CHAPTER I

DEFINITIONS OF FALSY
WHAT IS ADVAITA EPISTEMOLOGY

Advalta-vidya or Brahma-vidya primarily signifies the direct and intuitive knowledge of the Brahman which sublates avidya and its creation. It is self-valid, spontaneous and is free from the triple principle of knower, knowledge and knowable (triputi), which are invariably involved in all ordinary knowledge situations. It needs no proof for its establishment, as it is self-certain and self-sufficient. It cannot be brought down to the level of conceptual thought nor can it be grasped by our conceptual mode of thinking, as it is free from all differences. In this sense it cannot be confined to what we mean by the word 'philosophy'.

But whenever we try to translate this direct experience into our discursive thought with its conceptual framework, a system of the philosophy of Advaita becomes possible. It is true that this second one namely, expressing Advaita as a system of philosophy does not aim at the direct experience of the Brahman which is the end of it, simply because it is beyond its capacity. But certainly, this systematisation of Advaita-experience clarifies much doubt and difficulty in the path of an intellectual understanding.

of what Advaita stands for. Negatively it gives answer to the objections raised against Advaita and positively it prompts the indirect knowledge (paroksa-jñāna) of the Brahman though it cannot give rise to the direct knowledge of the Brahman.

Among the three Prasthānas of Vedānta the Āruti-prasthāna which consists of the Upanisads gives evidence of the direct and intuitive experience of the Brahman. The Smrti-prasthāna, the Bhagavadgītā gives a practical approach to this Brahman-experience with the predominance of a moralistic tone. With the help of Āruti and Smrti the Nyāya-prasthāna which consists of the Brahma-sūtra tries to systematise the fragmentary expressions of this plenary experience, scattered in different Upanisads. In course of describing its utility Śaṅkara says that the thread like aphorisms (sūtras) are necessary for stringing up the flowers of vedantic statements.\(^2\)

The commentaries, sub-commentaries on the Brahma-sūtra and other dialectical works can be described as the extension of this logical approach initiated by the Brahma-sūtra. Thus a system of Advaita philosophy is only possible with reference to this bulk of Advaita literature beginning from the Brahma-sūtra upto the dialectical works of such Advaitins as Citsukha and Madhusūdana which try to systematise the Advaita views regarding the world and the Brahman.

Advaita epistemology accepts two categories (padarthas) drk and drṣya. The Brahman that manifests the

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2. S.Bh., p.50.
whole universe is the only drṣṭa and the whole world which is made manifest by it is drṣṭya. The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge and Bliss; and the world consists only of names and forms. The whole universe consisting of the things which are to be revealed by the Intelligence is false as it is superimposed on caitanya, the Intelligence. Existence (sattā), manifestation (aphurti) and lovableness (priyatā) which are the very being of the Brahman, the drṣṭa are falsely attributed to the things of the world for which such judgements regarding the things of the world such as 'This is', 'This manifests' and 'This is lovable' become possible.³

The whole universe is revealed by one eternal caitanya as it is the substratum on which all the things are superimposed. The Kathopanisad describes it as the light which being manifest, all other things of the world are revealed.⁴ In all the activities of knowing this caitanya is the invariable factor which makes knowing possible. It is not only the knower (pramāṇa), but also the means of knowing (pramāṇa), the knowable (prameya) and the result of knowing (prameya). The substratum—Intelligence (adhiśṭhāna-caitanya) that reveals everything of the world is said to be the knowable (prameya) when it is not

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³. asti bhāti priyaṁ nāma rūpaṁ-cety-aṁśa-pañcakaṁ/
   ādya-trayaṁ brahma-rūpaṁ jagad-rūpaṁ-atho dvayaṁ/
   Dṛḍghrāvyaviveka, 20.

⁴. Kathopanisad, 2.2.15.
known (avidhāta), but when it is known, it is said to be the result (phala). So caitanya in this sense is not only the beginning of the act of knowing but also the end of it. The deep mystical sense of this is that every knowledge-situation, however insignificant it may be, has its end the Brahman-realisation, though we are not conscious of it owing to ignorance. The one eternal caitanya appears as knower, the means of knowing, knowable and knowledge through different adjunct (upādhis) caused by avidyā. But without the adjuncts it is pure Intelligence free from all distinctions.

Advaita epistemology intends to show that the world of manifold objects is revealed as it is superimposed on the Brahman-Intelligence. There can be no relation between drk and drṣya excepting that the latter is superimposed on the former. So the world is false. The Neo-Advaitins have elaborately tried to prove this through the process of dialectic. In fact, the whole first chapter of Advaita Siddhi is a grand syllogism devised to prove the falsity of the world. The main inference as it is elaborated in Advaita Siddhi is: "The doubted (the world) is false, as it is seen (drṣya), inert and limited, like the shell-silver". In this inference the sadhya that is intended to be proved is falsity; drṣytra etc. are reasons and the example is the shell-silver. Madhusudana has discussed in great details the definitions of each term involved in this inference.

and whenever necessary has adduced pramāṇa to establish it, as to prove something definition (lakṣaṇa) and proof (pramāṇa) are invariable necessities (lakṣaṇapramāṇabhyām arthaśiddhiḥ).

Definition is the first step in a philosophical inquiry. A little alteration in the definition can completely change the character of a philosophical system. Much controversy in philosophy is due to defining apparently the same thing in different manners. For instance, the Buddhists give a functional definition of reality (sattā), whereas the Naiyāyikas define it in a conceptualistic-realistic manner. The Mādhyamikas seem to be ultra-realists and their definition of reality has not much difference from that of an ordinary man. The Advaitins define it in the term of unsublatatbility and their definition aims at finality. Thus sattā is not the same as it is used in different systems. This is true in many other cases. So Madhusūdana elaborately discusses the definitions of the terms used by the Advaitins as well as by the non-Advaitins. He shows that the definitions of the non-Advaitins are inconsistent and absurd, whereas those of the Advaitins are logically consistent.

First of all he discusses the definitions of falsity as it is the sādhya of the inference adduced to prove the falsity of the world. The inference is: "The doubted (the world, whose reality is doubted) is false as it is seen (drṣya) like the shell-silver". 7 The definitions of falsity which Madhusūdana defends and clarifies are taken from the works of

the previous Advaita teachers. He only defends them from the attack of the opponents. The opponents (purvapaksa) are the Madhvas and the view which he cites as purvapaksa mainly belongs to Vyāsatīrtha, the writer of Nyāyānītrita. Among the five definitions of falsity discussed by the Ācārya\textsuperscript{8} the first belongs to the Pancapādiṅkā of Padmapāda; the next two are taken from the Vivarana of Prakāśātmā and the other two definitions are taken from Citsukha and Anandabodha respectively.\textsuperscript{9}

THE FIRST DEFINITION

The first definition of falsity in Advaita Siddhi is taken from Pancapādiṅkā of Padmapāda. It says that the word 'falsity' means indescribability.\textsuperscript{10} It means absence of both reality and unreality in one locus. But the dualists do not accept this. They say that such a definition is self-contradictory. It is because that among the two viz., reality and unreality if we assert the absence of one the existence of the other is necessarily implied. So there cannot be absence of both at the same time in one locus. In the shell-silver there is the absence of reality, but there is no absence of unreality as it is sublated. So the example of shell-silver in the inference, adduced to prove the falsity of the world, suffers from the

\textsuperscript{8} In this work the word 'Ācārya' (in singular) signifies Madhusūdana Sarasvati.

\textsuperscript{9} Laghucandrika, p.206.

\textit{ādayāt syāt pancapādy-uktam tato vivaranodite/}
\textit{citsukhiyaḥ caturtham syāt antyam ānandabodhaḥ/}

\textsuperscript{10} A.S., p.48.
logical fallacy of सभ्य-वैकल्य as the example, instead of proving absence of both reality and unreality actually disproves it. It is to be borne in mind that according to the मध्वस the shell-silver is not false but unreal as it is sublated. They do not discriminate between false and unreal, as they define unreality as the counter-positiveness of the absence in all space and time. Both the shell-silver and hare's horn(शास्त्री-श्रीगा) are counterpositive of such absence; so they are unreal alike.

