CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

In the present study an attempt has been made to examine the views of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Viśistādvaita and Dvaita regarding three metaphysical relations, viz., substance-attribute, whole-part and cause-effect and cognitive relation under the epistemological category, with a view to investigate the following issues.

1. The extent to which the views of these systems regarding the three metaphysical relations reflect and justify their metaphysical realism.

2. The inter-relations, if any, among the views regarding different metaphysical relations.

3. The degree to which the views offered regarding cognitive relation imply epistemological realism.

4. The relation, if any, between the metaphysical and epistemological views of these systems.

5. The possible sources of variation in the nature of the analysis offered by systems sharing the same metaphysical and epistemological relations.

6. Points of similarity and difference between the approach adopted by Western and Indian realistic systems towards problems of common philosophical interest.
The implications of the views of each system with reference to these questions which have been pointed out in the course of the discussion in the preceding chapters are presented in this chapter.

3.1. Metaphysical relations and metaphysical realism

Realism on the metaphysical level involves a belief that there is some reality that is not of the nature of mind. Most realists go further and assert that all reality including persons is a complex or a product of what is essentially non-mental, impersonal and unconscious. The two essential postulates of realism are: (1) There is a mindless reality and (2) the mindless reality produces what is called mind.¹

Among the three relations studied, an explicit discussion on these issues is found in the analysis of substance-attribute relation. All the four systems maintain that the empirical universe can be reduced to a finite number of categories. Variations are found in the number and nature of ultimate categories assumed by each system. Substance and attribute constitute two of the ultimate categories according to all the systems excepting Sāṁkhya. Extensive discussion regarding the nature of these terms, the nature of the relation between the two at the ontological as well as the empirical level is found in all the systems. The terms are defined broadly in similar lines by all, but the relation between the two is conceived and explained differently by each system.
A study of the entities identified as ultimate categories and the classification of substances and attributes offered by each system reveals that reality, for these systems, involves both material and mental elements. Both are described as equally significant metaphysical principles. It is maintained that matter can be reduced to or explained in terms of the other. An explicit formulation of this proposition is found in the prakrti-sunya dualism postulated by Sankhya. The existence of non-mental reality, it can be said, is a primary postulate of all the systems.

Further, we find that while the importance of both the material and mental dimensions is recognized, primacy is attributed to the material rather than the mental dimension. This is suggested by the categorization of consciousness as an attribute which, by definition, requires a substratum. It is held to be an attribute of one of the substances, viz., the self. It may, therefore, be said that though these systems do not hold that mind is a product of matter as suggested by the second postulate of metaphysical realism, the mental dimension is held to be dependent on a substantive principle.

The discussions on whole-part and cause-effect relations also reflect the realistic bias of these systems. All the systems maintain that the whole is an entity ontologically distinct from its parts. This proposition plays a significant
role in the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika metaphysics as it is intended to reinforce the theory of substance advocated by the system.

The notion of cause becomes relevant in the analysis of the phenomenon of change. Realism involves the attribution of reality to all the dimensions of experience including change. All the four systems admit the metaphysical significance of the notion of cause. Various questions involve in the principle of causation as an explanatory principle are examined by all the systems. These include the implications of the notions of cause, types of cause, relation between cause and effect, etc.

The major part of the analysis offered by these systems concerns the relation between material cause and effect. While recognising that change involves elements of continuity as well as novelty, each system explains the emergence of effect differently. The explanations offered range from the theory of non-existent effect (asatkārya-vāda) of Nyāya-Vaiśeśika, through the theory of existent non-existent effect (sada-asatkārya-vāda) of Dvaita to the theory of existent effect (asatkārya-vāda) of Visistadvaita and Saṅkhyā. Underlying all these variations, however, we find a recognition of the possibility of change in a real sense, reflecting the realistic bias of these systems.

Thus the realistic orientation of these systems is reflected in and justified by, their analysis of the three metaphysical relations, viz., substance-attribute, whole-part and cause-effect.
6.2. Inter-relations among the different metaphysical relations

Apparently each of the three relations involves different kinds of questions. The conceptions of 'substance', 'attribute', 'whole' and 'part' deal with the static dimension of the world, while 'cause' and 'effect' emphasise the dynamic dimension of the universe. The interrelated nature of these conceptions, which is an expression of the interrelated nature of the phenomena designated by these terms, has already been pointed out. The views of these systems regarding the three metaphysical relations also reflect their interdependence.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views regarding substance-attribute relation are supported by its theory of the distinct reality of the whole. The Saṅkhya theory, by attributing novelty and distinctiveness to the effect, affirms the distinct reality of substance. Saṅkhya recognises the importance of both the static and dynamic dimensions of the empirical world, but concentrates on the analysis of the dynamic aspect. Viśiṣṭādvaṅga views on the three relations are also inter-related.

