CHAPTER - IV

ROAD TO MUSLIM SEPARATISM: JINNAH AND SIKANDER HAYAT KHAN’S CONFLICTING POSITIONS, 1938-1942.

Throughout the last decade, before 1947, there had been a constant struggle for supremacy between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party. The Muslim League, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was constantly trying to grab the control of the Punjab politics from the Unionist Party, but the period from 1937 to 1942 proved unlucky for the Muslim League as far as the Punjab politics was concerned. In this period, in spite of its strong efforts, it could not challenge the predominance of the Unionist Party which scored spectacular success in the elections of 1937, whereas the Muslim League had won only one seat in the elections.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Sikander-Jinnah Pact was signed in the Lucknow session of the Muslim League in 1937 and through this Pact, Sikander Hayat Khan

1. Raja Ghaznavar Ali had joined the Unionist Party, after getting the offer of Parliamentary Secretaryship, leaving Barkat Ali alone as the victorious member of the Muslim League.
had advised all the Muslim members of the Unionist Party to join the Muslim League. Kirpal Singh called this act of Sikander Hayat Khan as 'beginning of the end of the Unionist Party'. Jinnah proudly wrote to Barkat Ali soon after the Pact, "Once the Muslim members of the Unionist Party or any Musalman who becomes a Leaguer and pledges himself to the creed, policy and programme, he is no longer anything but a Leaguer." 

The Sikander-Jinnah Pact had been very controversial from the time of its formation and was probably deliberately so designed, allowing both the parties temporary advantages. The British Governor also later referred to its "deplorable looseness." Outwardly, it did appear that the Unionist Party had formed a coalition with the Muslim League and Jinnah had been benefited a great deal and his position was strengthened. However, for the time being, especially during 1938-1940, Sikander Hayat Khan got the benefits of this Pact. Apparently, his political

4. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.92, letter from Bertrand Glancy, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated July 21, 1943, p.52.
prestige increased\(^1\) by associating with the Muslim League and he also got a firm hold on the Punjab Muslim League.\(^2\) In May 1939, Sikander Hayat Khan was even asked to preside over the Sholapur Muslim League session.\(^3\) It was a clear demonstration of the Unionist Party's ascendancy in the Muslim politics.

Even the Congress was unable to command its influence in the Punjab during this period. The Punjab Muslim leaders were suspicious of the activities of the Hindus in the Congress-governed provinces. Some scholars said to this extent that the Sikander-Jinnah Pact was an outcome of combined efforts of the League and the Unionists to arrest the growth of Congress in the Punjab and outside.\(^4\) It was further suggested that the "rising tide of Congress totalitarianism" led Sikander to secure the support of the Muslim League.\(^5\) Following the elections

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1. Sikander Hayat Khan's prestige received a great setback because of the Shahidganj tragedy.

2. Choudhri Khaliquzzaman said, "Sikander had saved Muslim India by coming to the League session in Lucknow and by infusing life into the organisation. His association with the Muslim League at this crucial hour in the fate of the Muslim India is an event in history and must have for ever to remind us his greatness." See Choudhri Khaliquzzaman, *op.cit.*, p.290.


of 1937, the Congress ministries had been formed in seven of the eleven Indian provinces.\(^1\) In the Punjab, Congress started a campaign to increase its members and especially to woo Muslims in its fold. Five Muslims were appointed in the five Divisions of the Punjab to control the Muslim mass contact campaign.\(^2\) The Congress was further charged with popularizing Hinduism in the garb of nationalism.\(^3\) The flying of the Congress flag from public buildings and the introduction of the singing of the Bande Matram with its strong Hindu sentiments in the Congress ruled provinces also increased Muslim fears of Hindu domination.\(^4\) These apprehensions.

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2. *Home Department (Political)*, F.No.18/7/1937.
3. Jinnah accused the Congress of being intoxicated with power. He added that it was not yet Hindu Raj but British Raj. The Congress was puffed up with what little power it had acquired. If the same degree of Congress intoxication continued, there would be no freedom for the country. The Congress had its own vocabulary and, when it talked of nationalism, what it really meant was Hinduism. See *The Tribune*, July 31, 1938, p.1.
however, brought Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan close to each other. Hanuman Parshad analysed that "as a matter of fact Sikander used Congress exertions and mass contact programme to justify his Pact with the leader of the Muslim League."¹

I. Role of Sikander Hayat Khan in the Punjab Politics, 1938-1940

In spite of the prestigious position of the Unionist Party, certain sections of the Punjab Muslims tried to shake the position of Sikander Hayat Khan. In this connection, it is necessary to mention the Ahrar's campaign of Civil Disobedience in connection with the Shahidganj dispute. Herbert Emerson, the Governor of Punjab, felt that this campaign of Ahrars was purely political and was the direct outcome of the Lucknow Conference² where Sikander Hayat Khan signed an agreement with Jinnah.

Malik Barkat Ali, who represented the Punjab branch of the Muslim League, tried his best to create a

¹ Hanuman Parshad Sharma, op.cit., p.234.
² Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.86, letter from Herbert Emerson, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated January 11, 1938, p.11.
rift between Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan, because in a coalition between the two, Barkat Ali found himself in danger of being sidetracked. Hence, for his own ends, Barkat Ali sought to embarrass the Punjab government. Other Muslim leaders like Maulana Zafar Ali and Lal Din Kaiser spoke in a sense hostile to Sikander Hayat Khan, putting him in an awkward position.

Above all, Mohammed Iqbal also disliked Sikander Hayat Khan's friendship with Jinnah because, in that situation, Iqbal himself could not gain control over the Muslim League. Hence, he became an ardent opponent of the Unionist Party and its so-called non-communal politics.

Earlier in November 1937, he reported to Jinnah that through the Pact which, he thought, had damaged the prestige of the League, Sikander wanted nothing less than the complete control of the League and the Provincial Parliamentary Board. This clearly showed the politics that

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1. Barkat Ali, in a letter to Jinnah, abused the Punjab Premier and his party and claimed that about twenty Muslim Unionists were prepared to join the League without any condition. See Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.86, letter from Herbert Emerson, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated February 12, 1938, p.37.

