CHAPTER II

SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE RELATION

2.1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

2.1.1. The notion of 'substance'

The problem of substance has been described as the most troublesome philosophical problem. A study of the philosophical literature reveals that 'substance' has been used both with a wide and a narrow connotation. In its wider sense it refers to the ultimate material principle constituting or underlying the world of experience. It has also been used to designate particular complexes of attributes or individual entities known empirically. Both kinds of usage presuppose a belief in an entity over the above the qualities and relations. The question that underlies the problem of substance is whether experience stands on its own feet or it is supported by something that is not experience. It may be said that the notion of substance refers to that entity which remains when one removes the properties of something, the assumption being that something does remain when properties are removed. The assumption that substance is something more than a mere group of qualities, leads to the question of the relation between substance and attributes.

We find that much of the discussion in Western philosophy on this issue is concerned with the analysis of the characteristics
of substance in general and the problems involved in delineat-
ing the substance-attribute relation. The earliest thinker
to deal with this concept in detail is Aristotle. He defines
substance as follows: "Substance, in the truest and primary
and most definite sense of the word is that which is neither
predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance,
the individual man or horse". He examines in detail the
various characteristics that are associated with such entities.

Much of the importance attached to the Aristotelian discussion
on this issue in subsequent writings derives from his elaborate
but slightly confused presentation. As Connors remarks,
"The various notions of substance, as (1) concrete individual,
(2) a core of essential properties, (3) what is capable of
independent existence, (4) a center of change, (5) a substratum
and (6) a logical subject are never thoroughly worked out and
reconciled in Aristotle. He appears to emphasize now one and
now another mark of substance as of paramount importance."^5

The observations of Aristotle have constituted the nucleus
of much of the subsequent discussions on this issue, and the
Aristotelian position has been subjected to a number of cri-
ticisms. Some recent thinkers have attempted to justify
some of the views advocated by Aristotle. Parker, for in-
stance, refers to four moments of substance. He says, "As
developed historically, the concept of substance yields upon
analysis, four moments; to be substance means to be subject
but never predicate, to be independent, to be causally efficient, and to be conserved through change." He points out that though these moments are inter-related, each contributes something unique to the definition of the concept. Myers has defended some of the propositions advocated by Parker in a recent article. According to him, a substance is characterized by laccecity (individuality), logical independence, causal independence, causal efficiency, and conservation through change. We find that in spite of some minor differences, all the thinkers mentioned above agree that individuality, independence, logical and/or metaphysical, causal efficiency and persistence or conservation through change constitute the essential characteristics of a substance.

The Aristotelian conception of substance involves a sharp contrast between two aspects, viz., the static and dynamic aspects, or the structure of substance at a moment and that of substance through time. As Demos remarks, "In the former case, substance is finitely divided (in respect of its predicates) and has a beginning and an end; in the latter, substance is divided infinitely, and while having a beginning, has no end." The recognition of this distinction may be helpful in understanding some of the difficulties that are encountered in establishing the validity of this conception.
Some of the problems that arise in the postulation of the notion of substance as an entity which exists in its own right, have been indicated by Lacey. He feels that it is necessary to state what things are distinguishable and definite enough to count as substances and also delineate the kind of independence that is relevant here. The question is whether the independence attributed to substance is logical or metaphysical or both. He observes, "How is the priority of substances to be explained since one can no more have a substance without attributes than attributes without a substance? Or indeed is substance related to attribute? Is a substance a mere bundle of attributes? If so, what binds the bundle together? or does a substance underlie all its attributes which leads to Locke's unsatisfactory view of an unknowable substance? If substances are what attributes copy, etc., what can be said about attributes of attributes?..."  

2.1.2 The debate on the reality of substance  
The view that substance is a distinct entity over and above the qualities and relations has been subjected to many criticisms. The primary attack against the concept is derived from the preposition advocated by the empirical epistemology, viz., only qualities and relations are experienced. The logical development of the implications of the empiricist epistemology beginning with the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities, leading to the Berkeleyan denial of material substance, culminating in the Humean denial of the spiritual substance is too well known to require a detailed
presentation here. Many thinkers do not accept the metaphysical conclusions that are supposed to follow from the epistemological premises of the empiricist, and attempts have been made to reinstate substance as a meaningful ontological term. However, once we grant the contentions of the empiricist, the underlying substance becomes unknowable, as is evident in the Kantian attempt at reinstatement, and hence in useless as a metaphysical concept.

The substance-attribute or 'story has been attacked from another angle by the linguistic philosophers. As Russell remarks, "Substance, in a word, is a metaphysical mistake due to the transference to the world structure of the structure of sentences composed of a subject and a predicate." Klausner and Kuntz hold that a particular view of reality may be favoured by philosophers only because it employs familiar arrangement of words. The reason for this confusion, Rajendra Prasad contends, is the misleading nature of language. According to him, the semantical dependence between the quality words and substance words, which is a feature of language, is mistaken to be a feature of the Universe.

Commenting on the empiricist criticiser, Myers argues that the notion of substance is rejected because of faulty reasoning about its implications rather than any real defect. Substance, as generally understood, is that which has properties but is
not itself a property or a set of properties. From this it is inferred that substance should be conceivable apart from its properties. But the question of what something is, Myers contends, can be answered only in terms of its properties and the attempt to arrive at a residual substance after a separation of properties presupposes that the object of inquiry is not such a residue. The inquiry, he points out is, therefore, self-defeating. Lazerowitz reiterates the same idea in his criticism of the Kemar analysis of the notion of substance. He says, "...We have to suppose that he looked for what he should have realized, if the theory were correct, he would not be able to find and, after looking for substance and not finding it, concluded that it did not exist."

The objections of the linguistic analysts have also been answered. It is pointed out that language may take this form because of an antecedent belief about the composition of things. A possible reason for the development of such a belief has been suggested by Nach. He contends that the basic presupposition of any effort to represent the world in thought is the belief in something permanent in the varied changes that things appear to undergo and holds that this may result in the formulation of the notion of substance.

Attempts have also been made to explore the reasons underlying the controversy regarding the notion of substance.
According to Lazerowitz, the impossibility of imagining a substratum is logical impossibility originating in the linguistic fact that the word 'substance' in the sense of 'something in which properties inhere but which is distinct from them' has not been given any application. Ewing holds that these difficulties may be either due to the limitation of our faculties or because the concept has been defined in such a way that it cannot be known. According to him, the fault lies in the way the question has been posed. He suggests that instead of asking what are qualities without substance and vice versa, it is better to maintain that the concepts of 'substance' and 'qualities' are inseparable and correlatives, neither being prior to the other, but both being necessary parts of our idea about matter. Substance, for him, is not just any collection of qualities, but a collection of qualities arranged in a particular way difficult to define. But nothing remains after the qualities are taken away.

2.1.3. Western realism on 'Substance'

The foregoing observations should be kept in mind while examining the views of the four Indian systems in this regard. These systems are realistic in orientation. A brief review of the views of Western realists regarding this issue may be helpful in indicating the problems involved in a realistic
interpretation of the notion of substance. Though the primary concern of Western realism has been the establishment of epistemological realism, some realistic thinkers have discussed a few metaphysical questions also.

