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REGENERATION OF THE CONTROVERSY
Moral philosophy is as old as philosophy itself if not older. The articulation of the two may coincide, but the origin may have a different history. The main human concern lends itself first of all to a consideration of moral philosophical problems, for the simple reason that it directly affects human life and individuals. Modern moral philosophy has crystalised itself around two main competing theories, namely Teleology and the Deontology. Deontologists believe that right or wrong is an intrinsic quality of an act without any extrinsic references, including ends or consequence.¹

For deontologists, there are some classes of actions which are indefeasibly right or wrong. For example, a deontologist would claim that lying and cheating are wrong even if by lying or cheating one may achieve a good end, like saving a life. They argue that an act is wrong because it is its intrinsic quality, which does not change in respect of the end achieved, so lying and cheating are bad. On the other hand, teleologists are concerned with ends and relate right and wrong actions directly to purpose, ends, or consequences. The teleological perspective is what has

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come to be known as ethics of consequences or consequentialist ethics. For teleologists actions are means to an end or way of reaching an objective. According to them, actions are judged on the basis of achievement or failure to attain the ends or goals intended to be reached. For example, a good pilot will know which way or which means may be adopted so that the aeroplane reaches its destination and his quality rests not on the means but the end of reaching his destination. For teleologists the means are under consideration to achieve an end and the means have to be good to achieve a good end. However, unlike the deontologists, the teleologists tolerate bad means to achieve good ends in special circumstances, like lying to save a life. Again teleology argues that the best way to achieve the end is to adopt the right means, people who lack such knowledge are likely to choose the wrong means or to perform acts that are wrong.² Teleology lays emphasis on ends but does not ignore the means, deontology, however, lays emphasis on means. Deontology asserts that a good end or purpose does not justify a bad action and therefore the maxim the ‘end justifies the means’ is rejected.
by it. In contrast, teleology maintains that actions are sometimes justified by ends produced.

The deontologists argue that a promise ought to be kept simply because it is right to keep promises, irrespective of consequences being good or bad. The rightness of the promise comes from the moral principles involved. Deontologists argue that certain acts such as breaking the law ought to be punished because they are wrong and deserve to be punished and not because doing so will serve a purpose, such as deterring others from breaking the law. Teleology, on the other hand, insists that we should keep our promises only when keeping them result in better consequences than the alternatives. In matters of punishment, teleology will appeal to such considerations as prevention of crime or the rehabilitation of criminals.

**Deontology**

Kant is the first and foremost philosopher to fully develop and articulate deontological moral philosophy. Kantian moral theory holds that only moral rules will make possible an ideal society, which is the ‘realm or kingdom of ends’. The realm is only
possible if it has two main aspects, first, that all its members respect one another as self-determining agents who follow different individual ends; and second, they seek to promote each others ends. Kant argued that these two aspects form the moral ideal, which will evolve if everyone follows the fundamental principle of moral law, that is, the ‘categorical imperative’. The categorical imperative requires that one acts only on such maxims that one can rationally will in order to become universal law or principle. However, in Kant categorical imperative is enjoined with the hypothetical imperative. The ‘hypothetical imperative’ postulates the practical dimensions of possible action as a means to achieve what one desires or which one may possibly desire. The ‘categorical imperative’ is presented as necessitating objectives and action without regard to any other end. In this sense, Fagothey argues,

“If the action is good only as a means to something else, the imperative is hypothetical; but if it is thought of as good as itself, and hence as necessary in a will which of itself conforms to reason as the principle of this will, the imperative is categorical…”".

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For Fagothey, as we are also arguing, the hypothetical imperative has an end as conditional, that is, it is dependent on the means. In hypothetical imperative Kant is suggesting the requirement of consideration of means when the end is specified. The categorical imperative, on the other hand, is not dependent on the means since there is no specific or definite end to justify the means. Kant claims that all hypothetical imperatives are conditional upon the ends since one desire an end and therefore, a hypothesis can be framed to suggest the best means to be adopted from the various available alternatives in order to achieve that end. He argues that such imperatives are supported by ends-means reasons. Hence, they do not bind absolutely but only on condition that we desire the end which is their condition.

For Kant, everything in nature is governed by law and only rational beings have the capacity to comprehend it and consciously regulate their behaviour according to principles, that is, through will or practical reason. The practical reason comprises the law which binds the will. These imperatives are either hypothetical, for example, if you want this end then you
must use these means, or categorically, for example, you must do this absolutely. However, Kant says,

“…the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end, and if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end, this is called the means”.

