CHAPTER II

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After clarifying the meaning of falsity the Ácārya proceeds to discuss the reasons of falsity. The reasons adduced for the falsity of the world are drṣyatva (capability of being seen) jadatva (inertness) and paricchinnatva (limitedness). Brahman which is only real, cannot be made an object of knowledge, it being knowledge itself. So in contrast to drṣya, it is said to be the drk. It is consciousness which is free from all the limitations.

All the objects of the world unlike the Brahman are drṣya, inert and limited. So they are false. Madhusūdana has discussed various definitions of these reasons (hetu) adduced to prove the falsity of the world in order to refute the charges of the opponents.

COGNISABILITY (drṣyatva)

This term means "capability of being seen or cognised". This characteristic is present in all the things excepting the Brahman and the unreal which cannot be made an object of knowledge. The Brahman being drk cannot be a drṣya and the tuccha being non-existent cannot be cognised. The false objects, both the empirical and the apparent like shell-silver are capable of being seen. Now the opponent asks what is meant by drṣyatva. It may mean pervasion by vṛtti (vṛtti-
vyāpyatva) or it may mean pervasion by the phala (phala-vyāpyatva). But both of these alternatives are unsound. If the first meaning is accepted, the definition will be too wide as to include even the brahman, as it is pervaded by vṛtti. On the other hand, if the second alternative is accepted, then the objects of indirect knowledge like dharma, etc. the apparent objects like shell-silver, etc. and the mental modes like pleasure, pain, etc. cannot be false, as they are not pervaded by phala consciousness. It cannot be defined as somehow being the object of Intelligence, as the Brahman being known after the destruction of ignorance, the definition becomes too wide. Nor can we define drṣyatva as non-self-luminosity (a-sva-prakāśatva). The meaning of self-luminous is to be capable of direct use, being not capable of being known; so drṣya means its absence. The apparent shell-silver is capable of direct use, though it is not capable of being cognised (avedya). It is to be noted that in this definition to be known or cognised is to be understood in the sense of phala-vyāpti. The shell-silver cannot be phala-vyāpya as the empirical objects of valid cognition are only pervaded by the phala consciousness. Thus this interpretation of drṣyatva is beset with difficulties.

The allegations of the opponent are due to wrong interpretation of the definitions of drṣyatva. Excepting phala-vyāpyatva all other definitions of drṣyatva are tenable.

1. The meaning of vṛttivyāpti and phalavyāpti is discussed in Chapter III.

2. A.S., pp.233-239.
Drśyatva, in the sense of phala-vyāpyatva is not accepted by the Advaitin, as non-perceptual objects and erroneous objects, being illuminated by the witness alone, are not illuminated by the phala caitanya. So they cannot be false. But if drśyatva means pervasion by vṛtti, there is no possibility of extending it to the Brahman. The conditioned Brahman is only pervaded by vṛtti, but not the pure Brahman. The conditioned Brahman is false alike the objects, but the unconditioned is not so. It cannot be questioned how then the unconditioned Brahman be proved, if it is not known through vṛtti. But such question does not arise as it is self-luminous. This explanation is given, according to the view of Bhamati school.

But, according to the view of Vivaraṇa, the pure Brahman is also pervaded by vṛtti or psychosis. Still there is no difficulty, as the meaning of drśyatva in this case is vṛtti-vyāpyatva which is not caused by śabda pramāṇa. The vṛtti that pervades the Brahman being caused by śabda, there is no difficulty. If it were not so, then the unreal like hare's horn (śaṣa-srīga), being the object of psychosis caused by words (śabda) that "The hare's horn is unreal" would be false. It is to be noted that the unreal is not false. Only that which is capable of being seen like the shell-silver is false. Thus the psychosis of the Brahman being caused by words (śabda-janya), Brahman cannot be false. This explanation is given according to the Vivaraṇa view.

4. Ibid., pp.264-269.
Madhusudana defines drṣyatva in a different manner. It can be defined as "being the object of vṛtti having some prakāra (saprakāra-vṛtti)". Prakāra means some characteristic which can be the object of knowledge and use. The psychosis which pervades the Brahman is free from all such prakāra. Thus the Brahman is the object of indeterminate vṛtti (nisprakāra-vṛtti); so it cannot be drṣya. Absence which is different from tuccha or unreal being the object of qualified or determinate vṛtti is also included in drṣya.

It can also be defined as "being the object of Intelligence (cīd-visayatvam)". It means to have relation with the cit by anyway. Intelligence (caitanya) being free from difference, cannot have relation which presupposes difference. Other objects excepting tuccha being imposed on the cit have relation with it. Cognisability which is taken as the reason for the falsity of the world is defined as "waiting for saṁvit (Intelligence)" for its manifestation. The term saṁvit means the consciousness (Intelligence), either manifest in the object or manifest in the vṛtti (psychosis). It may also mean only caitanya itself. So there is no difficulty in the cases of empirical things like pot, etc. supra-sensical objects like dharma and adharma, etc. and other objects which are illumined by the witness (śaksin) alone, as all of them are illumined by the Intelligence (caitanya). It is to be borne in mind that

according to Advaita Vedanta, the empirical things which are perceptible directly like pot, etc. are illumined by the *visaya-caitanya* that forms the basis of all. Non-perceptual objects like dharma, etc. are illumined by the *cit* that is manifest in the psychosis. The former knowledge gives rise to the use "The object is", "The object manifests", etc. But the latter gives rise to only the use "The object is". The erroneous objects like the shell-silver, etc. are only manifested by the witness-consciousness.

The opponent tries to find faults in the definition of *drṣṭvatva* as non-self-luminosity (*a-svaprakāśatvam*) given by Citsukha. Citsukha defines self-luminosity as capability of direct use, being not capable of being cognised. Here by the term "being not capable of being cognised" (*avedyatve sati*) means the absence of *phala-vyāpti*. The Ātman being itself not cognised which means not pervaded by the *phala* consciousness is capable of direct use. So it is self-luminous. But this definition of self-luminosity, the opponent says, is too wide as it can be applied to avidyā, internal organ and erroneous objects like the shell-silver, as they are capable of direct use though they are not pervaded by the *phala* consciousness. This is not true. The meaning of the term capable of direct use (*aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogya*) is "capable of being the object of the *vr̥tti* that sublates ignorance". *Avidyā*, internal organ and erroneous objects, etc. never become the object of the *vr̥tti* that sublates *avidyā*. So they do not come under the definition of self-luminosity. Thus, the empirical
world with avidya and the apparent objects like shell-silver, etc. are signified by the word drṣya as they are non-self-luminous. To avoid inclusion of the negation of avidya in the sense that it belongs to the fifth category (pañcama-prakārāvidyā-nivṛtti) and the tucca, the condition "existent at the time of avidya" (ajñāna-kāla-vṛttitvam) is to be added. Negation of avidya as belonging to the fifth category is not taken as drṣya, as drṣya being indescribable which means avidya, it will imply that negation of avidya is itself avidya, which is to be negated. Both the negation of avidya and unreal being not existent at that time, the definition does not become too wide.  

It is to be borne in mind that the doctrine according to which negation of avidya belongs to the fifth category, is not accepted by our Ācārya as the ultimate view. Here he accepts it only to show that all the views given by the old teachers of Advaita, are sound and they can be accepted only as prakriyas.

INERTNESS (jādatva)

Inertness is also the reason for the falsity of the world. So the inference runs like this: "The world is false as it is inert (jāda) like the shell-silver". The opponents do not accept this. They say that inertness may have three possible

meanings in this context viz. being different from the knower, not being knowledge and not being the self (anatmatva). The first alternative is not tenable as the ego (aham) which is included within the paksa (the world which is to be proved false) being the knower cannot be false then. The pure atman not being the knower will also be false. The second alternative is not tenable.

Knowledge means caitanya tinged with vrtti (vrtty-uparakta-caitanya).

So neither vrtti itself nor caitanya itself can be termed as knowledge. If we interpret 'inertness' as not being knowledge, then the reason of falsity can also be applied to caitanya. The third alternative cannot be accepted as atmatva (self-hood) cannot be determined. It cannot be jati (class-property), as it is said to be one. Though the individual selves are said to be different, atmatva cannot be a class-property as these individual selves being false cannot explain the real self-hood. Nor is it tenable to say that atmatva means the form of happiness as it will be too wide as to include even the worldly pleasures (vaisayika-nanda).

The Acarya refutes the charges of the opponents and says that excepting the first alternative the other two are tenable. It is quite logical to say that inertness means "not to be knowledge". But this cannot be applied to the self, as knowledge which is the form of the self is defined as "illumination indicated by objects". So there is no loss of this even at the

time of emancipation. Here it is to be borne in mind that in *Advaita* Vedānta the word 'knowledge' primarily means 'Intelligence' which is known as *svārūpa-jñāna*. Secondarily it means *vṛtti-jñāna* (either the *vṛtti* of antahkarana or of avidyā) or *caitanya* reflected in the *vṛtti*. It is to be noted that the opponents base their objections on the secondary meaning of the word 'knowledge'. The Ṛcārya clarifies the meaning of the word in the primary sense and defends the position of *Advaita*. The objects being indicator only are violable. So the illumination is not lost even at the time of emancipation when all the objective contacts caused by avidyā are gone.

It cannot be said that as absence is always endowed with the counterpositive, so also knowledge, desire, etc. are always with their objects. Thus, in the case of desire "contact with the objects" is a necessity as desire without some object is impossible to conceive. This is also true in the case of knowledge. But this is not correct, as the relation of knowledge with the objects is not real but only superimpositional (*adhyāsika*). The impossibility of any real relation between them is discussed by Madhusūdana in great detail. As shell-silver is not real in the shell, so also objective contact of the knowledge is only superimpositional.10


10. Ibid., pp.300-301.
The purvapaksins try to refute the Advaita view in a different manner. They say that knowledge without some knower is impossible as the act of eating is not possible without the eater. It cannot be said that knowledge being beginningless and not being an activity is not relative. As the beginningless prior absence is relative to the counterpositive, as beginningless jāti is relative to vyakti (particular); the beginningless existence of the Brahman is relative to agent (kartr), it being implied by the use "The Brahman is" (Brahma asti - here the conjugational suffix tip stands for the agent). It is also said in the Vivarana that the illumination of the knower is knowledge. So knowledge without the knower is impossible.¹¹

The Advaitin refutes the charges of the opponents. He says that as the jāti (universal) which is determined by vyakti (particular), sometimes presents itself without its relation with the other, so also knowledge can be possible without the knower and the knowable (object). Here the Advaitin argues in the manner of the upholders of anyathā-khyāti, according to which independent of particular, pure universal like silverness (rajatatva), etc. is presented at the time of error. Otherwise, the imposition of the universal would have been impossible.¹² Now it is to be asked - what is meant by the

¹². Ibid., p.304.
adjective "endowed with the knowable". It may mean "caused by the knowable" or it may mean "to be vyāpya of the knowable". The first is not tenable, as it is absent in mediate knowledge (parokṣa-jñāna) and the knowledge of the God, because they are not caused by the knowable (object). The second is not tenable, as in the said instances (indirect knowledge etc.) the invariable concomitance in time (kalika-vyāpti) between the object and its knowledge is violated. In the above instances, at the time of knowledge their objects may not exist. Thus, from the temporal point of view concomitance between knowledge and its object is violated. The spatial concomitance (daśika-vyāpti) is quite impossible, as knowledge exists in the knower (argued according to the view of the opponents) whereas the object exists outside. It cannot be said that where there is direct knowledge, there is the object, as such a concomitance is violated in the cases of the knowledge of yogis and the knowledge of Isvara.13

Then the opponents argue that without assuming such a concomitance "where there is direct knowledge, there is the object" it is impossible to establish anirvacaniya khyāti as accepted by the Advaitins. They say that at the time of erroneous perception "This is silver" the Advaitins prove the anirvacaniya silver through arthāpatti. Necessarily it presupposes such a concomitance "where there is direct knowledge, there is the object". Empirical silver being impossible there,

the creation of indescribable silver instantly is supported by the Advaitins. Thus, the anirvacaniya object (artha) is a deduction from this vyāpti. But this is not true. At the time of immediate presentation of the erroneous objects "I am knowing that this is silver", etc. the anirvacaniya silver is proved, as otherwise its being the object of a particular knowledge (jñāna-visayata) cannot be explained. But this does not validate the vyāpti that where there is direct knowledge, there is the object. In the case of indirect error (paroksa-bhrana) where such a vyāpti is not accepted, there even the anirvacaniya artha (object) is accepted. Thus, the acceptance of indescribable object is not the proof for the validity of such a concomitance.14

While explaining this line of Advaita siddhi Laghucandrikā says that the object is proved in the same way as it is grasped by knowledge, knowledge being capable of perceiving its own object. So the apparent object viz. shell-silver, etc. are only established apparently but not empirically, as they are afterwards sublated. Likewise, empirical objects like pot, etc. being contradicted by Advaita śruti cannot be anything else but error.15 So this concomitance cannot prove that the objects are of the same ontological status as knowledge.

