MUSLIMS AND THE PARTITION OF THE PUNJAB, 1943-1947

This chapter forms the last phase of the Muslim politics in the Punjab. During this period of 1943-1947, the centre of the Punjab Muslim politics gradually shifted from the hands of the victorious Unionist Party to the Muslim League and Jinnah, its President, became more aggressive, more challenging and more authoritative than before. Here, different stages of the Muslim League's increased hold on the Punjab affairs would be discussed. What steps did Jinnah take to lower down the position of the Unionist Party? How Jinnah strengthened the 'two nation theory'? What role did the British government play during these years? Where did the British sympathies lie—towards the Unionist Party, towards the Muslim League or towards none? The foregoing pages would be presenting a detailed discussion on these questions.

1. For details, see Nicholas Mansergh, The Transfer of Power, Volume III, p. 918.
I. The League - Unionist Controversy

In Sikander Hayat Khan's death, Jinnah saw an opportunity to establish his stronghold in the Punjab. In a statement, he said, "There is not the slightest doubt that immediately after the Sikander-Jinnah Pact in October 1937, the Unionist Party in the Punjab was no more. Under the Pact, a Muslim League Party was to be established in the Punjab Assembly and that Party was to be subjected to the control and supervision of the All India Muslim League and the Provincial Muslim League."  

This way, in his view, Unionist Party had not been functioning at all since 1937. The motive behind it was that Jinnah liked the Muslim League to have a much greater degree of control over the Punjab Politics and he and his lieutenants complained that the Unionist Party had only been paying lip service to the League.  

The new Premier, Khizr Hayat Khan, also acknowledged the general leadership of Jinnah amongst the Muslims of India. He would refer to the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, the purpose of which was to the effect that in all India

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politics, the League was to be regarded as supreme and that the Unionist Party was more or less free to take its own line in the Punjab. ¹

However, this line of thinking was not acceptable to Jinnah. In the meeting of the All India Muslim League Working Committee held at Delhi from November 13 to November 15, 1943, he stressed that the Punjab Muslims should pressurize Khizr Hayat Khan to convert the Unionist Party into the Muslim League. ²

In April 1944, Jinnah demanded that Khizr Hayat Khan should change the name of the Unionist Party to 'Muslim League Coalition Party'. Infact, Jinnah forward three main points: (i) Every member of the Muslim League Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly should declare his allegiance to only the Muslim League Party in the Assembly. (ii) The present label i.e., the 'Unionist Party' should be dropped, and (iii) the name of the proposed coalition party should be the 'Muslim League Coalition Party'. ³

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¹. Linlithgow Collection, Roll No.92, letter from Bertrand Glancy, Governor of the Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, dated March 15, 1943, p.25.


³. See The Tribune, April 28, 1944, p.1; see also N.N.Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, 1944, Volume I, pp. 221-222.
Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan discussed the question during various meetings. In the meeting held on April 27, 1944, Khizr Hayat Khan, however, clearly indicated that such a proposal was not acceptable to him. Jinnah's pressure tactics did not pay much dividends as not only the majority of Unionist leaders but also the British government were suspicious of Jinnah's moves and counter moves. The Tribune commented that "the attempts of Jinnah to make the Punjab Premier 'surrender' to him and force the ministry to tear off the Unionist label and don the 'Muslim League' has failed".¹

The British government apprehended the Muslim League's rule in the Punjab which would automatically affect the War efforts being rendered to them by the Unionist government. In order to demoralize the Muslim League, Shaukat Hayat Khan, son of late Sikander Hayat Khan, was dismissed from the Punjab Legislative Assembly under the allegation of making illegal charges against an Indian Christian Inspectress of Schools.² Khizr Hayat Khan, too, supported this act of the British government.

² For details of the whole issue, see Nicholas Mansergh. The Transfer of Power, Volume IV. p.922.
by saying that 'Shaukat Hayat Khan's dismissal was fully justified'. The popular belief was that the real reason for Shaukat Hayat Khan's fall was his political activities in the cause of Jinnah and the Muslim League. This way, Shaukat Hayat Khan set himself up as a martyr and a considerable wave of sympathy for him began to spread in the Muslim League quarters.

Jinnah and other Muslim League members were taken aback by this decision of the British bureaucracy. This action was highly condemned and they alleged that the British government had acted "in contravention of the basic principles of democratic government and had severely injured the feelings of the Muslims". However, this development gave a big jolt to Jinnah's ambitions of capturing power in the Punjab as it followed almost immediately after the complete breakdown in negotiations between Jinnah and Khizr Hayat Khan.

After having failed to install the League Ministry in the province, Jinnah tried to take disciplinary action

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against Khizr Hayat Khan. An action Committee of the League called upon Khizr Hayat Khan on May 3, 1944\(^1\) to ask him to explain his conduct and to point out to him that his adherence to the Sikander-Jinnah Pact and his refusal to recognize the League as the sole representative of the Muslims were opposed to the constitutions and rules of the All India Muslim League which aimed at the consolidation of the Muslims as a separate nation inside and outside the legislatures under control, discipline and supervision of the All India Muslim League.\(^2\)

In reply, Khizr Hayat Khan pointed out that the Action Committee had not considered his statement as a whole and reminded the Committee that, while admitting the correction of the aims and objects of the Muslim League to consolidate the position of the Muslims, he had joined the Muslim League subject to the terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact and enquired whether the Committee considered the Pact as being still in force and binding.\(^3\) Instead of replying to this question, the Action Committee merely suggested that Khizr Hayat Khan should attend a

1. Gopal Krishan Papers, Pamphlets relating to Punjab, Roll No.1, Pamphlet No.XVII, statement by Khizr Hayat Khan about the decision of the Muslim League Action Committee to expel him from the membership of the Muslim League, p.1.

