Chapter-II

THE FORMATION OF I.N.A.

The formation of I.N.A. was not just an event but a historical phenomenon. It was also the consequence of a long process of dissatisfaction not only with the British rule but also with the Gandhian strategy of struggle for the independence of India. The outbreak of 2nd World War gave an opportunity to those old revolutionaries who had been working for past many years abroad. The war in the East, or the war of Greater East Asia, as the Japanese termed it, broke on the night of 7/8 December 1941.¹

The 2nd Indian Division was holding a defensive position in Jitra area on Malayan-Thai (Siamese) border. Mohan Singh’s battalion i.e. the 1/14th Punjab Regiment formed the foremost battalion of this Division. This Regiment came into contact with the enemy on the night of 8/9 and continued to fight till the evening of 11 December when the enemy tanks overran British army position. The battalion of Mohan Singh dispersed into small parties and began to retreat. All guns and W/T sets fell into the enemies hands. 2200 hrs. Hav. Allaha Dad returned to lines and told the officer commanding that the section set was destroyed.²

When Mohan Singh was returning with his party, a few pamphlets dropped by the Japanese came to his notice which

¹. General Mohan Singh, Bombay News Chronicle weekly December 8, 1946; Historical record of “G” Signal Section, Indian Signal Corps, I.N.A. Collections, File No.237, p.36.
². Ibid., p.36.
contained slogans like “Asia for Asiatic”, “Kick out the white devils from the East”, “We have come to liberate Asia from the deadly clutches of Anglo-Saxons”, “No Asiatic is our enemy” etc. etc. After seeing these pamphlets, he felt confident that if he approached the Japanese with his plan, they would certainly not stand in his way to raise a truly Indian Army to fight the British.  

Mohan Singh himself concedes that there was a conflict in his mind at that time. He says, “It was indeed a long drawn struggle between two loyalties…. One to my commission, which means allegiance to the British Crown and the other, unwritten yet more binding my duty to my beloved country.”

When Alor Star, the Capital of Kedah (a province in North Malaya) was captured by Japanese forces, Mohan Singh dispatched a message about his intention to Japanese headquarters on 15 December, 1941. Major Fujiwara, head of the Japanese Intelligence Services accompanied by a Sikh gentleman, Sardar Pritam Singh of Bangkok, met Mr. Mohan Singh in a village about 20 miles away from Alor Star where the aim of the Japanese High Command was to create a Japanese trained Indian force sabotaging the British efforts of utilizing India’s military man power. This dream of Japanese forces was fulfilled by the surrender of Mohan Singh on 15 December, 1941.

At this crucial time, two prominent personalities Rash Behari Bose in Japan and Sardar Pritam Singh in Thailand were working to establish an agency which could be a custodian for the whole movement of Indian Independence in South-East Asia. Therefore, Rash Behari Bose interviewed the Minister of Home Affairs and other important officials of various departments of Japanese Government alongwith the general staff with a view to securing their support and cooperation in the struggle for freedom and get assurance for such support from other side. On the other side, an Indian officer of the British Indian Army stationed in Malaya Mohan Singh sought the help of the Japanese to raise an Indian National Army to liberate India. It was a time when growing aspirations for independence in colonial countries of South-East Asia had induced the nationalist forces to look upon the Japanese as liberators.

This happening encouraged all those who were working for independence abroad and on 26 December, 1941, for the first time in the history of Indians in Japan, a conference of nearly 50 representatives of the Indian residents in Kobe, Osaka, Yakohama and Tokyo was held to seize this opportunity. A resolution was passed calling upon the Indians to realize the gravity of the situation. Resolution reads as follows: "Whereas the continued defeat of the British and their allies in Europe and Africa has sealed the fate of the British imperialism in Europe. Whereas the War is

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fast approaching the shores and borders of India, the British stronghold, Asia’s powers may be obliged to invade India in order to destroy the main source of British fighting strength. Whereas such an invasion will bring unimaginable and extremely unusual hardships, miseries and sufferings to millions of innocent and helpless Indians in cities, towns and villages: and whereas the only way to avoid this most unhappy situation is to declare complete independence of India from British rule and to cut off all possible ways immediately.\^8

After this conference, representatives were sent to Shanghai where a huge gathering of the Indian residents of Shanghai was held in Young Men’s Association Hall on 26 January, 1942.\^9 All such efforts were approaching to the destination of success when British forces surrendered in Singapore on 15 February, 1942.\^10 A meeting was arranged between the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Army – Lt. Gen. Tomoyuki and Lt. Gen. Arthur Percival from British side near Bukit Timah hills on Singapore Island in which the following terms were decided upon.