They also try to find out the logical fault अर्थान्तरर in the definition of the Advaitin as that which is not intended to be proved is proved by the definition. The ब्रह्म of the Advaitin is real, though the attribute reality is not there, it being free from all attributes(नैर्द्धर्मका). Like this, the opponents say, the world is real even though the characteristic reality is not there. So according to the opponents, the definition, 'absence of both reality and unreality' only means that the world is real though it is free from the attribute reality like the ब्रह्म. Absence of unreality in the world has nothing to contradict the thesis of the dualists as according to them the world is real.11

The Advaitins defend their position by showing the inability of the opponents to understand what is meant by reality and unreality in Advaita. In Advaita these two are not contradictory, but they are only contrary. To clarify this the Advaitins explain the relation between them. First, reality

and unreality may be defined as such that they become mutual exclusive (parasparabhāva-rūpa). Secondly, each of them may be understood as the vyāpaka of the absence of the other. Thirdly, each of them may be the vyāpya of the absence of the other. If the first alternative is accepted the assertion of the absence of one will imply necessarily the presence of the other. Inversely, the assertion of one will also imply the absence of the other. According to the second alternative, if each of them is thought to be the vyāpaka of the absence of the other, then by accepting the absence of one we have to admit the existence of the other. If the third alternative is accepted, then the existence of one will imply the absence of the other but not inversely. The Advaita conception of reality and unreality makes it possible to accept the third alternative. Both reality and unreality can be absent in one locus at the same time from the point of view of the third alternative.

According to Advaita that which is never sublated in any of the three times (past, present and future) is real (sat). Unreality (asattva) is not here defined as different from reality (sattva-vyatireka), but it is defined as "not being the locus of cognisedness as real in some substratum" (upādhi). To put the same in other words that which never appears in some substratum as real is unreal (asat). The son of a barren lady or hare's horn

13. Ibid., pp.50-51.

kvacit api upādhau sattvena pratiyamānatvā-nadhikaranatvam.
is never cognised as real in any substratum; so it is said to be unreal. But that which is intended to be proved viz. falsity is different from this. So the definition of falsity is "cognisedness as real in some substratum, being different from unsublatability in three times". Thus, that which appears as real in some substratum is false. All that which are seen (drṣya-mātra) are superimposed on the real substratum the Brahman; so they are capable of being cognised as real. In this case reality which is attributed to the objects belongs to the substratum the Brahman. So also the shell-silver is superimposed on the intelligence that is conditioned by the shell for which the reality attributed to it, in fact belongs to the substratum (Brahman). But the asat (unreal) is not superimposed on the Brahman, so it does not appear in identity with the sat (real). For this there can be no cognition of the unreal. Thus, we see that unsublatability (abādhyatva) is the criterion of reality and non-appearance (apratīyaṁanatva) is the criterion of unreality. In view of this, there can be no fault of sadhya-vaikalya (disproving that which is intended to be proved) in the example of shell-silver, as unreality is not sublatability (bādhyatva). The empirical objects of the world as well as the erroneous objects like shell-silver are false alike, as they have neither reality which means according to Advaita.

15. Bālabodhini, p.35.
unsublatability in all the times nor they have unreality which means absence of cognisedness (apratiyamānatva). There is no contradiction as reality is not the absence of unreality nor unreality is the absence of reality. Thus they not being mutually exclusive, the first alternative is not tenable.

The second alternative that each of the pair, reality and unreality is the vyāpaka of the absence of the other is also not tenable. In the shell-silver in which there is the absence of reality, there is the presence of falsity which is different from unreality (asattva-vyatireka), but there is no unreality. So reality cannot be the vyāpaka of the absence of unreality nor unreality can be the vyāpaka of the absence of reality.  

If the third alternative is accepted, there will be no contradiction. According to the third alternative reality is the vyāpya of the absence of unreality and unreality is the vyāpya of the absence of reality. In this case by asserting reality (vyāpya) we have to accept the absence of unreality (vyāpaka) but not inversely. So also the assertion of unreality will necessarily imply the absence of reality but not inversely. In this case both these vyāpyas can also be denied at the same time. For instance, both cowness and horseness, which are vyāpya of each other's absence, are absent in something else viz. camel etc.  

17. Ibid., pp.52-55.
horseness is the vyāpya of the absence of the other, as if we assert any of these two, the absence of the other is necessarily implied. In this case there is no contradiction if we deny both of them. Like this, there is no logical difficulty, if we deny both reality and unreality at the same time with reference to a particular thing viz. shell-silver as each of them is only the vyāpya of other's absence. It is remarkable that this third alternative is accepted by the Advaitin.

Now the Advaitin is going to refute the fault of arthāntara which the opponent tries to show in the definition of the Advaitin. The opponent says that the Brahman of the Advaitin is real though it is bereft of the attribute 'reality', being free from all the attributes (nirdharmaka); so also the world is real, though it is bereft of reality. But this is not tenable as reality which is attributed to the world or the things of the world does not belong to them. Such cognitions as "The world is real", "The pot is real", etc. are due to the real basis of the world - the Brahman followed by all the things (sarvanucaata). 18 So the cognition of something as real is made possible by the real substratum on which all are superimposed. There is no pramāṇa (means of knowledge) to prove that the world is real also. It is noteworthy that the reality which is attributed to the world is only the functional reality (artha-kriya-gāmartya-sattva) which is not the same as the reality, signifying unsublatability in three times. In the

following chapters the Ācārya discusses how reality is not capable of being grasped through perception in the world. The ultimate reality which means unsublatability in all the three times (trikāla-badhyatva) is not capable of being determined by perception. 19

After showing that there is no proof to establish the reality of the world, the Advaitin says that there is even proof against it. He says that if it is taken for granted that the world is real, it cannot account for such uses as the substance is real, quality is real, inherence is real, universal is real, non-existence is real, etc. which are based on the respective cognitions. In these cases, though the objects vary reality which characterizes all of them does not vary at all. From a strictly realistic point of view this cannot be logically explained. It is a necessity that the cognition (pratiti) is always regulated by its object (visaya-niyama). But in this case the objects vary, though the cognition of reality does not vary. This may also lead to the nihilistic view of the Buddhists that the form (ākara) 'reality' is attached to these objects wrongly in these cognitions which results in the complete abandonment of the realistic ground. This criticism is directed against the upholders of the reality of the world; and these upholders do not at the same time admit 'reality' as


A.S., Pratyaksabādhodhāra prakarana, pp.333-334.
the universal (sattā-jāti). The realists who think that reality (sattā) is the universal which accompanies all the things in such cognitions, cannot also explain this. The Naiyāyikas say that the highest universal 'reality' inheres in substance, quality and action. So such cognitions as "The substance is real", "The pot is real", etc. are due to this inherent universal reality. In order to avoid some logical difficulties the Naiyāyikas do not admit reality (sattā-jāti) in universal, particular inherence and non-existence. For instance, in non-existence universal reality is not thought to be inherent as non-existence (abhāva) is defined as different from existence (bhāva-bhinna) which is further clarified as the absence of relatedness with the universal 'reality' through the relation 'inherence' either directly or indirectly. So, if reality as the universal is admitted to be inherent in non-existence, then there will be contradiction. Likewise, if universal reality is said to be inherent in universal, there will be ātmāsraya. If it is admitted to be inherent in inherence, there will be ātmāsraya, since inherence is required to relate the universal to it. But such a doctrine that the reality only inheres in substance, quality and action will make it difficult to explain such cognitions as "The non-existence is real", "The inherence is real", "The universal is real", etc.