2.1.3.1. New Realism

Perry, a New Realist, points out that the term 'realism' has been traditionally associated with the conception of 'substance'. He remarks, "It is held that the real is not what is experienced but some substance or essence which lies behind what is experienced. The real according to this view is not constituted by its predicates; but is manifested in them. It is the subject that orcs them, the ground that supports them, or the cause that produces them." In this connection he quotes extensively from an earlier realistic thinker, Reid, and elucidates the implication of this position. Commenting on Reid's view, Perry notes that the qualities are left in a precarious position. Since they are not identified with the substratum, they may be more easily apprehended by the mind and converted into ideas. Thus, the principle of substance Perry argues, betrays realism into the hands of its enemy.

Recognizing the serious nature of the problem that is generated by an admission of the reality of an underlying, but unexperienced substantial principle, New Realism identifies reality with the elements, processes and systems of experience. Perry points out that realism maintains that these elements,
processes and systems are independent of being experienced, although they may compose or enter into an experience. But, he contends that this notion of independence must be purified of all suggestions or otherness, remoteness and inaccessibility which get attached, once a substance over and above the experienced phenomena is granted.24 In the context of the observations of Perry, it may be said that the Neo-realist denies the category of substance on the ground that the admission of such a category would lead to the denial of the realistic epistemological position, involving the postulation of something that is beyond experience.

Another explanation for the Neo-Realistic position in this regard has been suggested by Evans. He points out that the conception of substance is incompatible with the analytical method advocated by this school. He observes, "An ontology which exalts the idea of substance has little place for the notion of many self-existent reals; it is likely to reduce the world to a numerical monism. An epistemology which emphasizes the doctrine of substance has small place for the idea of consciousness, as one among many objective entities; it will probably consider consciousness as a container and external objects as a mental contents. The ontology and epistemology of new-realism can only be the outcome of analytical method whereas, substance conceptions are the product of synthetic procedure."25
The New Realist, denies the reality of a synthetic principle underlying the diverse qualities and relations that are experienced on the ground that the admission of such a reality would involve the positing of an entity that is not experienced. Such an admission, he argues, is opposed to the fundamental tenets of reality. But the New Realist contention that ultimate reality, as revealed in analysis, consists of neutral entities that are neither matter nor mind, but are interpreted as one or the other depending upon the context, involves the positing of entities which are not the content of experience. The New Realist thereby, violates the principle on the basis of which he denies the reality of substance and, implicitly admits the need to move from experienced processes and elements to a principle that underlies these experiences.

2.1.3.2. Critical Realism

The inherent contradiction in the theory of the New-Realist has been recognised by the Critical Realist who tries to justify the positing of a substratum experience, on the basis of experience itself. Presenting the Critical Realist position, Sellars remarks, "To know a thing is not to be it. Knowledge, as I have put it, is not equivalent to being. An idea gives knowledge of an object when it reveals that about the object which is knowable. But it presupposes and does not pretend to destroy the being and reality of the object known." He admits that knowledge is certainly
restricted to the qualities. But from this it should not be concluded, he argues, that things are existentially qualitiless substratum. It only implies that we can never intuit the existential content of the world.\textsuperscript{27} Santayana's views regarding the substantial implications of knowledge have already been stated.\textsuperscript{28}

This raises the question of the grounds for the acceptance of a substance that is never an object of experience in a direct sense. Sellars considers that the spatio-temporal continuity of certain entities, in spite of change, is a sufficient ground for admitting the reality of substance. He holds that change presupposes an endurant that changes.\textsuperscript{29} The argument advocated by Santayana is different. Recognising the difficulties involved in admitting the reality of an underlying substantial principle he says, "Belief in substance, taken transcendentally, as a critic of knowledge must take it, is the most irrational, animal and primitive of beliefs; it is the voice of hunger. But when, as I must, I have yielded to this presumption, and proceeded to explore the world, I shall find in its constitution the most beautiful justification for my initial faith, and the proof of its secret rationality."\textsuperscript{30} Pratt, after examining some of the alternatives, like the denial of the substance, and some form of phenomenalism concludes, "My conclusion, therefore—and I do not see how it can be avoided—is that we cannot do without the concept of substance in an existent world."\textsuperscript{31}
Regarding the characteristics associated with substances, Pratt holds that the essential differentia of substance are existence and substantively. He recognises that there are grades or degrees of substantivity or independence. The notion of substance is also said to involve a certain amount of unity, the degree of unity varying among different substances. He also distinguishes between intrinsic and relational qualities and believes that in the context of the relational nature of sorts of the qualities, some amount of change also becomes part of the notion of substance. The element of selectivity involved in the determination of the nature and number of substances is stated more explicitly by Santayana. He remarks "For it will be simply a question of good sense and circumstantial evidence, how many substances I admit, and of what sort."

The observations of the Critical Realists indicate the difficulties encountered and the strategies that can be adopted by a realist who advocates the notion of substance in the context of the empiricist epistemological framework. The important points that need to be clarified, in any satisfactory understanding of the notion of substance, and substance-attribute relation are, therefore, the following: the connotation of the terms, the justification for postulating an ontological distinction between substance and attribute and the nature of the relation between the two that accounts for their inseparability at the level of experience. The views
of the four Indian systems selected for study are presented in the context of the above framework.

2.2. NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA ON SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE RELATION

2.2.1. The Ultimate categories

Nyāya-Vaiśesika advocates a pluralistic ontology. Seven kinds of ultimate entities (padārthas) viz., substance, attribute, action, universal, individuator, inherence and negation are postulated by Nyāya-Vaiśesika. It is necessary to understand the implications of the term padārtha, as both substance and attribute represent two distinct padārthas according to this system. The term 'padārtha' literally a meaning a thing to which a word refers, is usually translated as a category. Commenting on the Nyāya-Vaiśesika classification of ultimate entities Datta observes, "In their search for the ultimate entities (padārthas), Kaṇḍa and his followers realistically start from common experience (anubhava or pratīti or sarvīd) and the linguistic usages (vyavahāra), subject them to critical examination (parīkṣā) and try to understand and explain them. On the two assumptions that every experience must have an object and that every phenomenon including linguistic usage must have some adequate cause they reach the entities as the causes responsible for different experiences and usages and without which the latter cannot be explained."35 Discussing the rationale underlying
this classification, Patilal contends that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers believed that an analysis and classification of the concrete object of experience into substance, quality, action, etc., would provide a satisfactory explanation of 'What there is', i.e., an explanation of what is meant when we say 'that object exists'. In a broad sense, then, padārtha denotes the ultimate distinguishable division of reality.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers hold that that the different padārthas belong to different orders of reality. Shastri has drawn attention to the experiential basis of this classification. He holds that the different grades of reality of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories result from the basic principle that all the dimensions of our experience must have a counterpart in the external world. Potter points out that the admission of relations as well as relate as basic entities becomes necessary in view of the fact that the Vaiśeṣika ontology allows predicates also to denote along with subjects. He also notes that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika includes both physicalistic and phenomenalistc elements, i.e., items which are directly perceived and those which are known to us by inference.