(a) “On the 15 February, 1942 before 2200 hrs (Nippon Time) the British will cease-fire.

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By 2300 hrs (Nippon time) all troops of British Army will remain unarmed in their positions.

The Imperial Army will allow the British to maintain 1000 armed men until further orders to keep the peace.

The Imperial Army will open fire on the British Army if there is any breach of these terms.”

Lt. Gen. Percival agreed to the terms and duly signed as the British Commander himself made sure that the British Army carried out the order to surrender.11

After surrender British Army was divided into two parts. British officers were sent to “Changi” and the Indian officers were asked to gather in Farrer Park in Singapore on 17 February, 1942. Lt. Col. Hunt handed over the prisoners of war to the Japanese and Major Fujiwara delivered a speech invoking Indian soldiers to be anti-British and fight for the liberation of India in the presence of Mohan Singh. It changed the general attitude of the prisoners of war. During his speech, Mohan Singh announced the existence of the Indian National Army formed of the soldiers who fell into the Japanese hands before the fall of Singapore and he would work as a Supreme Commander of this Army.12

By March 1942, Japan had overrun the Philippines, Indochina, East Indies (Indonesia), Malaya, Singapore and Burma. The triumphant campaign of the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean and the South-Eastern Asia lands caused much excitement among the people of Indian origin living in this region. The successes of an Asiatic power over western empires roused great hopes which led to the formation of the Indian Independence League. Therefore, a Conference was held at Goho’s house at Singapore on 5 March, 1942 to discuss the furtherance of movement in which the following officers took part:

(a) Thailand - Giani Pritam Singh
Baba Amar Singh
Amar Singh
Satyanand Puri

(b) Malaya - Raghvan
Goho
Memon

(c) I.N.A. - Capt. Mohan Singh
Capt. Mohd. Akram
Major Aziz Ahmad

In this conference, it was decided to convene a conference in which Rash Behari Bose and Japanese would be present. Consequently, a ‘Tokyo Independence Conference’ was held in Tokyo on 15 March, 1942 in which delegates from Japan, Malaya, Hong Kong and Shanghai participated. At this conference, it was decided to hold a conference of Indians in East Asia in

Bangkok to consider the measures to be taken for the Independence of India.\textsuperscript{14}

Before Bangkok conference, a conference was held in Singapore by the delegates from the Independence League of India, Malaya on 22 April, 1942 in which the delegates namely Shri N. Raghavan (President) from Panang, Shri S.C. Goho from Syonan, Shri K.P. Menon from synon, Shri S. Shamugam from Mallaca, Shri Gurdial Singh from Segamat, Shri Budh Singh from Kuala Lumpur, Shri S.N. Chopra from Batu Pahat, Shri Govindasam from Kuala Lumpur, Shri Dr. Lekshumegah from Kuala Lumpur, Shri P.K. Dalal from Kuala Lumpur, Shri Lal Singh from Kaula Kangsar, Shri Nagappa Chettiyar from Alor Star, Shri J. Maneksha from Taiping, Shri Dr. Majumdar from Seramban, Shri B.K. Das from Ipoh, Shri Sucha Singh from Ipoh took part.\textsuperscript{15}

In this conference, a Supreme Council of Malaya was constituted with Shri N. Raghavan as president and B.K. Das as Secretary and also included Shri K.P.K. Menon, Shri S.C. Goho, Shri S.N. Chopra, and Shri Dr. Bakshumeyah in this council. It was decided that the commander of INA would be an ex-officio member of the council.\textsuperscript{16}

The Bangkok conference was held under the auspices of the Indian Independence League of Greater East-Asia under the chairmanship of Rash Behari Bose at the Silapkorn Theater from

\textsuperscript{15} I.N.A. Collections, File No.401, p.23.
\textsuperscript{16} I.N.A. Collections, File No.401, p.32.
The presence in this conference was very much inspiring in itself for not only Indian civilians of South-East Asia but also for military personnel who were being prepared for the war against British power. Speaking in this conference Capt. Mohan Singh said: "The distinguished officials of the Thai Government, foreign diplomats of great nations residing in this capital and other officials now present at this significant function have imbued in us the tremendous confidence of brotherhood... This is the first occasion in the history of the world that the people oppressed with the foreign rule in their own homeland and banished or left on foreign soil have come to a realization of self-determination and freedom of the mother land from tyranny."\(^\text{19}\)
Mohan Singh elaborated upon the treatment given to the revolutionary movement and revolutionaries by the foreign powers in the past. He observed that nearly for a century, they had been fighting without arms without any sympathy to their cause from the outside world. He was thankful Almighty God that today Japan, the almighty Eastern power, is our friend, .... We are grateful to Japan but India is our own country and to liberate it from the foreign domination is our own business."20

