CHAPTER V

THE RECIPIENT (SAMPRADĀNA)
Two Kinds of Sampradāna: Helaraja has asserted that Sampradāna is of two kinds viz. technical (śāstrīya) and popular (laukika) which are later on hinted by Nārāyaṇa in his Dipaprabhā, a commentary on Vārarucaśaṅgrahā. K. A. S. Iyer has called these two kinds of Sampradāna by the names minor and main respectively. The popular or main type of Sampradāna is that which is designated by P.1.4.32; and the designation Sampradāna prescribed by P.1.4.33-36, 38-41 and 44 is called by the name technical or minor Sampradāna, because it is done in order to explain the syntactic structure of Sanskrit language or to extend the realm of the term Sampradāna.

Justification of this classification: As both the kinds, namely, popular and technical, are prescribed in the science of grammar, one may doubt about the consistency of this classification. To avert this doubt it is said that the term sampradāna prescribed by P.1.4.32 is etymological significant as Hari, Kāśikākāra, etc. have observed and thus carries the same sense as is prevalent in popular usages. Therefore, to call it by the name popular (laukika) is appropriate. The designation sampradāna done by 1.4.33, etc. is only to extend the realm of the term sampradāna, because in such cases as Devadattāya rocate', etc. there is no such conditions as are necessary to designated as sampradāna. The name sampradāna pres-

1. Hel, Pr, 3.7.30, P.335: शास्त्रीयभौतिकतमेदन दिवमिं समप्रदानम्।
3. Iyer, K. A. S., The Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, Chapter III,
   English Translation, 3.7.130 Preface, P.223.
cribed to such instances is based purely on grammatical consideration, i.e., to explain the fourth case-ending in the syntactic structure. Thus, to call this category of Sampradāna by the name technical (Sāstrīya) is appropriate. The ground of this classification is the assertion of Bhartrhari in which he asserts that the Pāṇini’s sūtras, namely, 1.4.33, etc. have given the name sampradāna what would otherwise have been Hetu, Karman or Sesa.

Popular Sampradāna as defined by Pāṇini (1.4.32): Pāṇini has introduced the term sampradāna in the jurisdiction of ‘Kāraka’ technically as ‘Karmaṇaḥ yamabhiprāti sa sampraddhā‘, i.e. the object to which one wishes to connect with through the instrumentality of karman of the verb of giving is recipient or what is desired by the agent through the instrumentality of the object of the expressed verb is sampradāna. For instance, the teacher and the enemy in the expressions ‘Upādhyayaya gām dadāti’ (gives cow to the teacher) and ‘śatrave praharatyastram’ (attacks on enemy throwing a weapon) respectively are sampradāna.

4. Hel, Pr, 3.7.130, P.335: कन्योत्तच्छ सम्प्रदानस्वयम्य लोकिक एव सम्प्रदानार्थः। पूर्वैनुमून्तः। च तु संख्याःदिविषयं वस्त्रमहत्स्वाभास्मृतिमेतद्यद्वैतनात्य शरस्त्र-रम्भमार्ण्यानुमून्त सम्प्रदानस्वयमः। Cf. Vā.Śam., Dīpaprabhā, P.10.

5. WP, 3.7.130: हेतुवेच कर्मदात्वाय शेषस्ते वाचिकारस्मृतः। संख्यादिविषया शास्त्रेः सम्प्रदानस्वयमः।

6. P.1.4.32.

7. KV, 1.4.32, P.545: क्योग्या करणामूलेन कल्या व्यमेनिति वन्यस्वयमेन् तत्कारां सम्प्रदानस्वयमः। क्योग्यिताः विज्ञानोस्वयमाद विक्रमिति विज्ञातोऽसि। Cf. S.K., 569, P.635.

8. KC, P.109: क्योग्या करणामूलेन व्यमेनित्विति तत्कारां सम्प्रदानस्वयमः। Cf. SK, 1.4.32, P.120, VB, P.141.
Before proceeding towards the treatment of sampradāha
made by Kaundabhatta, Nāgėsa and other schools of grammar it is
desirable to examine Pāṇini's definition of sampradāha particularly
with regards to the words karman, yam and sah, and abhipraiti.

Purpose of the term Karmanā: The sampradāha is that Kāraka which
is intended through the instrumentality of karman and for this purp­
ose Pāṇini has put forth the word Karmanā in the definition of
sampradāna. The purpose of his doing so is that the term sampra­
dāna would not be applied to the object such as cow in the sentence
'Upādhyaśya āgam dādāti' (gives cow to the teacher). Here one may
contend that for this purpose the word karman is not necessary in
the definition of sampradāna. To designate teacher in the said
expression as sampradāna the word karman is not required, as the cow
receives the designation karman on account of the later prescription,
i.e., 1.4.49, and hence teacher will only be left to be labelled as
sampradāna. Thus the sūtra 'yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam', i.e.,
what is desired by the agent is sampradāna, should be quite appro­
priate to designate the term sampradāna. Thus there is not only
the brivity that is so much desired by Pāṇini but the shortcoming
that falls on the use of the word karman in the definition is also
ratified. On using the word karman in the definition it does not
applicable in case of the intransitive verbs. On omission of this
word there would be no need to add kriyā, as suggested by Kātyāyana,
in the sūtra to justify the designation sampradāna in connection

9. Pradāpa, 1.4.32, P.256: तत्र पर्त्याद्वारः: कर्मेशति पारिशेष्यादुपारिषेष्यायस्येत्
सम्प्रदायेऽवस्मिति। Cf FM, 1.4.32, P.547.
with intransitive \textit{verbs} and the example like 'Fatye sete' (lies for husband) would now be valid through the remaining sūtra.

However, a flaw in this argument is not far to be sought. As Patañjali observes the definition without the word karmanā, \textit{Niravakasa} (having no scope for application) would be equally applicable to karman also. Kaiyata on the strength of maxim 'Asiddham bahiraṅgāṃ antaraṅge' (that which is bahiraṅga is regarded as not having taken effect or as not existing, when that which is antaraṅga is to take effect) exposes the validity of Patañjali’s observation. According to him, karman, i.e., cow in the above expression is directly related to the action of giving. The teacher too is related to the verb of giving, but only indirectly, i.e., through the cow. Thus the cow being internal (antaraṅga) would receive the designation sampradāna and not the teacher. Thus in the absence of the word karmanā the definition would lead to an entirely undesirable situation. Being so the designation karman becomes 'Niravakasa' (having no scope for application).

The principle of elimination (Pārisēga) suggested by Kaiyata to show that the designation sampradāna would only be...
applied to teacher and not to cow is, however, not acceptable, as it is based on the principle of paratva. The principle of paratva is not legitimate here, as its application is possible where the two concerned rules having scope elsewhere claim their applications on a common point. But here the designation karman is 'Nirvakaśā' (having no scope for application) as the designation sampradāna is applicable to the cow on the ground of its being internal, as we have seen above. In other words one cannot show an exclusive instance where the designation karman is applicable without the involvement of the designation sampradāna. Thus in case of Nirvakaśā as the principle of paratva is not appropriate the solution based on its assumption is no longer entertainable.

Thus when the term sampradāna equally applies to karman the term karman has no scope. But since it is prescribed by Pāṇini it must have scope. This is only possible in two ways - either by co-application (Samāvesa) or application in turn (Paryyāya). The first possibility cannot come into practice on the strength of P.1.4.1 which restricts only one name for one nameable at a time. The second one is also not applicable because in the case of the two alternative designation there would be no point for Pāṇini to formulate the rule 2.3.12 which prescribes the optional use of the dvitiyaś and caturthī in connection with the action involving movement.

Therefore to prevent the over application of the term sampradāna in the domain of karman the statement of the word karmanā in the definition of sampradāna is inevitable and not

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15. P.1.4.1, शाखाराजदेका संस्था
16. P.2.3.12, गत्येक्षेत्रपैत्र: बित्ति याकौ वैष्टयायामनवनि
17. Pradīpaka, 1.4.32, P.256.
extraneous. The notion becomes pertinent with the statement of 'karmaṇepaṭitaṃ' read in the definition of sampadrāṇa put forth by Bhartrhari.

Purpose of the term Yam and saḥ: Patañjali has pointed out the shortcoming in connection with the sūtra in case it is without the words 'yam' and 'saḥ', i.e., 'karmaṇaḥbhiprāti sampadrāṇam' (he who has something in view through the direct object is called sampadrāṇa). According to him now the designation sampadrāṇa would only apply to one who has something in view (abhiprayata), i.e., the agent. In that case it would result in the wrong use like 'ḥiṣyayopadhyāyasya gaurdīyat' in the sense of 'Upadhyāyasya hiṣyena gaurdīyat' (a cow is given to the teacher by the student).

To avert this inaccuracy if it is argued that designation Kartr being Niravakasa (having no scope for application) would prevail over the term sampadrāṇa cannot be accepted. The nomenclature agent has scope for application in case of the intransitive verbs such as Devadatta āste, āte, etc. Moreover, to remove the above inaccuracy if one assume the supply of relative pronouns, namely, 'yam' and 'saḥ', in P.1.4.32 on the ground that the supplying of relative pronouns is not something unusual in Pāṇini’s rules is not to the mark. The supply of any word in any sūtra of Pāṇini is legitimate only where the completion of syntactic construction —-----------------------------

18. Vf, 3.7.128, P.332.
21. For instance, in P.1.4.49 and 54 we supply Yat, Tad and Yah, saḥ, respectively. Cf. Kāśikā, 1.4.49 & 54.
requires it. But in the present case the rule without Yam and Sah conveys the complete sense, i.e., one who has something in view through the direct object is sampradāna. Hence it is not possible to have the relative pronouns ‘yam’ and ‘sah’ in the Sūtra through the method of supplying (adhyānāra).

Even if we invoke the principle of supplying of relative pronouns it is only possible to supply ‘yah’ and ‘sah’ pronouns and not required ‘yam’ and ‘sah’, as is observed by Haradatta. But even on supplying the ‘yah’ and ‘sah’ position remains the same as without them. No improvement takes place. Even now the use of ‘śayyora-dhyāya-sa gaundiyate’ would be applicable in place of the desired use ‘Upādhyāya Sesvēna gaundiyate’.