Kant further classifies ends as subjective and objective and distinguishes them,

“…subjective ends require action in accordance with hypothetical imperatives for their realisation, e.g. roses blooming in one’s garden in winter, objective ends do not”.

Therefore, for him, persons are objective ends, for they do not require further realisation as the source of categorical imperatives.

The Kantian definition of the concept of ends and means can be explicated much more simply and correctly by denoting that an end is the direct motive of an act of the will and means the
indirect. Kant argues that man exists as an end in himself. Every end can only exist in relation to a will, which is essential to the things. Haezrahi highlights Kant’s view and argues,

“...ends which are also duties like performing moral actions for the sake of duty. But products of moral actions are not absolutely good, and morally good actions are not absolutely good, such supreme goodness belonging only to the will. Since the end cannot be less perfect than the will, only rational agents as far as they are possessed of a will itself capable of being a good will actuated by the idea of the law, can be the ends of a categorical imperative”.

Kant asserts that morality is not concerned with ends and insists that the adoption of ends such as the happiness of others is itself dictated by morality. If morality is the condition of ‘kingdom of ends’ then even morality itself may have a conditional value of it serving the ends.

If Kant is right in his assertion that morality is not concerned with the ends that it may achieve or fail to achieve, then all moral actions would turn out to be non-rational, if not
irrational. It is a matter of fact that Kant considers actions which are clearly moral, on his criterion of morality, to be the supreme examples of the exercise of morality. Our own happiness cannot be accounted as merely arbitrary end and not merely with the method of attaining an end already presupposed, but also with determining what constitutes the end itself. However, Hutchings points out Kant’s view and argues,

“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an End”.

Kant’s duty theory is centered on the categorical imperative, with its three formulations, where he argues that we should not treat men as means but as ends in itself. Kant argued against the maxim ‘end justifies the means’ and he tried to distinguish the ends from its necessary means. Therefore, an attempt to justify the maxim goes in support of the view of the teleology or consequentialism which is contradictory to the Kantian view.

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Teleology

As is pointed out above teleology is also sometimes known as consequentialism, which moots the idea that ends determines the rightness or wrongness of an action and not means to it. In other words, Consequentialism as a moral theory holds the maxim ‘end justifies the means’. Consequentialism holds the view that an action is good only if it brings as its necessary consequence the greatest amount of happiness to the greatest number of people or the individual’s long-term self-interest. Consequentialism defines the desired end in terms of either the long-term self-interest of the individual or the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. The former emphasises the individual interest which is the theory of ethical egoism associated with Thomas Hobbes, while the latter emphasises the collective interest of individuals is utilitarianism associated with Bentham and Mill.

Ethical egoism claims that in moral decision the consideration should be the individual’s long-term self-interest as the end desired and if by using reasonable moral means the long-term self-interest can be achieved, then that action should be performed. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, considers the
desired end to be the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people and therefore asserts that an action which achieves this end by using reasonable moral means should be performed. Both the schools agree on using moral means, if, as mentioned above, it is not an exceptional situation, like saving another's life, but their ends are different which have to be kept in mind.

Deontology rejects the Utilitarian principle and argues that there can be no duty to maximise good in the first place. The deontologists suggest that there is nothing in the utilitarian principles which would bind one to contribute towards maximising the good and as such is not a realisable goal. According to deontologists the Utilitarians are assuming the duty. In this sense Lacewing puts up a counter-argument,

“Utilitarians object that deontology is irrational. If it is my duty not to murder, for instance, this must be because there is something bad or wrong about murder. But if murder is bad, surely we should try to ensure that there are as few murders as possible. If I know that unless I kill someone deliberately, many people will die, how can I
justify not killing them by appealing to duty? Surely it is my duty not to kill only because death is bad. So I should prevent more deaths. To insist that/don’t do anything ‘wrong’ seems a perverse obsession with ‘keeping my hands clean’.”