Phenomena interpreted in the substance-attribute framework, Viśiṣṭādvaṅga maintains, also admit of an analysis in the whole-part framework. For the Viśiṣṭādvaṅga, cause and effect denote different levels of existence of the same entity. Dvaita adopts a moderate standpoint regarding all the three relations. Dvaita holds that the substance and attribute are
inseparable, but admit of distinction due to the power of viséga. Whole is held to be distinct but inseparable from the parts. According to Dvaita, effect is non-existent in its specific form but existent in the form of cause.

6.3. Cognitive relation and epistemological realism

The primary postulates of epistemological realism are the existential independence of the objects of experience and the cognitive process being a process of discovery. The former postulate, viz., the existential independence of the objects, is implicit in the distinction between the mental and material dimensions advocated by all the systems. The same idea is reiterated in their discussion on cognitive relation. All the systems maintain that cognitive experience, by definition, presupposes the distinction between the subject and the object. Various issues relating to the process of cognition like the nature of the subject, the conditions of knowledge which include, the elements involved in the process of cognition like the sense organs, the types of contacts involved, types of perception, the nature of cognitive act, etc., have been discussed elaborately by all the systems. It is necessary to examine the manner in which the views of these systems on these questions explain the possibility of knowledge, in the context of the existential independence between the subject and the object, and also establish that the cognitive process reveals the object without any distortion.
Among the four systems, Śākhya encounters distinctive problems at the epistemological level in view of the absolute dualism between mind and matter advocated at the metaphysical level. The attempts made by the Śākhya thinkers to resolve the problems and contradictions that arise due to such a dualism have not been successful. In spite of these difficulties, the system retains its realistic nature as it postulates the ontological independence of the objective dimension of experience.

The other three systems define the subject as a substance, viz., self characterised by the attribute of sentience. This implies that the subject is by nature capable of apprehending entities other than itself. While granting the existential independence of the object, these systems hold that such an independence does not preclude the possibility of being apprehended by a conscious entity. Further, there is no ontological break; as the subject is also included under the category of substance.

The discussion on the conditions under which cognition becomes possible reveals a recognition of the complex nature of the cognitive process, and attempts are made to account for the various elements involved in the cognitive experience satisfactorily by all the systems. The instruments of cognition, viz., the sense organs are conceived on broadly similar lines by all the systems with some minor differences.
between the different systems. Same is true of the means of cognition recognised by these systems. The nature of perceptual process is the same in all these systems. But the classification of perceptual contact offered by the Nyāya is not accepted by the other systems. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika distinction between the indeterminate and determinate perception is also not admitted by the other systems, though some difference between two stages of perception is postulated by all others also. Cognition is defined as an attribute of the self—a contingent attribute according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but a permanent attribute according to others. In the context of the Sāṅkhya metaphysics, cognition is neither a substance nor an attribute, but an empirical event. A study of the cognitive process, as delineated by these systems, reveals that in spite of the variations between the systems all of them attempt to develop a theory that would justify the description of the process as a process of discovery, a necessary postulate of realism.

The major difficulty encountered by the realist in establishing this proposition originates in some cognitions failing to reveal the real nature of the object consistent with their realistic orientation. All the four systems recognise the possibility of some cognitions being erroneous. But each system tries to explain the occurrence of such cognitions without denying the valid nature of cognitions in general.
Visistādvaite maintains that all cognitions are valid, but admits that some cognitions fail to reveal all the aspects of the object cognised, and are, therefore, found inadequate. The other three systems recognise that there is an element of error in such cognitions but account for it differently. The various theories offered in this regard, viz., the anyathākhyāti of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the saḍasaṭkhyāti of Sāṅkhya and Dvaita, concentrate on specifying the ontological status of the object of erroneous cognition and fail to explain the possibility of erroneous cognition satisfactorily. In spite of the limitations of the theories advocated by these systems, the recognition of the possibility of erroneous cognition, as has been pointed out earlier, reflects the objective determination of cognition in general.