Thus for the vivid knowledge of the term sampradāna the reading of ‘yam’ and ‘sah’ is required in the Sūtra P.1.4.32.

Purpose of Abhi-pa: Pāṇini has used two prefixes viz. Abhi and pra, with the verb ‘stā’ (to go or to attain) in the rule P.1.4.32 but the meaning of it remains the same even after affixing them. Thus, they should not have been used for the sake of brivity which is fundamental characteristics of Pāṇini.

View of Patanjali: Patanjali has disclosed the drawbacks in connection with the Sūtra in case it is without the preverbs ‘Abhi’ and ‘Pra’, i.e., ‘Karmaḥ yametī sa sampradānam’ (to whom one has undertaken the action of going through the object is a

22. Fradīpa, 1.4.32, P.256: नमदार्धस्वच्छितम् निराणात्युक्तप्रश्चात्याः।
Cf. Pāṇi. 1.4.32, P.547, BSS, Catuirūkāra, P.884.
23. Pāṇi. 1.4.32, P.547: सत्यपि वायुःद्वायान्नि: स इत्यत्वथाध्यात्मारात्।
24. Fradīpa, 1.4.32, P.256: कैशन्त योनिः गच्छति, प्राप्यन्ति सम्भवनातीत्यथेः।
Cf. Pāṇi, 1.4.32, P.547.
sampradāna). According to him, now the designation sampradāna would only apply to the sphere of the present tense such as in the case of teacher in the expression 'Uparṣayāya gām dadāti' (he gives a cow to his teacher) and not in reference to the action which is a matter of past or future as in the case of the examples 'Uparṣayāya gāmadāt' (He presented a cow to his teacher) and 'Uparṣayāya gāmadāsyati (he will present a cow to his teacher).

In other words, in the absence of 'abhi' and 'pra' there is chance of the intention of time. In that case the designation sampradāna would be applicable only to the action being performed, because the verb 'Eti' being a form of 'lat' conveys the sense of present.

Thus as the term sampradāna is bound to be restricted in present, Panini has employed two preverbs 'abhi' and 'pra' to compensate for this. By the use of 'abhi' and 'pra' the idea of having somebody in view (ābhimukhya) occurs in the mind and now the application of the term sampradāna becomes possible in connection with all tenses. The two preverbs make the verb devoid of the sense of particular time and thus now the designation sampradāna is not be limited to a particular time. All the three times, i.e., the past, present and future, are now covered by the definition.

The abovestated purpose of abhi - pra is, however, required only when the suffix 'tip' in 'Eti' is used intentionally.

25. Mbhā, 1.4.32, F.256: 'कैरणां योगलिः स हर्म्यावनस् ' छतासच्छासानानि

26. Ibid*: इति जिसि न दीर्घे मवति | जिपिरामिद्रये बलिते, पृ

shubhā च अदिकम्बिता | तैन यं चामित्रित यं च चिप्रित्याति य चामित्रागादिपिद्रयात्रे

सूर्येऽं सिद्ध मवति | Cf.Nyāsa, 1.4.32, P.548.

to specify the notion of time along with its another meanings. If we, however, presume that the time notion is not intended to be conveyed in the word 'Eti', the question of making it devoid of the particular time - notion through the use of preverbs does not arise. The intention of the speaker determines the meaning of a word is a well-accepted principle. This principle is followed by Pāṇini is beyond controversy. The suffixes denoting time, number and gender have been used by him in the non-intentional way. In other words, they have no bearing as far as the application of the rule is concerned. For instance, in Pāṇini 4.4.2 the suffix 'tip' in 'divyati' should not lead us to think that the nouns derived are to be used in the singular only and their meaning is confined to the present tense, lest the desired usage like 'Aṣṭikāḥ divyāti', 'Aṣṭikāḥ deviśyati, adviyāt' etc. should be considered illegitimate. In the same way, in P.4.1.92 when gender is considered non-intentional use, only then the suffix 'nān' is applicable to the base 'stri' to express the sense 'offspring of a woman' (śraṇāh). In case of the intentional use of the gender the application of the suffix denoting 'the descendant of some one' (Apatya) is only possible in connection with the masculine gender. Therefore, on the ground of these evidences it is not awkward to consider that the suffix 'tip' in 'Eti' is a non-intentional use as regards to the time, person and number. Even now, one may argue that the sutra 1.4.32 does not come under the sphere of the principle of intention and hence it

27. KV. 4.1.92: लघुष्णकात्विषवस्यत्वविषविश्चितम्

28. P.4.4.2: केव दीर्घति लंति वयति जितम्

29. P.4.1.92: तत्स्यापत्थम्
is difficult to consider that the suffix 'tip' in 'eti' is a non-intentional use. But this is not the fact. In case of intentional use the desired usages like 'Viprebhyādadāti' (He gives to brahmins), 'Kanyāvai dadāti' (gives to his daughter), etc. are not appropriate, because in 'yam' and 'saḥ' there is singular number and masculine gender. Thus for the justification of these usages when the number and the gender are considered non-intentional use, there is no difficulty to presume that the suffix 'tip' in 'eti' is a non-intentional use in regards to time. 30. Jinendra-buddhi with the help of example 'Jo'rtho yo' narthām bādhatē ityukte yo'pi bādhita-vān yo'pi bādhita-vatē sa'pyartha eva 31 has proved the fact that the non-intention of time is not only possible but also desirable. Thus when it is accepted that the suffix in 'eti' is a non-intentional use as regards to time, number and person there remains no purpose of prefixing the preverbs 'abhi' and 'pra' to 'eti' in P.1.4.32.

Purpose suggested by Kaiyata and Haradatta: Nevertheless, Panini has used them to give a clear idea of the above mentioned fact attained by reasoning, i.e., the non-intentional use of the suffix as regards the notion of time.

Apart from this, Haradatta has expressed another purpose of abhi-pra. According to him 'abhīpraitei' has two meanings—connection (sambadhānati) and desired (ipsati). The meaning sambadhānati is possible even in the absence of 'abhi' and 'pra' as stated above. But to take 'abhīpraitej' in the sense of 'ipsati' 32. Nyāsa, 1.4.32, 1.4.32, P.543, Pradāpa, 1.4.32, P.256, P.M., 1.4.32, P.547.

30. Nyāsa, 1.4.32, P.548.
31. Nyāsa, 1.4.32, P.548.
32. Pradāpa, 1.4.32, P.256: एवं ताहि न्यायविद्येत्याचारः उपस्थितियोपादानेन प्रदस्यै।
Cf. PM, 1.4.32, P.547.
the use of 'Abhi and Pra' is inevitable, because the root 'hiṅ' preceded by 'abhi' and 'pra' is equal to 'Tsita'.

Jinendrabuddhi has put forth the significance of 'abhi' and 'pra' in another way. According to him these two preverbs being extravagant enhance the meaning of rule. By this dint he rebutts the addition of action (kriyā), as suggested by Katyāyana, in the rule. Thus these two prefixes are meant for the refutation of such addition as later on suggested by Katyāyana.

Sampradāna defined by P.1.4.32 a technical term:

Etymological Sense of the term: Exposing the Pāṇini's rule 1.4.32, Kāśikākāra has asserted that the term sampradāna accords with its etymological sense and thus its application is legitimate only in the connection with the action of giving. By employing the word 'dāna', the exposition of P.1.4.32 Bhattoji Diksita has also followed the suit. The base of their observation may be lengthy designation. In Pāṇini's system samjña is meant for brivity and thus the reading of lengthy designation suggests only that the samjña (sampradāna) must be understood in accordance with its derivational sense. Thus the term, being a lengthy designation must have etymological sense. Following the etymological sense the designation sampradāna should be applied to the washerman and the beater.

33. PM, 1.4.32, P.547: का क्षरित्कियति क्षरित्वे एकस्तीत्वे, शाक्तिनिरपराण कार्यस्व
34. Nyāsa, 1.4.32, P.548: एते तिष्ठापिः क्षरित्विति तस्यां परः सम्प्रवानस्या सिद्धा प्रवति
35. KV, 1.4.32, अन्येकसंसादविजयाः अन्येकसंसादविजयाः बिधायते।
36. Sk, 569, P.635: दानस्य कप्रेणा क्षरित्विति सम्प्रवानस्य: स्वादु्।
37. Mbhś, 1.4.23, P.242: तपस्य च स संसादस्यान्।
in the expressions like 'Rajakasya Vastram dadati' (He gives clothes to a washerman) and 'Ghnatah pratham dadati' (He turns his back towards the striker) because here the verb 'da' is expressively used. To restrict this kind of overapplication Jindrabuddhi says that donation (Dāna) means 'Cessation of one's ownership over something and creating ownership of somebody else without taking anything in return and not only to hand over something to another. The same sense of 'dāna' has been shared by the later grammarians like Haradatta, Bhattoji Dīksita, Jhānendra Saraswati, etc. Rāma Tarkavagīsa in his Mugdhabodha's commentary has endorsed this sense of donation by defining sampradāna as the receiver (arpanasthāna) of the gift is known as sampradāna only if he gets the offering given to him with worship, favour, etc. Thus following this sense of donation there is no question of designating the washerman and the beater as sampradāna, as in these contexts the root 'dā' is used in its secondary sense, i.e., to hand over the clothes for washing only and not for ever.

Thus according to the explanation made by Kāśikākāra and Bhattoji Dīksita it is evident that Pāṇini has used the term

39. Nyāsa, 1.4.32, P.546: दानं हि नाम पुजानुसारस्याया स्वकीयकृत्यायाम: परप्रवृत्यायाम:।
40. Pañchi, 1.4.32, P.547.
41. Frau.M., Caturtha, P.692.
42. TB, 568, F.634; VSB, Darpana, P.214, Laxmi, P.813.
43. Mugdhabodha, 295, P.306.
sampradāna in its etymological sense. The notion gains strength with the treatment of Sampradāna made by other school of grammar as well as Mīmāṃsakas. Jīvagoswāmi in his 'Harināmāmṛtam' has said that what is connected with the donation is Sapradāna. Thus according to him the term sampradāna agrees to its derivational sense. Bhāṭa Mallika in his Kārakollasa has followed the suit. The Mīmāṃsakas accept the etymological significance of the term sampradāna. According to Khandadeva, a specific recipient which is the purpose of the substance being given is called Sampradāna. The same view has been presented by the Someśwara Bhāṭa in his Nyāyasudha.