The Utilitarians argue and assert that it is to start with irrational not to maximise the good. The deontologists of Kantian bent, on the other hand, argue that if everyone could act in a manner to maximise the good then the principle is irrational. The teleologists retort that everyone acting to maximise the good is not possible and therefore the demand of the deontologists is irrational. In other words, the teleologists deny the Kantian principles; the status of criteria to assess rationality. However, our concern in this thesis is the obtaining of ends-means reasoning, whereas the deontological argument only picks up formal features of reason such as, universal, categorical, etc. Kant has been criticised for creating confusion between facts, science, and logic as features of practical reason.¹¹

Utilitarians being concerned primarily with ends separate out the action from the actor and in the process disregard his
motive. Mill argued that motive has nothing to do with the morality of an action. For him, good motive is normally socially profitable, which is of prime concern. However, he qualifies that if exceptionally a motive issues in unprofitable action, we must not be deterred by habitual respect for a valuable motive from recognising the badness of the act. The deontologists, on the other hand, claim that in the utilitarian scheme individuals are overlooked and they insist an action cannot be moral unless the motives are moral. The emphasis is on the motive behind an action, which is claimed to be an integral part of ends-means equation and as such cannot be ignored.

In Utilitarianism ‘ends justify the means’ and actions are judged on the basis of its results which is unlike the deontologists, not on the basis of intentions or motives. The antithesis of the utilitarian ideal is Kant, for whom the end was not important in determining whether an action is justifiable or not. Motive was everything to him and insisted on a very strict view on how to judge the morality of an action.

The ends according to Utilitarians have no intrinsic relations between themselves and are isolated from each other,
which, nevertheless, are particular and identifiable, states of affairs. An agent aims or brings about a result through his actions, which are the means. They go on to argue that human life is evaluated and looked at in terms of a series of actions aiming at particular ends, which may in turn become means to other ends. It has been argued against Utilitarians that ends and means form a range or variety of relations between human actions and their ends. In life, each end achieved becomes a part of the total well-being or good of the agent and the total well-being is a series of ends spread over life time. The series is made up of distinct units, which only when taken together constitute the well-being.

The Utilitarian view is that an action is performed to bring about an event, which is an end and the action that brought it about is its means. They therefore assert that the goodness or badness, that is, the normative character of an action consists in their efficacy as means to an end. It is too obvious to say that to achieve an end there are different alternative means. Again, often an agent’s end may impinge on his some other end, in which case Utilitarians argue that the worth of an action can only be
evaluated in terms of benefits it yields. The Utilitarians, therefore, asserts that action is value neutral and has no intrinsic normative character of its own which is derived from an assessment of the agent's ends.

The principle of utility, as value in determining the worth of human beings, is that when rated as means, human beings are unequal. All human beings do not carry the same value some have greater worth compared to others. The unequal rating of men as more or less valuables depends on their efficiency, as means, in meeting the ends of other people. However, if human beings are treated as ends, not as means, this kind of rating simply does not apply. Not treating human beings as means but as ends, as beings whose own ends, that is, their desires and choices are to be respected, obviously does not bring in the calculus of efficacy.

The Utilitarians do not have any consideration of ultimate end as part of their scheme. A thing is said to be good only if it is shown to be a means to an end admitted to be good, that is, the ends are good as a matter of fact. From a reading of Mill it's not very clear whether he is asserting that pleasure or happiness is
good as an end or that pleasure and happiness is the only end. However, he is definitely arguing some things are to be treated as ends, which are then desired otherwise there will be nothing to desire. Hartland-Swann argues,

“...ends are...what things are desirable. The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things are only desirable as means to that end”.14

Mill is trying to say that happiness is desirable as an end and other things are desirable as a means to this end. Moore argues that Mill has failed to distinguish ‘end’ in the sense of what is desirable, from ‘end’ in the sense of what is desired. For him, desirable signifies that which ought or deserves to be desired, not that which is desired or possible to be desired. For Moore, people may desire bad things, and so what is desired is not necessarily desirable. Mill could defend himself by saying that it is not the desirable which is the good, but the desired. But Moore argues that if good was the desired, then there would be no problem in finding motivation for individuals to do good. Shaw argues,
“Whether happiness be or be not the end to which morality should be referred...to and end of some sort...the morality of actions depends on the consequences which they tend to produce, is the doctrine of rational persons of all schools; that the good or evil of those consequences is measured solely by pleasure and pain, is all of the doctrine of the school of utility, which is peculiar to it”.\textsuperscript{15}

For Bentham, reason and morality themselves must be made instrumental to the great end of promoting human happiness.\textsuperscript{16} He argues that happiness is the end justifying all means. Iyer disagrees and suggests that the maxim ‘end justifies the means’ may sometimes be harmful for the society. Iyer suggests that this formula should be taken as analogous to Machiavelli who argued that power never justifies all means, but merely that the gaining of power often involves committing some very nasty crimes.\textsuperscript{17} Flemming argues that if Kant is right in forbidding man to be treated entirely as a means to some ends, then,
“…teleology is in trouble. Egoism not only permits but requires that an agent use others for his own good. Utilitarianism does not at first seem so badly positioned, since it can use Bentham’s rule to give each person equal consideration in the utility calculus and then include among intrinsic goods whatever is thought valuable in persons”.

