CHAPTER III

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Madhusūdana does not deal with prati-karma-vyavasthā for the first time; he only follows the old teachers of Advaita in this respect. The word karma here means jñāna-karma or jñaṇa-visaya or the object of knowledge. The prefix prati is regulative. The word 'vyavasthā' means order. Thus the compound literally means "the order that regulates a particular thing as the object of a particular knower". If the whole world is superimposed on one Intelligence and is revealed by it, how can the order that a specific object is grasped by a specific knower but not by all is to be explained? No theory regarding the world can be accepted as satisfactory unless it explains the world of experience. Throughout the dialectical arguments the Ācārya tries to prove that the specific world-view upheld by Advaita is free from all logical faults like self-contradiction, etc., and it can also explain the world of experience.

The discussion of epistemic order in Advaita does not primarily aim at establishing some methods of knowledge but seeks to prove that the world is false as it is superimposed on Intelligence. The secondary aim is to prove that even though

1. V.P.Ś., pp.244-245.
the world is superimposed on Brahman-Intelligence and it is revealed by the same, the epistemic order is not shattered. In connection with it, various methods of knowledge are discussed. But this is not the final point of Advaita. The final point of Advaita is the Brahman which cannot be proved through any method, as it transcends both speech and mind. It cannot be known through any method of knowledge, as it is the light of knowledge which makes all methods possible. So the whole epistemic order with its methods and categories is only valid in so far as the empirical reality which is due to avidyā, is concerned.

It is noteworthy that epistemic order like other orders (vyavasthās) as the order of jivas and Īśvara, the order of causes and effects, etc. is only a prakrīyā which intends to make others understand the central truth of Advaita viz. the non-duality of the Self. Like the doctrines of limitation (avaccheda) and reflection (pratibimba) which are adduced to explain the appearance of the non-dual Brahman as jivas and Īśvara, epistemic order has no ultimate validity. These are only valid in so far as they help others understand the truth of Advaita. In order to prove that the apparent contradiction between such prakrīyās is not untenable, Madhusūdana says that

2. See Śaṅkara's Introduction to S.Bh., pp.20-21.

tametaṁ avidyākhyam ātmānātmanoh, etc.
all the vyavasthās being valid from the empirical point of view and non-existent from the ultimate point of view, there is no difficulty at all. 3 The preceptors of Advaita have expounded this basic truth in different ways to suit people of different grades. It is said that for the best sort of adhikārīn the doctrine of ajāta-vāda according to which there is only the non-dual Brahman but non else, is preached; for the second grade of adhikārīn, ċṛiti-sṛsti is formulated and for the inferior, prati-karma-vyavasthā which presupposes the existence of many jivas is accepted. 4

It is noteworthy that in his discussion of ċṛiti-sṛsti Madhusūdana admits that epistemic order is meant for the less qualified persons (mandādhikārīn). 5 The doctrine of ċṛiti-sṛsti is the epistemological conclusion of eka-jīva-vāda; and prati-karma-vyavasthā is the outcome of aneka-jīva-vāda, as without the acceptance of many perceivers (pramātr) it becomes baseless.


evaṁ vyavahārataḥ sarvāvyavastho-papattau paramārthataḥ
kasyā api vyavasthāyā abhāvāt na kāpy-anupaptiṁ.


5. A.S., p.534.
CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge (jñāna) in Advaita primarily means the pure intelligence or caitanya which is the Brahman, the only Reality. It is free from all difference; so it cannot be put to any category or classification. It is not a substance nor a quality nor an activity. It is self-luminous for which it never requires any other principle or method for its establishment. It is known as svarūpa-jñāna or knowledge itself. Though it transcends the world, it is the ground of all our empirical activities. In way of expressing the essence of Advaita Sarvajñātman says that Intelligence which transcends all speech and mind is referred to by all transactions made through speech and mind. It is the substratum-Intelligence which illuminates all the world. This pure Intelligence which illuminates the objects through avidya is known as the witness (sāksin). It becomes the witness through the contact of that which is to be witnessed (sāksya-sambandhat). In all sorts of empirical knowledge both valid and erroneous this witness is the indispensable principle which reveals them all. Knowledge in the secondary sense, in contrast to the Brahman-knowledge or the knowledge itself, may signify either witness-knowledge.

6. S.S., 1.331.
or psychosis-knowledge (vṛtti-ज्ञान), both of which are grasped by the witness, the difference between them being the non-intervention of the vṛtti and its intervention respectively. From the empirical point of view witness-perception (sākṣi-pratyakṣa) can be either valid as it is in the case of the perception of the modes of the internal organ, or it can be invalid as it is in the case of the perception of the erroneous objects. The latter viz. erroneous knowledge is also marked with vṛtti (modification), but that is not the psychosis or the vṛtti of the internal organ, but only the modification of avidyā (avidyā-vṛtti). Psychosis or antahkarana-vṛtti is also known as pramāṇa-vṛtti which is generally meant by the word 'knowledge' in the empirical usage.

Psychosis-knowledge or vṛtti-ज्ञान can be divided into immediate knowledge or mediate knowledge. In the sense of the Brahman, being self-luminous, knowledge is always immediate. But 'immediate knowledge' (aparokṣa-ज्ञान) in empirical usage does not signify that, but it only means psychosis-knowledge not caused by any other knowledge. Among six kinds of psychosis-knowledge perceptual knowledge (pratyakṣa-ज्ञान) is only immediate. Other five kinds of mediate knowledge are grasped through inference, comparison, postulation, verbal testimony and non-cognition. This six-fold knowledge, in fact, is nothing other than the same pure Intelligence limited by psychosis (vṛtty-avacchinna).  


jñānāṁ hi vṛtty-avacchinnaṁ caitanyam, etc.
The Advaitins have accepted six ways of valid knowledge. We find their systematic exposition only in a much later work named *Vedānta Paribhāsā* of Dharmarājādvarindra. Like other eminent Advaitins of the past as Prakāśātman, Vidyāranya, Citsukha, etc., Madhusūdana has not discussed the six ways of knowing. It is noteworthy that in his commentary on the *Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad* Sāṅkara mentions the name of five pramāṇas. It seems from the maxim *vyavahāre bhaffanayah* (*V.P.S.*, p.54). "In the matters of empirical uses the doctrines of the Bhatta school of Mīmāṃsā are to be accepted" that the six ways of knowing are tentatively taken from the Bhattas. The attitude which the preceptors of Advaita had towards the problem as to how many means of valid knowledge are there, makes it clear that they are not seriously interested in such problems. However the author of *Vedānta Paribhāsā* says that difference in pramāṇas is not due to the resultant knowledge, but it is due to difference in the *vyrtti* or psychosis. Only for this, perception, non-cognition and knowledge through the identity-statements like "Thou art the tenth", "That thou art", etc. are taken as three in kind, though the resultant knowledge is the same direct cognition. The Naiyāyikas who accept only four means of valid knowledge...
knowledge adduce law of parsimony as the reason for accepting their position. But the Advaitins have given a better argument when they say that difference in the psychosis which is always instrumental in producing knowledge, determines difference among the pramanas. So from practical point of view we have to take for granted these six ways of valid knowledge. Madhusūdana has not systematically discussed them, as primarily he aims at proving the falsity of duality. He delineates the mechanism of knowledge only to show that it is helpful for proving the falsity of the world. The opponent argues that the world being superimposed according to Advaita, there can be no epistemic order as it is in the case of the erroneous objects. In the case of erroneous objects like shell-silver, etc., the very object being non-existent before its appearance, there is no necessity of sense-object contact, etc. for making epistemic order possible. If the empirical objects are false like apparent objects, sense-object contact which makes knowledge possible cannot be possible in the case of empirical objects, as they are non-existent before they are known. But this is not true, as unlike the apparent objects the empirical objects like pot, etc. are superimposed on the Intelligence before the psychosis. So there is difference between the apparent and the empirical, as unlike the former the latter can remain unknown; so in the case of empirical objects epistemic order is possible.