On the misuse and exploitation of Indians through Army by British rule, Mohan Singh tried to stir the gathering that their army made other independent nations slave of the British. In Europe, Africa, Middle East, Afghanistan, China and Malaya in fact everywhere British took them and made them fight for the 'continuance of slavery in the world'. He exhorted the Indians present at that time to think for a moment "what harm Germany and Italy had done to India. Why are we shedding blood in Libya? .....Why did we fight in Malaya and Burma? Why did we advance into Thailand on the 8 December, 1941? Just because we were the tools of the British".21

In his message sent to D.N. Das, the Chairman of the Reception Committee of Bangkok Conference, S.C. Bose said, "My own objective study and observation in different part of the world for 18 months has led me to the irresistible conclusion that if Britain lose this war and that the British Empire will be completely dismembered, all the forces that are striving to destroy or weaken

20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
the British empire are helping Indian's emancipation while all forces that are endeavouring to save the British Empire are attempting to perpetuate India's slavery."22

In his speech at the opening session of the Bangkok Conference, German Minister explicitly told Thailand Government that the nations allied to each-other by the 'Tripartite Pact', Germany, Italy and Japan would see to a just new order, terminating Anglo-American tutelage over the rest of the world.23

Italian Minister in his inspiring speech tried to strengthen the cause of their fighting against British-American forces by explaining the institutions and societies working abroad especially in Italy. He fully confirmed that Italy's interest for the cause of Indian Independence was deeply rooted in the past. Indian exiles had always found in Italy a most cordial welcome and hospitality. He firmly believed that particular sympathy, which was spontaneous, lively and disinterested, had found expression in the institution of a society in Rome called The Friends of India where Indian patriots of undaunted faith and sincerity, such as Iqbal Sohedarai, were working for the cause of Indian liberty. He expected that “The Friends of India” would make closer connections possibly between cognate associations existing in Germany, Japan and Thailand with a view to attaining the final aim through a better and greater coordination of their respective efforts.24

23. I.N.A. Collections, File No.401, p.36.
24. Ibid., p.21.
Amidst such high profile gathering and cooperative atmosphere, leaders of the Indian Independence League drafted comprehensive rules and regulations for the League which "shall consist of: (a) Council of Action (b) A Committee of Representatives (c) Territorial Committees and (d) Local Branches." A committee was thus constituted by the representatives selected by the Territorial Committees with the following territories:

1. Japan & Manchuria - 4
2. Phillipines - 2
3. Thailand - 6
4. Malaya - 14
5. Burina - 14
6. Borneo & Celebes - 1
7. Hong Kong, Canton & Macao - 2
8. Other parts of China including Shanghai - 2
9. Indo-China - 1
10. Java - 2
11. Sumatra - 1
12. Andamans - 1

The committee of 50 representatives both the civilians and military from all over the South-East Asia would deal with the problems of I.N.A. and this committee would be responsible for the general policy and programme of the Indian Independence
The Formation of I.N.A. Movement. It was such a final decision that would be binding on each and every member of the movement.\textsuperscript{25}

A Council of Action consisting of a president and its four members would be appointed by the delegates to this conference. This Council of Action, it was expected, would be responsible for the carrying out of the policy and programme of work lay down by the conference.\textsuperscript{26} Thus the Council of Action was consisted of the following members such as Rash Behari Bose (President), N. Raghavan, Capt. Mohan Singh, K.P.K. Menon and Col. Gillani. The Council of Action committee finally resolved: “The Indian National Army from its inception be accorded the powers and status of a free National Army of an independent India on a footing of equality with the armies of Japan and other friendly powers. It was also decided in this conference that all officers and men of the proposed Indian National Army shall be members of the Indian Independence League and shall owe allegiance to the League.”\textsuperscript{27}