Moore, in his *Principia Ethica*, argues that Utilitarianism is contradictory since it fails to distinguish between actions promoting happiness, that is, a means to future happiness, and actions that promote happiness as an end in itself. Moore further explains that if each person’s happiness is a means to happiness for the greatest number of persons, then each person’s own happiness cannot be an end in itself which is held by Utilitarians.

According to Moore, if we consider pleasure as a means to an end implies that it is not an end in itself, then the consciousness of pleasure cannot be considered as an end in itself. The reason is that in order to be truly pleasurable, the consciousness of pleasure must be combined with consciousness of other things. Therefore, Moore argues,
“...pleasure alone is good as an end, since you imply that something else, something which is not present in all pleasures, is also good as an end. It is plain that if you say ‘colour alone is good as an end’, then you can give no possible reason for preferring one colour to another”.

Therefore, he argues that pleasure is the only thing at which we ought to aim, the only thing that is good as an end and sought for its own sake.

Utilitarianism, of all varieties, however, maintains that right actions are useful actions, good as means. For example, screwing down the thumbscrew is good or efficient way of giving pain, but its efficiency or utility for that purpose does not make it right. Right acts are acts which are useful, efficient, for good purposes or ends. Classical Utilitarianism, that is, Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick say that the only purpose which counts is the production of pleasure or happiness and the removal or prevention of pain or unhappiness. It is the only purpose which counts because pleasure and pain are the only things that are good and bad as ends, good and bad in themselves. Classical Utilitarianism or Hedonism holds that pleasure alone is good as
an end. The Ideal Utilitarians, like Moore, point out that other things besides pleasure, such as, virtue, love, knowledge, beauty are also good as ends. Both schools are Utilitarian because they both maintain that the only reason for an act to be right is its utility, its usefulness for producing results which are good in themselves.  

Marx argues that the theory of utility is true by definition only and thus as a theory does not really add anything meaningful or significant. For Marx, it needs to be investigated what sorts of things are good for the people, for which the stepping stone would be an understanding of what our nature, alienated under capitalism, really is. Moreover, he points out that Bentham fails to take account of the changing character of people, and hence the changing character of what is good for them. He criticises Utilitarianism because he believes that all important statements are contingent upon particular historical conditions. According to Marx, human nature is not static but dynamic, so the concept of a single utility for all humans is one-dimensional and not useful. He further criticises Utilitarians for denying that different things make different people happy and that
what promotes happiness changes over time. Marx argues that this approach of the Utilitarians goes against their entire project and therefore they should never deny the importance of investigations into what promotes utility.

The consequential or teleological views, on ‘ends-means’ relationship debate whether ‘end justifies the means’ has shown an inclination towards the maxim. However, despite the inclination they also present arguments pointing out the importance of means in attaining an end. Utilitarians try to show that only those means are permissible that attain ends are moral. Therefore, consequentialist view is that end justifies the means.

**Hegelian view**

The Deontological and Teleological views, explicitly or implicitly, assert that bad means cannot lead to a good end. However, Teleology does accept, at times, that nothing justifies a means except an end. Hegel sharply disagrees that ‘end justifies the means’ by arguing that the maxim has little value and is therefore, pointless. Hegel argues that it is simply pointless to say the end justifies or does not justify the means. For Hegel the
utterances are pointless for it is like saying that a planet is a planet, which is a tautology. Hegel insists that both terms must be analysed concretely and objectively in terms of the specific socio-historical context.\textsuperscript{22}