To escape such difficulty the Naiyāyikas say that in a few cases the universal 'reality' is related to some categories through direct relation 'inherence' as in the case of substance, quality and action. In other cases as universal, particular, inherence, etc. it is related to them indirectly through a series of relations (parampara-sāmbandha). For example, the universal 'reality' is related to the substance through inherence. But it is related to the universal 'substance-ness' (dravyatva) and the inherence (sāmavāya) residing in the substance through the indirect relation of staying in the same locus (sāmanādhi karanya). So such cognitions as "The universal is real", "The particular is real", "The inherence is real", etc. are possible since there is an indirect relation between reality and these categories. Though in the case of non-existence there is neither direct nor indirect relation of it with the universal reality, the cognition "The non-existence is real" can be explained by non-existence itself (svarūpa-sattā). 22

But such an explanation is untenable as it will give rise to some logical difficulties. Cognition which follows its object is always regulated by it. In a cognitive judgement there are at least three parts viz. the qualifier (viśesana), relation (saṁsarga) and the qualified (viśesya) which correspond to their objective counterparts. Being regulated by its object

of cognition means corresponding to the three objective counterparts viz. viśesāṇa, saṁsarga and viśesya. Here, it is to be borne in mind that though the Advaitins do not admit the correspondence theory of validity of knowledge, they admit the fact that knowledge is regulated by its object (vastu-tantra)\(^\text{23}\). So whenever there is a change in the objective counterparts, there should be a change in the cognition. But in these examples "The substance is real", "The universal is real", "The inherence is real", "The non-existence is real", etc. even though we admit 'reality' as a universal, there is no change in the cognition inspite of the change in the objective counterpart 'relation', since in some case the universal 'reality' is said to be directly related and in other cases it is said to be related through indirect relation\(^\text{24}\). Through relations of different kinds it is not possible to have similar cognitions as if it were so, there would be no validity of the difference in relation. Cognition as "Non-existence is real" cannot be explained as reality as the universal is not admitted to be inherent in non-existence. It is not even proper to maintain that cognition as "Non-existence is real" can be explained by the form of non-existence itself (svarūpa-sattā). If it were so, there would be no necessity of imagining a universal like sattā or reality as the cognition of anything as real would be explained by the svarūpa of the thing itself. But we have already discussed that without

\(23\) S.Bh., p.53

\(24\) Bālabodhinī, pp.39-40, 354-356.
admitting the universal 'reality' inherent in all the things, we cannot explain cognition of something as real by taking the help of the thing itself or by its svarūpa-satta. It is because that the forms of the things (svarūpa) rest in the respective individual things (prati-vyakti-visranta), but are not related to other things. So the form of a thing is not common to others for which it cannot explain a common cognition like 'The substance is real', "The non-existence is real", etc. Thus, we have seen that without admitting 'reality' as the universal we cannot explain the viśesana 'real'. Even though we admit 'reality' as the universal we cannot explain the relation between the viśesana (real) and the viśesya (like substance, quality, universal, inherence, non-existence, pot, potness, etc.). So such cognitions cannot be explained from the point of view of the opponents.

But all these can be explained very well from the point of view of Advaita. According to the Advaitin the only reality is Brahman on which the whole world is superimposed through a false identity (mithya-tadatmya). Thus, the things of the world including the so-called substance, attribute, inherence, universal, etc. of the Nayayikas are superimposed on the one real substratum the Brahman. So reality which is attributed to these things wrongly in these cognitive judgements as "The substance is real", etc. is really the Brahman. So it

is not a fact that reality as an attribute (dharma) resides in different substrata (dharmin), but it is more intelligible to say that on one real substratum (Brahman) the different things like substance etc. are superimposed. As there are sound arguments to disprove the opponent's view that the world is real and there is nothing to support it, the opponent cannot find out arthāntara in Advaitin's definition.

From the above discussion it is clear that the basic difficulty in the view of the opponent is his way of conceiving 'reality' (sattā) as either an individual attribute or a universal attribute. Neither as an individual property nor as a universal can it be consistent with our experience. It is further based on a wrong classification of categories and relations. Though the arguments of the Advaitins are directed against the ultimate reality of these categories, they also show their inconsistency with the empirical knowledge and their uses. In contrast to this, the position of the Advaitin is sound and consistent. According to him, 'reality' is not an attribute of the real Brahman, but the Brahman is reality itself. Thus 'real', 'reality' and 'existence' are the same. The criterion of reality is unsublatability in all the three times. Such empirical uses as "The pot is real", "The substance is real", etc. are possible only through superimposition. Because of

this Advaita only repudiates the ultimate reality of the world but not its empirical reality; so it does not conflict with our empirical knowledge and uses. When the Advaitins disprove the reality of the world, they do not disprove the reality as functionality (artha-kriya-samarthya) but as unsublatability.

After refuting all the charges of contradiction, sadhya-vaikalya and arthaantara the Acarya now proceeds to define indescribability in a different way. The previous definition of anirvacanlyatva was made with the help of absolute absence (atyantabhava), but the present definition is made through the use of the concept of difference (bhedā). Thus, it is described as "both the differences whose counterpositives are the real and the unreal". In other words, 'false' means to be different from both real and unreal. In the previous definition, "absence of both reality and unreality", the opponent has tried to find out the fault arthaantara which the Acarya refuted. But in this present definition there is no possibility of finding out arthaantara as something real bereft of the attribute 'reality' (like the Brahman) is possible; but it is impossible to think of something as real, when it is different from real. Some of the opponents like the writer of Tatparyatikā (Vācaspati) say that the world is both real and unreal (sadasadatmaka). Others like the Ādīvās and the later Naiyāyikas (coming after Vācaspati) Mīmāṃsakas, etc. think that the world is real. The Buddhists

think that the world is unreal. If we define falsity (indescribability) as different from both reality and unreality, arthāntara cannot be urged from these stand points of view.

The Madhvas may try to find the fault siddha-sādhana in the definition of the Advaitin. They may say that when partially the difference from unreal is proved in the world, there occurs partially the fault of siddha-sādhana, as one part of the sādhya that is the difference from unreality is already said to be established in the world. But this is not tenable as no part of both the differences - difference from real and difference from unreal - is intended to be proved here. What is intended to be proved is not any part of it, but the combination of both these differences. The Ācārya gives a counter argument against the Madhvas to show that there is no siddha-sādhana in the case of the Advaitic definition. The Madhvas uphold the view that quality, action and class-property, etc. are different and non-different (bhinnā-bhinnā) from substance which has quality etc. So according to them quality and substance, action and that which has action, class-property and that which has the class-property are both different and non-different from each other. The Madhvas do not accept samavāya or inherence between these pairs. In order to prove their thesis they adduce an inference: "Quality etc. are different and non-different from

29. Bālabodhinī, pp.41-42.
30. When some sādhya (intended to be proved) is already proved (siddha) according to the opponent's view it is known as siddha-sādhana.
those which have them (guny-ādi), as they are of the same locus (samanā-dhikṛta). This inference is formulated against the Naiyāyikas who uphold the theory of difference between them. The sādhyā or that which is intended to be proved is the combination (milīta) of both difference and non-difference (bheda-bheṣa). Among these two the Naiyāyikas accept only difference.

If partial siddha-sādhana is accepted as a fault when in fact, the combination of two factors is intended to be proved, then this inference of the Mādhvas will also suffer from siddha-sādhana, since one part of the sādhyā namely 'difference' is already established according to the Naiyāyika. As in the above inference of the Mādhvas the combination is intended to be proved but not any one of the pair, so also according to the Advaitins, the combination of both the absences or both the differences is intended to be proved. Thus, there is no siddha-sādhana. 31

After refuting the charge of partial siddha-sādhana, Madhusūdana defines it in a modified manner as "the absolute absence of unreality qualified by the absolute absence of reality", so that there is no possibility of siddha-sādhana. In the previous definition which is made with the combination of both the absences or the differences there is possibility of thinking of partial siddha-sādhana, as there are two limiting attributes of the sādhyata (sādhyata-vacchedaka-dharma-dvaya). But in the present definition where the qualified whole (visista)

is the meaning there is only one limiting attribute of the sadhyata, that is the 'qualifiedness' (viśistatva).