2. Ibid., see also, Iftikhar Haider Malik, Sikander Hayat Khan: A Political Biography, 1892-1912 (Islamabad, 1985), pp.81-82.

3. Ibid., dated April 25, 1938, p.86.


5. Iqbal's letters to Jinnah, November 1, 1937, quoted in Ibid., p.16.
Mohammed Iqbal tried to play in order to lower the prestige of Sikander Hayat Khan in the eyes of Jinnah.

Not to talk of the Punjab Muslims, the Hindu colleagues of Sikander Hayat Khan also disliked his friendly Pact with Jinnah. They began to question the non-communal character of Sikander Hayat Khan's government and asked him to clarify his position. Sikander Hayat Khan's declaration that "his adherence to the Muslim League would not affect the position and policy of the Unionist Party" failed to satisfy them. It was Chhotu Ram who tried to make the best out of a bad bargain. It is true that Sikander Hayat Khan had participated in the League session with the consent of Chhotu Ram, but he did not consult him about the Pact. Chhotu Ram personally regarded it as "discouraging and depressing from a purely national point of view", but he refused to treat it as a "surrender to Jinnah" and felt satisfied by Sikander Hayat Khan's assurances.

1. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No. 89, letter from Herbert Emerson, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated December 3, 1937, p.184.
5. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers, F.No. 132, p.63.
The Premier's boast that Jinnah was "in his pocket" greatly re-assured him.¹

Infact, the arrangements in Lucknow were in the nature of a compromise and were intended to safeguard the interests of both the Muslim League and the Unionist Party. Gradually, when the Muslim League gained strength in the Punjab, the position of the Unionist Party became uncomfortable and, in that situation, Sikander Hayat Khan, while trying to defend his Unionist Party before his critics in the Punjab, expressed that he did not accord fully with the Muslim League point of view.² Actually, Sikander Hayat Khan was trying to 'sail in two boats'.³ Hindu Outlook commented that "Sikander Hayat Khan simultaneously rides so many horses", because to the Unionist, Sikhs and Punjabi Hindus, he posed as a great provincial patriot.⁴

Infact, being the Premier of the Punjab, Sikander Hayat Khan was playing his role neither too much in favour of the Muslim League nor too much against it. This type

³. Ibid.
⁴. For the details about Sikander Hayat Khan's tactics, as explained by Hindu Mahasabha. See Hindu Outlook, February 1, 1940, p. 17.
of politics was, however, not acceptable to Jinnah, who
wanted to grab the banner of the Punjab politics through
Sikander Hayat Khan.

On July 21, 1941, Lord Linlithgow informed Jinnah
through a letter that he had appointed three Muslim
Premiers all over India, viz., Sikander Hayat Khan of
Punjab, Fazlul Haq of Bengal and Mohammed Saadullah of
Assam, to form the 'National Defence Council' to provide
justice for the Muslims in the matter of communal represen-
tation. The 'National Defence Council' was composed of
thirty one Indian members in total, to advise the govern-
ment in the war effort. Muslim Premiers' acceptance of
the 'National Defence Council's membership, annoyed
Jinnah, who regarded its composition as "farcical". He
viewed the nomination of Muslim Premiers as 'embarrassing
to the League organisation' and an attempt 'to create a
breach in the League'. Infact, Jinnah felt that these
Muslim leaders did not truely represent the Muslims.

1. The Times, July 3, 1941, p.4.
3. Home Department (Political), F.No.17/4/1941.
4. Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, Leaders' Correspondence
   with Jinnah (Bombay, 1944), pp. 184-187.
It was beyond his endurance to see anybody else as the representative of the Muslims. At least, he did not expect this sort of attitude from Sikander Hayat Khan. Hence, through the Secretary of the Muslim League, notice was served on all the three to explain their violation of discipline.¹

On the other hand, Sikander Hayat Khan in an utter astonishment, was prepared to resign from the Muslim League, if he was not allowed to become the member of the 'National Defence Council' as suggested by the Viceroy. He called a meeting of the Muslim members of the Unionist Party at Lahore. About seventy two members handed him their resignations from the Muslim League to use if necessary.² But on the persuasion of Jinnah, Sikander Hayat Khan visited Bombay and to the great surprise of the British government, he surrendered to the dictation of Jinnah and resigned from the 'National Defence Council'.³ The other two Premiers of Bengal and Assam also did the same. This was a great victory of Jinnah as he was successful in dictating his terms, leaving the British authorities perplexed.

1. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.90, letter from Bertrand Glancy, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated August 2, 1941, p.72.
2. Ibid., telegram from Bertrand Glancy, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated August 16, 1941, p.73.
3. Ibid., dated September 10, 1941, p.76.
The influence of the British government on the role played by Sikander Hayat Khan in the Punjab politics was no less important, and, in turn, Sikander Hayat Khan's loyalty to the British authorities was also noteworthy. Sikander Hayat Khan left the entire administration into the hands of the Governor, whenever he was away from Lahore. Henry Craik, the Punjab Governor reported to Linlithgow, "My ministers have all... left Lahore, for the Christmas holidays... As usual when he leaves Lahore, Sikander Hayat Khan asks me to dispose of really urgent matters in his absence on the assumptions that he would agree to my decisions. This is of course an entirely private arrangement between him and myself, which I am careful to keep absolutely secret. Though not quite constitutional it is convenient..."¹

The whole trend of the British policy in the Punjab was to form a province of self-cultivating landed proprietors. Of course, there were big landowners, especially in the Western region, but their interests were not different as they and their families retained a close interest in the cultivation of their land.²

² Ibid., p.154.
Sikander Hayat Khan, many a times found all this quite uncomfortable and faced a difficult situation on account of the intercommunal tensions and the commanding position of Jinnah. Hence, in difficult times, he also looked towards the British government for help and also got it. Throughout his career as the Premier, Sikander Hayat Khan surprised the British government only once when he resigned from the 'National Defence Council'.

