Chapter - III
Growth of I.N.A. – From the Indian Legion to I.N.A.
Chapter-III
Growth of I.N.A. – From Legion to National Army

The creation growth and emergence of I.N.A. as a revolutionary army was not achieved in a day or two. It was a lengthy process, many national leaders outside India had struggled for a long time to achieve this reality. Consequently the study of I.N.A. its vision and struggle is complimentary with the activities of these leaders. The activities of Bose in Germany, the formation of Indian legion to free the country from bondage or to protect the same against foreign invasion is infact the study of creation of the Indian legion. In the same way the vision of creation of National Army in South-East Asia lies in the activities and efforts of Rash Behari Bose, A.M. Sahay, Pritam Singh, Amar Singh, Mohan Singh, Fujiwara and many other revolutionaries. Here I wish to stress that while discussing the creation, vision and struggle of I.N.A. I will be discussing the activities of these leaders, who took great pained in the formation of a 50,000 strong revolutionary army, and their activities are synonymous with the activities of I.N.A.

This chapter will be dealing with the need for creating a national army by Subhas Bose, his escape to Germany, and formation of the Indian legion from the P.O.Ws. in Germany. Bose was not happy with the attitude of Hitler towards the issue of Indian Independence, secondly with the German attack on Russia, Bose felt that he cannot achieve anything further staying in Germany. On the
other hand Japan was emerging as a strong Asiatic power. The revolutionaries in South-east Asia like Rash Behari Bose, A.M. Sahay, Pritam Singh and Amar Singh had done the spade work in the form of Indian Independence Leagues, which were given a definite framework through Tokyo and Bangkok conferences. The interest of the Indian nationalist and Japanese war aim coincided. Both were fighting against the common enemy, but may be to achieve different results, any how Japanese strategic and economic interests got overlap with the freedom struggle of Indian nationalists and through the efforts of Maj. Fujiwara and Mohan Singh, I.N.A. was created from the Indian P.O.Ws.

With the arrival of Bose, the I.N.A. and the I.I.L. got a new life which had almost disintegrated and declined due to Mohan Singh’s episode. Bose gave a new life direction and vision to the I.N.A., he was a leader of high structure and negotiated with the Japanese on equal terms. The Japanese P.M. Tojo and the army commanders were overawed with his personality and his leadership qualities. In the end, we will be discussing the formation of provisional government of Azad Hind Fauz and declaration of war with the batter cry ‘Chalo Delhi Chalo Delhi’.
The Indian Legion:

Bose had no definite plan of organizing a national army in Germany to fight the war for India’s freedom. But like other national leaders, he had always cherished “the patriotic desire of giving Indian young men military training, and wished to have at their command a national militia, in order either to free the country from bondage or to protect the same against foreign invaders or for both purpose.”¹ The British created army of Indian mercenaries was used to fight wars of expansion for the British in other distant lands and against India’s neighbouring countries. With the help of this army the freedom movement was suppressed.

“The poor Indian farmers worked, laboured and even starved sometimes, to feed and clothe the army which as at times used against his own kith and kin when they began to demand their country’s freedom.”²

Almost every nationalist Indian was conscious of this anomaly and felt the necessity of a national army devoted to the cause of India. Nobody liked the idea that the Indian Army should either be used against the Indians to suppress their nationalist aspirations or against India’s neighbours with whom India had no quarrel. Like these realistic leaders, Bose had always nursed a feeling that:

“India must have a National Army that should reach the standards of the most successful and modern army of the world in discipline,
training and equipment, in order to be able to fight for freedom and to defend it after it was won."3

The idea of an Indian National Army got concrete shape in Germany after he came across a group of Indian prisoners of war, who were brought to Berlin, by the Radio Department to listen to and translate the Hindustani programmes. After he had a talk with them, his dynamic and realistic mind immediately worked out a scheme "for utilizing this valuable young Indian material for some better purpose, useful for the country, if not immediately, at least at a later date. He could not tolerate such fine material rotting in the prisoner's camps."4

Bose gave his proposal to the German Government to create an Indian Legion from amongst the Indian prisoners of war in Germany. In the beginning, the German authorities did not receive such a proposal favourably and they expressed their skepticism about Bose.5 This created some obstacles in his way to organize the Legion, but subsequently the "Germans ultimately welcomed the idea, as a far-sighted policy".

Bose worked tirelessly and courageously without caring for the difficulties. He contacted the military authorities, initially, through the Foreign Office and then directly. In spite of several difficulties, "he never lost courage or patience."

As desired by Bose, Walter Harbich met him in the Hotel Esplanade and had detailed discussions with him as the first German
Officer of the Commando Unit. In January 1942, Harbich received the Commission to raise a training unit in the Camp at Regenwurm, for the Indian Army of volunteers. In this connection, Bose also met Adalbert Seifriz, with whom he very soon developed intimate relations. The role Seifriz played in acting according to the wishes of Bose and in attending to the interests of the Indian Legion, is really noteworthy.

The recruitment for the Indian Legion started in September 1941, from among the prisoners of war in Germany and North Africa. Before starting the campaign for recruitment in full swing, Bose wanted to visit personally the prisoners of war camp and study their background and mental attitudes. He wanted to assess personally for himself as to what would be the reaction of the prisoners of war to his appeal to join the Indian National Army to fight the British. He visited the POW camp at Annaberg. He spoke to many of them personally and came to the "conclusion that there was enough enthusiasm amongst the captured soldiers to form out of them a military unit capable of fighting the British later on."6

The Indian Legion was first started with a group of twelve young men who were given military training by the Germans. The response to Bose's appeal to join the Legion was not satisfactory "in view of the officers" and non-commissioned officers' critical attitude." However, without being disappointed, Bose continued his efforts to convince the soldiers and in the course of his speeches and discussions in the POW camp on the second day, he appealed to them
to volunteer to fight and sacrifice their lives for the sacred cause of India’s freedom. Despite the critical attitude of some of the officers, hundreds of prisoners of war volunteered to join the Indian Legion. Bose never agreed to compromise on principles to attract the prisoners of war and “demanded a clear allegiance towards a Free India as well as an absolute readiness to undergo sacrifices for the purpose”. Though Bose made emotional speeches and appeals to the Indian prisoners of war to join the Legion, “at no time was there any pressure exercised. This is borne out by the large number that did not enter the Legion.

By August 1942, more than 2,000 prisoners of war had joined the Indian Legion. Due to the poor response in the beginning, the Legion could not be brought up to regiment strength. There were two important reasons for this. Firstly, it was the ordinary Indian soldier’s distrust that made him skeptical about the Bose-German collaboration. Secondly, Shedai’s disturbing interference with his ‘Centro Militare’ in Italy, was another important reason for the dearth of recruits as he recruited many volunteers from among the prisoners of war from North Africa in violation of the Italo-German agreement that all prisoners of war were to be transferred to German POW camps.

But after these difficulties were over, the Legion reached the strength of four battalions towards December, 1942. On January 28, 1943, the First Official manoeuvre was held with three battalions in honour of Bose. Colonel Yamamoto, Bose’s friend and the military
Attache of Japan in Berlin, also accompanied Bose. The Indian soldiers were sworn in to their flag under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Krappe. They expressed loyalty to Hitler and accepted Bose as their leader under whom they were to fight for India’s freedom. The expansion of the Legion had posed financial difficulties and this necessitated the direct payment to the soldiers of the Legion by German authorities and Bose had to agree perforce to their expression of loyalty to Hitler.

Bose, however, had clear understanding with the German Government that the Legion would not be mixed with any German Army formation and “its exclusive identity was to be maintained with the emblem of the Springing Tiger, which once adorned the flag of Tipu Sultan. The Legion was to maintain its separate identity and independence and the German Army was only to provide the necessary training staff and other facilities. The Legion was not to be sent to any other front except India. The Legionaries could, however, fight in self defence in any other place in the event of being taken by surprise. “To begin with, the Legion was to have gone to war only in or near India: be used against British Indian troops.”

Bose had no previous military training but he proved to be a born commander. Despite the lack of regular military training “he commanded his troops as efficiently as any professional Army Commander. Nobody without the combined qualities of wisdom, benevolence and courage could do such a feat. He was undoubtedly a born commander. Unlike such dictators as Hitler and Mussolini,
Netaji was a different type of Hero. He had great intelligence and an excellent educational background.\textsuperscript{13}

Bose continuously addressed the Legionaries to keep their morale high and also appealed to the enthusiastic crowds in the POW camps. His speeches made a deep effect on the minds of the assembled illiterates. He said that opportunities come but once in the life of a nation to improve its lot and if that is lost, it might come after decades. He said that, that opportunity had come and they must seize it to make their country free. "We have to take this chance and make the best of it. It is our sacred duty, for fulfilling which we should not expect any return, but if we do not do our duty when we know that it would help our people, we shall be great defaulters and sinners. The great impact that his speeches produced has been very ably described by Girija Mukherjee, who was one of the important colleagues of Bose in Germany:

"When I watched Subhas speaking to the Indian soldiers and the effect he produced on them, I felt more and more convinced that he was a leader of the masses par excellence. I shall always remember a rally of Indian soldiers, mostly from peasant families, in Dresden where Subhas spoke for nearly an hour and a half. It was a glorious autumn afternoon and all the men had gathered on
the lawn. He spoke in Hindustani. When he finished, the audience of about 400 men had almost acquired a new life.\textsuperscript{14}

Bose was very particular about the military training of the Legionaries. He had very high opinion of German military training and was curious not only to know the secret of this training, but see whether some Indians could be imparted the same training. The German Army was reluctant in the beginning to impart such training to the Indians. But he "eventually succeeded in getting artillery training for the Legion which was denied to Indian soldiery in the Indian Army."\textsuperscript{15}

The composition of the Indian Legion was an evidence of Bose's genius and foresight. He wanted that the Indians should work together for the freedom of the Motherland, forgetting their artificial differences of caste and religion. He was of the view that the British Government in India deliberately stirred up the fight among rival parties in India following the dictum of "divide et impera". With this object in view the formation of army units in the Indian Army was based on caste, religion of region. Bose dispensed with the practice and army units were organized by taking Indians of religious faiths, castes and regions faiths, castes and regions together to promote a fraternal spirit, while making provision for the observance of their separate religious rites and practices.\textsuperscript{16}

Bose provided the ideal of sacrifice to the Legion. It was inspired by National spirit and freedom of India became its mission.
object. They forgot all their differences and were prepared to make the maximum sacrifice for the cause of India’s liberation. “In India we have many Gods and religions, but everything is only Jai Hind here,” that was how a Legionary described the spirit of the Legion. Whatever differences and difficulties were there could be solved by the iron will to work for winning India’s independence. “The Legion was inspired by a good spirit of comradeship, the feeling of belonging together and the mutual will to help, each other. A living national will was the distinguishing character of this Legion. The troops made every effort to maintain discipline in all respects, and the cooperation and relations with the German troops caused no serious difficulties. Even in difficult situations, the Legion suffered privation and proved their courage and readiness for battle.” This fact has been corroborated by Alexander Werth: “The morale and discipline of the troops as well as the personal relationship between officers and soldiers were excellent. Netaji frequently visited the training camps in order to convince himself of the progress his men were making.” Huge Toye’s observation that “preservation of morale was always difficult, and Indo-German relations never satisfactory,” could only be accepted with a pinch of salt.