Then the dualists try to find out some other faults in the definition of the Advaitins. They say that even though we accept the combination of these absences or the differences or we accept one as qualified by the other, this sadhyā cannot be established as nowhere can we find such a thing. Thus it is absolutely unfounded. According to the opponents it is not even proper to argue that since each of these absences or the differences is established separately (pratyeka-prasiddhyā), their combination or the qualified whole is possible. If it were so, hare's horn would be valid, hare and horn being established separately. But this criticism of the opponents is due to lack of proper understanding of the position of Advaita. The Advaitin does not hold that since each of the absences is established their combination or qualified whole is established. On the other hand, in the cases like shell-silver, it is proved. According to the Advaitin the shell-silver is neither real as it is sublated nor is it unreal as it appears. So the absence of both reality and unreality is proved here. So there is no fault of unfoundedness of the sadhya (sadhyā-prasiddhi).32

It is not even proper to say that this definition is too wide (ati-vyāpta) as it also includes the Brahman. The opponents say that the Brahman which is said to be attributeless (nirdharmaka), being destitute of these attributes 'reality'

32. A.S., pp.79-80.
and 'unreality' comes under this definition of falsity. But this is untenable as the Brahman being attributeless is said to be destitute of both reality and unreality; it is also destitute of both the absences of reality and unreality. Thus, the Brahman being free from all existential attributes and their absences alike, the definition does not include it. So it is not too wide.\textsuperscript{33} What is clear from this discussion is that our convenient categories of thought as reality, unreality, absence of reality and absence of unreality, etc. are not applicable to the Brahman. This is described in the M\textsuperscript{\text{\textsc{and}}yk\textsuperscript{\text{\textsc{a}}}}\textsuperscript{\texttext{\text{\textsc{k}arik\textsc{a}}}} as that which is untouched by the four categories 'is', 'is not', 'is and is not' and 'is not at all'.\textsuperscript{34} It is important to note that though the Brahman is only real from the ontological point of view, reality or existence is not attributed to it as it is reality or existence itself. In the judgements where reality is attributed to something, it is not intended to say that the thing is reality itself; but it is only meant that the thing appears to be real, being superimposed on the Real (the Brahman). As the Brahman is the real ground of the whole world and unlike the things of the world is not superimposed on something else, it cannot be described by the attribute 'reality'. So, by saying that the Brahman is real, it is meant that the Brahman is reality itself, but not that it has the attribute 'reality'.

\textsuperscript{33} A.S., p.90.

\textsuperscript{34} M.K., 4.83-84.
From the above discussion it is evident that the alleged logical difficulties like contradiction (vyāghata), etc. only arise if we define reality and unreality in the way of the dualists. But, from the stand-point of Advaita there is no difficulty at all. Reality is defined by the Mādhvas as not being the counterpositive of the negation related to all space and time. Unreality is the counterpositiveness of the negation related to all space and time. Thus according to the Mādhvas, both the superimposed as the shell-silver and the alīka as the hare’s horn are unreal alike, as they are the counterpositive of the negation related to all space and time. The empirical things as pot etc. are real, as they are not the counterpositive of such negation (nisedhā-pratiyogī). So far as the existence of the empirical things is asserted in any time and space, they say, their absence in all space and time is not possible. So, according to them, there can be only two alternatives viz. unreal and real, among which the superimposed and the totally non-existent (alīka) belong to the first category and others excepting them belong to the second category. As each of reality and unreality in this view is the vyāpaka of the absence of the other, there will be contradiction and other faults if we deny both of them at the same time.

35. Nyāyānta quoted in Bālabodhini, p.49.

trikāla-sarva-desiya-nisedhā-pratiyogī
tattocyeṭādhvasta-tucche taṁ prati pratiyoginī//
Reality is not defined in Advaita as "not being the counterpositive of the negation, related to all space and time", nor is it said that unreal is to be the counterpositive of such a negation related to all space and time. On the other hand real is defined as that which cannot be sublated in any time. Brahman is only real as it cannot be sublated in any of the times. Reality which means unsublatability in any time cannot be determined through perception, as perception only gives us the knowledge of the present (vartamāna-mātra-grāhi) nor is it possible in the case of the transient things of the world. So reality as such which is determined by āruti is possible only in the case of the Brahman. The Advaitins define unreal as that which cannot be cognised as real in some locus or that which cannot appear as real. The son of a barren lady and hare's horn etc. are unreal, as they cannot be cognised as real. Something which appears as real is superimposed on the real substratum for which its cognition as real is possible through the relation of false identity with the substratum. Since the unreal is not superimposed in any substratum it cannot be cognised as real in any substratum or locus (upādhi). The superimposed (adhyasta) which includes both the apparent objects (prātibhāsika) like the shell-silver and the empirical (vyāvahārika) like pot etc. is neither real nor unreal since both sublation and cognition are possible in their case. The shell-silver is superimposed on the intelligence (caitanya) defined by 'this' portion of the shell (idam-anāśā-vacchinna).
The empirical world (prapāñca) is superimposed on the Brahman-Intelligence (Brahma-caitanya). The defined Intelligence, being the same Brahman-Intelligence in reality, all the things are superimposed on the Brahman and appear as real in identity with it. Thus it is possible to be different from both real and unreal from the standpoint of Advaita since reality and unreality are neither of the form of their mutual absence nor vyāpaka of their mutual absence.

It is important to note that the controversy is due to defining reality and unreality differently. But it is not correct to think that it is a mere verbal controversy based on different preconceived definitions. Instead of being so, the definitions are based on matter of facts and try to explain them. It is clear from the definition of reality of the dualists that they are content with the immediate things of the world and do not want to question their ultimate status. The Mādhvas define reality in the term of ordinary experience as related to any space and time but confuse it with reality in the sense of unsublatability. On the other hand, the Advaitins are consistent with their position and try to find out the ultimate meaning of the things of experience, without understanding which the dualists try to misinterpret Advaita. The dualists also violate the evidence of experience when they include both the superimposed and the unreal in one category. But the Advaitins in agreement with experience differentiate them and have given them different
status. What is important is that Advaita should be understood in its own light. The dualists without understanding this make wrong allegations against it. The Ācārya clarifying the position of Advaita has defended it from the attack of the opponents.

THE SECOND DEFINITION

The second definition of falsity is taken from Vivarana written by Prakāśātman. It is as follows: Falsity is the counterpositiveness of the absence, related to all times in a cognised (pratipanna) locus. 36 Here cognition in the term 'cognised locus' does not mean valid knowledge nor does it mean erroneous knowledge but only cognition (pratīti) common to both erroneous cognition (bhrama) and valid cognition (prama). If the cognition of the locus as the locus of the counterpositive (pratiyogin) were valid, there would be contradiction when we assert its absence in that very locus in all the three times (past, present and future). If the cognition on the other hand, were invalid, there would be the fault of siddha-sādhana, as the absence is established already in that locus, the counterpositive being erroneous. So the definition only means that as the locus of the counterpositive the locus is cognised neither rightly nor wrongly. 37

36. A.S., p.94.
pratipannopadhu traikālika-nisēdha-pratiyogitvam.
37. Bālabodhini, p.53.
In this definition the term 'cognised locus' limits the definition from being too wide as to include the unreal like hare's horn, etc. as it is also the counterpositive of its absence in all times. But it is never cognised in any locus. Thus 'cognised locus' means to be cognised as the locus of the false object or the counterpositive that is also cognised. So the term 'cognised locus' restricts the definition from being too wide. The world is false, since it is the counterpositive of its absence in the Brahman which is cognised as the locus of it. It is not even proper to say that the Brahman being colourless (rupa-nīna) cannot be cognised even as the locus. As the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas accept that the colourless 'time' (kāla) is cognised by all the senses, so also the Brahman is cognised, though it is colourless. It is to be borne in mind that though the Brahman is said to be beyond the senses, in its aspect of reality it is capable of being perceived by all the senses. So its cognition as the substratum of all the phenomena is not impossible.38 In the definition 'absence' or 'negation' (nīsedha) means only atyantābhāva, as unlike prāg-abhāva and dhvaṃśa it pervades all the times. As counterpositive of prior negation and dhvaṃśa are not false, atyantābhāva is given in the definition.