6.4. Metaphysics and epistemology

It is difficult to describe precisely the nature of the relationship between metaphysics and epistemology in general. The problems are of more serious nature in the case of the closely organised Indian systems, whose boundaries have been clearly defined and the loose ends tied together fairly well during centuries of historical development. It may, however, be said that all the systems attempt to develop a philosophical theory which does not explicitly contradict ordinary experiences. Examining the Nyāya system in this regard, Mohanty contends that the Nyāya attempted to exhibit its ontological
theories as implicants of ordinary experience and usage and compatible with ordinary practice. "This is not to say," he remarks, "that the ontological framework was derived from ordinary experience, but the system tried to validate the framework perhaps developed a priori by reference to ordinary experience and usage." 3 Mohanty draws attention to the primary role played by the metaphysics of a system in determining the other aspects of its philosophical theory. In the present context, it implies that the epistemology of a philosophical system does not determine, but is determined by, the metaphysics of the system.

Mohanty's observation on the Nyāya system is applicable to other systems as well, as is revealed by the epistemological observations of these systems. Variations in the nature of epistemological analysis offered by each system seems to be related to the differences at the level of metaphysical analysis. The contingent nature of the association between consciousness and self in Nyāya-Vaisēsika epistemology is a reflection of the contingent nature of the relation between substance and attribute in general, advocated by the system. The contention of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Advaita consciousness is a permanent attribute of the self admits of a similar explanation. The absolute dualism between mind and matter postulated by Saṅkhyā at the metaphysical level involves the systems in many contradictions at the epistemological level. The influence of metaphysics is also evident
in many other aspects of epistemological analysis like the kind of perceptual contacts recognised by each system, the stages of perception admitted, the explanation given for validity and invalidity of cognition, the description of the cognitive act, etc.

6.5. Factors responsible for variations between the four systems

The foregoing discussion deals with issues on which all the four systems are in agreement. But our analysis of the different relations reveals that though all the systems adopt a similar approach to reality and experience, each system introduces certain distinctive entities, principles and interpretations. It is necessary to identify the factors responsible for these variations.

Differences in the interpretations offered regarding the same phenomena may arise due to differences in the elements emphasised, the kind of questions posed, the presuppositions each theory starts with, etc. In the case of the relations studied here, we find that all the systems emphasise the same elements and raise similar questions. But significant differences are found in the basic postulates of the metaphysical scheme advocated by each system, though all of them adopt a realistic approach. Our discussion in the previous chapters has brought out the areas in which these differences at the level of ultimate postulates have resulted in variations in the analysis offered regarding the same relation.
In the case of substance-attribute relation differences are found in the number and nature of entities identified as ultimate categories, ultimate substances, conceptions regarding the nature of relation between substance and attribute, etc. These variations are derived from the differences at the level of metaphysical postulates. The view of the Visistâdvdaitin that the same entity can be a substance as well as an attribute is a necessary corollary to his view that the prakrti and selves which are substances in their own right are also attributes of Brahman, the ultimate substantive principle. Further, some of the entities designated as substances and attributes by these systems are products of their theological beliefs.

Regarding the relation between substance and attribute, Nyâya-Vaiśeṣika, consistent with its pluralistic interpretation of reality, postulates the independent existence of both the relata and explains their empirical inseparability with the help of a third principle. An admission of such a position on the part of Visistâdvdaita would result in prakrti and selves, defined as attributes of Brahman becoming distinct from and by implication independent of Brahman, a pluralistic position not acceptable to Visistâdvdaita. Visistâdvdaita, therefore, maintains that substance and attributes are inseparably associated both at the empirical and metaphysical level. Dvaita contends that attributes are not metaphysically separate from the substance and attempts to explain the possibility of
differentiation with the help of notion of Viśesa. The Dvaita account is intended to account for both empirical usage and the nature of the relation between substance and attributes in the case of Brahman and His attributes.

The analysis of whole-part relation is also influenced by the metaphysical postulates advocated by each system. The Nyāya-Vaiśesika contention that the wholes are distinct entities manifesting properties not found in the parts serves to bridge the ontological gap between the measureless atoms and the concrete objects of experience. It also reinforces the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory of substance. The Viśistādvaitin's views on the whole-part relation are influenced by his contention that Brahman is a whole with prakṛti and selves constituting its parts. The whole-part relation does not play any significant role in the metaphysics of Śāṅkhyā and Dvaita systems, and is not discussed extensively by either of the two systems.

The differences found in the analysis of cause-effect relation also admit of a similar explanation. While all the four systems admit the relevance of the distinction between material and efficient causes at the empirical level, Viśistādvaita holds that the same principle functions both as a material and efficient cause at the ultimate level. Such a position becomes necessary in view of the Viśistādvaita...
conception of ultimate reality. The other systems distinguish between the two at the ultimate level also.