Adalbert Seifriz had paid glowing tribute to Bose’s contributions to the making and the success of the Indian Legion:

“It must be emphasized that Bose’s principle that preferment and advancement within the
Legion should only depend on ability and proof of aptitude, independent of birth or former grade, was recognized and esteemed by the Legionaries. It can be said that the experiment to form Hindus, Sikhs, Moslems, Punjabis, Maharattas and Bengalees and members of other religious communities into a close military unit and to form an efficient fighting force was crowned with success.... The intellectual basis for the growth and success of the Legion was created by Subhas Bose. Repeatedly he explained to his compatriots and the German personnel his ideas about the Legion and their future task in free India. He was very anxious to see preserved in the Legion traditions of the cultural and political past of his country. With a feeling, fine and noble, he did his utmost to banish the danger of losing the cultural roots of his ardent desire of losing the cultural roots of his Legionaries... He was the great ideal of the day of the German capitulation, to try to emulate him and to help him in the execution of his ideas. A meeting with Subhas Bose was a special event for the
German training staff. We spent many evenings with him discussing the future of India. He lives in the minds of the training staff members as an idealistic and fighting personality, never sparing himself in the service of his people and his country.\textsuperscript{19}

Though Bose's plan to take the Legion to India did not materialize, he rendered great service to the Indian POWs who did not join the Legion. By virtue of the new status acquired by the Legion, they were saved from inhuman and torture, which otherwise they would have suffered. Thus the POWs were not only saved from arduous physical labour in distant lands but their return to India, after the war was also facilitated.\textsuperscript{20}

The Indian legion had come into existence, Bose now wanted to have an official declaration on India's Independence from Hitler, so a meeting was arranged. The meeting between Bose and Hitler took place on May 29, 1942. Bose requested Hitler to explain as to what he exactly meant by the insulting remarks about India made in his book \textit{Main Kemp}. Hitler point-blank refused to discuss this point. Bose then requested Hitler to make an official declaration on India's right to independence after the war. "Hitler replied by saying that according to him India would not be able to rule herself for another 150 years."\textsuperscript{21} Hitler's refusal to make a declaration on India's right to independence on the pretext of great distance between German war front and India, made Bose perplexed and to
some extent agitated. At the end of the discussion Hitler asked Bose as to what practical steps he would take in the interest of the Indian Freedom Movement when the conditions were so unfavourable. Bose lost his patience and told Von Trott in English: “Tell His Excellency that I had been in politics all my life and that I don’t need advice from any side.” In spite of a diplomatic rendering of Bose’s statement in German by Von Trott, the Hitler-Bose meeting was a total failure. “The meeting was a disappointment for Subhas,” writes Girija Mookerjee, “and he did not like very much satisfied with Hitler, with whom, he said, a logical discussion even for a few minutes was impossible. We felt, however, that the reception for a few minutes was impossible. We felt, however, that the reception of an Indian by the head of a foreign Government, as if he was the representative of a sovereign state, was somewhat flattering. The War had now taken a different turn. Since the day of Hitler’s declaration of War against Soviet Union, Bose was having an uneasy feeling Recalling his discussions with Bose, Dr. Wirsing writes:

“I remember well the dramatic days in Berlin’s Hotel Excelsior, during which Bose constantly spoke on this decisive error in German war policy until he finally came to the conclusion that he could no longer remain and would have to return to Asia.”
From the German experience it was clear that the Indian P.O.Ws. were not allowed to write in concentration camps, secondly the theatre of war was shifting towards South-East Asia, where about 2 million Indian and 50,000 I.N.A. forces were going to play a decisive role in India’s freedom struggle.

Bose had already been in contact with Rash Behari Bose and his group through the Japanese Embassy in Berlin and Rome and had received an invitation from them to come to East Asia as soon as possible and assume the leadership of India’s freedom movement.\textsuperscript{25} Besides this unofficial invitation, the Japanese Government had also extended an official invitation to come to East Asia.\textsuperscript{26} Thus Bose was confident of the Japanese support and with that help, he thought, he would be able to persuade all Indians in East Asia, to unite for fighting India’s battle for freedom. Bose requested Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, to use his good offices to enlist the help of the Japanese Government in implementing his plan.\textsuperscript{27} In the beginning, Tokyo did not take much interest in such a project, but subsequently it became more enthusiastic about the matter. In January 1943, Hitler approved the Japanese request to send Bose to Japan. Bose told Shun Higuchi, the then Military Attaché of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, that he wanted a more vigorous and active development of India’s freedom movement. Bose expected that the journey to East Asia would be safe, but in case anything happened to him, he wanted that Higuchi should see that Nambiar
and Rash Behari Bose work in close touch with each other. Bose also expressed that he desired to take with him the Indian soldiers recruited in Germany.

On February 8, 1943, Bose left Berlin by train for Kiel, accompanied by Abid Hassan. From there he boarded the German Submarine U-190. Bose’s journey was kept a top secret and except Werth, Keppler, Nambiar and the military people concerned, nobody else knew about Bose’s departure from Germany.

The first dramatic announcement of Bose’s arrival in Japan from Berlin filled the hearts of nearly three million Indians in East Asia with extreme happiness and “overnight the atmosphere was electrified.” In Germany Bose had launched his programme of mobilizing armed assistance for India’s unarmed freedom fighters with the help of Germany. But the transport of the soldiers of the INA from Germany to the western borders of India to fight the British on the Indian soil, posed a formidable problem. Due to the intransigence of Hitler regarding an official declaration on India’s right to freedom and his defective war policy, Bose left Europe “with his trust in Germany’s victory substantially shaken.” Bose left Germany when he realized that Germany had nothing more to offer him “in the way of an advanced base in any of its theatres of war for his fight to free India.” Bose had expressed his feelings in very clear terms in the autumn of 1942 to Admiral Canaris:
“You know as well as I do that Germany cannot win this war. But this time victorious Britain will lose India. Even the British will not be able to break their promise to give up their dominion over India, a promise made by their own free will in 1940.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Revolutionaries in South-East Asia and Formation of I.I.L. and I.N.A.}

Before the outbreak of the greater East Asia war, there were many Indian societies in South East Asia “with different appellations,” professing to be working for the cause of Indian Independence. In this connection the name of Rash Behari Bose deserves to be mentioned. He was an eminent Indian revolutionary, who had escaped to Japan after throwing a bomb at Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in 1912, when the viceregal procession was passing through Chandni Chowk, Old Delhi. Even after escaping to Japan, he did not rest and the liberation of India from the yoke of British control became his sole mission in life.\textsuperscript{29} With this purpose, Rash Behari Bose founded the Indian Independence League in 1924, with Tokyo as its headquarters and branches spread out in other neighbouring states.\textsuperscript{30} Through the IIL, he explained the political conditions of India to the people of South East Asia and emphasized “the supreme importance of Indian Independence as a factor of Greater Asian freedom and unity. It is due to the sustained efforts of Rash Behari Bose, that the
people of East Asia were roused from their slumber and they began to “look upon the political emancipation of India as a stepping stone to Greater Asia liberation from bondage, and that they became sympathizers with the Indian cause in large number.” Another significant contribution of Rash Behari Bose was promotion of Indo-Japanese cooperation, goodwill and understanding. Thus Rash Behari Bose had done ample spade-work in Japan for the Indian Freedom Movement before the arrival of Subhas Bose in South East Asia.

Rash Behari’s efforts received great impetus as similar movements were started in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok by Indian leaders. An underground organization, headed by Amar Singh and assisted by Pritam Singh was operating from Bangkok and was known as the Indian Independence League. “The IIL, was a secret society devoted to the cause of emancipation and independence of India. They had their like-minded comrades scattered in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tokyo and Berlin.” Amar Singh and Pritam Singh maintained close contact with Tamura, the Japanese Army Attaché in Bangkok and because of this association with them the Japanese were able to get secret information about conditions inside India as well as military intelligence about Malaya. The Japanese side was given to understand that the IIL, was well organized and was prepared to resort to force, if necessary.

Though Pritam Singh sought Japanese assistance to fight against the British, he held very strong views regarding the
Independence of action of the IIL, and like Subhas Bose, he believed that India must fight for her independence free from the control by any foreign country:

"The leaders of the Indian National Congress don't welcome any outside assistance for the independence movement with open arms, as they fear that 'after the wolf is driven out by the front gate, may come a tiger from the back.' India is fighting only for complete independence, free from control by any foreign country. When we need outside help, we have to bear in mind that should we give any impression that we were used as political pawns, - our passionate movement would lose the support of the entire people of India. In point of fact, however, we are so powerless that we need outside help to accomplish our purpose. Therein lies our headache."33

Thus it is evident from the above statement that Pritam Singh's ideal harmonized with that of Subhas Bose. In order to make his position and that of the IIL clear and well established in the context of his collaboration with the Japanese, a note was exchanged between Pritam Singh and Tamura, much before the outbreak of the
Great East Asia War. This note is historically very important as it set the basis for the later collaboration between Bose and Japan.  

The first Article said that Indo-Japanese cooperation should be carried on for the ultimate purpose of bringing peace, freedom and prosperity of the Greater East Asia on the basis of joint effort by the completely independent, free and equal countries of Japan and India. The second Article said that:

"The I.I.L. will carry out anti-British struggle, resorting to force, to win prompt and complete independence. Towards that end, it will welcome the comprehensive support of Japan. However, Japan will guarantee that it has no territorial, military, political, economic, cultural and religious designs and demands what so ever on India."  

According to the note the IIL was to embrace all the Indian people transcending racial, religious and political differences, who agree to fight for independence. The Indians who were residing in the areas of military operation including those who surrendered (including POW's) were not to be regarded as enemies by the Japanese Army. They were to be treated as friends and their lives, properties, freedom and honour were to be protected. The Japanese Army was to make available whatever material and funds were
needed by the IIL, for carrying on its activities. It was also to facilitate liaison between the IIL, and Subhas Bose.\textsuperscript{36}

The Tokyo Conference with the slogans of “Independence of India for Indians” was a step forward in the formation of I.N.A. The Japanese now practically needed the supports of Indians in South-East Asia as the war situation was changing and they were beginning to face difficulties in the pacific.

The Tokyo conference of representatives of the Indians resident in East Asia opened at Sanno Hotel, Tokyo on Saturday 28\textsuperscript{th} March 1942 at 2 P.M. Rash Behari Bose, the Chairman opened the Conference with a welcome address to all the delegates and other gentlemen and requested their whole hearted cooperation in the attachment of the common objectives viz. the Complete Independence of India. At the outset he expressed his heartfelt condolences at the demise in an air accident of four prominent persons, namely Swami Satyanand Puri, Sardar Pritam Singh, K.A. Nilkantha Iyer and A. Mohd. Akram, while on their way to the Conference.