The opponent argues that pot, etc. are not superimposed on knowledge, as their contact with the senses is presupposed by knowledge. Thus they are existent before their knowledge. He says that "being superimposed" means "to be existent in so far as it appears". It cannot be said that "being sublated by knowledge" is meant by the term "being superimposed". Unless the thing is said to be existent only in so far as it appears it cannot be sublated by knowledge. But this is not tenable, say the Advaitins. Superimposition of the world is established by the śrutī and the inference of falsity supported by the impossibility of relation between drk and drśya. Recognition proves its stability which differentiates it from the apparent objects. So though the world is superimposed, it is not existent only so far as it is perceived. It is to be noted that the world is not superimposed on its knowledge which means the psychosis-knowledge, but it is superimposed on the Brahman-Intelligence. So it can remain unknown before the origination of its cognition, the psychosis-knowledge.

12. Compare with Berkeley’s esse est perceipī
MECHANISM OF KNOWLEDGE

Though it is obvious that we know, how actually we know is difficult to explain. Different schools of philosophy have explained it in different ways. The epistemological explanations of these schools are based on their specific world-views. Some may think that before having some world-view theory of knowledge is to be propounded for examining its soundness. But this is not possible, as every epistemological consideration is based on some metaphysical outlook presupposed consciously or unconsciously.\textsuperscript{14} Even the commonsense philosophers and the anti-metaphysicians opposed to metaphysics unconsciously presuppose some world-view suitable to their conclusion. Thus, Advaita epistemology is also based on its specific world-view, the only reality is the Brahman and the world is superimposed on it. But there is difference between Advaita and other philosophical systems. In other systems of philosophy a specific view of reality is either established through speculation or presupposed without much attention, whereas in Advaita it is ascertained through the direct realisation of the seers recorded in Sruti. This experience of reality being itself the Reality and self-valid, it does not depend on the epistemological tests for its validity. Thus, the inter-dependence between the view of reality and the theory of knowledge is transcended in Advaita.

\textsuperscript{14} Six Ways of Knowing, pp.31-33.
According to Advaita Vedānta, the Brahman—Intelligence which is the material cause of the universe manifests all the world; so it is omniscient. There is no regulation of means of knowledge, knowable and knower with reference to it. But not being the material cause of the universe, the jīva depends on such mechanism of knowledge. The order of knowledge, knowable and knower is there with reference to it. The jīva grasps the objects through the help of the internal organ (antahkarana). Most of the systems of Indian Philosophy agree on one point that the self grasps the objects through the internal organ, but they differ regarding how it happens actually. The internal organ is necessary to maintain the non-simultaneity of attaining different kinds of knowledge. Other schools prove the existence of the internal organ by inference, but the Advaitins point out that the internal organ is directly revealed by the witness (sāksi-bhāsya).

Every act of cognition presupposes three factors viz. the knower (pramātr), the knowable (prameya) and the means of knowledge (pramāna). According to Advaita Vedānta, the internal organ (antahkarana) which is constituted of the subtle portions of the tanmatras like the objects and acts as the instrument of

15. S.B., p.55, 102
16. S.Bh., 2.3.32.
17. V.P., 24.
the self in grasping the objects, goes out through the sense organs and takes the shape of the object after reaching it. This modification of the internal organ in the shape of the object is known as vṛtti or psychosis. This psychosis together with the reflection of Intelligence (cid-ābhāsa) pervades the object and destroys ajñāna concealing the Intelligence. The internal organ assuming the form of the object is compared to water that enters the field through conduits and takes the form of the field. After the destruction of concealment the object is illuminated by Intelligence. 18

The portion of internal organ limited by the body is known as ego or the agent. The portion which pervades the space from the body to the object is known as vṛtti-jñāna or activity; and the portion which covers the object and makes the thing an object of knowledge is known as capability of manifestation. As this vṛtti is very subtle and transparent, the Intelligence manifests there. The portion of Intelligence limited by the agent is known as knower (praṇātṛ), the portion of Intelligence limited by activity is known as the means of knowledge (praṇāṇa); and the Intelligence limited by capability is known as knowledge (pramāti).

S.B., pp.56-57, 103-104
Thus, the internal organ being the relation between the knower and the knowable through its three parts, such qualified cognition like "This is known by me" becomes possible.\textsuperscript{19}

According to Madhusūdana the substratum-Intelligence (adhisthāna-caitanya) or the object-Intelligence (visāya-caitanya) which is Brahman itself is the knowable (prameya) when it is unknown. When the concealment of avidyā that conceals the object-Intelligence is shifted, the object is illumined by the object-Intelligence. In this connection Madhusūdana refutes the theory that the knower-Intelligence (pramātr-caitanya) reveals the object through psychosis. He says that after the shifting of concealment the object-Intelligence (visāya-caitanya) manifests the object. So there is no need of other illumination. It being the fact that illumination (prakāśa) manifests its object directly, there is no necessity of imagining any indirect relation through psychosis for the manifestation of the object. So he says that the Intelligence reflected in psychosis which only takes away the concealment is not required for the manifestation of the object.\textsuperscript{20}

This Brahman-Intelligence pervading the object is the knowable (prameya) when it is unknown; and when known, it is known as phala or fruit or phala-Intelligence (phala-caitanya).\textsuperscript{21} Thus,

\textbf{19.} V.P.S., pp.244-245.
S.B., pp.56-58, 103-104
A.S., pp.489-490.

\textbf{20.} A.S., p.461.

\textbf{21.} S.B., p.58, 104.
according to this view the *Brahman-Intelligence* is the knowable as well as the fruit of all cognitions. This is the general *Advaita* view regarding the process of knowledge. According to it the Intelligence conditioned by the internal organ is said to be the *jīva*. Regarding the internal perception viz. the perception of the internal organ and its modes, Madhusūdana says that there is no necessity of psychosis for the destruction of concealment, as being transparent they themselves destroy concealment and are revealed immediately by the witness.22

According to Vidyāranya the author of *Pañcadaśī* the reflection of Intelligence (*cid-ābhāsa*) that pervades the object is the fruit-Intelligence or *phala-caitanya*. The *Brahman*-Intelligence cannot be the *phala* as it exists prior to knowing. When the fruit the reflection of Intelligence is generated in the object, it is revealed by it. So it is said that known-ness of the pot means the generation of the fruit namely the *cid-ābhāsa* in the pot.23 According to this explanation every object of cognition is illumined in two ways - by *Brahman*-Intelligence and by the reflection of Intelligence. The reflection of Intelligence produces known-ness in the object by which the knowledge "This is pot" is made possible. This known-ness is

23. *Pañcadaśī*, 8.10

Also The *Pañcadaśī: An Interpretative Exposition*, p.138.
again illumined by the Brahman-Intelligence by which such a judgement "I know the pot" is made possible. Cid-ābhāsa only manifests the pot, as it is evident in the former judgement. The Brahman-Intelligence manifests this cid-ābhāsa together with psychosis, as it is seen in the latter judgment. It may be noted that the term 'know' stands for psychosis together with cid-ābhāsa. This second type of cognition made possible by the Brahman-Intelligence is termed anu-vyavasāya or reflective cognition by the Naiyāyikas. In the case of internal perception namely, perception of the internal organ and the mental modes like happiness, etc., the two sorts of Intelligence viz. the reflection of Intelligence and the witness that is not different from the Brahman illumine them. The internal modes cannot remain unknown at all, as with the help of reflection of Intelligence they themselves destroy ajñāna and are revealed by the witness.24

Thus, there is difference between Madhusūdana and Vidyāranya regarding the phala-caitanya or fruit-Intelligence that illumines the object. Both of them refer to the Vārtika of Suresvara.25 The Vārtika referred to runs like this: "According to the authority of Vedantic statements the knowable (ātman) is the

Pañcadaśī, 8.10-23.
25. parāg-artha-prameyesu vā phalatvena sammatā/
sahvīt saivā-ha meyo'rhtho vedānto-kti-pramānatah/ saṁbandha Vārtika (159) quoted in Pañcadaśī, 8.11.
Intelligence which is regarded as the fruit (phala) in case of external objects". Madhusudana interprets the word saśvita (Intelligence) to signify the pure Brahman-Intelligence which is the substratum of all. He refers to the commentary of Śaṅkara on the Brahma-sūtra (2.2.28) where Śaṅkara writes that only one Intelligence illumines the whole world. On the other hand, Vidyāranya interprets saśvita as reflection of Intelligence to substantiate which he refers to the Upadeśaśāstra of Śaṅkara. However, there is no real difference, as the reflection of Intelligence is not different from the Brahman-Intelligence. Though the manner of exposition differs, all the preceptors of Advaita accept the fact that one all-pervading Intelligence illumines the whole universe.