2. Home Department (Political), F.No.18/5/1944.

3. For details of the complete statement of Khizr Hayat Khan, see Gopal Krishan Papers, Roll No.1, Pamphlet No.XVII, pp.2-11.
meeting of the Committee at Delhi on May 13 and 14, 1944 and explain his position.¹

Khizr Hayat Khan found himself unable to accept the invitation and again asked for the clarification of the League's attitude towards the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. With the same end in view, Jinnah before leaving for Kashmir,² left in the province two members of the Action Committee to suggest measures for the educational, economic and industrial uplift of the Punjab Muslims but really to maintain pressure for the League especially in the rural areas besides organizing the Muslim National Guards.³

In the meantime, Khizr Hayat Khan and the colleagues had been touring in several districts in the province and had produced a distinct effect on the audiences, especially in Layallpur. The Governor reported to the Viceroy that they got a remarkable success in convincing the residents of the city.⁴

1. Home Department (Political), F.No.18/5/1944.
3. Home Department (Political), F.No.18/5/1944.
In spite of all these efforts on the part of Khizr Hayat Khan the All India Muslim League Action Committee, in its meeting at Delhi on May 14, 1944 passed a resolution asking the Punjab Premier to confine himself to answer the specific charges formulated against him and gave him a further period in which to do so. In reply, Khizr Hayat Khan reiterated his previous demands and repeated his request to the Committee to define their attitude to the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. He was informed in return that the Action Committee would meet at Lahore on May 27, 1944 to give a final decision. After the deliberation, the Committee issued a statement saying that Khizr Hayat Khan had contravened the policy and programme of the Muslim League and violated its constitution, rules, aims and objects, and they decided that he should be expelled from the membership of the All India Muslim League and should be ineligible to become a member in future, until the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League removed a ban against him.

The All India Muslim League, in its Lahore session in July 1944, approved and endorsed the action taken by

1. Home Department (Political), F.No.18/5/1944.
2. Ibid.; see also The Tribune, June 4, 1944, p.1; N.N.Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, 1944, Volume I, p.232.
the Action Committee in expelling Khizr Hayat Khan from the Muslim League "for his utter disregard of the wishes of the Muslims of India in general and the Muslims of Punjab in particular and for having acted in contravention of the rules, aims and objects of the All India Muslim League ...". 1

All the political parties felt quite concerned over the League-Unionist conflict. The non-Muslims, especially the Hindu masses of the Punjab, saw with great apprehension the League's ambition to capture power in the Punjab. The Hindus, especially the urban ones, thought not fully satisfied with the policies of the Unionist Party, wished Khizr Hayat Khan well, for the fear of Pakistan outweighed their mistrust of the Muslim majority in the Unionist Ministry. 2

The Tribune admired Khizr Hayat Khan for his stand against Jinnah and also warned the Hindus and the Sikhs that they would gain nothing by siding with the League and in pulling down the Unionist Party. 3

1. Gopal Krishan Papers, Roll No.1, Pamphlet No.XXIV, Part B. Resolutions of All India Muslim League, at Lahore in July. 1944, p.3.
3. There were a few Hindu leaders who were hobnobbing with the League leaders in the game of toppling the Unionist Ministry. See the editorial, The Tribune, April 6, 1944, p.4.
The Hindu Mahasabha, though intensely opposed to Pakistan or domination of the Muslims over the Hindus in any part of India, proved quite ineffective to check the rise of the Muslim League in the Punjab which was a key to Pakistan. Rather, it showed signs of favouratism towards the League.¹ V.D. Savarkar, President of Hindu Mahasabha, issued instructions in 1943 that in the Hindu minority provinces, whenever Muslim Ministry seemed inevitable, whether it was a League one or otherwise and Hindu interests should be served better by joining it, the Hindu Mahasabha in particular should try as a right to capture as many seats in the Ministry as possible and try to do the best they could to safeguard the interests of the Hindu minority. But they should oppose publicly any attempt on the part of the Muslim Ministry to support Pakistan.²

The Sikhs were also in a state of utter confusion during this period. The demand of the Muslim League for a Muslim majority party greatly upset the Sikh leadership. They wanted to maintain and preserve their political entity and protect themselves against leadership. Sardar Baldev

2. Ibid.
Singh, the Development Minister, had clearly said on January 2, 1945, that the Sikhs would not allow the Muslims to establish a majority party in the Punjab, while ignoring the Sikh interests.  

In the absence of a clear strategy to oppose the League's move for Pakistan, a few Sikh leaders entered into negotiations with the League leaders for some political gains. Earlier in November 1943, when Jinnah was busy in toppling the Punjab Ministry, rumours were afloat in the province that the Akalis were offered some concessions by the League in return for strengthening the League against the Unionist Ministry.  

As discussed earlier, various proposals had been coming forth as alternatives to the Pakistan Resolution. But in between, the Punjab politics took a turn due to League - Unionist or Jinnah-Khizr conflict. Inspite of Khizr Hayat Khan's refusal of accepting the League leadership, Jinnah did not loose heart and kept on popularizing the Pakistan movement in the province.

II. Punjab Muslims’ Reaction to Various Peace Proposals

Various proposals were put forth as alternatives to the Pakistan Resolution. Feroz Khan Noon, in a scheme presented in August 1942, suggested the division of India into five independent dominions - (i) Bengal and Assam, (ii) The C.P., U.P., Berar, (iii) Madras, (iv) Bombay, (v) Punjab, Baluchistan, Sind and North-West-Frontier-Province. His scheme also provided some sort of central authority to deal with four subjects: Defence, Customs, Foreign Relations and Currency.¹

Due to the growing interference of the Muslim League in the Punjab, a Congress-League deadlock became apparent as a result of which the Congress leaders also started finding ways and means to resolve this deadlock. So, at the Congress quarters, C. Rajagopalachari interpreted the League’s demand for Pakistan in terms of the right of self determination, and he clearly said that Congress should come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the issue of Pakistan.² This was the C.R. Formula that clearly rationalized the Pakistan demand.

¹ The Tribune, August 27, 1942, p.4.
² Ibid., June 16, 1942, p.4.
C.R. Formula embodied the exclusion of twelve districts of the Punjab (The whole of the Ambala and Jullundur Divisions plus the district of Amritsar), from the so-called Pakistan of Jinnah. In March 1943, C. Rajagopalachari contacted Gandhiji and obtained his consent to this formula which he conveyed to Jinnah later on.

Some Congress leaders like Lala Dunichand and the Hindu Mahasabha President, V.D. Savarkar, severely criticized the C.R. Formula. At the Sikh quarters, Master Tara Singh opposed this formula whole heartedly as it clearly suggested a vivisection of the nation and of the Punjab in particular. The Governor of the province apprehended a civil war in the province in case this formula were accepted.

Jinnah also turned down the formula and also expressed his inability to carry on negotiations with Rajagopalachari on the issue of Pakistan. He said that the

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1. Nicholas Mansergh, The Transfer of Power, Volume IV, P.1223; see also Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, Evolution of Pakistan, pp. 219-220.