The Bhartrhari's definition of sampradāna, i.e., that factor in the act of giving which is sought to be reached by the thing given is called Sampradāna, is also suggestive of the fact that the term sampradāna is a significative one (āvartha). It is clear from the Helārāja's commentary. According to him, the use of the word 'tyāga' in the definition is only legitimate when the term sampradāna is considered etymologically significant. He has

44. Harināmāmṛtam, 1039, P.448: पुद्देरामिकार्यानां समप्रदानस्।
45. Kārakollasa, 56, दानात्मकानथानि के लम्पो पुजाताना समप्रदानस्।
46. VSN, 1.4.32, P.825-26: मीमांसाकार्यांके शासनाद्वारा संप्रदानस्नानाद्वारा स्वति स्वीकारतः समप्रदानस्।
47. Bhatta Dīpiṅka, 2.1.9, P.129: समप्रदानस्नानाद्वारा त्वायूक्तिः प्रायदवधातिः प्रतिगृहीकृतिः।
48. Nyāya Sudhā, 2.2.10, P.751: समप्रदानश्च तत्त्वः त्वायूक्तिः प्रायदवधातिः प्रतिगृहीकृतिः-तृत्य समप्रदानश्च।
49. WP, 3.7.129: ब्याप्तिकारणात् कृष्णत्यागाद्वारा कृपिणस्तिः समप्रदानस्तिः।
50. Hel,PF,3.7.129: ब्याप्तिकारणात् समप्रदानश्वस्ति त्यागाद्वारा द्वितिः समप्रदानस्तिः।
exposed the word 'tyāga' thus: transference of one's ownership to somebody else through giving up one's own ownership on it. Thus the sense of 'tyāga' is the same as that of 'dāna'.

**Difficulties involved:** Following the etymological sense it is extremely difficult to justify the designation sampradāna in the usages of Mahābhāṣya like 'Na Śūrāya matīn dadyāt' (one should not impart instruction to śūdra) and 'Khāṇḍiko'pāḥhyāyah tasmāi capeṭam dadāti' (Khandika-teacher slaps him). In the first expression knowledge is not something which could be handed over after giving up its own ownership. In the second case the thrashed one does not accept the ownership of slap. Thus in these examples original sense of the verb of giving, i.e., dāna, does not exist. Therefore, it would be wrong to designate 'śūdra' and 'tad' as sampradāna in case of the term being etymologically significant.

Inadequacy of the corrective suggested by Helārāja: Accepting the term sampradāna as etymological significance Helārāja, however, has tried to justify the designation sampradāna in these instances. According to him, the case of ownership of the recipient on something should be decided on the ground of benefit which recipient gets from the thing received by him. If a thing received by him renders benefit to him it should be taken as received and owned by him. It

51. Hel., PP, 3.7.129: त्यागोऽद्वियानैनात्य स्वत्वतिनिवृत्या परस्वत्वावधानपूर्वः

52. It is not found in Mahābhāṣya, yet it is quoted on the name Patanjali by Kālayata. It is actually found in the Manusmṛti. (4.80).

is not possible to get benefit from a thing without owning it.

Thus according to Helārāja the term sampradāna is applicable
not only in case where the thing given becomes exclusive property
of donee but also where the thing given is beneficial to him,
though it has not become his property. Thus there is no difficul-
ty now in designating 'śūdra' as sampradāna, because the instruc-
tion given to him is certainly beneficial to him. Similarly, the
slap apparently is not a desirable thing to its recipient but it
renders good to the thrashed one. The slap given if borne enables
the student to achieve the fruit of study.

From the above discussion it is clear that the assumption
of etymological significance of the term sampradāna has forced
Helārāja to adopt such a far-fetched explanation to justify the
designation in case where no donation is meant at all. Anyhow,
the solution offered by Helārāja is not only a far-fetched but
it is also devoid of the capacity to solve the problems in all
instances. For example, the designation sampradāna in connection with the enemy in the expression 'atrave praharata-
strām' (attacks on enemy by weapons) would not be justifiable in
case of the term being etymologically significant. Therefore, it
is difficult to accept that the term sampradāna conforms to its
derivalional sense.

Technicality of the term: Views of Patanjali, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita,
Kaṇḍābhatṭa, Nāgasa, Nārāyana: Kālīyaṭa directly counters the
view of Vṛttikāra in regard to the etymological significance of

54. Hel. PP., 3.7.129, F.332: के ज व हानालकैन मन्त्रालर्ख्यक्षापक पार्शिव
परीपोषकिनिन परस्वलापायानयिप स्वीकृतम्।
the term sampradāna. He has asserted that both the etymological sense of the term sampradāna and the original sense of the verb 'dadāti', i.e., cessation of one's ownership along with the origination of ownership of the recipient are not correct. His assertion is based on Patanjali's usages. Patanjali has applied the designation sampradāna in connection with the verb of giving having not the original sense such as 'Khandikopādayāh tasmait Cēpetām dadāti'. (Khandika - teacher slaps on his face) and 'Na sūdayamatim dadyāt' (one should not impart instruction to sūdra). Moreover, from Patanjali's way of rejecting the addition of Kriyā, as suggested by Katyāyana, in the sūtra 1.4.32 and his contention that P.2.3.12 is a superfluous, it is evident that the term sampradāna does not accord to its etymological sense. Thus on the ground of these evidences it has to be accepted that according to Patanjali the nomenclature sampradāna does not conform to its derivational meaning.

Similarly, later grammarians like Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣitā and Kaunda Bhaṭṭa though not expressively have asserted that they, too, are not in favour of accepting the term sampradāna as derivationally.

56. Frādīpa, 1.4.32, P.257: कैशिकासूक्तकाव्यांग्नास्य दिविषयं स्य वस्मादनु-सौजन्यसूक्तकाव्य:। दार्शना स्वत्त्वनिवृत्तिः परस्वस्त्वविश्ववैवैति प्रत्यक्षार्थ:।

केदारसौ-प्रकाशम्।

57. Mbh., 1.1.1, P.152.
58. Supra, F. Note No. 52.
60. Mbh., 2.3.12, P.496.
61. Sk., 1.4.32, P.120-21.
significant. They have at first put forth the view of Vṛttikāra who has favoured the etymological sense of the term sampradāna and then that of Patañjali as against it. Nāgėśa in his Paramalaghu-mañjuśī has openly rejected the view of Vṛttikāra and supported the Patañjali’s view. He has also asserted that the verb ‘dā’ in the term sampradāna metaphorically (upalaksanataya) implies the sense of action (kriyā). Following this assertion, the word karmeṇa in P.1.4.32 denotes not only the object of the verb of ‘giving’ but also the object of any expressed verb and, consequently, the usages like ‘Bālāya Kathāṃ kathayati’ (tells the story to boy), ‘Jiguṣṭa Pākkikāṃ vyācaṣṭe (He explains Pākki to the student), etc., are valid in accordance with P.1.4.32.

Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in his explanation of P.1.4.32 has clearly disfavoured the view of the etymological significance of the term. For him the term is merely technical one. According to him, whatever is intended by the agent through the object of any expressed verb is designated sampradāna. For instance, enemy in the expression ‘strave praharatastram’ (attacks on the enemy by weapon).

Fact endorsed in other Schools: Prior to Bhaṭṭoji Dṛkṣita, Hemachandra in his ‘Biddha-Haimasabdānasamāna’ has defined sampradāna thus: ‘what is intended through karma or kriyā is sampradāna’—such as ‘Rājñe Kāryamācaṣṭe’ (He performs duties for the king), ‘Devya valim datte’ (He offers sacrifice to god), Patye sete (lies down for husband), etc. From this definition it is clear that

63. PLM, Karakarthaśicra, P.180.
64. LSS Caturthī P.713, ‘दानस्येति दानात्तवियेत्तथांत्र: ’; Ṣākyamunī śākyamunī
65. Prakriyā Sarvasva, L.4.32, P.121: ‘सत् कृत्ति सत् कृत्ति सत् कृत्ति सत् कृत्ति सत् कृत्ति सत् कृत्ति सत्
66. HSA, 2.2.25, P.63: ‘क्षरिणिणिणिणिणिणिणिणिणिणिणि’
according to Hemacandra the term sampradāṇa does not have its etymological meaning.

This is why Khandadeva in his 'Bhāṭṭa Rahasya' while stating the view of new-grammarians has vividly mentioned that according to them the term sampradāṇa is the subject of that desire which is the basis of fruit generated by the action associated therewith. This view does not favour the etymological significance of the term sampradāṇa.

Thus on the ground of above discussion it can be said that in the Pāṇini's system as well as in Sanskrit grammar the term sampradāṇa does not have its etymological sense.

Lengthy designation justified: When it is accepted that the term sampradāṇa is a purely technical term one may ask why Pāṇini has employed the lengthy designation sampradāṇa inspite of his strenuous attempts of brivity as is evident from the terms 'ṛti', 'ghu', etc. To satisfy this question the answer put forth by new-grammarians is that the term sampradāṇa is already so well known and established in tradition that Pāṇini could not overlook its traditional force and incorporated it in his system. Dr. N.C. Nath justifies the lengthy designation sampradāṇa by arguing that "the term has been made wide by dragging it to cases where there is no question of any give and take, such as sentences with the verbs ruch, krūdha, druṣṭa, irṣya, asuy - and their synonyms, and the verb sprh-, dhāri-, etc."