There is no doubt that his unexpected surrender to Jinnah over the issue of 'National Defence Council' had weakened the position of Sikander Hayat Khan.¹ This way, Unionist Party's popularity got a severe setback and the 1940s brought an entirely new chapter for the Punjab Muslim politics which gradually shifted from the Unionist Party to the Muslim League especially after Jinnah made the Punjab Muslims aware of his two nation theory and infused in them a spirit of separatism.

II. Muslims' Move Towards Separatism

The Muslim reaction to the Congress rule may be said to have led directly to the idea of separatism. The Congress demand of a strong Centre had always raised

¹ Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.91, letter from Abell, Secretary to the Governor of Punjab to Gilbert, dated January 11, 1942, p.4.
apprehensions in the minds of the Punjab Muslims, because they believed that a Congress dominated Central Government would nullify the autonomy of the Muslim provinces. The uncompromising attitude adopted by the Congress made the Muslim community reactionary and produced an extreme type of communalism which led to the bifurcation of Hindustan.¹

A very weak Centre might have satisfied the Muslims but Congress and the Hindus were not prepared to accept it and that is why, they were adamant on a strong federal government. Infact, the Punjab Muslims agreed to the Hindus' demand of a strong Centre, but in that case, the Muslims wanted to have their own separate Centre.² This was the crux of the theory of partition.

The concept of the Muslim separatism had not received much notice in the Punjab till 1930s. The formation of the Unionist Party in the early 1920s, had put a check on the Muslim concept of separate homeland, due to its non-Muslim ties. Actually, the party had to keep non-communal pretensions as it needed the support of all the communities in the rural areas. It also checked the growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab till the death of Fazl-i-Husain in 1936.

¹. See the editorial of Hindu Outlook, April 4, 1940, p.2.
However, as mentioned earlier, Mohammed Iqbal was the first person who was credited as having mooted the idea of a separate Muslim state in 1920. It was in December 1930 that Mohammed Iqbal delivered his Presidential Address at the Muslim League's annual session at Allahabad. He believed that the Muslims of India were the only Indian people who could aptly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the term. Then came the famous proclamation, which earned him the title of the originator of the idea of Pakistan.

Although Iqbal's proclamation did show his inclination towards a separate homeland, yet, in fact, it was not so. It was grossly misleading to call him the originator of the idea of Pakistan or the poet who dreamt of partition. He never talked of partition and his ideal was to get together the Muslim provinces in the North-West as to bargain more advantageously with the projected Hindu Centre.


2. The famous proclamation of Mohammed Iqbal was, "I would like to see the Punjab, North-West-Frontier-Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state, Self-Government within the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslims State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India." Ibid., p.7.

3. Iqbal stated, "I don't put forward a 'demand' for a Moslem State outside the British Empire... I am all for a redistribution of India into provinces with effective majorities of one community or another on lines advocated both by the Nehru and the Simon Reports..." Ibid., p.90.
In 1932-33, during the sittings of the Round Table Conferences, a group of Muslim students in England were evolving a new scheme. Led by Chaudhri Rehmat Ali, a Punjabi studying at Cambridge, they formed the Pakistan National Movement which issued its first pamphlet on January 28, 1933 entitled, 'Now or Never'. The essence of the plan was the formation of an independent Muslim state comprising the Punjab, the North-West-Frontier province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan.

Rehmat Ali emphasized that his scheme was essentially different from Iqbal's since it involved the creation of an entirely separate Muslim Indian Federation. But in 1930s due to the influence of the Unionist Party, the Muslims of the province did not take much notice of these utterances and remained busy in their demand for separate electorates and special privileges for

1. "...The issue is 'Now or Never'. Either we live or perish for ever. The future is ours only if we live up to our faith..." See Gopal Krishan Papers, Pamphlets relating to Punjab, Roll No.1, Pamphlet No.1.

2. The word 'Pakistan' coined by Rehmat Ali himself was formed from the initials of the component units - P for the Punjab, A for Afghan Province (North-West-Frontier-Province), K for Kashmir, S for Sind and Tan for Baluchistan - and meant literally, 'the land of the pure' i.e. Pak: Pure + Stan: Land. See Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, Jinnah on Pakistan, p.9.
the majority community of the Punjab. But after Jinnah's entry into the Punjab politics, the position underwent a gradual change.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah started persuading the Punjab Muslims towards separatism through his two nation theory. Jinnah told the press in 1940 that the constitutional settlement must be governed by the fact that India was not one nation but two and that the Muslims of India would not accept the arbitration of any Indian or British but would determine their destiny themselves.

That was why he conveyed this message through the Muslim League: "The Congress is composed of the Hindus and therefore stands for Hindu culture and Hindu domination over all other minorities especially the Muslims... The only course for the Muslims is to organize in difference and to prepare for a fight with Hindus...".

1. According to Jinnah, The Muslims and the Hindus were two separate nations. He said, "We (the Musalmans) are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization..." See Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, Jinnah on Pakistan, p.3.