After the fall of Singapore, prisoners of war were detained in various camps according to their categories. The Bidadari Separation Camp was meant for I.C.O.s and others who were considered as anti-I.N.A. There were about 20 officers in this camp and were forbidden to speak with the outsiders without the personal permission of Mohan Singh. This camp was guarded by Indian National Army Police. It was finally closed down in the first week of November 1942. Bidadari concentration camp was the

\textsuperscript{25} I.N.A. Collections, File No.399, pp.22-23.
\textsuperscript{26} I.N.A. Collections, File No.399, p.23; I.N.A. Collections, File No.401, p.55.
\textsuperscript{27} I.N.A. Collections, File No.399, pp.24-25.
place whither recalcitrant non-volunteers were taken in order to persuade them to join the Indian National Army. The methods of persuasion seemed to have been copied from the German concentration camps where the plugging, starvation, degrading fatigue, tortures etc. were in daily use. There were about two hundred prisoners in this camp. Bidadari detention camp was a part of the concentration camp in Bidadari but it was purely a disciplinary and punishment camp, run by ‘A’ branch of I.N.A. Hq., commanded by Capt. Habib-ur-Rehman. In this camp, there were confined under-trials, deserters and men serving disciplinary sentences.  

From March 1942 onwards, an intensive propaganda campaign was initiated in Bidadari camp with the object of eradicating the old loyalties of the soldiers and replacing them with the sedulously nurtured anti-British propaganda themes of Mohan Singh and other leaders. By the end of April, the propaganda was begun to pay good dividends since it was fostered by the officers themselves. Mohan Singh held a conference of officers in April 1942 when the officially raising of the I.N.A. was unanimously agreed to. In May 1942, Mohan Singh organised a party of officers to visit all P.W. Camps to deliver lectures to induce those who did not show any interest in joining I.N.A.

Mohan Singh’s propaganda party was consisted of Lt. Col. C.Q. Gilani, Lt. Col. A.C. Chattergee, Major Prakash Chand, Major Azia Ahmad, Capt. Taj Mohd Khanzada, Capt. A.D.

Jehangir, Lt.Col. Longandan, and Major M.Z. Kiani. In the middle of the August 1942, Indian National Army was officially formed with the following units: (a) H.Q. I.N.A. (b) Field Force Group (c) Guerrilla Group (d) Special Service Group (e) Intelligence Group (f) Reinforcement Group.

The further expansion to the extent of maximum Indian manpower resources available in the territories under occupation of Nippon would be carried out as facilities which would be afforded by the Nippon Government, for the purpose of dealing with matters concerning the military administration, movements of troops and operations. A military department was also created by the Council of Action with the official and non official categories.30

To stop desertion and maintain law and order in not only the Indian National army but also in the camps, military police was established to apprehend all Indian soldiers found in the bazaars selling, clothing, rations or other military stores. A campaign would also be started to apprehend all Indian soldiers found in the bazaars not possessing any pass; to apprehend all Indian soldiers found in out-of-bound areas. An effort would be made to collect "undesirable" personnel from camps at the request of camp commanders, and to take them to the concentration camp for treatment. This was applied only to the non-volunteers or anti-I.N.A. elements in the camps.31

The Indian National Army was properly organised in August 1942 and was officially declared in September 1942. Approximately 16000 volunteers were allowed by the Japanese to be absorbed into the Indian National Army and 30,000 surplus volunteers could not be absorbed into Mohan Singh's organization. By the end of October 1942 almost all the captured Indian Army equipment and a large proportion of the supplies were handed over to Mohan Singh. The Japanese declared that all surplus volunteer would thenceforth be regarded as prisoners of war. It shows that Japanese did not want Indian National Army to become too strong. 32 Mohan Singh was keen for expanding his forces around 40,000 prisoners of war had signed the pledge to join I.N.A. because at the time of surrender on 15 February, 1942, he had already 10,000 officers and 45,000 men under his command. But the Japanese were reluctant in allowing him to do so. 33 Up to June 1942, Indian Independence League had passed a number of resolutions some of which required the acceptance of the Japanese, for instance, regarding the status of the Indian National Army vis-à-vis Japanese Army. Unfortunately, the Japanese Army commanders did not express their acceptance of either the resolutions or of the council of action officially which led to the trouble eventually. Therefore, Mohan Singh raised some of the issues before Iwaguru that:

Japanese did not reply to the resolutions of the Bangkok Conference article by Article.

(ii) there was some impropriety in work or action of some Japanese in connection with the management of the properties of absentee Indians in Burma.

(iii) the Japanese side has not given recognition to the I.N.A. by publicly announcing its existence.