Col. Iwakuru, on behalf of the Imperial Government of Japan addressed the Conference and expressed whole hearted support to the Conference. The following is the text of Col. Iwakuru’s speech:

“It is my great pleasure to greet you at this Conference, which will mark the birth of New India. Today your dual ideology of “Independence of India” and “India for the Indians” over which you have been most concerned, is going to be realized before long.
Because it is my belief that the outbreak of this war has created an opportunity which is most favourable for its realization. If you lose this golden opportunity by being cowardly, lazy or too much involved in mutual antagonisms, you and your descendents would remain as slaves for, no body knows, how long. The objective World situation is rapidly changing. It is your mission to prepare fully and immediately so as to adjust yourselves for the fast changing times and to liberate India from the British yoke. We, the Japanese, are prepared to give the spiritual and material aid to your revolutionary task without any compensation or condition. It is needless to say that common enemy, Britain will employ every means...... We must be very cautious.... Indian Independence cannot be a gift from anybody, far less from India’s enemy, England, from whom you can only expect oppression. India’s able leaders must make good use of the surrounding international conditions.... On her part what Japan expects from India is that she should do away with all the retarding ideas of religious and class antagonism and the various rivalries between political and military ways of thought and become a united body of 400,000,000 to proceed along the way of independence, that she should realize that the realization of India Independence in itself is a great revolution, to lead to success only on the strength of her leaders’ firm determination and of the fiery patriotism of all the Indians.... And we wish to assure you that Japan has not the slightest territorial or political ambition in India and that she will not hesitate to extend any help to the Indians in their fight and that
without any ulterior motive. Please take your own time and engage yourselves in calm deliberations so that you may arrive at a plan of action which may be beneficial on all parts for future India as well as future East Asia. This is my request to you all, and it comes from the bottom of my heart.37

**Mohan Singh and I.N.A. – The First Phase:**

While on the political level things started moving fast at branches of the Independence League started sprouting in towns and villages where the Indian people were residing, on the military front the Japanese forces were inflicting defeats on the British forces and major areas that were under the control of the British had fallen in the hands of the Japanese and thousands of Indian soldiers working for the British had been captured and made prisoners of war.

Keeping with the Japanese policy of Asia for Asiatics and the creation of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese were keen to accord friendly treatment to the Prisoners of War. Many prominent Indian revolutionaries who were cooperating with the Japanese established contact with the prisoners of War and influenced them to fight for India's Independence. Between December 1941 and 17 February 1942 nearly 45,000 prisoners of war had surrendered and those who did not agree to join the newly formed Indian National Army were sent for fatigue in Guinea and Sumatra. While the exact figures of the number of soldiers taken prisoners of war is not available, it is estimated that nearly 60,000 soldiers were captured and five thousand of them died due
malnutrition, dysentery and malaria. About 30,000 refused to join the new Army and were sent for fatigue. Out of the remaining 25,000 soldiers had agreed to join the Indian National Army under the leadership of Mohan Singh. The remaining soldiers were kept as reserve volunteers. Out of 3,777 officers and men who participated in the I.N.A. as per Haryana Government archives about 3,000 were in the Mohan Singh’s I.N.A.

The main question confronting the Indian Army and the Japanese forces was of rehabilitating the prisoners of war. The barracks in which they were living were not healthy and many soldiers were afflicted by diseases such as malaria. The issue of providing the welfare measures to such a large number of persons involved huge efforts in terms of men and material. Supply of rations and other daily necessities and providing medical facilities was another area where Mohan Singh and his associates played an important role. Apart from these, yet another area where sincere efforts had to be made was of educating the soldiers on their new role. Mohan Singh had started the process of Spiritual education or political education to inculcate nationalist and patriotic feelings among the soldiers. As a result of these measure san army devoted to the cause of India’s freedom was gradually emerging.

From the very beginning of his talks with Maj. Fujiwara, Capt. Mohan Singh has insisted that all the prisoners of war should be entrusted to him so that he can build an effective fighting force. Finally around January 20, 1942 Fujiwara consented to Mohan Singh
keeping a maximum of 200 rifles. He was anxious that Mohan Singh should be absolutely sure of the bonafides of every man to whom a rifle would be given and Mohan Singh assumed full responsibility for anything that might happen. About 200 men were selected and armed in Kuala Lumpur between 22 and 24 January, 1942.

Narrating the sequence of events that led to the formation of the Indian National Army. Gen. Mohan Singh writes in an article in *Bombay News Chronicle Weekly* dated December 8, 1946 as follows:

"The War in the East, or the War of Greater East Asia, as the Japanese termed it, broke out on the night of 7/8 December 1941.... We came in contact with the enemy on the night of 8/9 and continued to fight him till the 11th evening when the enemy tanks overran our position.... It was on that fateful day of heavy battle (11th December 1941) that a spark began to glow in my being, awakening the dormant patriotic feelings in me. I had seen how thin and flimsy was the dividing line between life and death. Besides being subjected to heavy Japanese bombardment, I had been twice the target of a Japanese tank from a range of only 20 yards. A rubber tree had saved me while several of my comrades fell. That brought a supreme realization. I began to search my soul and I became agitated. These were some of the questions that I had put to myself.

*Why were we Indians fighting? To what purpose was the flower of our youth being sacrificed? Is the Indian soldier only destined to die a dog's death for his white masters?*
If the brave Indian soldier is brave enough to fight for the freedom of his white Masters or the white Devils as the Japanese called them, should not he make an attempt to fight for his own freedom? And then who was the enemy of Indian freedom? It was certainly not Japan — it was Britain, the real enemy of World Peace.

I felt convinced in my heart that the Indian soldier had no right and no cause to fight for the British, who were making use of him merely as gunfodder for an absolutely alien cause. I also felt that as long as the Indian Army remained loyal to the British they will never feel the necessity of giving India Independence. The hazy and doubts disappeared from my mind and a new vista opened before my eyes and my course of action became crystal clear. If it was a sin to fight for the British, wasn’t it right that I should contact the Japanese, find out their true motives as regards India and then, assured, make common cause with them and fight our enemy Britain? Almost each and every person, who participated in the I.N.A. campaigns from Haryana had similar views. Their vision of getting into I.N.A. was in alignments to that of Mohan Singh. As was returning with my Party, a few pamphlets dropped by the Japanese came to my notice which contained slogans like “Asia for Asiatics” “Kick out the white Devils from the East” “We have come to liberate Asia from the deadly clutches of Anglo-Saxons” “No Asiatic is our enemy” etc. etc. This of course encouraged me and felt confident that if I approached the Japanese with my plan they will certainly not stand in my way, to raise a truly Indian army to
fight the British....... With mind submerged in these and a thousand more such ideas I was returning through a jungle when I met Capt. Mohd. Akaram of my battalion with ten pathans. I opened my mind to him with my plan. After long deliberations and deep thought he not only approved of my plan but pledged to stand by me in brave soldierly manner..... On the 15th morning, Col. Fujiwara.... Accompanied by a Sikh gentleman Sardar Pritam Singh of Bangkok, arrived at that village... And who was this S. Pritam Singh? .... He was the Founder and Father of the Indian Independence League Movement. Although a civilian, he was a brave soldier of the battle of Indian Freedom... It was he, who practically single handed went all over Malaya and organized Indian Independence League branches... At the time of my surrender on 15th December 1941, I had collected 54 Indian soldiers... They had, one and all pledged loyalty to me to fight for India's liberation.... It was the first time in my life that I was driven in a car flying the tri-colour, the symbol of our nation... it thrilled me and filled my entire being with a strange and in destructible feeling of immense joy and pleasure.... Success was immediate and immense. By the time Singapore fell I had already under my command nearly 10,000 officers and men, who were all volunteers for the sacred cause of liberation of our Motherland, organized into ten battalions. On 17th February 1942 nearly 45,000 officers and men over and above the 10,000 on the mainland were placed under my command. The Indian National Army was officially declared in September 1942. This is the date
when we had actually armed, equipped and paraded in the INA uniform 17,000 soldiers with about 25,000 soldiers as surplus volunteers. Besides these regular soldiers centres for civilians recruitment had been opened all over Malaya. The real foundation of the INA was however, laid at Alor Star in December 1941 only a couple of weeks after the declaration of the war of Greater East Asia.\textsuperscript{38}

**The Bangkok Conference**

The Bangkok conference to coordinate the movement for Indian Independence and discuss about territories in east Asia, which had fallen under Japanese control, about the east Asia co-prosperity sphere and purposes for which the I.N.A. should be used and the expansion and objectives of the I.N.A.

In pursuance of the decisions taken at the Tokyo Conference in March 1942 the Bangkok Conference of representatives of Indians in the States of East Asia was held between June 15 and 23, 1942. The main objects of the Conference were:

1) To coordinate the movement for Indian Independence, which had already started but lacked uniformity and cohesion, in those territories of East Asia, which had fallen under Japanese control.

2) To clarify the position regarding their inclusion in the “East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”.

3) To determine the purposes for which the INA should be used.
4) To decide what assistance should be expected from the Japanese without committing India to post-war Japanese domination.

The Conference opened with the playing of a gramophone record 'BAND-E-MATARAM' followed by a chorus of "Chal Chal Re Naujawan" which was sung by Capt. Jahangir, Sub. Kishen Singh and Puran Singh Khawas.

In his opening address to the Conference on 15th June 1942 Rash Behari Bose, President of the Conference narrated the various steps taken by the revolutionaries towards the independence of India and the enthusiastic response received from the Indian people living in East Asia. He said: "I want to sound a note of warning here. Our enemies have always been successful in keeping us divided and creating false impressions in our minds on such occasions. On many occasions in the past we have missed opportunities to free our country by being victims of lying British propaganda. I can only hope that we shall not repeat our folly. Our doubts and suspicions are to a great extent the results of shrewd and well thought plan of our enemies to sabotage our efforts. Those of us who have intelligence enough and who are not blind to facts and happenings can see the way clearly. We should feel thankful to the Governments of Japan, Germany, Thailand and Governments of Japan, Germany, Thailand and Italy for their most friendly attitude... Let us not forget the words of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru when he said: "SUCCESS OFTEN
COMES TO THOSE WHO DARE AND ACT; IT SELDOM COMES TO COWARDS”39

In its object it said: This Conference endorses the view of the Tokyo Conference held in March 1942 that the Complete Independence of India free from any foreign control, domination or interference of whatever nature shall be the object of this Movement and is emphatically of opinion that the time has arrived to take necessary steps for the attainment of that object.

It further resolved that the Indian Independence Movement sponsored by this Conference shall be guided by the principles indicated below:

a) That UNITY, FAITH, SACRIFICE shall be the motto of the Indian Independence Movement.

b) That India be considered as ONE and indivisible.

c) That all activities of this Movement be on a national basis and not on sectional, communal or religious basis.

d) That in view of the fact that the Indian National Congress is the only political organization which could claim to represent the real interests of the people of India and as such be acknowledged the only body representing India, this Conference is of the opinion that the programme and plan of action of this Movement must be so guided, controlled and directed as to bring them in line with the aims and intentions of the Indian National Congress.
e) That the framing of the future Constitution of India be only by the representatives of the people of India.

f) That a Joint Axis policy favourable towards India would be advantageous to India.

g) That the sympathy, cooperation and support of Japan be invaluable in securing the object of this Movement namely the Independence of India.

Resolved that an organization be started for carrying on the Indian Independence Movement and it shall be known as the Indian Independence League.

Resolved that the Indian Independence League shall immediately proceed to raise an army called the Indian Nation Army from among the Indian soldiers (Combatant and Non-Combatant and such civilians as may hereafter be recruited for military service in the cause of Indian Independence.

The Indian Independence League shall consist of:

a) A Council of Action

b) A Committee of Representatives

c) Territorial Committees, and

d) Local Branches.

A Council of Action consisting of a President and four members of whom at least one half shall be from Indian Nation Army in East Asia shall be appointed by the Delegates to the Conference. The first President shall be Sjt Rash Behari Bose and the four members shall be:
Resolved that a request be made to the Nippon Government that it may be pleased to place immediately all Indian soldiers in territories in East Asia under their control at the disposal of this Movement.