2.2.2. Substance

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that substance and attribute represent distinct ontological categories and assigns the same degree of metaphysical reality to both. The Naïyayika contends
that substance is a distinct entity underlying the attributes. The difficulties involved in establishing the ontological reality of substance along with the special problems encountered by realistic metaphysics in this regard, particularly in the context of the objections raised by the empiricist epistemology have been stated earlier.\textsuperscript{40} It is necessary to examine how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika establishes his position against the objections raised by the Buddhists, who advocate a position broadly similar to that of the empiricist.\textsuperscript{41}

The Buddhist maintains that substance does not exist as distinct from the attributes. Clarifying the Buddhist position, Shastri states that the Buddhist regards colour, touch etc., as ultimate particulars (kṣetras or dharmaś) and does not interpret them as gunas in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sense. Therefore when the Buddhist says that there is no separate substance apart from the attributes, he only means that substance and attributes are not two different entities as maintained by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.\textsuperscript{42}

The Buddhist view has been justified on various grounds. At the linguistic level, it is maintained that all names refer only to combinations. The name 'jar' for instance is applied to the odour, taste, colour and touch (the qualities of the jar) and also to the combination of the bottom, sides and neck (the parts of the jar). The same principle, the Buddhist argues, is applicable to other entities.\textsuperscript{43} At the ontological level, the Buddhist holds that the whole is not distinct from its parts. Further
the Buddhist maintains that the substratum as distinct from
the attributes is never apprehended at the level of experience
also. The Buddhist position is restated by Jayanta as follows.
"The substratum of qualities as distinct and apart from them is
never cognised. It never shows itself to be an entity separate
from the qualities." 44

The Naiyāyika supports his position by denying the arguments
advanced by the Buddhist. He holds that symbols do not refer
to combination of entities, but denote single entities. The
possibility of using such expressions as "I am touching the jar
I saw before", "I am seeing that which I touched before",
implies that there is a substance called 'jar' beyond tangibility
and colour, which are two distinct attributes belonging to the
same substance. 45 This kind of usage is justifiable on
metaphysical and epistemological grounds also. According to
the Naiyāyika, the whole is ontologically distinct from the
parts and is cognised as such. Epistemologically this implies
that all our experiences are experiences of unitary or single
entities. 46 The Naiyāyika holds that the substance is therefore,
ontologically distinct from the attributes and relations
that characterise it. An interesting point about this debate
between the Buddhist and the Naiyāyika has been brought out
by Shastri. He remarks, "The reality in this case, as in
many other cases of metaphysical dispute, is that the same
common experience is interpreted in two different ways.
Prima facie, we experience external objects which appear to us as the substrata of qualities. An analysis of our experience, however, shows that substances do not exist apart from those qualities. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika takes its stand on the prima-facie experience, while the Buddhist relies on the analysis of that experience.  

Kaṇṭha defines a substance as that which is possessed of actions and attributes and it an inherent cause. The implications of Kaṇṭa's definition have been brought out by Pracāstapāṇa. According to Katila, the Vaiśeṣika emphasises the following notions of substance, (1) Substance as the locus of quality and actions (2) Substance as the substratum of change, and (3) Substance as capable of independent existence. Substance, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika denotes an independent and dynamic principle.

Nine ultimate substances are admitted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, viz., earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, self and mind. A study of this list reveals that the substance category includes not only material entities like earth, water, light, etc., but apparently conceptual entities like space and time, a psychic principle, mind and a spiritual principle self.

2.2.3. Attribute

The most distinctive and problematic aspect of the conception of substance, relates to its nature of the substratum of attributes and relations. Attribute (guṇa) is a distinct
ontological category according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is
defined by Kaṇḍāda as that which has substance as a substratum,
is without attributes, and is not the cause of conjunctions
and disjunctions. \textsuperscript{54} The same points are reiterated by
Pradāntapāda. \textsuperscript{55} Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika offers a list of twenty four
gunas. \textsuperscript{56} It is necessary to note that the implications of
the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of guna, have been extensively
debated. Potter holds that a guna cannot be equated with the
English term 'quality'. 'Quality' according to him, refers
to a repeatable entity, whereas guna as conceived by Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika does not refer to a repeatable entity. He suggests
that terms like 'particular character', 'abstract particular' or
'trope' bring out the implications of the term in a better way. \textsuperscript{57}
Datta admits that a single guna is unrepeatable as contended by
Potter. He, however, does not accept Potter's suggestion
that guna should be translated as 'particular character' or
'abstract particular', because, in that case, guna would become
the same as Viṣeṣa. Further, such an interpretation would be
inconsistent with the Vaiśeṣika view that gunas possess
universal characteristics. Datta remarks, "The real point
is to see is that though "a single guna" (like this particular
shade of red in the present house) is particular, many gunas
(e.g. many particular red shades), form a class (e.g., of reds).
In other words 'guna' is not a particular but a general term,
a class term." \textsuperscript{58} He grants that the term 'quality' does not
bring out the implications of the term 'guna' completely, but
holds that, to the extent it refers to a dependent character,
it can be used as an equivalent for guna in the absence of a
more exact term. 59 Commenting on this controversy, Bhattacharya
argues in support of Potter's view. 60

Bhattacharya has reviewed in detail the various questions
raised by these scholars in this regard. He points out that
there are both repeatable and unrepeatable theories in Western
philosophy about the nature of quality and the same is true of
the notion of guna in Indian Philosophy. However, the un-
repeatability theory is the dominant one in Indian Philosophy,
while the repeatable nature of qualities is emphasised more in
Western philosophy. He, therefore, maintains that the objections
against interpreting guna as quality on the ground of its
unrepeatability is not tenable. 61

His rejection of quality as an adequate equivalent for
guna is based on other grounds. He points out that the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika list of guṇas includes not only phenomena which are
designated as qualities in Western philosophy, but others like
difference, conjunction, etc., which are generally designated
as relations and quantitative features. Further, motion, which
is treated as a quality in Western philosophy, is held to be a
distinct category in this system. 62 Suggesting an alternative
to the term 'quality' in view of the above difficulties, he
says, "I, for one, should like to commend the use of the very
simple term "attribute", which as John Stuart Mill has it, covers "quality", "quantity" and "relation", and which is, for the sure reason, the nearest English equivalent for 'guna' despite the fact that it is used by philosophers in many other senses as well. In the present study also, therefore, the term 'attribute' is used, as it is free from the limitations of the term 'quality'.

1.3.4. Substance-attribute relation

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an attribute constitutes a distinct ontological category of the same order as the substance. Both are said to be positive categories. The arguments that are offered to establish the distinction of substance from the attribute imply the distinction of the attributes from the substance also. The Māyāyika also maintains that causes attributes have a different from those of the substance. The Māyāyika further holds that at the time of origin the substance is independent of the attributes for the duration of a moment. It may, therefore, be said that the Māyāyika posits a real distinction between substance and attributes at the ultimate level. As Kursi remarks, "substance (Dravya) and quality (Guna), in Nyāya, are distinct and discrete entities, they belong to distinct classes and are not necessarily understood through each other."
The positing of a distinction between substance and attributes creates problems, when an attempt is made to explore the nature of the relation between the two. The need to consider the relation arises because, though distinct, the two terms are found to be related at the level of experience. Substance and attributes are found to be inseparable empirically, the inseparability being manifested in the attributes being always experienced as characterising some substantive entity, and the substance being always experienced and understood as characterised by some attributes. The inseparable nature of the two at the empirical level is recognised by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, also, as is clear by the definitions offered regarding substance and attribute, presented earlier.