4. In June 1942, a Pact was signed between Sikander Hayat Khan and Baldev Singh, popularly known as Sikander-Baldev Pact. See, The Tribune, June 20, 1942, p.1.

proposal offered, "a shadow and a husk, mained, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan".¹

Eventually, the famous Gandhi-Jinnah parleys were held. Fourteen interviews took place between the two leaders, the first on September 9, 1944 and the last on September 27 of the same year. The talks proceeded on the basis of the C.R. Formula but nothing came out of these talks as the basic differences between the two leaders could not be reconciled.² Infact, Jinnah wanted his Pakistan immediately and had no patience to wait till the country became free from the foreign domination, as was suggested by Gandhiji.³

It was clear that the C.R. Formula and the Gandhi-Jinnah talks generated enormous heat and anxiety in the Punjab. The Unionist Party was quite disturbed over these developments. It was felt that Jinnah, having failed temporarily to defame the Unionist government and holding Muslim League's complete control in the

¹. Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, Evolution of Pakistan, p.220.

². The main objection taken by Jinnah was that Gandhiji did not represent Congress and had no capacity to speak on its behalf. This attitude of Jinnah was very much resented by the Congressmen who had great respect for Gandhiji. See The Tribune, September 29, 1944, p.1.

³. For the full text of Gandhiji's proposals, see Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, Evolution of Pakistan, p.222.
Punjab, was trying to take the help of the Congress to achieve that goal.\textsuperscript{1} In fact, the Unionist Party apprehended that the success of the talks would have an adverse effect on the stability of the party, because if the Muslim League and the Congress would have come to some understanding, the position and prestige of the Unionist Party would have been automatically lowered down and this was what Jinnah wanted.

The Muslim League workers were perhaps the most disappointed of all at the failure of the talks because they had a hope that an agreement would lead to a League-Congress Coalition Ministry, replacing the current Unionist Ministry in the Punjab.\textsuperscript{2}

However, the failure of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks proved to be a blessing in disguise for Jinnah and his Muslim League colleagues, because these talks once again made Jinnah popular in the Punjab and the popularity that was lost after the Khizr-Jinnah conflict was regained by him.

The British also watched this situation with great excitement and concern. Outwardly, they showed regrets

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] The Tribune, December 3, 1944, p.10.
\item[2.] Home Department (Political), F.No.18/10/1944.
\end{itemize}
on the failure of the talks, but inwardly they were quite happy because the success of the talks might have led to the Muslim League's Ministry in the province giving tough times to the Unionist Party. Hence, failure of the talks gave a sense of relief not only to the Unionist Party but also to the British Government.

Although the talks yielded no concrete results, yet it set the stage for further negotiations between the Muslim League and the Congress. The initiative was taken by Tej Bahadur Sapru who headed a committee of thirty members to give their report.

The Sapru Committee Report was rejected by the Muslim League. Jinnah condemned the members of the Committee as "handmaids of the Congress Party, who have played and are playing to the tune of Mahatama Gandhi".

1. The Governor, Bertrand Glancy, reported to the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow that "whatever Gandhi's intentions, may have been, his advance to Jinnah has certainly come at a most inopportune time, so far as the Unionist Party is concerned". See Nicholas Mansergh, The Transfer of Power, Volume IV, p.1224; see also The Tribune, September 29, 1944, p.1.


3. The Committee favoured single union in India. Its recommendations also included the replacement of separate communal electorates by joint ones, and its thoroughly rejected the demand of partition. See Home Department (Political), F.No.18/4/1945.

The Hindus and the Sikhs of the province accepted the Sapru Committee Report with great pleasure. They appreciated the principle of the indivisibility of the country and also the joint electorates. The Punjab Muslim League rejected it and looked upon it as a new edition of the Nehru Report inspired by Gandhi, designed to destroy the 'two nation theory' and place the Punjab Muslims under the perpetual subjugation of the Hindus.¹

Another attempt was made in 1945 to bring about an understanding between the Congress and the Muslim League. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Deputy President of the League was trying to reach an accord with Bhulabhai Desai, a Congress leader. Both of them agreed that they would join in forming an interim government in the Centre.²

As was expected, the Desai-Liaquat Pact also received a mixed reception in the Punjab. As far as the talk was concerned, all communities including Muslims, Hindus and the Sikhs welcomed, that something was thought

1. **Home Department (Political), F.No.18/4/1945.**

2. **The composition of such government would be on the following lines:**
   i) An equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and the League in the Central Executive (the persons nominated need not be the members of the Central Legislature).
   ii) Representatives of the minorities (in particular the scheduled castes and the Sikhs).
   iii) The Commander-in-Chief.

For the further details of the Desai-Liaquat Pact, see Latif Ahmad Sherwani, *Pakistan Resolution to
about but the actual gist of the Pact was criticized by all sections. The Punjab Muslim League was not happy because, although formula conceded everything that the League was asking for all those years, yet it made no provision for the actual partition of the country. The Hindus, Sikhs and other minority communities of the Punjab also rejected this Pact.

Bhulabhai Desai wanted the consent of the British Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in this regard. Lord Wavell announced his plan on June 14, 1945. In summary, he said that a Conference of Indian leaders would be held at Simla on June 25, 1945 and the following would be invited to attend - the Premier of each province or, if the province were under Governor's rule, the last person to have been the Premier; the leaders and deputy leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League in both houses of the National Legislature; the leaders of the nationalists and the European groups in the Central Assembly; Gandhi and Jinnah as the recognized leaders of the two main parties;

2. Ibid.
3. Wavell's plan was to reorganize the Executive Council of the Governor General in consultation with the leaders and to bring representatives of the parties into it. The Executive Council was to work under the present constitution and the Viceroy would retain the veto power. See The Tribune, June 19, 1945, p.1.
4. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, pp. 84-88.
Rao Bahadur N. Shiva Rao as the representative of the scheduled castes; Master Tara Singh as a representative of the Sikhs.¹

Inspite of severe criticism by the Hindu Mahasabha² of the Wavell Plan, a Conference was arranged at Simla as per plans.³

A rupture came when the Viceroy expressed his wish that out of five Muslims, he wanted to select four from the Muslim League and one from the Unionist Party which claimed representation on the basis that it was the ruling party in the Punjab.⁴ But, in July 1945, Jinnah clearly refused the membership of any Punjab Muslim because he claimed the Muslim League to be the sole representative of the Muslims⁵ and wanted that all

1. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, pp. 84-88.