Resolved that the formation, command, control and organization of the Indian National Army be in the hands of Indians themselves.

Resolved that it is the earnest desire of this Conference that the Indian National Army be in the hands of Indians themselves.

Resolved that it is the earnest desire of this Conference that the Indian National Army from its inception be accorded the powers and status of a free National Army of an Independent India on a footing of equality with the armies of Japan and other friendly powers.

Resolved that the Indian National Army shall be made use of:

a) For operations against the British or other Foreign Powers in India.

b) For the purpose of securing and safeguarding Indian National Independence, and

c) For such other purpose as may assist the achievement of the object viz: the Independence of India.
Resolved that all officers and men of the proposed Indian National Army shall be members of the Indian Independence League and shall owe allegiance to the League.

Resolved that the Indian National Army shall be under the direct control of the Council of Action and that the said Army shall be organized and commanded by the General Officer Commanding, Indian National Army, in accordance with the direction of the said Council of Action.

Resolved that before taking any military action against the British or any other foreign power in India the Council of Action will assure itself that such action in conformity with the express or implied wishes of the Indian National Congress.

Resolved that the Council of Action shall make all efforts to create an atmosphere in India which would lead to revolution in the Indian Army there and among the Indian people and that before taking military action the Council of Action shall assure itself that such an atmosphere exists in India.

In view of the great urgency and imperative necessity of informing and convincing our countrymen in India and abroad and the friends of India all over the world of the meaning and purpose of this movement and in view of the fact that propaganda in and outside of India is one of the most effective means of waging war for Indian Independence, this Conference resolves to take immediate steps to carry on active and vigorous propaganda by Broadcasts,
Leaflets, Lectures and by such other means as may be found possible and practicable from time to time.

Resolved that the Imperial Government of Japan be requested to be good enough to provide all facilities for Propaganda, Travel, Transport, Communication within the area under the control of the Imperial Government of Japan in the manner and to the extent requested by the Council of Action and also all facilities to come into contact with the National Leaders, Workers and Organizations in India.

This Conference while according its grateful appreciation of the various pronouncements made by General Tojo, the Premier of Japan, expressing the preparedness of the Nipponese Government to give its unstinted support to the cause of Indian Independence reiterates the Resolution of the Tokyo Conference that in further clarification of the attitude of Japan towards India, the Imperial Government of Japan be good enough to make a formal declaration to the effect.

a) That immediately on the severance of India from the British Empire, the Imperial Government of Japan shall respect the territorial integrity and recognize the full sovereignty of India free of any foreign influence, control or interference of a political, military or economic nature.

b) That the Imperial Government of Japan will exercise its influence with other powers and induce them to recognize the national Independence and absolute sovereignty of India.
c) That the framing of the future Constitution of India will be left entirely to the representatives of the people of India without interference from any foreign authority.

That the Imperial Government of Japan may be pleased to arrange with the authorities in the territories now freed from the domination of Anglo-Saxons and their Allies by the Imperial Forces of Japan to hand over the properties owned by the Indians (including those owned by the Indian Companies, Firms or Partnerships) and left behind by them owing to the exigencies of the war, to the Council of Action of this Movement in trust for their rightful owners to manage and control the said properties and advance the income thereof for the use of this Movement to be repaid as and when claimed by the said owners.

That this Movement adopts the present National Flag of India and requests the Imperial Government of Japan and the Royal Government of Thailand and the governments of all other friendly powers to recognize the said flag in all territories under their jurisdiction.

The Conference requests Sjt Subhas Chandra Bose to be kind enough to come to East Asia and appeals to the Imperial Government of Japan to use its good offices to obtain the necessary permission and conveniences from the Government of Germany to enable Sjt Subhas Chandra Bose to reach East Asia safe.

The Bangkok Chronicle, 23 June 1942 carried the following report:
Indian Independence Parley Concluded Action, Forward to Action' is decision.

Amidst deafening shouts of "Long Live Revolution", "Long Live India" and "Down with England", the Indian Independence Conference which began its historic session at Bangkok under Mr. Rash Behari Bose's Chairmanship on Monday June 15, came to successful conclusion this morning at the Silapakorn Theatre....

The Chairman of the Conference Mr. R.B. Bose addressed the audience in grave tones. "The Council of Action will start work today, said Mr. Bose adding: "All able-bodied men must come forward to join in the fight for India's freedom. Nothing could be done by talk, they must be prepared to make sacrifices, India's freedom was important for Asia. There could be no peace in the World until India was free. After achieving their own freedom Indians would help in achieving the freedom of other peoples in the world."

The Bangkok Conference declared openly that the Indian National Army "will be organized" under the direct control of the Council of Action and "shall be asked for operations against the British" and "for the purpose of securing and safeguarding India National Independence". The task of organizing the Indian National Army was being done by Mohan Singh from the very beginning. But the conference, gave him the legitimacy to pursue it more vigorously. Initially the INA was not a spontaneous, but a deliberate creation. Both Mohan Singh and Fujiwara had laboured a lot to rea
it and moulded the defeated and demoralized soldiers of the British army into members of a patriotic army. Fujiwara was a genuine idealists who fervently believed in Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere conception. He sinfully and sedulously inspired Mohan Singh with similar enthusiasm for a liberated India. But other Japanese officers had very vague plans for the formation and the status of the INA. Iwakuro as the head of the Japanese liaison agency had received no specific instructions as regards the organization and expansion of the INA nor he was bound to follow the line taken by Fujiwara. He was still guided by the policy laid down by Tokyo in January 1942 that every effort was to be made to prevent the Indians from cooperating with British and the anti-British sentiments of the Indians in East Asia were to be encouraged according to the development of the Japanese military campaigns. Naturally the role which the Imperial Headquarters was ready to allot to the INA was marginal. They viewed INA as an organization, which could at best be used for propaganda purposes, particularly to foster anti-British feelings in the British Army and the Indians in the regions for controlling the prisoners of war; and for maintaining law and order among the Indian population. This role was quite opposite to the one Fujiwara or Mohan Singh wanted to give it. For Fujiwara, the INA was to play many important roles: intelligence work and maintenance of law and order among the prisoners of war were its minor task, while its important function was to prepare itself for the final assault on the British. He knew that it would take sometime to
infuse new spirit in the Indian National Army and initially he advocated that a nucleus of the INA comprising of only 500 commissioned officers, about 1,000 NCOs, and 1,000 private soldiers, should be formed and given a special training. He wanted that the rest of the prisoners of war should be split up into different groups and assigned manual and technical work. His view was that these soldiers should be attached to the Japanese Army and since they had been deeply affected by materialistic considerations, their present general conduct was not conductive to the well-being of a revolutionary movement. Fujiwara also was not willing to deviate from the general trend of thinking in Tokyo where no specific plans had yet been formulated for raising a strong army from amongst the Indian POWs for the liberation of India. Mohan Singh looked at it as the India’s Army of Liberation, and though optimistic about his mission, he knew the difficulties of raising such an army.

Iwakuro, it appears was following a passive policy. He did not take any active interest, as compared to Fujiwara either in the Indian Independence movement or in the organization of the Indian National Army. His duty, he explained to the Indian representatives in Malaya, was not to lead the Indian independence movement but to give it a helping hand. No doubt, he tried to create goodwill between the Indians and the Japanese by meeting the leaders of the IIL at various places, but he had no clear instructions save that of serving as a liaison agency between military administration and Indian Independence League.
Despite the heterogeneous elements which came into the fold of the INA and swelled its ranks, the INA still posed a challenge to the British Raj once it was formed. It was inspired by the lofty ideals of unity, faith and sacrifice, and every soldier had taken a solemn pledge to sacrifice his all for the honour of his motherland, making it a unique movement in the history of India. A patriotic army was now ready to launch an attack on the British for the liberation of the Indian people. But the remarkable spirit of the INA was not adequately appreciated by the Japanese and, as Shah Nawaz says, they never intended to use it for actual fighting and the Indians got the impression that the Japanese did not trust the INA and were afraid lest it should become too powerful: therefore the Indians became suspicious of the Japanese, began to lose confidence in them and “doubted their professed intentions”. Despite this atmosphere, Mohan Singh went ahead with the programme of moving the INA towards India. He even sent Col. Gill with a few selected officers in early August 1942, to the Burma Front to work with the Japanese Intelligence Officers.

The events were moving fast. An advance party under Habbibur-Rehman was operating on the Indo-Burma border in pursuance of the “Operation 21” which had been discussed by Mohan Singh and Iwakuro. Gill had also gone to Burma alongwith trustworthy officers who were to infiltrate into India; to collect military and other valuable information for the use of the INA and
the Japanese and to carry on propaganda in India with a view to fomenting an internal revolution.

Mohan Singh has undertaken a heavy responsibility which involved great danger to him, but he was undaunted and was full of vitality and courage. Overflowing with confidence in himself and his men whom he loved and who reciprocated his love, he was now on the verge of achieving his dream of taking the INA towards India. But the entire scene changed within a few months, because mutual suspicion and distrust gripped the leaders of the Indian Independence movement and the Japanese in East Asia, Fujiwara had been able to convince the Indians of the sincerity of Japan to the cause of Indian Independence by his words and deeds, but Iwakuro failed to build any cordial relationship with the Indians. Since he “had no personal commitment to the men of the INA”, he was less sympathetic to their aspirations and expectations. Instead of removing misunderstanding and suspicion, which had been gradually developing since the Bangkok conference, the members of the Iwakuro Kikan aggravated them by their arrogant actions and uncalled for utterances. As a matter of fact Iwakuro had not been able to convince the Imperial Headquarters either to evolve a positive policy towards the INA or even to take any concrete decision for bringing Subhas from Berlin. Undoubtedly, the emergence of the crisis in the last quarter of 1942 was due more to the mishandling of the situation by the Iwakuro than to any other factor. The rapport that had been established between the Japanese and the Indian sides by Fujiwara resulting in close
cooperation and sharing of each other problems, began to receive serious setback under Iwakuro's tutelage. Instead, both sides became suspicious of one another. The basic cause of such a phenomenon, writes Hayachida, "was the considerable gap that existed between the Japanese way of thinking and that of expressing it", which perhaps Indians were not able to understand.

Mohan Singh was aware that his deference with the Japanese would lead him to a trouble, moreover, he could not digest the idea that political power lied with the council of Action with R.B. Bose as President, hence his strained relation with Rash Behari Bose and the Japanese led to his ouster leading to decline of I.N.A. for the time being.

A week later in September Mohan Singh requested that a 1 Div. be allowed to be raised. He said that he had 25,000 surplus volunteers. Her urged that 6,000 men be permitted to be trained. Through Mohan Singh claims that his plan was in general approved by all quarters no reply was received till the end of September 1942.

The Japanese wished that the INA be moved to Burma. However, Mohan Singh was of the opinion that before the INA was moved to Burma the 2 Div. be formed so that it may not be necessary to bring back the officers and equipment for training from Burma thus causing delay. Meantime N.S. Gill kept sending messages to Mohan Singh that he was not happy in his new position and that he be recalled.
The Council of Action met on November 19, 20 and 21 after R.B. Bose had arrived on November 18 and considered all the points raised by Mohan Singh and K.P.K. Menon. Even as the Council of Action was meeting Mohan Singh had received intimation that a ship was coming to take about 900 men to Burma. The Council decided that no troops would be moved pending a clarification by the Japanese. Around the middle of November N.S. Gill returned and told Mohan Singh that Dhillon had deserted and gone to India. But Gill did not disclose to Mohan Singh that he had sent him to India with a letter informing of the developments in East Asia. It was only while arresting N.S. Gill that the Japanese disclosed his past Intelligence activities and his sending Dhillon to India.