The variations found in the theories offered regarding the relation between material cause and its effect become meaningful in terms of the role played by these theories in the metaphysical scheme advocated by each system. All the systems postulate certain entities as the ultimate material causes, underlying the diverse phenomenal entities that are the objects of empirical experience. The causal theory advocated by each system has to explain the transition from the level of ultimate entities to that of the objects of empirical experience in a consistent manner. The atomic theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika requires that the effect possess features not found in the cause in order to explain the measureless atoms, producing the concrete objects of experience. Such a change is possible in the framework of the asatkārya theory. Sāṅkhya utilises the satkārya theory to justify the postulation of an incalculable entity as the underlying cause of the empirical world as well as to infer the ontological nature of this ultimate principle. The attribution of material causality to the unchangeable Brahman becomes valid in the context of the causal theory advocated by Viśistādvaita. The Dvaita theory of sadasatkārya provides an explanation for prakṛti and other eternal entities manifesting features not apprehended at the level of cause at the level of effect.
The relations between the metaphysical scheme advocated and the epistemological observations of these systems have already been pointed out.

The foregoing observations indicate that the variations in the analysis offered regarding the same phenomena, by systems sharing a common metaphysical and epistemological orientation are related to a difference in the metaphysical postulates advocated by each system.

6.6. Points of similarity and difference between Western and Indian realism.

The present study also highlights some of the points of agreement and difference between Western and Indian realism. It should be remembered at the outset that Western realism is primarily concerned with epistemological issues, though metaphysical issues have also been dealt with. The Indian realistic systems, on the other hand, find metaphysical and epistemological questions equally significant. Further, as already pointed out, between metaphysics and epistemology metaphysics seems to determine, rather than be determined by epistemology in most Indian philosophical systems. The similarities and differences between the views of Western realists and Indian realists on the various aspects of the relations studied here are to be understood in the context of this difference between the two traditions.
In the context of the empiricist criticisms against the notion of substance, the New Realist denies the reality of substance on the ground that such an admission is contradictory to a realistic interpretation of experience. But the New Realistic interpretation, while emphasizing the variety and diversity apprehended in the empirical world, fails to account for the experience of certain collections of attributes as unitary entities, which continue to function with certain distinctive traits. The Critical Realist realizing the importance of this dimension of experience contends that experience justifies the assumption of an underlying substance. While admitting the contentions of the empiricist that the substance is not perceived, he maintains that the substance is intuited through the datum, which constitutes the content of cognition. In spite of their differences, both New Realists and Critical Realists seem to assign priority to the attributive dimension of experience at the cost of the substantive dimension. The Indian realistic systems go a step beyond the position advocated by the critical realist. They contend that substance is as much an object of direct apprehension as the attributes that characterize it. Further, unlike the Western realists, Indian realists attribute priority to substances rather than to attributes, when the relative importance of the two is evaluated.
Extensive discussion regarding different types of wholes, the elements constituting them, the nature of the relation among these elements, etc., it is found in the New Realist literature. The primary motive underlying the discussion is to establish the external nature of the relation among the elements constituting different types of wholes. No explicit discussion on this question is found in the Critical Realist literature. The Indian realistic systems, on the other hand, are concerned with establishing the distinctive reality of the whole. But the reasons underlying the advocacy of such a position, varies from system to system.

The metaphysical importance of the notion of cause is revealed by the fact that both Western and Indian realists maintain that experience justifies the classification of certain sequences as causal and contend that the causal notion is an integral part of any satisfactory entological theory. The strategy adopted by the Indian realists to counter the objections raised by the empiricists against the postulation of a necessary connection between cause and effect, particularly in the case of material cause has already been pointed out. Many thinkers have drawn attention to the fact that while the Western analysis on cause is primarily concerned with the relation between efficient cause and effect, the
Indian systems are mainly concerned with the relation between material cause and effect. The causal theories advocated by the Indian systems have to account for change not only at the empirical level, but at the level of ultimate cause or first cause as well. This explains the preoccupation of these systems with the relationship between material cause and effect. The present study also reveals that though material cause has been the focal point of interest, other problems involved in causal analysis have also been recognised.

Any thinker advocating epistemological realism has to resolve certain problems. The problems include, the need to specify the process whereby the gap between the subject and the object implied by the existential independence of the object is transcended during the cognitive act, and the reconciling of the view that cognitive process is a process of discovery with the causal theories of perception and the possibility of erroneous experience.