67. Bh.Rah, F.82: वैयक्तिकाभिधाक्यातांत्यस्तु "वर्तिष्ठायणेविशेषणांककरणादिभिःप्रकटमित्वो दृष्टःतत् ।

68. Cf. Sharm., Diptti, WKV, P.128.

69. VVs, Darpana, F.217, विद्यार्थीकरणोप्राचायांस्यायामुनिरूपित:।

Laxmi, 813. VVs, Prabhā, F.217. LS5, Varvarṇinī, P.713, etc.
Thus from these arguments it is clear that the term sampradāna is purely technical and has no concern with its etymological sense. In this respect George Cardona observes:

"What Pāṇini has done, then, is to take terms like sampradāna and empty them of their traditional meaning in order to use them for his grammar. What is to be called sampradāna, etc. depends upon the operations to be performed on item." 71

Possible difficulties in technical sense of the term removed: In the technical sense, i.e., non-significant, what is intended by the agent through the instrumentality of kārman of any expressed action called sampradāna. In this sense one may contend that there is scope to designate village as sampradāna in the expression 'Ajām nayati gramam' (brings a goat to the village) because village is intended by the kārman, i.e., goat, of the action of bringing. Thus it would result in such undesired usage as 'Ajām nayati grāmayā' in place of the desired one. To restrict such inaccuracy is the only purpose of taking the term sampradāna as having etymological significance. Being etymological significance there would be no question of designating village as sampradāna in the above instance because the verb 'dādati' is not used there.

However, Kaiyāṭa and his followers who claim the non-significant nature of the term sampradāna have asserted that there is no scope for such difficulty as introduced above. For example,


71. Cardona, George, Pāṇini's Syntactic categories, JOIB, 16, P.212.
According to Haradatta Panini has used the word karman in instrumental case in 1.4.32. From this it is deduced that to be designated as sampradāna the recipient must be intended through the instrumentality of karman. For instance, teacher is designated as sampradāna in the expression 'Upādhyāya gām dadāti', because cow being a karman in relation to the action of giving becomes, at the same time, karana in respect to the action of 'abhiprayaṇa'. Thus, the karman in the sentence must be related to the action of 'abhiprayaṇa' as instrument. Its relation to the verb of 'abhiprayaṇa' in capacity other than karana cannot be allowed. In that case there would be no scope for the application of the designation sampradāna to village in the above expression, because here the karman, i.e., goat, is not a karana in relation to the action of 'abhiprayaṇa'. In this expression only the relation between village and goat is intended to express. But whenever it is intended that village should be connected through goat in that case village must be designated as sampradāna and results in the use 'gām nayati grāmāya'.

To refute the abovesaid problem it is also said that in Panini's sūtra 1.4.32 'Yam' being primary connotes sesitva and 'karman' being secondary denotes sesatva and thus designation sampradāna has chance for application only where sesa - sesi relation exists. For instance in the expression 'Vipraya gām dadāti'...

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72. PM, 1.4.32, F.546: कर्माणि करणेतुत्तमं यत्वं श्यायानां श्यायानां प्रयत्नयो गायत्री गो: करण, श्यायः गायत्री गोः।
74. PM, 1.4.32, F.546: कर्माणि हत्सुकों यत्वं श्यायानां श्यायानां प्रवत्त्वत्वम्, कर्माणि निर्दिष्टः स्वाधैः करणस्ति शैवश्यामः च पृति द्वी॥

(gives cow to the Brahmin). In this expression the karman cow becomes karana in relation to reach 'vipra'. The giver desires the 'vipra' as he intends to give the cow. The cow serves as karana in his desiring the 'vipra.' Thus, the cow referred to by karman is a sesa (subordinate) while the 'vipra' referred to by 'yam' is a sesin (primary). The relation of sesa-sesin is understood from the sentence 'vipra ya gam dadati' which is not comprehended in the sentence 'Ajam nayati grama' . In the expression 'Ajām nayati grama' goat does not stand as a sesa, i.e., subordinate, to the village and vice versa. Thus, there is no question of designating village as sampradāna in the above instance even when term has no etymological significance and hence there is no need to consider the term sampradāna as etymologically significant to restrict such undesired consequences.

Sampradāna - according to Mīmāṃsakās: The point that designation sampradāna is applicable in sesa - sesi relation becomes pertinent with the assertion of Kaundabhatta. He expressively says that sesitva is another name of sampradāna. Similarly, Nāgęśa, too, has pointed out in his Brhat-Sabdendusekhara that sampradāna is also known as sesi. Kaundabhatta has asserted that sesitva, according to Mīmāṃsakās, is the subject of the desire of the agent. Commenting on this, Bālakṛṣṇa Pāṇcil in his Prabhā, a commentary on 'Vādyakarana bhusanāsāra,' has said that according to Mīmāṃsakās sampradāna is the subject of the desire of the giver such as 'vipra'

75. VBS, Subartha, P.215: ष्ट्रवेव शैवत्सन्तम्।
76. B&3, Caturthī, P.882: ष्ट्रवेव च उद्भव शैवस्च शैवीत्व च।
77. VBS, Subartha, P.215: लदृष्टवक्षान्वित व शब्रिव त्योगत्येऽयुगितं नित्यात्मविवेच्यात्।
in the expression 'Vipra yā gāṃ dadatī'. According to them, in donating cow to 'vipra' giver desires that 'vipra' should feel easiness which can be had by having a cow. This kind of desire resides in kartā along with the action of giving. Hence it would be wrong to consider sampradāna as a kāraka, because according to this definition it is absolutely associated with the desire of agent and has no connection with the action of giving. Thus this definition loses the kārakatva of sampradāna and hence it is difficult to consider it as an accurate definition.

Sampradāna in view of later grammarians: Later grammarians like Kaundabhatta has expressively said that purpose (Uddesya) is the meaning of dative case; while Nāgasa has pointed out that uddesya is the another name of Sampradāna. Bālakṛṣṇa Pancoła in his Prabhā, a commentary on 'Vaiyākaranabhusanasara' has exposed the 'purpose' in two ways. At the first instance, purpose is the object of that desire which is indicated by the point of the action implied by the meaning of the various verbs. Secondly, purpose is the object of that desire which is basis of the fruit generated by the action associated therewith. Regarding this exposition Dr. Siddheshwar Verma has observed that according to the former

78. VBŚ, Prabhā, P.215: धात्विच्छया यत्कथः तद्वौच्छिद्यद्वित्यक्षेत्राः तत्कथा।
79. Sharma, Diptti, VrKA, P.130.
80. VBŚ, Subartha, P.213: उद्देस्ययुक्तवेद्यः। तथाचि समुप्राप्तेऽस्तिति।
81. Bop. Caturthr, P.892: प्रकृतिः व उद्देस्यम् तद्यथेऽस्तिति।
82. VBŚ, Prabhā, P.213: उद्देस्यवृत्तं व तत्कथा।
83. Ibid: कथितवेद्यां तद्वृत्तमनुष्ठवत्तामणोऽधिकारिन्सक्यविच्छिद्यत्वं उद्देस्यत्वं।
interpretation the determinant of the purpose is the fruit. According to the latter, it is desire itself. It may be presumed that the latter view, being more psychological, will be acceptable.

**Gadadhara's view:** Gadadhara in his Vyutpativāda has expressed the same view. According to him, the subject of desire of the agent who is the substratum of fruit caused by the action is called sarnpradāṇa. He has also asserted that the same sense has been already expressed by Pāṇini in his 1.4.32.

**Difference between kārman and sarnpradāṇa:** It is evident from the above discussion that sarnpradāṇa is the subject of desire of the agent which is also the chief determinant in the designation of kārman. Following this analogy one may argue that there is no need to accept two different kārakas viz. sarnpradāṇa and kārman as their base, i.e., desire, is one. But following the Pāṇini's sūtras a vivid difference between kārman and sarnpradāṇa comes out and accordingly it is impossible to assert the oneness of two kārakas. According to Pāṇini, kārman is the most desired thing sought to be reached through his action by agent whereas sarnpradāṇa is intended through the instrumentality of kārman. Gadadhara has expressed the same difference between the kārman and sarnpradāṇa.

85. Vyā., Caturthī, F.446: तया च लिङ्गाज्यकपल्लभगितयाः कृतिरिक्षा-विषयात् पञ्चसन्त्यः।
86. Ibid: कृतिरिक्षा क्यं यत्निप्रृत्ति ेशति कृतिरिक्षा-सम्भवमेवात्।
87. P.1.4.49.
88. P.1.4.32.
According to him, substratum of the result is karman, while what is desired through the substratum of result, i.e., karman, is sampradāna. From the exposition of Sabra Swamī it is evident that karman and sampradāna are two different Kārikas. According to him recipient is more desired object even than the object (karman) which has been desired as the most desired.

Three kinds of popular sampradāna: While defining sampradāna Bhartrhari has pointed out the three main factors, namely, acceptance, prayer or stimulation and approval, which are responsible to persuade a man to perform the action of donation. Keeping in mind these three causes the later grammarians like Puruṣottamadeva, Bhattoji Diksita, Kaundabhatta, Nāgasa, etc. have contended that sampradāna is of three kinds. In support of their views they have quoted Bhartrhari's Kārikā in which he has pointed out the three causes of sampradāna.

These three kinds are: Anirākta - the recipient who does not decline or does not beg or gives his consent to the giver such as the Sun in the expression 'Sūryāya arghyaḥ dadāti (He gives oblation to the Sun); Preraka - when the recipient makes previous

89. Vy. Va., Caturthr, P.449: फलोत्सवययस्तयथपेति हि कर्मलयूँ फलसृष्टिविन्यास-

90. Sabarabhāṣya, & 9.1.6.,P.153: संप्रदायिन च नाम कौशिकापि हेतुसाक्षरार्थप-

91. Vf, 3.7.128.
93. Sk, 1.4.32, P.122.
94. VB, Subartha, P.218-19, VB, Subartha P.142.
95. LM, Subartha, P.1265, VSN 1.4.32, P.830.
request to the giver for gift, for example brahmin in the sentence
'Vipraya gām dadāti' (He gives a cow to brahmin); and ṇumatipur-
vaka - when the giver seeks permission from the recipient to make
gift, for instance teacher in the example 'Upādhyāyā gām
dadāti' (He gives a cow to his teacher).

**Technical Sampradāna**: According to this definition of Sampradāna
the designation Sampradāna is not possible in such instances as
'Devadattāya modakam rocate', 'Puṣpebhya sprhayati', etc. To
justify these instances Panini supplements his definition of
sampradāna by 1.4.33-37, 39,40,41. Regarding the designation
Sampradāna defined by these sūtras, Helārāja says that it is
technical sampradāna. Pointing out the purpose of these sūtras
Bhartrhari says that Panini's sūtras namely, 1.4.33, 34, etc.have
given the name sampradāna what would, otherwise, have been hetu,
karman or Sesa. Thus technical Sampradāna is the extension in the
realm of Hetu, Karman and Sesa.