Jinnah clearly said in the Lucknow session of the Muslim League in 1938 that the All India Muslim League stood to safeguard the rights and interests of the Muslims and also requested them to come under the banner of the Muslim League.¹

This way, nearing 1940, although the Unionist Party was quite strong in the Punjab, yet, Jinnah started his campaign of influencing the Punjab Muslims and inspiring them to join hands with the Muslim League by which arrangement their rights would be protected. Here, it is necessary to mention that Sikander Hayat Khan put forward a 'Zonal Scheme' in 1939² in order to bring in peace and harmony. But Jinnah not only turned deaf ears to this scheme but also attacked it during his various visits to the Punjab.³

2. Sikander Hayat Khan believed that, for the administrative purposes, India should be divided into seven regional provinces and Centre should be supreme and dominant in such matters as Customs, Railways, Currency and External Affairs. This scheme was based on economic and administrative interests as well as affinity, languages and geographical considerations. For details, see The Tribune, July 5, 1939, p.1. and July 30, 1939, p.1.
3. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.91, letter from Bertrand Glancy, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated November 28, 1942, p.65.
The Tribune, in its editorial, alleged that Jinnah and his Muslim League always claimed that they were the sole representatives of the Muslim community in India. This claim had always been hotly disputed by the large body of Muslims who owned allegiance to the Congress, Ahrars, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and other bodies of the Muslim nationalists. Obviously, Sikander Hayat Khan did not, in all matters, see eye to eye with Jinnah and his Muslim League. However, despite this, Jinnah tried his best to popularize his 'two nation theory' in the province.

III. The Pakistan Resolution and the Punjab Muslim Politics

In 1940, the time was ripe for the Muslim League to put a demand for the creation of a sovereign state of the Muslims by dividing the country on the ground that Muslims were not a mere minority but a nation with a distinct culture and religion of their own.

In February 1940, meetings of the Working Committee of the Council of All India Muslim League were held in Delhi.

Here, the question of a separate homeland for the Muslims was discussed and it was proposed that this should be discussed in the sessions to be held in March 1940.\(^1\)

As explained earlier, the Khaksars came into conflict with the police on the issue of the restoration of the Shahidganj Mosque to the Muslims. This incident took place just two days before the Muslim League session in Lahore, i.e., on March 19, 1940. Sikander Hayat Khan was in doildrums as he did not want the League session to begin in such a chaotic situation.\(^2\) But, if he had ordered for the postponement of the session, he would have incurred the ill-will of the League opponents that he deliberately provoked the clash with the Khaksars in order to deliberately bring about a failure of the League Conference.\(^3\) In this peculiar situation, Sikander Hayat Khan approached Jinnah

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1. Jinnah met Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy and conveyed to him that the Muslim League was going to demand the partition in the next session at Lahore in March 1940. See Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, p. 197.


3. Actually, Sikander Hayat Khan suspected that the rival branch of the Provincial League had encouraged the Khaksars to create a disturbance in order to discredit Sikander Hayat Khan's government and to make the Conference a failure. *Ibid.*
for help, but Jinnah did not respond positively as he was in a mood to organize the session as per previous plans.

Hence, the meeting of the Working Committee of the Muslim League was held on March 21, 1940 in which a committee was appointed to draft the famous Lahore Resolution of which Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan were the members. On March 23, 1940, Fazlul Haq, the Bengal Premier, moved the Resolution, which was passed on March 24, 1940 in the presence of about one lakh members. The Resolution ran as follows:

"... Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., the geographically


2. For the full text of the Lahore Resolution, see Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, p.340; See also N.N.Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, Volume 1, 1940, p.312; The Tribune, March 24, 1940, p.1; Shafique Ali Khan, The Lahore Resolution, pp.2-3.
contiguous units are demarcated into regions, which should be so constituted, with such territorial re-adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign ..."

As expected, Jinnah's proposals regarding a separate Muslim state, put forward at the meeting of the Muslim League at Lahore, were ridiculed in the Hindu and the Sikh press and in all the Hindu and Sikh meetings held in 1940 onwards.

The Hindustan Times, while speaking on behalf of the Congress, criticized the Lahore Resolution.¹ C. Rajagopalachari called the division of the country as 'Dividing the Baby'.² Hindu Outlook, a Hindu Mahasabha newspaper, published the speech of V.D. Savarkar, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, in which he clearly criticized Jinnah's

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1. The Hindustan Times, March 26, 1940, p.1.

2. C. Rajagopalachari, in an interview with The Hindustan Times said, "The proposal to divide the country reminds me of the old story; when one of the two claimant mothers was quite willing to divide the baby ...", Ibid.
motives of dividing India. "The objective of Hindu Maha-
sabha is the consolidation of the Hindus with the ultimate
goal of absolute independence. The Hindus do not mind if
the Muslims considered themselves a separate race, but the
proposal to divide the country can not be permitted".¹

In short, the general Hindu opinion was that this
scheme of Jinnah left the communal question unsolved and
inevitably intended to lead the country to a civil war.²
The Sikhs also made it clear that any attempt to set up a
permanent Muslim majority in the Punjab would be strongly
resisted.³ In this regard, two momentous Sikh Conferences
were held in May, 1940 at Amritsar and Ferozpur, which
clearly and severely criticized the League's Lahore Reso-
lution.⁴

The Muslim papers like Dawn generally supported the
scheme⁵ and Jinnah's prestige and influence increased among

2. Nur Ahmad, op.cit., p.156.
3. Ibid.
4. For the details of the Sikh Conference, see Hindu Outlook,
   June 1, 1940, p.1.
5. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.89, letter from Henry
   Craik, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the
   Viceroy, dated March 31, 1940, p.63.
the Muslims. The Muslim press sought to justify the scheme by the experience which Muslims in minority provinces were said to have received at the hands of the Congress ministries. It was, however, doubtful if the responsible Muslim opinion in the Punjab really believed in the practicability and political wisdom of the scheme, although the majority regarded it as a useful bargaining counter in future negotiations with the Congress.

As stated earlier, V.D. Savarkar, the Hindu Mahasabha President, openly criticized the Lahore Resolution. He observed, "... it has become imperative on the part of the Hindu Sangathanist world to declare their will and determination to resist this vivisection of their motherland and holy land by all constitutional and legitimate means within our reach today ..." To give strength to this criticism, he issued a circular to all the branches of the Hindu Mahasabha to observe an 'Anti-Pakistan Day'.

1. The Congress Muslims opposed the Lahore Resolution. According to them, Jinnah took into consideration the Muslim majority provinces and ignored the interests and future of the Muslims living in the Hindu majority provinces. See Nur Ahmad, op.cit., p.156.