We find significant differences between the approaches adopted by Western and Indian realistic schools to resolve these problems. The New Realist advocates a theory of direct perception, epistemological monism, and attributes objective reality even to the contents of erroneous perception. In the context of his conception of a neutral entity as the ultimate ontological entity, the subject-object dichotomy does not involve any ontological gap. Recognising the limitations of
the New Realistic position, Critical Realism advocates a three dimensional interpretation of cognition, epistemological dualism, and a representative theory of perception. The Critical Realists contend that erroneous cognitions are possible in the above framework. In spite of these modifications, the Critical Realist epistemology also suffers from serious limitations.

Both New Realism and Critical Realism attempt to establish realism against the objections raised by empiricism without denying the validity of the epistemological propositions advocated by the empiricist. The Indian realists adopt a different strategy. While criticising the distinction between the subject and the object, they maintain that this does not necessarily imply an ontological gap between the two, necessitating a third term to bridge the gap. They contend that the subject has the potential to transcend this distinction and apprehend the object. The existence of such a capacity on the part of the subject, they argue, does not negate the ontological independence of either the subject or the object. Some further Indian systems include the subject and the objects of experience under the same ontological category, viz., the category of substance.

Like the Critical Realists, the Indian realistic systems also admit the reality of the erroneous cognitions and attempt to explain the possibility of such cognitions without denying
the validity of cognitions in general. As already pointed out, the recognition of erroneous cognitions does not contradict, but reinforces the true nature of cognitions in general.

A comparative analysis of the views of Western and Indian realists regarding the relations studied here, reveals that in spite of certain significant differences the Indian realists adopt a position broadly similar to that of the Critical Realist. It may be said that the analysis offered by these realistic systems of India is free from some of the limitations found in the critical realist analysis, as these systems deny the validity of some of the propositions advocated by the empirist epistemology and adopt a different set of initial premises.

It will be proper to conclude our comparative study with a brief examination of the extent to which the Indian systems have been successful in resolving some of the difficulties encountered in the analysis of these relations. It was pointed out earlier that while part of the difficulties are due to the complex nature of the phenomena being analysed, the rest originate in the way the questions are posed. These observations are applicable to the analysis offered by the Indian systems also. Further, the problems are of a more complex nature in the case of Indian systems. Apart from empirical considerations, the views of these systems
are influenced by their metaphysical presuppositions also. As a consequence, though, the Indian systems succeed in resolving and avoiding some of the problems encountered by the Western realists, the benefits derived thereby are lost in their attempts to accommodate the metaphysical postulates.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

FOOTNOTES


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


CHAPTER II

SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE RELATION

FOOT NOTES:

2. Parker, op. cit., p.46.
5. Ibid., p.37.
6. op.cit., p.48.
7. Ibid.
12. op.cit., p.352.

15. Ibid.


17. op. cit., p.353.

18. E. Mach cited in The Philosophy of Science Ed.

19. op. cit., p.179.

20. op. cit., p.176.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.


24. Ibid., p.100.


26. T.W. Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism,

27. Ibid., p.100.

28. Ibid., Ch.1., p.7.


31. op. cit., p.73.

32. Ibid., pp.67-71.

33. op. cit., p.183.