**Extension in the realm of Hetu**: In the expression 'Devadattāya
rocate modakah' (the cake is appetising to Devadatta) the meaning
of the 'ruci' is a kind of desire that is caused by the cake. In
this connection the cake is the object of the desire of Devadatta.
The cake which is the object of the desire is prompted by Devadatta.
Thus in fact Devadatta here is a prompter and is therefore liable
to have the third case-ending by P.2.3.18. But Panini through
1.4.33 extends the term sampradāna to the person or thing that is

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97. Hel., FP., 3.7.30, P.335.

98. See Foot note 5.
satisfied in connection with the root 'ruch' and its synonymous
and thus in the above instance, Devadatta claims only dative case.
In this way it is an extension of sampradāna in the realm of Hetu.
Similarly, Devadatta in the expression 'Devadattāya slāghate' has satisfied the condition of Hetu but Pāṇini through 1.4.34 here also extends the name sampradāna to Devadatta. The Devadatta in the expression 'Devadattāya rādhyati Yksate va' is Hetu when the expression conveys the sense that Gaṅaka looks into the fate of Devadatta' because Devadatta is the prompter of Gaṅaka. But F.1.4.39 extends the sampradāna here also. Same is the case with Devadatta in the expression 'Mohanah Devadattāya gam pratisāṃnoti', āśāṃnoti'. In this example the sampradāna relation between the nominal stem 'Devadatta' and the verbal stem Šru preceded by 'Prati' presupposes that Devadatta had earlier made a request for a cow to Mohan. Thus Devadatta, being a prompter of Mohan to make donation, is Hetu. But Pāṇini through 1.4.40 enunciates that Kartā of the preceding sentence holds sampradāna relation with the verb 'Šru' preceded by the verbal prefix 'Prati' or an. This is why Devadatta in the above instance has dative case. From this

99. Hel. PP, 3.7.130, P.333: देवदात्य रोचे मोदकः 'हेत्त्या-काल्पृष्ठि-
लाबो रुचि प्रस्लनाय विविधक्षमामां नौकर देवदात् प्रवृते, तारियः कानू-
गुण्यातार्थाय ते हेतुवस्त्रयू यथावन्नत्यायू वायुस्वयमस्य देवदात्य क्राकापत्यायू व सम्प्रदानसंज्ञायू व।

Cf.ŚK, 1.4.33, P.123, VSŚN, 1.4.23, P.830. B33, Caturthi, P.693.

100. Hel, PP, 3.7.130, P.334: एव देवदात्य स्लापे वृत्त गुणः कण्स्म देवदातः
कान्यानि गुणान्यात्य तत्स्मातार्थार्थायस्यायोपित प्रवृत्तांभावो हेतुसंज्ञा प्राप्तां -
स्लामदेवः (1.4.34) हेत्त्या-प्राप्तां सम्प्रदानसंज्ञायू व।

101.Ibid देवदात्य राप्यति, हेतुते वृत्त तु देवं यथार्थार्थम् गणः देवदातः प्रवृते वृत्त हेतुवायू प्राप्तायू राम क्राकायू (1.4.34) वृत्त सम्प्रदानसंज्ञातः।

102. Nyāśa, 1.4.40, P.556, Hel.PP, 3.7.130, P.334,PM, 1.4.40,P.556.
B33, Caturthi, P.890.
explanation it is also evident that Pāṇini while describing the sentence structure has recognised that logical and derivational relation held between linguistic elements at morphological syntactic and discourse levels.

Extension in the realm of Karman: Like Hetu, Pāṇini has extended the realm sampradāna in the domain of karman also. For instance, when the expression 'Devadattāya rocate modakāh' conveys the sense 'the cake pleases Devadatta' Devadatta who is satisfied (Pṛyamāṇa) fulfils the condition of karman. But P.1.4.33 asserts the name sampradāna to one who is satisfied in connection with root 'ruch' and its synonymous and thus in the abovesaid example Devadatta becomes the sampradāna. In the same way Devadatta in the expression 'Devadattāya slaghate' is karman because it is Devadatta who is the case most desired through the action of 'Slaghe', but P.1.4.34 here also extends the name sampradāna. Similarly, P.1.4.37 has extended the name sampradāna in the domain of karman such as 'Devadattāya Trṣyati asūyati vā'. In these expressions Devadatta is karman because these verbs are transitive ones.


104. Hel, PF, 3.7.130, P.334: देवदत्तायं रोधवे दृष्टयास्यां देवदत्तं मोदन्त: प्रीण-कृत्यविहार: तत्ता च प्रीणकर्म संति विवेचनां तता कुमार्भायायं प्राप्तायाय।

समुदातिब्वधायाम: । / Prau.K., P.693, SK, 1.4.33, P.123, Va.Saḥ, Dhpraprabhā, P.10, VaŚā, 1.4.33, P.830, BhŚP, 885, BhŚ, P.693.

105. Hel, PF, 3.7.130, P.334: देवदत्तायं स्लाघते -- गुणालोकवेन वा शापमिस्व-भियो शापतानाम क्षात्रताहूः क्षितं स्लाघिकू ह (१.४.३४) इत्यादिनव

स्मृतसांसं खृष्टेऽच। / Prau.K., F.694, SK, 1.4.33, P.123, TB, 572, 637.

106. Nyāsa, 1.4.37, P.553: दहरो (क्रेश्या, क्षूर्या) सकृष्टाः तत्र ऊँचितायां प्राप्तायाम्।

Cf.PK, 1.4.37, P.554.
Extension in the realm of Sesa: Bhattoji Diksita, Nageso and Visveswara Suri have taken a different position in case of the expression 'Devadattaya rocate modakah'. They plead that when the sentence is to convey the sense in which the cake becomes the subject of the desire of Devadatta in this expression Devadatta comes within the range of Sesa, but P.1.4.33 prescribes the name sampradana to sesa in such cases. In the same way, in the example 'Devadattaya satah dharyati' Devadatta is Sesa, because Devadatta, a creditor (uttamarna) is the nimitta in 'dharyana' of money through the action of lending which is to be understood in the expression. Thus Devadatta is a nimitta of the 'dharyana' and so he is aKaraka. But at the same time he does not come in the purview of any specific Karaka. Therefore he is evidently to be considered as Sesa.

But P.1.4.35 extends the name sampradana to Devadatta in the above expression. Similarly in connection with the intransitive verbs Krudh and druht Devadatta is to be considered as Sesa in the sentences 'Devadattaya Krudhyati druhyati va', because intransitive verbs have neither karmen nor accomplished by any specific karaka. Thus P.1.4.37 extends the name sampradana to Devadatta in the above instances in the purview of Sesa.

107. SK, 1.4.33, P.123: क्या तू देवदास्य यो दिशाबोस्तिविधियों नवतीत्त्वस्वाता
क्रेन्त्वत्त्वमूया प्राप्ताया वकनम्।
Cf. BJR, P.693, VSBN, 1.4.33, P.830.

108. Hel, PP.3.7.130, P.334: 'देवदास्य शर महायति ' हित स्कृष्यत्वतिष्ठतावर्ण
मतस्तधारवत्त्वमनां यायति। बोधोक्तमांक देवदास्य त्रिव्रातप्रति निर्पितं
वायुत्त्वम्। यतं वदायि शर न व तत्र ददाति दिव्य सुखोऽद्वृक्तमान्ति
किं तत्र कारकेऽद्वृक्तमूया प्राप्तायां वायुत्त्वम्।' १.४.३४ हित समुदाय
वकनम्।
Cf. EM, 573, P.638.

109. Nyasa, 1.4.37, P.553: दवदास्य तत्र वृहत्यमकेते तत्र वृहत्यमकेते शुचिः प्राप्तायामकारम्:
Cf. EM, 1.4.37, P.554, EM, 575, P.640.
Helaraja, however, further asserts that when the speaker does not want to convey any particular relation between action and kāraka there would be scope for sēṣa in all cases from P.1.4.33 to P.1.4.41 except P.1.4.37. Thus to restrict the scope of sēṣa in these cases Pāṇini has formulated these Sūtras. Being so, it is clear that by prescribing sampradāna designation through the above-said Sūtras Pāṇini has restricted the scope of 'sēṣa ūṣāṇī' (2.3.50).

**Sampradāna and intransitive verbs:**

Non-application viewed: While being defined sampradāna has been presented as an accessory or means which is intended through the instrumentality of the object of any verb. Following this sense the designation sampradāna would be applicable only in the association of transitive verbs. Only the transitive verbs have distinct objects through which an agent can intend a recipient. From this one may have impression that P.1.4.32 fails to account the nomenclature sampradāna in connection with intransitive verbs such as 'patye sēte' (she lies down for her husband), 'yuddhaḥ sāmānyate' (he equips himself for battle), etc. which are not uncommon in Sanskrit literature. The other Sūtras prescribed to supplement P.1.4.32 are not in capacity to justify the designation sampradāna in reference to intransitive verbs. Therefore to justify the dative case endings in these instances another provision in the grammar of Pāṇini is required.

Corrective by Jñānendra Saraswati and its inadequacy: To account for the fourth case in 'patye sēte' etc. Jñānendra Saraswati has asser-

110. Hel., P1, 3.7.130, P.335: विशेषविवक्षया अभावे च चात्र स्तव्वमेव श्रिया-

निमित्तमात्राश्चेत्रणे शेषले प्राप्ते सम्प्राणात्तीजहायाः।
ted that there is no need of a separate provision. According to him, the usage like 'Patye sete', etc. have the sense of 'Patimantulayitumañ sete' (She lies down to win the favour of her husband) and thus they are valid according to the authority of P.2.3.14, i.e., the fourth case-affix is employed in denoting the object of that verb, which is suppressed in the sentence, and which has in construction therewith another verb, denoting an action, performed for the sake of the future action. But such suggestion provides only partial solution. When the sentence 'Patye sete' is used to convey the sense of 'Patimupasptya sete' the rule P.2.3.14. cannot solve the problem of justifying the fourth case-ending in this example, as in that case there is no action meant for another action.