15. Laghucandrikā, p.309.

*tathā ca vadrśaṁ rajataṁ bhramena, etc.*
Going to refute the charges of the opponents that knowledge is impossible without the knower, the Ācārya asks - what is meant by saying "to be with the knower". It may mean "caused by the knower"; but this is violated in the knowledge of Īśvara whose knowledge is eternal. It may mean vyāpya (pervaded) of the knower. But this is not correct, as illumination indicated by the object or indicated by knowledgeness (jñānatv-opalaksita) cannot be proved to be the vyāpya of the knower. It is to be noted that the illumination indicated is the pure knowledge or cit. Though our ordinary knowledge depends upon the knower, knowledge in the sense of caitanya does not depend upon it. So, Madhusūdana says that there is no supporting hypothetical argument (anukula tarka) to prove that knowledge is the vyāpya of the knower. So this alternative is unnecessary (a-prayojaka). Likewise, "to be with the knower" does not mean to be inherent in the knower, as knowledge is accepted neither as a quality nor as an act.¹⁶

The statement of Vivarana "The illumination of the knower is knowledge" and our experience "In me there is the knowledge regarding the pot", etc. are to be explained from the occasional (kādācītka) relation of the knowledge and the knower. In the use 'Brahma asti' (The Brahman is) the suffix 'ti' does not mean that the Brahman is the agent of the activity of its existence, but used only for grammatical correctness of the sentence.¹⁷

¹⁷. Ibid.
It cannot be said that knowledge as the form of the ātman (atma-svarūpa) is impossible, there being no knowledge which is distinguished from both pramā (valid knowledge) and a-pramā (invalid knowledge). Knowledge which means ātman cannot neither be pramā as it is not caused by guna, nor can it be a-pramā as it is not caused by faults. The Advaitin says that as in the view of the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge of Isvāra and indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpaka) are said to be different from both pramā and a-pramā, so also in the present case it is possible. He says that knowledge which is 'caused' and is 'determinate' falls under any of the categories viz. pramā or a-pramā, but not the uncaused eternal knowledge, which means the ātman itself. This svarūpa-jñāna comes to be used as pramā and apramā, being tinged with two sorts of psychosis (antahkarana-vṛtti and avidyā-vṛtti). 18

In the same way, to be different from bliss is said to be inertness, as bliss is the form (svarūpa) of the ātman. The opponents may object to this as this can be applied to the worldly pleasures. But the worldly pleasures (vaisayikananda) are in reality the same eternal bliss, the Brahman manifest in limited conditions. These conditioning adjuncts (upādhis) are created and destroyed, but the unconditioned bliss remains as it is. Thus, dullness explained as such is the reason for the falsity of the world. 19

18. A.S., pp.311-312.
19. Ibid., p.312.
LIMITEDNESS (paricchinnatva)

Limitedness is also another reason for the falsity of the world. Limitedness is of three kinds viz. spatially limitedness (deśa-paricchinnatva), temporally limitedness (kāla-paricchinnatva) and limitedness by things (vastu-paricchinnatva). When something exists in a particular space but is absent in another it is said to be spatially limited, as it becomes the counterpositive of its total absence in some other place. So spatial limitation is defined "to be the counterpositive of total absence". Something which exists in a particular time but ceases to exist for all the times to come becomes the counterpositive of the subsequent absence (dhwāṣa-pratīyogī). This is known as temporal limitation. To be limited by things is to be the counterpositive of mutual absence (anyonyābhava-pratīyogītva). All the things of the world being counterpositive of these sorts of absence like the shell-silver are false.

The opponents may say that this definition is too wide as it applies to the self. The ātman is the counterpositive of total absence through the relation 'inherence', as it is not inherent in anything. So the ātman becomes spatially limited. So also in the case of ākāsa, etc. (time, space) which are said to be false, this definition is violated. Ākāsa which is said

to be conjoined with all the mūrtas (having inferior measure or having limited measure) cannot be the counterpositive of total absence in anything. It may be said that being not conjoined with amūrta padārtha (having superior measure), it is the counterpositive of its total absence lying in these things. If this is accepted, this will also apply to the ātman, as it is the counterpositive of its absence in the amūrta things through contact. If it is said that spatially limitedness means to be not related to all, then it will be too wide as to include the supreme self (paramātman) since it is free from all relations. Ajñāna also will not be included, as it is related to all things as the material of all. 21

There will be violation of the rule of being limited by time in the case of ākāśa etc., they being not the counterpositive of subsequent negation (dhvamsa). It is because ākāśa, kāla, etc. are accepted as eternal (nitya) by the Vaiśeṣikas. To be limited by things, which means "to be the counterpositive of mutual absence" is too wide as it also includes the ātman. The ātman being different from inert things (jada) is the counterpositive of mutual absence, otherwise it would be inert. 22

The Ācārya refutes the charges of the opponents that these definitions of limitedness cannot be applied to the ātman, as here the total absence and mutual absence are said to be of the

21. A.S., p.315
22. Ibid.
same ontological status as that of the counterpositive. The ātman, being only the ultimate reality (paramārthika), its absence is only apparent (pratibhāsika) but not of the same ontological status. Ajñāna, ākāśa, etc. being the counterpositive of their absence which is of the same status, there is no violation of this even in these cases.²³ This is said according to the view that the absence of the world is empirical. It is to be borne in mind that in the second definition of falsity two views are there as regards the status of the absence of the world. According to one view, the absence is empirical, and according to the other, it is absolutely real (paramārthika). In the second view the absence is said to be non-different from the substratum the Brahman.

If the second view that the absence of the world is absolute is accepted, then without giving the adjective "of the same status" the absence is to be described as ontologically not lower than the counterpositive. Thus, this absence being non-different from the ātman or the Brahman, the definition will not include the ātman. The apparent shell-silver which is adduced as the example of the inference of falsity, being the counterpositive of the empirical absence, there will be no logical difficulty.²⁴ Counterpositiveness of subsequent absence is not unproved in the case of ākāśa, as it is proved by the sruti.²⁵

²³. A.s., p.315.
²⁴. Ibid.
²⁵. T.u., 2.1
It is described in the śruti that whatever is different from the ātman is not eternal (atdnyat ārtam).  

The Ācārya then refers to the inference of Anandabodha. He says that pot, etc. are superimposed on that which follows them all (the invariable substratum) as they are different from each other (vibhaktatvat) like the serpent, the garland, etc. which are superimposed on the 'this' portion of the rope. The Brahman which is the real substratum continues in all the cognitions, whereas pot, cloth, etc. are differentiated from each other, so do not continue in all the instances. Thus, in all the cognitions "pot is real", "cloth is real", etc. the cognition of reality does not vary whereas pot, cloth, etc. do vary. Madhusudana clarifying the meaning of the term vibhaktatva (to be different from each other or to be differentiated) says that it means to be limited by other things, which on the other hand, means to be the counterpositive of the difference belonging to the same ontological status. So this definition is not too wide as to include the Brahman and the unreal. 

The dualists object to this explanation. They say that the principle that the variable things are superimposed on that which does not vary is untenable as the individual cows are not superimposed on the invariable cowness (gotva), etc. which

26. B.U., 3.4.2
27. A.S., p.316.
28. Ibid.
continues as it is evident from the knowledge "one part (of the cow) is the cow", "The head (of the cow) is the cow", etc. This is said in way of illustration. Other instances like "The pot is a substance", "The cloth is a substance", so these are superimposed on substanteness (dravyatva); "The pot has a form", "The cloth has a form", so pot, etc. are superimposed on form can also be adduced to invalidate the thesis of the Advaitin.

The Advaitin refutes the charges of the opponents. He says that excepting the universal 'reality' no other universal is accepted. Even though 'cowness', etc. are accepted, the universal 'reality' is the cause of their use as the universal. As all the things are said to be superimposed on one reality, superimposition of the individuals on the so-called universals like 'cowness', etc. is not accepted. It is to be borne in mind that according to one view of Advaita the Brahman is the only universal, according to another view, avidyā appears as the so-called universals. Madhusūdana here explains the position of Advaita according to the first view. He quotes the Brahma siddhi that pot, etc. are superimposed on the real (sadrūpa), everything cognised as connected (anubiddha) with it.

It may be asked - How can the Brahman signified by the word 'real' which is formless, concealed by ajñāna up to the existence of the world (samsāra) and known only through śabda, be

29. A.S., p.316.

30. Ibid., pp.316-317.
the object of the knowledge "This is real", etc. It is sound, the opponents add, to say that the reality in the pot is grasped by the knowledge "The pot is real" as the non-eternity in the pot is grasped by the cognition "The pot is not eternal". It cannot be said that the *Brahman* itself being not perceptible, becomes the object of perception only with the limitation (*avaccheda*) of pot, etc. as Rāhu though non-perceptible is perceived with the condition of the moon. Rāhu which is not known as it is distant, black, but capable of being perceived, is made the object of visual perception with the conditioning of moon, but the *Brahman* cannot be so, as it is not capable of being perceived. \(^{31}\)

The Advaitin says that the *Brahman* as reality is not concealed by *mūlā-jñāna* but by fragmentary *ajñāna* conditioned by pot, etc. So when the respective concealment is destroyed by the psychosis caused by eye, etc., the *Brahman* manifests in the cognitions like "The pot is real", etc. It cannot be said that being destitute of *rūpa* (form and colour) it cannot be perceptible by eye, etc., as *rūpa* etc. are necessary for the perception of those which are objects of specific senses. The *Brahman* in the above sense is grasped by all the senses. Though it is destitute of form, colour etc., there is no difficulty in being perceptible by the senses like eye, etc. Even others like Naiyāyikas, etc. accept this that reality (*sattā*) is grasped by all the senses. Then Madhusūdana quotes the statement of Suresvara to substantiate

\(^{31}\) *A.S.*, pp.318.
his position. Sureśvara says 'that one unknown ātman (anubhava) is the self-established (svatah siddha) object of all the senses. Not only sattā but also time which is formless (colourless) is accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas as perceptible by all the senses. So there is no difficulty if the Brahman is said to be perceived as reality in all the cognitions. It is to be noted that only in its aspect of reality the Brahman becomes the object of the senses. But it does not mean that it is known as it is. Its all perfect nature as boundless Existence, Knowledge and Bliss is still unknown. It is important to note the word 'unknown' (ajnātalaksanah) in the vārtika of Sureśvara. What is intended to be said is that wherever there is the manifestation of reality, knowledge and bliss, it is the Brahman that manifests unknowingly (ajnātatvena) owing to avidyā. As it is said by Vidyaranya: "Existence, illumination, dearness, name and form are five aspects, of which the former three are the nature of the Brahman and the rest two are the nature of the world."

It cannot be said that ākāśa can also be the object of audial perception, being conditioned by sound, like the Brahman which becomes perceptible, being conditioned by pot, etc. That which is capable of being perceived but is not perceived due to some obstruction can be made capable of being so with the help of some limiter or condition (avacchedaka). For example, Rāhu's perceptibility which is obstructed is again restored by the contact of the moon. Thus, the Brahman as reality (sattā) which

32. Sañùbandha vārtika, 1002
34. Dr̥gārśyaśiviveka, 20

asti bhāti priyaḥ nāma rūpaḥ cety-aṇiśa-paścakam/
ādyav-trayam brahma-rūpaḥ jagad-rūpaṁ atho dvayam/  
The Philosophy of Advaita, p.116.
is capable of being perceived but is veiled by the concealment (āvarana) can be perceived with the condition of pot, etc., so ākāśa being not capable, cannot be perceived by ear even if it is conditioned by sound.35

In a different manner Madhusūdana explains the perceptibility of the Brahman as sattā in all cognitions. He says that the Brahman being not a substance, can be the object of eye, though it is destitute of rūpa (form and colour), as only for the visual perception of a substance rūpa is necessary. Even though it is said to be a substance, its substanteness (dravyatva) is superimposed, so it belongs to a lower ontological status than the dharmin (the Brahman). He says that only when substanteness of a thing is not lower in ontological status than the thing, there only rūpa is necessary for the visual perception of the thing, which is not the case with the Brahman. So being destitute of rūpa, it is capable of being perceived by the eye. Likewise, it is perceptible also by other senses in its aspect of reality.

It is to be borne in mind that whatever is perceived through some sense, its sattā (existence) is known through that sense organ. So, sattā (existence) becomes the object of all the senses. But that existence does not belong to the things. It is the Brahman itself, which is not known properly due to avidyā. Thus, Existence, which is the Brahman, though not manifesting

in its true nature, appears faintly in the conditioning of pot etc. (ghatādy-avacchedena). Thus, limitedness is the hetu for the falsity of the world.

Apart from these principal reasons Madhusūdana also adduces other reasons as “being made of parts” (āmśitvāt) and “being not known without knowledge” (jñāna-vyatirekena anupalabhyamānatvāt), which are put forth by Citsukha and Vidyāśāgara respectively. He says that many other arguments of other Ācāryas can also be adduced to prove the falsity in the above manner.