He therefore, selected 5 Sikh civilian recruits of good education who were natives of Kuala Lumpur and guaranteed reliable by Budh Singh, an old gentleman of Kuala Lumpur who had been doing social work among PW there. These men were to proceed to Thailand, Burma and India in civilian proceed to Thailand, Burma and India in civilian guise. He made them learn their message by heart and also gave them documents which they must absorb and destroy, before crossing the Malayan border. His instructions were to pass on the information to INA comds of PW camps, to Ram Swarup in Burma and to Congress leaders and Indian officers of the Indian Army in India. The 5 selected men were:

1 Ajaib Singh
2. Kehar Singh
3. Dalip Singh
4. Ajit Singh
5. Mukham Singh

A warning order for the dissolution was issued on 21 Dec. It contained a full statement of the situation, and said that as the purpose for which the INA was raised could not be served, duty to Indian demanded that it be dissolved. Mohan Singh sent a secret letter to all units which was marked "To be opened in the event of the removal, disappearance, assassination or arrest of the GOC." This contained final orders for the dissolution, for the removal of badges of rank, the burning of records, the absolution of all ranks from their personal pledge to Mohan Singh and their reversion to PW status.

Mohan Singh was called for a meeting with Iwakuru on December 29, 1942. Iwakuru also wished to see all INA officers to the rank of Major and above at the INA HQ. Mohan Singh told his officers that he might not return from this interview. Also present at Iwakuru's house when Mohan Singh went there were Rash Behari Bose and Senda. R.B. Bose handed over the letter of dismissal and a statement of charges. It ended by saying that in consideration of his services he would be saved alive and provided with the necessities of life. Iwakuru then read out a long statement setting out the Japanese charges against Mohan Singh and replies to Mohan Singh's own accusations against the Japanese. Mohan Singh was then arrested and
was confined in Pincrol Point till April 43. Mohan Singh was kept in the Pulau Ubin Island which was most unhealthy and malarial. From September to December 43 he was almost continuously ill. Dr. D.S. Raju who was the personal physician of S.C. Bose visited Mohan Singh in November 1943 and gave him medicines. Raju also delivered a verbal message from S.C. Bose on December 20. The gist of the message was as follows:"

"1. For several reasons it was not possible for me to consult you earlier. I have now consulted many of your staunch followers and consequently your point of view has been placed before me with the facts of the crisis,

"2. I fully appreciate your past services and have a very high opinion of you and your work but in dealing with the crisis you made a mistake to break away with the Japanese authorities and have not helped the cause of India but rather a set back to India.

"3. I fully appreciate the difficulties you had to meet in dealing with the Japanese and I also know them very well by experience. But being provoked... as a leader should not have lost the head.

"4. I regard you as a patriot and I feel your services should be made available to India.

"5. The INA as it was till Dec. 1942, was largely your creation. The INA subsequent to that event is not your creation.

"6. Some of those who gave their word that they will go with you subsequently joined the new INA. Though they might have
broken a pledge or assurance given to a person, by rebuilding the INA they have served the larger interests of India.

"7. When you are restored to full liberty, it will not be possible to use your services for the new INA but the Independence Movement can eventually benefit by your services.

"8. If you have full confidence in my leadership I am prepared to invite your cooperation and you should not have any mental reservations. If you come in the Movement inspite of any mental reservations and without having full confidence in my leadership then another break might take place.

"9. In case you come in the Movement, I shall do my best to restore your personal prestige.

"10. How we can best utilize your services in a non-military capacity in advancing and helping the Independence Movement will depend on our work.

"11. Even if there is no agreement between us then for purely humanitarian point of view proper arrangements will be made to look after your person."

Subhas Chandra Bose met Mohan Singh on 27 or 28 December, 1943 at Changi and the meeting lasted for over two hours. During the meeting Mohan Singh defended his actions. No conclusion could be reached since Subhas Chandra Bose as well as Mohan Singh had to reach their residences before the black out practices took place. From the message of Subhas Chandra Bose it would appear that he was prepared to utilize the services of Mohan Singh, but could not do
Towards the end of January 1944 Mohan Singh was moved to Sumatra, where he remained until September 1945.

S.C. Bose - The Second Phase of I.N.A.:

The Mohan Singh episode have left the I.N.A. and the I.I.L. in a shattered position, all the parties involved losing faith in each other. The Japanese started showing less interest in the India struggle, hence a necessity was felt of a dynamic leader "a man of commanding personality, full of indomitable will and energy, with courageous adherence to conviction and consummate political ability to lead the Indian freedom Movement in East Asia. When the arrival of Subhas Bose was finalized, Japanese wanted to know as to what would be the reaction of Rash Behari. It was doubted if Rash Behari would agree to turn the leadership over to Subhas Bose, but when Col. Iwakuro broke this news to Rash Behari he replied saying:

"That is a good idea. He is a born leader. I will be glad to turn the leadership to Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose. Our ultimate goal is to win our independence. Since I have done my bit, I would like Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose to take over. He is young and bouncy."51

Bose had heard about Rash Behari from V.D. Savarkar, when on June 22, 1940, he had come to Savarkar to seek his advice on the vexed question of Hindu-Muslim unity. Rash Behari ha
correspondence with Savarkar and kept him informed about the political developments in Japan and the possibility of Japan joining the World War II, against Anglo-American imperialism. It seems that Savarkar advised Bose to go to Germany and organize an Army from among the Indian Prisoners of War and then come to Japan with German help, where he could join hands with Rash Behari Bose.

It may be mentioned that like his earlier experience in Germany Bose's experience in Japan in the initial stages was not very pleasant. Before he took charge of the Presidentship of the League, he met the Japanese Army Chief of Staff, the Minister of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. These meetings were successful and he could impress them considerably. But Japanese Premier Tojo was reluctant to meet him and refused an interview on the pretext of pressure of work. The fact was that Tojo was himself prejudiced against the Indian Freedom Movement, after the developments of the Bangkok meeting and the Mohan Singh incident. In holding such a view, Tojo was influenced by officers in the Army who had definite hostility towards the Indian Independence Movement in East Asia.

Finally on June 10, 1943, the meeting took place between Bose and Tojo:

"Once Tojo met Bose his prejudice was completely dispelled ... with his appearance and manners Bose cut in imposing figure."
The sincerity and intelligence he displayed in spelling out his opinion struck a responsive chord. Tojo was very deeply impressed by Bose’s personality, and underwent a complete change of heart about India and Indian people as a whole.54

The single minded devotion of Bose to the cause of Indian Freedom and his preparedness to sacrifice every thing for that sacred cause had its unavoidable impact on everybody. His personality compelled attention from everybody and even made his worst enemies admit his great qualities. His dauntless courage, daring spirit, sacrifice, bold and imaginative leadership and the dignified way in which he conducted himself, changed the attitude of the local inhabitants in the Far East about the Indian in general. Bose also knew that the Japanese had a poor opinion of the Indians in general and the INA in particular.55 This consciousness made him determined to impress everybody by his flawless manners and the righteousness of the cause to which he was devoted. Bose’s impact was so great, even the cynical Tojo could not remain uninfluenced by him. After their first meeting he offered to meet Bose again on 14th June for the second time.

Bose and Tojo exchanged views regarding the greater East Asia co-prosperity Sphere, and plans for achieving the independence of India, during the time of their second meeting. The meeting was a great success as both the leaders came to an agreement on the basic
issues confronting India and Japan. It is probable that during his discussions with Tojo, Bose gave him a hint about his idea of forming the Provisional Government of Free India. But as usual, Tojo gave some non-committal answers which created embarrassment for both the Indian and Japanese sides. Tojo, however, expended an invitation to Bose to attend the section of the Diet on 16th June.

In the speech before the Diet, in presence of Bose, Tojo explained the Japanese policy towards India and his concept of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere:

“We are indignant about the fact that India is still under the relentless suppression of Britain and are in full sympathy with her desperate struggle for independence. We are determined to extend every possible assistance for the cause of India’s independence. It is our belief that the day is not far off when India will enjoy freedom and prosperity after winning independence. A week later in September Mohan Singh requested that a II Div. be allowed to be raised. He said that he had 25,000 surplus volunteers. He urged that 6,000 men be permitted to be trained. Through Mohan Singh claims that his plan was in general approved by all quarters no reply was received till the end of September 1942.

The Japanese wished that the INA be moved to Burma. However, Mohan Singh was of the opinion that before the INA was moved to Burma the 2 Div. be formed so that it may not be
necessary to bring back the officers and equipment for training from Burma thus causing delay. Meantime N.S. Gill kept sending messages to Mohan Singh that he was not happy in his new position and that he be recalled:

“The Council of Action met on November 19, 20 and 21 after R.B. Bose had arrived on November 18 and considered all the points raised by Mohan Singh and K.P.K. Menon (The points raised by them have been narrated in an earlier chapter). Even as the Council of Action was meeting Mohan Singh had received intimation that a ship was coming to take about 900 men to Burma. The Council decided that no troops would be moved pending a clarification by the Japanese. Around the middle of November N.S. Gill returned and told Mohan Singh that Dhillon had deserted and gone to India. But Gill did not disclose to Mohan Singh that he had sent him to India with a letter informing of the developments in East Asia. It was only while arresting N.S. Gill that the Japanese disclosed his past Intelligence activities and his sending Dhillon to India.”56
After he knew the Japanese mind, it was no longer necessary for Bose to remain in disguise. He held a press conference on 19th June and boldly announced his future course of action, which also epitomized his political philosophy:

"During the last great war our leaders were deceived by the cunning British diplomats. We took a decision some twenty years ago that we would never again be cheated. In the past twenty years of my generation all the Indians have been fighting for freedom and have been waiting for the opportune time, which has come now. We are therefore, determined to utilize it to the fullest extent. Very often it is said that this war is being waged only for saving liberty and democracy. But you can very well appreciate the feeling of my compatriots against the Anglo-Saxons who talk all about liberty and democracy and these they deny to the same people forming one-fifth of the human race, and who through terror and brutal cruelty are massacring unarmed and innocent men, women and children."
“Spiritual degradation, cultural degeneration, dire poverty and political slavery, are the only things which India got from British imperialism. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Indian people have once and for all risen up boldly to smash the British chains and attain freedom.

“By declaring war on our permanent enemy, the Axis Powers have given the greatest help to India in her fight for the freedom ... We would, however, get out freedom only by shedding our own blood. We will be able to preserve our freedom only if we get it through our own sacrifice and toil.

..We, therefore, feel that we should take an active part in this war against our common enemy. Since the enemy fights with his sword we too should fight with the sword. The non-violent struggle should transform itself into a violent one. Only if a large number of Indians undergo this baptism of fire can they win the race and get the reward of freedom."
On July 4, 1943, in a mammoth meeting at Singapore, Bose took over the Presidentship of the Indian Independence League, making over the charge to him, Rash Behari said:

"Friends and Comrades in Arms! In your presence today, I resign my office and appoint Deshsevak Subhas Chandra Bose as president of the Indian Independence League.... India's best is represented in him."

