CHAPTER V

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Epistemic order or prati-karma-vyavasthā which regulates the knowledge of a particular object to some particular knowers vouchsafing the epistemic transactions of empirical world is accepted by the Advaitins in so far as it does not contradict the falsity of the world. It presupposes the existence of many individual selves as well as the existence of the objects independent of their knowledge. Here knowledge is to be understood in the sense of vṛtti-jñāna, as nothing can be independent of svarūpa-jñāna on which all the world is superimposed through avidyā. According to it the objects can remain unknown (ajñāta-sat), as their existence precedes their knowledge. They are empirical in contrast to the apparent objects like shell-silver or rope-serpent which exist only in so far as they are perceived. The empirical objects are said to be false only with relation to the ultimate reality which belongs to a higher ontological status. Though the empirical objects are false inasmuch as they are superimposed on the Brahman, their functional reality and also their distinction from the apparent remain intact. From this point of view all the world including its creation, maintenance and dissolution is upheld as empirically real. In contrast to drsti-srṣṭi it is also known as srṣṭi-dṛṣṭi,
as according to this view the objects are created (srsta) before they are perceived (drsta). Though the objects are said to be false since they are superimposed on the Brahman-Intelligence, in order to maintain the distinction of the empirical from the apparent a sort of epistemological realism is advocated. This is the general Advaita-view.

As a prakriya or method of explanation so far as it makes others understand the central truth of non-duality prati-karma-vyavastha is valid. But it is not the final view of Advaita. It is transcended in a more profound vision of Reality known as drsti-srsti. According to the Advaitins prati-karma-vyavastha is meant for the less qualified (mandadhikarin). The other view, viz, drsti-srsti is much superior to and more profound than srsti-drsti, as it directly proves the falsity of the world. In fact, prati-karma-vyavastha in Advaita can aptly be described as viewing Reality from the standpoint of the world, whereas drsti-srsti can be described as viewing the world from the standpoint of Reality. In course of discussing various Advaita-views regarding the jiva Madhusudana states that ekajiva-vada which is also known as drsti-srsti is the main Advaita-view.

1. S.L.S., p.484.
2. A.S., p.534.
In fact, *drsti-srṣṭi* is the epistemological outcome of the theory of one *jīva*, whereas *prati-karma-vyavasthā* is the outcome of the theory of plurality of *jīvas*.

Though *ekajīva-vāda* is not used as a synonym of *drsti-srṣṭi*, the former necessarily implies the latter. Thus Appaya Diksita when discussing *ekajīva-vāda* propounds *drsti-srṣṭi* even without mentioning the name. Citsukha another great authority while discussing *ekajīva-vāda* states that the world according to this view is apparent like dream object. It is noteworthy that according to the contrary *Advaita*-view, the world is not apparent but empirical. It is clear from his account that what he intends to discuss is nothing other than *drsti-srṣṭi*. Madhusūdana goes one step ahead and makes it clear that *ekajīva-vāda* is the same as *drsti-srṣṭi*.

It is noteworthy that according to *drsti-srṣṭi* the object has no unknown existence as the difference between the apparent and the empirical is not here accepted. If different individuals (*jīvas*) as the knowers of the objects are not accepted, there is no necessity to account for the manifestation of the object for some and its non-manifestation for others. So the unknown existence of the object becomes futile. The creation of the object is its 'being seen' as existence of the object independent of its experience is not accepted by the upholders.

of this view. In view of this the process of the world is thought to be a passing experience a long beginningless dream of one jīva.  

In *siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* two sorts of *drstī-srṣṭī* are discussed. One view is that the object exists as long as it is seen (*drstī-saṃa-saṃaya srṣṭiḥ*) and the other is that the object is verily its knowledge (*drstī-eva srṣṭiḥ*).  

The previous explanation of these two seems to be acceptable to Madhusūdana with some modification. It is noteworthy that the second view comes nearer to the Buddhist *Vijñānavāda* with the difference that according to the former view this knowledge is the changeless *caitanya*, but according to the latter school it is the momentary *vijñāna*.