Principle of Tadarthya and its drawbacks: To justify the dative case-endings in connection with intransitive verbs one may take the help of 'tadarthya', because the use of the dative case ending is accepted in case of tadarthya. Thus the numerous case of dative uncovered by P.1.4.32 can come under the principle of tadarthya. For instance, tadarthya is quite apparent in such expressions as 'Yaddhya samnayate' (he equips himself for the sake of battle) and 'Jatay sete' (she lies down for the sake of her husband). Hence, one is allowed to use dative case in such cases without caring about the designation of sampradāna.

However, in this regard two flaws have been pointed out by Dr. S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen. One of them is that all the case endings in connection with intransitive verbs cannot come

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under the domain of 'tādārthya', for instance, the dative case
to 'sraddha' in the expression 'sraddhāya Nigārhaṁ' (he speaks
with the disapproval of the 'sraddha - ceremony) is not in accor­
dance with the rule of tādārtha, because there is no question of
existing the notion of 'tādārthya'. The other drawbacks is that
in case of tādārthya the object bearing dative case remains no
longer Kāraka.

However, in the said example husband, battle, etc. are
Kārakas, because they play their respective role for the accom­
plishment of their actions. Thus they are meant for their actions.
Whereas in case of tādārthya the contrary position is understood,
i.e., actions are meant for husband, battle, etc. Thus the prin­
ciple of tādārthya cannot solve the problem of dative case­endings
in connection with intransitive verbs.

Kātyāyana's suggestion and its adoption by Bhoja and Nāgara: To
account for dative case-endings in connection with intransitive
verbs Kātyāyana has suggested that the word Kriyā (action) should
be added to the sutra P.1.4.32. Thereby the designation sampra­
dāna would also valid in connection with that person or thing
which is aimed at by the subject through the instrumentality of
the action he performs. Thus it would not wrong to justify the
designation sampradāna in the above cases, because husband, battle,
etc. are aimed at by their respective agents through the instru­
mentality of their actions they perform.

It may be that following Kātyāyana's suggestion Bhoja
expressively incorporates the word 'Kriyā' in the definition of


112 Joshi, S.D.; Roodbergen, J. F., Patanjali's Vyakarana
Mahābhāṣya, Karakahnika, P.110.

113. Mbh., 1.4.32, F.256: क्रियाग्रहणम्।

114. KV, 1.4.32, P.548: क्रियापि कस्मिन्द्रिति स सम्प्रदानम्।
Sampradāna and thus according to him what is intended by the agent through the instrumentality of karman or 'Kriyā' is called Sampradāna.

To justify the designation sampradāna in connection with intransitive verbs Nāgēsa has put forth a separate supplementary definition of sampradāna based on Kātyāyana's suggestion. According to this definition 'Uddesya' of intransitive verbs is also a sampradāna.

Kātyāyana's suggestion refuted: From the above discussion one might have an impression that Panini failed to notice the use of dative case in connection with the intransitive verbs. But according to Patanjali it is not the fact. This is why he has rejected the suggestion of Kātyāyana to add 'Kriyā' to P.1.4.32 to meet this new requirement, because the desired effect intended by the addition of the word Kriyā in the sūtra is already meant in Pāṇini's Sūtra by the use of the word karmanā. He has established this fact with the help of popular usages. In the worldly usage the word karman conveys the meaning of action in such example as 'kim karma karisyasi' (What action will you do?). Pāṇini himself uses the term karman in the sense of Kriyā. Thus it is evident that the word karman carries technical sense as well as the general sense, i.e., action. Thus according to Patanjali there is no need to supplement the word karmanā in P.1.4.32 by another word Kriyā.

Even now, it would be necessary to add the word 'Kriyā' along with Karmanā in P.1.4.32 as the latter in the sūtra can denote

115. Śāk, 1.1.56, F.17: कृत्तितत्तत्तिति स सम्प्रदातनां।
116. FLN, Kāraṅkṛitis, P.182: प्रकृतीचरित्रोदयस्य सम्प्रदातनात्मप।
117. Bhāṣā, 1.4.32, F.257: न वक्तव्यम्। कथम्? कथितम् ति नाम लोके कृत्तितात्मिति।
कर्मनां करिष्या ति कर्मेन करिष्यति।
Cf. FLN, 1.4.32, P.548.
118. P.1.3.14, 3.4.71, etc.
only technical sense and cannot convey the general meaning 'action' on account of the maxim 'Krtrimakrtrimayoh krtrame sampratyayo bhavati'. According to this maxim a technical meaning is to be preferred to the general meaning of a term in the 'Aṣṭādhyāyī'. Same is the position in the popular usage also. For instance, by the word 'Gopalaka', at first instance, the bearer of this name is known instead of the keeper of cows. In this position it becomes essential to incorporate the word 'Kriya' in the P.1.4.32.

Patañjali has, however, refuted this addition of the word Kriya by stating that Kriya is also a technical karman. Keeping in view the characteristic of karman, i.e., the most desired object to be reached by the agent through his action, the above-stated Patañjali's assertion seems at first glance to be improbable. In connection with intransitive verb there is no other action in comparison to which it is considered most desired, such as in the expression 'Patya Sete' there is only one action, namely, lying down. But Patañjali on the basis of psychological analysis of the process involved in an action has established that any action can become the most desired thing to be reached and thus capable of having the designation karman. He has put forth a logical sequence of an action thus: A perceptive person first conceives something by intellect, on conceiving it he wishes to have it, this wishing leads him to decide, on the decision efforts to attain it begin, thus by achieving the fruit he fulfils his desire. It is evident that in this process each succeeding stage becomes 'object' of its

119. Mbhṛ, 1.4.32, P.259: शास्त्रमणैरहिते, ऊज्जवलिः। कृतिनामाः कृतिनां समुपलयं समर्थिति।

Cf. PhK, 1.4.32, P.549.

120. Ibid, 1.1.22, P.255.
preceding stage, so there is no difficulty to accept an action as a technical karman. Following this explanation of Patanjali, Bhartrhari has also manifested the sadhanā of an action by arguing that seeing leads to desire, the latter to decision and decision to effort. That which was action before becomes the means in the next stage. As far as seeing is concerned, it is the self which must be considered to be special means.

Thus it is clear from the above discussion that an action in relation to understand process of actions is also a technical karman. Kaiyata, with the help of a concrete example 'Praviṣa pinḍīṃ', has made the point clear that there is no objection to accept the Kārakatva of anything in reference to understanding.

In this expression sweet meat is karman in relation to the action of eating which is not expressed but understood through context.

Later on, grammarians like Haradatta, Bhattoji Diksita, Nagesa and...

121. Mbh. 1.4.32, P. 257: फ्रियापिकृत्तिः कर्मम् । न सिद्धयति। 'कल्पितो पितातम्कर्मो' इत्यवस्थितम्। कर्मचन्द्र नाम फ्रियापिकृत्तिः सर्वस्य? फ्रियापिकृत्तिः पितातम्कर्मो भवति। कर्मचन्द्र नाम फ्रियापिकृत्तिः सर्वस्य? सत्त्वस्तिनिरस्तिः प्रार्थयति। पितातम्कर्मो फ्रियापिकृत्तिः सर्वस्य? प्रार्थयति।

122. W, 3.7.16-17. P. 244: अन्धकारेण प्रार्थयति व्यक्तमानान्तरात्। अन्धकारेण प्रार्थयति। प्रार्थयमानान्तरात्। प्रार्थयमानान्तरात्।

123. Fradh, 1.4.32, P. 257: प्रार्थयमानान्तरिक्षिकावतः कार्यावर्तेः पुर्बेन पितात्मकम्यो।
Visveswara Śūri have expressed the same view and by referring to P.2.3.14 they have also asserted that Pāṇini is of the same opinion on this point. Thus in the case of that action is technical karman there is no problem to justify the designation sampradāha in connection with intransitive verbs on account of P.1.4.32. This is why, Patanjali has rejected the addition of 'Kriyā' in the sūtra P.1.4.32. Bhartrhari has also proved the redundancy of the addition of Kriyā in P.1.4.32. Firmly standing by Patanjali he has observed that when difference is meant to be conveyed each succeeding action becomes the object of the preceding one and that is why the mention of kriyā has not been made.

Accepting the fact that action is a technical karman, Helārāja has refuted the addition of 'Kriyā' in P.1.4.32. He states that Kriyā is a technical karman when it is intended through 'Samdarsana', etc. In other words, when the action in a sentence has been cognised as having parts the succeeding stage becomes karman in respect to preceding one. In this stage the action lying down in the sentence 'Fatye sete' being the object of the actions 'samdarsana', etc. becomes a ground of 'Fati' having designation sampradāha and, consequently, there is no need to make another provision to justify the designation sampradāha in connection with intransitive verbs in addition to P.1.4.32.

127. VSSN, 1.4.32, P.829.
128. P.2.3.14: क्रियायोऽपपदस्य च कर्मेण स्था नित्यः।
129. WP, 3.7.131: पदस्य च कवित्वायं पूर्वव पुत्र एव क्रियां प्रतिः।
परस्याद्वृक्त्य कपित्वान् क्रियागुणं कृत्यः।
130. Hel.PP., 3.7.131, P.335:
Refutation involves technical sense: Helārāja has, however, further asserted that the refutation of the addition of Kriyā in the above-said way is only possible when the term sampradāna is considered not to conform with its derivational sense. In case of its being etymologically significant it would be necessary to entertain the addition of Kriyā to the sūtra to justify such expression as 'Patye sete' etc. The same view has been put forth by Haradatta, Bhāttoji Dīksita and Jhānendra Saraswatī.