REFUTATION OF THE FALLACIES

The opponent argues that the reasons viz. cognisability, etc. are conditional (sopādhika). Upādhi means a condition which is the vyāpaka of the sādhyā but not the vyāpaka of the sādhana (sādhyā-vyāpakatve satī sādhanāvyāpakatvam). For instance, in the case “where there is fire, there is smoke”, the sādhyā is the smoke and the hetu or sādhana is fire. In this case the upādhi (condition) is the contact with wet fuel. Unless the fuel is wet there cannot be smoke even though there is fire, as it is in the burning iron-ball. So the contact with wet fuel becomes the vyāpaka of the sādhyā (smoke) but not of the

hetu (fire). So it is the upādhi. Thus, upādhi is a condition which falsifies the invariable concomitance between the sādhya and hetu.37

The opponent alleges that the reasons adduced by the Advaitins are conditional. The condition (upādhi) is "to be the object of the knowledge caused by the fault which cannot be sublated by that which is thought to be the sublater of the concerned".38 The example shell-silver and the world of duality are to be understood respectively by the words sva and pakṣa.

The sublater (bādhaka) of the concerned shell-silver is the knowledge of the shell. The appearance of shell-silver is caused by the fault of eyesight like kāca, etc. which cannot be sublated by "the knowledge of the shell" which is supposed to sublate the shell-silver. Thus, the condition (upādhi) lies there in the example (ārthastānta). As the sādhya 'falsity' is also there in the example, the upādhi becomes the vyāpaka of the sādhya 'falsity'. But this upādhi does not become the vyāpaka of the reasons like cognisability etc. as it is not there in the pakṣa 'the world of duality'. The concerned pakṣa viz. the world is sublated by the knowledge of the Brahman which at the same time also sublates the fault avidyā that causes the appearance of the world. Thus

37. When the hetu becomes conditional, the inference suffers from a fallacy known as vyāpyatvāsiddhi.


sva-bādhakā-bhimanatā-bādhya-dosa-prayuktā-bhānatvam, etc.
the condition "to be the object of the knowledge caused by the fault which cannot be sublated by that which is said to be the sublater of the concerned" is not fulfilled, as the knowledge of the Brahmaṇ sublates both the world and the fault avidyā which causes its appearance. Though the reasons like cognisability, etc. are there in the pakṣa, the upādhi is not there. So the upādhi does not become the vyāpaka of the reasons.

The Advaitin refutes the charge of the dualists when he says that this condition does not become the vyāpaka of the sādhya at all. In the case of "the identity of the body and the self" which is accepted as false by all, this condition is violated. The sādhya 'falsity' is there in the identity of the self with the body. The knowledge of the Brahmaṇ sublates this false identity and also avidyā which causes it. Thus, the sādhya 'falsity' is there, whereas the intended condition (upādhi) that the sublater only sublates the concerned identity but not the fault which causes it is violated. So this intended condition cannot be an upādhi at all, it being the vyāpaka of the sādhya being violated. 39

Then the Acārya proceeds to show that each and every characteristic or fact which seems to be the vyāpaka of the sādhya cannot be so unless sufficient hypothetical arguments (anukulatarka) are there to support it. He cites the example "to be different from the pakṣa" (paksetaratva) given by the author of

Tattva cintāmanī. As "to be different from the pākṣa" cannot be an upādhi, there being no supporting argument to show that it is the vyāpaka of the sādhyā, so is the case with the present condition. The Acārya says that something whose absence establishes the absence of the sādhyā can be the vyāpaka of the sādhyā. In a complex condition only that portion whose absence establishes the absence of the sādhyā becomes the vyāpaka, and the other portion becomes futile. As in the argument "earth etc. are with some agent, being effects", "to be caused by the body" (sarīra-janyatva) cannot be the upādhi being an unnecessary adjective (vyarthā-vīdesana), the intended condition in the present case cannot be upādhi. The Naiyāyikas say that earth, water, etc. being effect are produced by some agent like the pot. As no ordinary agent is possible, they prove the existence of God through this argument. Those who do not accept God as the agent (kartr) of the world, try to show that the inference of the Naiyāyikas is conditional. The condition (upādhi) is that pot, etc., which are given as examples are produced by a body (sarīra-janya), but earth, water, etc. are not, since God has nobody. But really it cannot be the vyāpaka of the said sādhyā. The portion "to be caused" is only the vyāpaka of the sādhyā "to have some agent", as the word 'body' (sarīra) is a futile adjective.4

In the concerned case only the portion "to be the object of the knowledge caused by fault" (dosaprayukta-bhanatva) is meaningful; and the portion "which cannot be sublated by that

which is thought to be the sublater of the concerned" (sva-bādhaka-bhimanata-badhyā) is the futile adjective of the fault. So the complex cannot be the upādhi, it being not at all the vyāpaka of the sādhyā falsity. It cannot be said that the meaningful portion "to be the object of the knowledge caused by fault" is the upādhi, as it is the vyāpaka of both the sādhyā 'falsity' and the sādhana 'cognisability', etc. ⁴¹ In this manner the Ācārya refutes other upādhis alleged by the opponents like 'apparentness' (pratibhāsikatva etc. ⁴² Thus the inference is not conditional. When the upādhis are eliminated the opponents try to put forth some counter arguments against the inference of the Advaitin. These are expressed in inferential form "The doubted (the world) is apparent (pratibhāsika), being cognised, as the shell-silver. The Brahman is false, being the object of (empirical) use as the shell-silver". It is to be noted that the conclusion of both these inferences is not accepted by the dualists and the Advaitins as well. But the dualists only support it tentatively in order to show the unsoundness of the inference of the falsity of the world asserted by the Advaitin. They say that if the falsity of the world can be proved by the reason 'cognisability', etc. and the example 'shell-silver', then we can also prove that the world is only apparent (pratibhāsika) by the same reason and example. ⁴³ It is to be borne in mind that

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⁴¹. A.S., p.298.
⁴². Ibid., pp.299-303.
⁴³. Ibid., p.332.
the Advaitins accept the world as empirical but not as apparent.\textsuperscript{44} To be empirical (\textit{vyāvahārikatva}) means to be sublated by nothing other than the knowledge of the Brahman. Apparentness (\textit{pratibhāsikatva}), on the other hand, means to be sublated by empirical valid knowledge (\textit{vyāvahārika prama}). To put in other words, the empirical things can exist without being known (\textit{ajñatatasat}), so they become the object of empirical use, but the apparent things cannot remain unknown, being illumined by the sāksin (witness). So they are not the object of \textit{pramāṇa-vṛtti} (psychosis).\textsuperscript{45} In course of refuting this allegation of the opponent Madhusūdana says that as there are counter hypothetical arguments against these inferences they cannot be valid. In other place, he says that the strength of inference is to be endowed with supporting hypothetical arguments (\textit{anukulata-kāra-sācivya}), otherwise anything can be inferred in any place.\textsuperscript{46} In these inferences of the opponent, there being only contrary hypothetical arguments, they cannot be valid. The contrary arguments are: "If the world were apparent, there cannot be empirical use of it". But it is not true, as otherwise the epistemic uses cannot be possible. "If the Brahman were unreal, there would be utter nihilism" is another counter-argument.\textsuperscript{47} Nihilism is not possible, as it cannot explain the empirical truth of the world. Error without any basis is not possible; so nihilism cannot be accepted.

\textsuperscript{44} A.S., p.332.
\textsuperscript{45} Balabodhini, p.305.
\textsuperscript{46} A.S., p.370.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., n.332.
The meaning of apparentness may be "to be contradicted by other than the knowledge of the Brahman" or it may mean "to be of the form of appearance only" (pratibhāsa-mātra-sāriratva). The first meaning is violated in the case of the identity of the self and the body, as being apparent for the reason cognisability, it can be sublated by the knowledge other than that of the Brahman. Here the reason 'drāyatva' is there but the other characteristic viz. "to be contradicted by other knowledge than that of the Brahman" is not there, as the knowledge of the Brahman can only sublate this false identity. So its apparentness is not proved. There is no supporting hypothetical argument as to the fact that if "to be sublated by other knowledge than that of the Brahman" is not accepted as the vyāpaka of cognisability, cognisability cannot be possible. So cognisability is not a necessary reason to imply apparentness. If the second meaning of apparentness viz. "to be of the form of appearance" (pratibhāsa-mātra-sāriratva) is accepted, there will be siddha-sādhane in the view of drsti-sṛṣṭi, which is accepted by the Advaitin. According to the doctrine of drsti-sṛṣṭi all the things of world including the so-called apparent things are of the form of appearance, there being no unknown existence (ajñatasattva) of anything. Madhusudana accepts all the views of Advaita as valid, they being only prakriyās; so he also accepts drsti-sṛṣṭi.

In this way when falsity is intended to the proved in the Brahman which is conditioned (sopādhika), there is siddhasādhanā, it being accepted as false. In the unconditioned (nirupādhika) Brahman the reason "being the object of use" (vyavahāra-visayatva) is invalid, as it is beyond all uses. This is said according to the view of Bhāmatī. Even though we accept the view of Vivarana that the unconditioned Brahman is the object of use, it being only the object of psychosis according to this school, there is no difficulty. It is to be noted that according to the Vivarana view pervasion by psychosis (vṛtti-vyāpti) is accepted in the case of unconditioned Brahman only for the destruction of avidyā, but the Brahman is not affected by it. Phalavyāpti (pervasion by the phala) being denied in the case of the Brahman, it is never revealed as an object. Thus the pure Brahman is not false even though it is the object of empirical use.

Now Madhusūdana is going to refute the charge that this inference of falsity is contradicted by pratyakṣa (perception). The opponent says that this inference which seeks to prove the falsity of the world cannot be valid, as it is contradicted by pratyakṣa which reveals the world as real. But this reality of the world, the Advaitin says, is empirical, which is proved by perception. The inference which establishes the falsity of the

49. A.S., pp.332-333.
50. Ibid., p.333.
world only negates its absolute reality (paramārthika sattva). So there is no opposition between inference and perception. To show the uncontradictedness of the inference of falsity the Ācārya tries to show the absurdity of the word 'reality' (sattva) as used by the opponents. He says that 'reality' as opposed to 'falsity', which is capable of being grasped by perception through eyes, etc. cannot be explained. Thus, it is to be asked, what is the meaning of the word 'reality' which is perceptible. It may mean "to be the object of valid knowledge" or it may mean "capability for being such"; or it may mean "not to be the object of error".

The first alternative is not possible, as there is the fault of mutual dependence (anyo'nyāṣraya). Before determining the fact viz. "to be the object of valid knowledge" reality is to be determined, as valid knowledge means "to have the real as the object". Thus there is mutual dependence. The second alternative that the capability of being the object of valid knowledge is also not tenable, as capability cannot be determined without the determination of valid knowledge. The third alternative is not possible, as in the view of the Buddhists, being momentary by nature everything is the object of error. On the other hand, error being itself determined by reality, cannot be used to determine it. 51

It cannot be said that reality which is grasped by perception is reality as the universal or class property (sattā-jāti). Neither can it mean fruitful activity (arthakriyā-kāritva) nor can it mean "to be different from unreal (asad-vailaksanya)". These three, being not opposed to falsity, there is no harm to the inference of falsity. It is to be noted that Advaita is not opposed to the functional reality of the world, as it accepts the empirical reality of the world.

From the empirical point of view sattā jāti imposed by avidyā is accepted by Advaita. Difference from the unreal is already established in the world according to Advaita. What the Advaitins object to is the absolute reality of the world. Thus reality in the above sense is not opposed to falsity.

It cannot be said that reality means the absence of falsity, as it is too wide as to include the tuccha (unreal). Nor can it be said that "being different from unreal" and "to be not superimposed (anāropitātva)" is reality. Everything being superimposed excepting the Brahman, this is not possible in the world. It cannot be defined as "being directly the object of valid knowledge, qualified by existence (astitva-prakāraka-pramā)", as valid knowledge, being determined by reality cannot be used to define the latter. It cannot be said that to be related to time is reality, as this is not opposed to falsity, the shell-silver being also related to the time of appearance. Though the relation

52. A.S., p.334.

itaresāṁ mithyātvā-virodhitvena, etc.
with the real time (tattvika-kāla-sambandha) of the shell-silver is not accepted by Advaita, its relation with the apparent time is not denied. It cannot be defined as being related to real time as reality is not yet determined. Thus, the sattva (reality) of the world is itself indeterminable.

Now the dualists being impatient, try to pay back the Advaitins in their own coins. They say that the same reality, as it is accepted in the Brahman by the Advaitin, is accepted in the world by them. So, there is no necessity of defining reality. If this reality of the Brahman is indeterminable, the reality of the world is also indeterminable. As the Brahman is said to be real, being the substratum of error, so also the shell can be said to be real, being the substratum of error. But this is not correct says the Advaitin. The reality of Brahman means its very being, which is intelligence, non-dual and self-luminous. If this is the reality of the insentient world, then the world itself is proved to be false, as the silver is proved to be false by the reality of the shell, which is opposed to silverness. Answering the charge of the dualists that the shell being the substratum of error, can equally be real, the Advaitin says that the Brahman, in fact, is the substratum of all errors. When it is the object of the limited ajñāna, it is the substratum of the error like the appearance of the silver, but when conditioned by the unlimited ajñāna (mūlajñāna)

53. A.E., p.334
54. Ibid.
it is the substratum of the world.\textsuperscript{55} It is to be noted that the substratum of the shell-silver, in fact, is the Intelligence conditioned by this-ness of the shell, though the shell is said to be the substratum provisionally.