For getting the correct one Madhusūdana discusses ten definitions of *drstī-srṣṭī*. The first definition that the creation of the object (*srṣṭi*) is verily its knowledge (*drstī*) is untenable. In accordance with this definition *drstī* may mean *caitanya* itself or *vṛtti* (psychosis). If the first meaning is accepted there cannot be absence of *srṣṭi*, as its *drstī* the *caitanya* is eternal. So there cannot be emancipation. If the second meaning that *drstī* is psychosis is accepted, the *Brahman*.

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5. Aś., p. 539.

which is an object of final psychosis-knowledge (carana-vrtti) becomes false being an object of \( \text{drsti-srsti} \). The second definition that the \( \text{srsti} \) is impossible in absence of \( \text{drsti} \) is also not tenable, as in view of this such use like "That which is created by Caitra is seen by me" will be impossible. The third view that there is nothing to be created (srjya) apart from its \( \text{drsti} \) is not tenable, as common experience such as "The pot which is known (jātāto chatāh) is not the same as its knowledge (na jānām)" proves the difference between the object and its knowledge. The fourth definition that \( \text{srsti} \) (object) is caused by the same necessary materials (sāmagrī) which also cause \( \text{drsti} \) (knowledge) is not acceptable, as the same difficulties which arise previously will be encountered here also. It is noteworthy that \( \text{drsti} \) and \( \text{srsti} \) being produced by the same materials cannot be different from each other; so the same difficulties will arise. The fifth definition that \( \text{srsti} \) is of the same time as that of \( \text{drsti} \) (drsti-samāna-kālīna-srstin) is not sound, as some object of verbal knowledge can simultaneously be produced with its knowledge. So falsity of the object cannot be established, as according to such a definition the object and its knowledge as well can be real. Thus the fault of siddhasādhana and arthāntara occur here. The sixth definition that \( \text{srsti} \) is of the same ontological status as \( \text{drsti} \) (drsti-samāna-sattāka) is untenable, as both can be real according to
this; so there is siddhasādhana. The seventh definition of drṣṭi-srṣṭi as being different from both real and unreal is not tenable, as it is intended to be proved. It is noteworthy that this difference from both real and unreal being the meaning of 'falsity' is to be proved by drṣṭi-srṣṭi; so it cannot define the latter. The eighth definition that being distinct from the three grades of existence it is to be different from unreal, is not acceptable, as according to this view the world is included in prātibhāsīka sattā; so it cannot be distinct from the three grades of existence. It is to be noted that three grades of existence are not accepted by the Advaitins who uphold this view. According to them there are only two grades of existence viz, prātibhāsīka (apparent) and pāramārthīka (absolute). The former belongs to the world as well as to others like shell-silver, etc. and the latter belongs only to the Brahman there being no third category as vyāvahārika (empirical). The ninth definition that it means "absence of unknown existence" (ajñata-sattva-bhāvah) is logically not sound; it is too wide as it includes even the unreal. It is noteworthy that the unreal (tuccha) is not accepted by the Advaitins as false; so it is not the object of drṣṭi-srṣṭi. The tenth definition that it means to have the existence of the knower only as its existence (jñātaika-sattva) is not tenable, as there will be the faults of siddhasādhana and arthāntara in the cases
like pleasure, etc., (sukhādau). According to the opponents, pleasure pain, etc., have no separate existence apart from that of the knower. But they are as much real as the knower. So this definition does not prove the falsity of the objects.

It is clear from the above discussion that most of the above definitions cannot properly explain the Advaita-view of drsti-srṣti, as instead of proving the falsity of the world they prove its reality. Some definitions can be applied equally to a sort of subjectivism like that of the Vijñānavādins who hold that the object is not different from knowledge. It is clear that according to Advaita the object is not the same as its knowledge, but it is superimposed on knowledge. Madhusūdana accepts the last two definitions and modifies them a little so that neither they become too wide nor contradict the very thesis of the Advaitins.