2. The Hindu Mahasabha called the Wavell Plan as anti-Hindu, anti-democratic and anti-national. They alleged that it had placed the Hindus at the mercy of the Anglo-Muslim domination. See Hindu Mahasabha Papers, F.No.P-65/1945, pp. 18, 53 and F.No.P-77/1946, p.5; See also Hindu Outlook, July 3, 1945, p.4.


5. The Tribune, July 5, 1945, p.4; See also Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan. pp.88-89; Hindu Outlook. July 24, 1945, p.2.
the Muslim members of the proposed Executive Council should be chosen from the Muslim League; otherwise, he refused to send the names on behalf of the Muslim League, for inclusion in the proposed Council.

Later, it was felt that the Viceroy was prepared to ignore Jinnah, if he did not agree and might nominate all the five Muslims on his own. However, the Nationalist Muslims like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad also urged that the Viceroy should not have paid any attention to what Jinnah said. Even the Unionist Party opposed this move of Jinnah because Khizr Hayat Khan could guess that Jinnah was trying to damage the Unionist Party's prestige and wanted to establish Muslim League's supremacy in the Punjab. That is why he agreed to attend the Conference on the request of the Viceroy.

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1. Hindu Mahasabha blamed the Congress for this point of view of Jinnah and Muslim League because whenever the question of the Hindu-Muslim problem arose, the Congress leaders like Gandhi, Sapru, Desai etc. looked towards Jinnah and the Muslim League for conversation and this had certainly led Jinnah to regard himself as the sole Muslim representative and Muslim League as the sole Muslim organisation. See the editorial, Hindu Outlook, July 24, 1945, p.2.


3. Ibid.


The Simla Conference was finally adjourned on July 13, 1945\(^1\) apparently due to Jinnah's insistence on the Muslim League members constituting the new Executive Council, with the Congress and the Unionist Party equally determined to nominate at least one Muslim representative each. The adjournment of the Conference, for the time being, saved the Unionist Party of the danger of the Muslim League's domination. Jinnah who was eagerly looking forward to the early replacement of the Unionist Ministry by a Coalition Ministry, took the failure of the Simla Conference as a personal triumph.\(^2\)

There was now a direct clash between the Unionist Party and the Muslim League. The League's main aim now was to destroy the Unionist Party which, according to it, was a 'dying power.'\(^3\) and the success of which in the Punjab could be very harmful for the Muslim League. So, Jinnah was not ready to sacrifice the Punjab just because British had their hand on Khizr Hayat's head. He was to attain his Pakistan and that was possible only, if Punjab would come directly under the control of the Muslim League.

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2. Home Department (Political), F.No.18/6/1945.
For this the Unionist Party needed to be thoroughly isolated.

Having this end in view, some of the Punjab Muslim Leaguers first of all wanted to come to an understanding with the Congress Hindus. For instance, Mian Iftikharuddin, the former President of the Punjab Congress, declared his earnest wish for a Congress-League compromise. He also stated that Pakistan was not a mere slogan. The independence and Pakistan were both related with each other and both these aims could be got only through a Congress-League compromise.¹

It is necessary to mention, at this juncture, that the Hindus were quite dissatisfied with the Unionist Party because of its communal policies regarding jobs. By 1945, apart from the bad shape of economy due to the Second World War, recruitment in all the thirty seven departments of the Punjab government was made on communal lines,² that caused great discontentment among the Hindus as they were the main losers in this

¹. The Dawn, December 4, 1945, p.5.
distribution of government jobs. Thus, the Muslim League tried to take advantage of the disorderly state of affairs.

The general elections of 1946 were approaching quite near and the Muslim League was keen to improve its political position in the province by capturing as many seats as possible in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Inspite of great efforts on the part of the Muslim League, other parties in the Punjab were, however, not in its favour. Above all, the British government, too, apprehended a good amount of instability if the Muslim League came to power. On December 6, 1946, the House of Commons,

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2. Home Department (Political), F.No.18/5/1945.
London, had a debate on the Indian elections. The government reports said, "... The Unionist Party, which was in power there, was very friendly to Britain, and wished probably more than any other party that Indian nationalism should never be achieved. It might be more convenient to Britain or for government administration in the Punjab to see that the Unionist Party was again returned at the elections because if it was not returned, a certain amount of instability must follow". ¹

However, inspite of all these odds, the Muslim League tried its best by starting a campaign that the Punjab Muslims could escape the Hindu domination only by the creation of Pakistan. 'Islam in danger' was their battle cry. They did the election propaganda by exploiting the religious sentiments of the Muslims. The Punjab League leaders like Feroz Khan Noon, Shaukat Hayat Khan and Mumtaz Khan Daultana spread religious fanaticism among the Muslims. Feroz Khan Noon preached that "a vote for League was vote in favour of the prophet". ² He pleaded

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¹ The Dawn, December 9, 1945, p.1.
that "it would be against the interest of Islam and the Muslims to vote for any non-League Muslims". Thus, the fight for Pakistan became the main issue for the forthcoming elections.

III. Punjab Muslims and the Elections of 1946

In anticipation of an early provincial elections, the Muslim League, with the help of the Muslim Students' Federation, started showing signs of greater activity and a sub-committee was formed to draw up a programme in preparation of an election campaign. It was estimated that, during the elections of 1945-46, over a thousand young Muslim students were reportedly sent from Aligarh to Punjab for electioneering work.

The Unionist government was the main target of attack and the most important demonstration of this attack was made in the early June 1945 in the form of a meeting held in Shahpur, Khizr Hayat Khan's home district. Coupled with the anti-Unionist propaganda, assurances of good treatment to minority communities in Pakistan were given and the

1. Home Department (Political), F.No.97/1945.
2. For the details regarding the work of electioneering in the Punjab by Aligarh students, see the *Dawn*, December 31, 1945, p.5.
ventilation of their economic grievances promised.¹

Not only this, Jamil-ud-Ahmad who led a special
delegation to the province, said in his speech, "... The
Unionist Party which has no root anywhere is only a con­
venient cover under which the bureaucracy is making a
last desperate effort to retain its stranglehold on the
warm hearted but unsophisticated Muslim masses of the
Punjab which has always been a favourite hunting ground
for imperialistic exploitation ...").²

New Muslim League pamphlets appeared and pro­
paganda meetings were held at Hoshiarpur and Muzzaffar­
garh. Many non-League candidates left their respective
parties and joined the Muslim League.³ Not only this,
a new pro-League Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Islam was also found
in the Punjab and a vigorous propaganda campaign was
launched against the Nationalist Muslims.⁴