The modes of internal organ like happiness, etc. as well as the erroneous objects are grasped by the witness. This witness is not the same as prameṣṭi or the cognizer. The witness is only the drṣṭi or the seer of that which is seen. But it is not concerned with its validity or invalidity. Though the internal organ or manas is accepted by Vācaspati as the sense for the internal perception, it is rejected by the followers of Vivaraṇa which Madhusudana follows. According to the latter school the manas is not a sense, as it is perceived

27. The commentator of A.S., Gauda Brahmananda accepts both the views Ladhucandrikā, pp.234-235.
like other objects, the internal perception being possible by the witness alone. The pramātṛ or cognizer is the Intelligence limited by the internal organ; but the witness is the Intelligence limited by avidyā. The cognizers (pramātṛs) are many as their limiting adjuncts viz. internal organs are many. But the witness (sāksīn) is one as its limiting adjunct avidyā is one. The witness only becomes the pramātṛ through the extraneous adjunct (adhikopadhi). Though the sāksīn that reveals all is one in all jīvas, one's happiness, etc. is not known by the other, as it reveals happiness, etc. only with reference to the particular jīva or pramātṛ. The view of Vedānta Paribhāṣā according to which there are many witnesses just as there are many jīvas, is baseless and misleading, as it is not supported by other great Acāryas like Sureśvara, Vidyāranya, Citsukha and Madhusūdana, etc. Referring to such opinion Madhusūdana says that such a view upheld by some is due to ignorance as even the writer of Vārtika has refuted it.

28. V.P., pp.10-11.
30. G.D., p.93.
The cognition made possible by the witness alone without the intervention of psychosis is called witness cognition. Though all the cognitions including all psychosis-knowledge are made possible by the sāksin, the non-intervention of psychosis is the differentiating characteristic of witness-cognition. Witness-knowledge is said to be common to both valid and invalid cognitions, as the witness is indifferent to truth and falsity. Vidyārāṇya says that the concealing avidyā only veils the Brahman but not the witness which is its revealer, otherwise avidyā itself cannot be established. Thus, the objects of witness-cognition cannot remain unknown, there being no concealment in the witness. But the Brahman-Intelligence being concealed, the external things imposed on it remain unknown before psychosis.

**MANIFESTATION OF THE OBJECT AS UNKNOWN**

Everything is said to be superimposed on Intelligence; so it is made manifest by the Intelligence. But before the generation of psychosis the object does not manifest as known, but only as unknown. It is said in the Vivarāṇa that everything becomes the object of witness-Intelligence either as known or as

33. A.S., p.344.
34. V.P.Ś., p.206.
unknown. Vidyāranya says that the pot is made manifest as unknown by the Brahman-Intelligence before the generation of psychosis. Madhusūdana says that the objects as pot, etc. are superimposed on the Illumination which is the illuminator of their unknown state. In some texts of Advaita it is said that the unknown thing is revealed as unknown by the Brahman, but in other places the witness is said to be its revealer. But there is no real difference, as in fact, the witness is not different from the Brahman. Unlike the jīvas it is not false and many as it is the basis of all difference and false things as well.

In order to show the nature of the witness

Madhusūdana says that, according to the view of Vivarāṇa Iśwara is the caitanya that is reflected (bimba) and the jīva is its reflection (pratibimba); the witness is the Intelligence that is common to both Iśvara and jīva. According to Sarvajñātman both Iśvara and jīva are reflections and the Intelligence that is reflected (bimba-caitanya) is the witness. According to Sureśvara there being only two kinds of Intelligence namely, Iśvara and jīva, Iśvara is the witness. Describing the four stages viz. waking, dreaming, etc., he says that the witness is the Fourth or

V.P.S., p.57.
36. Pañcadaśī, 8.5.
37. C.D., p.32
38. S.B., p.139.
turīya which is all-pervasive and one.\textsuperscript{39} In other places he describes the witness as the Intelligence conditioned by the upādhi avidyā, but avidyā being only the adjunct but not the limiter of the witness, it is free from all difference. Though the witness is conditioned by ajñāna, the latter is not included in the being of the witness, but it only falls under the category that is to be witnessed (sāksya-koti).\textsuperscript{40} Pratyaksvarūpa the commentator of Citsukhī, clearly states that avidyā is neither the qualification (viśesana) nor the indicator (upalaksana) of the witness, but only the adjunct (upādhi).\textsuperscript{41} Thus it is clear that the witness is not different from the Brahman; so both the views, the unknown is revealed by the Brahman-Intelligence and the witness-Intelligence are valid and do not clash with one another.

It is to be borne in mind that the concealment of avidyā is there only in the Intelligence, but not in the objects. So when it is said that the unknown thing is superimposed on the Brahman-Intelligence, it only means that the Brahman-Intelligence which is unknown or concealed by avidyā manifests pot, etc. which

\textsuperscript{39} S.B., pp.169-170.
\textsuperscript{40} A.S., p.261.
\textsuperscript{41} Mayanaprasādini on Citsukhī, p.588.

That which gets involved in the effect is qualification, otherwise, it is either an adjunct or an indicator. The adjunct persists so far as the effect lasts, but the indicator does not.
are superimposed on it. Thus, when the substratum-Intelligence is revealed the objects like pot, etc. are revealed and when that is concealed by avidyā, the objects are also said to be concealed or unknown. It is proved, Madhusūdana argues, that the objects like pot, etc. are superimposed on the unknown Illumination, as that unknown Illumination being known, manifests pot, etc. which are superimposed on it. Otherwise, being insentient objects cannot be either unknown or known. So it is clear from the above discussion that an object can neither be known nor unknown by itself, but its knownness or unknownness is due to the revelation and non-revelation of the Illumination the Brahman-Intelligence that forms the ground of the object. Thus, to account for the unknownness of the object, knowledge which is the substratum of the object is indispensable. So some knowledge other than the psychosis-knowledge which grasps only the known objects, is to be accepted.

From the above analysis it is clear that to say that the unknown object is made manifest as unknown by the Brahman-Intelligence is the same as to say that the unknown

42. G.D., p.83.

43. D.M. Datta tries to account for this in a psychological way. He says that manifestation of an object as unknown only means a faint imagination of the object, which precedes its actual manifestation as known. But this is hardly convincing, as this is more philosophical than a psychological problem. Six Ways of Knowing, pp.78-79.
object is superimposed on the Brahman-Intelligence which is concealed by avidyā. But on objection may be raised: How can Illumination which is itself concealed by avidyā, manifest the object even as unknown? The simple answer is that avidyā which is false cannot entirely blur the Illumination which is the only reality; otherwise avidyā itself cannot be established. Concealment of avidyā is there in the substratum-Intelligence only with reference to the jīvas, but it is meaningless from the stand-point of the Brahman. The thing both as known and unknown is revealed by the substratum-Illumination, as it is indifferent to all. Vidyāranya states that ājñāna, causing unknownness in the object, makes it manifest by the witness, as pramanā (psychosis), producing knownness in the object, makes it manifest by the witness.

The opponent may argue that there is no necessity of the Brahman-Intelligence for the manifestation of the unknown object, as the unknown object being the cause of its known state can be established by inference. But it is not tenable, as inference being a kind of psychosis-knowledge which is the destroyer of ājñāna, cannot manifest a thing as unknown. There cannot be any logical link between the absolutely unknown with the known, for which the former cannot be inferred by the latter. Inference is made with vyāpti which cannot be ascertained.