Madhusūdana defines drsti-srṣti as "having the existence of the knower only as one's existence caused by some fault" (dosa-prayuktanaibandhama-jñātaikassattva). It can also be defined as "having no unknown existence being itself caused by fault". It is noteworthy that the unreal like the son of a barren woman has no unknown existence. But unlike the erroneous objects like the rope-serpent the unreal cannot appear. So it is not caused by any fault like avidyā, as it is the case with the

erroneous objects. On the other hand, it is merely a verbal one. Thus the condition that drsti-srsti is caused by a fault being not fulfilled, the definition is not too wide.

Likewise, the modified definition is also free from arthāntara, etc. Though pleasure, pain, etc., have no separate existence apart from that of the knower, they are not caused by faults. On the other hand the erroneous objects have avidyā as the fault. So the fallacy of arthāntara which shows that even a real may have no separate existence apart from that of the knower does not arise, as pleasure, pain, etc. cannot fulfil the condition "being caused by avidyā". It is noteworthy that pleasure, pain, etc., are as much false as other false object.

In order to eradicate the fallacy of arthāntara Madhusūdana has only differentiated them from other false objects.

It may be alleged that drsti-srsti is self-contradictory, as it contradicts the Advaita-view which is differentiated from the theory of momentariness of the Buddhists by the enduring character of the world because of its recognition. The Advaitins recognise the beginninglessness of six principles, namely jīva, Īsvarā (God), pure Intelligence, difference between

9. jīva iśa viṣuddhā cit tathā jiveśayer-bhidā/
   avidyā tat-citor-yogān sad-asnākan anādayah//
   quoted in A.G., p.534.
the individual and God, avidyā and its contact with Intelligence. The theory of drsti-srsti cannot account for their beginninglessness, nor can it explain recognition (pratyabhijā) of the things which proves their enduring character, as according to it all the things are created at the time of their cognition.

Refuting these charges Madhusūdana says that drsti-srsti is only applicable to the things of the world except the six beginningless principles referred to above. It is noteworthy that though jiva, īśvara, avidyā, etc., being beginningless are not objects of drsti-srsti, their falsity is not impossible. Their falsity is due to their drṣyatva (capability of being seen or known). Among the six beginningless principles the pure Intelligence the Brahman is only real, it being not drṣya but drk itself. The enduring character of the things of the world is possible, as the underlying cause remains intact through apparent changes. Thus the Vedantic theory is very much dissimilar to the Buddhist theory of momentariness, as the latter does not admit any such unchanged causal principle underlying the changing effects. 10

Another charge made against such a view is that it renders the law of causality futile. If all the objects of the world are nothing more than their appearance being created at the time of their perception, there is no necessary link between two

things as cause and effect. So the Vedic rites like jyotistoma, etc., for the attainment of heaven and hearing of Vedānta for the attainment of knowledge regarding the Brahman become futile. The Vedic statement which says that ākāśa, etc., are the cause of wind, etc., is without any meaning. Likewise the causal link in the empirical level being shattered, there arises utter chaos, as there is no necessity of eating for satisfying hunger or using words to make others understand something. The upholders of drsti-srsti refute these charges saying that the causal link between the objects is possible as it is there in dream-experience. As in dream eating satisfies hunger and drinking quenches thirst, though they are no more than appearance, so also the causal link in the empirical world is no more than appearance, though it is a necessary one. 11

Thus it is clear that necessity is not the same as reality. Reality in the Vedantic sense means unsubstitability in all the times, but necessity only means the notion of one giving rise to that of another deemed as the effect. It can very well be possible between two things existing in so far as they are perceived. As their perception is not a discordant phenomenon but a harmonious order, there is no possibility of any chaotic break in their causal link. Had it been the fact that the things were no more than fragmentary experience, there would have been

breach in causal connection. But this is not the fact. So the law of causality is not affected if drsti-srṣṭi is accepted.