2. Home Department (Political), F.No. 18/4/1940.


4. Ibid.
Mahatma Gandhi, too, condemned the League's partition plan in strong words and declared that he would employ every non-violent means to prevent the vivisection of India.¹

Some of the more prominent Akalis declared that the thought of 'Pakistan' was quite intolerable and that they disliked still more the prospect of a closer union with the Congress Party, since this would eventually mean the submergence of their political identity.² Consequently they looked up to the British government to get their differences with rival factions clarified.³ Many of them, in particular, Giani Kartar Singh, had been actively helpful, as far as they deemed it expedient, in promoting the Sikh recruitment. They confessed that this policy was essential for the preservation of the Sikhs as a separate entity.⁴

Sardar Ujjal Singh, too, condemned the Lahore Reso-

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1. Gandhiji, in an article, wrote, "As a man of non-violence, I can not forcibly resist the proposed partition, if the Muslims of India really insist upon it. But I can never be a willing party to the vivisection. I would employ every non-violent means to prevent it. For, it means the undoing of centuries of work done by numberless Hindus and Muslims to live together as one nation ..." See The Tribune, April 14, 1940, p.3.

2. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.90, letter from Bertrand Glancy, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated November 22, 1941, p.84.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.
Resolution on behalf of the Sikhs.¹ A writer of the Muslim point of view in The Civil and Military Gazette, expressed surprise at the attitude of the Sikhs regarding Pakistan. He failed to understand, why Sikhs should not be in favour of the scheme by which the Punjab, which they claimed to be their holyland, should be free from the Central government.²

Master Tara Singh clarified this viewpoint by saying that the very conception of the Pakistan Scheme was based on extreme communal consideration, because its aim was not the protection of the Muslims but their domination over the minorities.³

The Ahrars also condemned the Pakistan Scheme and called it un-Islamic.⁴ They offered a new concept of a Muslim State known as 'Hakumat-i-Illahia' based on Quran⁵ and Shari'⁶. Earlier, at an All India Ahrar Conference

1. Sardar Ujjal Singh said, "The Sikhs will resist any attempt to divide India. We will not tolerate the Rule of any communal majority over any part of the country and the Sikhs will stand united against any form of the Pakistan Scheme". See The Tribune, April 8, 1940, p.1.

2. The Civil and Military Gazette, November 18, 1941, p.4.

3. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan (Delhi, 1985). pp 32-33.

4. The Tribune, April 15, 1940, p.9.

5. Quran is the holy book of the Muslims.

6. Shari'a is the sacred, divinely revealed law of Islam.
held at Delhi on August 22, 23, 1941, Mazhar Ali Azhar was not over-enthusiastic about the Pakistan Scheme, which he supported only for want of a better alternative for protecting the rights of the Muslims in the future constitution of India. He said that he was still prepared to lead the movement for the country’s freedom with the cooperation of his Hindu brothers, but he was not prepared to sacrifice the interests of the Muslims at any cost.¹

The Khaksars, though a militant organisation of the orthodox Muslims, were also not reconciled to the idea of the partition of the country. Their leader, Allama Mashriqi, emphasised on the Hindu-Muslim unity.²

The Punjab Premier, Sikander Hayat Khan, who was responsible for the drafting of the Pakistan Resolution, also spoke against it. In a speech on March 11, 1941, he said, "... I have no hesitation in admitting that I was responsible for drafting the original Resolution. But let me make it clear that the Resolution which I drafted was radically amended by the working committee, and there is a wide divergence in the Resolution I drafted and the one that was finally passed. The main difference between the two Resolution is that the latter part of my Resolution which

¹. Home Department (Political), F.No.209/41.
². Ibid., F.No.18/6/1943.
related to the centre and co-ordination of the activities of the various units was eliminated. It is therefore, a travesty of fact to describe the League Resolution as it was finally passed as my Resolution. It must be taken as the official Resolution of the Muslim League which was ratified by the Muslim League . . . 

As mentioned earlier, the position of Sikander Hayat Khan had become very critical in the Unionist Party, after the passage of the Lahore Resolution. His non-Muslim supporters, i.e. the Khalsa National Party and the rural Hindu group led by Chhotu Ram, in particular, were annoyed with him and were pressing him again and again to explain his stand or to disassociate himself from the so-called Pakistan Resolution. Sikander Hayat Khan also did not want to annoy them because he knew that, without their support, his party could not command a majority in the Assembly. Moreover, the continuous increase in Jinnah’s prestige had created a fear in his mind, that, if he would not win the confidence of his non-Muslim colleagues, it was not possible for

1. From the speech of Sikander Hayat Khan in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, see Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates. Volume XVI, 1942, pp. 350-356.

2. The Muslims critics were often of the view that the word Pakistan was used no-where in the Resolution and the Congress Hindus were alleged to have invented this word by their own assumptions. But, on December 23, 1940, Jinnah in a speech had clearly stated, "As a matter of fact, the Lahore Resolution embodies a principle which is popularly known as Pakistan and therefore there is no difference between the two. You can call it by name, but what matters is the principle". See Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, p.78.
him to secure a majority in the next general elections.¹

Sikander Hayat Khan knew that while doing so he would lose the support of the Muslims of extremist views or, in the other words, followers of Jinnah, but the rural supporters—both Muslims and Hindus, would remain favourably inclined towards him and this was what he wanted.

Consequently, in order to re-assure the Muslims and the non-Muslims in the province, Sikander Hayat Khan clearly opposed the division of India and said that there could be rule of no one community but the rule of the Punjabis.² Further, he offered a scheme according to which, a new legislature would be elected after the war on the basis of existing franchise and separate electorates.³ Inspite of the criticism of The Tribune, Sikander Hayat Khan

¹ Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.90, letter from Henry Craik, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated March 4, 1941, p.20.

² For details about Sikander Hayat Khan's views, see the editorial, The Tribune, September 11, 1940, p.8; see also Iftikhar Haider Malik, op.cit., p.97.