Knox highlights the Hegelian view that the maxim ‘end justifies the means’ is a tautology, since the means is nothing in itself but is always for the sake of an end, where the means, if they are truly so, has a purpose and worth.\textsuperscript{23} Hegel argues that the highest end is the state which is the embodiment of eternal, absolutely rational and substantive will of an individual, who in turn is duty bound to obey it. Hegel asserts that the individual realises his freedom only in carrying out the dictates of the state, the Hegelian end in itself, which is an expression of the Spirit or the Absolute. For Hegel the ends and means equation has little importance and is purely metaphysical in nature. His prescription of spiritualised end leaves it no role in the debate on morality of ends and means.\textsuperscript{24}
Gandhian View

For Gandhi ends and means are the two sides of the same coin which are inseparable. Pal points out Gandhi’s view that all ends are means, therefore all means are ends.\(^2\) Gandhi maintains that ahimsa or non-violence is the means and truth is the end. For him the definition of means demands that it must be that which is placed within our reach by the Creator. According to Gandhi ahimsa or non-violence is always within our reach and not the ends. Therefore argues Gandhi we should choose ahimsa or non-violence as our means, which shall lead to the truth. The relationship between ends and means is brought out by Gandhi on the analogy of the seed and a tree. In this sense he says,

“The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree”.\(^2\)

The seed is potentially a tree and the tree is the seed manifested. Consequently, this relation inheres between the potential and the actual, the latent and the manifest, the idea and the realised. So, Chapter – IV
means is ‘the end in process and the ideal in the making’.\textsuperscript{125} Gandhi argues,

“They say ‘means are after all means’; I would say ‘means are after all everything. As the means so the end. The creator has given us control (and that too very limited) over means, none over the end. Realization of the goal is in exact proportion to that of the means. This is a proposition that admits of no exception’.\textsuperscript{28}

Gandhi says that we always have control over the means but not over the end.\textsuperscript{29} But, our progress towards the goal will be in exact proportion to the purity of our means.\textsuperscript{30} Gandhi goes on to emphasise by saying,

“For me it is enough to know the means”.\textsuperscript{31}

In the Gandhian thought there is an emphasis on continuity of means and ends, and treatment of means as end-creating. In Gandhian perspective Bondurant writes,
“Means and ends in…Satyagraha is distinguishable only temporally. Both means and ends partake of a continuous process. The means precede the end in time; but there can be no question of moral priority. Truth is inseparable from non-violence, the method of achieving and clinging to the truth is non-violence. Non-violence becomes both the means and the end, and the terms become convertible”.\textsuperscript{32}

Satyagraha, for Gandhi, is to fight evil and change the system based on evil. Gandhi believes that the means and ends are inseparably connected and he is keen on that the means used should in no way detract from the moral character of one’s end. Hence, his insistence that we should be taking moral stand on the means adopted by us. Gandhi’s effort is to give a concrete expression in the form of Satyagraha to the principle of moral approximation of the ends and the means.\textsuperscript{33}

From Gandhian perspective we may assume that Marxists separate out the means from the ends and hold fast to the maxim ‘end justifies the means’, whereas, as we have said earlier, Gandhi believed that there is a continuum of ends and means.

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Ends attained depend directly on the means employed. As pointed out in the second chapter of this thesis for Dewey ends are literally endless; there is a ‘means-ends-means’ series extended indefinitely. In similar vein political independence is not an absolute end for Gandhi, but only a tentative end which later on is to become a means for realising a host of other social, moral and spiritual ends.34

Gandhi does not permit and condone any violent means in any sphere of life. He insists that means should not only be non-violent but also be pure as we pointed out above. He considers purity to be the essential quality of means. For him, means become pernicious and valueless if it is devoid of purity just as a man loses everything if he loses character. Gandhi, known as the apostle of truth, asserted that an impure means can never attain truth for it extinguishes its vitality in the image of untruth and violence. Gandhi based his argument on ethical purity of means especially the purity of motivation underlying non-violent action.

Gandhi while appreciating the Marxists objective of a classless society, free from exploitation of man by man, nevertheless claimed to be the staunchest opponent of their
method of violence, intrigues, emphasis on class conflict and so on. Gandhi differentiates between ‘truth’ and ‘Truth’ the latter being an absolute. Gandhi declares Truth as an absolute end and Non-violence as an absolute means but he adhered to ‘reasonableness’ as absolute in practice and insisted on no compromise on this under any condition.