(iv) the Japanese side has an intention of using the I.N.A.

(v) there have been several happenings of assault and insult inflicted by Japanese on the officers and men of the Indian National Army.  

The arrest of Col. N.S. Gill and others also caused the rift between Mohan Singh and Japanese authority. While Gill was executing a special mission in Burma, he was connected with a case of his subordinates Maj. Dhillon and several others, who had jilted away to the British side and also with a case of sending a secret correspondence from Col. Gill to a senior adjutant of the British General Headquarters in New Delhi. In this connection, not only Col. Gill but several others who were connected with these cases had also been taken into custody for examination in Bangkok and Rangoon.

All these facts were only contributory cause of the Mohan Singh's crises. Another leading cause was the fact that

34. Tarachand, op.cit., I.N.A. Collections, File No.9, p.65.
35. I.N.A. Collections, File No.9, p.67.
Mohan Singh brooked no opposition or rivalry but found himself hedged around by the Council of Action, and particularly by the actions of R.B. Bose.\textsuperscript{36} The first strings of trouble were visible in November 1942 when Mohan Singh called a series of meetings with the high ranks of military officers. Mohan Singh expressed the possibility of disbanding I.N.A. due to non-cooperative and superiority complex on the part of Japanese Army. He not only accepted but also agreed to dissolve I.N.A. while Lt. Col. Ehsan Quadir opposed this move strongly.\textsuperscript{37}

Mohan Singh not only wanted a free hand from Japanese but also tried to bypass his Council of Action. In the later part of November 1942, according to Rash Behari Bose, it came to light that Mr. Mohan Singh as G.O.C. of the I.N.A. had arranged with the Iwakuro Kikan for the transport of some I.N.A. troops to Burma for the purposes of training. An advanced party was sent by the G.O.C. to Rangoon without the consent of the Council of Action. It was openly the defiance of the constitution of Indian Independence League as is evident from a pamphlet: “That the ‘Indian National Army’ shall be under the direct control of the ‘Council of Action’ and that the said Army shall be organised and commanded by the General Officer commanding, Indian National

\textsuperscript{36} I.N.A. Collections, File No.403, p.252.
\textsuperscript{37} I.N.A. Collections, File No.403, p.252; Sahai, Shashi B. South-Asia: From Freedom to Terrorism, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, p.34.
Army in accordance with the directions of the Council of Action."\textsuperscript{38}

Mohan Singh had already started taking precautionary measures in order to constitute a team in October 1942 to break the I.N.A. as and when required by the coming circumstances. Those who took a prominent part in conveying the planning to all commanding officers of I.N.A. were Major Nripander Singh Bhagat, Capt. Taj Mohd. Khanzada, Major Prakash and Capt. Gilani.\textsuperscript{39}

Rash Behari Bose, in the capacity of the President of the Council of Action, took strong exception to the activities of Mohan Singh and his team. Mohan Singh started ignoring Bose's direction which is evident from a letter dated 13 December, 1942 that the members of the Indian National Army are pledged to me and me alone by name; under the existing circumstances, we cannot usually serve our motherland through the Indian Independence League in East-Asia and have accordingly thought it fit to sever our connection with it."\textsuperscript{40}

This attitude of Mohan Singh created strong reaction and concern among the Indian Independence League leadership. Therefore, League headquarters asked the Japanese authority to remove Mohan Singh from General Officer Commanding and allow him only as a soldier in I.N.A. Meanwhile a most

\textsuperscript{38} Bose, Rash Behari, A Pamphlet 'Our Struggle' published by the Indian Independence League Headquarters, p.5; I.N.A. Collections, File No.399, p.25.

\textsuperscript{39} I.N.A. Collections, File No.403, p.289.

\textsuperscript{40} Bose, Rash Behari, \textit{op.cit.}, p.8.
unfortunate event happened when Col. Gill was suddenly arrested by the Japanese Military Police for certain investigations on 8 December, 1942. On the recommendations of I.I.L., Mohan Singh was dismissed from the position of General Officer Commanding of I.N.A. becoming a mere Mohan Singh. Before his removal, Mohan Singh had already wrote to Iwakuru Kikan that he had severed all his connections with the Indian Independence Movement in East Asia and arbitrarily made a proposal to Iwakuru, the Chief of Iwakuru Kikan, about the dissolution of the I.N.A., under the impression that it was his own private Army. Thus he had reached a conclusion which was not acceptable both to the Indian Independence League and the Japanese side.\footnote{Bose, Rash Behari, \textit{op.cit.}, p.7; Statement of the Chief of Iwakuru Kikan, \textit{I.N.A. Collections}, File No.9, pp.65-68.}