3.3.4.1. The category of samavāya

Nyāya Vaiśeṣika attempts to account for the empirical inseparability of the two ontologically distinct principles through the introduction of a third principle. One of the categories postulated by this school, viz., samavāya, is a relational category. It is defined by Prāsastapāda as the relation that subsists among inseparable entities, which stand to one another in the relation of container and the contained and which gives rise to the idea 'this is in that'.\textsuperscript{68} It is held that these conditions are fulfilled in relations between substance and attributes, substance and its activity, universal cause and effect and particulars, whole and its parts, and particularity (vīśeṣa)
and eternal substances like space, time, natural atoms, etc.\textsuperscript{69} Though \textit{samavāya} is treated as a distinct ontological category, it does not possess existence (\textit{sattā}) like the terms it relates.\textsuperscript{70} This suggests that the reality attributed to this category is of a different order. It is also said to be unitary and eternal in spite of the multiplicity and transient nature of some of the relata it is said to relate.\textsuperscript{71}

The introduction of a distinct category to account for apparently inseparable relations by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has been subjected to elaborate criticisms by other systems, the primary objection being the need for another term to relate \textit{samavāya} to the relata. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers contend that there is no need for another relation to relate \textit{samavāya} as it is in itself of the nature of a relation. As Pradātapāda observes, "Inherence being inseparable from its substrate and being of the nature of a subsisting relation could have no other relation and should be considered as self-sufficient."\textsuperscript{72} Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, therefore, maintain that substance and attributes, though ontologically distinct, are empirically inseparable as they are related by \textit{samavāya}. This inseparability does not contradict the distinction between the two at the ultimate level. As Burti remarks, "The quality is in (not of) the substance, the \textit{in} being a permanent fixture or glue in between the two."\textsuperscript{73}
2.3. SĀNKHYA ON SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE RELATION

2.3.1. The ultimate categories

Sānkhya, like the other realistic systems attempts to understand the nature of the ultimate reality through an analysis of experience. The ultimate ontological entities recognised by the system are prakṛti, the material principle and purusa, the conscious or spiritual principle. The material principle has to be understood at two levels, viz., the manifest and the unmanifest. The world of experience represents the manifest levels and the unmanifest prakṛti is the cause of the manifest phenomenal universe. Sānkhya, unlike Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, makes a fundamental distinction between the unconscious matter (prakṛti) on the one hand, and the conscious principle (purusa) on the other. Both are, however, held to be irreducible ultimates presupposed in any experience.

Like the other realistic systems Sānkhya also contends that there is a real term corresponding to every experience. But, Sānkhya holds that the objects of the material world in the form in which they are apprehended in ordinary experience, are transitory manifestations of an eternal principle which is unmanifest. It is maintained that the imperceptibility of prakṛti is due to its subtlety. The existence of prakṛti, Sānkhya argues, has to be admitted as its effects are apprehended. The nature of prakṛti, it is contended, can be inferred
on the basis of the nature of the objects of the world in accordance with the principle that the nature of effect is the same as that of the cause. Sāṅkhya holds that the objects of experience can be ultimately reduced to three guṇas, sattva, rajas, and tāmas. The union of these three in different degrees involving variations in their mutual dominance and subordination accounts for the variety and diversity manifested by the objects of experience.

It may be said that to the extent the system grants objective existence to the objects of the world, it advocates realism. But the objects of experience are said to be the phenomenal and non-eternal in nature. Commenting on this, Dasgupta points out that it is the noumenal character of the ultimate constituents that introduces the elements of idealism. But it should be remembered that Sāṅkhya attributes phenomenality and non-eternity only to the objects of experience and not to the underlying material principle. If belief in the existence of an objective reality independent of and unlike the mental phenomena is termed as 'realism', then, Sāṅkhya ontology will have to be described as realistic. As Dasgupta remarks, "The realism of the Sāṅkhya consists in the fact that it does not agree with the idealist in holding either that it is only thought that exists or that the world is but the determination of thought objectified."
2.3.2. *Pra[kr]ti* as substance with *gunas* as attributes

The *prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya represents the ultimate substantial principle underlying the diverse objects of the material world. *Pra[kr]ti* may, therefore, be described as a 'substance' in the wider sense of the term, viz., the ultimate material stuff underlying the material objects. While attributing objective reality to the objects of experience, Sāṅkhya does not categorically into different ontological categories like the Naiyāyika. Sāṅkhya recognises the variety and diversity manifested in the empirical world by reducing the objective world into the three *gunas*, which differ both in nature and functions. But all of them are designated as *gunas* and are said to be interdependent. Sāṅkhya does not attribute independent existence to the different *gunas* and maintains that they represent different aspects of the unitary principle *prakṛti*. Therefore, the substance attribute dichotomy can not be applied to Sāṅkhya ontology explicitly. Still, it is possible to arrive at some understanding of the Sāṅkhya views regarding the relation between substance and attribute on the basis of the observations of the system regarding the relation between *prakṛti* and its constituents, the *gunas*.

The implications of the term 'guna' denoting the constituents of *prakṛti*, the ultimate material principle, have been extensively discussed. Dasgupta has pointed out that it is difficult to understand why these ultimate reals are called *gunas*. He
notes that the term *guna* in Sanskrit, means (1) quality, (2) subordinate or inferior and (3) string, and many later commentators have tried to justify the use of the term in all the three senses. The latter two meanings are not directly relevant for the present analysis. Since we have already examined in detail the nature of Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika attribute, it is necessary to examine the nature of *guna* as conceived by this system in order to understand whether it is similar to the *guna* of Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika.

Among the Śāṅkhyā writers, Vācaspati Miśra interprets the term *guna* as secondary *pārārthā*. He does not deal with the question whether they are qualities or substance. Vījñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, expressly states that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tāmas* are substances (*āryya*) since, lightness (*laghutva*) heaviness (*guruṭva*) etc., are talked of with reference to them.

Among modern interpreters, Dīcit has argued that the term should be understood in the usual sense of qualities. Suryanarayana Sastri holds that the *gunas* of Śāṅkhyā are not attributes of substance other than themselves, but are themselves constitutive of the substance. The Śāṅkhyā position in this regard can be understood better if we examine the way these three *gunas* are elucidated by the writers belonging to this school.

It is said that *gunas* are of the nature of pleasure, mien and infatuation and serve to illumine, to actuate and to
Sattva is said to be buoyant and illuminating; rajas exciting and mobile and tamas heavy or enveloping in nature. They are described mutually supportive, suppressive, productive, co-operative, etc., implying thereby that no guna can act independently of the other two.