It cannot be said that in view of drsti-srṣṭi, Vedānta with its conclusion becomes nothing more than dream experience. But it is not correct. There is difference between other things and Vedānta, as their objects are dissimilar. In other cases the objects are totally sublated, but in the case of Vedānta, its object the Brahman cannot be sublated, though Vedānta itself is false.¹²

Now the opponent questions the very possibility of error in the doctrine of drsti-srṣṭi. He says that substratum (adhisthāna) of error the 'this' portion of the shell being non-existent like the false silver before its cognition, error cannot be possible. It is noteworthy that perceptual error presupposes three factors viz, contact of the sense organs with the substratum, impression of the false object and some fault in the perceiver. But it is not possible in drsti-srṣṭi, as the substratum the 'this' portion of the shell, according to the said doctrine, is non-existent before the erroneous knowledge "This is silver". Refuting these charges Madhusūdana says that contact of sense organs with the substratum, impression, etc., are said to be the cause of superimposition with reference to the less qualified persons (mandādhikārin). All these are not applicable

to drsti-srṣṭi. But the actual definition that adhyāsa is the appearance of the real conjointly with the false is also possible in drsti-srṣṭi. The Brahman-Intelligence is the reality which is referred to in all cases of error. In the case of false silver the Intelligence conditioned by 'this' portion (idam-aṅga-vacchinna-caitanya) is the reality. The false silver appears conjointly with the real. So the definition of adhyāsa is consistent with drsti-srṣṭi. ¹³

Now the opponent tries to show the impossibility of error in drsti-srṣṭi in a different way. He says that ignorance (ajñāna) of the substratum like the shell is the cause of error. But according to drsti-srṣṭi the shell being only existent so far as it is perceived, is non-existent at the time of false cognition like "This is silver". If the shell is non-existent, its ajñāna cannot be possible. So adhyāsa which is the effect of the said ajñāna cannot be possible. The Advaitins who uphold drsti-srṣṭi do not accept it. They state that there is no contradiction in accepting ajñāna regarding something at the time of the non-existence of the said thing. It is to be borne in mind that according to the other Advaita-view viz, the theory of srṣṭi-drṣṭi, ajñāna of the shell is said to be there at the time of existence of the shell. But according to the present view the shell being impossible at the time of its non-cognition, its

¹³. A.B., p.534.
ajñāna is to be accepted at the time of non-existence of the shell, as without it error cannot be possible. The point of view of the Advaitins is that just as knowledge with regard to some object of future is accepted we have to accept ajñāna with regard to the object of the future. The judgement "The pot will be made" has the future pot as its object. Likewise the future thing can be the object of ajñāna. So ajñāna of the shell which is not there at the time of the appearance of silver but which will be created afterwards is to be accepted at the time of the appearance of silver.

How can sublation (badha) of error be possible, the non-Advaitins ask, if at the time of appearance of silver the shell does not underlie as the existent substratum. The shell being non-existent at the time of the appearance of silver, the cognition "This is silver" which is sublated and the cognition "This is not silver" which sublates the former, have two different things as their object. The former has false silver as its object and the latter has shell as its object. Both of them being independent of each other cannot be related as something which is sublated and that which sublates.

In reply to this the Advaitins state that sublation is possible owing to the similarity between the objects though objects are different in both the cognitions. They adduce the


Also see Laghucandrika on it.
example of dream to prove this. In a dream somebody may wrongly see silver and in the same dream he may come to realise that it is actually not silver but shell. In the case of dream-sublation of the dream-silver there is no underlying shell as the substratum, though the dream-experience of the shell sublates the former experience of dream-silver. As the shell in a dream which does not exist at the time of false appearance of silver in dream, can sublate the dream-silver, the cognition of shell in waking stage can sublate the false silver, even though the shell is not existent at the time of false appearance of silver.\\footnote{15}

It is to be noted that according to the general Advaita-view which accepts three kinds of ontological status, the shell belongs to a higher ontological status viz, the empirical reality (vyavahārika-sattā). So it can exist at the time of the false appearance and after its sublation. But according to drsti-srṣti both shell and the false silver belong to the same ontological status viz, prātipṭhāśiśka-sattā for which the former cannot exist at the time of the appearance of silver as then it is not known. But through the example of dream the Ācārya shows that sublation can very well be possible in drsti-srṣti as it is in the other Advaita-view, even though both the shell and the silver are prātipṭhāśika alike. So error with its causes and sublation can very well be explained by drsti-srṣti.\\footnote{16}