1. Home Department (Political), F.No.18/4/1945.
2. The Dawn, January 8, 1946, p.4.
3. Malik Wazir Mohammed, an independent candidate, Fazl­
Illahi, an Ahrar candidate, Babu Mohammed Din, and
Khan Abdul Qayyum, Congressite Muslims, left their
parties and signed the Muslim League pledge. Even
Feroz Khan Noon resigned his post of Defence Minister
in order to assist the Muslim League in the Punjab
elections. Ibid., December 2, 1945, p.1.
4. Home Department (Political), F.No.18/8/1945.
All these campaigns and programmes brought good popularity to the Muslim League and by means of this campaigning, the Punjab Muslims became more attracted towards the League, automatically destabilising the Unionist influence. Although Khizr Hayat Khan did a bit of election propaganda for the Unionist Party and visited various districts of the Punjab, addressing various election meetings, yet his efforts proved futile as the Muslim Leaguers were out and out speaking against the Unionist Party.

The Unionist Party, which had been dependent on its rural supporters from the very beginning, was worried about its inability to function effectively as a vehicle for the Zamindar's interest, during the War. This helpless state of affairs was exploited by the Muslim League which endeavoured to choose the leaders from rural areas as its candidates. Hence, many Unionist members like

1. The Dawn, January 5, 1946, p.4.

2. The commercial castes' exploitation of the agriculturists could no longer be attacked because of the need for their co-operation in fighting the War. See Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, p.145.

3. An interesting case in point was the Wazirabad constituency in which most of the voters were Jats. Ibid., p.209.
Mohammed Salah-ud-din, etc. became converts to the Muslim League in 1946. Apart from landlords, the Pirs' support was also demanded by the League in the name of Pakistan.

The main drawback in Khizr Hayat Khan's propaganda was that it lacked a distinct and consistent ideology. It also failed to devise a political programme as an alternative to the 'two nation theory' of the Muslim League. As it occurred, Khizr Hayat Khan himself fell a prey to the propaganda for Pakistan as he identified himself with this demand and assured the Punjab Muslims that they would be voting for Pakistan whether they voted for the League or the Unionist Party.

There is no doubt that the British bureaucracy had been helping the Unionist Party a lot, because the


2. In the Punjab many landlords adopted the garb of Pirs, in 1946 like Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot as Mamdot Sharif, Shaukat Hayat Khan as Wah Sharif, Feroz Khan Noon as Sargodha Sharif, etc. Ibid.

3. The Muslims League, while making fun of his electioneering, thanked him for having helped the cause of the League much better than his own because in one of his speeches, Khizr Hayat Khan said, there was no difference between the ideals of the Unionist Muslims and the Leaguers as both have agreed about the right of self-determination. See the Dawn, January 5, 1946, p.4; see also The Tribune, October 29, 1945, p.12.

government knew, that the Punjab could remain safe and beneficial only under the hands of the loyalist Unionist Party. The bureaucracy wanted the Party to build up a strong organization in which the interest of the rural masses could be safeguarded. Lord Wavell told the Governor of the Punjab in 1944 that the real need for Khizr Hayat Khan and his associates was to organize a strong party to represent their views and not to expect His Majesty's Government to do everything for them.¹

This was what the Unionist Party failed to do. The dual character of its members both in the Muslim League and the Unionist Party also stood in the way of the enforcement of Party discipline. The situation for the Unionists had turned so adverse that they were not left with any solid election slogan and they lacked a convincing election campaign cry.²

First, the elections of the Central Legislative Assembly were held. The success of the All India Muslim League was astonishing. It had won all the Muslim seats and polled 90% of the votes. In the Punjab, it won all

2. Prem Choudhri, Punjab Politics and Role of Sir Chhotu Ram, p. 103.
the six seats. The victorious Muslim Leaguers were Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Hafiz Mohammed Abdullah, Captain Abid Husain, Sher Shah Jilani, Ghulam Bhik Nairang, and Nawab Mehar Shah. Jinnah won from Bombay.

On February 23, 1946, all the results of the Punjab Legislative Assembly were declared. The party position in the Assembly was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist Party</td>
<td>20 (13 Muslims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panthic Akali Sikhs</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>175</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results showed some definite trends in the Punjab politics. These indicated that the era of regional political parties was over. The supremacy of the national level parties was clearly demonstrated. The communal pattern of the Punjab politics could also be seen. By and large, the Hindus voted for the Congress, the Muslims

3. Ibid., February 24, 1946, p.1; see also Home Department (Political), F.No.18/2/1946.
for the Muslim League and the Sikhs for the Panthic Party.

For the Muslim League, it was a wonderful victory. With its victory and the defeat of the loyalist Unionist Party, the British government foresaw danger for the domination. They received a set back from the results of 1946 Punjab elections. Now the only alternative left with them was to take advantage of the fact that the Muslim League could not score absolute majority. Bertrand Glancy greeted with relief the Muslim League's failure to form a Ministry and encouraged Khizr Hayat Khan to do so. The new government contained the Unionists, the Sikh Akalis, and the Congress.

The formation of the non-league Coalition Ministry augmented communal tension in the province to the highest pitch as a result of the indignation and frustration felt in the League circles for having been deprived of political power in the province in spite of a spectacular performance in the elections. There was a wild talk of

1. In each province except the Frontier, the Muslim League had won at least 90% of the seats and thus provided a solid proof that the entire Muslim nation was behind it and supported its demand. See Nur Ahmad, op.cit., p.178.
direct action by the League. The situation worsened to such an extent that it appeared as if the province was on the verge of a civil war.  

After the elections, the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, decided to send a Mission to India, in order to solve the communal problem of the country in general and the Punjab in particular.

IV. Cabinet Mission’s Influence on the Punjab Politics

The Cabinet Mission reached Delhi on March 24, 1946 and it promised to meet the Premiers of different provinces and representatives of different communities.