Now the dualist questions the status of the negation(absence) used in this definition. He holds that this absence related to all times, may be either absolutely real

(tātvika) or empirical; or it may be apparent. It is to be borne in mind that according to the Advaitins there are three grades of existence viz. absolutely real (paramārthika), empirically real (vyavahārika) and apparently real (pratibhāsika). Absolute reality which belongs only to the Brahman, means unsublatability. Empirical reality means that which is not sublated by anything other than the knowledge of the Brahman. It belongs to the world of experience. Apparent reality which belongs to shell-silver etc. is sublated by empirical valid knowledge (vyavahārika-śraddhā-pānta-bāndhya). Among these three the first is only real and to the other two grades of existence, reality is falsely attributed. If this absence, the dualist says, is real in the absolute sense (tātvika), then the position of Advaita will be vitiated, since there will be a real absence apart from the real Brahman. If it is apparent (pratibhāsika), there will be siddha-sādhana, as it cannot contradict the reality of the empirical world. On the other hand, if it is empirical, it being itself contradicted cannot contradict the world; so there will be arthāntara. The explicit meaning of this objection is that the empirical negation can only negate the empirical reality of its counterpositive (world) but it cannot negate its absolute reality. So there will be arthāntara. Though the empirical reality of the world is contradicted by the empirical negation, its absolute reality (paramāarthikatva) upheld by the opponents, is established, since apparent character is denied to it.
In course of refuting the objection of the opponent Madhusūdana says that there is no difficulty in accepting either absolute reality or empirical reality of this negation. If this negation is accepted as absolutely real (tattvika), this will not vitiate the position of Advaita, as this absence is not different from its locus (adhikarana), the Brahman. It is not even proper to say that the world being the counterpositive of real absence, is real in the absolute sense (tattvika), as such a vyāpti is not invariable. In the case of shell-silver, such a principle that the counterpositive is of the same grade of existence as its determining absence is violated, as here the counterpositive belongs to the grade of apparent reality whereas its determining absence belongs either to the grade of absolute reality or to the grade of empirical reality. The absence of shell-silver is said to be absolutely real in relation to the unconditioned Intelligence (anavacchinna-caitanya) on which the absence of the whole empirical and apparent world rests as non-different from it. This absence may also be termed as empirical in relation to the Intelligence conditioned by the 'this' portion of the shell, which is the locus of shell-silver from the empirical point of view. As the shell-silver belongs to a grade of existence which is different from the grade of its absence so also the world belongs to a different grade of existence. So there is no difficulty when we say that the absence of the world is absolute whereas the counterpositive is empirical. 39

After showing that there is no difficulty if the absence of the world is accepted as absolutely real (tattvika), the Ācārya proceeds to prove that there is no difficulty even if we do not accept it as absolutely real. In this view the absence is accepted as empirical but not as apparent. Being empirical it is contradicted or sublated by the ultimate knowledge of the Brahman. But there is no fault of arthāntara which the dualists allege. The dualists argue that when the negation (absence) is itself negated, the reality of the counterpositive is necessarily implied; so there will be the fault of arthāntara in the Advaita view. But this is not correct as here both the counterpositive and its negation are to be negated.

Only there the reality of the counterpositive is implied where its negation is negated and its counterpositive is established. The following instances may be cited in support: "This is not silver" and "This is not not-silver". The second negation negates the first negation and establishes the silver. But when both the counterpositive and the negation are negated, the reality of the counterpositive is not implied as in the case of posterior absence (dhvāma-bhāva) both the prior absence (prāg-abhāva) and its counterpositive are negated. 40 Here the commentator Brahmananda interprets the word 'prāg-abhāva-pratīyoginoḥ' as the previous (prāk) absolute non-existence (abhāva) and its counterpositive. He says that the context

40. A.S., pp.105-106.
of discussion being absolute negation, it is illogical to speak of prior negation (prāc-abhāva). Thus, according to this meaning at the time of subsequent negation (dhyānaśa) both absolute negation and its counterpositive are negated.

Thus, in the case of the negation used in this definition of falsity, both the negation and the counterpositive being negated, there is no implication of the reality of the counterpositive. There only reality of the counterpositive is implied by the negation of negation, where the grade of the negation is dissimilar to that of the counterpositive. But in the present case both being of the same grade viz. empirical (vyāvahārīka), such a difficulty does not arise. In fact, the determinant of negation as drṣytva etc. being there in both the negation and its counterpositive, both are to be negated. 41

It is clear from the above discussion that the absence of the world like the absence of the shell-silver is not itself either absolute (paramārthika) or empirical (vyāvahārīka). But only in relation to its locus (adbhikaraṇa) it is termed either as absolute or as empirical. When the unconditioned intelligence is taken as the locus of the absence of the world, the absence is termed as absolute as its locus. But if the intelligence conditioned by the world is taken as the ground of this absence, then this conditioned intelligence being empirical the absence resting there is also said to be empirical. 42 In the first view the absence being non-different

42. Balabodhini, pp.58-59.
from the Brahman, there is no implication of dualism. In the second view both the negation and the negated being negated, there is no implication of the reality of the counterpositive. The opponents without understanding this variable position of the absence used in this definition vainly try to refute it. It is interesting to note that they also jumble up the empirical either with the absolute or with the apparent. It is because that, according to them, the empirical is the same as the absolute. But in Advaita the empirical is distinguished by its special character "sublatability by nothing except the knowledge of the Brahman (brahmajnāne-tarā-bādhyā)" whereas the apparent is defined as that which is sublated by empirical right knowledge or right knowledge other than the knowledge or the Brahman.

Now in a different manner the opponents try to disprove the Advaitic doctrine by questioning the character of the pratiyoqin (counterpositive). They point out that there can be no limiting characteristic (avacchedaka-dharma) of the counterpositiveness. Neither can it be said that this counterpositiveness is limited by its own form (svarūpa), nor can it be said that it is limited by the characteristic absoluteness (paramārthikatva). In the first alternative the term 'svarūpa' means cognisability (drṣyāvata), etc. which forms its 'svarūpa' and in the second alternative the term 'absoluteness' means unsublatability. The first characteristic lies in the same locus, whereas the second one lies in a different locus. To state this in other words, the opponents ask whether this
counterpositive is the counterpositive of the absence by itself (svarūpeṇa) or by a different characteristic 'absoluteness'. As the Madhvas do not accept the view that the counterpositive is conditioned by a characteristic residing in a different locus (vyādhikarana-dharma-vacchinna-pratiyoga), so, to say that the absence of the pot as the cloth (pāṭaṇena ghato nāsti) only means absence of clothness in the pot. Thus, to say the absence of the world as absolute (or by the characteristic absoluteness) only means the absence of absoluteness in the world. Both these alternatives are acceptable to the Advaitins, as either of them proves the falsity of the concerned object.

But the opponents argue that both these alternatives are impossible. If the first alternative that the concerned object is the counterpositive of its absence in all the times by itself is accepted, this will imply the absolute non-existence or unreality of this object. But the empirical things like ether (ākāśa), etc. or apparent objects like shell-silver, etc. cannot be said to be unreal as their creation is validated by śrutī; they are capable of fruitful activity; avidyā is said to be their material cause and they are thought to be destroyed by right knowledge. These arguments are tentatively adduced by the opponents only by assuming the view of the Advaitin. They add further, so far as the empirical objects are cognised, their absolute non-existence cannot be proved. Hence their absence in all times by themselves is not possible. It is to
be borne in mind that according to the opponents, unless a thing is unreal, it cannot be the counterpositive of its absence in all the times by itself.  