34. Dravyagunadharmamâyavisaharaväyabhävaḥsaptapadärtaḥ,

35. p.2.
39. Ibid.
41. See D.N. Shastri, op. cit., Chapter VI.
42. Ibid., p. 181.
43. V. Bh. on U.S., p. 134.
44. V. Bh. on U.S., p. 173.
45. Ibid., p. 173.
46. Supra, Chap. III, p. 10.
49. F.B. p. 7.
50. Patilal, op. cit., p. 66.
51. The independence of the substance is implied by the fact that it is subject to inherent causation, see Myers, op. cit., p. 513.
53. T.S. p. 3
54. V.S. I.1.16.
55. P.B. p.80.
56. T.C. p.5.
58. op. cit., p.284.
62. Ibid., pt.50-51.
63. Ibid., p.51.
64. V.B. I.2.7.
65. See P.B. Shastri; op. cit., p.289-291.
66. T.B. on T.C. p-4.
68. F.B. p.171.
69. Ibid.
70. Cattā is attributed only to substance, attribute and action. V.S.I.1.2.7.
72. Ibid., p.174.
78. Kurthi, op. cit., p. 149.
74. Kārika 2, S.K.
75. Iibi.
76. Saurāṇyaśāstacupalabhāh nāabhāvat, kāryastacupalabhāh. 
Kārika 8, S.K.
77. Karṇapāthaccha satkāryam. Kārika 9, S.K.
77. Trīguṇārtavicch, Kārika 11; Kārika 12 and 13.
79. S. R. Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy in relation to other 
systems of Indian Thought, Calcutta: University of Calcutta: 
1933, p.126.
80. Iibi., p.126
81. Iibi.
82. C. D bitrate, S.K., on Kārika 12.
83. Atra satītyādhaṃ guṇānātariṣayātma ca 
īcchavakarvakaravāt sattvāhāṃ dravyatvāh śiddat.
84. I. I. 126.
84. C. D. bitrate, "Meaning of Guna in Samkhya System," Poona 
University Journal 1933, cited in S.R. Pandurangi, "Concept 
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University, Vol. III., No. 2, June 1933, p. 18.
85. The Saṃkhya Kāriκa of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, (Ed. and Trans.) 
S. J. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras: University of Madras, 
86. Prakṛādapravṛtiṇiyarthaḥ, Kārika 12, S.K.
87. Kārika 13, S.K.
88. Kārika 12, S.K.
83. Pandurangsi, *op.cit.*, p.20
81. Ibid., pp.20-21.
82. Turti, "Types of Indian Realism II," *op.cit.*, pp.148-149.
83. Pandurangsi, *op.cit.*, p.21
84. Ibid., p.22.
85. Dravyasūkta iva viveka dravyādravyaḥ bhedaḥ, Ṛ.M.C. p.2.
86. Ibid., p.51.
87. S.Ci., p.6.
88. Ibid., p.40.
89. Y.C.J. p.50.
90. Ibid., pp.50-51.
91. Dravyasūkta Dharmakundalādeḥ dravyādravyaprakāratvam. 
āyuṣte eva Y.Ci. p.16.
92. Y.C.J. p.53
93. Ibid., p.141
94. Ibid.
95. S.Ci. pp. 500-504.
96. Isha or dravyā or dravyādvyayatbhinnat na panchakṣa, 
97. Ibid.
98. S. S. Prākāra Brahmā, *Vidistāvāka*, Madras; University 
110. *Atc lokadṛṣṭaviveśaṇaṇaśaṇaṇaśātivibhāgānamsare
dravyādviśaṇaṃ pārkalpanaṃ nyāyasyati. S. Śi. p. 592.
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112. K. C. Varāchārya, The Metaphysics of Śrī Rāmānuja's
Śrī Chāda, Madras: University of Madras, 1926, p. 64.
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114. Ibid., p. 63
115. Ibid.
118. Tadādvṛtyagunaḥ karuṇāśānyaviveṣaṇa visistārṣisākti-
120. Ibid., p. 1.
121. Cāstregunastvahā vyākhyātavigyaṣṭavā guṇasārāmya
lakṣānam M. S. S. p. 1; Doṣabhinnaṃ guṇastvān. Ibid., p. 68
122. Ibid., p. 1.
123. Ibid.
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the substance-attribute relation have been presented in
detail by S. H. K. Sharma. See, Sharma, Philosophy of
Śrī Vedāntaśarma, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962, Chap. VIII.
126. Yat punāryātvadṛṣṭaḥ Śaṅkara tvatra bheda nāsti kiṁ tu
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Viveka p. 73.
139. BhedAbhAvo bhedaParidaṁ dharmaParidaṁ saMstva eva
vastu. M.S.S. p.7.
140. Su sharma, pp. cit., p.49.

141. This is implied by the inclusion of Viśeṣa in the
ultimate categories.
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152. D. K. Jisuen, Science The Nyāya Philosophy, Delhi:
153. T. M. Datta, "Does Sarvanujita admit identity-indifference?"
CHAPTER III

THREE-PLACE RELATION

FOOT NOTES:


3. Ibid., p. 136-138.

4. Ibid. in J.L. Evans cit., p. 77.

5. E. Holt and others cit., p. 118.


7. V. B. on N.C. 17. 8. 7.

8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., 14. 2. 10.

11. Ibid., 14. 2. 11.


15. N.Y. 1. 476. 96d. p. 255

16. V.Y. on N.Y. 1. 2. 11.

17. Ibid. p. 214.

17. N.C. p.233-239.
21. V.Da. on N.C. JL 34.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p.132.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
29. op.cit., p.200-201.
31. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, op.cit., p.79.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p.79.
35. E.Bullin, in Brain and Human Behaviour (ed.)
36. op.cit., p.434-436.
38. Ibid., p.435.
40. Karikä 12. S.K.