The Punjab Premier Khizr Hayat Khan told the delegation that had Jinnah been asked at an earlier date to define Pakistan and had its financial and other implications been worked out, the demand for it would not have been so strong for, the possibility of the division of the Punjab as a result of the partition of the country

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1. Home Department (Political), F.Nos.18/4/1946 and 18/5/1946.
3. Cabinet Mission included three Cabinet Ministers: Lord Pethie Lawrence, Secretary of the State for India; Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade; and Mr. Albert Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
would have produced a reaction against it amongst the Muslims of the province.¹ He further expressed his view that the Sikhs would also not be happy under the Muslim domination in Pakistan. Not only this, the Muslims would have quite a lot of differences among themselves because some of them would be Sindhis, the others Baluchis, and still others Pathans and so on, and though having one religion, they would still be different in language and culture.² Khizr Hayat Khan had clearly shown his inclination towards an All India Federation with a weak Centre.³

Jinnah spoke in favour of the demand of Pakistan, which, according to him, was the only solution that could lead to peace, stability and happiness not only of the two major communities but of all the people of the sub-continent.⁴ He further believed that a hundred million Muslims could not be put together with two hundred and fifty million Hindus whose way of life was entirely different from that of the Muslims.⁵

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.148.
5. Nicholas Mansergh. The Transfer of Power, Volume VII, p. 120.
After taking the views of the Muslims, the Cabinet Mission gave its own statement about the Indian situation on May 16, 1946. The Mission clearly stated that setting up of Pakistan, as suggested by Jinnah, was not advisable. "... An interim government may be set at once to carry on the administration of British India until such time as a new constitution can be brought into being ..."\(^1\)

The Cabinet Mission's point of view was that, if Pakistan was created,\(^2\) the non-Muslim population left in those areas would have to face the Muslim rule. The following figures showed the areas of the proposed Pakistan and the percentage of the Muslim and non-Muslim population\(^3\):


2. Such a Pakistan would be comprised of two areas, one in the North-West, consisting of the provinces of Punjab, Sind, North-West-Frontier-Province, and Baluchistan. The other in the North-East consisting of Bengal and Assam ... *Ibid.*, p.2.

These figures indicated that the setting up of a separate sovereign state of Pakistan would not solve the communal minority problem, nor there was any justification for including within a sovereign Pakistan those districts of the Punjab in which the population was predominantly non-Muslim. This point would particularly effect the position of the Sikhs.¹

¹ A.I.C.C. Papers, F.No.57/1946, p.1.
Hence, the Mission recommended either of the two following solutions:

1. There should be a loose Federation in the form of Union of All India consisting of three principle parts, viz., the Hindu majority provinces, the Muslim majority provinces and the states with Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications minimally in the hands of the Union government, but with a wider range of optional powers that might, by agreement, either be exercised by province co-operating as groups and thereby constituting a third tier in the pattern of government or be transferred to the Centre.

2. There should be two Indias, Hindustan and Pakistan. The Pakistan element consisting only of the Muslim majority districts, i.e., roughly, Baluchistan, Sind, North-West-Frontier-Province and Western Punjab in the North-West and Eastern Bengal without Calcutta with Sylhet districts of Assam in the North-East. The two divided parts would have a treaty or alliance, offensive or defensive, but nothing in a way of an actual executive Centre and, therefore, no common control of Foreign policy or assurance of effective common defence of the sub-continent.¹

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¹ Nicholas Mansergh. The Transfer of Power. Volume VII, pp. 528-537
When Jinnah's view was taken regarding the Cabinet Proposals, he clearly stated on May 22, 1946 in a statement that the Muslims would not be satisfied with any other thing except partition. On the other hand, the Congress was adamant and opposed the system of partition as proposed by Jinnah.

The Sikhs also showed their resentment towards the Cabinet Mission Plan. In a letter to Lord Pethic Lawrence dated May 25, 1946, Master Tara Singh wrote about the plight of the Sikhs under the proposed plan. He showed resentment on the very fact that if Jinnah's demands would be agreed upon, the Sikhs would be entirely thrown at the mercy of the Muslims. Similarly, Sardar Baldev Singh also expressed his resentment over the Cabinet Mission Plan in a letter to Pethic Lawrence dated May 26, 1946. He said that the Sikhs interests had been ignored.

1. A.I.C.C. Papers, F.No. 57/1946, p. 35.


On the demand of the Congress and taking account of the problems of non-Muslims especially the Sikhs, the Mission, too, rejected the Pakistan demand and called it impracticable.¹

Now, the Muslim League was definitely and irrevocably on the warpath. Its war was against all those who did not allow it to get its Pakistan.

V. Effect of the All India Muslim League on the Punjab Muslims and the Partition of the Punjab

August 14, 1946 was the day when Jinnah made an announcement of celebrating a 'Direct Action Day' on August 16, 1946.² The Working Committee of the Punjab Muslim League endorsed this decision of the All India Muslim League and appealed to the Punjab Muslims to renounce all the titles and observe the 'Direct Action Day'.³

However, the news of the disturbances in Calcutta⁴ led to the deterioration of communal situation in the

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3. Direct Action Day actually meant any action against law. The main aim of Jinnah was to plunge the country into the horrors of the civil war and create a grave communal situation in several places of the Punjab in particular. Ibid; see also Home Department (Political), F.No.18/8/1946.
province. Consequently, the Muslim religious festivals which followed the 'Direct Action Day', caused official concern and public apprehension because of the intermingling of the League politics and the Muslim religion. The Provincial League planned civil disobedience which included non-payment of taxes and revenues, the deliberate violation of laws and the boycott of non-Muslim trade and goods.¹

The deteriorating communal situation in the Punjab was a matter of great concern for the non-Muslim groups, especially the provincial Congress leadership whose cooperation towards this action of Muslim League was doubtful.²

In the meantime, the politics had taken a crucial turn. Lord Wavell had been looking for the opportunity when he could announce an interim government with the help of the League and Congress.³ There were certain reasons for this. First, after the defeat of the Unionist Party in the Punjab, the British government's

¹ The Dawn, August 21, 1946, p.6; see also Home Department (Political), F.No.18/9/1946.
² The Dawn, August 16, 1946, p.6.
³ Ibid., August 20, 1946, p.1.
position had become unstable. Second, the Cabinet Mission had failed. And, third, Jinnah's 'Direct Action' had spoiled the situation all the more. By offering an interim government, the British tried to make a last effort to remain the rulers in India.

But Jinnah was adamant and he doubted every action of the government as a hinderance in the way of his Pakistan. That was the reason that his talks with Nehru on the same question failed as a result of which Wavell announced on August 24, 1946, the formation of an interim government without the League. Jinnah minded this move of the Viceroy Wavell and viewed it as the latest trick of the British and the Congress to avert the move for Pakistan.