Even in case of its having etymological significance Jinendrabuddhi has tried to refute the addition of kriyā in P.1.4.32. According to him, the preverbs 'Abhi' and 'pra' in P.1.4.32 are extravagant and being so they convey the additional meaning in this sūtra, as it has been discussed in the previous pages. Therefore on the basis this assumption the usages such as 'Patye sete' become justified on the authority of P.1.4.32. Thus there is no purpose of adding 'Kriyā' in the P.1.4.32. In reference to this explanation one may question how it is assumed that the extravagant meaning generated by the preverbs 'abhi' and 'pra' stands to cover the sense conveyed by the addition of 'kriyā' or to conduct the nomenclature sampradāna in connection with intransitive verbs. The preverbs 'abhi' and 'pra' are nowhere seen conveying the sense. To satisfy

131. Hel.PF., 3.7.131, P.335: वदातिकग्रंथयं विशेषनं न भूती झिक्ले।
132. FM, 1.4.32, P.549: एवमपि क्रिया-रूपान्तः कर्त्तव्यम्, वदाति कर्त्तात्।
133. SK, 1.4.32, P.121: न केवल-वदातिक-कर्त्तव्य-क्रिया-रूपान्तः कर्त्तात्।
134. TB, 570, P.635: न केवल-वदातिक-कर्त्तात्-क्रिया-रूपान्तः कर्त्तात्।
135. Supra, p.325.
136. Nyāsa, 1.4.32, P.548: तव तत्वं नन्त्यातिक-कर्त्तव्य-क्रिया वद-कृत्यकालश्च-मन्निरोगश्च। रैल क्रियान्ति वानिषुपरि तस्यापि सम्प्रदानं न सिद्धाभवति।
this question Jinendrabuddhi has asserted that this particular sense is to be understood on the basis of usages like 'Fatye sête', etc. found in the language of erudites (Siśṭhā) and the unbroken tradition of the grammarians-preceptors.

From the argument of Jinendrabuddhi, however, it is clear that his assumption of refuting the addition of Kriyā has forced him to make such far-fetched and extremely artificial interpretation which seems to be based on supposition. Thus in case of its having etymological significance it would be necessary to accept the addition of Kriyā in P.1.4.32. to justify the designation sampradāṇa in connection with intransitive verbs.

**Difficulty of overlapping of the term solved:** When the addition of Kriyā is included in P.1.4.32, there would be scope to designate 'Cdana' as sampradāṇa in the expression 'Cdana pacati', because the rice is intended by the agent through his action of cooking and it would result in an undesired usage 'Cdana pacati'. One meets with the same inaccuracy when the addition of 'Kriyā' is rebutted on the facts that the term sampradāṇa is not etymologically significant and the kriyā falls within the purview of technical karmā. In that state what is aimed at by the agent through his action becomes sampradāṇa, as the term karmā in the P.1.4.32 implies the sense of Kriyā. Therefore, one might object that meat and rice in the expressions 'kaṭāṃ karoti' and 'odanaṃ pacati' respectively would be taken as the dative case as they are aimed at by their agent through the instrumentality of actions and thus the term sampradāṇa would be result in overapplication.

137. Nyāsa, 1.4.32, P.548: तद्दशस्त्रविशालविचाराचाया कथा रस्यांपदेशम्
विशेषवागतिप्रियश्चि
However, there is no chance for the overapplication of the term sampradāna in the above instances as Bhartrhari observes that when the community of actions is looked upon as a single unit the object connected with that action is known by its own name, i.e., karman. In the aforesaid cases the action of making, cooking, etc. are not perceived as having their parts. Consequently, there is no chance of their being considered as technical karman. Therefore the object desired by such actions as having the form of unity cannot be designated as sampradāna. It would be known only by its own name. Thus there is no question of overapplication of the term sampradāna in the above-said cases. To avert the problem of overapplication of the term sampradāna Kaiyata, Bhattoji Dīksita, Nāgesa and Visveswara Sūri have also expressed the same view as that of Bhartrhari which in turn is based on the observation of Patañjali.

In case of addition of Kriyā in P.1.4.32 Bhattoji Dīksita has put forth a solution to avoid the overapplication of the term sampradāna in case of 'Odanam Pacati', etc. He points out that as the Vārttika is intended to cover only the cases of intransitive verbs like 'ṣete', 'āste', etc. there is no question of overlapping of the term in the usages like 'Odanampacati', 'katam karoti', etc. because the verbs cooking, making etc. are transitive ones. The view...

138. VP, 3.7.132, P.336: "कियाणां युज्याये तु को कर्मणु विकाले लम्। कता कर्म कियायोगात् स्वाध्येकौवधे।"

139. Prātipā, 1.4.32, P.257.
140. ŚK, 1.4.32, P.121.
141. Prātipoddyyota, 1.4.32, P.257.
142. Vēṣṇ, 1.4.32, P.829.
143. ŚK, 1.4.32, P.121: "नैवं वासिइं वासिइं ककस्म, कियायोगात्सारान्निमाकाविषयं, प्राप्तविज्ञानानाथार स्व प्रेतः।"
of Bhattoji Dīkṣita is confirmed by Jñānendra Saraswati.

In connection with the principle of 'bhedābheda-vivākṣā' which is put forth to solve the problem of overapplication of the term sampradāna, a question may arise, namely, what is the criterion to determine the nature of action in a particular instance as to its having parts or unity. Following the speaker's intention there is chance of anomaly in the application of the terms sampradāna and karmā, as they depend entirely upon 'bhedābheda-vivākṣā' of an action. To avert this irregularity Bhartrhari has asserted that the 'bhedābheda-vivākṣā' of an action depends upon its own nature. In other words it follows the worldly usages. Thus there is no question of confusion in the application of both the above-said terms as the 'bhedābheda-vivākṣā' of an action is postulated according to usages found in the language of erudit (siṣṭa) or explained in the science of grammar. Kāyāṭa has expressed the same view by contending that the 'bhedābheda-vivākṣā' of an action pursues the usages prevalent in tradition. Haradatta and Nārāyaṇa Bhatta in regard to this point have closely followed Kāyāṭa who

144. TB, 570, F.635: परमेश्वर इत्यादिकेऽस्मातः साक्षात्स्य निर्देशकायाः कौशिक्याः वाचितवयो वाक्यविध्यप्रस्तुतिः।
145. WP, 3.7.133, F.336: भैरवविलक्रमाय व स्वाभावक व्यवस्थिता।
146. Hal,Fr,3.7.133,F.336: तौलिक्यपूर्णः प्रसिद्ध दति त्वुदिश्यत्वा वास्तवाने यथा प्रयोगमूलपिनिर्दिष्टपथम् निर्देशदेशविकेशोऽस्मैव।
147. Fradd, 1.4.32, F.257: सा च भैरवविलक्रमां प्रयोगस्तेष्वेत्त नियत-विषय श्रीमे।
148. PK, 1.4.32, F.547: प्रयोगस्तेष्वेत्त नियत-विषय यथा।
149. SKA, Hṛdayahārini, 1.1.56.
in turn follows the view of Bhartrhari. Thus the worldly usage is the determinant factor in deciding where an action is to be conceived as having parts or as a whole entity. Hence there is no question of antinomy between the two terms, namely, karman and sampradāna.

With the device of the principle of 'bhedabhedavivakṣa', which is subject to the worldly usages', the destination of the verbs involving movement can be sampradāna and karman accordingly as the action is to be conceived on the basis of usages as having parts or as a whole entity. Therefore, there remains no purpose to prescribe the optional use of the second and fourth case-endings to the objects of the actions having the sense of motion in P.2.3.12. Bhartrhari has expressively accepted that with the help of the principle of 'bhedabhedavivakṣa' there is no discrepancy in respect of the objects of the verbs having the sense of motion.

Similarly following the 'abhedavivakṣa' there is no difficulty in justifying the restricted sphere of P.2.3.12, i.e., 'Nādhvani'. This is why Bhartrhari has further asserted that if both the names (sampradāna and karman) were optionally possible everywhere, the approval and rejection of the sūtra (.2.3.12) would not have the same effect. The observation of Bhartrhari absolutely follows the Patanjali's rejection of P.2.3.12. Had Patanjali not adopted the principle of 'bhedabhedavivakṣa' which follows the worldly usage he would have not rejected the P.2.3.12, because in the

150. W, 3.7.133, P.336: क्षयत्त्वत्त्वमेति व्यापिकारो न दृश्यल ।
151. Ibid, 3.7.134: विक्षेर्नेव सबिंश च स्यालाम्युषयेण यदि ।
ब्राह्मणान्त् योगस्य प्रत्यावर्त्यां समं भैव् ।
case of speaker's intention it would play a role of a restrictive rule (Niyamartha). In other words, this very rule indicates that both kinds of intention are only possible in connection with the action involving movement. Thus the rejection of P.2.3.12 by Patanjali shows that he has also accepted the principle of 'bhedabhedavivakṣa' based on the worldly usage to settle the problem where an action is to be conceived as having parts and where not.

Following the principle of 'bhedabhedavivakṣa' it may be said that the roots comprising motion are in capacity to have both kinds of intention, i.e., 'bhedabhedavivakṣa', such as 'ग्रामम् grāmam grāmāya gacchati', the intransitive verbs are always thought of as having parts (bhedavivakṣa) such as ब्राह्मण निगधाने brahman nigāhate, the transitive actions are viewed as unity or whole (abhedavivakṣa), for instance 'विद्या प्रविष्टिः vidyā param pravistih', and the exceptions introduced in P.2.3.12 such as 'हनसा पतालिपत्ति हनसा hanasa patalipatati hanasa', etc. are also always taken as without having previous stages. Thus there is no difficulty to justify these usages even when the P.2.3.12 is discarded or dispensed with.

However, in case of its (P.2.3.12) approval there would be a chance of applying the fourth case-endings also in the unwarranted domain along with the desired use of second case-ending.