44. V.P.S., pp.57-58.
between an absolutely unknown state and the known state of a thing. The unknown ceases to be unknown if it is grasped at the time of ascertaining the vyāpti. Thus, Madhusudana has refuted the possibility of inference in the case of the unknown object. Some may think that there is no necessity of inference, as the object before being known can remain as absolutely unknown. Thus, it may be said that the Advaitins wrongly find a reference to the object as unknown, whereas there is no reference at all. But it is not tenable, as the hypothesis "the unknown being the basis of sense-contact is the cause of the known" would be without any foundation. Unless the object is grasped as unknown, it cannot be distinguished from the unreal. Thus there is the necessity of some kind of illumination for the manifestation of the unknown object. This is the Brahman-Intelligence which manifests all the objects as unknown.

It is to be noted that this conception of the manifestation of the unknown object is the outcome of a logical necessity. It is at once the repudiation of the inference of the

45. A.S., pp.468-469.
G.D., pp.82-83.

D.M. Datta, "Knowledge, Reality and the Unknown", Contemporary Indian Philosophy, pp.296-297.
unknown by the realists and the complete liquidation of the
unknown by the idealists and nihilists. The realists like the
Naiyayikas cannot see the logical difference between inference
and the manifestation of unknown object, for which they put
them in one category. On the other hand, the Vijñānavādins
illogically do away with the unknown existence of the object.
But the Advaitins with perfect logical necessity have accepted
the eternal Brahman-Intelligence as the revealer of all unknown
objects. But it is not the fact that the eternal Brahman-
Intelligence is only accepted owing to the logical necessity of
the manifestation of the unknown objects. On the other hand, the
Brahman-Intelligence which is self-valid and self-luminous solves
the problem of the manifestation of the unknown.

THE PROCESS OF KNOWING

It is said that the self knows the objects through
the help of the internal organ (antahkarana). The internal organ
assumes the shape of the object and it is known as vrtti or
psychosis. How this vrtti acts actually in helping the self to
know the object is explained by different Advaitins in different
ways. These explanations are based on their respective conception
of the self. Madhusūdana classifies these divergencies into three
major views which are based on three different theories of the
Self.47

47. A.S. pp.478-479.
S.B., pp.105-107.
According to one theory the individual Self or \textit{jīva-caitanya} being conditioned by the internal organ is limited. According to the second view it is unlimited being conditioned by \textit{avidyā}, but it is free from concealment of \textit{avidyā}. The third view holds that this is unlimited being conditioned by \textit{avidyā} but at the same time it is concealed. According to the first view the \textit{Brahman-Intelligence} is the illuminator of the object. But the other two views accept the \textit{jīva-caitanya} to be the illuminator of the object. It is to be noted that the \textit{jīva} is conceived either as limited or as unlimited only with reference to its condition. The internal organs are limited and many; but \textit{avidyā} is accepted here as unlimited and one.

According to the first view the \textit{jīva} being limited does not exist in the place of the object. So it cannot illuminate this. But the \textit{Brahman} only manifests the object, as it is the ground of the object; the object is known by the \textit{jīva} only through identity with \textit{Brahman}. Thus \textit{vṛtti} (psychosis) is necessary for revelation of this identity (\textit{abheda-bhivyakty-arthā}).\footnote{A.S., pp.478-479.} Though the \textit{Brahman-Intelligence} which manifests in identity with \textit{jīva} is the ground of all, all objects are not known at once by the

For discussion of the three views of the necessity of psychosis, see D.M. Datta’s \textit{Six Ways of Knowing}, pp.77-80.
jīva. The object with reference to which vrtti is assumed, only manifests. So the contingency of the knowledge of all objects at once does not arise. According to this view the jīvas are many.

The second view which says that the jīva-caitanya is unlimited and all-pervasive being conditioned by avidyā, makes it responsible for the manifestation of the object. According to this view jīva-caitanya being the ground of the object and at the same time being free from concealment, manifests the object. But Intelligence being free from all contacts (asaṅga) does not by itself illuminate the objects. The vrtti or psychosis assuming the shape of the object, effects this objective tinge of the Intelligence after which the object manifests. As the universal commonness (gotva) only manifests through the particulars coming under it but not by others though it is all-pervasive, and as the light of a lamp only manifests rūpa (colour and shape) though it pervades ākāśa, odour and taste, etc., so also Intelligence is tinged only with the psychosis but not with the objects. As fire alone cannot burn, but when associated with some base like the iron-ball, etc., it can burn, caitanya alone cannot manifest the objects but it manifests only through psychosis. 49 This is known as the

view that *vrttī* is necessary for tinging the Intelligence (cīd-uparāga).  

The third view maintains that *jīva-caitanya* which manifests the object, is covered by *avidyā*. Psychosis is necessary for the overpowering (*abhibhava*) of the concealment. When this concealing *avidyā* is overpowered (according to some Advaitins destroyed) the object with reference to which this overpowering takes place is illuminated by Intelligence. This is known as the view that *vrttī* is for the overpowering of concealment (*āvaranā-bhibhava-rtha*).  

It is to be borne in mind that in the other two views psychosis also overpowers the concealment; otherwise the object cannot manifest even though there is the tinging of Intelligence and the revelation of identity.  

This process of knowing is explained with regard to the immediate knowledge of the objects. In the case of mediate knowledge (*parokṣa-jñāna*) the internal organ does not shoot out from the body towards the object to assume its shape but gets modified within it. In the case of direct cognition

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50. D.M. Datta in his *Six Ways of Knowing*, pp.78-79 discusses the Vedantic doctrine of manifestation of the object as unknown in connection with this second view. But there is no reason for restricting it to this view only.

51. *ĀS.*, p.480.

52. *Laghucandrika*, p.479.
the three sorts of intelligence viz. pramātr-caitanya, prameya-caitanya and pramāṇa-caitanya come under a relation through psychosis, but in the case of indirect knowledge only two viz. pramātr-caitanya and pramāṇa-caitanya get unified together under a relation. Thus, in this latter case the prameya-caitanya or the phala-caitanya that manifests in the immediate cognition is not required. Madhusūdana states that there are two sorts of concealment (āvarana) of which the first gives rise to the false knowledge that the object does not manifest (abhāna-pādaka) and the second gives rise to the false knowledge that the object does not exist (asattva-pādaka). The concealment posing the non-manifestation of the object rests in the prameya, the substratum-intelligence (prameya-vacchinna); and the other that poses the non-existence of the object rests in the pramātr the knower. In the case of direct cognition both of these concealments are shifted, but in the case of indirect knowledge the concealment that poses the non-existence is only shifted. So such a judgement "I know that the object is there" becomes possible, but the manifestation of the object is not there. Thus, indirect knowledge also requires vrtti for the knowledge of the object, but it cannot manifest the object, as the phala-caitanya that makes the revelation possible is not involved there.