The preference for non-violent means for Gandhi had an ethical and pragmatic ground. The condemnation of violent means from moral standpoint is based on the understanding that violence propagates violence. He argued that violent means degrade an individual and a nation and give birth to an endless series of future bloodshed and degradation. In short, Gandhi lays stress on non-violence being the best means of establishing a good end. For him, through violent means the opponent is oppressed and even at times annihilated. Gandhi was adamant that man must not destroy what he cannot create.\(^{35}\) However, he did not condemn violence under all circumstances or conditions, for him violent means are justified by the end in rare cases where it safeguards the magnificence of morality and the dignity of

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human being. Marx and Gandhi have in common the ideal of restoring human dignity and enhancing opportunities.

Gandhi’s pragmatic attitudes make him careful about the adoption of violent means because of practical difficulties it creates. An end achieved through violent means returns violent in an un-ending chain. Therefore, Gandhi insisted that for a permanent and lasting impact on social life non-violent means are more appropriate than the violent ones. Therefore for him non-violent means, attributes like compromise, persuasion, etc., are more fruitful and lasting than violent means.

Gandhi rejects the maxim that ‘end justifies the means’ and asserts that moral means are almost an end in itself because virtue is its own reward. He opposes this maxim and emphasises that our end itself must be high and pure but the means that we employ to achieve that end must be equally high and pure.\(^{36}\)

In Gandhi ethical Truth is perfection or liberation or moksa and in politics it takes the shape of Swaraj or freedom. In this context Gandhi says,

“For me…Ahimsa comes before Swaraj”.\(^{37}\)

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Gandhi asserts that Swaraj (self-rule) is established by non-violent means, which is differing from that established by armed rebellion. Gandhi clearly understands that means are embedded in and affect the ends. Gandhi in his explications assumes that every human being in the existing social, economic, political and moral conditions is capable of showing a harmony and balance. He therefore sounded ‘utopian’ and ‘romanticist’ in his advocacy of non-violence.

Gandhi rejects the rigid dichotomy between ends and means and in his extreme moral preoccupation with the means to the extent that the ends provide the standard of assessment. In this sense, Louis Fischer comments,

“Means were all to him. Ends never arrive, for all ends are means to further ends which are again means”. 38

For Marxists means are given or implied in the objective situation, that is, end itself. We have pointed out in the second chapter of this thesis that there is no duality in dialectical materialism and no separability between ends and means, that is,
there is a continuity of ends and means in Marxism. Gandhi firmly asserts that there is a continuity of ends and means and argues,

“There is no wall of separation between means and ends.”

Marx felt that there is a necessity of having a classless society free of exploitation, fragmentation and alienation, to which he lent the force of ‘ends’ to justify the ‘means’, Gandhi while also agreeing for a society free from exploitation, manifests the desirability of caring for the purity of means above other considerations.

Gandhi’s view on the question of ends and means, on the one hand, hinges on rigidity about the concept of social progress, since the dynamics of social change sometimes demand unorthodox methods, in such instances all that matters is the rightness of the ends. On the other hand, under the cover of the maxim ‘end justifies the means’ every conceivable type of violence and aggression is pleaded to be accepted. Gandhi tried to show that if all violence and aggression is accepted as falling under the maxim ‘end justifies the means’ then the spiritual foundations of human life are being and will be destroyed and the
very survival of humanity as a whole is under threat. Gandhi, and other humanists, like Aldous Huxley and Gilbert Murray, felt that an end which either demands or justifies an unworthy means cannot be good because, as Naravane says,

“…the dust that soils the means also soils the end.”

Gandhi points out that the moral discipline is the most important means of social construction. The content of the ethical discipline will also determine the structure of all spheres of life, including politics. The search for truth, says Gandhi, means ceaseless effort for progress and refinement in all spheres of life. For Gandhi, this truth can be realised only by means of ahimsa, any truth without non-violence is not truth but untruth.

According to Gandhi violent means instead of helping us to advance on the path of progress lead us to regard human beings as means rather than ends. Gandhi asserts that good means alone can lead us to lasting peace and progress.

Gandhi accuses the bourgeois morality of justifying violence and use of force by its elite. For Gandhi the moral worth of the means used is to be evaluated by its effect on human character and personality. He argued that if the means used are
noble then there will be an increase in brotherhood and fellow-feeling and will release the suppressed capacities of the human spirit for creative freedom and spontaneity.

According to Gandhi, truth is the supreme common end for all men but its content cannot be known in advance. He like ancient Greeks admits that the truth refers to the highest human activity rather than an imposed and predetermined end. Gandhi develops his social and political ethics in terms of a theory of action under which all our thinking and activity can be corrected and justified by reference to truth, which is end in itself.