The Mādhvas define sattva (reality) as "not being the counterpositive of absence, related to all place and time". According to them both the unreal and the so-called indeterminable (false) belong to one category 'unreality'. Unreality is defined as "being the counterpositive of the absence, belonging to all place and time".\textsuperscript{56} Both the shell-silver and the barren woman's son are the counterpositive of such absence. So they are unreal alike. But pot, etc. which exist at least at any time in any place cannot be such counterpositive, as their absence in all space and time is not possible. They say that the absence of such unreality which means reality, is there in the world, as it is in the Brahman. But this is not tenable, as this definition of reality is formed with many facts, which cannot be perceived by the senses like eyes, etc. So it cannot be determined by pratyakṣa. All the absence in all place and time is not capable of being grasped by perception.\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} A.S., p.335.
\item \textsuperscript{56} trikālasarvadesīya-nisedhā-pratīyogitā/
\phantom{satto'-cyate'-dhyastatucche tam prati pratiyogini/}
Nyāyāmṛta quoted in Balabodhinī, p.317.
\item \textsuperscript{57} A.S., p.336.
\end{itemize}
The dualists try to defend their position. They say that all cases of absence in all place and time are not intended to be perceived, which cannot be possible as perception is always limited to a specific place and time. What they intend to say is that, when a particular thing viz. pot is perceived as existing in a particular time, it is not the counterpositive of absence in its own place and time. Thus, the absence of counterpositiveness of the absence, existing in that particular place and time is grasped in that pot. In other words, it is determined that the pot is not the counterpositive of absence in its place and time. So the dualists say, when it is known that the pot is not the counterpositive of absence in its place and time, its falsity which means counterpositiveness of absence in all place and time cannot be proved, as that particular place and particular time are included in all place and time. Thus, the inference which seeks to prove the counterpositiveness of absence in all place and time (falsity) is contradicted by pratyaksa which proves that the concerned things (emperical world) are not the counterpositive of absence in all place and time.

But this explanation of the dualists is not tenable. When they use "absence in the particular place and time", it is to be asked, whether it means "all the absences in that particular place and time" or it means "anyone of the absences in that place and time". The first alternative is not tenable, as all the

absences even in a particular place and time cannot be determined, as infinite absences can be there in a particular place at a particular time. If the second alternative is accepted, there is no harm, for it is not opposed to falsity, as when something is not the counterpositive of a particular absence in its place and time, it may be the counterpositive of other absence. As the pot is non-counterpositive of some particular absence in its locus, the shell-silver can also be said to be non-counterpositive of some particular absence in its locus. So this second alternative is not opposed to falsity. Thus, it cannot be proved by pratyakṣa that a thing is not the counterpositive of absence in all place and time.59

Now the opponent, assuming the view of the Naiyāyikas, says that one particular absence being known all the absences are presented through the extraordinary perception samānyalaksanā.60 This is said according to the Naiyāyikas, as the Mādhyāvatas do not accept such extraordinary perception. But this is not correct, as even though all the absences are presented through samānyalaksanā, the absence of their counterpositiveness (or not being their counterpositive) cannot be grasped by perception. When the counterpositive is perceptible, the absence related to it is also perceptible. But here by the term "counterpositive of all absence" the things beyond senses (atīndriya) are also included. Thus "not


60. Ibid., p.337.
being counterpositive of all absences" cannot be determined by perception. This explanation is given by the Advaitin by tentatively accepting samanya-laksana. But samanya-laksana is not accepted by the Advaitin. It cannot be said that without this the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire cannot be established, as the smoke of the kitchen (mahanasya-dhuma) is first known as invariably associated with fire, whereas in the mountain the smoke of the mountain (parvatiya-dhuma) is seen. But this is not tenable says the Advaitin, as the invariable concomitance between the smoke and fire is not known first in the smoke as the smoke of the kitchen but as smoke only. This is possible without samanya-laksana. So the acceptance of this is illogical. Thus it is proved that pratyakṣa cannot contradict the inference of falsity, as the reality of the world accepted by the opponent is not opposed to indeterminability accepted by Advaita. 61

The opponent may ask - If pratyakṣa only grasps the thing in the present time, how can the counterpositiveness of absence in all times in the cognised locus be possible even in the Advaita view. It is to be noted that the Advaitin defines falsity as the counterpositiveness of absence in all the three times in a cognised locus. It is possible in the Advaita view, only when the shell-ness, opposed to silver-ness is directly grasped by the witness that reveals everything related to it. 62

62. Ibid., p.351.
The opponent may reply that the witness which grasps all the times also grasps the future unsublatedness (reality) of the empirical things like ākāśa, etc. But this is not correct, as the witness only illumines all that are present (vidyamāna-sarvā-vabhāsaka). So it cannot grasp the future unsublatedness. It is to be noted that the witness grasps the absence of the shell-silver in three times only after it is sublated. But as such, it cannot grasp the future unsublatedness of the things as it is not yet achieved. On the other hand, witness-knowledge (saksi-jñāna) being common to both error and valid knowledge (bhrama-prama-sādharana) cannot contradict pramāṇa. It is to be borne in mind that witness-perception (saksi-pratyaksa) in the case of happiness, etc. is valid, whereas in the case of shell-silver it is invalid. Though all knowledge is made possible by the witness, by the interference of psychosis (antahkarana-vṛtti) and non-interference of it, knowledge is termed either as vṛtti-jñāna or saksi-jñāna (witness-knowledge) respectively.

Now the opponent tries to defend his position in a different way. He says that when the witness grasps the validity of knowledge, it also grasps the unsublatable of the objects, as without taking into consideration the unsublatable of the objects it is not possible to grasp the validity. It is to be borne in mind that the theory of intrinsic validity (svatah pramāṇya) is accepted by the Advaitin in both origin and

63. A.S., p.351.
ascertainment (utpatti and jñāpti). When the witness grasps the vṛtti jñāna, it immediately perceives its validity. So the opponent says that the witness grasps the unsublatability of the objects, when it grasps its validity. But this is not opposed to falsity. The witness only grasps the validity which means unsublatability at the time of empirical uses. The functional validity of the knowledge of pot, etc. is not unsublatability in three times (trikāla-badhyatva), but it only means difference from that of shell-silver. This is supported by Śaṅkara when he says that so far as the knowledge of the body as the self is accepted as valid, this is empirical pramāṇa, which continues till the attainment of self-knowledge.

The opponent asks - Though there is no difference between the cognitions, how is the reality established by the cognition "The pot is real" is false, but the falsity established by the cognition "The shell-silver is false" is not false. But this, the Advaitin says, is not opposed to the truth of Advaita. Even though the falsity is itself false, the reality of the shell-silver or the world is not implied, as the limiter of sublatability (nisedhyatā-vacchedaka) 'cognisability', etc. is common to both things and their falsity. This is proved in detail by the Ācārya previously. Thus, the reality capable of being grasped by perception being impossible, the reasons of falsity cannot be contradicted by perception.

64. A.S., pp.334-346.
65. S. Bh., 1.1.4
So neither the ordinary perception nor extraordinary perception produced by the universal (सामान्या-मात्रेयम) can contradict the reason of falsity. Nor the witness-perception can do so. Thus the inference of falsity is free from all contradiction by perception. It is interesting that Śaṅkara in his commentary also tries to prove non-opposition between different grades of प्रमाणाः. He says that प्रमाणाः like perception and Vedic testimony which accept the reality and falsity of the world respectively are true from their own stand-points.

In the cognition "The pot is real" the substratum ब्रह्म न only manifests as real, as in the cognition "This is silver" the substratum manifests as 'this'. It cannot be said that the ब्रह्म not being formless cannot manifest as real, as the formless time manifests in all cognitions, so also the ब्रह्म manifests. This is discussed in detail at the time of explaining the reason 'limitedness'.

The opponent says that if this is accepted, then by the help of such cognitions "The pot is blue", "The shell-silver is false", "The human horn is unreal", etc., it can be proved that blueness, falsity, etc. are the substrata of pot,

shell-silver, etc. But this is not tenable says the Advaitin. In the case of this viz. "The pot is real" the samanadhirakaranya is contradicted. Thus, it is to be asked how can samanadhirakaranya be possible between 'reality' and 'potness'. In other words, how can we assert that both 'reality' and 'potness' are there in one substratum viz. pot. It may be possible due to the class-property 'reality' (sattajati-nibandhana) or the thing itself (svarupa-sattva-nibandhana) or unsublatability in three times (trikala-badhyatva-nibandhana). It is not possible that in all cases of the cognition of real the universal 'reality' can manifest, as the opponents deny the universal 'reality' in absence, universals, particulars and inherence. It cannot be said that in some cases (substance, attribute, action) this cognition of the real is possible through direct relation (saksat-sambandha), whereas in other cases (universal, particular, inherence) it is possible through indirect relation (parampara-sambandha). Through different kinds of relations such common cognitions "The substance is real", "The universal is real", etc. cannot be possible. Otherwise, different kinds of relations cannot be established. It is to be borne in mind that only through uncontradicted cognitions (abadhita-pratiti) the things are established. So when there is difference in the objective counterparts, there should be difference in the cognition. Though there is difference in

68. A.S., p.353.
relations as direct relation and indirect relation in these cases, there is no difference in the cognitions. So this explanation is untenable. 69

In order to explain the cognition "The absence is real", it may be said that this cognition of the real is possible through the very being of the absence as reality which is said to be the universal is not related to absence either directly or indirectly. But, if this is accepted, says the Advaitin, the concept of universal will be completely eliminated, as everywhere the cognition of the real can be possible by the svarūpa of the thing itself. On the other hand, the cognition of reality being possible by one substratum which underlies everything there is no proof to validate the imagination of many such svarūpas existing in many things for explaining the cognition of reality. 70 It is to be noted that the Advaitin accepts the functional reality or the empirical reality of the world. Here it is said that the reality with which the things of the world are associated does not belong to them but to the substratum. The fact is that this empirical reality of the world is also due to its superimpositional identity with the Brahman. This is supported by Sureśvara when he says that from the reality there is no difference of the substance-ness etc. (drvyatvādi). 71

69. A.S., pp.353-354
70. Ibid., p.354.

Also see B.B.V., Sambandha Vārtika, 968, p.176.
Here non-difference means superimpositional identity with the Brahman. Śrī Śaṅkara also supports this when he says that with this real (Brahman) others are accepted as real.  

It cannot be said that the cognition as real is due to unsublatability in three times. It is proved before that reality as unsublatability cannot be grasped by senses like eyes, etc. Thus, reality cannot be there in the same locus with potness etc. as their saṃādhikaranya is contradicted. Blueness, falsity, etc. cannot be the substratum, as there is no contradiction if we accept them as of the same locus with potness, etc. on the other hand, the substratum is always of different ontological status. But blueness, potness, etc. belong to the same ontological status. So they cannot be the substratum.

The opponent says that perception is stronger than inference, as inference depends upon perception. Inference and verbal testimony depend upon perception for producing knowledge, but perception does not depend upon them. So inference of falsity cannot contradict perception which proves reality of the world. But this is not true. The capacity of perception on which inference, etc. depend for producing knowledge is not contradicted, but what is contradicted is its absoluteness (tattvikatva). Madhusūdana quotes a verse of Śrīharsa which says that the cause

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72. Śaṅkara's comm. on C.U., pp.609-610
73. A.S., p.354.
74. Ibid.
is accepted as only the unconditional invariable antecedent by both the dualists and the Advaitin, beyond which speaking of reality and unreality which are not included in being the cause is futile. It may be said that if perception is invalid, invariable concomitance which is supplied by it being contradicted, the validity of inference is also contradicted. But this is not opposed to Advaita view, as the inferred, being of the same ontological status, is valid from the empirical point of view as invariable concomitance (vya\textipa{\textasciitilde}pti), etc. It is to be noted that vya\textipa{\textasciitilde}pti, inference, etc. are accepted to be valid from the empirical point of view. On the assumption of the position of the opponents it is said tentatively. But really this principle that the ontological status of that which is to be inferred is similar to that of vya\textipa{\textasciitilde}pti, etc. is not tenable, as there is violation in the case of reflection. Reflection which is of lower ontological status, can be used to infer that which is reflected belonging to a higher ontological status. So, there is nothing to prove that vya\textipa{\textasciitilde}pti, li\textipa{\textasciitilde}nga, etc. belong to the same ontological status as the anu\textipa{\textasciitilde}eya. Thus, we have seen that perception is not stronger than inference, even though the latter depends upon the former. Not only this, inference which is endowed with valid hypothitical arguments can also contradict perception.

\[ \text{p\textipa{\textasciitilde}rva-sa\textipa{\textasciitilde}mbandha-niyame hetutve tulya eva nau/} \]
\[ \text{hetu-tattva-vahirbh\textipa{\textasciitilde}ta-sattva-sattva-kah\textipa{\textasciitilde} vrth\textipa{\textasciitilde}a/} \]


77. Ibid., pp.369-370.
Now the opponent tries to show the unsoundness of inference by proving that there are counter-arguments which can equally be employed to show the reality of the world. One such inference runs like this: "The doubted (the world) is absolutely real, as it is not unreal and is different from the apparent like the Brahman." But this inference is not free from faults. If this hetu is asserted according to the Mādhavas, it is not tenable, apparentness which is included in the hetu being not accepted by them. If, on the other hand, this is said accepting the Advaita view, there will be violation in the case of the identity of the self and the body. The identity of the self with the body being sublatable only by the knowledge of the Brahman, it is accepted as different from both apparent and unreal. If on the other hand, it is included in the paksā, there will be contradiction (bādha), it being not at all real. Difference from apparent and unreal being established in the world by empirical reality, this hetu cannot imply absolute reality. The hetu is also conditional as eternity is the condition (upādhi) which is there in the example (Brahman) but not in the paksā (the world), thus it is the vyāpaka of the sādhyā but not the vyāpaka of the sādhana. In this manner the Ācārya also refutes other counter-inferences. Thus the inference of falsity cannot be vitiated by counter-inferences (sat-pratipakṣita).