In view of these observations it is clear that gunas as conceived in Sāṅkhya, cannot be interpreted either as substance or attributes in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sense. As Hiriyanna observes, "The chief point about them as that they are not what their names might suggest, viz., the qualities of prakṛti. That would be admitting the distinction between substance-attribute as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does, but the Sāṅkhya Yoga regards it as a pure abstraction. The gunas are to be understood here as components of prakṛti. They might be described as substances, if that again did not suggest the same artificial distinction." Pandurangi in his discussion on the Sāṅkhya conception of gunas has suggested an alternative approach to this question. According to him, the question is not whether sattva, rajas and tamas are either abhyāsas or substance, but examining whether Sāṅkhya believed that there are mere attributes which do not inher in any substance, or that there is a substance also to which attributes belong. He holds that Sāṅkhya adopts a third way in dealing with this problem. Sāṅkhya does not subscribe to the view that the attributes inhere in things. It does not demarcate
between substance and attributes to the extent of considering them as independent categories, nor are the two cancelled out altogether. He maintains that if the doctrine of identity between dharma and dharma advocated by Sākhya is kept in mind, the riddle whether the gujas are attributes or substance solves itself.

This suggests that though Sākhya recognises the possibility of distinguishing between the two terms analytically, it posits an ontological identity between the two. As Kārtti points out, the relation between substance and its attribute is viewed by Sākhya as one of identity, for the attribute is but the determination of the indeterminate substance. As he puts it, "It is the indeterminate substantive that presents itself as the determinate adjective. There is real conditioning or categorisation here."

In view of the absence of a real ontological distinction, there is no need for a third term to relate the two terms. The relationship between the two aspects will have to be conceived differently here. According to Pandurangi, treating sattva, rajas and tamas merely as three broad heads of the multifarious attributes or as merely three constituents of substance is not correct. However, avyakta state may be thought of, he maintains, as the unchanging substance aspect and the vyakta state as the changing attribute aspect. But, according to him, this does not imply that this
Distinction is similar to the Nyāya position, since guṇas are present both in the vyakta and avyakta states. The distinction is only between the latent and the actual and not of the two categories of substance and attributes.⁶⁴

In the context of the observations made above, we have to admit the substance-attribute dichotomy as conceived in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is not applicable to Sāṃkhya, with the result that the problems encountered by the Naiyāyika in his attempts to delineate the relationship between the two are also not relevant the Sāṃkhya analysis.

2.4. VISĪSTĀDVAITA ON SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE RELATION

2.4.1. The ultimate categories

A study of the views of Visīstādvaita regarding both the nature of substance and substance-attribute relation is important for understanding the basic metaphysical propositions advocated by this system. Visīstādvaita holds that the universe of experience can be classified into two broad categories, viz., substance (dravya) and non-substance (adraṇya).⁶⁵ These two constitute the ultimate metaphysical categories (tattvas) recognised by this system.

Before examining the implications of the terms 'substance' and 'non-substance' it is necessary to note the reasons given for the non-acceptance of the other categories postulated by
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Viśistādvaite holds that the rest of the categories can be included under these two broad dimensions. It is contended that all the different activities included under action (karma) can be classed under one category, conjunction, which is one of the non-substance recognised by this system. Similarly generic character, (sāmānya) is not admitted because the structure of the substance itself constitutes this. Inherence (sāravāya) requires another inference to relate it thereby leading to infinite regress, and therefore is not admitted as a distinct category. The category of individuating (viṣeṣa), introduced to distinguish the different substances at the atomic level, is not required here. On these grounds, Viśistādvaite contends that only two ultimate categories need to be recognised, viz., substance and non-substance.

The Viśistādvaite's arguments in this regard indicate that, according to him, the recognition of conceptual entities like universals, relations etc., as distinct ontological entities, is not necessary for a satisfactory classification of the things of the world. He includes all attributive and relational terms under one category, viz., the non-substance. The usage of the term 'ādhyāya' rather than 'gūna' in this context is significant, as it implies that this category includes not only the entities recognised as gūnas by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but
other categories as well. It may be said that all the phenomena that cannot be classified under the category of substance have been included under this class.

This distinction between substance and non-substance has been justified on grounds broadly similar to those advocated by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is pointed out that perception reveals a single entity characterised by colour, size, shape, etc. The variations in the degree of distinctness of the perception of an object, which would involve variation in the number of qualities perceived cannot be explained without postulating a distinction between the substratum and the qualities that characterise it. Therefore, it is argued, substances have to be considered as distinct from attributes. It is, however, necessary to note that the distinction between substances and non-substances advocated by Viśiṣṭādvaita is not the same as the substance-attribute dichotomy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The difference between the two systems becomes evident when we examine the way these categories and their relation have been delineated by this system.

2.4.2. Substance

Substance has been defined as a material cause. This definition implies that it is a locus of states or modifications and attributes. The two important features emphasised by this definition are that substance is (1) the ground or
substratum of attributes, and (2) the persistent principle underlying modifications or changes.

The wide range of phenomena included under the category of substance by Visistadvaita becomes evident when we examine the classification of substances offered by this system. Substances are broadly divided into two groups: the material (jada) and the immaterial (ajada). The material substances are of two kinds, viz., primordial matter (prakrti) and time (kala). The immaterial substance is further divided into the purak and the pratyak types. The first category includes the nityavibhuti and dharmabhutajñana. The latter type is also of two kinds because of the difference between the jiva, the individual self and Isvara.

A study of the classification presented above reveals certain significant differences between the views of the Visistadvaita and Nyaya-Vaisesika. Visistadvaita includes under the category of substance, phenomena ranging from unconscious matter to the highest conscious principle, the principle which is held to be the ultimate principle. The justification for including under the same category entities manifesting such diverse characteristics is that all of them are found to be substrata of attributes and continue to persist in spite of apparent modifications. This also brings out the importance of the conception of substance in the overall
metaphysical theory advocated by the syster. The ultimate integrating principle, Tāvāra (otherwise designated as Brahman) is held to be a substance and the material world and the selves are considered to be His attributes.

Vidistādvaita analysis differs from that of Nyāya-Vaiveśika in another respect also. Nyāya-Vaiveśika holds that substances are always subjects and never predicates of another term. This is not acceptable to the Vidistādvaitin, who argues that not only class attributes or qualities but even substances can be attributed under certain circumstances. There are instances of substances becoming attributes of other substances, as in the case of a man holding a staff (jandira) man wearing earrings (kundalin), etc. 101

Vidistādvaita, therefore, holds that one and the same entity can be considered as a substance or an attribute depending upon the context. For instance, dharmabhūtajñāna is defined as a substance attribute. It is not only an attribute of the self but also a substance undergoing change of states such as contraction and expansion. 102 The contention that a substance can also be an attribute under certain circumstances is specially relevant to an understanding of the Vidistādvaita view regarding the nature of the ultimate reality, which in a broad sense represents the highest level of substantial reality.
2.4.3. Non-substance

Non-substance is defined as that which is devoid of conjunction.\textsuperscript{103} In a negative sense it may also be defined as that which is devoid of the qualities of a substance, viz., that of being the substratum of modifications. This category, as already noted, includes all the other categories postulated by Nyāya-Vaiśeśika.