From the Gandhian perspective, the maxim that any means can be justified by the attained end is not tenable from the ethical standpoint. Gandhi feels that there is requirement of harmonising inner conflict of the relation between ends and means on the basis of moral approximation. However, his technique of moral approximation of ends and means debate has importance in the theoretical perspective which may be adopted in human thought and action.

Gandhi does not accept the maxim ‘end justifies the means’ since his emphasis is on high and pure ends and requires
means employed to achieve the end to be equally high and pure. He argues that in justifying any end, the means should be pure and moral and thereby laying emphasis on means and not on ends. Gandhi supports Marxists view of a society free from class domination and exploitation while opposing violent or immoral means to attain that end. However, it is interesting to note without going into details that Gandhi prescribes violent means or justifies it in rare of the rare cases in order to safeguard the majesty of morality and the dignity on human beings.

**Marxists view**

The left Hegelians, Marx and Engels, in contradistinction to Hegel argue that consciousness and thought are human products. They reject the whole spiritual edifice constructed by Hegel and assert the material perceptual universe as the only reality. Our consciousness and thinking may be thought by liberals as super sensuouos but in fact are the product of our material bodily organ, the brain. According to Marxists matter is not a product of mind but mind is the product of matter.\(^{42}\)
Marx inherited or derived from the Hegelian dialectics, as it appears and is explicated by Hegel in developing the master and slave relationship. The Marxist heuristics involve class struggle and a social will to power. The Marxists argue that societies are divided into classes where there are no formally declared universal moral values, but only class moralities, which serve the interest of one class or the other. Afansyev represents the Marxist argument as,

“In a society divided into antagonistic classes there exist the morality of the exploited, the morality of the ruling class prevailing. Under slavery, the morality of the slave owners dominated in the feudal society, the morality of the feudal lords and in bourgeoisie society, the morality of the capitalists. Opposite to them stood the moral standards and principles of slaves, peasants and proletarians. In society at present, two moralities are pitted against each other communist and bourgeois. Bourgeois morality plays a reactionary role in society’s development. Its main social
aims are to preserve private property and exploitation, the keystone of capitalism”. ④³

Selsam finds two postulates in a reading of Marxism. First, the Marxian Socialism is to free man from exploitative relations between men, including as is the case under Capitalism. ④⁴ Secondly, socialism both in its ends and means is a struggle to realise freedom. Marxists argue that, there are means that ensure ends and there are means, although temporarily expedient, that endanger the ends. ④⁵ However, there has been a raging controversy on whether such an end is attainable without violating fundamental standards concerning means. Therefore, the dilemma crops up that either there has to be re-evaluation of ends or there is a change in the standards of acceptable means or to locate the proper means by which an end can be achieved.

Marxists highlight the liberal view that human beings are considered to be mere means and other things as ends, such as commodities, profits, institutions etc. Marx asserts that man should always be considered to be an end in himself and never as a means to an end, irrespective of whether it is in relation to

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state, class or nation. According to Marx, the freedom and
dignity of human beings are first and foremost of all human
values. The human personality and its spiritual quality cannot be
developed without developing man as a social being. The existing
social conditions are created which in turn create conditions in
the society so that man can become fully aware of his own
capabilities and aptitudes. For Marx, man on the basis of his own
creative energies is trying to free himself from exploitation,
oppression and alienation of all kinds of social boundation and
create human unity. It is to be kept in mind that Marx prescribed
socialistic order in order to change the existing capitalist system
based on violence, hatred, class war, for the purpose of
establishing social equality. According to Marxists socialism is not
only an end but also a means for the man to develop and attain
emancipation. Althusser goes on to extend this thesis in terms
of theory and practice. For him,

“Theoretical practice produces knowledge which can then
figure as means that will serve the ends of a technical
practice. Any technical practice is defined by its ends: such

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Marx and Engels have pointed out with regard to theoretical and practical or technical knowledge as,

“…they [bourgeoisie] reject all political and especially all revolutionary action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel…

“They [workers] openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions”. 48

On the maxim ‘end justifies the means’ Trotsky observes and argues from the Marxists perspective

“…do lying and violence ‘in themselves’ warrant condemnation? Of course, even as does the class society which generates them. A society without social contradictions will naturally be a society without lies and violence. However, there is no way of building a bridge to that society saves by revolutionary, that is, violent means.