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16. Ibid.
Now it may be asked whether this sublation of apparent silver, etc., is itself \textit{drstī-srṣṭī}. If it is admitted sublation being false its counterpositive viz., apparent silver (\textit{rūpya}) will be real. In reply to this the Advaitins say that it is not required that something which sublates must belong to a higher ontological status in order to be capable of sublating the other. What is required is that the \textit{bādhaka} is not ontologically lower than the \textit{bādhya} (which is to be sublated). As the empirical can sublate the empirical, the apparent can sublate the apparent.\footnote{A.S., p.534.} It is noteworthy that according to the general Advaita-view both the world and its sublation belong to the empirical level, whereas according to \textit{drstī-srṣṭī} both of them belong to the apparent level. If the \textit{bādhaka} were of different ontological status, then only by the falsity of this, the reality of its \textit{bādhya} would be implied. But both the apparent silver and its sublation belong to the level of apparent reality being created at the time of their cognition. So both of them can be false alike. Here Madhusūdana cites the same argument which he has adduced at the time of discussing the definitions of falsity that the "falsity of the falsity of the world" does not imply the reality of the world, as both belong to the level of empirical reality.
The Advaitins advocating drsti-srsti have made it clear that the term drsti does not mean pure Intelligence. It only means caitanya qualified by psychosis or vṛtti. If pure Intelligence (caitanya-mātra) were drsti, there would be no end of the world-process, Intelligence being eternal. But this difficulty does not arise, as here the word drsti signifies psychosis-knowledge. Drsti in this sense being non-eternal, its creation the world invariably becomes non-eternal. It may be asked how can drsti-srsti with regard to vṛtti be explained. If another vṛtti qualifying or conditioning caitanya is accepted there will be infinite regress. But such a difficulty does not arise, as vṛtti itself is the condition (upādhi) of caitanya. 18

The non-Advaitins try to disprove drsti-srsti by the example of recognition (pratyabhijña). They say that in case drsti-srsti is admitted, there can be no recognition of an object, as the object can only be existent in so far as it is seen. So an object seen beforehand cannot be the same as seen after some time, each time the object being created with its cognition. But recognition being a valid knowledge cannot be disproved, as there is no badhaka which can contradict it.

But it is not correct, says the Advaitin. As perception cannot prove the reality of the things of the world, recognition cannot prove the stability of the worldly objects.

In dream-experience a particular dream-object may also be recognised; but it cannot prove the enduring character of the object. So the recognition of a thing with reference to two different times is a kind of false knowledge. But with reference to one time, viz., the cognition of oneness in the ātman and recognition of pot, etc., is not false. But with reference to two perceivers, even with the cognition of one time, recognition of the objects like pot, etc. is false, as appearance varies from person to person. It is to be noted that unlike the Vijnānavādins the Advaitins do not think that the object differs every moment, on the other hand they accept the oneness of the object with reference to unity of appearance and time.  

The common character of the things of the world is no more capable of proving their enduring nature. An erroneous perception can happen to more than one person. Many persons in faint darkness can mistake a rope to be a serpent. Agreement of their perception cannot prove the reality of that which is perceived. It may be asked how can there be false knowledge of non-difference. But this is verily possible, say the Advaitins, as non-difference, similarity, etc., according to drsti-srsti can be created instantly as the rope-serpent. So the common character of the objects cannot prove their

independence from their knowledge. Thus the recognition of the object like "This is that pot" only shows that its object the pot and its non-difference implied by the reference of both 'this' and 'that' to one pot are only apparent, being created at the time of their cognition. 20

Now the opponent tries to show self-contradiction in the Advaita-view. He says that being a case of drsti-srsti if non-difference(abheda) is false then jahad-ajahal-laksana or partial indication cannot be possible. The Advaitins accept partial indication in such cases as "That is this Devadatta" and the Upanisadic statement "That thou art". For instance, in the case "That is this Devadatta" Devadatta as signified by the past and the present is given up and the one Devadatta is indicated. Likewise in the case of the Upanisadic statement "That thou art", 'that' and 'thou' indicating Iśvara and Jīva respectively are given up and the pure Intelligence is indicated. Unless non-difference(abheda) is admitted, such partial indication cannot be possible. In view of drsti-srsti non-difference being false, the implication of the mahāvākya "That thou art" becomes false.