Bose in turn appointed Rash Behari as the Supreme Adviser to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind. Bose had the full knowledge of the world situation and he had come to Japan with invincible determination to take the Indian Independence Movement to the culminating point.

"Friends, the time to start an armed struggle for freedom has come. Military service and loyalty to the mother country are the most essential things necessary to achieve our goal of freedom during the war. I appeal to you, my countrymen in the Far East, to assembly under the common flag... The British may offer promises which I must tell you are made to ensure you. Any compromise with the British will be sheer loss for us, and will
prove detrimental to our interests. We must be ready for sacrifice and action... We have now a good opportunity to free ourselves and lay the foundations of a new world order based on truth, justice and freedom. I ask those who have any doubts or suspicions in their minds to rely upon me. I shall always be loyal to India alone. I will never deceive my motherland. I will live and die for India. There is no one who can divert me from the right path.

"The time has come when the Indians at home and those abroad should gather together with arms under one leader and await the orders for the destruction of the British imperialists. I have decided to form a Free India Government in order to bring the different elements together and to collect our strength. The aim of this Provisional Government of India will be to make the Indian revolution a success. It will be the duty of this Government to arm the Indians at home and abroad and to realize our aspirations of freedom with the aid of arms. The task of our Provisional Government will
end with the extirpation of British influence from India. The people of India will then be able to set up a National Government. We shall be ready to fight side by side with the Axis soldiers against our enemies when our preparations for armed warfare are completed. We shall pay the price of our freedom with our blood, but by so doing we shall lay the foundation stone of national unity. We shall be able to maintain our freedom if we attain it through our own sacrifices and blood.  

Next day on the 5th of July, Bose reviewed the Indian Army and for the first time appeared in a military uniform. Addressing the parade he emphasized the need of a National Army for fighting the war of liberation and after the country is independent to preserve the independence against foreign aggression. He gave the examples of George Washington and Garibaldi, who won the independence for their respective countries with the help of their armies:

"Every Indian must feel proud that this Army-his own Army-has been organized entirely under Indian leadership and that when the historic Moment arrives, under Indian leadership it will go to battle."
It was in this meeting that Bose gave the INA its battle-cry:

"Comrades! My Soldiers! Let your battle-cry be: "To Delhi! To Delhi! How many of us will individually survive this war of freedom, I don’t know. But I do know this: that we shall ultimately win and our task will not end until our surviving heroes hold the victory parade on another graveyard of the British empire—the Lal Kila or Red fortress of ancient Delhi."

He made the soldiers of the INA conscious of their duties and responsibilities and the dire consequences that they would have to face in their fight against the British for the liberation of their country:

"Comrades! You have voluntarily accepted a mission that is the noblest that the human mind can conceive of. For the fulfilment of such a mission no sacrifice is too great, not even the sacrifice of one’s life. You are today the custodians of India’s national honour and the embodiment of India’s hopes and aspirations. So, conduct yourself that your countrymen may bless you and posterity may be proud of you.

"I have said that today is the proudest day of my life, For an enslaved people, there
can be no greater pride, no higher honour, than to be the first soldier in the army of liberation. But this honour carries with it a corresponding responsibility and I am deeply conscious of it. I assure you that I shall be with you in darkness and in sunshine, in sorrow and in joy, in suffering and in victory. For the present, I can offer you nothing except hunger, thirst, privation, forced marches and death. But if you follow me in life and in death, as I am confident you will, I shall lead you to victory and freedom. It does not matter who among us will live to see India free. It is enough that India shall be free and that we shall give our all to make her free. May God now bless our Army and grant us victory in the coming fight, Inquilab Zindabad! Azad Hind Zindabad”!62

On July 9, 1943, addressing a mass meeting in Singapore, Bose said:

"I want total mobilization and nothing less, for we have been told repeatedly even by our enemies, that this is a Total War. Let the slogan of the three million Indians in East
Asia be ‘Total Mobilization for a Total War’!\textsuperscript{63}

He also gave the call for the formation of a unit of brave Indian women to constitute a ‘death-defying regiment, who will wield the sword, which the brave Rani of Jhansi wielded in India’s First War of Independence in 1857.’ The formation of the Rani of Jhansi Regiment, as a contingent of the INA was announced by Bose, at a mass rally of Indian women in Singapore on 12\textsuperscript{th} of July.

Immediately after becoming the President of the Indian Independence League, Bose affected a reorganization of the League by dividing it into twelve departments according to its various activities. The Departments were as follows: The General Secretariat, Propaganda Department, Finance Department, Accounts and Audit Department, Recruitment and Training Department, Supplies Department, Women’s Department, Housing and Transport Department, Health and Social Welfare Department, Education and Culture Department, Territorial Branches Department and the Overseas Department.

Similar Departments were also created in State-Branches and sub-branches with adequate staff and with Members in charge of each department. The vigorous steps taken by Bose to increase the efficiency of the League and the Army proved his energy and his organizing ability. Thus the League functioned like a Government. The various Departments cooperated and coordinated with each other
to accelerate the march of the Freedom Movement and to provide men, material and money to the INA for the prosecution of the war.

On the 25th of the July, Bose issued a Special Order of the Day, taking over the Supreme Command of the INA. He was "the greatest revolutionary and freedom fighter that the Indian subcontinent has produced in the present country." After he took the command, he reorganized and revitalized the INA with the creation of the Chief-of-Staff, Divisional Commands and the Army Department of the League. Under the revolutionary leadership of Bose the 'INA took the form and effectiveness of any modern regular army." When Bose took over the command, the INA was 13,000 strong. He organized the Army in such a way that, besides fighting guerrilla warfare, it could fight on the front as a regular fighting force. The existing strength was found to be inadequate. He wanted to increase the strength to 50,000. But as Japanese Army had to resources to equip and train more than 30,000, Bose decided to organize three divisions of 10,000 troops each, plus a 20,000 strong Volunteer Army. The men and officers of the INA were recruited from among the POWs and young Indians in East Asia.

Bose was particular to expand the INA "despite the danger of qualitative inadequacy" to give a moral boost to the freedom-fighters in India. This was also necessary to meet the offensive of British propaganda about the invincibility of the mighty British Army.

Bose’s request for Japanese help to expand INA was not received favourably. The Hikari Kikan was opposed to the expansion
of the INA Premier Tojo also promised help with a world of caution. Bose suspected the Japanese intentions. "The misunderstanding between the two sides subsequently militated against Indo-Japanese collaboration."

Bose was not prepared to be dictated to by any body and whenever he decided to do something he insisted till the last and could perform it with an indomitable will and great organizational ability. "His policy was that he would not ask help from the Japanese Government where his own countrymen could afford assistance to the movement. He had great personal charm and inspired millions of soldiers and civilians alike, living in East Asia at the time, so much so that everyone was prepared to sacrifice his all and even his life for the freedom of the country under his leadership.

Ultimately the INA was expanded and was organized into the three divisions according to the plan of Bose, but the "basic mission remained guerrilla warfare as none of its divisions was capable of operating as a strategic division. However, after Bose assumed the Leadership of the INA there was great enthusiasm among its men and officers and they vowed to sacrifice everything for the cause of Indian Independence. Bose said that freedom was won on the battle fields and not on wooden rostrums and in assembly chambers. "He was a born leader, a sincere man, a selfless worker." He sacrificed everything to fight for the freedom of India and asked the Indians to march under his banner and people were prepared to sacrifice and die under his command. Bose wanted to liberate India with the help
and support of Indians: "If I want the help of Japanese I can have it, but I want to win the freedom of India with the help of Indians alone." His extreme independence, daring action, indomitable courage and strong determination dispelled all fears from the mind of Indians who suspected the Japanese intentions. One of his officers of the INA said: "Netaji was like a God to us. He was a superman. He was a man of extreme independence. He would never allow himself to be bought by any foreign power. He would rather have seen himself being shot than being dictated to by the Japs."

Bose was satisfied with the response of the Indians to his call to unite for fighting the British. The delegates from different parts of East Asia assured him that the Indians in their respective states had the same high spirit as was witnessed in Malaya. But Bose wanted to meet the Indians personally and he made a tour of all the Territorial Branches of the IIL, in East Asia to assess the situation. He was very much satisfied after his personal inspection and was convinced that the Overseas Indians meant business. In the meantime, training centres had been established in Malaya, Burma and Spain and these centres were packed to the capacity. Thousands of volunteers who could not accommodated in these camps, were given part-time training and were in readiness to receive regular training when their turn came. Bose insisted on the independence of the INA. He always expressed his fervent desire that the INA should spearhead the Japanese thrust into India.
On August 26, 1943, Bose expressed his desire before Maj. Gen. Todai Kunomura, Chief of Staff of the 15\textsuperscript{th} Army and Maj. Iwaichi Fujiwara, the Intelligence Officer of the 15\textsuperscript{th} Army. Gen. Kunomura told Bose that the 15\textsuperscript{th} Army had received orders to prepare for an invasion of Imphal and it was the desire of Gen. Mutaguchi, Commander of the 15\textsuperscript{th} Army, to carry on his operation in full cooperation with the INA. This was the long cherished desire of Bose, since he left Berlin. After listening to Gen. Kunomura with rapt attention for some time, Bose spoke out his mind, when he "asked Gen. Kunomura to see that the Indian National Army be deployed in such a way as to spearhead the invading forces, so that they should be the first to set foot on the soil of their father land... Netaji was confidant that if the Indian National Army advanced to Assam, the Indian people would never fail to rise in response.\textsuperscript{72}

Bose was a very keen observer of national and international politics and people "were stunned by his masterly discourse on the International situations. He knew that the Japanese needed the support of the INA and the Indians in East Asia as much as they needed the Japanese support:

"He said that the Japanese, by assisting us were doing no favour to Indians. We were helping them as much as they were helping us. We had a common aim in as much as we both were interested in driving the British out of India, the Japanese for their own safety..."
and we for the independence of our motherland. He said that quite frankly he did not trust the British nor did he trust the Japanese. He went on to say that where it was the question of the independence of one’s country one could trust no one and as long as we are weak we would always be exploited. Netaji said that the surest guarantee against being betrayed by the Japanese was to build up our own strength. He said that we should ask for no safeguards from the Japanese. Our surest safeguard must be our own strength, and if on going to India, we found that the Japanese wished to replace the British, we should turn round and fight them too."

The Indians in East Asia were skeptical in the beginning about Bose’s relations with the Japanese. The way in which the Japanese behaved with the people of Malaya and Burma and the unbecoming treatment towards Gen. Mohan Singh, had made them suspect in the eyes of the Indians. But Bose was an entirely different person. He had no personal ambitions although he expressed a desire to “remain in history.” He had no identity apart from the cause of Indian independence. Bose tried to maintain independence at every cost. The position, therefore, changed after Bose took the leadership of the freedom movement and the Japanese Militarists were so much
influenced by him that “no new move was made without consulting him and without his advice.”

Bose warned his soldiers that they should come prepared first to fight the British and then to fight the Japanese, if it was necessary. To maintain the independence of INA, he never asked for any facility from Japan, that could be provided by the Indians in East Asia. He, therefore, refused to receive any help from Japan, other than the supply of war materials. It was due to Bose’s insistence, that the INA was the only army in East Asia which was not under the Military Law of the Japanese. Bose told the Japanese in very clear terms that the INA would fight only for the independence of India and would not allow itself to be exploited by the Japanese for their own interest.