The revolution itself is a product of class society and of Chapter – IV
necessity bears its traits. From the point of view of 'eternal truths' revolution is of course 'anti-moral'. But this merely means that idealist morality is counter-revolutionary, that is, in the service of the exploiters".  

Marx remarks that revolutionary violence serves the role of "…midwife of the old society grown pregnant with a new one".  

However, Goldman disillusioned with the Marxist approach remarks, "…no revolution can ever succeed as a factor of liberation unless the means used to further it be identical in spirit and tendency with the purpose to be achieved."  

Lukes in disagreement, points out that means have no moral weight and do not enter into the moral scales, where only the purpose counts.  

In keeping with this Engels argues, "Setting the moral question aside, as a revolutionary I welcome any means – both the most violent one and the seemingly most restrained – that will lead to the end".  

Most liberals have condemned the use of violence deeming it as immoral means to an end. However, Singer does not agree with the statement and suggests that the argument is one sided, and
therefore, asserts that the condemnation is absolutely wrong. According to Singer such an argument only shows that no consequence is taken into account of the evil the revolutionaries are trying to stop. Singer goes on to point out that if violent means are the only way of changing the conditions, as Engels claims, then those who opposed the use of violent means would be responsible for the perpetuation of conditions. However, Engels had argued,

"...any means that leads to the ends suits me as a revolutionary, whether it is the most violent or that which appears to be most peaceable".

The above quote clearly demonstrates that the Marxists do not emphasise violent means to achieve the end but are willing to adopt peaceful means so long it leads to the desired end which is revolutionary and therefore emancipatory. Some philosophers have accused Marxism of being a form or variation of Machiavellianism in holding the maxim ‘end justifies the means’.

The Marxists justify their adherence to the maxim ‘end justifies the means’ in terms of welfare and emancipation of the masses. It is a misnomer to suggest that the Marxists think of
individuals as a means for the community, which is composed of other individuals. The Marxists can be accused of not understanding the individual as a means for the community in the sense of it being an entity over and above all individuals. Ewing points out the Marxists view,

“...State as an entity over and above the individual citizens to which entity the latter is regarded as mere means...But it would...be unfair to look on the Communists as regarding the individual as in this sense a mere means either to the State or to the class or party”.

Marxists argue that violent means may result in the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which is then justified. For Marxists action is to be judged solely by the motive involved. In other words, if the motive is good, the action is justifiable whatever might be the means. As far as the Marxists are concerned the means adopted by them to achieve socialism are restricted to what is provided by capitalism. The contention, therefore, is that it is capitalism which is responsible for the means since it controls the whole apparatus of the state.

If political freedom is the end then it is also a means to achieve economic freedom. In this sense, Korsch rightly points
out the Marxists view that socialism is, both in its end and in its
means, a struggle for realising freedom.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, ends and means
are convertible terms and interconnected. The means are ends in
the making, which are determined and conditioned by the end.

The Marxists insist that on choosing the end one also
chooses simultaneously the means. The means are chosen
because they are appropriate and suitable to the ends to be
achieved. One cannot employ just any means to secure a specific
end, the effectiveness of the means to secure the end is
considered, and otherwise it ceases to be the means. For
example, if you want to go to Kolkata to see your ailing mother
you do not purchase a plane ticket for London. The liberals argue
as if the Marxists are talking about all ends in the same manner,
which is not the case. The Marxists favour the maxim ‘end
justifies the means’ and argue that to attain a particular end, that
is, the change of social relations, we can adopt any means
whether it is moral or non-moral, violent or non-violent, and there
is no predetermined moral rules, as all such rules serve the
interest of some group.

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After the historical origin of the controversy on the maxim ‘end justifies the means’, as found in Machiavelli and Jesuits as is pointed out in the second chapter of this thesis, the debate regenerated in modern period as a controversy between Deontology and Teleology or between Utilitarian and Kantian principles. However, the two theories boil down to the same principle of analysis and only at times their emphasis changes. Marxists have argued against these two theories and their presentation has been interpreted by the adherents of these two theories as favouring the maxim ‘end justifies the means’. Gandhi, too, sometimes or under very special or exceptional circumstances accept the Marxists view but otherwise he is not a supporter of the maxim ‘end justifies the means’.

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