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, non-substances are ten in number, viz., sattva, rajas, tāmas, sound, touch, colour, taste, smell, conjunction and potency.\textsuperscript{104} It is contended that there is no need to recognize twenty-four guṇas as advocated by Nyāya-Vaiśeśika, as the rest can be included either under these ten types or, are part of the substantial entities recognized earlier. Viśiṣṭādvaita writers have attempted to justify the above classification on the basis of a number of arguments.\textsuperscript{105}

2.4.4. Substance-non-substance relation aprthaksīḍdhi

It was pointed out earlier that the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika distinction between substance and attribute is not merely analytical, but ontological also. The Nyaiyāyika attempts to reconcile this ontological distinction with the empirical inseparability of substance and attributes with the help of the saravāya relation. Viśiṣṭādvaita differs from Nyāya-Vaiśeśika in both the respects.
Viśiṣṭādvaita holds that the substance–non-substance distinction does not imply the independence of either at the ultimate level. Neither substance can be conceived without the non-substances which characterise it nor the non-substances, without the substance that supports them. It is stated that the non-substances are not totally different and distinct from the substances, nor are partially identical and partially different. The non-substances are said to qualify the substance. The relation between the two is aprathaksiddhi or inseparability, which implies that neither can be apprehended without the other. The need for another category, samavāya in order to explain this inseparability is denied by Viśiṣṭādvaita system. The Nyāyika holds that samavāya does not require another relation to relate itself to the terms, but is a self relating principle. Viśiṣṭādvaita contends that it is much simpler to maintain that the non-substances, by their very nature, qualify the substance, than to introduce another term defining it as self-relating. Venkatanātha states, it is more logical to treat the relation itself as inseparable rather than introduce another relation that relates inseparable entities. As pointed out by Raghavachar, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita the attribute must be other than the substance in order to make a difference to it, but it can not be different in the sense of being ontologically and epistemically separate from it, requiring a linking category, like samavāya.
The notion of aprathaksiddhi resolves this problem. Pointing out the difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśesika and Viśistādvaita conceptions in this regard, Hiriyanna remarks, "It is parallel to, but not identical with, the Nyāya-Vaiśesika samavāya. The two agree in so far as the relata which they bring together are regarded as quite distinct and real; but while samavāya is an external relation, the conception of aprathaksiddhi is an internal one."

This inseparability, however, does not imply the identity or lack of distinction between the terms of the relation. It is contended that the substance-non-substance classification is valid as it is based on the same principle which justifies the classification of the qualifier and the qualified at the empirical level. The primacy of the substance over the non-substances is due to the fact that one can talk of the non-substances only in the context of the substance as the substances are the substrata or ground underlying the non-substances.

2.4.5. The importance of substance-non-substance relation in Viśistādvaita metaphysics

We may now examine, how the substance-non-substance relation is made use of in explaining the relation between the ultimate substance Brahman or Śvāra and His modes, the material world and selves, by Viśistādvaita.
Visishtādsvaita makes a distinction between entities which are qualities or attributes only and those which are substances primarily, but are also attributes of another substance. These are designated as the modes (prakārās) of that substance.

The difference between the two in terms of their relation with the substratum has been clearly stated by Varāḍachāri. He points out that an attribute cannot be seen elsewhere than in its own subject. The object cannot be conceived without its attributes and the attributes cannot be experienced without the substance.112 A mode on the other hand, is an entity which can be realised apart from its substrate (duḥṣṭārtha). It is an entity that may be perceived or realised even when we do not see the substance of which it is a function or attribute.113

This distinction can be expressed from the point of view of the substance also. A substance may be conceived to be different from its absolute relations or modes and one can understand its nature (svarūpa) as distinct from its modes.114 It should however be noted that this distinction is not explicitly stated in the writings of Rāmānuja. Varāḍachāri points out that neither Rāmānuja, nor his commentators have given specific terms for differentiating between these two in spite of implicitly recognising this distinction.115

This distinction is significant in elucidating the relation between Brahman and the other two reals recognised by the system.
Both the material world and the selves are said to be the
codes of Brahman, though they are substances in their own
right also. As Hiriyanna observes, "Rāmaṇja recognises as
ultimate and real the three factors (tattva-traya) of matter
(s citt), soul (cit) and God (Īśvara). Though equally ultimate,
the first two are absolutely dependent upon the last, the
dependence being conceived as that of the body on the soul."¹¹³

By defining both the material world and selves as attrib-
utes or codes of Brahman, and describing the relation between
them as nāsthaka-siddhi their dependence on, and inseparability
from, the ultimate principle are emphasised. This, however,
does not imply that the two are identical. The modes can be
understood without any reference to the substance also.

This also implies that it is possible to differentiate between
the qualities of the modes and the qualities of the substratum.
As Varamadhari remarks, "Whilst some things stand in an in-
sparable relation to a particular thing, as such constituting
what are called its modes, it may possess individual qualities
expressive of its perfections. Brahman as the ideally perfect,
as the absolute spirit in all intelligent, great and powerful,
formful (dosh-traya), omniscient, omnipotent, etc., which
qualities (guṇa) cannot be derived from their substance."¹¹⁷
2.5. DVAITA ON SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE RELATION

2.5.1. The ultimate categories

Like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Viśisṭādvaita, Dvaita also discusses the substance-attribute relation extensively. Dvaita classifies existence into ten ultimate categories, viz., substance, attribute, action, class, character, individuator, quality, whole, power, similarity and negation. It may be noted that Dvaita has excluded some of the categories introduced by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and has included a few others not recognised by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The reason given for the inclusion of most of these categories is that they are required by experience or have empirical support. A closer study, however, reveals that these categories serve the purpose of not only explaining empirical experience but support some of the theological propositions of the school as well.

2.5.2. Substance

Dvaita definition of substance is broadly similar to that of the other two systems. Substance is the substratum of qualities and possesses material causality. A substance is an entity that has the potentiality to undergo modifications. Since the implication of these characteristics have already been presented in the course of our discussion about the other systems, they need not be repeated here. Dvaita holds that the term 'substance' is applicable to the following
twenty entities, viz., God, Lakshmi, souls, unmanifest ākāśa, prakṛti, the three guṇas, mahaț, ahańkara, buddhi, manas, indriyaś, tattvās. The elements, 'brahmāṇḍa, avidyā, vāya, darkness, vāsanās, time and, reflection, etc. 120 A study of this list reveals that the substance denotes a wide range of phenomena in this system. It includes theological categories like God, Lakshmi etc., psycho-physical entities like, prakṛti, the three guṇas, mahaț, ahańkara, indriyaś, tattvās, bhūtas, etc. All these are said to manifest the characteristics that are attributed to substance, though they differ from each other in many respects.