Mohan Singh not only proposed to dissolve I.N.A. but also released all men in concentration camps and were allowed to return to their parental units. This was the extreme step to be taken by the Mohan Singh and his team against the interest of Japanese as well as I.I.L. Consequently Mohan Singh was arrested on 28 December, 1942. When Mohan Singh was arrested, the majority of I.N.A. personnel laid down their arms and refused to get any training. Singapore was most affected. R.B. Bose and Japanese authority had to work hard to get I.N.A. going again to their job.\footnote{\textit{I.N.A. Collections}, File No.403, p.252, 290; Tarachand \textit{op.cit.}, pp.417-18.}

Amidst such circumstances I.N.A. was divided into two parts- pro-dissolution and anti-dissolution. Therefore, the Indian leaders of I.N.A. fell out amongst themselves and Mohan Singh fell
into disgrace, whereupon some 8000 Indians who had previously joined I.N.A. withdrew from it and rejoined the "Whites". But they with some other prisoners of war were recaptured and sent to New Guinea.43

Up to the arrest of Mohan Singh, the Indian National Army consisted of three Guerilla Brigades, a Field Force, a Secret Service Group; the three Brigades were stationed at Neesoon where there were three battalions. Prisoners of war from Indian Army were recruited in the I.N.A. under the command of Mohan Singh. Whole structure of I.N.A. can be understood through the following classification:

(i)

\[
\text{Indian National Army H.Q.}
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\begin{align*}
\text{Azad Brigade} & \quad \text{Nehru Brigade} & \quad \text{Gandhi Brigade} & \quad \text{Field Force} & \quad \text{Secret Service Group} \\
(\text{About 3000}) & \quad (\text{About 3000}) & \quad (\text{About 3000}) & \quad (\text{About 4000}) & \quad (\text{About 1000}) \\
3 \text{ Battalions} & \quad 3 \text{ Battalions} & \quad 3 \text{ Battalions} & \quad & \\
& & & & \\
\text{Medical} & \quad 3 \text{ Infantry Units} & \quad 1 \text{ FD Bty.} & \quad & \\
\text{Bidadari Base Hospital} & \quad \text{Neesoon Base Hospital} & \quad \text{Field Aid Pary} & \quad & \\
\end{align*}
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The Formation of I.N.A.

(ii) H.Q.I.N.A. were situated in Bidadari near Alkaf's Gardens, Singapore. The following personnel held appointments in Headquarters:


5. Deputy Director of Medical Services – Lt. Col. A.D. Loganadan, I.M.S.


7. Military Secretary – Major N.S. Bhagat, Royal Bombay S & M.

8. Propaganda Officer – Major Bharar, I/Bhawalpore Infantry.

9. Provost Marshal – Capt. Abdul Rashid, 1/14 Punjab Regiment

10. M.O. to G.O.C. – Major D.S. Raju, I.M.S.

(iii) Azad Brigade Commander – Major Parkash Chand R.I.A.S.C.

(iv) Nehru Brigade Commander – Major Aziz, I Kapurthala Infantry.


(v) Gandhi Brigade Commander – Capt. I.J. Kiani, 5/2 Punjab Regiment


(vi) Officer-In-Charge of Field Force – Lt. Col. J.K. Bhonsle

Other Officers: Capt. S.M. Hussain, Capt. S.W.Palsikar, Capt. P.K.Sehgal, Capt. Rawat, Capt. Negi, etc.


Other Officers: Capt. Dutt, Capt.Misra, Sub. Abdul Latif.44

In this way throughout the whole period of Capt. Mohan Singh’s Army i.e. from January 1942 to December 1942, I.N.A. was dominated, directed and controlled by two officers of Japanese Intelligence Services. From January 1942 to July 1942, the Officer-

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in-charge was Major Fujiwara. I.N.A. was financed by Fujiwara Kikan. Mohan Singh got advice and orders from Major Fujiwara concerning the general administration of the I.N.A. Mohan Singh had a peculiar notion that I.N.A. was more or less his personal Army. After the transfer of Major Fujiwara in August 1942, Lt. Col. Iwaguru took charge of the Kikan and the I.N.A. came directly under the redesignated Iwaguru Kikan.  