152. Hel.P.1, 3.7.134: पेदमेधदिहियाण्योऽन्त्वाय निवितां निश्चयनिर्देशा ता विकालात्मकसंस्कारस्तु निष्पादो न प्रत्यावर्तित। प्रस्तावते हत्यमित्रसह स्वादु। यदा तु च विकालात्मकस्य निर्देशं माध्यमार्गस्य स्पुर्षाति तदार्थस्य प्रत्यावर्त्त्यात्मार्गं विकृतं नानां सुकृतं यथा प्रत्यावर्तित।

153. ibid. तदेवं गत्याविषयं विक्षरं वर्ष। चाद्रायं निर्गमितं हत्येत्तत्त्वो तु पेद- विकृतं च विद्यामात्मित्यान्यात्मकेवलर्विकृतं। वेदायात्मानत्तरत्त्वत्तक्तुस्कार्यायो- रम्यानात्मित्यान्यात्मकेवलर्विकृतं, कस्य पाटलिपुरं गच्छत्यात्मानं गच्छति।
For example, the woman and the goat in the expression 'strīyam gacchati' and 'ajam nayati' are in capacity to claim fourth case-ending also according to P.2.3.12. To restrict these undesired uses, Katyāyana suggests to modify this rule as: 'asamprāpta karmāṇi dvitiyā caturthyāv bhavataḥ'. Here 'asamprāpta' means what is not connected with the action of reaching (gamana). Now there is no scope for the application of the term sampradāna in above cases, as the woman and goat are samprāpta karmāṇa. Following this device there is no need to read 'adhvan' as exception in P.2.3.12, because 'adhva' in the expression 'adhvanam gacchati' being a samprāpta karmāṇa has no power to claim forth case-ending. In regard to this, Bhartrhari has observed that in case of the object of going which is said to be contacted (āsthita) action has two aspects: abandoning the spot which has already been reached and contact of what has yet to be reached. Thus road in the above example is the continuous process of the action of living the spot which has been covered and tries to reach the spot which has not yet been covered. Thereby here road is not thought of as something for which the action of going is meant. It is thought of as something to be covered by the action of going and thus it becomes only karmāṇa and not sampradāna. This argument holds good only in regard to the road which is going to be covered and not true in the case where

154. Mbhā, 2.3.12., P.496: सिद्ध त्वसंप्राप्तेनकर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्मचतुर्विधोऽसमप्राप्तेति कर्म�
road is not contacted (anāsthita). Such as in the example "Utpathena paṭhimāṇa gacchati, Paṭhegacchati". In this example one reaches the right road by going along the wrong one and it is not contacted with the action and, consequently, the word denoting the right road would take the second and fourth case-endings optionally.

Thus with this discussion it is obvious that in case of its approval one has to read something more as is evident from the suggestion made by Kātyānā, namely, Siddhāṃ twasamprāptavacanāt, 'adhvanāscāntāpavādah' and 'āsthitapratīṣedha', for the justification of above said usages. In case of its rejection there is no difficulty to vindicate such usages as are put forth as example of P.2.3.12 on the ground of the principle of 'bhedābheda-vivakṣa'.

Concluding this discussion it can be said that there stands no problem in the way of justifying the designation sampradāṇa in connection with intransitive verbs according to P.1.4.32 provided that the term sampradāṇa is understood as non-significant one. In case of its etymologically significant one has to include an addition, namely, Kriyā, in the P.1.4.32 to justify the designation sampradāṇa in reference to intransitive verbs. As earlier pointed out that in Pāṇini's system the term sampradāṇa is non-significant one there is no question of making any provision except P.1.4.32 in Pāṇini's system to meet with the designation sampradāṇa.

158. Hel, 3.7.135, F.338: कत्वनारतिस्थीतो व्याख्या तत्र देव विभक्तिः।
यथावचारतिः प्रख्याति पञ्चायाः पद्ये गच्छति, पञ्चायां गच्छति।

159. Ibid: प्रत्यास्वाते तु विभाज्यानिमांतीयेङ्ग सिद्धम्।
in relation to intransitive verbs.

Sampradāna expressed: In the surface structure of Sanskrit the designation sampradāna according to syntactic agreement is expressed by the fourth case-ending when it is not expressed by 'tīf', 'krt', etc. Such as 'Vipra' in the sentence 'Vipra yā gām dadāti'. As it is expressed by the suffix like 'āniyar' it takes nominative case (Prathama) to express the nominal stem (Pratipadikārtha) on the strength of P.2.3.46, such as in the sentence 'Dāniyo Viprah' (the brahmin whom something is given). In this sentence sampradāna has already been expressed by the suffix 'āniyar' (3.3.113) and hence it invites only nominative case inspite of dative.

Redundancy of sampradāna on the ground of tādarthya answered: It has been said that what is aimed at by the agent through the instrumentality of object or action is called sampradāna and the motive behind defining it is only to explain the deep syntactic structure of Sanskrit. The item bearing the name sampradāna claims dative case-endings for its manifestation in the surface structure of Sanskrit language. Thus the main purpose of defining the term sampradāna is only to indicate the driving force of the fourth case-endings. Nonetheless it cannot be claimed that the dative case-endings are altogether accordingly with this device. For instance, the dative cases from 'Yūpa', etc. in the expression 'Yūpya daru' (wood is meant for pole) etc. are not in accordance with P.2.3.13.
In this expression pole is not sampradāna as it is not intended by the karman or kriyā of an agent. To account the dative case in pole, Kātyāyana has suggested that 'tādarthya' is added to P.2.3.13 for the enjoining of fourth case-ending.

If the addition suggested by Kātyāyana is accepted for the approbation of such usages as 'Yūpaya dāru', etc. there remains no purpose to read sampradāna in P.2.3.13, because the dative endings in such expressions as "Upādhyāyā gām dādāti", etc. would also come within the range of the term tādarthya. In this expression the donation of cow is meant for the welfare of teacher and thus the notion tādarthya does exist here. Following this possibility one may contend that there would be no need to define sampradāna in P.1.4.32. The purpose of dative case-endings in such cases would be served by the addition. But this would be possible only when the term sampradāna is considered etymologically significant. In case of its not being conform to derivational sense one shall have to add the word sampradāna in P.2.3.13 to explain such usages as 'Jātrave praharatyāstram', etc., and therefore it becomes necessary to define sampradāna.

Helarāja has, however, refuted abovesaid possibility even in the case the term sampradāna is accepted as having its etymological sense. According to him, recipient is meant for the accomplishment of an action of donation and not vice versa, because sampradāna in its capacity of being a kāraka is meant to perform an action.

164. Mbhā, 2.3.13, P.497: chakbāvāntānā tādādyān upasātyānām ||

165. Ibid: 2.3.12, P.498: yadi tādādyān upasātyānām kīkhyā tathārthā: sampradaṇgaśāhān ||

11. हुस्तापुष्पायाय नौसिक्को उपाध्यायायः स्थतिः || तत्र तादाध्ये इत्येक सिद्धः ||

Cf.PK, 2.3.13, P.167, VB, P.142.
further adds that it cannot be denied that the object being given such as cow in the above expression is meant for the recipient, i.e., teacher, but it would be wrong to assert that the action of donation is for the sake of recipient. In other words the agent performs action not for the sake of recipient but for himself, such as in the said sentence cow is given to please the teacher for his own interest. In this way there is no question of tādarthya between the action of donation and the recipient, i.e., teacher in the above example. Therefore, the dative case-ending to teacher does not come within the purview of the addition. The view put forth by Ḥalārāja has been adopted by Brhaṭṭoja Diksita and Kaundabhatta in the way of verbatim and substantially by Kalyāṇa, Nāgessa, Jhānendra Sarasvatī, etc. Thus, to explain the fourth case-ending in the above expression it becomes essential to read sampradāna in P.2.3.13 and thereby it is also necessary to define the term sampradāna in P.1.4.32.

The reading of sampradāna in P.2.3.13 is inevitable, because the designation sampradāna is not confined only to 1.4.32. It is also defined further in P.1.4.33-36, 38-41 and 44 and, therefore, to manifest that designations in surface structure in

166. Ḥel, PP, 3.7.129, P.332: दानक्रियाः ति सम्प्रदानय, न तु दानक्रिया तद्यथा कार्याणां क्रियायेश्चतातु सम्प्रदानार्थं तु हृदयान्तः कर्तितं वाक्यार्थेषुमात्राया दानक्रियाः क्तातदः यथार्थस्तु तत्स्यथा चचार्था क्रियायो तद्यथा सम्प्रदानाः न्यात्या।
167. 3K, 1.4.32, F.122.
168. VB, Subarthanirnaya, P.142.
169. Pradīpa, 2.3.13, F.498.
170. LSS, Caturthī, F.719.
171. TB, 570, F.635-36.
such cases as 'Puspebhyo sprhayati', 'Devadattaya rocate' etc. The reading of sampradāna in the Sūtra P.2.3.13 is necessary. Similarly, the definition of sampradāna said by P.1.4.32 is, too, necessary due to the other reasons. To understand the intended sense of the term sampradāna in 2.3.61 and 3.4.73 it becomes necessary to define it already. The replacement of the term in these Sutra by tādarthya would not solve the purpose adequately. To defend Panini it may also be said that it is not legitimate to rebut Panini's Sutras on the ground of Katyāyana's vārttika which are composed afterwards the Sutra. It is also said to justify the P.1.4.32 that as the sampradāna is traditionally accepted a Kāraka it would be proper on the part of Panini to define sampradāna while he defines the other kārakas like anādāna, karaṇa, etc.

The possibility of discarding the P.1.4.32 and P.2.3.13 arises only when the vārttika in question is accepted to justify the such usages as 'Yūpaya dāru', etc. But Patanjali has set aside the need of formulating such addition as suggested by Katyāyana. In that case there is no chance of such postulations as are put forth above. Patanjali has asserted that Panini in his 2.1.36 has accepted that the notion of tādarthya is expressed by the dative case-endings and, consequently, it becomes useless to accept this addition. Jīnendrabuddhi also follows the suit. According to him,

172. MBhā, 2.3.13, कन्यu सम्प्रदानं गृहं करण्यं | यज्ञ-देश त्रिपीति सम्प्रदानसः करण्यं |


175. MBhā, 2.3.13, F.498: एष्य आद्यान्तविश्लेषणाति - 'वित्तिः स्त्रियावदेन योगे चक्षूरी श्रवणी श्रवणी, कतयं चक्षुरिं तद्धर्षिः - हति तत्तयेऽस्त्रियावदेन सह समां सारसिति |
through splitting the P.2.1.36 as 'Caturthī' and 'tādarthārthavali-hitasukharaksitai', it becomes obvious that Pāṇini has recognised the dative case-ending to express the notion of tādarthya.

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176. Nyāsā, 2.3.13, P.167: तेन प्रकृतिपादनम् - 'चतुर्थी' इति योगविभाग: फऱ्डे, तेन ताद्यथेष्व चतुर्थीं भवतीति । अथवा - 'चतुर्थीं' तद्विधिविधकारकानिधिः इति ताद्यथेष्व चतुर्थीं: सवा मयं ताद्यथेष्व भवति ताद्यथेष्व रिपि चतुर्थींति ।