41. S.T.K. on Karikä 12.

42. op.cit., p.77.


44. Ibid., III.3.28

45. Ibid., C.II.3.45.

46. op.cit., p.79

47. Ibid., p.81.

48. C.II. p.11

49. Ibid., op.cit., pp.187-188.
CHAPTER IV

CAUSE-EFFECT RELATION

FOOT NOTES:

2. op.cit., p. 228.
4. W. W. Wundt cited in Philosophy of Science, p. 67
6. Ibid.
12. op.cit., p. 113.
15. Ibid., p.137.
20. Ibid., p.94
22. See Bhartiya, op.cit., pp.142-145.
23. Ibid., p.147.
24. op.cit., p.145.
26. Ibid., p.27.
27. Yat sa navete māyastraṣyate tatt samavāyikāraṇam
T.S. p.76.
28. Ibid.
29. op.cit., p.43
32. Purti, "Types of Indian Realism, 'II", op.cit., p.150.
33. op.cit., p.166.
34. Ibid., p.27-28.
39. T.C.p.36.
40. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, op.cit., p.55
41. Utpādana-yadarsanast. N.Y. p.149.
42. N.Y. p.149.
43. Ibid.
45. N.Y. Part II. p.64 Cited in Chastri p.
46. Ic. p.252.
47. Ic. ibid.
48. Ic. ibid.
49. Ic. ibid. pp.8-12.
50. Cakra, Chap.II.p.3.
51. Parti, Types of Indian Realism II, op.cit., p.149.
52. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, op.cit., p.65.
54. Sadākāraṇatvar nityaḥ N. V.1.1.
55. N.1p.56-59.
56. Ic. Ic.
57. N.1p.56-59.
58. Ic. Ic.
59. N. Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy
57. Iurti, op.cit., p.151.
58. Gbd.
60. Potter, *Preconceptions of India's Philosophies*, op.cit., p.117.
61. Ibd.
63. Ibd., p.120.
64. Uchic kāśṭāya sa iti vacyar. Kāryarthe
66. Udayanirūṭṭhayorvibhāgā, sarvalokasiddha ityarthah.
S.I.3. I.41.
68. Ibd., p.42.
69. Ibd., p.45
70. Ibd., p.46.
71. Ibd., p.47.
72. Ibd.
73. Ibd., p.46.
74. Ibd., p.74.
75. Ibd., p.41.42.


80. op.cit., p. 31.

81. s.v., p. 43.


83. Kārīka 10. s.v.

84. Ibi., Kārīka 1.

85. Ibi., Kārīka 8.


88. I.S. 1.162.

89. Kārīka 21, s.v.

90. Ibi., Kārīka 57.

91. Ibi., Kārīka 58.

92. Ibi., Kārīka 68.

93. Ibi., Kārīka 61.
95. Larsen, op.cit., p.36.
96. Ibid., p.37.
98. Nirmit 22, S.K.
101. Ibid., p.106.
103. SbG.
104. s.1. or II.1.15
105. श्लोकमेवावास्तंतरंगमन्यं धर्मार्थस्युत्तमं न्यायम् नाम सप्तमं न्यायम् ।
106. शब्दाविमुखोऽसु सत्त्वकों आर्थवियंतयां वस्त्रवेद्यम् ।
107. Ibid.
108. V. Sa.5.430.
109. Ibid.
111. Brahmanah tathāviśeṣa sthālabhave eva arṣti ityucyate ।

112. S.B. on I1.95.12.
113. V.Sc. p.3.
114. Ibid.
115. S.B. on I1.115.
116. op.cit. p.73.
117. C.S. on II.1.4.
118. V.Sc. p.426.
120. Ibid., pp.60-68.
121. V.Sc. p.17.
122. Lagirvacher op.cit. p.38.
123. Ibid.
125. Ibid., p.11.
126. op.cit. p.112.
128. Ibid., p.3.
129. C.S. on I1.16.
130. V.Sc. p.396.
131. Ibid.

135. MG. S. S. p. 86.


137. H. S. Ch. II. Paśe i Adhikarana 6.

138. Ibid.

139. On cit., pp. 78-79.

140. *Asadyasthāryaśaḥ kāraṇatratayeśthiḥ* A. J. p. 95.