In reply to this Madhusūdana says that the non-difference of the ātman being itself the ātman (ātma-svarūpa) is not a case of drsti-srsti. So it is not false. But non-difference in other cases is false, as it is contradicted by

both profound experience and śruti. In the case "That is this Devadatta" partial indication is admitted so far as the non-difference of the dharma is provisionally uncontradicted. The direct experience of the Brahman is a case of drsti-srsti alike, but its object, the Brahman being not contradicted, its validity remains intact. But in this sense only this experience is itself false.21

It is to be borne in mind that the Advaitins upholding drsti-srsti prove the apparentness (pratibhāsikatva) of the world on the parity of dream-experience. The reason adduced to prove this is that it is drṣya (capable of being seen by Intelligence) like the dream-objects. The Advaitins upholding this doctrine have made it clear that the law of causality, principles of error and its sublation, the commonness of the things of the world, etc., can be consistently explained by the doctrine of drsti-srsti. From the line of arguments followed by the upholders of drsti-srsti it becomes obvious that there is no necessity to posit an unknown existence independent of its knowledge, as the law of causality, apprehension and the sublation of error, etc., can be very well explained with the example of dream-experience. The commonness of the objects can be explained by the example of an erroneous perception like that of the serpent in the rope happening simultaneously to

many persons in a dark room. It is more intelligible from the point of view of ekājīva-vāda. If there is only one jīva who undergoes the world-experience and the so-called many jīvas are but his imagining, there is no difficulty in maintaining the so-called commonness of the things even if they are said to be existent so far as they are perceived.

It may be said that in the light of modern science and technology drstī-srṣṭi cannot be upheld. If the objective world is nothing but mental projection, advancement in science and technology which depends on the objective laws of nature and discovery of the unknown possibilities of nature becomes meaningless. But this is not true. Though with the example of shell-silver it is difficult to explain the meaningfulness of objective sciences, it becomes intelligible with the instance of dream-experience. As dream-fire can cause the pain of dream-burning which seems as much objective as the so-called real fire, objective causal link between the things of the world can be well-maintained. Since the world-order is thought to be a cosmic dream of one jīva, it can explain easily the laws of nature which form the basis of objective sciences.

As a final world-view it seems that drstī-srṣṭi is irrefutable. Though it is hardly convincing for the common man to believe in such a view, it at least questions the truth of the popular belief that the objective reality of the world which we experience is beyond doubt. If the realists with their
pre-conceived idea maintain the reality of the objective world, why not the contrary view which entirely does away with the objective existence of the things but explains the world-order consistently, be maintained? The fact is that from the ultimate point of view the Advaitins accept neither srsti-drsti which accepts the independent existence of the objects nor drsti-srstri which does not accept it. They are only manners of explanation or prakriya. In this respect the famous doctrine of drsti-traya-vāda of Sarvajñātman deserves consideration. According to it common man's view which maintains that the empirical pramanas like perception, etc., give us the reality, is the lowest one. The mixed view is marked by two stages successively viz., one that accepts many jīvas and the other that accepts only one jīva, both of which maintain that the world is superimposed on the Brahman. The third view which only grasps the reality completely does away with the existence of the world. It is noteworthy that the two kinds of mixed view upheld by Sarvajñātman are the same as srsti-drsti and drsti-srstri respectively, whereas the third view is nothing more than ajāta-vāda, upheld by Gaudapāda. Thus both srsti-drsti and drsti-srstri are transcended in the highest vision of the Reality.

