links these interpretations inextricably. Thus, that interpretative reading cannot go beyond the certain point. In Of Grammatology (1967) Derrida introduces the term deconstruction to describe the understanding language, as “writing” (in general) renders infeasible a straightforward semantic theory. Deconstruction is what happens to meaning when language is understood as writing. When language is understood as writing, it is realized that meaning does not originate in the logos of thought of the language user. Instead, individual language users are understood to be using an external system of signs. The system exists separately to them because these signs are written down. The individual language users operate within a system of meaning that is given to them from outside. Meaning is, therefore, not fully under the control of the individual language user. The meaning of the text is not neatly determined by authorial intention and cannot be unproblematically recreated by the reader. Meaning necessarily involves some degree of interpretation, negotiation or translation. This becomes necessity for the active interpretation of meaning by readers when language is understood as writing, then deconstruction takes place.

Alternatively, writing is about absence, the absence of the speaker and what is signified by the written signifiers. It is the underprivileged partner in the speaking/writing binary pair. He opens up the hierarchy, questioning whether or not one really is more primary or important than the other. To Derrida, the primacy and priority of speech over

157 Landmarks in Linguistic Thought II, p. 191.
writing (Phono-centrism)\textsuperscript{158} is a universal fallacy in the Western philosophic tradition. From Plato in his dialogue \textit{The Phaedrus}, to Rousseau in his \textit{Essay on the Origin of Languages}, to Saussure in his \textit{Course in General Linguistics}, writing is seen as derivative. The hierarchical\textsuperscript{159} bifurcation of language comes about because there is traditionally assumed to be the direct connection between the signifier and the signified, which in turn is assumed to parallel to the direct connection of speech with thought. These direct connections would entail full presence. Again, real presence inheres not in the observable fact to face encounter, but may be said to be deferred to something more virtual.\textsuperscript{160} Writing can exist without the thought, both spatially and temporally, attains no such presence. Therefore, the privileged position is given to presence that results in the pejorative position given to writing. It is important to note that phono-centrism shows that the concept of ‘presence’ functions in both space and time. Things can differ in space and people can defer (put-off) things in time. They can be drawn a similarity between \textit{presence} and \textit{difference}. However, there is also a fundamental and crucial difference: presence is stable while difference is dynamic and destabilizing. Difference is free, less binding, than presence. There is another gradation of the term \textit{difference}, its subtle movement across the varied meanings of its constituent parts, is undetectable in speech because the alien \textit{a} makes no difference to pronunciation. It is only detectable in the inscription. In that way, deconstruction and phono-centricism of Derrida, is the cause to commencing new debate as speech vs. writing. Although his establishment of writing is criticized mostly, nonetheless the arguments are strong enough to establish the claim of centrality of writing over speech. Thus, in the theory of difference, he gives new aspects

\textsuperscript{158} \url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phono-centrism}. Phono-centrism is the idea that sounds and speech are inherently superior (or more natural) to the written language. To adherents of this philosophy, spoken language is inherently richer and more intuitive than written language. Phono-centrism holds that spoken language is the primary, fundamental way of communicating, and writing is merely a "second-rate" attempt to capture speech.

\textsuperscript{159} The system of levels, according to which, a language is organized, as phonemic, morphemic, syntactic, or semantic.

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Landmarks in Linguistic Thought, II}, p. 194.
to the meaning. He centralizes the absence rather than presence. In this direction, priority of writing is always significant over the speaking.

In nutshell, the whole tradition of arguments and debates in Western civilization has been running through the individual, who represents distinct organization of their thoughts. Establishment and de-establishment is the fashion in Western tradition. Each individual scholar keeps markedly personal characteristics of language. Some of them could not percept beyond the languages. But the very contrary to Western thinkers, Indian thinkers, representative of various schools, related to the different disciplines, goes beyond languages. At least, they shared one characteristic in general that is 'creativity' of Language. No matter what is the line of demarcation of creativity of Language is. Intensity of creativeness varies according to foreground theories of particular philosophical Schools. A few schools like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika bound language with empirical world, since only sense-experienced elements are valid and authentic, according to them.

By now, in the view of this short history of philosophy of language, it can be said without any doubt that language is the prerequisite element for understanding any principle in any school. It is the most essential equipment, thus without understanding of the structure of language, not a single step of movement is possible. Schools of Indian tradition have focused on the architecture of language since the beginning of verbal knowledge in the Ṛgveda, the first text of the world. Every aspect of language, either with the linguistic or philosophical or psychological or grammatical, has been fully examined in the six Vedaṅgās and in other branches. Language is different to the speech sounds that's why at some places it is said that reality is beyond to the language i.e. speech sound. At some places language construct the world, but the surprising factor is that both the paradoxical expressions appear with the same nomenclature. This should be characterized as the one specialty of Indian culture. Nigama and Āgama present the language as the power for construction, whereas Bhartrhari 's language constructs the world, but it is the highest category metaphysics. Parallel to that, Dīgnāga establishes language as the equipment of constructing the world, but it constructs only mental world,
which is mere illusion and keeps existence empirically. In the ultimate sense there is no connection between language and reality. In Jaina philosophy, language is only a medium of expression. Nyāya philosophy develops a scientific language which would parallel to the artificial language also for sketching the accurate truth. Contrary to the Indian tradition, some Western schools, particularly Continental scholars, are quite closer to the Buddhist, Bhartrhari and Śaiva also. Saussure accepts that language is not only the speech sound. It is beyond to that. It has own systematic structure where any language of the world can be adjusted. Other side, some scholars try to make that ideal and perfect language. Analytical philosopher Bertrand Russell attempts to make the structure of language which is able to present the exact world. Fulfilling his purpose, he considers artificial language which is of scientific and logical nature. But Wittgenstein does not feel any requirement of artificial language, because in his views, language of day to day life is perfect for the representing the world. Although, both philosophers accept language as parallel to the world and it has caliber to represent reality. In nutshell, language is the common problem for all philosophers, because it is not only the most convenient equipment for communication. It is more than that. It has power to construct its world. Thus, the thought system bifurcated itself into two groups mainly i.e. construct vs. represent. All the issues and interfaces have been discussed according to these schools.

Now in the subsequent chapter-II, the Śaiva and Śākta schools of Tantras will be examined. The chapter is completely devoted to the tradition of Āgama. The schools which have been chosen to discuss, are closer to the Kashmir Śaiva Tantra and Philosophy, particularly the Śākta philosophy. This philosophy disagrees with Kashmir Śaiva only on the metaphysical element, since the Śākta is related to the śakti, while śakti is the essential nature of Paramāśiva in Kashmir Śaiva Tantra and Philosophy. Contrariwise, other schools of Śaiva tradition are quite different in nature from Kashmir Śaiva, like Śaiva Siddhānta accepts duality at metaphysical level. Thus, in the next chapter, tantric schools will be defined with two purposes- to get the background for the philosophy of language of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy as well as to perceive the difference between them.