All these developments influenced the situation in the Punjab. Liaquat Ali Khan declared September 2, 1946 as a day to be greeted with black flags.

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1. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, pp. 242-243; see also the Dawn, August, 26, 1946 p.4.
2. The interim government would consist of fourteen members of which six members would be nominated by the Congress, five members nominated by the Muslim League, three representatives of minorities nominated by the Viceroy, and one of the three places would be kept for the Sikhs.
the National Guards, a paramilitary body of the League, multiplied by leaps and bounds. Earlier, Shaukat Hayat Khan had also given a message of Jehad to the Punjab Muslims and told them to get trained so that they could glorify the Muslim Nation.¹

The main purpose of all these agitations was to instigate the Punjab Muslims not only against the Congress or the British government but to make the functioning of the Coalition government difficult and putting Khizr Hayat Khan in an odd position.

However, the agitation caused a serious concern not only to Khizr Hayat Khan but also to the Viceroy who felt that the further worsening of the situation in the Punjab would create more complications in the all India politics.² Hence, a ban was imposed by the Punjab government on the activities of the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh and the Muslim National Guards so that peace could be maintained.

A number of the Punjab Muslim League leaders were arrested including Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot, Feroz Khan Noon, Shaukat Hayat Khan, Mumtaz Daultana, Begum Shah

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¹ Jehad means Holy war, the Dawn, August 27, 1946, p.8.
The Punjab situation worsened after the ban was imposed. Many processions were taken out in order to defy the ban. The Punjab Muslim Leaguers were determined to carry their struggle all over the Punjab until all restrictions on the civil liberties of the Muslims were withdrawn.

Consequently, the Governor and the Premier were under pressure from all sides to diffuse the situation. In consultation with his colleagues, Khizr Hayat Khan withdrew the ban on both the organizations i.e. the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh and the Muslim National Guards on January 28, 1947, though a ban on processions and meeting organized by these parties, remained. Ironically, the Muslim Leaguers took the withdrawal of the ban as a victory and continued carrying on disruptive activities with more zeal and vigour. Their main aim was to oust the Coalition government under the leadership of Khizr Hayat Khan and to get the banner of the Punjab's

2. Ibid., January 26, 1947, p.4.
administration in their own hands.¹

The agitation now spread to different parts of the Punjab. Hartals, unlawful processions and meetings were the main programmes of the agitation. Processions, led by volunteers offering themselves for arrests,² were taken out through the main streets of the cities especially Lahore and Amritsar.

Although Khizr Hayat Khan tried his best to control the situation, but to no avail. At last, the British Prime Minister, Atlee, made an announcement on February 20, 1947 that the British would be leaving India by June 1948.³ The Muslim League rejoiced over this announcement as their Pakistan dream could be realized only after the British left India.⁴ Khizr Hayat Khan was quite shaken at this announcement because he knew that his governance in the Punjab was insignificant without the British support.

While Khizr Hayat Khan was in an utter shock, the communal situation in the province worsened all the more.

2. Ibid., p.1.
3. For the full text of Atlee's statement, see Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, pp. 213-215; see also Partition Proceedings, Volume I, Expert Committee No.1 (New Delhi, 1949), p.1.
The Governor of the province reported to the Secretary of the State on February 25, 1947 that celebrations marking the completion of one month of agitation by the demonstrators on February 24 were accompanied by violence in several districts such as Lahore, Amritsar, Rawalpindi and Jullundur where situation was controlled with great difficulty.¹

Unable to face the odds, Khizr Hayat Khan resigned on March 2, 1947² against the wishes of the Governor and to the surprise of his colleagues who wanted him to stay. On the other hand, his resignation was greeted by the Muslims in the Punjab who were definitely under the control of the Muslim League by now.³

The fall of the Coalition Ministry after Khizr Hayat Khan's resignation resulted in a lot of communal tension in the Punjab. The confused non-Muslim masses including mainly the Hindus and the Sikhs took out a procession in Lahore and raised the slogans of 'Pakistan Murdabad'. In order to stop them, the police had to open

3. According to Jinnah, "I am glad to learn the news this morning that Malik Khizr Hayat has submitted the resignation of his Cabinet ..." See the Dawn, March 3, 1947, p.1.
fire as a result of which one hundred and twenty five persons were injured and ten were killed.\textsuperscript{1} This news spread like wild fire and other important cities like Amritsar, Multan, Gujaranwala were also caught in the grip of communal riots. Curfew was imposed there to control the situation.\textsuperscript{2}

The All India Hindu Mahasabha showed grave concern over the prevailing situation in the province. At the same time, it boosted the morale of the Hindus and the Sikhs by congratulating them for organizing a common anti-Pakistan front and told them to observe March 23, 1947 as a 'Punjab Day' as a mark of sympathy towards the suffering Hindus and the Sikhs.\textsuperscript{3}

In the meantime, the Muslim League under the leadership of Jinnah tried its best to form a League Ministry in the province but due to the prevailing circumstances and taking account of the angry non-Muslim masses,\textsuperscript{4} the Viceroy and the Governor opposed Jinnah's

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1. For the details about the so-called civil war that began in March 1947, see Manmath Das, Partition and Independence of India (Delhi, 1982), pp.159-165.

2. The Dawn, March 6, 1947, p.1; see also A.I.C.C.Papers, F.No. 9-10/1947, pp. 31-33.


move and the 'Governor's Rule' was imposed.1

In fact, the fall of the Coalition Government created a lot of tension in the province. Had the Khizr government not resigned, the situation would have been entirely different because with Khizr Hayat Khan's resignation, a sense of insecurity prevailed among the non-Muslim section of the province. The feeling among them was that they would have to live in the so-called Pakistan under the domination of the Muslim League.