Nor can it be said that as absolute it is the counterpositive of its absence in three times, as this will give rise to the fault of interdependence (anyonyāśraya). Here absoluteness means unsublatability (abādhyatva). Sublatability means falsity (mithyātva). So absoluteness which means unsublatability is determined by falsity. So it cannot be used to define falsity. Thus absoluteness cannot be the limiter (avacchedaka) of the counterpositiveness that is used in the definition of falsity.  

The Advaitins accept both the alternatives among which the former one is that the shell-silver is the counterpositive of its absence by itself (svarupena). When, after the sublation of error the right knowledge of the substratum is attained the experience — “The shell-silver was not there, it is not now, it will not be in the future” — reveals the absence of the shell-silver by itself in all the times. Thus, the sublation-cognition (bādha-jnāna) confirms the view of the Advaitins that the shell-silver is itself the counterpositive of its absence in three times. So also the Vedic statement neha nānāsti kiñcana proves the absence of the world by its

44. Ibid., pp.116-118.
own svarūpa. So the opponents' view that something which is the counterpositive by itself of its absence in all times must be unreal is contradicted by both the empirical and apparent objects which are not unreal. 45 Brahmānanda says that the second alternative that the silver is the counterpositive of absence as absolute is also correct. There is no indedependence as here absoluteness does not mean difference from sublatability, but only means not being sublated by knowledge (jñāna-nivārtayatva).

When it is said that by its own self (svarūpa) the silver is the counterpositive of its absence, the opponents may think that the empirical silver (laukika-parameṛtha-rajaṭam) is such counterpositive by its own self. But it is not the fact. If it is said that the object of error is the apparent silver (pratibhasika-rajaṭam) and the object of the sublation-knowledge is the empirical silver, then the basis of both the cognition will be different which is untenable. There will also be the sublation of the unwanted (aprakta) as the empirical silver is not here imposed on the shell. 47 Thus, it is in conformity with logic that the shell-silver (apparent silver) by itself is said to be the counterpositive of its absence in three times. This is also supported by the previous teachers of Advaita. In this context the Acārya solves an apparent contradiction in a statement of Vivarana and quotes Citsukha's view in support of

45. A.S., p.120.
46. Laghucandrikā, p.124.
47. A.S., p.121.
his interpretation. In his Tattva Pradipika Citsukha says that when the previous teachers say that the empirical silver is the object of the sublation-knowledge "This is not silver", it only means that the silver (apparent silver) which appears as the empirical silver is the object of it, as activity is seen in the desiring man with regard to the silver that appears in front. The plain meaning of the sublation-knowledge is: "That which appears as silver is not the empirical silver".

Though this cognition has its content the mutual absence (anyonyabhava), it implies the total absence (atyantabhava) of the empirical silver in the front, in absence of which this cognition cannot be possible. But when the sublation-cognition expresses itself in a different shape "There is no silver in the front" the total absence (atyantabhava) is directly proved. Always it is proved that the apparent silver is the counterpositive by itself of the absence in three times. So its falsity is proved. According to anyatha-khyati the empirical silver which is existent else where, is the object of both the erroneous knowledge and sublation-knowledge. But according to the Advaitins the apparent silver (pratibhasika) is the object of both error and sublation.

It cannot be said that if we accept the absence of the counterpositive in three times, its unreality is automatically proved. But this is not the fact as counterpositiveness of the

49. Citsukhi, p.139.
absence in three times is the common characteristic of both
the non-existent (tuccha) and the indescribable (anirvacanīya),
but the difference is that the unreal is not capable of appearing
as real in any substratum. But both the empirical world and the
shell-silver appear as real before their sublation. So they are
not unreal but false (mithyā). This is indicated in the definition
by the word 'upādhi' or substratum which means the reality. 51
Thus, the view of Advaita cannot be confused with that of the
Mādhyamikas (nihilists), as they do not accept any real substratum
(sad-adhisthāna) of the error. It is to be borne in mind that
according to the Śunyavādins, the reality of the world only means
its functional capability (artha-kriyā-samARTHya), but according
to the Advaitins it means appearing in identity with the
unsublatable reality which is the Brahman (trikālā-bādhya-brahma-
tadātya). This reality the Brahman appears in identity with
the empirical things as the qualifier (prakāra) in such judgements
"This is real", "That is real", etc. 52

It cannot be said that this definition suffers
from siddha-sādhana with reference to ākāśa, etc. which are
accepted as avṛtti (not lying in another substratum) by the
Naiyāyikas. The absence used in this definition is Kevalā-nvayī,
as it rests everywhere. According to the Naiyāyikas all pervasive
substances like ākāśa, etc. do not lie in any place, so they are
said to be counterpositive of their absence lying everywhere.

51. A.S., pp.138-140.
52. Balabodhīṇī, p.100.
So the definition of falsity suffers from siddha-sādhana. But this is not true, as by the word 'substratum' (adhikarana) the substances which are accepted as not resting anywhere, are eliminated. It is to be noted that this is said only in accordance with the view of the Naiyāyikas. But it does not mean that ākāśa, etc. are not false. In fact, all the things even including ākāśa, etc. according to Advaita Vedānta are the counterpositive of their absence in the reality the Brahman.53

It cannot be said that when something like pot, etc. is present in a substratum through the relation contact (saṃyoga) it may be said to be absent in that very substratum through some other relation like inherence (saṃavāya). So there will be siddha-sādhana in the case of the things which lie in some substratum. To avoid this the specific relation through which a thing lies in some place is to be included. Thus the definition means: when something is the substratum of some other thing through a specific relation, counterpositiveness of the absence lying in that substratum through that very relation is intended to be said in the definition. So also to avoid siddha-sādhana in the case of contracts, etc. which are said to rest not pervasively (avyāpya-vṛtti), specific limiters are to be included. Otherwise, when the contact of the monkey (kapi-saṃyoga) is there in the tree with reference to the top of the tree, its absence (kapi-saṃyogā-bhāva) also lies in that very tree with regard


saṃmatra-nīsthā-tyantābhāva-pratīyogitvam etc.
to its root. This explanation is given by adopting tentatively the view of the Naiyāyikas and others, but according to the Advaitins there is no need to include these two viz. relation (saṁbandha) and the limiter (avacchedaka). Advaitins, relying upon experience say that there is no proof as to the fact that when the pot is present through contact on the ground its absence is there through inherence. It will be more in conformity with the law of parsimony to say that there is the absence of the inherence of pot than to say that the pot is absent there through inherence. So also with regard to the inclusion of the limiter, it will be better to say that the contact of the monkey is absent in the root of the tree than to say that the contact of monkey is absent in the tree with reference to its root. So there is no need to include a relation and a limiter. In view of this the definition of falsity means counterpositiveness of the absence residing in the only Real or sammātra, the Brahman.

It cannot be said that if we accept the absence and its counterpositive in once substratum, there being no opposition between being and non-being, knowledge of one cannot be the sublater (badhaka) of the knowledge of the other. This objection is made against the doctrine of sublation (badha) of

54. A.o.S., pp.150-151.
55. Ibid., pp.152-154.
56. Ibid., p.154.
the Advaitins. According to the Advaitins the knowledge of the absence of silver is the sublater of the knowledge of silver in the front. Thus, there is a relation of sublated and sublater (badhya-badhabhava) between them. But this is not possible in the case of the Advaitin, as they are accepted in one substratum, there being no opposition. Refuting this charge the Advaitin says that though there is no opposition between being and non-being when they belong to different grades, there is opposition when they belong to the same grade.