2.5.3. Attribute

Dvaita interpretation of the term guṇa is broadly similar to that of the Naiyāyika in that guṇa is understood in terms of its relation with the substance, here also. However, it is necessary to note that though the term generally signifies any attribute, good or bad, Dvaita limits the term to those attributes that are free from defects. 121 This qualification is applicable to only to the attributes of Brahman. This point becomes evident by the list of attributes enumerated by Dvaita thinkers which include both good and bad attributes. 122 Dvaita holds that guṇaś are innumerable and only a few are specified by the Dvaita texts. 123
2.8.4. Substance-attribute relation

The relation between substance and attributes can be absolute distinction, absolute identity, or partial identity and partial difference. The positing of absolute distinction, the Dvaita points out, would preclude the possibility of the two being experience, together unless a third entity is introduced to relate the two. Dvaita admits both the other alternatives viz., identity and identity-in-difference. Dvaita classifies attributes into two types, those that are associated with the substances permanently, (ayavādṛavyaabhēvi) and those that are associated with substance contingently (ayavādṛavyasbhēvi). As the second class of attributes are contingently associated with the substance, there can be a change in these attributes without the substance losing its identity. Dvaita, therefore, advocates bhedaabheda relationship in the case of these attributes. 126

2.8.4.1. The category of viśesa

The problem is of a different nature with regard to the class of attributes which are associated with the substance permanently. Dvaita admits that the relation between attributes of this class and the substance is one of the identity. 126 But, Dvaita recognises that they are differentiated in ordinary usage on various grounds. The object and attributes are not synonymous in their connotation. The
perception of an object does not always involve the perception of all its attributes. Advaita in, therefore, confronted with the problem of explaining the possibility of differentiation between substance and attributes in the context of their irreseparability at the ultimate level. The Advaitin resolves this problem with the help of the category of videsa. As Sharma remarks, "It is in this crossing or intersection of identity and difference that Pachua finds the clue and the justification for his concept of videsa to bridge the gulf between substance and attributes and preserve the basic unity of experience without in danger sacrificing the numerous distinctions demanded and drawn by the necessities of scientific usage and practical utility." Videsa is defined as the peculiar potency of things which makes description and talk of difference possible where there is no difference in reality. This implies that the relation between the relata is not one of difference. But it is possible to differentiate between them in various contexts. This differentiation becomes possible because the entities possess a feature which facilitates such a differentiation. This feature is designated as videsa.

In view of the important nature of the concept, various dimensions of this conception have been discussed in detail by the Advaitins. Videsa is said to be a real entity in an objective sense, and is known through sakshi. Videsas are held to be innumerable. In view of the fact that this
is associated with objects of all orders and all levels. Dvaita holds that *videsa* can be of two types, eternal and non-eternal. It is eternal in the case of eternal entities and non-eternal in the case of non-eternal entities. 134

A question that can be raised here concerns the relation of *videsa* to the relata. Dvaita maintains that it relates itself to the relata without the assistance of any third entity. It is defined as self-relating (*svanirvādha)*. 135 As Śaṅkara observes, "*Videsa* is neither a third entity, nor a relation; it is a part and parcel of the term and yet capable of distinguishing the phrase and when necessary." 136 It is not meaningful to talk of the relation of *videsa* to its terms, because, though a distinct ontological category, it designates that aspect of the essential nature of the object which contributes to a possible differentiation of the substratum from the attributes.

The Dvaitins maintain that this notion is not applicable to phenomena in which there is a real difference, but operates only when there is identity along with the possibility of differentiation. It should be noted that the operation of *videsa* is, therefore, not restricted only to the substance-attribute complex. Śaṅkara states that the sphere of *videsa* includes not only the relation between the substance and attribute, but also that of the universal-particular, motion and energy and the things possessing them, *svarūpa* and *svarūpa*, etc. 137
The Dvaitins realize that the conception of \textit{vīdeśa} is open to a number of objections and elaborate attempts have been made to defend it against these objections. It is contended that even advocates of other alternatives like difference (\textit{bheda}) identity-in-difference (\textit{bheda-bheda}), etc., have to implicitly admit the principle of \textit{vīdeśa} in order to justify their position.  

According to Dvaita, the conception of \textit{vīdeśa} is free from the inadequacies that are found in the \textit{samavāya} conception of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Though posited as a distinct ontological category, as \textit{vīdeśa} is defined as part of the nature of the object, the Dvaitins argue, it does not require a third term to relate itself to the object. \textit{Samavāya} on the other hand, though defined as a self-relating category, is not defined as the part of the nature of the object and, therefore, need for another relation to relate it to the relata cannot be eliminated.

\textit{Vīdeśa} plays an important role in the Dvaita delineation of the relation between \textit{Brahman} and the attributes. Madhva holds that they are inseparable from the nature of \textit{Brahman} and in view of this inseparability attributes may be interpreted as identical with one another. But, if this identity is granted, it becomes necessary to reconcile this identity with the conceptual and verbal description of difference of attributes found in texts and tradition as well as experience. It is in this context that the principle of \textit{vīdeśa} becomes meaningful.
As Nagaraja Sharma observes, "It renders possible the maintenance of identity between Brahman and its Attributes, identity again between the Infinite number of Infinite attributes and a descriptive affirmation of difference between a Substance and Attributes." 136

2.6. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

2.6.1. The ultimate categories

A study of the views of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Viśistādviṭa and Dvaita regarding the substance-attribute relation reveals that the conceptions of 'substance' and 'attribute' play an important role in the metaphysical scheme postulated by these systems. All the four systems maintain that the universe of experience can be classified into a finite number of ultimate categories. More significantly, all the systems, while attributing reality to the objects of the empirical world, interpret them as transitory manifestations of ultimate principles which are not objects of direct apprehension. But the ultimate reality is conceived differently by each system. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocates a pluralistic scheme even at the ultimate level. The objects of the empirical world are explained as products of combinations of the ultimate material entities, viz., atoms. Sāṅkhya, Viśistādviṭa and Dvaita hold that a unitary material principle underlies all the variety and diversity of the
anifest world. But the description of prakṛti as constituted of the three guṇas suggests that there is a recognition of the seed to postulate variety even at the ultimate level. According to all the systems excepting Saṁkhya, substance and attribute constitute two of the ultimate categories that underlie the universe of experience.

6.2. Substance

Substance is broadly defined as the substratum of attributes and as an entity which has the potentiality to undergo change. The number of ultimate substances varies from system to system. Substance, for these systems denotes not merely purely material entities, but psycho-physical and spiritual entities along with others which seem to have a theological significance.

6.3. Attribute

The nature of attribute has also been discussed extensively. Attribute denotes those dimensions of experience which are apprehended in a number of entities and are always found in association with some substratum. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Dvaita hold that attribute is a distinct ontological category, but Viśiṣṭādvaita includes it under the broader category of non-substance.