78. A.S., pp. 400-401.
79. Ibid., pp. 401-404.
From the above discussion it is clear that the inference of falsity is free from all fallacies. The reasons of falsity drṣyatva, etc. are not fallacious. It cannot be contradicted by perception, so there is no pratyakṣa-bādha. There is no fallacy of satpratipakṣa as the counter-inferences are fallacious.

**IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND OBJECT**

It is said that "to be endowed with valid supporting hypothetical arguments" is strength in inference.\(^80\) Before stating such arguments Madhusūdana expresses the view of the opponent. The opponent says that if without the falsity of the world drṣyatva of the world were impossible, such inference would be possible. But even though the world is real, cognisability is possible. But this, the Advaitin says, is not correct, as there can be no relation between Intelligence and the cognisable (drṣ-ṣaṁbandhā nupapattēḥ). Thus the supporting hypothetical argument is "If the world were real, there would be no relation between drk and drṣva."\(^81\) At the time of discussing the definitions of cognisability the Acārya says that to be related to drk (Intelligence) or to be revealed by it means drṣyatva. Thus, absence of relation between

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80. *As.*, p.370.
Intelligence and the object means absence of cognisability. Here Madhusūdana follows Citsukha and adds his own arguments to show that there can be no relation excepting that of superimposition (adhyāsika saṁbandha) between knowledge (Intelligence) and its object.  

Knowledge cannot reveal its object without any relation with it, otherwise, there being no regulating factor, discordance will prevail. Nor can it reveal its object being related with it, as knowledge which means the Self itself (ātmasvarūpa) according to the Advaita-view or the attribute of the self (ātmacūḍā) according to the opponent's view cannot have any relation like contact (saṁyoga) or inherence (saṁavāya) with its object. There being no superimpositional relation the object cannot be revealed at all.  

It is to be borne in mind that knowledge according to advaita being the Self itself which is free from all relations and attributes cannot be related with the object. According to the Vaiṣékā view knowledge being the attribute of the self which only rests in the self, cannot have contact with the external objects. Inherence being possible only in the cases of substance and attribute, substance and action, cause and effect, substance, attribute, action and universal, it

82. Citsukha, pp.75-80.
83. A.B., p.453
Advaita-ratna-raksana, pp.22-23.
cannot be possible between knowledge and its object. By resorting to such arguments the Advaitin intends to show that by no realistic standard we can explain drṣyatva of the world.

But it does not mean that according to Advaita there is no relation between knowledge and object. Advaita only says that there can be no objective relation between knowledge and its object except the relation of superimposition, as the objects are superimposed on knowledge. But it is not the same as the Buddhist idealism (vijñānāvāda). According to Ātmakhyātī upheld by the Buddhist vijñānāvādins the objects are the transformation of the vijñāna (intellect confused by the Buddhists with Intelligence). Thus, the objects are of the same ontological status as the vijñāna. But according to Advaita Vedānta, the objects are of lower ontological status, as they are superimposed by avidyā on Intelligence which is the only Reality. Thus, the position of Advaita differs from that of both the realists and the idealists. It is clear that Advaita Vedānta accepts an epistemological realism which just means that the object as different from the subject is to be accepted in order to make perception possible. But it does not mean that the object is as real as Intelligence.

When both contact and inherence are not possible between the object and Intelligence, it may be said that the state of being the visaya (object) and the visayin (perceiver) is the relation between them. But it is not correct. "Being the visaya" and "being the visayin" are there in the visaya and
the visayin respectively, for which combinedly there cannot be any such relation between them. It is not also possible to define visayatva or objectivity for which the state of being visaya and visayin cannot be the relation between them. In this context the Ācārya shows various ways of defining objectivity and refutes them.

Objectivity cannot be defined as being the substratum of the fruit produced by knowledge (jñāna-janya-phalāchāratvam). It is to be asked whether this fruit of knowledge is jñātata (knownness) or abandonment, use, etc. (hānādi). The former is given according to the Bhāttaśas who say that through the activity of the agent (knower) some extraneous characteristic named jñātata is produced in the object. Thus according to them jñātata is the fruit of the activity of knowledge. According to the Naiyāyikas the object is either abandoned or used after being known. So use (upādāna) or abandonment (hāna), etc. are the fruits of knowledge. But this is not tenable, as jñātata, being a fictitious fact, cannot be accepted. Also jñātata is absent in the things of the past which are already destroyed but which can be made objects of knowledge at present. Use and abandonment cannot be the fruit of knowledge as they are absent in the case of ākāśa, etc. Nor can it be said that recognition (abhijñā) and speaking of the object (abhilapana) are the fruits of knowledge, as being there

84. A.S., p.454.
85. Ibid.
in the knower, they are not present in the objects. It is not even proper to say that these two are there in the object through the relation objectivity (visayatā), as this is yet to be defined. For this reason, objectivity (visayatva) cannot be defined as being the karma (objective case) of the activity 'knowledge'. Karma\textsuperscript{86} which is a case (kāraka) among the seven cases of Sanskrit grammar, is defined as being the locus of the fruit produced by the act of the agent (kartr). But from the above discussion we have seen that the fruit of the activity cannot be logically determined, so the definition formed with its help is not possible. The knowledge of God and knowledge regarding the past things which are already destroyed being not produced by karma-kāraka (objective case), this definition cannot be possible.\textsuperscript{87} It is to be noted that the past thing, being destroyed cannot be the karma, since it cannot be the locus of the activity of the agent.

The Buddhist definition that "the thing which gives form to knowledge (jñanā-kārā-rpaka) is its object" is also not tenable. Knowledge and its form being non-different all the causes of knowledge would be the object of knowledge. Thus, the sense being helpful in giving form to knowledge can be its object. In case of indirect knowledge like inference this definition is violated, as there the object does not give form to knowledge.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{86} kartr-vyāpāra-prajojya-phalā-śrayatvāṁ karmatvam

See Pālamanorāma on Siddhānta Kaumudi, pp.597-598

\textsuperscript{87} A.S., p.454.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
To exclude the senses, the opponent may add another condition to the definition that "the thing which being itself perceived, gives form to knowledge" is its object. The senses which are not perceptible are excluded. But this is not tenable, as "to be perceived" means "to be the object of knowledge" which is yet to be determined for which it cannot be used to define objectivity. Objectivity cannot be defined as "being capable of the use produced by knowledge (jñāna-janya-vyavahāra-yogyatvam)". This capability being itself an object of its knowledge, in order to be understood requires another capability which is not accepted as it will lead to infinite regress. It cannot be said that as cognisability (drṣyatva) is itself cognised (drṣya) without any further cognisability, capability can be maintained without any further capability. But it is not sound, as without the knowledge of the limiter (avacchedaka) capability cannot be determined. If "to be the object of knowledge" is said to be its limiter, there will be the fallacy ātmāśraya. Object may be defined as that in contact with which the senses like eyes, etc. produce such knowledge. But this is not correct, as the knowledge of God (Īśvāra-jñāna) would be without object, it being not produced by the senses as it is eternal. 

Then Madhusūdana refutes another definition of object. According to this definition, a thing which manifests in a particular knowledge is its object. But it is to be asked

89. A.S., pp.454-455.
90. A.S., p.455.

yasyaṁ sañvidi yo'rthe'vabhāsate sa tasya viṣayah
what is meant by saying "in the knowledge" (samvidi). This may mean "to manifest in a particular knowledge", which is the locus of the object or it may mean "the object of the particular knowledge". The first is impossible as knowledge cannot be the locus of the knowable (object). The second meaning (visaya-saptamī) is untenable, as it is yet to be determined. On the other hand, the state of being manifest (bhāsamanatva) being itself formed with objectivity, there will be the fallacy of atmaśraya.

The dualists may try to define objectivity as being the limiter (avacchedaka) of knowledge without any other relation. Both the knower and the knowable are the limiters of knowledge, whereas the knower becomes the limiter through a different relation 'inherence' (samavāya), as knowledge rests there through it. But the knowable does not become the limiter through other relation. To avoid the knower the condition "without any other relation (sambandhāntaraṁ vinā)" is added. But this definition is not free from fault. In the example "The knowledge of the form (rupa-jñāna) is inherent in me" (mat-samavetaṁ rūpa-jnataṁ), inherence is the limiter of the knowledge of the form without any other relation. So according to this definition, inherence can be the object of the knowledge regarding form which is not

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91. The word 'samvidi' occurs with the seventh case suffix which according to Sanskrit grammar may have three meanings viz. (i) being the locus (adhikaraṇa), (ii) to have something as the object (visayasaśtamī), (iii) a condition (satisaptamī).

92. A.E., pp. 454-455.
tenable.\footnote{93} Here it is to be noted that the object of the knowledge "This is form (rupa) is the form itself, but not its inherence, though the latter is the limiter of knowledge without any further relation. So this definition is untenable.

The opponent then tries to define objectivity in a pragmatic manner. He says that the very use of the learned men "the object of knowledge" is the relation between knowledge and its object. He says that as 'mantra' is defined by the Mīmāṃsakas as the object of this use 'mantra' so also object can be defined as the object of this very use 'object'. There is no fault of inter-dependence (anyo'nyāśraya) between objectivity and its use, as latter use depends upon the former use. It is to be borne in mind that the previous uses define objectivity depending upon which the latter uses are made.\footnote{94}

But this explanation, says the Advaitin only shows "what is knowability in general", but does not explain the fact that such and such things are objects of such and such knowledge. Moreover, latter uses depending on former uses in an infinite series are permissible in the case of something which has no beginning (anādi), but in the present case it is not permissible. As the object of a particular use a particular thing is not beginningless (anādi) but with a beginning; on the other hand, use means a relation with its object. Thus, objectivity which is

\footnote{93. A.S., p.455.}
\footnote{94. Ibid.}
to be defined is presupposed. It is noteworthy that the opponent tries to escape rather than define objectivity.

The opponent then tries to define 'object' in a different manner. He says that a thing is said to be the object of a specific knowledge when knowledge is the cause of the verbal use regarding that thing. When verbal use of an object is absent as is the case of the dumb, there the causality is present, though there is the absence of the effect (verbal use) due to the absence of the helping factors (like the organ of speech, etc.). Thus, in the case where we do not find verbal use of an object, there even, knowledge of that object is the cause of its verbal use, though the latter does not take place owing to the absence of other helping factors like the speaking capacity, etc. So this definition does not suffer from avyāpti. It cannot be said that this definition is too narrow as it does not include indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpaka jñāna), as this sort of knowledge is not at all accepted.

This definition, says the Advaitin is faulty. Capability of producing verbal use cannot be determined in each and every case, as there is absence of the effect (verbal use) in some cases. There is no proof of that capability in any particular case where the effect is absent. However, it would be possible if the limiter of causality (kāranatā-vacchedaka) were determined.

95. A.S., p.455
96. Ibid.
The limiter of the capability of producing verbal use of something cannot be anything other than to have that very thing as the object. In other words, capability by itself cannot be determined as the producer of the effect, unless it is limited by some characteristic. For instance, in the case of the pot whose cause is earth, the capability of producing the pot is there in earth. So it is determined as limited by earth-ness. Here in the above case, knowledge is capable of producing verbal use regarding the thing, only due to the fact that it has that specific thing as its object. So objectivity which is to be defined, is presupposed by the definition as the limiter. So the definition is untenable. 97

The definition that "a particular thing is the object of a specific knowledge when that knowledge is of the nature of that thing(yadiya-svabhava)" is also untenable. 98 To say "to be of the nature of something" means "to have that thing as the object". 99 Thus there is the fault of ātmāśraya.