If the total absence of the pot is empirical on the ground, there the pot cannot be empirical. 57

It cannot be said that the absence which is the content of the knowledge "This is shell but not silver" being empirical, it can only sublate the empiricalness of the silver but not its apparentness. So after sublation which only takes away the empiricalness, the silver may appear through its apparent existence (pratitika sattā). But this is not true as by the immediate right knowledge (aparoksa pramā) "This is shell" the material cause of the erroneous silver, ajñāna, being sublated, the apparentness is also sublated. 58 It is to be noted that, according to Advaita Vedānta, the immediate right knowledge of the substratum only destroys ajñāna, but the mediate knowledge only takes away its empirical-ness (vyāvahārikatva). Thus, before the attainment of the direct

58. Ibid., p.155.
knowledge of the Brahman, the empiricalness (vyāvahārikatva) of the world is sublated. By the mediate knowledge arising out of the study of the scriptures the empiricalness is sublated. But the appearance still continues. When, by the direct experience the ājnāna pertaining to the substratum is sublated, the appearance ceases. 59 It is noteworthy that two sorts of ājnāna are accepted by the Advaitins viz. one lying in the witness (sāksin) conditioned by the internal organ and the other lying in the Brahman-Intelligence conditioned by the object. The former poses non-existence of the object; so it is known as asattvāpādaka and the latter poses unmanifestness or abhānāpādaka. The first is sublated by anyone of immediate and mediate knowledge, but the second is only sublated by the immediate knowledge of the substratum. 60 So, by the empirical negation through mediate knowledge the empiricalness of the world is negated, but its appearance persists so far as there is avidya its cause.

It cannot be said that this definition is too wide (ati-vyāpta), since the Brahman is absent really in the cognised upādhi of space and time. So Brahman becomes in this sense, the counterpositive of its absence in all space and time. But this is not tenable, as the Brahman, being attributeless, cannot possess the characteristic counterpositiveness of absence. When it is said that the Brahman is real, reality is not there an

60. S.B., p.115.

Pancadasī, 7.45.
attribute of the Brahman, but it is the same as the Brahman. To show this Madhusudana says that reality means absence of falsity; and absence being not different from the substratum, reality is the svarga of the Brahman. In this way self-luminousity (sva-prakaśatva) means absence of illumination by other; eternity means absence of limitations by time; all pervasiveness means absence of limitation by space; plenitude (purnatva) means absence of limitation by things. Absence being not different from the substratum there is no implication of dualism. Thus, the Brahman is free from all positive and negative attributes. So, this definition of falsity cannot be too wide as to include the Brahman.

The doctrine that absence is not different from its substratum upheld by the Mīmāṃsakas, is also accepted by the Advaitins which is contrary to the view of the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas have accepted four kinds of absence. Sometimes, by the Advaitins, these are accepted tentatively, but their acceptance is not absolute. It is remarkable that Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Taittirīya Upanisad says\(^\text{62}\) that the differentiation of absence is only apparent or illusory (vikalpa). Suresvara in his vārtika repudiates separate status of absence independent of existence.\(^\text{63}\) So, absence being one with its


\(^{62}\) See Śaṅkara's introduction to his comm. on Taittirīya Upanisad, pp.19-20.

\(^{63}\) B.B.V. 1.1.927.
substratum and the acceptance of many kinds of absence being only functional, non-dualism is not affected.

Thus, by refuting the charges made by the opponents against Advaita and clarifying the second definition of falsity Madhusūdana has made it clear that there is no difficulty if we define falsity as the counterpositiveness of absence in three times.

THE THIRD DEFINITION

Then the Ācārya discusses the third definition of falsity which is given by the author of Vivarana. To be sublated by knowledge is falsity (jñāna-nivartyaţvam vā mithyāvan). The shell-silver which appears as real, is sublated by the knowledge of the shell. But the opponents object to this definition. They say that this definition is too wide as a previous cognition is sublated by a subsequent cognition. There will be avyāpti in the case of pots etc. which are destroyed by clubs etc. but not by knowledge. Nor can it be said that to be sublated by knowledge as knowledge is falsity. In the case of shell-silver, the shell-silver is sublated by the cognition of the substratum but not by knowledge as such. It cannot be said that to be sublated by any kind of knowledge with the characteristic which is pervaded by knowledgeness (jñānatva), is falsity. This definition also suffers from ati-vyāpti, as it applies to the impressions which
are sublated by memory, a kind of knowledge pervaded by
knowledgeness (jñānatva-vyāpya-dharma). 64

The Advaitin refutes the objections of the opponents by defining the term "to be sublated by knowledge" (jñāna-
nivarttyatva). He says that to be sublated by knowledge means to be the counterpositive of the absence of existence (avasthiti-
samānya-viraha) caused by knowledge. Existence is two-fold, viz. to exist in its own form (svārūpena) or to exist in the form of the cause (kāraṇātmanā), as satkāryavāda is accepted. Negation of these two sorts of existence caused by knowledge is known as badha. The counterpositiveness of this negation is falsity. 65

When by the stroke of the club a pot is destroyed the pot does not exist in its own form, but it does exist in the form of its cause viz. earth. But the knowledge of the Brahman destroys both the cognised (drṣya) and its cause avidyā. This is—This is supported by Madhusūdana when he says that existence is either by itself or in the form of the material cause. The knowledge of the Brahman takes away these two sorts of existence of the world. Thus, this definition does not suffer from ati-
vyāpti in the case of the past pot, as here the pot exists in the form of its material cause after its destruction. So also in the case of previous knowledge which is destroyed by the subsequent

64. A.S., p.160.
65. Ibid., pp.160-162.
knowledge, there is no siddha-sādhanas, as after the destruction the previous knowledge remains in the form of its cause.  

Madhusūdana quotes Prakāśatman and Sureśvara to support his view. He also cites day-to-day experience as the proof of it. He says that it is accepted by all that both ignorance and its effect shell-silver are sublated by knowledge. Many ajñānas being accepted as the cause of many erroneous objects like shell-silver, etc., the sādhyaviz. sublatability by knowledge does not suffer from any logical deficiency. It is also sound to define it as sublatability by knowledge with the characteristic pervaded by knowledgeness (jñānatva-vyāpya-dharmena). It cannot be said that in the case of impressions (saṃskāras) which are destroyed by memory (smṛti) this definition suffers from ativyāpti, as memory is a kind of knowledge. But this is not tenable as impressions become stronger by memory but they are not destroyed. The subsequent knowledge destroys a previous knowledge not because that it is a kind of knowledge but as it is subsequent to the former knowledge.

We may define it as sublatability by knowledge as direct apprehension (sākṣātkāratvena jñāna-nivartyatvam). If we define it in this manner, faults which we have dealt with in other definitions will not arise. Knowledge as direct apprehension of the substratum destroys error and its cause avidyā; and it is supported by experience.
The fourth definition of falsity is in the lines of the definition given by Citsukha. It runs as follows:

Falsity is the counterpositiveness of the non-existence residing in the locus of the concerned object. This definition is essentially the same as the second definition. However, to differentiate them the Acarya alters the qualifier (viśesana) and the qualified (viśesya). He says that the meaning of the fourth definition is to appear in the locus of its absolute non-existence (svatyantabhāvā-dhikarane eva pratīyanāntvam). The second definition means to be the counterpositive of the absence which resides in that which is cognised as the locus of the counterpositive. But this definition means to appear in that which is accepted as the locus of its absence.

The allegations which are made by the opponent at the time of discussing the fourth definition are to be answered in the same manner as it is done in the case of the second definition. The opponent says that if the absence used in the definition is real in the absolute sense, there will be the implication of duality. Neither can it be apparent as it will give rise to siddha-sādhana nor can it be empirical as it gives rise to arthāntara. These faults can be eradicated in the manner discussed in the second definition. Specific relations (saṁbandha-viśesa) and, specific limiting characteristics (avacchedaka-viśesa) are to be introduced as in the previous definition.