53. A.Ś., p.490.
54. A.Ś., p.490.
Paścadaśi, 7.44-45.
S.B., p.115.
A clear-cut division is drawn between vṛttī- 
vyāpyatva and phala-vyāpyatva by the Advaitins. Phala-vyāpyatva 
or pervasion of phala-caitanya is only possible in the case of 
mediate knowledge which is caused with the help of external 
senses. But in the case of the objects of mediate knowledge 
like dharma, etc. which are totally supra-sensible (nityā-tīndriya), 
apparent objects like shell-silver and pleasure pain, etc. which 
are only grasped by the witness (sākṣi-vedya) the pervasion by 
phala is not possible. However in these cases vṛttī-vyāpti or 
pervasion by the psychosis is admitted. Thus, vṛttī-vyāpti may 
mean either pramāṇa-vṛttī (psychosis assumed by the internal 
organ) or avidyā-vṛttī (modification of avidyā). 55 In the case of 
knowing the Brahman vṛttī-vyāpti is accepted for the destruction 
of ajñāna, but there is no necessity of phala-vyāpti for its 
illumination, as it is illumination itself. 56 So there is a 
marked difference between knowing other objects and knowing the 
Brahman. Though in the case of knowing the Brahman vṛttī-vyāpti 
is accepted as in other cases of indirect knowledge and erroneous 
knowledge, its revelation is neither indirect nor erroneous. 
The opponent may object to this. If it is possible 
in the case of immediate knowledge that psychosis reveals an 
object, why not the same psychosis reveals the object in mediate 

knowledge. But it is noteworthy that even in the case of mediate knowledge, psychosis is not the revealer of the object which only reveals with the help of the reflection of Intelligence. It may be said that the objects of mediate knowledge being imposed on the same Intelligence like the objects of immediate knowledge should be revealed directly. But this is not tenable; it is because, only there where the object-Intelligence (vāsya-caitanya) or the substratum-Intelligence is manifest the object is directly revealed. It does not manifest in mediate knowledge, as the required rāttī does not go to the object, but it is assumed only within the body. It cannot be said that the difference between immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge is made by specific jātis (universals) inhering in them, as there will arise the fault of saṅkara (combination that falsifies a jāti) in the case of recognition, there being directness and indirectness together. A jāti being vyāpya-vṛttī (pervasive), directness (aparokṣatva) and indirectness (parokṣatva) cannot be jātis as they reside in specific parts of recognition. Again, vṛttī being material, cannot manifest the objects, for which the necessity of

57. A.S., p.480.

58. This is one of the six faults which disqualify a generic property to be a jāti.

Intelligence cannot be repudiated. Thus the division of directness and indirectness in knowledge cannot be caused by *vṛtti*. Directness is caused by the object that has identity with the unveiled Intelligence (*anāvṛta-cit-tādātmya-viśiṣṭa-viśayakatvam*). 59

The opponent may argue that there is no necessity of going out of the internal organ for assuming the shape of the object, as internal organ can achieve it within the body as it happens in the case of mediate knowledge. To clarify his position Madhusūdana says that merely assuming the shape of the object (*tad-ākāratva-mātra*) is not the necessary requirement of immediate knowledge, as it is there also in the case of mediate knowledge. What is required is to take the shape after coming in actual contact with the object. The internal organ being just like light can reach the farthest star within the twinkle of an eye. It cannot be said that, there being contact, the atoms constituting the star should also be perceived, as the necessary requisites (*sāmagrī*) like *mahattva* (visible magnitude), etc. are absent in them which make their perception impossible. 60

To clarify his position the Advaitin tries to state clearly what is meant by "assuming the shape of that" (*tad-ākāratva*). 61 The dualist argues: "To have the shape

59. See *A.S.* and *Laghucandrika* on it, p. 480.

60. *A.S.*, p. 481.

61. Here 'that' in this definition stands for the object.
of that" cannot mean to have it as the object (tad-visayatva), as the Advaitin himself has refuted objectivity (visayatva) at the time of discussing the relation between drk and drsya. It cannot also mean "to take the very shape of the object", that is, when the object is a ghata (pot) the internal organ also takes a form whose middle portion is bulgy and wide with the neck-portion narrow just like a ghata (ghatavat prthu-budhno-darā-kāra). This is not sound as psychosis having jāti, qualities (guna), etc. as objects which have no form, will very well be formless. In the case of a knowledge where more than one object are present (samūhā-lambaṇā-ajñāna) there will be chaotic mixture of various forms. It cannot be said that "to take the shape of that" means to overpower the concealment of ajñāna that veils that object, as the latter being the product of the former cannot be the same.62

Madhusūdana says that "to have the shape of that" means the capability to dispel ajñāna which obstructs the use of the object like "This is", "This manifests", etc. It also means to be caused by some instrumentality which has contact with the object. It cannot be said that there is the fault ātmāsraya, as dispelling ajñāna being the result of assuming the shape, "capability of dispelling" is not the same as the actual dispelling of it. In this explanation the word 'instrumentality'

or karana signifies the senses required for direct cognition of the external objects; it also signifies vyāpti-ajñāna (knowledge of the concomittance), etc., which are necessary for indirect knowledge, as formation of psychosis is common to both immediate and mediate knowledge.

It is important to note that assuming the shape of the object on the part of vṛtti is not the same as it is understood grossly. Though the gross meaning can be maintained somehow in visual perception, it does not hold good in other cases. It only emphasises the fact that the involvement of the internal organ assuming psychosis is invariably required for the revelation of the object by Intelligence. The Ācārya states it clearly that assuming the shape of the object means only the capability to dispel ajñāna that obstructs the epistemic use of the object. This repudiates many misconceptions regarding this important view of vṛtti in Advaita epistemology. If we take it in the gross sense, in the cases of the objects which have no shape or form as sound, etc., we cannot explain how the internal organ takes the form of the object. So taking the form of the object only means to be tinged with the object in such a manner that it becomes capable of being perceived by the perceiver.

The internal organ is material by nature being constituted of the subtle tattvātras, but its going out and taking the form of the object cannot be ascertained physically, it being too subtle to be perceived. It is to be noted that
according to Advaita Vedānta both the so-called mental and physical worlds belong to the domain of not-self. This also holds good in the case of the senses. Being supra-sensible they cannot be directly perceived, but they are known so long as they help perceiving the object together with the antahkarana. Without the senses one antahkarana cannot account for different kinds of perception, for which apart from the internal organ the senses are to be accepted.

With regard to what is meant by the word 'sense' (indriya) there is controversy among various schools of Indian Philosophy. The Buddhists say that the external orifices are the senses, whereas the Mīmāṁsakas think that they are the capacities (śakti) of them. Others hold them to be different from these. The Advaita-view is that they are material subtle principles constituted of the tattvātmanas. Being the fundamental means of perception they cannot be perceived as external objects, nor can they be perceived by the witness like the internal organ, as without the knowledge of their respective objects the witness cannot grasp them. According to Advaita the visual and auditory senses grasp the object by going out to it, whereas other senses grasp the objects in their respective position. This is contrary to the Buddhist view that all senses grasp their objects in their respective place and the Nyāya view that auditory sense grasps sound without going to the object. 63 Going out of the

63. V.P.S., pp.613-623

D.M. Datta, Six Ways of Knowing, pp.39-46.
antahkarana with the senses in the case of visual and auditory perceptions is necessary to account for the perception of distance, otherwise there would be no perception of their distance, as it happens in the case of other sense-objects.

It is said that the pure Intelligence is the ground as well as the revealer of the world. But it remains veiled by avidya so far as the world exists (asamsarau). The opponents charge that if the pure intelligence remains concealed by avidya upto the dissolution of samsara, the whole world will be left blind-fold, there being no other revealer. But this is not correct, the Advaitins answer, as there is temporary suspension of concealment with respect to the object like pot, etc., when psychosis is assumed. Even though mulavidya (the root avidya) remains intact, for which concealment remains else where, it is overpowered with regard to the particular object that is revealed by Intelligence with the help of psychosis. If the view that "avidya is one" is accepted, it is to be maintained that by psychosis avidya is overpowered or temporarily suspended. On the other hand, if plurality of avidya is upheld, then the particular avidya is said to be destroyed.64

It may be asked, how does Intelligence (cit) conjoined with visual psychosis, only manifest rupa (colour and shape) but not others. It cannot be said that it only manifests rupa but not others like light which though pervading other

64. A.S., p.484.
sense-objects like sound, only manifests its object viz. \textit{rūpa}. Light being the auxiliary cause of the manifestation of \textit{rūpa}, only helps its manifestation. But Intelligence being the illuminator of all, cannot be said to reveal a specific object only. But Intelligence alone being free from all relations (\textit{asaṅga}) cannot manifest the object, but it only manifests the object when it is tinged with psychosis of that specific object. Thus it manifests \textit{rūpa} only, when it is conjoined with visual psychosis. This explanation is given by the \textit{Ācārya} from the point of view of \textit{cid-uparāga}.\footnote{65}