The Provisional Government of Azad Hind

By October 21, 1943, the freedom movement of the Indians in East Asia had reached the highest point of enthusiasm. There was a well-organized and disciplined army in the INA and the League provided a system and a machinery. There was the dynamic leadership of Bose, under whom, the three million Indians in East Asia, were united and were ready to undergo any trials in order to liberate their motherland. Now there was the necessity of the establishment of a Government without which, it was not possible to get international recognition for the activities of the INA. Without a
Government, Bose could not have declared the war of independence, not could be have led the army to battle as an equal partner of the Japanese Government.\textsuperscript{75} The unmistakable significance of the Provisional Government of Free India was clear to Bose and the idea of forming such a Government on the lines of the numerous émigré European Governments then functioning from London, had already taken deep roots in Bose's mind. He had given expression to this idea in his address to the Indian Independence League Conference in Singapore, on July 4, 1943.\textsuperscript{76}

On October 21, 1943, about 1,000 Indian representatives from different parts of East Asia assembled in Singapore to consider the proposal of Bose and "the Provisional Government of Free India was planned and established according to the free will of the Indian people, to emancipate themselves from British Rule." In establishing the Provisional Government, besides meeting the exigencies of the Indian situation, Bose followed the course of History. The Irish people had set up a Provisional Government in 1916 to fight against the British. During the First World War, the Czechs had followed the same course and after the War the Turks had formed their Provisional Government, under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal in Anatolia.

Bose's concept of the Provisional Government of Free India was different from the normal time Governments. It was to be a fighting organization with its main object being to launch and to conduct the war against the British and their allies in India.\textsuperscript{77}
"Netaji’s most extraordinary move was the formation of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind. It was a master move in the game of international politics. The original Indian Independence League could not freely declare war on their enemies and could not cooperate on equal terms with the League of East Asiatic National. It was Netaji who foresaw the necessary of equality and thus he declared the inauguration of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind. The officers and workers remained the same but this switch-over carried us overnight to the status of a free state and since then the Provisional Government of Azad Hind was recognized by nine Sovereign states as an equal partner in the comity of those nations. We were a refugee Government but our privileges and status was no less than that of any of the Sovereign states there.

After he read out the Proclamation, the solemn ceremony of Oath-taking followed. Bose was the first to take the Oath:

"In the name of God, I take this sacred Oath that to liberate India and 38 crores of
countrymen, I, Subhas Chandra Bose, will continue this sacred war of freedom till the last breath of my life..."

At this point, he became visibly moved. He paused for a while with tears in his eyes and then continued again:

"I shall always remain a servant of India and look after the welfare of 38 crores of Indian brothers and sisters. This shall be for me my highest duty. Even after winning freedom, I will always be prepared to shed the last drop of my blood for the preservation of India's freedom."

For the Japanese, the Provisional Government posed, two big problems: one was related to the composition of the government by suitable persons and the second was its formal recognition. Japanese held that under the circumstances it was not possible to bring together the talented Indians in East Asia to form such a government so as to be accepted by all and as for the second they believed that Subhas had taken for granted that the Japanese recognition would be accorded automatically. Premier Tojo while in Singapore had no doubt agreed in private with Bose that the approval would be given, but the Japanese Army representatives on the spot were reluctant to support the idea on the plea that it would raise a "number of political, military and diplomatic issues in the midst of a world war in which they were waging, at that moment, a life and death battle." Ultimately, both the problems were solved to the satisfaction of the Japanese Subhas decided to form a small cabinet, which the British
propagated as composed of gang of well-known Indian traitors and not men of any caliber. The Japanese Government recognized the Provisional Government on 23rd October as already decided by the Liaison Committee on 9 October wherein it was laid down that “the Imperial Government of Japan will recognize the Provisional Government of Free India in the event of its establishment under the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose in order to pursue Japan’s policy towards India vigorously especially to gear up the propaganda offensive. A formal international relation will be established with the Provisional Government in conformity with the above policy”. It is believed by Hikari Kikan that Subhas was aware of the above policy of Japan and was able to form the Provisional Government without any opposition from the local Japanese representatives. Premier Tojo was modest enough to observe later on at the Tokyo trial that it had come into existence on the support of the Indians in East Asia to secure freedom and prosperity of India under the leadership of Bose, and that the Japanese Government supported it to realize its long-cherished “Greater East Asiatic Policy”. A few days after, the Governments of Germany, Italy, Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Nanking and Korea extended recognition to it.

From the day the Provisional Government was formed, the INA had a will, a purpose and a mission: it was now to fight out India’s last war of independence, with the new war cry "on to Delhi". With the full support of the Japanese Government and military, Bose now turned his attention to the organization of INA.
Subhas expanded it to three divisions, its basic mission remained guerrilla warfare. Following the example of the British, Bose also believed in its propaganda effect. He said:

British propaganda always makes its troops stationed in India seem ten times more powerful than they actually are. Taking a leaf from the British book, I will try to make it appear that the Provincial Government of free India has thirty army divisions.

Naturally, the reaction of the officials of the Government of India to Subhas' claim about Indian National Army was mixed. They were, no doubt, perturbed by the developments in East Asia but had grave doubts about the success of the movement. An official report on his activities ridiculed him, saying that during his tour of the southern regions under Japanese occupation he had announced his intention of flinging his allegedly well-equipped Indian National Army across the India-Burma frontier before the end of 1943 "no less than five times." To deflate the movement, the British presented him as a traitor and spoke of the INA with disdain. Nevertheless, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in a secret dispatch to the Secretary of State for India was constrained to report that Bose should not be dismissed as "a mere loquacious tool of the Japanese", for his influence on Indians, both in India and abroad — if not actually on the Indian soldiers — "was a factor to the reckoned with".
The report agreed that the impact of his propaganda on the Indians was not very widespread and there was even a hostile reaction to it in some quarters, but it observed that Bose was one of the most colourful of Indians seditionists and had "personality capable of infecting others with his own enthusiasm". The British Intelligence agencies admitted that Bose's broadcasts were beginning to attract more attention in Delhi and there was a general belief that he had made a special appeal to the Bengalis to rise against the Government. The report also warned that Bose's assumption of a Presidentship of the Indian Independence Movement "must be regarded as something more than a mere publicity move". Though there was a little chance, the Report commented of his being recognized by Gandhi and the Congress High Command, yet the public opinion was not very hostile to the Japanese and consider that "if the Japanese win the war and come to India, Indian National aspirations will benefit rather than suffer". But unfortunately, Subhas could not arrive in East Asia in 1942, when his presence might have created a different situation. The British came to know that when Subhas left India he had a specific plan for coordinating the nationalists forces within India and abroad to make it a gigantic movement powerful enough to overthrow the British rulers of India. But by the time he landed in East Asia, the nationalists movement in India had been completely suppressed and most of the prominent Indian leaders were behind the bars. Since Bose was out of their clutches, in the eyes of the Raj, he was a traitor, who had "finally burnt his boats with us by virtue of
his association with Germany and Japan; his political future being entirely dependent upon the continued military success of the Japanese and the paralysis of British rule in India by internal revolt". The British officials, however, were convinced that the internal revolt was not possible since the public morale and internal security was fairly steady. They believed that Bose’s “chances of whipping up a major revolt would appear to be small. Had he arrived in East Asia last August or even during Gandhi’s fast his prospects would have been much better”.

Subhas, however, hoped that the INA would have a tremendous psychological impact on the Indian people and would spark off a revolution inside the country once it stood on the Indian soil. Mohan Singh was never given any indication by the Japanese about the role which the INA was to play in the fight against the British, but Bose was determined that it should play a significant role in ousting the British, with or without the Japanese army. He believed in strategy rather than in military might to defeat the British. As the Supreme Commander of the INA, he knew that an outright victory against the superior British and American forces was impossible, but he firmly believed that the armed activity near the borders of India would stimulate the Indians to rise against the British. Bose’s success in making an effective appeal to the patriotism of the Indian officers and his powerful leadership, no doubt, together with the liberty given to the unwilling men and officers to leave the INA if they so desired seemed to have changed the character of the army into a real
revolutionary force. Despite his best efforts, Hikari Kikan, however, could agree that the strength of the INA should not exceed thirty thousands including civilians recruits. More assuring was the encouraging announcement of General Tojo in the Diet on 27 October 1943 wherein he expressed his deepest sympathy for the plight of the Indian people and gave assurance for all support in their struggle to win independence. He ended his speech with the following encouraging words:

"It is my strong conviction that this rising tide of the movement for emancipation and active cooperation of the people of Greater East Asia will inevitably bring in the not so distant future the glorious day of independence freedom and prosperity of India."

I.N.A. and Japan:

About the Japanese help Subhas was never oblivious. He expressed his gratefulness to Japan in the Conference of Greater East Asia Nations held in Tokyo on 5th November 1943. Besides Prime Minister Tojo, the Conference was attended by representatives from Munchukuo, Philippines, Burma, Thailand and Nanking China. Tojo in his opening speech remained the participants of the common culture and spiritual affinity of all people of East on the basis of which the common union of economic cooperation for prosperity of the people was to be created. Subhas attended the conference as an
observer as in his view India did not come into the Greater East Asia and the Japanese Government was also of the same view. Despite this limitation, he was as Lious Allen says an outstanding politician among those in Asia who collaborated with the Japanese. On the other hand, The Times dated 1 November, 1943 commented on Bose as “a quisling, head of the Provisional Puppet Government of Free India” on his arrival in Tokyo. His presence, however, lent dignity to the conference. In his speech, he whole-heartedly supported Japanese policy and said that the Greater East Asia charter was a declaration of liberation of East Asia – the Magna Carta of 1943 – which would live for even in world history. The establishment of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, he declared, would pave the way for a pan-Asiatic federation. He reiterated his faith in the ultimate victory of Japan and underlined how the fate of all Asia was linked with it: “We must not forget”, he said “that all these decisions of a new world, of a new Asia, of a free and prosperous Greater East Asia depend entirely on our ability to achieve victory in this war with the help of the Axis powers”. For India” he said in an emotional strain “there is no other path, but the path of uncompromising struggle against British Imperialism.... But we have to pay the price of our liberty... I do not know how many members of our national army will survive the coming war, but that is of no consequence to us. Whether we individually live or die, whether we survive the war and lie to see India free or not, what is of consequence is the fact that India to be free”. There is no doubt that Subhas was a fine orator
and his speech at the Conference inspired many Asia leaders to have faith in their destiny which was not linked with Japan. Subhas found a lot common between the aims of the Japanese and the India’s standing in Asia; and hoped that Japan would help the Provisional Government acquire all the paraphernalia of a state. Therefore, during his visit to Tokyo, he asked Japanese premier to hand over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which they had occupied earlier, to the Provisional Government, so that it had a territory of its own and be recognized as a free government under International Law. The Japanese had taken over the Islands without any resistance. They disarmed the British officers. The British soldiers, women and children had already been evacuated.83

The provisional Government appointed Lt. Col. Loganadhan, Chief Commissioner of civil administration of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Loganadhan, along with his staff, joined his duties at Port Blair and was required to cooperate fully with the naval authorities. The Islands were named as "Shahid" and "Swaraj" when Subhas paid a visit on 29th December 1943. By the acquisition of this territory, the Provisional Government as Subhas propagated became "national entity in fact as well as in mane". At Port Blair, while addressing a grand rally on 30 December 1943, Bose again paid tribute to the Nippon Government for handing over the islands to the Provisional Government. Lieut. Col. D.S. Raju, the personal physician to Bose, who accompanied him to Andaman has left;
graphic description of what he witnessed at the Islands. He records that