70. A.S., pp.182-183.
The opponent says that in the place where something is present either through conjunction (sāmyoga) or through inherence, its absolute absence is not possible there. Even though it is possible, difficulties like the impossibility of being the material cause (upādānatva) will arise. If the absence of the pot is there in the two halves (kapāla) through inherence, then the halves cannot be the material cause of the pot. On the other hand, if something having the absence of pot can be the material cause of the pot, then threads (tantu) can also be the material cause of pot. But the Advaitins say, this is not true. As in time (kāla) both counterpositive and its absence are possible, so also in space (deśa) they can co-exist. There is no difficulty in being the material cause as the prior absence (prāg-abhāva) is also there.\[^{71}\] This cannot be said that in the locus of absolute non-existence prior non-existence is impossible. Such experiences "Now there is no pot", "The pot whose prior non-existence is there, will be there" confirm the fact that both the absolute non-existence and the prior non-existence can be possible at the same time.\[^{72}\] So also anumāna (inference) for proving the falsity and īruti are Pramāna for proving both of them in one space. Thus we see that the counterpositive and its absence are possible in one locus.

The Ācārya then reasserts his previous view regarding the non-opposition between existence and non-existence.

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72. Ibid., p.186.
(bhāvā-bhāvayoh) belonging to different grades of reality. He says that as there is no opposition between existence and non-existence belonging to different grades, the counterpositive and its absence can be asserted in the same locus. The total absence (atyanta-bhāva) here belongs to a higher ontological grade. This is said with regard to the view that the absence of the world is absolute (paramārthika), whereas the world is empirical. Even though both of them belong to the empirical grade, there is no difficulty as inference of falsity and Vedic statements are there to prove it.

Thus, we have seen that there is no difficulty if we accept either of the view of that they belong to the same grade or belong to two different grades. In the latter view the absence is always accepted as belonging to a higher ontological grade. The definition "appearing in the locus of its absence" means appearing as real (sattvena) for which this is not too wide as to include the unreal. 73

THE FIFTH DEFINITION OF FALSITY

The fifth definition is taken from Anandabodha. To be different from real (sad-viviktatva) is falsity. 74 In the first definition falsity is described as different from both reality and unreality. Now in this definition the Ācārya defines

73. A.S., pp.189-190.
74. Ibid., p.195.
falsity in a different manner saying that falsity is to be different from real. It is explained as the difference whose counterpositive is the real sat-pratigya-bheda. Here 'real' means that which is established by pramāṇa. Pramāṇa signifies the means of knowledge that is free from fault (dosā-sahakrtasāntanakaranatvam). As the theory of self-validity of knowledge is accepted by Advaita, in absence of any fault naturally knowledge becomes valid. Knowledge of the world (empirical knowledge) is invalid like the knowledge of the dream as there is the fault of avidyā. In the case of knowing the Brahman, in which case vṛtti-vyāpti (pervasion by psychosis) is accepted, there is avidyā, as without avidyā psychosis is impossible. But here, unlike in the case of knowing the world, avidyā is not the co-operative fault (sahakrtasāsa) which invalidates knowledge, though it is the material cause of the psychosis. In both the cases viz. in the knowledge of the Brahman and the knowledge of the world, avidyā is the material (parināmi upādāna) but it is not the sahakāri karana in the case of knowing the Brahman.

"Being established by pramāṇa" is the vyāpya of of unsublatability. So this is different from the definition which is formed with the help of sublatability. It is to be borne in the mind that Anandabodha defines real as unsublatable

75. Bālabodhinī, p.151.
76. A.S., pp.151-152.
77. Bālabodhinī, pp.151-152.
and false is defined as sublatable. Though this definition is in accordance with the truth of Advaita, it is not free from logical difficulties. Sublatability being falsity and reality which means unsublatability, being defined with the help of sublatability, we cannot define falsity with the help of this reality. So the Acarya defines reality as "being established by pramāṇa" without the help of sublatability.\footnote{Balabodhini, p.153.}

To avoid ati-vyāpti in the case of the unreal and the qualityless Brahman (according to the view that the pure Brahman cannot be the object of psychosis), the adjective "appearing as real" is to be added.\footnote{A.S., pp.153-154.} It is to be noted that according to Vivarana view the pure Brahman is the object of pramāṇa-vrtti. But this is not accepted by Bhāmatī. So according to this second view, if "different from real means, different from that which is established by pramāṇa", then the definition will be too wide as to include the unreal (asat) and the pure Brahman. But if the adjective "appearing as real" is added, there will be no difficulty.

In the definition the meaning of the word 'real' being pramāṇasiddha the allegations of the opponents are without any basis. The opponent asks whether the meaning of the word 'reality' in the definition is "being the locus of the class-property (universal) reality" (sattā-jāty-adhikaranatvam) or it is 'unsublatability' or it is 'the svarupa of the Brahman'. If
it is the class-property, illusory class-property being admitted in the things like pot, etc. by the Advaitin, there will be impossibility (asādhava). If the second is admitted, it will be logically untenable, as the meaning of falsity being sublatability, it cannot be defined by reality which means unsublatability. If the third meaning will be accepted, there will be the fault of siddha-sādhana, as difference from the Brahman is already established in the world. But these allegations are without foundation as these meanings are not accepted here.

It is to be borne in mind that reality as unsublatability and the svārūpa of the Brahman are accepted by Advaita. Even 'reality' as the illusory class-property is accepted by Advaita tentatively. Though reality is itself the Brahman, the pure Intelligence, it is by avidyā pot, etc. are imposed in identity with Brahman; according to another Advaitic view class property is the form of avidyā. Thus, commenting upon this problem Advaita Siddhi Brahmananda cites these two views. These views being different ways of explanation only, there is no difference in the result.

THE FALSITY OF THE FALSITY

Now after defending the definitions of falsity given by the old teachers of Advaita Madhusūdana is going to refute other arguments of the dualists. The dualists ask

whether this falsity defined by the Advaitins which is intended to be proved in the world is itself false. If this falsity is itself unsublatable, the position of Advaita is vitiated. If on the other hand this is sublatable(false), then the reality of the world is invariably implied, as among the two contradictory characteristics in one thing; if one is false, the other is necessarily true. Madhusūdana says that even though falsity is itself false, reality of the world is not implied, as the determinant of falsity (mithyātvā-vacchedaka) lies in both the world and its falsity. There only among two opposing characteristics, if one is false, the truth of the other is implied, where the determinant of falsity does not lie in both. For instance, in the case of silverness (raja-tatva) and its absence (taa-abhāva) which are of the form of mutual absence in the shell, and in the case of silverness and difference from silver (raja-abhinnatva) which are the vyāpaka of their mutual absence in the shell, the limiter of being negatable (nisedhyatā-vacchedaka) is different. So when one is negated with one determinant, the other is not negated. In silverness the determining characteristic of the negation is silverness-ness (raja-tva-tva); in the absence of silverness the determinant of the negation is the absenceness of the silverness (raja-tva-bhāvatvan). But in the concerned cases (the world and its falsity) the determinant of negatability is cognisability, etc. (dṛśvatvādi) common to both the cases. So there is no

81. A.S., p.207.
82. Bālabodhinī, p.159.
difficulty if we assert the falsity of both the world and its falsity. It is to be noted that both the empirical reality of the world and its falsity are cognised alike. The limiting characteristics of falsity like cognisability (drṣyatva), inertness (jadatva) and limitedness (avacchinnatva) are there in both the world and its falsity. So both are false alike. Thus, being of same ontological status, both the world and its falsity are eliminated. Thus, non-dualism is never affected.

Though a single definition is sufficient to give a clear idea of falsity, the Ācārya discusses all the definitions of the old teachers of Advaita to show that all of them are valid as they are intended to make others understand the truth of Advaita. It is clear from the above discussion that the definitions of the Advaitins are not arbitrary but are logically consistent and are attested to by the world of experience.

83. A.S., pp.221-222.