It cannot be said that svarūpa is the relation between the knowable and its knowledge. If it is said that svarūpa itself is the relation, then the definition will be too wide as to include even contact and inherence, because they have

97. A.S., p.455.
98. Ātmatattva viveka of Udayana quoted in Śālabodhini, p.738.
99. In the word yadiya the suffix Īya (cha according to Panini) means objectivity.
also their own svarūpa. If on the other hand, it is said that excepting these two relations svarūpa is the relation, then between the Himalayas and the Vindhya mountain there can also be this svarūpa-saṁbandha. It cannot be said that the capability of producing qualified knowledge (vīśista-pratīti) without any other relation is svarūpa-saṁbandha. If we define like this there will be avyāpti as in the case "I am knowing the self", as apart from the so-called svarūpa-saṁbandha there is another relation 'inherence'. There will be also avyāpti in the cases like the absence of dharma (merit), which cannot be grasped by the senses. There is no proof as to the fact that in this case there is the capability of producing qualified knowledge. It is to be noted that a relation is invariably necessary for producing a qualified cognition like "a man with a stick" (dandī puruṣa). Here the stick and the man become mutually qualifier and qualified. Contact is the 'relation' between them. But in the present case there can be no relation between knowledge as defined by the opponent and the absence which cannot be grasped by senses (atindriyā-bhāva), as there is no qualified cognition regarding it. 100 Though the question of svarūpa-relation is not raised by the Mādhvas, the Ācārya refutes it as it is upheld by the Maiyāyikas. 101

It is to be asked whether this capability of producing qualified cognition (viśista-pratīti-janana-yogatva) is an attribute, which is thought to be the relation, or the relation consists of two svarūpas of the two relata. If the first alternative that it is an attribute is accepted, it cannot be the relation between these two, as an attribute merely rests in an object; so it cannot be a relation between two objects. The second alternative is not also tenable, as each of the two svarūpas being the relation there will be disorder in knowledge. Combinedly both the svarūpas cannot be the relation, as each of them being located in the respective thing, cannot be a relation combinedly. Without the knowledge of the limiter of capability (yogatā-vacchedaka) capability cannot be determined. If it is said that the limiter of this capability of producing qualified knowledge is the very being of the thing concerned like potness (ghatatva), etc. then the said difficulties will arise. On the other hand, if it is said that objectivity (visayatva) is that capability of producing qualified cognition, then there will be anya'nyāśraya as the same is to be determined.

If svarūpa is accepted as the relation between knowledge and knowable, there will be other difficulties. In such cases as "absence of knowledge" (jñānasyaśbhāvah) and "known is absence" (jñato'bhāvah) there will be no difference as both

103. A.R.R., p.22.
have *svarūpa-sambandha* in common. But, in fact, in the first case the meaning is "the absence having knowledge as the counterpositive" (*jnāna-pratīyogikā-bhāva*) and in the second case the meaning is "the knowledge having the absence as its object" (*jnāna-visayo-bhāvacaka*). It is to be borne in mind that some characteristic which determines the difference between two cognitions is the limiter of objectivity (*visayatā-vacchedaka*). For instance, the cognition of the pot differs from that of the cloth because of the difference in the limiter of objectivity *viz.* in the first case the *vacchedaka* of objectivity is potness (*ghatatva*), whereas in the second case it is clothness (*patatva*). But objectivity (*visayatā*) being not determined, no difference can be asserted in the cited examples. Both knowledge and absence being common to the above two cognitions and there being no difference in their *svarūpas*, there can be no difference in the meaning of the two cognitions. Thus, we reach the conclusion that if the world (object) were real, there would be no relation between *drk* and *drāya*. The object being false, the relation between them is superimpositional (*adhyāsika*).

The opponent may ask what is the necessity of defining objectivity when it is necessary to find out the relation between Intelligence and the object. Madhusūdana says that by

105. Ibid.
the refutation of objectivity the concerned relation is also refuted. It is worth-nothing that the relation between the visayin and the visaya can be real (paramarthika) only when the two relata are real. But one relatum (sambandhi) viz. the object (visaya) being false, the relation is also false.

This point viz. the impossibility of relation between intelligence and the object is discussed by Madhusūdana in great detail, as it directly supports the inference of falsity. Here Madhusūdana follows Citsukha and adds his own arguments. The same arguments also occur in his other works like Siddhānta Bindu and Advaita-ratna-raksana. It seems from the manner of argument of the Advaitin that not only these arguments but many new arguments can be put forward in the same line. The intention of the Advaitin is not that there is no relation between intelligence and the object; he only repudiates any such realistic relation which presupposes the reality of the object. By showing the faults in the definitions of the opponents who uphold the reality of the objects, the Advaitin intends to show that the concept of objectivity is such a fundamental concept that it cannot be further defined with the help of any other concept. On the other hand, the realistic conception of objectivity is so unfounded and uncertain that any attempt at explaining it

must meet with difficulty. Objectivity can be explained only by the fact that the objects are superimposed on Intelligence. This view is not the same as that of the idealists, as according to them the objects are the transformation of vijñāna, whereas according to this view they are superimposed on it.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE INference OF Falsity

This prakaraṇa in Advaita siddhi is a necessary corollary to the previous prakaraṇa "Impossibility of relation between drk and drṣya". The basic hypothetical argument supporting the inference of falsity (anukulatarka) which the Ācārya gives, is this: If the world were real, there would be no relation between Intelligence (knowledge) and the object. The opponent objects to this. He says that though the Advaitin accepts this that all the drṣya (objects) are superimposed on the Intelligence (drk) which is the Brahman for the revelation of an object for a specific knower he has to assert the necessity of a relation between drk and drṣya through psychosis (vṛtti) caused by the contact of the sense and the respective object. If it is accepted that the world is not superimposed but real (satya), even then there can be relation between drk and drṣya through such psychosis (vṛtti-dvāraka-sambandha). So there is no necessity of an unwanted relation of superimposition. The opponent adds, unlike the Buddhists it is not accepted by
the Advaitins that such and such objects are superimposed on their respective knowledge, as the pure Intelligence unlike the vijñāna of the Buddhists is free from all differences. The conditioned (upādhi-viśista) Intelligence is with difference; still it itself being false, cannot be the substratum of the world. So there is no necessity of a superimpositional relation.

In course of refuting the above charge of the opponent the Advaitin states that illumination (prākāsa) manifests that which comes directly in contact with it; so it is not tenable to say that Intelligence (caitanya) manifests the object through a series of relations (indirect relation). It is never seen that the light of a lamp manifests other things through a series of relations. So the substratum-Intelligence (adhisthāna-caitanya) that is the Brahman, being free from concealment, only manifests. Destruction of the concealment is made by the psychosis. Thus, though there is the superimpositional relation beforehand, the non-manifestation of the object is possible.

The opponent may say that manifestation of the object being possible by the Intelligence reflected in the psychosis, there is no necessity of the superimpositional relation with the substratum-Intelligence for its manifestation.

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110. Ibid.
111. According to some Advaitins like Vidyāranya the reflection of intelligence in psychosis manifests the object, still he accepts the substratum-intelligence. See Pañcadasī, 3.1-16.
But this is not tenable, as for the direct manifestation of the object in contrast to indirect knowledge (paroksa), there is the necessity of the illumination of the substratum-Intelligence. Psychosis is common to both direct knowledge and indirect knowledge, but there is only the illumination of the substratum-Intelligence in the case of direct knowledge. It is to be borne in mind that according to Madhusūdana the substratum-Intelligence, the Ūbrahman manifests the things, whereas according to some Advaitins the reflection of Intelligence (cīd-ābhāsa) does it. But both of them accept the substratum-Intelligence for the manifestation of the objects as unknown and for the reflective knowledge or anu-vyavasāya.

It cannot be said that the pure Intelligence (Ūbrahman-Intelligence) does not manifest before the final knowledge (the realisation of the Ūbrahman) and the Intelligence conditioned by pot, etc. which manifests cannot be the substratum of the objects like pot, etc., there being the fault 'ātmāgraya'. The pot-conditioned (ghatāvacchīna) Intelligence cannot be the substratum of the pot, as it presupposes the latter. The fact is that the pure Intelligence manifests the pot, but not the pot-conditioned Intelligence. But at the time of manifesting the pot mūlajña is not destroyed, but only a portion of it (avasthāviśeṣā) that causes the concealment of the Intelligence.

112. AŚ., p.462.
113. Pañcāśā, VIII.4-5.

For detailed discussion see the Chapter III.
with reference to the object 'pot', is destroyed. So even though the pure Intelligence manifests before the final realisation, there is no contingency of emancipation.\textsuperscript{114}

Now the dualists try to invalidate the Advaitic view in a different manner. They ask whether the \textit{drk} (Intelligence) which is said to be the substratum of the object is itself false or true.\textsuperscript{115} If it is false, it cannot be the substratum. If it is true, it being valid knowledge (\textit{pramaa}), its object is also real but not superimposed. The object being not superimposed, there is no need of any substratum. But this charge is based on a misunderstanding of the Advaitic doctrine. The \textit{Acarya} says that "being not caused by fault (\textit{dosaa-janyatva})" is not the necessary condition of valid knowledge, as caitanya (Intelligence) is never caused by fault. But the necessary requisite of valid knowledge is "not to be limited by the psychosis caused by fault" (\textit{dosaa-janya-vrtty-avacchinnatva}). The pure Intelligence being free from it cannot be said to be \textit{pramaa} (valid knowledge). So the real (\textit{satya}) Intelligence (\textit{drk}) can be the substratum of the false object.

It is to be noted that the knowledge as pure Intelligence, the \textit{Brahman} cannot be either valid knowledge or invalid knowledge. In all cases caitanya itself is free from

\textsuperscript{114} A.S., p.462.

\textsuperscript{115} The word \textit{satya} means both true and real. A thing is generally said to be either real or unreal and a knowledge is said either to be true or to be untrue. Intelligence (knowledge) in the Advaitic sense being itself Existence there is no such dichotomy here.
faults be it pramā or apramā. When it is limited by vṛtti (vṛtty-avacchinna) or in other words when it becomes vṛtti-jñāna, it can be either valid or invalid. But svarūpa-jñāna, Brahman itself, which is neither valid nor invalid but sat is the substratum. Thus there is no difficulty if the real drk is said to be the substratum of the superimposed object.116

The opponent formulates inferences to prove the real relation between knowledge and knowable. He says that superimpositional relation is thought of only when real relation is impossible. But since there is proof to establish another relation, there is no necessity of superimpositional relation. As contact being impossible between substance and attribute, inherence is accepted, likewise a third relation can be proved by both inference and perception. The first inference runs like this: "The qualified cognition (viśista-dhiḥ) between the qualified (viśesya) and the qualifier (viśesana) which are not related by either contact or inherence, is with a relation between the qualifier and the qualified, it being a qualified cognition like the cognition of a man with a stick".117 Another

117. Ibid.

parasparā-saṃyukta-saṃaveta-viśesana-viśesyaka-viśista-
dhir-viśesana-viśesya-saṃbandha-viśista-viśaya, viśista-
dhītvat, dandi-ti viśista-dhīvat.
inference adduced by the opponent runs like this: "The produced valid knowledge (janyapramaṇa) is with the uncontradicted relation between the qualifier and the qualified, being uncontradicted qualified knowledge like the cognition of the man with a stick." 118

In course of refuting the inferences the Advaitins say that the first inference suffers from arthāntara, as it can also prove the superimpositional relation between drk and drṣya, which is accepted by the Advaitins. The second inference suffers from siddhaśādhana, as the superimpositional relation and such qualified knowledge is uncontradicted till the realisation of the Brahman. If the term 'uncontradicted' means always uncontradicted there will be sādhyavaikalya, as uncontradictedness in all the times cannot be proved. 119 In other words, the inferences adduced to prove a real relation can simply prove a relation between the two relata but cannot prove its reality; so the Advaitins point to the faults of arthāntara and siddhaśādhana in the inferences. Absolute uncontradictedness of the qualified cognition or the concerned relation cannot be proved either by perception or by inference. The Ācārya has discussed it in detail when considering the question whether the inference of falsity can at all be contradicted by perception and inference. So, if uncontradicted means always uncontradicted then there arises sādhyavaikalya.

118. A.S., p.462.
119. Ibid., p.463.
The opponent says that when real relation is impossible, then only superimpositional relation is necessary. But here real relation is not possible, as the vyāpaka of real relation that is the absence of spatial and temporal distance (deśa-kāla-viprakārā-bhāva) is not there in the case of knowledge and knowable. In the case of the knowledge regarding the past things this condition viz. the absence of spatial and temporal distance is not fulfilled. It cannot be said that like inherence this relation is valid even though one relatum is absent or separated from the other, as there is no proof as to the fact that the so-called real inherence relates the destroyed pot with its future form. 120 Thus, the inference of the opponent implies only superimpositional relation, as the vyāpaka of real relation is not there.