"The whole Islands were heralded with tricolour flags. There no longer was the atmosphere of tyranny and oppression; the islands were no longer a place for convicts, criminals and political exiles. The 'whole island's 20,000 people were breathing a free pure atmosphere of love and freedom with a sense of honour. The Central Jail was closed because it was no longer necessary. The tricolour Congress flag flew from the very flag pole where the Union jack used to be hoisted. Netaji Bose on witnessing the scene, momentarily was lost in emotion.\(^85\)

In the very first review of the INA at Singapore on 5\(^{th}\) July, he instilled in soldiers a sense of pride and honour in their existence when he told them that theirs was not only a liberation army but also the one which would develop into the national army of India. This delineation of the future role of the Indian National Army was very essential since by joining the INA the soldiers had completely relinquished their claim to go back to the British Indian Army. As Fujiwara says, the INA under the leadership of Subhas became a really "revolutionary army".\(^86\) The Directorate of Military Bureau was converted into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and
Bhonsale was appointed Chief of Staff. The Army Headquarters was abolished and the INA was placed under various Divisional Commanders. To stimulate the determination of the INA soldiers, Bose constantly remind them that their task was not are easy one and that the war was going to be hard and long; he exhorted them to continue to labour and to fight till their national flag flew over the Viceroy's House in New Delhi and the Azad Hind Fauj held the victory parade inside the ancient fortress of India's metropolis. The central theme of all his public utterances was: "Give me the total mobilization of Indian manpower and resources in East and I will guarantee a real second front against the British in India's war of independence". He reminded the patriotic soldiers that "we have to buy our independence with out own blood. If we take it with the assistance of others that independence will not be permanent. "Do not think” he explained that “this battle will last only for few months. This war will be prolonged one, but every soldier must be free of spirit and let us go to Delhi must be on everyone's lips”. He repeated the same sentiments for the next six months in many of his speeches and broadcasts.

More than the military training what made the INA so distinguished was that its officers and men were imbued with a deep sense of patriotism and faith. They were ready to sacrifice their lives at the altar of their country's freedom. To an impartial observer in East Asia, the INA soldier gave the distinct impression that he was an Indian first and last and that his goal was the liberation of India.
There was no difference of race, religion or caste and the spirit of national consciousness was clearly apparent. Subhas had created social revolution amongst the Indians.

For the INA to develop into an independent and strong force, it was necessary for Subhas to settle the question of its relationship to the Japanese Army. It was propagated by the Anglo-America block that the INA was a puppet army raised and equipped by the Japanese to serve their own ends, and this impression had to be obliterated from minds of the INA soldiers before they could be expected to play their rightful role in the war of India's liberation. Commanders, thought that the INA was fit only for intelligence duties and could not be relied on in actual fighting. For instance, Field marshal Count Terauchi, Commander of the Southern Expeditionary Force, told Subhas that in the event of the Japanese advance towards India, the main burden of fighting would be born by the Japanese Army and the INA would be utilized for propaganda purpose. This role was not acceptable to Subhas and other INA commanders. The patriotic soldiers of the INA, too, did not consider this role as an adequate price to pay for liberty. Mohan Singh had raised his voice against the Japanese attitude and had been ousted, but Bose was a stalwart, both physically and figuratively and commanded the respect of the Japanese. He frankly told the Japanese that the only role acceptable to the INA during the Japanese advance towards India was that of the vanguard: Indian freedom had to be won by Indians, for the freedom secured through Japanese
sacrifice would be worse than slavery. He declared that “the first drop of bloodshed on Indian soil should be that of a soldier of the INA.”

Initially Terauchi was not impressed by Bose’s arguments. His opinion about the INA was not very high. In his assessment the INA soldiers were nothing more than mercenaries who had been demoralized by their defeat in the Malayan campaign. On the other hand, the Japanese Chief of Army Staff, General Sugiyama, promised that in the impending Imphal campaign the INA would rank as an allied army under Japanese operational command, and that its movements and role were to be decided in consultation with the C-in-C, Burma Area Army. Sugiyama also agreed to Subhas’s suggestion to train the INA cadets in Tokyo, and the Japanese would accept the full financial responsibility for all the ex-prisoners of war in the INA; however, the Provisional Government was to find money to pay for the civilian recruits. As regards equipment and arms, they were to be supplied to the INA out of the captured British stocks. It was a great success for Subhas to have extracted so many commitments from the Japanese.

By the end of 1943; Subhas was able to convince the Japanese of the wisdom of delivering the final blow to the British. This does not mean that he always had a smooth sailing with the Japanese; in fact, during the first six months many points of friction arose between him and the Hikari Kikan, but by virtue of his forceful personality he could get from the Japanese what he wanted. The
head of *Hikari Kikan*, Yamamoto, who did not cooperate with him fully, was replaced by Ltd. Gen. Isoda Saburo in January 1944, when Subhas complained to Tokyo against him. He had won the confidence of the Japanese Government to some extent and they were willing to accommodate his demands as far as possible. By the end of 1943, Bose had been able to establish the Provisional Government of Azad Hind despite great difficulties. He had travelled far and wide and had established contacts with political leaders and Indian nationals in various parts of East Asia. Surprisingly, he was the only political leader in East Asia whose movement and speeches were reported in every newspaper every day. With a view to strengthen Bose’s position, it was given out in the newspapers by Japanese leaders that Japan would support India unconditionally, but it was anticipated that after the formation of the Co-prosperity sphere, India would become a member economically because of her geographical position. It was further clarified that Japan would whole-heartedly support India not with such intention as harboured by Britain. Indians were asked to trust Japan and her sincere intentions. With the opening of the new year Bose decided to move his headquarters to Rangoon, for he thought that Burma was to become the spring board of attack on India.

There is a tide in the affairs of men and in the affairs of nations which when on the rise transforms dreams into realities. The Japanese Government and Subhas saw the opportunity and took the tide on the rise; they had dreams which might turn into realities. That
the "March on to Delhi" would result in the termination of Western dominance in Asia was the expectation of both the Japanese and the INA; ironically, the expectation was fulfilled not by their victory but by their defeat.
REFERENCES

6. Werth and Harwich, *Netaji in Germany*, p. 34.
7. Werth and Harbich, *op. cit.* Also see A.C.N. Nambiar’s foreword, “Persuasion and emotion brought large numbers into the Legion. With some a bizarre situation too counted. The Indian Legion in Europe did not enroll any of the small group of Commissioned officers taken as prisoners, this is another proof of absence of force”, Ganpuley, *Netaji in Germany*, p. x.
8. Iqbal Shedai was an Indian Muslim and was the founder of the Centro Militare Indian in Italy. This military unit established by Shedai to work for Indian freedom existed only from April to November 1942, when it was disbanded after a mutiny.
9. Cf. The soldiers had to say in German words: “I swear by God this holy oath: that I will obey the leader of the German State and People, Adolph Hitler, as Commander of the German Armed Forces, in the fight for the freedom of India, in which fight the leader is Subhas Chandra Bose, and that as a brave soldier, I am willing to lay down my life for this Oath” Toye, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.
11. Toye, *op. cit.*, p. 81
12. Tadamoto Negishi in Hayashida’s *Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose*, p. 162. Also see Prem Sehgal’s *Reminiscences of Netaji*, Quoted by Jag Pravesh Chander in *Meet the Heroes*, p. 93.

15. Cf. Walter Harbich records “His Excellency Bose thus refused systematically to accept the division of India into a Hindu and Muslim State”, Werth and Harbich, *Netaji in Germany*, pp. 50-51.


17. Werth and Harbich, *Netaji in Germany*, p. 32.


20. Dr. G. Wirsng, Quoted in *Netaji Through German Lens* by Nanda Mookerjee, p. 59.

21. Quoted in *Netaji in Germany* by Werth and Harbich, p. 36.


23. Quoted by Nanda Mookerjee in *Netaji Through German Lens*, p. 50.


25. A.C.N. Nambiar, Foreword to Ganpuley’s *Netaji in Germany*, p. viii.

26. Shun Highuchi, *Movement from Outside in Hayashida’s Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose*, p. 139. Also see Fujiwara’s memories of Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, pp. 155-56.


29. Uma Mukherjee, *Two Great Indian Revolutionaries*, p. 146.


37. File No. 814/INA NAI

38. File No. 470/INA NAI

39. File No. 253/INA NAI

40. File No. 870/INA NAI

41. File No. 253/INA NAI

42. I.I.I. Papers, F.No. 45/3.


47. This was confirmed by General Mohan Singh – Discussion with the Author.


50. File No. 814/INA NAI


52. Mukherjee, *op. cit.* footnote, p. 159.

53. Cf. Iwaichi Fujiwara, the then Director of Shita Kikan (Army Liaison Organ), Staff Officers of the Southern Army HQ, writes: “The Imperial General Head Quarters ... lacked a thorough understanding of and reasonable interest in our Indian operations, and knew very little about Netaji and did not have full confidence in Mr. Rash Behari Bose and other Indian leaders who were in Japan during the days immediately preceding the outbreak of the war and in its early stages.” *Memoirs of Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose* in Hayashida’s *Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose*, p. 156.

54. Cf. Prem Sehgal said: “In the Far East, the local inhabitants had a very poor opinion of Indians. As a matter of fact, they loathed them. But with the
arrival of Netaji, they for the first time in their life saw a true specimen of Indian manhood. ... a living symbol of Indian culture... a personification of India's aspirations, Quoted by Jag Pravesh Chander, Meet the Heroes, p. 20.

58. Selected Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose, pp. 183.
59. Ibid. p. 182.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid. p.184.
62. Thivy records: “The reception he received in Singapore at the mass rally of Indians on 9th of July was one which any conquering hero in any part of the world would be proud of. The people responded to his rallying call for Total Mobilization with sincerity and spontaneity.” The Struggle in East Asia, p. 34.
64. Thivy, He Come, He Fought, He Conquered, Sri Ram Sharma (edited), Netaji: His Life and Work, p. 282.
65. Hayashida, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, p. 52.
66. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p.52.
69. Ibid.
70. Thivy, The Struggle in East Asia, p. 35.
71. Iwaichi Fujiwara, Memories of Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose in Hayashida's Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, p. 159.
73. Cf. Shah Nawaz Khan who himself was skeptical about Japanese intentions and did not join the INA in the beginning writes: "We were anxious to see how they would behave towards Netaji and how he would react to their behaviour. Very soon we found out that Netaji was not the person who would ever bow before any one or sell the honour of his country for any price" ibid. p.x.,

74. Shah Nawaz Khan, op. cit., p. x.

75. Selected Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose, p. 180.


78. Thivy, The Struggle in East Asia, p. 67.

79. F.No. 601/10569/H. (H.S.)

80. F.No. 601/10569/H. (H.S.)

81. War Office, F.No. 208/810.

82. K.K. Ghosh, op. cit, p.147.


84. Proceedings International Military Tribunal for Far East, Vol. 44.

85. Memoirs of Anand Mohan Sahay. See also F.No. 601/7575/H.


88. Shah Nawaz, op. cit, p. 75.

89. Hugh Toye, op. cit, p. 107.

90. Ibid.