³ See the editorial. Ibid., May 13, 1940, p.8; for the details of Sikander Hayat Khan's Scheme, see also Nicholas Mansergh. The Transfer of Power, Volume II, pp 361-362.

⁴ Regarding Sikander Hayat Khan's Scheme, it was said that it was wholly impracticable. It would neither solve the communal problem nor bring India the constitutional independence she wanted. It just resembled the Pakistan Resolution. Ibid., April 14, 1940, p.8.
hoped that the settlement of the communal question in the Punjab would pave way for the settlement of the Indian problem.

However, Sikander Hayat Khan's formula was disliked by most of the leaders of the province as well as by the Muslim League. The Hindus rejected it as according to them, this scheme of the Premier also indicated the partition of the country and automatically the partition of the province. The Hindu Mahasabha celebrated an anti-Pakistan Day on May 10, 1942 and at its meeting at Lahore and Amritsar, the Pakistan Scheme was severely criticized and a lengthy resolution in favour of an independent and undivided India was passed. Although Akalis accepted this resolution as the basis of further negotiations, yet they demanded several amendments to it. Jinnah described it "as latest trick to puzzle and purposely mislead the ignorant masses".


2. Home Department (Political), F.No.18/5/1942.

3. For the details of the All India Akali Conference held at Lyallpur on September 26, 27, 1942, see N.N.Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, 1942, Volume II. pp 296-301.

4. For the full text of Jinnah’s speech, see The Tribune, November 16, 1942, p.3.
As expected by Sikander Hayat Khan, Jinnah was opposed to any idea that came in the way of his Pakistan. That was why, with the help of the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation, he tried to popularize the Pakistan demand in the rural areas. A Pakistan Conference under the Presidentship of Jinnah was held in March 1941 with the help of the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation. This Conference appointed a rural propaganda committee, whose task was to tour the villages, to enlighten the Punjabi peasants about the demand for Pakistan.

Although Sikander Hayat Khan had successfully resisted Jinnah's attempt to capture the minds of the Muslims in the Punjab, yet his non-Muslim Colleagues in the Punjab Legislative Assembly looked at Sikander Hayat Khan with doubt and considered him to be an agent of the Muslim

1. The Governor of Punjab, Bertrand Glancy, told the views of Sikander Hayat Khan to Lord Linlithgow in a letter dated July 10, 1942, that by Sikander's formula, "Jinnah's personal feelings will be seriously offended, because the scheme does not emanate from himself as the Head of the Muslim League ..." See Nicholas Mansergh, The Transfer of Power, Volume II, p.360.

2. For details, see N.N. Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, 1942, Volume II, pp 289-292.

3. Ibid.

4. In a speech in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, Sikander Hayat Khan clearly stated, "If Pakistan meant unalloyed Muslim Raj, he would have nothing to do with it. What he wanted was a Raj in which every community would be a partner." See Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 1941, Volume XVI, pp.349-352.
League. It seemed as if Sikander Hayat Khan was trying to please both the Hindus and Jinnah, but he was unsuccessful in impressing both. Hence, his position remained ambiguous in the eyes of both Jinnah and the Hindus.

There is no doubt that the Lahore Resolution was indefinite and vague, but the demand for a separate Islamic state was quite clear. To a number of Muslims, both in the Punjab and outside, Pakistan was a mere slogan raised to obtain the best terms for the Muslims in the undivided India. But, there was also several Muslim groups like Ahrars and Khaksars in the Punjab that did not subscribe to the idea of the partition of the country. Nevertheless, the Muslim League, under the leadership of Jinnah, made a concerted move to rally the Muslims of the Punjab under its banner since this province was considered by Jinnah as the 'corner stone' of Pakistan.

IV. Effects of the Second World War on the Punjab Politics

By the time the Lahore Resolution was being discussed in the Punjab, the Second World War had already started. On September 3, 1939, Britain declared war against Germany.

1. Sikander Hayat Khan once said, "India is divided in such a manner that every community has an opportunity to rule with the help of the minority and that the Hindus can rule in seven provinces and the Muslims can do so in the remaining four provinces without grudging each other." See The Tribune, March 14, 1941, p.8.

2. Ibid., April 25, 1943, p.4.

Unlike the Congress and the Muslim League, the Unionist Party offered unconditional support to the British during the War by sending nearly a million recruits for the Indian army, by organizing savings and by 'grow more food' campaigns on a massive scale. Unionist government also spent a sum of Rs. two lakhs so that an intensive campaign of war propaganda could be launched to enlighten the villagers which would enable them to contribute their might by offering their services for winning the War.

Not only this, Sikander Hayat Khan criticized the Congress, the Muslim League and the Akalis for not cooperating with the British government regarding war-efforts. Further, Sikander Hayat Khan himself issued a statement to the press asking the people to support the British crown fully in its war-effort, and also advised the people to take up arms in favour of the Allies.

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2. The government was of the view that war propaganda was essential specially in view of the fact that during the First World War, lack of proper and adequate propaganda in favour of the War led to the creation of misunderstanding and great dissatisfaction among the masses. See Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 1942, Volume XVIII p. 136.
3. Ibid., 1940, Volume XII, p.83.
4. Iftikhar Haider Malik, op.cit., p.84.
The extent of Sikander Hayat Khan's loyalty was clear from the fact that he put forward a proposal that if the Congress decided to give unconditional support and co-operation in the execution of the War, he would take into his Cabinet two prominent Congress men, Pandit Gopi Chand Bhargava and Mian Iftikharuddin, with a view to secure a Ministry representative of all shades of opinion. But, Sikander Hayat Khan remained unsuccessful in pursuing Congress to give War-time support to the British government without any condition.

On the other hand, the Muslim League also issued a resolution banning members of the Muslim League from joining the War Board of Committees. This resolution of Jinnah was supported by Sheikh Sadiq Hasan, member of the Legislative Assembly. Henry Craik showed his apprehension that 'a final rupture between Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan cannot now be long delayed.'

1. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.88, letter from Henry Craik, the Governor of Punjab, to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated September 13, 1939, p.138.
2. Ibid., Roll No.89, dated July 16, 1940, p.119.
3. Ibid.
4. This apprehension of the Punjab Governor was based on the fact that the Muslim Leaguers who had joined the War Committees, had not submitted their resignations. In this regard, Nawab of Mamdot, the President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, decided to send a deputation of three Muslims to Jinnah to reconsider the resolution about the ban. Ibid.
opposition towards the War became intolerable to Sikander Hayat Khan and he wrote to Viceroy that "There is no course open except to part company with Jinnah and the League".  

The Tribune commented that their differences were so numerous, "that the two can pull together only on the basis of mutual exploitation and mutual toleration".  

Sikander was losing his patience. He requested Jinnah to relieve him of his duties as member of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League for "Matters have come to a breaking point" because of his (Jinnah's) "unrealistic attitude".

However, unfortunately at this juncture, the Unionist ministry got a setback in its prestige because of the rise in prices during the War. Furthermore, it was alleged that Sikander Hayat Khan was offering War help to the British in the name of independence; although actually it was not so. His aim was always to keep India under the yoke of the British domination.

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1. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.88, letter from Sikander Hayat Khan to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated August 29, 1939, p.188.


4. This was the statement of Lala Duni Chand, the leader of the Congress Party, at the budget session. See Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 1940, Volume XII, p.83.
The Muslim League tried to exploit the War-time discontent. It began openly to challenge the Unionist Party's pre-dominant position within the politics of the Punjab.

Earlier, the Muslim League had clearly refused an unconditional support to the Britishers during the War.\(^1\) But, after the War was declared, the Viceroy naturally wanted help from the Muslim League. At the All India level, the War accelerated the British departure from India and built up the Muslim League to a position of equality with the Congress. At the provincial level, it resulted in gradual diminishing of the Unionist influence and Muslim League's increasing control over the politics. Sikander Hayat Khan became greatly isolated within the League Council and Working Committee. Jinnah no longer supported him in the face of the often hostile criticism of its other members.\(^2\)

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1. In a session of the Muslim League on September 18, 1939, it clearly said, "If full, effective and honourable co-operation of the Musalmans is desired by the British government in the great crisis which is facing the world today and if it is desired to bring it to a successful termination, it must create a sense of security and satisfaction among the Musalmans and take into confidence the Muslim League which is the only organisation that can speak on behalf of Muslim India". See *The Tribune*, September 19, 1939, p.9.

2. Raja Ghaznavar Ali Khan wrote to Jinnah on Sikander's behalf in October 1941 to complain about the increasing attacks on the Punjab Premier in the working committee. "There has not been a single meeting of the working committee when some members have not indulged in personal attacks on him..." See S.Qaim Hussain Jafri, *op.cit.*, p.193.
Hence, the struggle between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party at first centred not on the working of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact nor on the issue of Pakistan, but on the Unionists' attitude towards the War.

Apart from the War efforts, there were some other reasons by which Unionist Party's prestige got a big jolt. One of the main reasons was the lack of communal harmony. The Unionist government was alleged to be creating a situation of mutual dissentions and communal bickerings.1

There was criticism in the Punjab Assembly regarding the general administration of the Unionist government. The critics frightened the various instances of communal bitterness, and focused on the progressive deterioration in the efficiency of the Punjab government and their departments. Unparalleled hartals observed by trading community out of protest towards the vindictive policy of the Unionist government also helped in creating chaotic situation.2

1. The main allegation was, "Their discriminating treatment between urbanites and ruralites, Unionists and anti-Unionists, agriculturists and non-agriculturists and so on is mainly responsible for sowing the seeds of discord and hatred among different communities." See Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 1943, Volume. XXI. p.205.

2. Ibid., p.371.
A mention was also made of the treatment that was being accorded to the Hindus in the matter of their recruitment in the government services. The following three-year position of recruitment was as follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
<th>Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All these factors resulted in defaming the Unionist government of which the Muslim League took great advantage. Thus, a tussle between the Unionist Party and the Muslim League followed which caused immense embarrassment to Sikander Hayat Khan during the last year of his life. The embarrassment was particularly great as it had followed a settlement in the form of Sikander-Jinnah Pact. Consequently, Sikander Hayat Khan lost the goodwill of his Muslim and non-Muslim colleagues.

The struggle between the Unionist Party and the Muslim League became intense after the death of Sikander

Hayat Khan on December 27, 1942. 1 The Premier's post, then went to his Cabinet colleagues, Malik Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana on December 30, 1942. 2

V. Communal Riots (1938-1942)

Apart from Sikander Hayat Khan's politics, the Punjab faced a number of communal riots during 1938-1942. Although these riots were not as severe as the previous ones, yet, they were important as far as the communalism in the province was concerned.

Again, let us for a moment examine what had been the cause of rioting between the Hindus and the Muslims during this period. A pamphlet, written by 'A Punjabi' had described the Punjab politics in terms of communal aspirations of the different communities of the Punjab. 3 In the Pamphlet regarding communal aspirations and their rational adjustment, he analytically stated that the cause of the rioting was not religious but political—not


2. He was, in fact, one of the four persons whose names were on every body's lips in this connection. The other three being Feroz Khan Noon, Liaquat Ali Khan and Nawab Muzaffar Khan. See The Tribune, January 1, 1943, p.8; see also Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.91, telegram from Bertrand Glancy, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated December 30, 1942, p.73.

British but inter-community. The idea of each community was to assert the position of domination over the other. The feeling, "I am the master, therefore my religion must have the precedence over yours", was rampant. Infact, it was immature of them to think in that manner because the domination was of the British and they had only the right to fight with each other.

The communal riots left behind them a legacy of bitterness upon which communalism thrived. In these communal conflicts, the masses participated and were brought into conflict as regional groups against the opposite community, instilling each group with a sense of identity which leaders would translate into and exploit for political power.