Then the opponent asks what is the relation between destruction and the past thing, total absence (atyantābhāva) included in the Advaitin's definition of falsity and its counterpositive, desire and that which is desired; ignorance and unknown, statement and its meaning śakti (the capability of a word to express something) and that which is to be expressed (śakya), knowledge as psychosis and the knowable, etc. The opponent argues that according to the Advaitic view there being spatial and temporal distance in these cases, there is the implication of superimpositional relation. But it is absurd to

120. A.S., p.463.
say that counterpositive, etc. are superimposed on absence, etc. There is also self-contradiction in the statement of the Advaitin. When the Advaitin says that here there is no relation, this absence of relation cannot have any relation with knowledge. So the Advaitic view is very much absurd.

In course of refuting the charge of the opponent the Ācārya says that though according to the principle referred to there is no real relation between counterpositive and absence etc., superimposition is not the relation as it is in the case of knowledge and knowable. Superimpositional relation (ādhyāsika-sambandha) is possible only in the case, where one is real and the other is false. But in the above cases both the relata being drṣya are false alike. The Advaitin does not reject the relation between counterpositive and absence etc. from the empirical point of view. He only says that such a relation, being different from real and superimpositional is false, as it is drṣya. It is to be noted that inherence and contact etc. are said to be real only from point of view of the non-Advaitin, but according to Advaita they being drṣya are false. Madhusūdana says that the Advaitins are not interested in such question as to whether this relation between counterpositive and absence etc. is different from the relata or the svacāt of the relata; nor they are interested in examining whether this is included in the categories accepted by the opponents, as such a question is

121. A.S., p.464.
absolutely unnecessary, like examining of the teeth of a crow (कक्क-दांत-परीक्षा)\textsuperscript{122}. It cannot be said that the relation between knowledge and knowable is of the same status as that between counterpositive and absence (not superimpositional), but here knowledge is real being not द्रष्या, there being no possibility of any factual relation between knowledge and knowable.\textsuperscript{123}

 Everywhere, it may be said, such a principle that the विषय (object) is superimposed on the विश्वेत (subject)\textsuperscript{124} is not tenable, as the ब्रह्म is accepted as the विषय of अज्ञाना but it is not superimposed on the latter. This is true, the Advaitin says. This is only the principle that both knowledge and nescience (अज्ञाना) has superimposition as the relation. The difference is that the knowable is superimposed on knowledge and nescience is superimposed on the unknown. So there is no difficulty. It is to be noted that according to अद्वैत वेदांत the object is never concealed by nescience, but that which is concealed is the substratum-Intelligence that remains unknown for which the object cannot manifest.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{122} कक्क-दांत-परीक्षा is a maxim which denotes any useless, unprofitable or impossible task.

\textsuperscript{123} A.S., pp.464-465.

\textsuperscript{124} It is to be noted that the terms विषय and विश्वेत always do not signify the epistemological sense 'object' and 'subject'.

\textsuperscript{125} V.P.S., pp.60-66.
It may be asked, what is the relation between the final direct knowledge (carama sāksātkāra) and its object the Brahman. We cannot say that the object Brahman is superimposed on that final knowledge. Here final direct knowledge may mean either such psychosis or the Intelligence, manifest through it. If the first alternative is accepted, there is no difficulty as the psychosis is superimposed on the Brahman. If the second alternative is accepted, then the manifest-intelligence being not different from the Brahman which is its object, the question of superimposition does not arise.

The opponent may argue that absence of spatial and temporal distance is not a valid principle for considering any factual or real relation, as knowledge like desire can have relation with some distant object. Knowledge can have relation with a distant object, as we find it in the case of mediate knowledge (paroksa-jñāna). But this is not correct, the Advaitin replies, as desire has indirect relation with its object only through knowledge. Though direct relation of superimposition with the substratum-intelligence is there in the case of mediate knowledge, relation through psychosis which is required for the manifestation of the object is absent. There is only indirect relation with the Intelligence limited by psychosis.

126. In Advaita Vedānta 'knowledge' may either mean vṛtti-jñāna or the Brahman-Intelligence, which is also known as substratum-Intelligence, that manifests after the destruction of the concealment.


128. Ibid., p.467.
The unreal (tuccha) being not a knowable at all, there is no relation of superimposition between it and knowledge. According to the view that the destruction of avidyā belongs to the fifth category (pañcama-prakāra), the relation of it with pure Intelligence is superimposition also. The pure Intelligence is the substratum of avidyā, so it is also the substratum of its negation (avidyā-nivṛtti), as destruction (dṛśvāśa) lies in the substratum of its counterpositive. But it cannot be said that the destruction of avidyā being superimposed, which means indeterminable (anirvacaniya), belongs to the fourth category, as there is no harm if avidyā-nivṛtti which is different from the indescribable (avidyā) is accepted as superimposed on the pure Intelligence. Because destruction lies in the substratum of its counterpositive. In fact Madhusūdana does not accept the view that the negation of avidyā belongs to the fifth category. He defends this view only to show that all the theories of the preceptors of Advaita are sound as they are means for expounding the basic truth of Advaita.

129. Istasiddhi, pp. 85-86.

According to this view the negation of avidyā cannot be real, unreal, real and unreal, and indescribable. Avidyā being indescribable its negation cannot belong to the same category. So it is accepted as belonging to the fifth category.

130. A.S., pp. 467, 885.
It may be argued that shell-silver, etc. are superimposed on the intelligence limited by the 'this' portion (idam-āṁsa) but they are revealed by the intelligence reflected in the modification of avidyā (avidyā-vṛtti). So the principle that the visaya is superimposed on the visayin that manifests it, is untenable. But this argument is without foundation, as here the limiting adjuncts (upādhis) being not independent of each other cannot differentiate. Only the upādhis that are independent of each other can differentiate, as two pots existent in two different places differentiate the ākāsa. But a house and a pot inside it cannot differentiate the ākāsa limited by them, as they are not independent of each other. Following the old preceptors Madhusudana states that due to oneness of the result (phalaikyāt) there is but one knowledge (jñānaikyām).\textsuperscript{131} It is to be noted that the upādhis, the 'this' portion of the shell and avidyā-vṛtti are different, but there is only one knowledge "This is silver".\textsuperscript{132}

It may be said that erroneous knowledge is caused by ignorance of the substratum, and it is sublated by its knowledge. Since the shell-silver is said to be superimposed on its knowledge (sva-jñāna), if the knowledge of the shell-silver is absent, then error cannot take place, as the substratum (the

\textsuperscript{131} Pañcapādikā and Vivarana quoted in Bālabodhini, p.785.

\textsuperscript{132} A.S., p.468.
knowledge of shell-silver) is essential for the appearance of the error. If, on the other hand, there is the knowledge of the shell-silver, error cannot take place, the knowledge of the substratum (the knowledge of the shell-silver) being the sublater of error. There will be other difficulties if it is accepted that shell-silver, etc. are superimposed on their knowledge. If it were true, there would be such appearance 'knowledge is silver'.

But these arguments are based on a misunderstanding of the Advaita-view. Knowledge that is said to be the substratum of erroneous silver, is not the knowledge of the shell-silver or the Intelligence limited by avidyā-vrtti having the form of silver. The intelligence limited by 'this' portion is said to be the substratum, though this very Intelligence (knowledge) is also limited by avidyā-vrtti having the form of silver. As avidyā-vṛtty-avacchinna-caitanya is not the substratum of error, its knowledge cannot take away error.

For the same reason it does not appear that knowledge is silver. The Intelligence limited by vṛtti(vṛtty-avacchinna-caitanya) which is not the substratum of the shell-silver is said to be knowledge in the empirical sense. That which is the substratum is the Intelligence limited by 'this'

133. A.E., p.468.
134. Ibid.
portion of the shell. So the appearance of silver becomes possible in identity with the substratum "This is silver". The specific aspect of the substratum (viśesaṁśa) is concealed whereas the general aspect (sāmānyāṁśa) only manifests, as according to the rule of error the manifestation of the substratum in its total form sublates error.  

Now the opponent levels another charge against the Advaitins. He says that superimposition of the objects like pot, etc. on knowledge is not logically tenable, as they exist before their knowledge. Thus, the existence of the objects and their contact with the senses which are invariably presupposed by their knowledge, make it clear that they are not superimposed on knowledge. It is improper to say that the pot is not revealed by the psychosis caused by the contact of the sense and the object, but it is revealed by the substratum-knowledge as it is upheld by the Advaitins. There is no proof to validate any knowledge apart from the psychosis-knowledge.  

It is to be borne in mind that according to the Advaitins the word knowledge (jñāna) has two meanings viz. psychosis-knowledge (vṛtti-jñāna) and svarūpa-jñāna or knowledge itself. The first is also known as pramāṇa-jñāna or pramāṇavṛtti (knowledge caused by means of valid knowledge) in distinction to avidyā-vṛtti which is known as error. The second (svarūpa-jñāna) is the Brahman itself which is the substratum (adhisthāna) of all. Knowledge itself the Brahman-Intelligence is common to both psychosis-knowledge.

136. Ibid.
(valid knowledge) and error, as it is reflected in both antahkarana-vrtti (psychosis) and avidya-vrtti (error). This Brahman-Intelligence is knowledge in the primary sense but in the empirical uses psychosis-knowledge is signified by the word 'knowledge'. This Brahman-Intelligence is not different from witness-Intelligence or witness-knowledge (saksi-jñana). The opponent accepts psychosis knowledge but tries to repudiate witness-knowledge or the Brahman-knowledge.137

In response to the above allegation of the opponents the Advaitins argue that for the establishment of the unknown objects there is the necessity of some knowledge other than psychosis. Otherwise, there being no proof to establish the unknown object, it would be unreal like hare's horn, for which its existence as the cause of the contact with senses and knowledge caused by it would be without foundation. An object which is absolutely unknown cannot be said to be the cause of some effect, as the causal relation cannot be established with an unknown object, there being no ascertainment of concomitance and non-concomitance (anvaya-vyatiraka) with the unknown. So some sort of proof (manam) is to be accepted to establish the unknown as the cause of the contact and the knowledge caused by it. This

137. There is difference among the Advaitins as to whether this witness is the Brahman itself. However, Madhusūdana accepts the view that the witness, is the Brahman itself. Vidyāranya in his Pañcadasī holds the contrary view, whereas in his Vivarana Prameya Saṅgraha he accepts their identity.
proof is not the psychosis (the six pramanās in which the internal organ gets modified as psychosis), as it is the destroyer of nescience (ajñāna). So one self-luminous eternal knowledge is to be accepted as the revealer of nescience. This eternal knowledge (witness-knowledge or Brahman-knowledge) is free from inertness, origination and destruction unlike the psychosis. That eternal knowledge being limited by different objects comes to be used as pot-knowledge, cloth-knowledge, valid knowledge, erroneous knowledge, etc. Being the revealer of nescience it is not its destroyer. But the psychosis tinged with it destroys nescience. So psychosis is also necessary.  

Here the Ācārya follows the view of Vivarana that all the things become the object of the witness-intelligence either as known or as unknown. He also quotes the Brhadāraṇyaka Bhasya Vārtika of Sureśvara to strengthen his view that the pramanās would be unnecessary if the objects like body, etc. were by themselves valid (siddha) or invalid (asiddha). Something


G.D. on Gītā, 2.17, pp.82-83.

139. Vivarana, pp.83-84

sarvān vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā va sāksicaitanyasya visayasy eva, etc.

Also, V.P.S., pp.56-58.

140. Vārtika quoted in A.S., p.469.

Also see D.M. Datta's paper "Knowledge, Reality and Unknown" in Contemporary Indian Philosophy, pp.296-297.
which is invalid by itself (svatah asiddha) cannot be revealed by pramāṇa. For this reason the unknown object which must be accepted as valid (established) for being the cause of its knowledge, cannot be established by itself. So some proof for its establishment is required. The pramāṇa vr̷t̷t̷i̷s̷ cannot manifest the unknown objects as they are antagonistic to ājñāna, for this the all pervading witness-Intelligence on which all the objects are superimposed is to be accepted. There is no need for any proof for the establishment of the witness-Intelligence, as it is the basis of all empirical uses. It is self-luminous and self-valid for which there is no infinite regress.

It is to be noted that without admitting the establishment of the objects as unknown by the witness-Intelligence, we have to face two alternatives which are quite absurd. The first is ultimate agnosticism which means that the things before coming to be known are absolutely unknown. An absolutely unknown and unknowable existence cannot be linked with the known and knowable object logically. It may lead to the conclusion that the unknown is not presented as it is, but it is misrepresented for which the unbridgeable gulf between the unknown and the known remains intact. The second alternative

141. By saying absolutely unknown and unknowable it is meant that the object is not known through the pramāṇa vr̷t̷t̷i̷s̷ nor manifest as unknown through the witness-knowledge.

142. The same difficulty we find with the noumena of Immanuel Kant.
may lead us to completely do away with the existence of the empirical objects which may be expressed in the form of utter nihilism or subjectivism. Utter nihilism can neither explain itself nor can explain the world of experience. Subjectivism makes the world a mere fragmentary appearance having no order, as the difference between the apparent and the empirical is demolished in it. It cannot also explain commonness of the empirical things. For these reasons the witness-intelligence as the manifest of the unknown objects is to be admitted. However, it does not mean that witness-knowledge is proved by this. It being self-luminous and self-valid does not require any proof. The above explanation is merely a supporting hypothetical argument for it. So there is no difficulty in accepting that on the witness which is the revealer of all, all the things are superimposed.