It cannot be said that superimpositional (\textit{adhyāsika}) relation is there before psychosis, so there is no necessity of tinging of Intelligence for the manifestation of the object. Though the objects are superimposed on the substratum-Intelligence, they are grasped by the \textit{jīva} (individual) like "I know this". The manifestation of identity between the \textit{jīva}-Intelligence and \textit{Brahman}-Intelligence is achieved by \textit{vrtti}. This is explained according to the doctrine of \textit{abheda-bhivyakti}.\footnote{66} It may be said that the view \textit{āvaranā-bhībhava} is impossible, as there can be no concealment in self-luminous Intelligence which always manifests as the witness of \textit{ajñāna}, etc. Therefore, no concealment caused by \textit{ajñāna} can be possible in the Intelligence. But this charge is baseless, the Advaitins reiterate, as Intelligence only

\footnotesize{\textit{65} A.S., p.485. \textit{66} Ibid.}
manifests as the witness of ajñāna, etc., but it does not manifest as "unbounded bliss" free from the impurities like hunger, etc. So in the self-luminous Intelligence there is also the concealment of ajñāna. It is to be noted that the Brahman being the substratum of the world, only manifests partially, whereas its true svarūpa is concealed by ajñāna, as it happens with other substratum.

If ajñāna is there in the individual, there will be no revelation, as ajñāna of Caitra being destroyed, ajñāna of Maitra will persist. If on the other hand, it is there in the object, ajñāna being destroyed by the psychosis of Caitra like darkness destroyed by lamp, there will be revelation of the object for Maitra also. But this allegation is not correct, the Advaitin says, as ajñāna is as many and different in number as there are individuals and objects. So the psychosis of Caitra as related to a specific object destroys ajñāna with reference to them only for which Maitra cannot see, whereas Caitra can. Thus, there is difference between darkness and ajñāna, as the former is common to all, while the latter is different from person to person. It is to be borne in mind that when ajñāna is said to be there in the object it only means that it rests on the Intelligence that is conditioned by the object (visayā-)

68. Ibid.
vacchinna-caitanya), as strictly speaking ajñana cannot rest on the insentient. This explanation is given according to the view of plurality of ajñana. If on the other hand, the view of oneness of ajñana is accepted, there is only the temporary suspension of ajñana by psychosis with reference to the particular individual and particular object, for which there is no possibility of the said difficulties. According to the latter view the substratum of that one ajñana is the pure Intelligence.

The opponent may raise another objection against the doctrine of vṛtti. How is it possible on the part of vṛtti which is an effect of avidyā, to overpower or destroy the latter? Following the author of Vivarana Madhusūdana says that it is possible as the doctrine of modification (parinama-vāda) is accepted in this context. Had arambha-vāda upheld by the Vaiśeaikas been accepted, it would be impossible to hold such a view. It is noteworthy that, according to parinama-vāda the material cause of some effect is dispersed or modified in order to bring forth the effect, whereas according to arambha-vāda, the components combine together to give rise to the effect, as the two halves of the pot (kapāla-dvaya) constitute the pot. The world is said to be the parinama (modification) of avidyā and the vivarta (appearance) of the brahma. In view of this there is no difficulty in maintaining that psychosis which is an
effect of avidyā disperses the latter.\textsuperscript{69} The antahkarana in which sattva predominates reflects Intelligence and together with the reflection of Intelligence it overpowers avidyā.

The Advaitins state that in all the cognitions the Brahman manifests, so that the objects which are superimposed on it also manifest. They also point out that the Brahman manifests after the last psychosis (carama-vṛtti) which destroys avidyā completely. If it is admitted that the Brahman manifests in all the cognitions, there is no necessity of upholding the last psychosis (carama-vṛtti) caused by the Vedantic statement of impartite meaning (akṣara-rtha-vedānta-janya) for its manifestation. But this is not tenable, as the Brahman manifests in all cognitions with condition, whereas its unconditional (upādhy-avisayaka) manifestation (sphūraṇa) is made possible by the last psychosis. Knowledge and ignorance so far as they have only the same object (samāna-visaya) become mutually sublater and sublated. So avidyā that envelopes the pure Intelligence can only be destroyed by the last psychosis which has pure Intelligence as its visaya, but it cannot be destroyed by any other psychosis. Thus, it is clear that conditiona manifestation of the Brahman in the ordinary cognitions cannot destroy avidyā altogether, for which there is no contingency of emancipation by such fragmentary cognitions.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{69} A.S., p.486.
V.P.S., p.254.

\textsuperscript{70} A.S., p.484.
It is interesting to note the attitude of the Advaitins towards reflective cognition. According to the Naiyāyikas the object like pot is known first, which is expressed by the judgement "This is pot". Then arises another knowledge which manifests even this knowledge of the pot and it is expressed thus "I know the pot". This reflective cognition is termed as anuvyavasāya or after-knowledge by the Naiyāyikas. But such a view is discarded by both the Advaitins and the prābhākaras, as it will lead to infinite regress. Though both of them regard knowledge as self-luminous (sva-prakāśa) and reject the previous view, we find a sharp difference between their ways of explaining reflective knowledge. The Prābhākaras uphold the view of simultaneous manifestation of knower, knowledge and known (triputi-pratyakṣa-vāda) according to which knowledge manifests itself as well as its locus the knower and its object instantly. So there is no hard and first division between the so-called reflective cognition and the cognition, there being reference to these three in all cognitions. But this view is not accepted by the Advaitins as they do not accept the hypothetical division between the Self and knowledge.

The Advaitins state that the very Self is knowledge which is self-luminous. It is said to be the witness (sāksin) when it is conditioned by avidyā, and knower (pramātr) when it is conditioned by the internal organ. When the substratum—Intelligence and the pramātr become one through vṛtti, the
object is revealed by the Brahman (the substratum-Intelligence) which the pramātra perceives in identity with it. There also the internal organ and its vṛtti are revealed by Intelligence. Thus the reflective cognition "I know the pot" becomes possible. Here in this judgement 'I' stands for the internal organ; 'know' stands for its vṛtti and the pot is the object. Madhusūdana says that though Caitanya is one, it is named as pramātra or perceiver in relation to the external object, as it depends upon the vṛtti to have this relation and it is known as witness in relation to the internal organ and its vṛtti, it being not dependent on any further vṛtti. Vidyārānya in a slightly different manner explains this. He says that the Brahman-Intelligence illumines the psychosis, the reflection of Intelligence (ābhāsa) and the object. In this way two sorts of Intelligence, the real Brahman-Intelligence and the reflection of Intelligence (cidābhāsa) illumine the object. The knowledge "This is pot" is made possible by the ābhāsa, the Brahman-Intelligence makes the knowledge "The pot is known" possible. Thus reflective knowledge is not different in kind. It is a part of the same process. Though there is difference in the process of exposition, the intention of both the preceptors is that the self-luminous Intelligence makes all knowledge possible, which renders an entirely different reflective cognition futile.