143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.


146. On cit., p. 155.

147. Potter, on cit., p. 158.

CHAPTER V

COGNITIVE RELATIONS

FOOT NOTES:

1. J. E. Pratt, op. cit., p. 86.
2. Ibíd., p. 96.
3. Ibíd., p. 96.
11. Ibíd., p. 74-75.
12. Ibíd., p. 84.
14. B.F. Holt et al., op.cit., p.479
15. Ibid., p.34.
17. Ibid.
19. op.cit., p.117-118.
20. op.cit., p.353
25. Ibid., p.76.
26. Ibid., p.29.
27. Ibid., p.167
28. Ibid., p.333.
29. Ibid., p.178.
30. Ibid., p.97.
31. Ibid., pp.117-118.
32. J. Sinclair op.cit., p.112.
34. Ibid., pp.166-166.
37. V.Pk. on N.C. II. 848
38. Ibid.
39. N.C. III. 13
40. Ibid., III. 13.
41. V.Pk., III. 8.11
42. Ibid.
43. T.C. p.13.
44. Supra, Chap.II, p.83.
45. I.C.4.2.26.36.
46. op.cit., p.485.
47. T.S. p.24
49. N.C. f.1.4.
51. See Datta, Nyaya Theory of Knowledge for a detailed analysis of the nature and functioning of senses according to Nyaya syllogism.

52. See Datta, Six Ways of Knowing, op.cit., pp.40-46.
55. op.cit., p.13.
56. op.cit., p.31.
57. op.cit., p.133.
58. T.S. p.28.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
63. op.cit., p.469.
64. V.D. on N.S. iii.11.
65. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p.48
70. See Chatterjee, op.cit., pp.77-89.
71. op.cit., p.111.
72. T.C. on T.C. p.56.
73. Ibid.
75. Supra, Ch.II.p.33.
76. Karika, 17.3.1.
77. S.T.K. on Karika 19.
78. Karika 19 T.K.
79. Ibid, Karika 11.
80. S.T.K. on Karika 11.
81. S.T.K. on Karika 19.
82. Karika, 4.S.T.
83. Ibid., Karika 12.
84. Ibid, Karika 4.
85. S.T. I.89.
86. S.T.E. I.89.
87. C. T. S. on Kañika 35.
90. This follows from the non-admission of śamavāya.
91. C. T. S. on Kañika 29.
93. op.cit., p. 55.
94. op.cit., p. 45.
95. op.cit., p. 37.
96. op.cit., p. 295-296.
100. Roy op.cit., p. 45.
101. Ibid., p. 42.
102. Ibid., p. 42.
104. S. R. A. V. 55-57
105. op.cit., p. 105.


110. Ibid., p. 104.

111. C. Y. or II. 3. 10: V. Sa. p. 430.


113. ... on II. 3. 13: drutāhāvistātātma pravaca rithyatva sādhanaṃ āryaṃ eva nirodhatam. S. N. on II. 4. 15.


115. Ibid.

116. Ibid., p. 86

117. Ibid., pp. 91-92.

118. See Raghavachar op. cit. p. 39.


120. N. S. kriyān, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 383.

121. V. M. D. p. 13.


123. Ibid.
125. ibid., p.11.

129. ibid.
130. ibid., pp.14-15
131. ibid., p.15.
132. ibid.
133. ibid., p.14-16.
134. op.cit., p.301.
136. op.cit., p.304.
137. B. Sharma, op.cit., Section V.
139. Detailed arguments in this regard are found in V.P.N. pp.620-622.
140. ibid.
141. *Ama pratāpya Trivishaḥ Pratyabhāsādavānānavānasamāteti*.
146. Ibid., p.11.
147. Pravara laksana, p.128.
149. Lid., p.23.
150. Ibid.
151. P.C. 54, 46-42.
152. Venajātān brahmatena teniva tattvaprāprāpyamapi ghyata
153. Ibid., p.48.
154. Ibid., p.61.
156. P.C. p.6.
157. V.D. p.56.
158. V.D. p.56.
159. Tattvānāryota in Daśa Prakāraṇa, p.317.
160. Ibid., p.318.
161. See Dhāraṇa etcit., p.184. See also, Varma-N. pp.722-726.
162. Ibid., p.188.
163. etcit., p.84.
164. etcit., p.126.
165. Ibid.
166. etcit., p.137.
167. etcit., p.146.

168. *op. cit.*, p. 11.


CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

FOOTNOTES:

3. Ibid., p. 235.