Inspite of the twenty four hour curfew in many cities of the Punjab and other precautionary measures of the government, the unprecedented frenzy of communal fanaticism shook the province to its foundations. In view of these unfortunate happenings, the Congress Working Committee called upon the Muslim League representative. The Working Committee clearly resolved that there was the need of a united India but if that was not possible and if people must murder each other, then the Punjab should be divided into two provinces so that the predominant Muslim part might be separated from the predominant non-Muslim part.2

2. Ibid., March 9, 1947, p.1; see also the Dawn, March 11, 1947, p.4.
The Punjab Congress and the Akalis jointly opposed any sort of partition plan. According to them, "under no circumstances are we willing to give the slightest assurance or support to the Muslim League in the formation of a Ministry as we are opposed to Pakistan in any shape or form". ¹

Meanwhile, serious talks had been going on in the Centre to solve the Punjab problem. A new formula was put forward, i.e., 'the existing Punjab should be split up into two sub-provinces. Each of the sub-province should have its own legislature and its own cabinet to deal with its own affairs. The Governor as the executive head of the sub-provinces would serve as the connecting link between the two..." ²

It seemed that the Unionist leaders too were drawn towards this idea as it enkindled in them a hope of sharing political power in the Punjab through the formation of a Coalition Ministry. Thus, in reply to the questions of the Viceroy on March 3, 1947 over the issue of obtaining the will of the people by a referendum, Khizr Hayat Khan said that he was in favour of the referendum but wanted

¹ The Tribune, March 9, 1947, p.1.
² Ibid., March 12, 1947, p.3.
such alternatives to be considered as (i) Free Punjab with an agreement or agreements with Hindustan and Pakistan about Defence, (ii) Punjab to join Pakistan, (iii) Punjab to join Hindustan, and (iv) Punjab to be divided.¹

While the Congress and the Unionists were thinking in terms of new plans to solve the Punjab tangle, the riots increased in the province. Lahore, Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum, Jullundur, Kartarpur and Multan districts were in the grip of serious rioting.²

By March 20, it had been estimated that the total casualties in the Punjab were about 2,049 and the number of the injured was approximately 1,103.³ Just two days later, i.e., March 23, the casualty rate reached to 4,000.⁴ This clearly revealed how badly the province had become the victim of the Muslim politics. Now, even Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh⁵ agreed to

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2. Ibid., Volume X, p.59.
the partition plan though they were opposed to it earlier.

Lord Mountbatten, the new Viceroy, who arrived at Delhi on March 22, 1947, was a source of great hope of the final settlement. At that time the Punjab situation was at its worse and every individual and every party wanted a solid solution to this problem.

The communal situation of the province deteriorated more and more. The new Viceroy was convinced that a get-together of the Hindus and the Muslims was impossible. Therefore, he declared that while they wanted a united India, the Indians themselves were demanding the division of the country. Even in the Punjab, he found that the Hindus and the Sikhs who were, for the time being acting together, were stressing on the partition of the Punjab and were not inclined to any reconciliation with the Muslims.

On June 3, 1947, the new Viceroy gave his plan popularly known as the '3rd June Plan', which clearly

laid down that on August 15, 1947, 'two independent Dominions shall be set up to be known respectively as India and Pakistan'.

Regarding the Punjab, the Plan said, 'there shall be two new provinces, to be known respectively as West Punjab and East Punjab.'

While taking the mind of Jinnah, the Viceroy felt that he would agree to nothing else but partition, so he approved of this plan.

The Congress Working Committee on June 15, 1947 also completely agreed to the partition plan of Lord Mountbatten. The important Indian leaders like Jawahar Lal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, who were earlier opposed to the partition also agreed to the Plan.

Thus, the Mountbatten Plan, like most things in politics, was essentially a compromise from every point of view. The provinces of Bengal and the Punjab were

2. Ibid., p.12.
3. Ibid., p.8; see also the *Dawn*, June 5, 1947, p.1.
partitioned between Pakistan and India, on the basis of the Muslim and the non-Muslim majority districts.\(^1\) The Congress that had been struggling for independence, no doubt, achieved it. On the other hand, the Muslim League got its Pakistan, but much against its wishes,\(^2\) the Punjab was partitioned.

After the partition was declared, a sort of war broke out among the masses belonging to different communities. Infants, women and men were forcibly burnt alive. Ruthless murders and looting took place.\(^3\) The Hindus and the Sikhs held Jinnah and the Muslim League responsible for this tragedy. However, the Muslim League and Jinnah wanted Pakistan and they got it, for what price, only the sufferers knew.

Hence, the crux of what has been stated above is that the death of Sikander Hayat Khan was the turning point in the Punjab Muslim politics. Although Khizr Hayat Khan tried his best to check Muslim League's intervention

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3. For the details about the aftermath of partition, see Manmath Das, *op.cit.*, pp. 175-178; for the details about the refugee problem and the transfer of population, see Satya M. Rai, *Punjab Since Partition* (Delhi, 1984), pp. 101-104.
in the Punjab, but in vain. After 1942, in all the important events that occurred in the country, Jinnah took active participation on behalf of not only the Indian Muslims but also of the Punjab Muslims. Slowly and gradually, with the cries of 'Islam in danger' and the 'two nation theory', he was successful in finding a place in the hearts of the Punjab Muslims. At that juncture, the efforts of the bureaucracy resulted in a further deterioration of the communal situation. Both these factors i.e. increase of Jinnah's control in the Punjab and the deterioration of communal situation led to the weakening of the Unionist Party. The elections of 1946 were the final setback for the Unionist Party. Observing the state of affairs, Jinnah called for direct action and the situation got out of everybody's control. Finally the province had to face its unfortunate fate in the form of partition.

A review of the Muslim politics between 1943-1947 further points out to the fact that the Muslim Nationalism in the Punjab assumed proportions which could not be controlled. Rather it enveloped the Muslims at the grassroot level. Every turn and twist in the Muslim politics strengthened the hands of Jinnah. The Unionist Party fought an unequal battle for supremacy. Significantly the very
factors which were responsible for the growth of the Unionist Party caused its downfall. The British government's support acted as a nemesis. Khizr Hayat Khan increasingly lost his social base and he stood completely isolated in the Muslim politics. The British government supported him because they wanted to use him to strengthen their rule in the Punjab. The Hindus and the Sikhs supported him to postpone the inevitable. There was hardly any ideological support from any quarters. Even Khizr Hayat Khan was confused and unsure of his stand. He was for the Pakistan ideology during the elections of 1946 and yet he was opposed to it. It was because of this that his support base started slipping from his hands. The Unionist Muslim leadership deserted him. The Hindu rural support to the Unionist was aware that the previous arrangement was no more relevant. The march of events completely overpowered the nervous leadership opposed to Pakistan. The nationalist Muslims including outfits such as Khaksars, Ahrars etc. were marginalized. And it was nothing but a triumphant march for the Muslim League and its leader Jinnah, the victory of the communal ideology was the loss for united India. The communal frenzy was unprecedented. The face of the Punjab was blackened. The sounds of dance of death was heard all over the Punjab. The death wish had overshaken the valiant Punjabis. The entire fabric of the Punjab politics was laid to ruins.