71. G.D., pp.94-95.
THE PROCESS OF MEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

In the case of mediate knowledge the relation between the knower and the object is not a direct one though it is directly superimposed on the Brahman-Intelligence. The object-Intelligence (visaya-caitanya) or the Intelligence that forms the substratum of the object viz. the Brahman-Intelligence is not involved here in knowing the object, as there is no direct psychosis (pratyaksa-vrtti) for revelation of identity between the Brahman-Intelligence and the jīva-Intelligence which is the knower. The Advaitins admit the formation of vrtti in the case of mediate knowledge, as otherwise suspension of ignorance even for mediate knowledge would be impossible. But here vrtti does not go out of the individual to establish an identity of it with the substratum-Intelligence. Thus such mediate psychosis cannot overpower ajñāna enveloping the substratum-Intelligence, though it only overpowers ajñāna pertaining to the knower. Avidyā concealing the object-Intelligence gives rise to non-manifestation; avidyā not being overpowered, the object does not manifest in mediate knowledge. But its existence cannot be doubted, as avidyā that characterises the perceiver is overpowered (or destroyed) by mediate psychosis. Thus in an inferential knowledge we only know that there is fire in the mountain, but we do not know how there is fire. 73

73. A.B., p. 490.
When three sorts of intelligence viz. the object-intelligence (visaya-caitanya), Intelligence conditioned by vṛtti (pramāṇa-caitanya) and Intelligence conditioned by antahkarana or the knower (pramātṛ-caitanya) come to a unity there is immediate knowledge. But when only two viz., pramāṇa-caitanya and pramātṛ-caitanya become one, there we get mediate knowledge.74

This is the clarification of the Vivarana school that the object in mediate knowledge cannot manifest directly as it is neither karaka (active cause) nor vyānjaka. This Vivarana view is also clearly explained in the Vivarana Prameya Sāṅgraha. Vidyāranya argues, an object of mediate knowledge cannot be either karaka or vyānjaka, as it can belong to past or future. We can get an inferential knowledge of a past event or object as "There was rain" etc. A karaka or vyānjaka should be directly involved in the accomplishment of the action which disqualifies a past thing to be so. But how can we justify such use "I know that there was rain" in which the past rain is the "karma karaka" of the present knowing? The Advaitins say that it being a karma is only secondary (upacārāt). If the object in mediate knowledge is neither karaka nor vyānjaka, how can knowledge take its form? The Advaitins' answer to this is that liṅga (an inferential sign) and śabda (words), etc. give the form of the object to knowledge through inseparable relation (avina-bhava).75 This becomes more intelligible if we understand

74. A.S., p.490.
75. V.P.S., pp.283-286.
it in the light of Madhusūdana's analysis of taking the form of the object. He has made it clear that ignorance posing non-existence (asattā-pādaka) of the object is only shifted through mediate knowledge.

We may here consider some of the objections raised by some modern critics against the Advaitic solution of the problem of mediate knowledge. It is said that the Vedantic epistemology, while offering a remarkably satisfactory analysis of direct knowledge, is not able to deal with indirect knowledge with any significant success. It fails to account for how indirect knowledge may be regarded as reaching its object and how the light of the self reaches the object of that knowledge. We have seen from our discussion of indirect knowledge that these allegations are baseless, as knowledge does not grasp the object directly in this case; through an inseparable relation with some known fact we only get an idea of its existence. The light of the self needs not reach the actual object of indirect knowledge, as its manifestation is not required there. It cannot be said that if the pure cit is all-pervasive and the vṛttiś are directly known, why not the objects of inference be known directly? We have already seen that vṛtti-jñāna is hostile to avidyā but not


77. Ibid., p.111.
the pure cit. It is also said before that the vrttis being imposed on the jīva-intelligence are always revealed by the witness. But in the case of the jīva, the objects being imposed on the Brahmāntelligence cannot manifest without pramāna-vrtti.

In the case of inference the inferential knowledge (anumiti) a kind of psychosis is related to its object (anumeya) through knowledge of its vyāpya. The knowledge produced by śabda (verbal testimony) is related to its object through the words which signify the object. Memory is related to its object through the direct knowledge of the object. It is interesting to note that following the Prabhākāras sometimes it is included in pramanas. However Madhusūdana does not take memory (smṛti) as a pramāna; here he only discusses its indirectness. In this way in cases of other indirect knowledge the relation between knowledge and its object is only indirect. Thus it is clear that mediacy and immediacy of knowledge are respectively due to indirect and direct psychosis though all the objects are superimposed on caitanya alike.

78. See the definition of pramāṇa in V.P., p.3.
79. Madhusūdana defines pramāṇa as a means of knowing something which is not known previously, and it excludes memory, A.R.R., p.32.
SOME OTHER VIEWS OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

We have discussed in detail the Advaita view of the process of knowing and have come to the conclusion that according to it immediate revelation of the objects in direct knowledge is due to their superimposition on the self-luminous Intelligence. The Intelligence revealing itself illuminates the objects which are superimposed on it and the function of antahkarana restricts this immediate presentation of the object so that the epistemic order is not affected. It is clear from the above discussion that the Advaitin's view of direct knowledge is completely preservative, it is neither representative nor partly preservative and partly representative. It tentatively admits a realistic epistemology by accepting the separate existence of the objects apart from the subject, but it abandons this realistic epistemology by denying their ultimate reality, as they are thought to be superimposed on the Brahman-Intelligence. Though its epistemological explanation seems to be very much alien to the unaccustomed mind, it explains the problem of knowing thoroughly and consistently. Now let us consider the difficulties experienced by the non-Advaitic schools which try to explain the process of immediate cognition.

80. Swami Satprakashananda, Methods of Knowledge; According to Advaita Vedanta, p.94.
The Sautrāntikas, a school of Buddhists are conspicuous by altogether denying the perceptibility of the external objects as they hold the theory that the external objects can only be inferred (bāhyā-rtha-numeya). According to them in the so-called cognitions we get the reflections (pratibimba) of the objects which are inferred by their reflections. The difficulty of this theory is that it cannot account for the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the so-called reflections in the cognitions (saṃvedana) and the real objects. It may be asked whether the object the time of establishing the vyāpti is grasped directly without its reflection. If it is accepted, the Sautrāntika theory of the inferability of objects stands cancelled. If on the other hand, it is said to be grasped indirectly through its reflection, then the same difficulty, namely, the necessity of establishing vyāpti between the object and its reflection hinders any such inference. The basic difficulty is that the Sautrāntikas forget the wide difference between perception and inference. A total representationism cannot do justice to the direct presentation of object without mutilating its immediate character.\(^{81}\)

The Viśṇavādins on the other hand think that immediacy of perceptual objects is due to their being one with the viṣṇāna(subject). If we posit the existence of an external

\(^{81}\) V.P.S., p.188.
object, say the Vijnānavādins, we cannot explain how an external object be grasped by the subject. Such a difficulty does not arise if Vijnānavāda theory that the objects are the transformation of vijñāna be accepted. But this theory is not tenable as externality (bahistva) which is not accepted as the transformation of vijñāna even by the upholders of this theory, is also perceptible. If externality (bahistva) were the transformation of vijñāna, it would not be sublated like shell-silver. It is to be borne in mind that the Buddhist idealists do not accept the sublatability of the erroneous object. That which is sublated at the time of sublation (badha) is the externality of the so-called erroneous objects. Shell-silver being the transformation of vijñāna, cannot be sublated, but externality which is wrongly attributed to it is sublated. So externality is not accepted as a transformation of vijñāna. But this externality being perceptible, the theory of the vijnānavādins that perceptibility is due to its being the transformation of vijñāna cannot be accepted. 32

Now let us consider the view of the Naiyāyikas. According to their theory the Self is omnipresent, though they uphold the plurality of Self. But it cannot directly reveal its object. That which reveals the objects is its quality (guna) that is knowledge which is produced in the Self through the contact

32. V.P.S., p.189.
of mind and destroyed in the next moment. Thus knowledge is only an extraneous quality (agantuka-guna) of the Self; it arises and vanishes with the Self-mind contact. To regulate the production of knowledge the Naiyāyikas formulate a series of contacts (sānyoga-parāmpara). They say that mind comes in contact with the Self; the senses come in contact with the mind; the objects come in contact with the senses; thus there is the production of knowledge regarding the objects in the Self. The difficulties with this theory are conspicuous. Had the series of contacts been the regulating factor (niyāmaka) of the production of knowledge, all the things of the world being conjoined together would be revealed at once by one knowledge. It is not also conceivable how knowledge which is there in the Self, being a quality of it, reveals the external things of the world. We have seen how Madhusudana has advocated the direct relation of knowledge with the object for the immediate revelation of the latter. As light illuminates the objects directly without the intervention of anything else knowledge should directly reveal its object for making direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) possible. It is to be noted that according to the Advaita-view the objects are directly superimposed on knowledge (substratum-Intelligence); so there is direct relation between

83. V.P.S., p.242.
84. Ibid., pp.240-241.
them. Though the vṛtti is necessary for the overpowering of avidyā, it does not interfere with their direct relation. 85