The opponent alleges that the view upheld by Madhusūdana that the object like pot, etc. is revealed by the substratum-intelligence contradicts the view of the old teachers of Advaita that the object like pot, etc. is revealed by the reflection of Intelligence (abhasa). But this is not true, as the reflection of Intelligence on the psychosis is not

143. The doctrine of drsti-srsti accepted by Advaita, is not subjectivism.


Pancadasī, 8.18.
different from the substratum—Intelligence, intelligence being one without difference. Not only it conform to the view of the old Advaitins, but it is also supported by the great teachers of Advaita like the commentator Śaṅkara who says in his commentary on the aphorism nāthaśa upalabdheḥ (Brahma Sūtra, 2.2.28) that one Intelligence is the revealer of all. It is to be noted that in course of refuting Buddhist idealism Śaṅkara states that this witness (Intelligence) is different from the vijnāna of the Buddhists, as unlike the latter, it is free from creation, destruction, plurality, etc. He makes it clear that this witness which is the only knower (revealer) of all does not require any other revealer, as it is one and self-luminous.\textsuperscript{145} So there is no deviation from the views of the previous preceptors of Advaita.

Madhusūdana brings forward another argument against any factual relation between drk and drśya. This argument which is generally adduced against the realists to disprove relation in general, runs like this: If the relation between drk and drśya is different from the two relata, there will be infinite regress; if on the other hand, it is not different, it cannot be a relation at all.\textsuperscript{146} It cannot be said that this relation is self-explanatory (svanirvāhaka) like cognisability (drśyatva) which is used by the

\textsuperscript{145} S.Bh., 2.2.28.

\textsuperscript{146} A.S., p.472.

Compare with Śaṅkara's argument against inherence, S.Bh., pp.438, 446.
Advaitins as the reason of the inference of falsity. The Advaitins do not accept any further cognisability in *cognisability* as it will lead to infinite regress. The dualist argues that there is no necessity of admitting any further relation between the relation and the relatum as in the above instance.

In course of refuting the argument of the dualist the Ācārya says that "being self-explained or self-sufficient" (sva-nirvāhakatva) is not possible without illusoriness (māyikatva), which confirms the illusoriness of the relation. It is to be noted that except the caitanya which is self-luminous and self-valid, non-self-luminous objects cannot explain themselves without being illusory. The Brahman which is self-luminous and self-valid does not require any further explanation for its validity; so māyā (avidyā) which is the cause of all errors cannot be explained. Thus, Madhusūdana says that impossibility of all logical explanations is the embellishment of māyā. The logical faults like ātmāśraya and infinite regress which occur when this relation is respectively taken to be self-explanatory or explained by another relation disprove its reality and prove its superimpositional character.

147. A.S., p.472.


durqhatatvam avidyāya bhūsanām na tu dūsanam
The dualists reiterate that impossibility or possibility of defining are not determining factors of indeterminability or its opposite respectively, as the Brahman is also said to be indeterminable by the Advaitins. The dualist refers to a verse of Śrīhara which says that this is the inner self where both terms 'like this' and 'like that' cannot be applied. Even the Advaitins define the world as different from both real and unreal, so it is not indeterminable. The things of the world can be determined in this manner: That which is hard (kathina) among the substances (nine substances of the Vaiśeṣikas) is earth, etc. The apparent shell-silver which has the superimposed class-property 'shell-silverness' can be defined by it, so it cannot be indeterminable. Thus, indeterminability is not the determining factor of falsity. On the other hand, though objectivity (visayata) is indeterminable, it is real like the sweetness of the juice of sugar-cane.

It is to be noted that the dualists fail to understand the position of Advaita. Advaita is not opposed to the empirical reality of the world, but it refutes only the ultimate reality of the world. In clarification of this point Madhusūdana states that indeterminability is not the absence of determination in general but absence of determination as

148. K.K.K. quoted in A.S.
149. A.S., p.472.
real or unreal. This is there in the world, as otherwise there will be contradiction (badhaka). Absence of spatial and temporal distance is the vyapaka of all relations, as otherwise there will be relation between the Himalaya and the Vindhya mountains. But in the present case, viz. in the case of the knower and the known, there can be spatial and temporal distance, as it is evident in mediate knowledge and the knowledge of the past thing. So the absence of the vyapaka of relation endowed with the impossibility of defining the object proves the falsity of the world of objects. Though the Brahman is indeterminable as having the attributes as bliss, etc., it can be determined through indication of the opposite of sorrow, etc. (duhkha-pratyanika-vady-upalaksita). It cannot be said that in the same manner reality can be determined in the world as it is contradicted. It is to be noted that though error is sublated by the revelation of Intelligence which is its substratum; and it is caused by the non-revelation of the substratum, the erroneous object can be revealed by the Intelligence as its object. Revelation of Intelligence as it is sublates error, but with the limitation of the psychosis of the form of pot, etc. (chatadi-vrty-avacchedena) it reveals the object like pot, etc. The objects are known as real in identity with their substratum the Brahman, so they are superimposed. Thus there would be no relation between drk and drsya if the latter were real.

150. A.S., p.473.
ELIMINATION OF COUNTER HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENTS

As to be endowed with supporting hypothetical arguments is the strength of inference, likewise the elimination of counter hypothetical arguments is a requisite. To show that the inference of falsity is free from counter arguments (prati-küla-tarka) Madhusūdana refutes them. Some important hypothetical arguments adduced to contradict the inference may be discussed. The first argument runs like this: If the world is superimposed, it must have a substratum. The generic portion (sāmānyāṃśa) of the substratum manifests in error, whereas specific portion remains concealed, but this is not possible in the Brahman which is thought to be the substratum, as being free from difference it is free from both generic and specific portions.151

Madhusūdana in response to this says that though the Brahman is known, it is not known properly. The erroneous object manifests in identity with the Brahman through its aspects 'reality' and 'illumination'; so these aspects are known. But the Brahman is not properly known as the plenum (pūrṇa), Bliss, Reality and Illumination. Therefore even though the Brahman is free from sāmānyā and viśeṣa, it can be the substratum. It may also be said that the Brahman being endowed with superimposed sāmānyā and viśeṣa, can be the substratum. It

cannot be said that superimposition being dependent on sāmānyas and viśesas and on the reverse they being dependent on superimposition, there will be the fault of interdependence, as the superimposed sāmānyas and viśesas are beginningless as a series.\(^{152}\)

The second counter argument advanced by the opponent runs like this: If the world were superimposed, it would have a corresponding real entity (pradhāna), but this is not accepted by the Advaitins, for which their view is logically not tenable. It is to be noted that corresponding to every case of superimposition there is a real entity or pradhāna whose impressions in the mind help the projection of the erroneous object. For instance, in the case of the appearance of serpent on the rope the impression of the real serpent which helps avidyā to get modified in the shape of the appearance is there in the mind. So, for the superimposition of the world on the Brahman, the opponent argues that a corresponding real entity (pradhāna) is required.\(^{153}\)

Madhusūdana in the course of refuting the allegation of the opponent says that the corresponding real entity which is required as the cause of the impression for making superimposition possible, is not absent in the present case. The previous world  

\(^{152}\) A.S., p.494.  
\(^{153}\) Ibid., p.495.
which is of the same class is said to be the pradhāna for the superimposition of the present world. This is also logically sound as the world, is beginningless as a continuous process. It is not required that the pradhāna is real, as superimposition requires only its impression as the cause, but does not imply the reality of the object which causes the impression. So reality belonging to a higher ontological status is not required for the pradhāna, as its knowledge is only necessary for the creation of impression.154

It cannot be said that like the knowledge of the pradhāna only the knowledge of the substratum is necessary, but not its reality as it will lead to nihilism. Substratum(adhisthāna) is the object of ajñāna which is the material cause of error. All others except the Real(Brahman) being caused by ajñāna cannot be the object of ajñāna; so they cannot be the substratum. The substratum being not real, its knowledge cannot sublate error. So the order of error and its sublation can never be possible. So the substratum unlike the pradhāna must be accepted as real. In connection with this Madhusūdana refers to a statement of Śaṅkara that in error both the real and false are jumbled together.155

154. S.S., p.495.
155. A.S., pp.495-496.
The opponent asks as to how can superimposition be possible when there is no similarity between the pradhāna and the adhisthāna. This is the third counter argument against the inference of falsity of the Advaitins. It may be said that superimposition is possible between two attributes though they are attributeless; so in the present case some sort of similarity is to be accepted, even though the Brahman which is the substratum is attributeless. But this is not possible, as the similarity being itself superimposed cannot be the cause of superimposition, there being interdependence. Though in the case of conditional superimposition (sopādhikā-dhyāsa) as "The crystal is red" there is no necessity of similarity, in the case of unconditional superimposition (nir-upādhikā-dhyāsa), as the superimposition of the serpent on the rope, there must be some sort of similarity. The superimposition of avidyā on the Brahman being unconditional, there is the need of some similarity. It may be maintained that even in the case of conditional superimposition there is similarity as in the case "The crystal is red" the pradhāna 'red flower' and the substratum 'crystal' are both substance. So 'being substance' is the similarity. 156

But this argument is not sound, as superimposition of avidyā being beginningless does not require similarity. In the cases of subsequent superimposition like the superimposition of the internal organ on the Intelligence conditioned by avidya.

156. A.S., p.496.
there is similarity, as both the internal organ and the Intelligence are related to avidya. But, in fact there is no necessity of similarity, as it is violated in the case of unconditional superimposition like "The conch-shell is yellow". "Being substance", etc. (dravyatvādikam) cannot be the similarity which is necessary for superimposition as it is known to be common to both the pradhāna and the adhisthāna. Only that similarity which is first known to be there in the pradhāna and later on known to be there in the adhisthāna is said to be the cause of adhyāsa, but not otherwise. Another point to be noted is that similarity by itself is not the cause of adhyāsa, but only by awakening the impressions it is said to be the cause. When the impression is awakened without the intervention of similarity there is no necessity of the latter. 157

Then the opponent advances the fourth counter argument. If error is accepted without fault, invalidity of that knowledge will be intrinsic (aprāmāṇyaśya svatāstvāpattih). If on the other hand, it is said to be caused by fault, then the fault itself being superimposed, there will be infinite regress. 158 But this charge of the opponent is based on misunderstanding the view of Advaita. The superimposition of avidya being beginningless (anādi) does not require any fault.

158. Ibid., p.497.
The subsequent superimpositions which are with beginning (sādi) are caused by the fault 'avidyā'. So neither the intrinsic invalidity of knowledge nor infinite regress is implied. It is to be borne in mind that the Advaitins accept the doctrine of the intrinsic validity of knowledge (svataḥ prāmaṇya) whereas invalidity is accepted to be extrinsic. It cannot be said, if superimposition of avidyā is accepted without fault, the doctrine of the intrinsic validity of knowledge will be cancelled. According to the Naiyāyikas the beginningless valid knowledge (anādi-praṇa) is without guna, though they accept the extrinsic validity of knowledge. Likewise the beginningless ajñāna of the Advaitins can be accepted without fault. It is to be noted that the Naiyāyikas hold the doctrine of extrinsic validity of knowledge. So according to them valid knowledge is due to some extrinsic guna. But at the same time they say that beginningless valid knowledge of the God is not caused by any extrinsic guna.

In fact, "to be caused by fault" is not always the requisite factor of error, as errors excepting the beginningless superimposition of avidyā are caused only by fault. Fault itself being superimposed cannot be the cause of superimposition. So there is no difficulty if it is accepted that the superimposition of avidyā is without any fault.  

159. A.E., p.497.
The fifth counter argument formulated by the opponent runs like this: If bondage (bandha) were false, there would be no necessity of making any effort for its removal. But this argument is not tenable. If bondage were real like the Brahman, it would be unsublatable. Falsity is not contradictory but conducive to sublation. It is to be noted that the dualists do not understand the truth that falsity is not unreality.  

From the above discussion we come to the conclusion that the inference of falsity is free from all logical fallacies and it is supported by right hypothetical argument. Thus, if the world were real, there would be no relation between the object and the Intelligence. All the attempts to interpret it in a realistic manner result in utter absurdity and give rise to the faults of interdependence, infinite regress, self-dependence (atmāsraya), etc. The counter hypothetical arguments are not also sound. It is noteworthy that the opponent jumbles the absolute reality (paramarthika sattva) with the empirical or functional reality and argues against the Advaita-view. But in fact, Advaita does not contradict the functional reality of the world; it only contradicts the ultimate reality. The absolute reality cannot be established nor can it be denied by empirical knowledge. The functional reality of the world cannot contradict its falsity which means the absence of world in three times, as


For discussion on the possibility of superimposition, see The Philosophy of Advaita, pp.243-251.
this absence is ontologically higher than the empirical world. Even though it is of the same ontological status the reality of the world cannot be established as both the empirical reality and its absence are to be negated. Thus, the inference of falsity supported by the śrutis is free from all faults.