22. S.S., 2.33
Also quoted by Brahmananda in his comm. on A.Ś. and interpreted in a slightly different manner., Laghucandrika, p.537.

23. M.K., 4.4-6.
It is to be noted that drsti-sršti as it is upheld by Madhusūdana is not the same as the vijnānāvāda of the Buddhists. Unlike the Vijnānavādins he does not say that the objects are the transformation of vijnāna. His only point is that the object which is created by avidyā exists as long as it is perceived. The Vijnānavādins advocate ātma-khyāti whereas the drstisrṣtivādins like other Advaitins advocate anirvacanīya-khyāti. The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is rejected by the drstisrṣtivādins, as according to them the object does not change so long as it is being perceived. Its identity with reference to two perceptions is only rejected. Unlike the Buddhists they accept the unchangeable Intelligence as the substratum of the objects. Madhusūdana accepting the six beginningless principles like īva, īśvarā, pure Intelligence, difference between īva and īśvarā, avidyā and its contact with Intelligence as beyond drstisrṣti has made it clear that this vedantic view is not the same as vijnānāvāda.24 The other view of drstisrṣti upheld by Prakāśānanda which comes very close to vijnānāvāda is not accepted by Madhusūdana.25

The doctrine of drstisrṣti is an old one in Advaita tradition. It can be traced back to the Upanisads. The Praśna Upanisad describing the condition of deep sleep says that as

the birds return to the tree where they reside, all the diverse things of the world including the five elements, the senses, the mind and the pāṇa return to the Self in susupti. The Brhadāranyaka Upanisad says that though the Self which is the perceiver is there in susupti, perception does not take place, as that which are to be perceived are not there. Saṅkara commenting on these Upaniṣads seems to support this that in susupti all the diversities of the world are submerged in the Self.

There is an unmistakable tendency in the Māndukya Kārikā of Gaudapāda to obliterate the difference between the empirical and the apparent objects. Gaudapāda says that both dreaming stage and the waking stage are one as the state of being perceived and perceiver is equal to them. In another place he says that both the inner and outer objects which exist in the mental time (cittakālāh) and in two different times (dvayakālāh) respectively are apparently projected (kalpitāh) there being no reason to differentiate them. Saṅkara commenting on this verse gives the example of dream where some things are experienced as mental and others are experienced as existing

27. B.U., 4.3.23-24.
28. M.K., 2.5.
29. Ibid., 2.14.

Also see Saṅkara's comm. on it.
outside the mind though all are imagined alike. It is noteworthy
that this is the same argument as adduced by the upholders of
drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi in support of their view.

It is already said that a great authority like
sarvajñātman a direct disciple of sureśvara supports drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi
in his drṣṭi-traya-vāda. In the ninth varṇaka of Vivarāṇa there
is an unmistakable reference to drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi.30 Vidyārāṇya also
refers to this view to show that all are dissolved in susupti.31
Appaya Dīksita and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī whose views are cited
earlier also support this. So Mandana the writer of Brahma-
siddhi was not the first to hint at this view, nor Prakāśānanda
was the first Advaitin to develop this view in the line of
Mandana.32

Thus the Advaitins accept drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi as a way of
explaining Advaita. It is said to be superior to the other view
of Advaita, as it is directly helpful in establishing the falsity
of the world. So Madhusūdana describes it as the chief Advaita-
view.33 Concluding his discussion of drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi he says that
the world does not exist unknown since it is seen as drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi
by the awakened (prabuddha); and the śruti also speaks of the
dissolution of the world in susupti.34 We have seen that epistemic

30. Vivarāṇa, p.
31. V.P.S., p.213.
33. A.B., p.92.
34. A.S., p.537.
order which presupposes unknown existence of the objects and the existence of many jīvas is not possible here. Though ajātavāda is the final view of Advaita, it is not discussed by Madhusūdana, as being the plenary vision of Reality devoid of any reference to duality, it is beyond the purview of philosophical enquiry. It is the culmination of Advaita where questioning becomes meaningless and inquiry comes to an end. Thus the transcendence of epistemic order is the end of Advaita epistemology.