Next we consider the view of the Bhātta school of Mīmāṃsā. According to this school knowing is an act of the Self, which produces in the object some extraneous uniqueness (atiśaya) known as manifestness (prākatya) or knownness (jñātata). The activity of knowledge (vyāpāra) is there in the Self, whereas its result (phala) namely jñātata rests on the object. According to the Bhātta jñātata is directly perceived which reveals the object. But the activity of knowing is only known through inference. Thus knowledge is a process as well as its result. The former is the pramāṇa and the latter is pramāti. But this theory is not tenable. How can there be any activity in the Self which is all-pervasive and eternal? Even though we admit activity like modification (parināma) in the Self, how can it produce knownness in the object which is very much different from the Self. Granted that jñātata is there in the object; it cannot help in any way to infer activity of the Self. Whether knowledge is a quality of the Self as conceived by the Naiyāyikas or an act of it as conceived by Bhātta, leaving its locus (ārāya) it cannot contact the object. To infer the so-called activity of knowledge (pramāṇa) in the self from the manifestness in the object is no more logical than to infer fire in the hill

85. A.S., p. 461.
from smoke in the village, Vidyaranya refutes the Bhāṭṭa theory in a different way. He says that the inference can at best be formulated like this: The self is the substratum of the activity 'knowledge', as it is related to its result like Devadatta related to contentment that results from eating that is in him. But here the hetu adduced to prove the inference that the Self is related to the result is unfounded (asiddha). It is noteworthy that the result of the activity 'knowing' is said to reside not in the Self, but in the object. But the activity 'eating' and the result 'contentment' are there in the agent. So this reasoning is fallacious. It is clear that the so-called jñātata is a fictitious one; it can be nothing other than the revelation of the object after the shifting of avidyā which veils its manifestation.

Against the Bhāṭṭas the Prabhākaras hold that knowledge is self-luminous (svaprakāśa) which being a quality of the Self resides in it. It arises and vanishes in the Self. When knowledge is produced in the Self, it manifests itself as well as both the Self and the object. In the cognitive judgement "I know the pot", 'I' stands for the Self which is the substratum (ārāya) and 'pot' stands for the object (visāya). The word 'know' signifies knowledge which manifests itself as well as the locus and the object. Contrary to the Bhāṭṭas the Prabhākaras

36. V.P.S., pp.192-193.
maintain that knowledge (pramiti) is the fruit of the activity of knowing but not manifestness (jñātata). Unlike manifestness (jñātata) this knowledge (pramiti) is produced in the Self but not in the object. The activity of knowing as conceived by these two schools of Mīmāṃsā is also different. For the Bhāttras this activity of knowing is a unique process which takes place in the Self by its modification (parināma), whereas for the Prabhākaras it is nothing more than the contact of the Self, mind, sense and the object; and this contact is extraneous to the Self. This theory of the simultaneous revelation of the Self, knowledge and object is known as triputi-pratyaksa-vāda.\(^{87}\)

But this theory of the Prabhākaras is not tenable as there is no proof to establish difference between knowledge and the Self. Citsukha says that the Prabhākara theory according to which the Self is revealed as the locus of knowledge is arbitrary, as it contradicts the established fact that whatever is different from knowledge is revealed only as its object but not as the locus.\(^{88}\) That which depends upon something other than itself for its establishment can be doubted, but nobody doubts his own existence, which makes it clear that the self is self-luminous and knowledge itself.

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\(^{87}\) V.P.S., pp.193-194.

\(^{88}\) Citsukhati, p.49.

V.P.S., p.198.
The general Western view of perception is that mind does not go out to its object for its perception, but only receives the stimuli coming from the object. According to the supporters of passivism and atomism, the mind passively receives sensations which through the law of association form an image of the object in the mind. The activists on the other hand grant some sort of activity to the mind so far as it combines the sensations to translate them into proper perception which they think cannot be achieved by the sensations themselves. However all of them agree on this point that the stimuli come from the object. For instance, when we get the visual perception of an object, the light wave coming from the object is reflected on the retina, which stimulates the nervous activity; consequently the sensation reaches the brain-centre and the visual perception of the thing is achieved. Some of the Western psychologists take pains to show how from the distribution of light and shade of the picture in the retina we make an idea of the three dimensional things of the world. How much effort they may make, the problem remains unsolved. Such a theory cannot account as to how a total different psychological result comes from a purely physiological process. The fact is that the thing is not perceived as an image in the mind but something which exists outside in the outer space. 89 To quote D.M. Datta: "What we should like to emphasize,

89. Six Ways of Knowing, pp.65-66.
Methods of Knowledge: According to Advaita Vedānta, pp.56-60.
as regards such an account, is that without previous knowledge of the external the mere distribution of light or shade or other local signs would remain mere qualities of pictures painted on a level screen. No Herculean effort of inference could make us project our internal percepts into external space and see them in their real order, magnitude and dimension. The Vedantic view that mind goes out to meet its object in perception is, therefore, not at all unreasonable, supported as it is by common sense as well as philosophical speculation. The knowledge of the external world is explained by this theory far more simply and easily than by any alternative theory mentioned above.

The basic difficulty with the Western view is that it cannot do justice to the direct apprehension of the external objects. The image of an object and the direct revelation of the object as existing outside cannot be the same. A total representationism which is the outcome of such a theory cannot defend itself nor can it explain the actual world of experience. The difficulties which we have met with the Sautrāntika theory of inferability of all external things will also arise in this view. If we get only the image of the external objects but not the objects themselves, we cannot say that what we get through perception is the exact but not the distorted representation of the objects. Thus it will give rise to a form of ultimate skepticism regarding the empirical world. It is to be noted that the Advaita-view regarding the reality of the external
world can be regarded neither as skeptical nor as agnostic. With the sceptics and agnostics the Advaitins maintain that our perceptual knowledge cannot give the reality, but against them they hold that perception reveals the external world as it is. The fact is that according to Advaita the external world is the same as it is presented in perceptual knowledge, but it is only an appearance in so far as its substratum the Brahman is concerned. According to the former views the external things which may be real are represented distortedly, but according to Advaita the external world is an appearance only in comparison with the Brahman which is the reality and the substratum of the world of appearance. The skeptics and the agnostics assume their position in a speculative manner, whereas the Advaita-position is based on the basis of a higher experience, the intuitive knowledge of the Brahman and śruti. Reality according to Advaita belongs to a higher ontological status, but it is not unknowable as it can be known through a higher kind of experience, whereas the agnostics think it to be some unknowable hidden aspect of the external objects. The acceptance of the position of agnosticism and skepticism renders all our empirical transactions nonsense. But the Advaitic position validates our empirical activities from the empirical point of view. The famous verse in Sarīraka Bhasya, which is quoted by Śaṅkara from some ancient authority, clearly states that validity
of the empirical pramanas is upheld till self-realisation like that of the cognition of body as the self. 90

From the above discussion it is clear that the Advaita theory of direct and indirect knowledge consistently explains epistemic transactions, though it may appear absurd to an unaccustomed mind. We have seen how the non-Advaitic views are beset with difficulties as they cannot consistently explain themselves nor the world which they seek to explain. Thus, while explaining the Vedantic theory of knowledge Vidyaranya says that epistemic order (prati-karma-vyavastha) is not possible in other theories of the non-Advaitins, but somehow it is possible in the manner Advaita explains it. 91 It is significant to note the word 'somehow' (kathancit) which makes it clear that explaining the epistemic order even in the manner of Advaita is only a prakriya which is not ultimately real. Madhusudana Sarasvati reconciles apparently contradictory advaita-views when he makes it clear that all the orders (vyavasthas) being valid from the empirical point of view and absent from the ultimate standpoint, there is no contradiction within them. 92

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90. S.Bh. 1.1.4, p.99.

deha-tma-pratyavo yadvat pramanatvena kalpitah/

laukikam tadvad-eva-daṁ pramanan tvā-tma-niścayat//

91. V.P.S., p.242.