6.4. Substance-attribute relation

Though Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita hold that substance and attribute represent distinct ontological
categories, the relation between the two at the ultimate level has been conceived differently by each system. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that the two are distinct and separate ontological categories. Viśistādwaita and Śvētāmbara contend that substance and attribute are not separable at the ultimate ontological level. All the three systems, however, admit that substance and attribute are inseparable at the level of experience and different strategies are adopted by each system to explain his inseparability. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that, though distinct, they are empirically inseparable as they are related by samvada, a self-relating relational category postulated by the system. In view of the inseparability posited at the ontological level, Viśistādwaita does not require a third principle to relate the two. Viśistādwaita maintains that the relation itself can be described as one of inseparability aprthakāddhi). Śvētāmbara recognises that, though ontologically separable, substance and attribute are distinguishable. This is explained with the help of the category of viśeṣa, the otancy on the part of the substance to differentiate itself from the attribute. As already stated, the substance-attribute dichotomy, in the sense in which the terms are used in the other systems, has no place in the Śāṅkhya metaphysics. However, the views of Śāṅkhya regarding prakṛti-guna relationship suggest that this system does not advocate any real distinction between the two at the ultimate level.
2.3.4.1. **Samavāya and Viśesa - A Comparative Analysis**

The *samavāya* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the *viśesa* of Dvaita are similar to the extent that both are treated as categories ontologically distinct from the relata they relate. But significant differences are found in the way the ontological nature of these principles has been delineated by the respective systems. *Samavāya* is described as a conceptual and not an existential category, and its unitary and eternal nature follow from this initial proposition. *Viśesa*, however, seems to connote a material rather than a conceptual entity as *viśesas* are held to be innumerable, admitting of classification into eternal and non-eternal varieties depending on the nature of the relata. More significantly, the two differ in their functional implications. In the context of on the ontological distinction between substance and attribute advocated by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *samavāya* acts as a unifying principle relating distinct entities and by explaining their inseparability at the empirical level. On the other hand, *viśesa* acts as a differentiating force enabling us to distinguish between two inseparable entities.

Another question that can be raised relates to whether these relational categories can be interpreted in the framework of the internal and external dichotomy. A relation between two terms is called external when (1) it is
ontologically independent of, and can not be reduced to, the terms it relates and (2) when it does not bring about any change or identification in the terms so related. Sushanta Sen has argued that samavāya is an external relation. Denying the view of Radhakrishnan that samavāya represents an internal relation, she maintains that samavāya can not be reduced to the terms it relates, nor does it modify its terms since the ultimate entities posited by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, viz., atoms, do not admit of any modification in a real sense. It is true that samavāya is not reducible to the terms it relates, but it is difficult to admit that it does not modify the terms, because it is only by being related by samavāya that the relata manifest inseparability at the empirical level. Similarly, Viśeṣa is described as a distinct ontological category, but is also said to be an essential aspect of the relata it differentiates. Alexander's view that the internality and externality of relations depend upon the way the terms are used seems to be applicable here. These relational categories are external in that they have a distinct ontological reality of the same order as the terms they relate, but to the extent they do not exist independently of the relata, they may be considered as internal to the terms also.
2.6.5. Realistic implications of the views of Indian systems

The realistic orientation of these systems is evident in the attribution of equal ontological reality to both the material and mental dimensions of experience. Further, between the two, greater importance is assigned to the material dimension. Consciousness is defined as an attribute of a substantive entity by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Viśistādvaīta and Dvaita. All the four systems hold that the objects of experience are independent of the experiencer. The classifications of ultimate categories offered by these systems indicate that objective reality is attributed to all dimensions of experience including many apparently subjective dimensions.

2.6.6. Western realism and Indian realism – a comparative account

A comparative study of the views of Western and Indian realistic systems reveals that the possibility of differentiating between substance and attribute has been admitted in both the traditions. But we find an important difference between the Western and Indian approach to this question. A primary problem encountered by Western realism has been that of validating the ontological relevance of the notion of substance against the objections raised by the empiricists. The New Realist, accepting the empiricist arguments denies the metaphysical reality of substance. But such a position fails to
explain an important dimension of experience, viz., that certain collections of attributes are generally perceived together in a unitary form, continue to be experienced in that form and manifest other distinctive traits. The Critical Realist recognising the importance of this aspect of experience maintains that, though attributes constitute the content of experience, they reveal the existence of an underlying substance.

The Indian systems adopt a position broadly similar to that of the Critical Realist. They ascribe equal ontological reality to both substance and attribute. Further, they go beyond the position advocated by the Critical Realist and contend that substance is directly perceived and establish the reality of substance on empirical grounds. Unlike the Western systems which emphasise the attributive dimension of experience, the Indian systems attribute primacy to the substantive dimension, when the relative importance of the two is evaluated.

8.6.7. Indian views — a critical estimate.

The extent to which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Śāṅkya, Viśiṣṭādvaīta and Dvaita have resolved the problems involved in the substance-attribute relation may also be estimated. It has to be admitted that systems which advocate the substance-attribute dichotomy, recognise the various problems involved in the substance-attribute relation. Each system attempts to offer
an analysis that satisfactorily explains all the aspects of the phenomena interpreted in the substance-attribute framework. A close study, however, reveals the inadequacy of each solution. The *samavāya* conception of the Naiyāyika has been subjected to a number of criticisms, as it is held to be a distinct category relating the relata. By defining *samavāya* as a self-relating category the Naiyāyika emphasises the difficulty rather than resolving it. Junakher describes the *samavāya* conception as an inexplicable one. He remarks, "The relata between substance and its properties is one of inherence (*samavāya*) but the Naiyāyika frankly admits that he cannot explain what it is." Similarly, the *arthasaścādhipi* concept of Viśiṣṭādvaita does not explain but only describes the relation between substance and attribute. According to Datta, the term *arthasaścādhipi* conceals rather than answers the difficulty. Dvaita holds that *viśeṣa* as a distinct ontological category but describes it as an essential part of the nature of the relata. The ambiguous nature of the conception is indicated by Sharva's description of *viśeṣa* as an 'unnamable something'.

It may be said that some of the problems involved in the substance-attribute relation originate in, and remain unresolved, due to the complex nature of phenomena denoted by the conceptions of 'substance' and 'attribute'. These notions along with many other metaphysical notions are the products
of attempts by philosophers to reduce the universe of experience into a minimum number of ultimate principles. The purpose underlying such a programme of reduction is to evolve a theoretical basis for a philosophic discussion. In the course of such an attempt a number of principles, considered to be the irreducible ultimates required to account for the various aspects of experience, are postulated as ultimate categories. Each of these categories cover a wide range of phenomena sharing certain distinctive characteristics. Part of the difficulty encountered in defining the notion of substance, therefore, is due to the fact that 'substance' denote entities which manifest static as well as dynamic characteristics. The same is true of attribute. Some of the difficulties encountered in analysing the substance-attribute relation, therefore, follow from the complex nature of the terms involved in this relation.

Further, in the case of the systems studied here, the problem assumes additional dimensions in view of the relationship between the metaphysical postulates presupposed, and the analysis of empirical phenomena offered by each system. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Viśistadvaita and Dvaita recognise the metaphysical importance of the notions of substance and attribute and the need to delineate the relation between the two. But variations are found in the number of entities classified
as substances and attributes and the accounts offered regarding the relation between the two. These differences are explainable in terms of the fundamental metaphysical postulates advocated by each system. The Nyāya school, consistent with his pluralistic approach, ascribes independent existence to both the relata and explains their empirical inseparability with the help of a third category. The Viśistadvaitin's views regarding the substance-attribute relation are influenced by his views regarding the nature of ultimate reality. In the context of the Viśistadvaita view that the material world and selves are attributes of the ultimate Substance, viz., Brahman, the advocacy of an ontological distinction between substance and attribute would imply that the world and selves are also distinct from substance ontologically, तत्वतत्त्वमात्मात्मात् (tattvamat tattvam). The Advaita account of substance-attribute relation is intended to explain empirical usage as well as the nature of the relation between Brahman and His attributes.