Immediately after assuming office, the Unionists were called upon to tackle the problem of communal riots.

1. It was stated in this pamphlet that every individual and every community could claim some sort of independence in going on with its own ceremonies. But to say, "I will not let my neighbour observe the principles and observing his own ceremonies", is ludicrous. See Gopal Krishan Papers, Pamphlets relating to Punjab, Roll No.1, Pamphlet No.XI, pp.22-23.

2. Ibid.

as there were a series of communal riots during the first three-four years of the ministry. In an effort to restore law and order, the government invariably increased the number of police men in the effected areas. But all these efforts proved futile and the Punjab remained under the impact of communal riots during 1938-1942.

(i) Riots in 1938

There was a serious communal riot on March 26, 1938 in Hissar, when two Hindus were shot dead by the Muslims. The communal feeling was quite intense after the riot.

The situation in the province became, however, a bit easier later on and the Governor informed the Viceroy that the use of a new processional route adopted by the Rawalpindi Muslims, on the day of 'Id-i-Milad', was notable and satisfactory. The Governor further hoped that if the Sikhs would also agree to use the new route for their processions, it would undoubtly be a genuine contribution to communal peace.

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2. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No. 86, letter from Herbert Emerson, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated April 5, 1938. p.79.
4. Ibid.
However, all these hopes were shattered when a communal riot occurred at Multan on October 13, 1938.¹ A few days after the riot, two of the ministers, Manohar Lal and Mian Abdul Haye visited Multan at the request of Sikander Hayat Khan, in the hope of being able to ease the tension between the two communities, but their investigations assumed the form of police investigations, resulting in a further intensification of communal bitterness between the two communities,² which was beginning to die down. This clearly revealed that the political motives of the leaders also precipitated the communal feelings among the Punjabis.

(ii) Riots in 1939

There was a communal riot again in the Hissar district on January 28, 1939, in the course of which, three Muslims and one Hindu were killed.³

On March 2, 1939, there was a somewhat serious riot at Amritsar.⁴ The Muharram processionists had knocked down a tray of sweetmeats displayed outside the shop of a

1. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.87, letter from Henry Craik, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated October 26, 1938, p.34.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., dated February 9, 1939, p.35.
4. Ibid., dated March 14, 1939, pp.57-58.
Hindu confectioner. This riot further resulted in the deterioration of the communal relations.

(iii) Riots in 1940

Apart from the Khaksars' agitations and clashes of 1940 which have been discussed earlier, the year witnessed communal rioting on a disastrous scale. The first of these riots occurred at Sargodha on July 7, 1940. The Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police were Muslims that caused a great deal of uneasiness among the Hindus, because it was their apprehension that in the presence of both these Muslim officers, they could not be heard properly.

The second incident took place at Gujranwala on July 13, 1940 between the Muslims and the Sikhs. Here again, the Deputy Commissioner was a Muslim, so no proper action could be taken against the Muslims.

(iv) Communal Situation in 1941-42

Although there was no important communal riot as such in 1941-42, yet the state of communal feeling in the

1. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.89, letter from Henry Craik, the Governor of Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy dated July 16, 1940, p.118.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
province continued to provoke uneasiness. Tension was aggravated by Jinnah's visits to the Punjab, propaganda by the Hindu Mahasabha leaders, policies of Sikander Hayat Khan and, above all, the census at which all communities did everything possible to swell their population figures.\(^1\) In Lahore, the Deputy Commissioner estimated that no less than three lakhs of bogus names were recorded.\(^2\)

Hence it can be concluded that the years 1938-1942, were significant for the politics of the Muslim separatism and intense cold war between Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan. During these five years of Sikander Hayat Khan's Premiership, he did not follow one particular line of action. Some times, he seemed inclined towards Jinnah and the Muslim League and at other times he had his own way. One thing about his personality was quite clear and that was his loyalty towards the British bureaucracy and the British Raj. All these personality traits of Sikander Hayat Khan

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1. The Governor informed the Viceroy that "There have been general complaints of intentional omissions and artificial inflations, and I am afraid that in certain of the towns very little reliance can be placed on the returns actually made. Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs are equally to blame". See Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.90, letter from Henry Craik, the Governor of the Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated March 17, 1941, p.27.

2. Ibid.
had helped in one way i.e. despite Jinnah's constant efforts, Muslim League could not gain control of the province. The Muslim League's success was limited and the Unionist Party under the leadership of Sikander Hayat Khan remained an effective organ of the administrative machinery of the province till 1942.

Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan's conflict created a new dimension in the Muslim politics of the Punjab. The period witnessed Jinnah's determined bid to control the Punjab Muslims. Every step taken by Jinnah and ambivalent attitude of Sikander Hayat Khan enhanced his prestige among the Muslim masses in the Punjab. The dissenting voice in the Unionist Party had began to surface against the leadership of the Unionist Party. The unquestioned leadership of Jinnah at the All India level of Muslim League gave him a vintage position and he was held in great respect by a majority of Muslims even in the Punjab. The Hindu and the Sikh response against the Pakistan Resolution gave him added advantage in the perception of Muslim masses which he fully exploited. Since the levels of power were controlled by the Unionist Party in alliance with the British government. Sikander Hayat Khan did succeed in maintaining his position in the administration - though in terms of social base among the Muslims, he was definitely feeling shaken. It was because of this that
Sikander Hayat Khan could not opposed nor support him, whenever a crisis situation was reached in their relationship. A confused and harassed Sikander Hayat Khan found ground slipping from his feet. Even his Sikh and rival Hindu allies became suspicious of his stand. Not only this, the largely neutral instance of British government on the ongoing conflict between Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan was also detrimental to the stability of the Unionist Party and contributed to the growing influence of Jinnah. The seeds of separatism were safely planted. And the period after the death of Sikander Hayat Khan was nothing but a successful story for the politics of Jinnah as it unfolded itself in the years to come.